LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW
This is a peer reviewed annual research publication published by the Military Academy of Lithuania in co-operation with the University of Vilnius and the Vytautas Magnus University. The main objective of this publication is to provide the readers with a wide-scale analysis and generalization of the changes, both essential and significant, for the national security of Lithuania at the international–systemic, regional, and national levels. The yearbook also aims to give maximum emphasis to the specificity of Lithuanian national security issues and comprehensively present them to a widely interested and concerned audience.
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Preface

The Strategic Research Center of the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania presents its readers with the ninth volume of the “Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” devoted to actualities and problems of the security policy of Lithuania, Europe and the world in 2010–2011. Continuing the established tradition, we have classified the content of this issue into four principal parts.

The first part, called “The Global International System and Lithuania”, comprises three works. Dick Krickus, in his article “Barack Obama and Security in the East Baltic Sea Region” discusses and dissipates some of the concerns voiced in the Baltic States that after Barack Obama has become President of the USA, the commitments of Washington to the security of the Baltic States may become less firm. In her article “The conception of the ‘new wars’: a question of validity”, Berta Jasiukėnaitė critically explores the conception of the “new wars” that has become famous during the recent decade. The authors of the conception claim that conventional interstate wars have no perspective, while the nature of violence has in essence changed. The author maintains that the substantiation of the conception is doubtful because it lacks a historical dimension; besides, it is based on the imprecise interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas and unverified theoretical assumptions. The third article, “The Impact of the US Military Transformation on North Korean Defense Policy”, was written by Karolis Aleksa, who, on the basis of the analysis of the conventional balance between the USA and North Korea, presents the interpretation of the USA’s possibilities to force North Korea to renounce the building of nuclear weapons.

The second part of the publication – “The Changing European Security Space” – consists of two studies. The first one touches upon the consequences on the European Union of the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon. Rolandas Kačinskas, in his study “The New Service of European External Actions: Between the Ambition and the Compromise”, seeks to ascertain whether the amendment of the essential EU legal act truly signals a new stage of the institutionalization of EU foreign policy which could guarantee the consistency and harmony of EU common and security policy. The second article of this part of the publication, “Europeanization Trends of the Foreign and Security Policy of the Baltic States”, was written by Gražina Miniotaitė. She attempts to treat the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States through the prism of the Europeanization conception. By linking Europeanization with loyalty to EU norms and the construction of the European identity, the author analyzes the EU influence on the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States while they were aspiring towards EU membership and after they became members of the EU.

Three original studies make up the third part of the publication titled “Lithuania’s Eastern Neighborhood”. Virgilijus Pugačiauskas in his article “The Military Doctrine of Russia and Practical Realities” surveys the most impor-
tant strategic document regulating the military policy of Russia: the Military Doctrine of 2010 and its practical implementation. He explores the essential characteristics of the doctrine and compares it with previous doctrines. Daivis Petraitis, in his article “The Russian Military Reform 2005–2015”, extensively discusses the goals of the reform now being executed in the armed forces of Russia, the peculiarities of the reform stages, the predicted result and also the ways that the political command of Russia intends to apply in order to achieve that result. Vyachaslau Pazdnyak’s article “The Rise and Fall of Belarus’ Geopolitical Strategy” aims at tracing the trajectory of the change of Belarus’ foreign policy strategy in the twenty-first century as well as several of its decisive moments. Particular attention is paid to the issue dealing with how the severe measures undertaken by President Aleksandras Luka enka at the end of 2010 against the internal opposition have affected the mechanism of Belarus’ balancing between Russia and the West that has been in force for more than a decade.

In the fourth part of the “Review”, urgent some aspects, problems and cases of Lithuanian national security are traditionally analyzed. This time our readers have the opportunity to get acquainted with two studies. Vaidutis Laurėnas, in his analysis “The Reform of Higher Education in Lithuania and the Actualities of National Security”, while emphasizing the interaction of higher education and national security, critically assesses the higher education reform now under way in Lithuania and underlines the necessity to follow, in the course of the reform, the strategy of consecutive and gradual reforms. Rolanda Kazlauskaitė-Markelienė and Audronė Petrauskaitė, in their article “Civil Society and National Security: a Theoretical Survey of the Problem”, supply a theoretical analysis of the interaction between the state national security policy and the civil society and seek to discover the causes of the contradictions arising from this interaction.

We wish our readers a pleasant and productive engagement with the new research results provided here. Please note that this and previous volumes of the “Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” are available at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania website at all times. We are also pleased to mention that the circle of partners of the “Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” is continuing to further expand. Starting with this edition, alongside our traditional partner, the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius, the care for the preparation of the publication will now be shared by the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. Thus, starting with this edition, the “Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” is a joint publication of as many as three universities.

Vilnius, July 2011

Editorial Board
Global International System and Lithuania
Barack Obama and Security
In the East Baltic Sea Region

This paper addresses a number of fears that prevail in the East Baltic Sea Region about Washington’s commitment to their security under the administration of Barack Obama. While indicating that the Obama White House may have been cavalier about such concerns, they are unjustified. For example, the new anti-ballistic system that the U.S. intends to deploy in Europe is superior to the one favoured by the Bush Administration. Obama’s campaign to reset relations with Russia is good for Europe. And Obama has demonstrated that while he seeks to enhance the image of the U.S. in the world through a display of soft power, he has been resolute in applying hard power in Afghanistan where Russia has been a helpful partner. In conclusion, the Central and East European nations should join the U.S. in its quest to reset relations with Russia although there is no guarantee that it will be a success. Russia in turn must reconcile its differences with the countries in the East Baltic Sea region if it hopes to achieve fruitful relations with the West. At the same time, the EU must develop an energy security program that meets both the needs of the energy producing and energy consuming nations. As yet, this has not happened. Hopefully, it will as the EU takes the measures necessary to respond to the various economic and political challenges that threaten the European Project. The CEE states can rely upon the support of the U.S. but to deny any hostile foreign power the opportunity to compromise their security, they must address problems of corruption within their societies and reconcile points of discord with their neighbours.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, leaders in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) became preoccupied with hard security threats. They observed that Russian tanks were on the move in Europe for the first time since the Cold War while Moscow had wrested territory from a sovereign state. They noted with dismay that the most powerful NATO members, including the United States, blistered the Kremlin with harsh words but not tough actions. Granted Georgia was not a NATO member but it was in the “waiting room” so to speak and was deserving of NATO’s protection. As a consequence of NATO’s...
tepidal response to “Russian aggression”, CEE analysts asked if their countries were attacked, would Article Five be invoked in their defense.

Doubts about security were most evident in the East Baltic Sea region where the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and the Poles shared borders with Russia. They were “on the front lines,” and frequently excoriated by Kremlin hardliners for their “anti-Russian policies.” Military doctrine that justified force to protect Russians living in the former Soviet space was unsettling. Simultaneously they complained about Russia exploiting its energy assets to compromise their economies and to subvert their democracies. On many occasions they were victims of other hostile actions like being subjected to cyber-attacks. But what unnerved them most of all were Russian units conducting offensive military exercises on their borders. In response they urged their American and European allies to recall Carl Bildt’s observation that the best measure of Russia’s intentions were how well or poorly it treated the Baltic democracies.

While pondering NATO’s commitment to their security, they were most concerned about the United States since it was the alliance’s premier military power. It was with some anxiety then that they witnessed the 2008 transition of authority in Washington. Unlike their neighbors to the West, they greeted Barack Obama’s election with apprehension for they had enjoyed close relations with George W. Bush’s presidency. Likewise, they frequently met with Republican Party operatives in the region who helped craft their foreign policy agendas. Among other things, they were encouraged to support U.S. unilateralist foreign adventures and to serve on the front lines in NATO enlargement drives eastward. They accepted claims that Republicans were more resolute than Democrats in their relations with the Kremlin even though there was considerable evidence to challenge that notion. For example, Bush’s naı̈ve claim that he looked into Vladimir Putin’s soul and liked what he saw; his not taking direct action against Russia’s invasion of Georgia; and his not facilitating that embattled country’s march toward NATO membership after Georgia’s independence was placed in jeopardy.

Nonetheless, soon after Obama was elected president, many CEE commentators expressed concern about his administration’s commitment to their security. They cited three reasons for their apprehension:

- Obama scrapped the anti-ballistic missile system that George W. Bush had earmarked for Eastern Europe. They saw this as a victory for Moscow and were outraged that the White House did not even bother to alert them about a decision that so profoundly involved their security.

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1 The Five Day War was cited by many Western commentators as evidence that a new cold war had begun. For example, see Claire Bigg, “Georgia Woes Could Send Ripple Through Other Frozen Conflict,” RFE/RL, August 27, 2008.

• Obama’s pledge to re-set relations with Russia and his eagerness to cooperate with the Kremlin to obtain a nuclear-free world was evidence that another Yalta was in the works.
• Obama’s promise to address security problems with soft and not hard power demonstrated that he was irresolute in projecting U.S. military might. A weak president, in turn, made America’s European allies more vulnerable to Russian pressure.

This paper will assess the claims in question, demonstrate that they are largely unjustified and provide conclusions regarding the East Baltic Sea Region’s security threats from the U.S. vantage point.

1. Scrapping Bush’s Anti-Missile System in Eastern Europe

On December 13, 2001 President George W. Bush announced the United States was withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Presumably this would pave the way for a U.S. National Missile Defense System (NMD). It would be comprised of three legs—one in Alaska, another one in California and a third in Eastern Europe. In the last case, the project consisted of a radar system in the Czech Republic and anti-missile rockets in Poland. Bush answered protests from Moscow that NMD compromised their nuclear arsenal by indicating that the East European system was small and incapable of nullifying Russia’s huge nuclear strike force. Indeed, it was designed to deal with rogue states like North Korea and Iran that represented a more limited nuclear threat to the United States and its allies.

Officials in Moscow refused to accept Bush’s assessment of the project. Their fears about his motives were reinforced by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was issued in 2002. According to press reports, this classified document stressed the three interrelated components of the NPR.³

• Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (and the addition of accurate conventional munitions with the destruction capacity of a small nuclear weapon) to deter or preempt rogue nations and movements that threatened the U.S. with WMD.
• The adoption of a national missile defense system that would prevent rogue states like Iran or Northern Korea from raining rockets on the United States and its allies.
• Lastly, a wholesale upgrading of the U.S. national security infrastructure to make it a more efficient and effective force.

For the Russian side the conjoining of Bush’s missile initiative with the NPR provided plausible evidence that the Americans were striving for a first strike capability. Some American analysts supported this dark conclusion. The Union of Concerned Scientists produced a paper that portrayed the NPR in a much more provocative light and two American analysts concluded that the United States had the capacity to launch a first strike against Russia without fear of being devastated by a returning second strike.

Bush ignored Moscow’s complaints, indicating that the system could not nullify Russia’s huge nuclear strike force. Furthermore, he promised to provide it with detailed information about the project. Still, Russian analysts were not unmindful of an important observation: Bush’s Vice-President, Dick Cheney, and his Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld, were long-time and articulate supporters of NMD and they scorned arms control initiatives and instead set their sights on U.S. military dominance. Consequently, Russian defense planners eagerly awaited their exit from the American political stage.

While a candidate for president Obama indicated that he had grave reservations about deploying a system that did not work to deal with a threat—Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal—that had not yet existed. As president he announced on September 17, 2009 that the American missile project in Eastern Europe had been scrapped in favor of a new system that would be deployed first at sea and later in the air and on land with the explicit purpose of meeting the threat of short and intermediate range Iranian missiles. His announcement prompted a fire-storm of criticism within the United States and in Eastern Europe. Here, his detractors said, was evidence that he was backing down in the face of pressure from Moscow and in the process was compromising the security of Washington’s CEE allies.

Several former Eastern and Central European leaders including Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa and Valdas Adamkus—all who had played a vital role in their country’s drive for independence and democracy—wrote a letter to Obama expressing their reservations about his decision. Specifically, they expressed grave doubts about Washington’s commitment to the security of the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania. For these leaders Bush’s project did not directly protect their societies against a “foreign” attack but it placed American

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3 For insight into the men and women who would play a pivotal role in crafting foreign policy in George W. Bush’s administration, see James Mann, Rise Of The Vulcans, New York: Penguin Books, 2004.

personnel in the line of fire. In short, Washington’s pledge to honor Article Five of the NATO Treaty would take on greater weight were Americans at risk in event of an attack “from the East.” But they saw Obama’s decision as placing in question his pledge to honor Article Five.

2. Re-Setting Relations with Russia

In their letter to Obama, the East European statesmen expressed concern about his plan to “re-set” relations with Russia. “Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back on as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th century agenda with 21st century tactics and methods.” The authors feared “that the United States and the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for a ‘Concert of Powers’ to replace the continent’s existing, value-based security structure.” In official circles throughout the East Baltic Sea region one heard similar expressions of concern, for example, by Lithuania’s president Dalia Grybauskaite who said that she had refused a meeting with President Obama because she saw his disarmament discussions with Russia “not in line with interests of Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries.” She, and other leaders in the region, urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to consider concrete operational measures that the U.S. could take to safeguard the security of the states that occupied the former Soviet space.

Without them, the Poles and Balts feared that at some point they might be subjected to the same kind of Russian assault that the Georgians experienced in 2008. Perhaps of more immediate concern, Moscow’s knowledge that they were defenseless made it easier for the Kremlin to pry concessions from them when it came to commercial matters and diplomatic relations. Words of support were not sufficient to placate their fears; concrete measures had to be taken by NATO with the full support of Washington to accomplish that objective. The stark truth was that NATO did not have operational plans in place to defend the East Baltic Sea Region.

9 Ibid.
3. Obama is Soft on ‘Hard Security’ and Has Turned His Back on Europe

Reservations about Obama’s lack of resolve in meeting hard security threats are in keeping with a narrative crafted by his Republican opponents; namely, that like his Democratic predecessors, he is “soft” on national security matters. At the same time, CEE commentators underscored that it was a Republican president, George W. Bush who opened NATO’s door to the Poles and Balts and now Obama was closing it to the Georgians and Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, the CEE media cited Obama’s refusal to attend the May 2010 EU Summit as further evidence that his foreign policy priorities no longer included Europe. Clearly the two wars that America was fighting in the Greater Middle East demanded his attention but he was too cavalier in ignoring the legitimate security concerns that many in Europe still harbored—those who resided in the former Soviet space in particular. They also noted that while the U.S. was outside the EU, it had influence in Brussels and major European capitals that could be applied to help the CEE members press their concerns and advance their interests in EU bodies in relations with Russia. What they desired in particular was a common EU Russian policy, not one comprised of bi-lateral arrangements between Berlin, Paris and Rome on the one hand and Moscow on the other one. That arrangement simply left them out of decisions that keenly affected their welfare.

With encouragement from “friends” in the U.S., they excoriated Obama for not doing more to help the embattled Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvilli. For example, when he requested Washington provide his Army with anti-tank, anti-aircraft and other offensive military hardware, he was denied them. Moreover, while Secretary Clinton made pledges of support for Georgia’s security, Washington did not press for Georgian membership in NATO. Why? The answer was obvious: because President Obama feared that if he did so, his campaign to reset relations with Moscow would be placed in jeopardy—and among other things withdraw Kremlin support for the new START Treaty—an initiative that many in Eastern Europe cited as further evidence that Obama’s Washington was fixated on relations with Russia “at any cost.”

The above observations are cited to justify fears regarding the Obama administration’s resolution in protecting the East Baltic Sea Region from military threats “from the East.” While officials in these countries may have cause to express reservations about Obama’s policies in their neighborhood, their most pessimistic concerns are unwarranted.
4. The Truth about Obama’s Anti-Ballistic Missile System

Robert M. Gates, who had previously endorsed the missile site in Eastern Europe when he served Bush as Defense Secretary, explained why he had changed his mind and now favored the one introduced by President Obama. Bush’s system had been designed to deal with the threat of Iranian ICBMs, but intelligence reports indicated that it was a long-term one. The U.S. had to address the near-term threat of Iranian short and intermediate range missiles that were soon to be operational. What is more, under Bush’s program, the U.S. could not achieve protection until 2017, but under the new one, its first phase would be completed by 2011. At that time, “…we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missile weapons that are growing in capability in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.” This Aegis system, Gates emphasized, works and is cheaper than the Bush project! Many commanders in the Pentagon felt pretty much the same way and questioned the prudence of spending such vast sums on a system of questionable value at the same time that U.S. forces were over-stretched as a consequence of fighting two wars in the Greater Middle East.

But what about the charge that Obama scrapped Bush’s system under pressure from Russia? He responded, “Russia had always been paranoid about this (the system in Eastern Europe), but George Bush was right. This wasn’t a threat to them.” He added, “If the byproduct of it is that the Russians feel a little less paranoid and are now willing to work more effectively with us to deal with threats like ballistic missiles from Iran or nuclear developments in Iran, you know, that’s a bonus.”

Still, even those who agreed with Obama’s decision to deploy a new missile defense system took issue with the way in which it was announced. For example, in a Washington Post op-ed, Ann Applebaum, a highly respected American columnist and wife of Poland’s foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, scolded the administration for not directly forewarning the interested parties about his decision. Many CEE officials first learned about it via the media and not through diplomatic channels. Here was a typical example of how a new inexperienced American administration was prone to make mistakes that a more seasoned one would have avoided. It was not done out of rancor but nonetheless it was a needless affront that many European observers saw in keeping with Obama’s reluctance to keep EU leaders “in the loop.”

12 Ibid.
5. A Reset in Relations with Russia is Good for Europe

In a June 2008 Berlin address, Russian president Medvedev called for a new era of security cooperation between America, Europe and Russia. The “Unipolar Moment,” where the U.S. operated as the world’s hegemon, was over and all of the security institutions associated with American global domination, including NATO, no longer functioned. His words received a polite reception but did not prompt a concrete response to them.

Two months later, the “August War” precluded a serious, unemotional discussion of the proposal. Critics asked: “How could the West condone such talks when Russian troops had penetrated Georgian territory while Moscow had wrested both Abkhazia and South Osseta from Tbilisi proclaiming that both enclaves were independent states.” Others noted that the “value gap” superseded any “common interests” that the West shared with Russia. But soon afterwards, while not dismissing such reservations, supporters of serious security talks with Russia said the Georgian War actually demonstrated just how important such talks were if further fighting in Europe was to be avoided. Moreover there was disturbing evidence that the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvilli’s policies were a provocation and he had not conducted his affairs in a manner that enhanced Georgia’s prospects for membership in NATO. Even if Moscow tricked the young rambunctious Georgian President into launching an attack against South Ossetia, he took ill-considered actions that made this possible. The EU produced a report that inferred that he started the war in the first place. Similar charges were made by private security analysts. Subsequently American and European leaders turned their backs on him less his capricious antics prompt another military exchange with Russia.

In spite of numerous probes into the origins of the Five Day War, it has been overlooked that if George W. Bush had not invaded Iraq, it is unlikely that there ever would have been a Georgian-Russian war in 2008. Russian defense planners knew that burdened by a war in Iraq that had cost many lives and billions of dollars and a return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the American military was badly over-stretched and was not prepared to take counter-military measures in Europe. Simultaneously, the international stature of the U.S. had plunged under Bush’s stewardship and by this time few European leaders

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14 Dmitry Medvedev, Berlin Address, June 6, 2008, President’s Office, Moscow, Russia. For a comprehensive discussion of Medvedev’s Plan, see Richard J. Krickus, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia A Voice But Not A Veto In A New European Security System, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2009.

15 For an analysis sympathetic to Russia’s actions and critical to those of Georgia, see Mark Almond, “Plucky little Georgia? No, the Cold War Reading Won’t Wash: It is Crudely simplistic to Cast Russia as the Sole Villain in the Clashes over South Ossetia, The West Would Be Wise to Stay out,” The Guardian, August 8, 2008.

wanted to be associated with Washington. To make matters worse, the calamitous economic meltdown was waiting in the wings. Under these circumstances, the military-minded in Moscow believed they could act without interference from a discredited leadership in Washington.

While powerful European NATO members like France and Germany continued to pledge support for Georgia’s membership in the alliance, they also indicated that the time was not ripe for that event. American officials made similar pledges and provided Tbilisi with military equipment but denied Georgia offensive weapons. (On this matter of NATO enlargement, many in the CEE region forget that it was a Democrat, Bill Clinton, that took the initiative to pave the way for the eventual membership of all of the so-called “new European” members—although he was supported by Republicans in Congress in this endeavor.)

Having lost faith in the Bush administration, Moscow reacted favorably to Obama’s election assuming that a John McCain victory would freeze American-Russian relations—a condition that existed in the last four years of Bush’s term. Among other things, Russian commentators noted that one of McCain’s foreign policy advisers, Randy Scheunemann had worked as a paid lobbyist for the Georgian government. Some even believed that the McCain camp had encouraged Saakishvilli to engage in provocative actions with the expectation that a conflict with Russia would somehow help McCain in his presidential bid.

In the spring of 2009, Obama met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and later Prime Minister Putin indicating that he favored a reset in relations with Russia. This was in keeping with policies favored by Republican statesmen like Henry Kissinger and George Shultz who argued that harmonious relations with Russia were vital to U.S. security objectives—fighting global terrorism, stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and addressing global warming. The most immediate and urgent effort to reset relations, of course, was the ratification of what has been called the New START treaty.

According to the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy that Obama signed, “We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests.” In this connection, the American and Russian presidents initialed a document that replaced the expired START nuclear arms reduction treaty that George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev had signed in 1991. Following the lead of some of Obama’s political opponents, observers in the CEE region expressed alarm in face of these initiatives. They were deemed as proof positive that the Obama administration was prepared to bow to the Kremlin at the expense of the USSR’s former satellites and Republics.

American officials like Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to the region and sought to ameliorate the fears of those who harbored such concerns.

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She observed that good relations with Russia would actually enhance not subvert the security of all of the former communist countries of Europe. Her counterparts in Berlin, London, Paris and Rome made similar observations. Conversely, would the Balts and Poles feel more secure were U.S.-Russian relations on a cold war footing?

But the most significant endorsement of the U.S.-Russian reset came from Poland’s Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, an enthusiastic fan of Lady Margaret Thatcher who for years was deemed a “hard-liner” by Kremlin commentators. While the U.S. Senate was debating the merits of New START—specifically, Republican Senator Jon Kyl said that he and his colleagues could not ratify the treaty before the new Congress was formed early in 2011—the former American Enterprise Institute analyst wrote an op-ed that created a buzz in global foreign policy circles. He observed that New START, the European Missile Defense System and a reset in U.S.-Russian relations were in the interest of Poland and all of Europe. He also noted that failure to ratify New START could promulgate doubts about NATO’s credibility including its commitment to Article Five.\(^\text{19}\)

His upbeat attitude, of course, was bolstered by his awaiting the arrival of American soldiers who would help construct a Patriot anti-aircraft system in Poland. The mere presence of “American boots on the ground” gave credence to the Obama administration’s pledge to defend the East Baltic Sea Region.

Of course, in the aftermath of the tragic 2009 death of Polish president Lech Kaczynski and many prominent Polish civilian and military leaders, the world was captivated by what happened next: a dramatic improvement in relations between Warsaw and Moscow. The sympathetic words and actions of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in particular were deemed noteworthy. Indeed, that tragic event and Russia’s response to it explains, in part, why the Polish government subsequently has reset relations with Moscow.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a man whose name does not bring smiles to the faces of the Kremlin overlords, joined the chorus of Western analysts who have characterized Putin’s expression of harmony between Warsaw and Moscow as a possible huge resetting of relations between these ancient adversaries. “I do not think that this is a game on the part of Russia,” he wrote in Time Magazine, “this is something sincere and very new.” The former national security advisor of President Jimmy Carter and a man with influence in the Obama administration concluded that if this is evidence of reconciliation on the part of Poland and Russia, “it will be geo-politically potentially equal to the importance of German-Polish reconciliation.”\(^\text{20}\)

The Baltic states, however, while acknowledging that they favored harmonious relations with Russia, remained wary of the re-set initiative in large part because, unlike their larger Polish neighbor, their diminished heft made them more vulnerable to pressure from Russia. So in the run up to the important


Lisbon NATO Summit in mid-November 2010, where a new strategic concept and joint ventures with Russia would headline the gathering, the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians remained watchful.

Meanwhile, White House officials cited positive Kremlin responses to security cooperation with the West. For example, it endorsed tougher international measures that were aimed at forcing Tehran’s compliance with UN demands that its representative be allowed to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, Russia backed tough words with concrete actions when it canceled the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft Missiles to Iran at a cost of something approaching one billion dollars. Simultaneously, Russia has provided the NATO-American International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with land and air routes to supply its troops there. Ports in Latvia had been exploited for this purpose and Lithuania’s port of Klaipeda would also serve a similar function beginning in December 2010. Russia has trained Afghan helicopter pilots, funded development programs and provided the ISAF forces with critical intelligence and arms (albeit not free of charge) to help them destroy al-Qaeda terrorists and to dismantle the Taliban that threaten the government of Hamid Karzai and the independence of his people.

6. Obama Has Been Resolute in Projecting U.S. Power

The administration of President Obama is no less supportive of its allies in the East Baltic Sea region than was true of his predecessor. Obama remains committed to the security of all of NATO’s members. Indeed, his pledge to honor Article Five is enhanced by the fact that he has helped burnish America’s image in the eyes of the international community. During the Bush years, it had plunged so fast that even European public opinion indicated that people feared an abuse of American power more so than similar actions on the part of Communist China. In spite of all of his difficulties at home and some setbacks abroad, Obama retained the capacity to influence foreign leaders in a manner that Bush could not equal. Also, at Tallinn, his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that the U.S. pledge to defend Europe with U.S. nuclear weapons deployed there would be honored even after New START was ratified and Washington would address European concerns about Russia’s large tactical nuclear weapons arsenal.

In sum, claims—as well as evidence—that the U.S. no longer pays adequate attention to Europe must be measured against several realities. First, Obama inherited a poisoned legacy from Bush. As many analysts including Republican statesmen like General Brent Scowcroft and James Baker—respectively the elder Bush’s national security advisor and his Secretary of State—have indicated, there was no justification for the wrong war in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein did not have sufficient WMD–and no nukes–to threaten the U.S. and he was not linked to al-Qaeda. So Obama not only inherited that disaster, he also inherited the “right war” in Afghanistan that the younger Bush had ignored for many years and as a consequence has facilitated the Taliban’s return.

It is noteworthy that Obama did not dither but deployed 30,000 more U.S. troops to fight in Afghanistan; under his leadership, U.S. special forces have been especially bold in killing Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders; and in spite of protests from Pakistan, Obama has ordered a dramatic increase in drone strikes against terrorists in Pakistan who use it as a base to attack NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Second, Obama with the shift in global power West to East, has had to address the rise of new global players that exist outside of Europe such as Brazil, China and India–the so-called BRIC powers.

Third, Obama inherited an economic meltdown from Bush that has denied him the luxury of establishing his own global agenda in a coherent and deliberate manner. Instead, he has lurched from crisis to crisis while the American people have attacked him for not restoring the U.S. economy. Recall also that in the 2010 Congressional elections the American electorate and the candidates ignored foreign policy even though their country was engaged in two wars.

Finally, Obama’s political adversaries in advancing their electoral prospects have adopted an obstructionist political posture that has hampered him in his effort to decisively address America’s daunting problems domestic and foreign.

Conclusions

In a press conference following the NATO Summit in Lisbon, members of several CEE governments gave Washington their blessings in its reset in relations with Russia:

• Latvia’s foreign minister, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis said that he supported the U.S. Congress ratification of New START and added, “We support very strongly…this policy of President Obama…his administration is very important for our region.”
• Nickolay Mladenov, Bulgaria’s foreign minister said, “…we wholeheartedly advocate the ratification of Start.”
• Lithuania’s foreign minister Audronius Azubalis also endorsed the treaty.
• Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė met with President Obama at Lisbon and said: “Article Five has finally become applicable in real

terms for the Baltic States. We have everything we requested for at the summit meeting. We have security guarantees for Lithuania and an open door policy for NATO, which means that all democratic countries will be able to join if they conform to the set requirements."

Prior to the Summit, American officials were reluctant to comment about security guarantee, as one U.S. diplomat reminded an inquiring analyst, “it is not prudent to do so.” But in November the Polish newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, reported that NATO had in place a plan to defend the countries of the East Baltic Sea Region. Those for Poland that were developed in 1999 had been updated and new ones for the three Baltic countries were being considered. Responsibility for the operations would be assigned to the NATO Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands. In event of attack, 9 divisions would be deployed to protect the region. In addition to four Polish ones, the U.S., the UK and Germany would provide troops. U.S. and British warships also were identified as members of the task force and several ports in the East Baltic Sea would serve them. Air units already operating in the Baltic Air Policing system would provide cover along with other air units.

Soon afterwards, documents circulated by WikiLeaks revealed that in January NATO had agreed to extend defense contingency plans that had been designed for Poland to be extended to the Baltic countries. The documents confirmed earlier reports that a deal of this nature was in the pipeline.

From the perspective of American analysts who closely follow developments in the East Baltic Sea region, several final observations are in order.

• Following the example of Poland, the Baltic countries should join the major Western powers in the campaign to cooperate with Russia in addressing Europe’s common security problems. This will not be accomplished through a Grand Concert of Europe but rather through a step-by-step process where success on easy areas of reconciliation will serve as confidence building measures to address more difficult ones. In essence, this process was endorsed by NATO at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. That said, the adoption of the New START Treaty represents a victory for the reset campaign but there is no guarantee that in the final analysis it will promote long-term security cooperation between the West and Russia.

• Henceforth the EU will play a larger role in safeguarding the security of the East Baltic Sea Region than has been true of the past when NATO was the only source of security. But as Dmitri Trenin has observed, Russia must make an effort to resolve its differences with the Baltic countries.

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22 Editor, “NATO’s cooperation with Russia will be beneficial for Lithuania too,” The Lithuanian Tribune.com, November 21, 2010.
23 Off the record conversation with an American diplomat in the region, September 2010.
24 The Editor, “Nine possible divisions for defense of Baltic States and Poland,” The Lithuania Tribune, November 18, 2010.
just as it has with Poland. Indeed, a larger issue is involved here; fruitful EU-Russian relations are unlikely as long as tensions between the Balts and Russians are not reconciled. The community of Baltic Americans is not large and it is not rich but it has strong bi-partisan support that allows it to punch above its weight. For example, the press conference where CEE leaders announced their support for New START provides evidence to this effect. As the Washington Post has revealed, Republican Senator George V. Voinovich (who has announced his retirement) probably encouraged the Obama White House to organize the event. The Senator from Ohio had made clear that while he supported New START, he would not endorse it until he was convinced that the Baltics states and its neighbors in Eastern Europe were not harmed by its passage. Over the years Voinovich has frequently visited Lithuania’s Embassy in Washington in a display of support for its security.

- A reset in relations between Russia and the East Baltic Sea states is not likely to happen as long as Moscow exploits its energy assets at the expense of its neighbors in the East Baltic Sea region. As Keith C. Smith, the former U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania has written, “Moscow’s divide-and-conquer tactics have successfully prevented greater inter-European cooperation on both economic and security issues.” All of the Central and East European states are vulnerable to energy blackmail given their dependency upon Russian hydro-carbon exports. The EU has failed to address this issue.

- To rectify it, Smith urges the EU to develop a cohesive energy policy that fairly addresses the interests of both energy providing and energy consuming states. However, given the fact that the larger EU countries like Germany prefer bi-lateral rather than an EU approach to Europe’s dependency on Russia’s energy supply, it is foolhardy to assume that present trends are leading in this direction. Indeed, Europe’s economic troubles and fears about the viability of the Euro have fed the euro-skeptics and other interests that represent an ominous threat to the entire European Project. While some staunch supporters of the EU are hopeful about Europe’s economic troubles giving new life to the drive for a unified Europe with a strong executive—a prerequisite for fruitful relations with Russia—facts on the ground seem to indicate a less promising future for the EU. This means the countries in the East Baltic Sea Region in the short turn must try to achieve energy security on their own with the help of their friendly Nordic neighbors. Hopefully, in the long term Germany, and the other major powers of Europe, will

find it prudent to create an energy security system that breeds unity not disunity within the EU.

- Corruption and not advancing Russian tanks represent the greatest security threat to the countries in the East Baltic Sea Region. Corrupt practices upon the part of judges, law enforcement and other government officials as well as doctors and educators have a profound and deleterious impact upon societies in the region that have made considerable progress in their drive to create democratic polities and free market economies. Pervasive corruption compromises economic development; among other things, it discourages foreign investment, subverts commercial relations and promotes economic inequality. Simultaneously, the misuse of public authority fosters widespread political alienation, which, in turn, facilitates demagogic politics. Under these circumstances nations cannot muster the unity required to cope with external threats to their security. Indeed, national disunity invites provocative actions on the part of hostile foreign elements.

- Disunity among the East Sea Region countries continues to deny them the opportunity to collectively resolve common threats to their security. For example, Polish-Lithuanian relations recently have been characterized by harsh rhetoric and an inability to reconcile a host of disputes that foster enmity between both peoples. It is incumbent upon Poland and its smaller Baltic neighbors and not the EU or the U.S. to resolve their differences.

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The Conception of the “New Wars”: a Question of Validity

This article analyses the concept of the “new wars”, especially the claim of its authors that conventional interstate war is no longer viable, as the nature of organized violence has changed completely. The article questions the validity of such a statement by showing that the “new wars” idea lacks historical precision and is based on a misperception of the theoretical model developed by Carl von Clausewitz; moreover, the conception includes unclarified theoretical assumptions. The article examines the most popular and influential “new wars” theorists: Herfried Munkler, Mary Kaldor, Martin Van Creveld, as well as scholars whose ideas are tightly related with the “new wars” discourse - Amalendu Misra, Rupert Smith, Thomas X. Hammes. It also refers to the recent Clausewitzian studies (Hew Strachan, Antulio J. Echevarria, Christopher Bassford) and to a very original concept of the Western dis-enchantment of war, coined by Christopher Coker. The article ends up with the suggestion to evaluate the “new wars” discourse as a reflection of changing Western attitudes towards war.

Introduction

As far back as 1991 the famous military historian Martin Van Creveld stated that large-scale, conventional war was no longer viable. This idea reflected the words of John Mueller that major war in Western world might be rendered obsolete – like slavery or duelling. At that time, the post-Cold War confusion in international affairs, Yugoslav Wars, problems of humanitarian interventions and other factors highly stimulated the need to re-approach a mainstream discourse on violence and war. However, it took a while for the idea that major war is outmoded to make a solid stand – with a conception of the “new wars”.

Definition of the “new wars” was coined by Mary Kaldor. Highlighting underestimated tendencies of contemporary organized violence, she took an ambitious position arguing that the prevailing perception of war is no longer adequate because a new type of organized violence has developed. The new
concept, featuring a revision of the popular ideas of Carl von Clausewitz, quickly ignited a very productive academic debate2.

The challenging criticism of conventional warfare and efforts to grasp specific aspects of today’s organized violence contributed a lot to the relevance of the “new wars” conception. But even more interesting are its links with broader changes in the Western attitudes towards war. For example, in the recent U.S. Field Manual of Stability Operations, fragile states, unable to meet the basic needs of their people, are seen as the greatest threat to the national security of the U.S. What is more, the main focus in the document is on the provision of a safe and secure environment, post-conflict reconstruction, law-enforcement and broader interagency efforts to provide a base for civil-military integration. One can see here obvious similarities to the main ideas of Kaldor. Of additional interest is that this document is meant to represent a milestone of U.S. Army’s doctrine.3

The problem is that the concept of the “new wars” still fails to address many aspects pointed out by its opponents, thus undermining its validity. New wars analysis lacks coherence as well as a broader reference to military history. Therefore, the premise that war has gone through transformation is standing on very shaky ground indeed—as well as the practical political solutions suggested on its basis. This article aims to show that theorists of the “new wars” ground their arguments on vague generalizations and loose assumptions and, more importantly, do not distinguish between the nature and the character of war, confusing the levels of analysis. The article ends up with a suggestion to evaluate the “new wars” discourse as a part of Western disenchantment of war.

1. Clausewitzian Universe

Throughout history there have been many attempts to define the concept of war. Nevertheless, not many of them have had a long-standing success—apart from Clausewitz’s “On War”, Sun Tzu’s ideas and probably some principles of Antoine H. Jomini. In Western strategic thought, Clausewitz’s work deserves attention for its attempt to raise itself above the circumstances of a particular time period—to grasp the very essence of war’s nature. The Prussian general sought to build a coherent, more universal theory—a kind of “idealtypus” of war.

2 On the one side of the debate are the „new wars“ theorists and scholars, who do not use the term „new war“, but still assert similar ideas (Rupert Smith, Kalevi J. Holsti, John Keegan, authors of the „Fourth generation warfare, etc.). On the other side, there are critics of the „new wars“ (such as Mats Berdal and Stathis Kalyvas) and renewed Clausewitzian studies (Christopher Bassford, Antulio J. Echevarria, Hew Strachan, Colin M. Fleming, Andreas H. Rothe).

“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” – it is one of the basic statements of “On War”. Force, or violence, embodied not only in combat, but in a mere possibility of it as well, is inherent in any war. The fact that this violence is a collective act—and so is social by its nature—distinguishes it from the realm of simple criminal activities. Clausewitz insisted that there are no logical limits to the application of this force and that the impulse to destroy one’s enemy lies in the heart of war. However, these are only theoretical assumptions. Analyzing “On War”, it is very important to distinguish between the abstract framework—the “absolute war”—and practical particularities. Absolute form points to the natural tendencies of war: it is a strictly logical premise, a base for any coherent theory.

In real life, friction moderates war’s natural tendency to drive opponents to extremes. By friction Clausewitz refers to countless minor incidents, distinguishing war on paper from real war: it might be instincts, morale, environmental conditions, cognitive limits, imperfect information, or even political circumstances. Therefore, Clausewitz admits that wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity and only a small part of time in war is occupied by action, the rest being spent in inactivity.

Of all the aspects moderating war, policy is certainly the most controversial one. According to Clausewitz, war is a political instrument and a continuation of political intercourse, by other means. Hence, in reality war is not an unrestricted expression of force—policy creates war and, more importantly, it gives an overall object for it, or else the escalation of violence would see no limits. But even today it is not clear what Clausewitz meant by politik. The definition of policy (or politics) is actually more debated than the very question of whether war is truly an instrument of policy. Clausewitz perceived war as a part of man’s social existence, and saw politics as a major expression of the interests of a particular community. Consequently, it is quite clear that politik is not just public policy or rational actions of public authorities. As Bassford has stated it, politik is more about the process of power distribution in a society of individuals, involving both rational and non-rational factors.

Clausewitz stated clearly that imagining war between civilized people merely as a result of rational decisions made by their governments is a mistake; policy must adapt itself to its own instrument, and this process can radically change it. Most likely, he sought to show that the character of war results from prevailing political circumstances: war is like a chameleon, slightly adapting itself to change of environment. And yet the nature of war, its true essence, remains the same.

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5 Clausewitz (note 4), p. 76.
6 Ibidem, p. 81-83.
8 Clausewitz, p. 76.
9 Ibidem, p. 89.
The concepts of the nature and character of war have caused a lot of confusion. The character of war can be described as a way of applying force, or as a “theory of a conduct of war”, or simply as warfare. The character of war is always modified and is never absolute. The nature of war, on the contrary, points to the essential tendencies of war, to its innate logic, which does not lend itself to moderating principles of everyday reality. It certainly finds its most elaborate expression in Clausewitz’s idea that war is a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence and enmity (blind natural force), the play of chance and probability (the realm of creative spirit) and the element of subordination to reason alone (the principle of policy). The first aspect mainly concerns the people. The second addresses the commander and his army, and the third element is usually the realm of governments alone. It is of utmost importance that Clausewitz was reluctant to fix any arbitrary lines between those elements, as that would have destroyed the whole idea of war as an organic interplay. Nonetheless, many academics have attributed the main importance to the principle of war’s subordination to policy, overestimating the role of government/territorial state and political rationality in war. This kind of fallacy has also become a foundation for the “new wars” discourse.

One might call into question the need for such a complicated theoretical divide between the nature and the character of war. Concerning Clausewitz himself, he needed it to keep his theory coherent and to highlight the primary elements of any type of war. There again, Antulio J. Echevarria notes that our understanding of war’s nature also influences our approach to the conduct of war – the way we develop military strategies, doctrines or even the way we train combat forces. There is a big difference between a man who perceives war as violence with a tendency to get out of control and a man who thinks that war is merely an obedient instrument of policy.

2. The Concept of the “New Wars”

2.1 Martin Van Creveld, “The Transformation of War”: the Beginning of the New Wars Discourse

Hew Strachan once said that in order to identify whether war is changing and how that change affects international relations, we need to know what war is. However, what we mean by war is usually determined by an individual experience or a living memory of recent historical events. The

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10 Ibidem, p. 89.
sources of traditional warfare have been traced back to the first “true” battle at Kadesh, 13th century B.C. Nevertheless, it is the established convention of war, affirmed over the last three centuries, that we call “classical martial law”. Within this framework, war is defined as “throughout history a normal way of conducting disputes between political groups13”, waged between regular armies of states. It means between standard (and equal) bearers of a jus belli, respecting their enemies at war14. According to Carl Schmitt, this kind of contained continental land warfare was still present in World War I.

Historian Martin Van Creveld was one of the first to claim that war had suffered a fundamental transformation and had entered a new era, in which conventional principles of war were no longer relevant for extending political interests. It should be specified that Creveld actually had in mind a large-scale, organized industrial war. He pointed out two main factors that were destroying the viability of major war: the political impact of nuclear weapons and the spread of low-intensity conflicts (LICs).

Creveld described LICs as bloody conflicts, usually unfolding in developing countries, technologically primitive and involving paramilitary units (which become intermingled with each other and with the civilian population in general). According to Creveld, since World War II LICs have shown some clear advantages over conventional wars: they were “dirt cheap” and they were the most popular way to change the political status quo. Nonetheless, attention given to this type of warfare was far from serious - the tendency to think about war in traditional terms and to base military programs on conventional wisdom prevailed. Creveld observes that it had lots to do with sheer inertia, on the one hand. On the other hand, it was a way to buy some time in case a real conventional crisis did arise: that is, to restrain further escalation (which could lead to nuclear war).15

It is important that Creveld perceived the spread of LICs as a negation of Clausewitz’s Trinitarian war, because LICs are conflicts without clear boundaries between the people, the government, state units, paramilitaries and international actors. Furthermore, the driving force behind these wars is not essentially “political” (it can be religion, culture or even existence). And since the idea that war is a continuation of politics was understood by Creveld in a forthright manner, he automatically made the conclusion that the Clausewit- zian universe is not suitable to explaining the LICs16. In his subsequent books, Creveld revised his ideas about war’s nature, admitting that “at bottom, war

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13 Strachan (note 12), p. 3.
14 The principle of equality granted warring armies with rights, that were not available for irregular fighters (for example, the status of the partisan was ambiguous until the second half of the 20th cen. Schmitt, C., The theory of the partisan. Michigan State University Press, 2004, p. 6.
16 According to Creveld, the ideas of Clausewitz cannot explain the total wars of the 20th cen. and are not adequate for the bigger part of military history. He sorted out three historical alternatives to the Clausewitz’s “political war”: wars for religion, justice and existence. Creveld (note 12), p. 42, 124-149.
is simply an organized fight waged for political ends”\textsuperscript{17}. Yet, he still insists that modern armed forces, as well as conventional forms of warfare need a profound conceptual change. Otherwise, counterinsurgency (a predominant type of conflict for the nearest future) will go on as a record of failure.

2.2. Mary Kaldor and Herfried Munkler: a New Type of Organized Violence

Low intensity conflicts (LICs) are not so different from the phenomenon which ten years later Mary Kaldor called the “new wars”. A bit later the term “new war” was borrowed by Herfried Munkler, who made it popular in Germany, and Amalendu Misra, who started to talk about the “new civil wars”. Similar, and at times even identical ideas can be found in the famous analysis of the “third kind of wars” by Kalevi J. Holsti and in the books of military historian John Keegan\textsuperscript{18}.

The concept of the “new wars” came out when Mary Kaldor realized there were obvious similarities between the wars in former Yugoslavia (which she had been intensively analyzing for years) and armed conflicts in other developing countries. She asserts that these wars do reflect a new reality, in which traditional distinctions between war, organized crime and large-scale violations of human rights are blurring while political interests and financial motives become hardly separable\textsuperscript{19}.

Globalization is an important factor in the context of new wars. Firstly, it facilitates the development of a globalized war economy: transnational economic networks are the main supporters of new wars. We can also observe the increased presence of media in the conflict zones and the emergence of diverse international agents: NGO’s, private security contractors, reporters, volunteers, foreign advisers, etc. The context of globalization is hardly separable from the disintegration of a territorial state. Kaldor makes this clear, saying that “the main implication of globalization is that territorial sovereignty is no longer viable.” (Misra also tries to look at the shrinking importance of territorial state from the perspective of globalization.)\textsuperscript{20}

Apart from the globalized economy of war, there are another two factors making new wars exceptional: identity politics and the changed mode of warfare. The term “identity politics” describes a process of political mobilization and power politics, implemented by using certain labels, for


\textsuperscript{20} Kaldor, p. 91. Misra (note 19), p. 35-37.
example, ethnic, religious, tribal or other divisions. Open and cosmopolitan civil society, multiculturalism and moderate citizens appear to be the main target in new wars.

The changed mode of warfare can be shortly characterized as a brutal mix of guerrilla war and counterinsurgency: destabilization of society, spread of fear and hatred, destruction of cultural heritage and violence against civilians are the ways by which force is applied in new wars. Traditional military hierarchy is destroyed and regular state units are replaced by paramilitaries, which operate in a strange atmosphere of both confrontation and cooperation.

Non-state or sub-state paramilitary groups do not comply with the conventional rules of warfare. Moreover, they usually fight for narrow financial (or commercial) agendas. According to Munkler, these groups can sustain themselves through plunder and diverse sources of external support: black markets, the Diasporas, individual remittances, assistance from foreign authorities, global media or even humanitarian aid. According to Kaldor, the transition from centralized and closed economies of industrial wars to the globalized economies of current conflicts represents a major turning point in the changing character of war.

In the “new wars” discourse such a symbiosis between transnational financial capital and war is treated as a powerful source of individual gain and this comes as the main grounds for criminalizing new wars. Kaldor and Munkler both argue that the traditional notion of war automatically becomes irrelevant for the analysis of contemporary organized violence, as it cannot cover a range of interconnected interests and economic networks.

It is important that Creveld, Kaldor and Munkler all associate this traditional notion of war with Clausewitz’s ideas, which are seen as conterminous with the modern interstate wars. They all appeal to the same idea of “statization” of war, deriving it from Westphalian times. The “statization” of war (or subordination of war to the territorial state) refers to well-known historical processes: the creation of an effective bureaucratic machine, the development of standing armies and the institution of soldiering, and codifying the norms of war. The state has taken over the prerogative to name its enemies, has made a clear distinction between violence and commercial activity as well as between criminal violence and lawful killing in war.

New wars, differently from what they call the “Clausewitzian ones”,

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23 Munkler, H., The new wars. Cambridge, Polity, 2005, p. 1, 14. Kaldor, p. 10. Another important characteristic of new wars is the sexualization of violence, when the violence against women is used in a strategic (systematic and calculated) way.
are spreading in the context of declining state’s monopoly of mass violence. The military force is being privatized, the front lines and decisive battles are no more obvious and the distinction between civilians and combatants is blurring rapidly. Conflicts acquire a protracted character and weak states cannot contain the war, which proceeds according to its own logic. All in all, peace conditions in new wars are replaced by the state of war, in which new social ties and livelihood strategies are created. Thus, the prior imperative that the highest justification for war is peace, in new wars is utterly destroyed.

It is important that new wars are relatively cheap, because they normally do not rely on high technologies. This kind of primitiveness brings all the favourable conditions for militarists of the developing world: they can easily mobilize their fighters, getting a chance to protract the wars for years, or even for decades. The fact that war becomes a cheap business is one of the reasons why states are forced to compete with private subjects, losing their long-protected monopoly of organized violence.

In summary, by linking the phenomenon of major war to the Clausewitzian universe, Kaldor and Munkler are making the same mistakes as Creveld. They all give little serious consideration to the differences between war and warfare, between the nature and the character of war, between Clausewitz’s concept of strategy and his concept of war. On the other hand, they clearly overstate the role that political rationality plays in the Clausewitzian concept of war and miss a deeper meaning of the term politik. It is not surprising that this reliance on a reductionist understanding of the Clausewitzian universe as merely a realm of contained interstate wars encouraged them to assert that war has undergone a major transformation. Let’s turn now to a more comprehensive analysis of the shortcomings in the new wars discourse.

3. Key conceptual shortcomings in the “new wars” argumentation

3.1. Questionable Generalizations: Globalization, Territorial Sovereignty and the Asymmetric Threats

It was mentioned that recent U.S. Field Manual of Stability operations shares common attitudes with the “new wars” theorists. It is stated in the manual that stability operations are no longer secondary to the defense and offense. What is more, they are given a priority over combat operations. Essential stability tasks, named in the document, range from humanitarian relief (even
vaccinations) and restoring public services to the disarmament of combatants, securing borders and clearing explosive hazards\(^{25}\). All in all, the projected military mission is very similar to Kaldor’s idea of the “cosmopolitan approach”: rebuilding a legitimacy of public authorities through the reestablishment of a rule of law (a kind of “cosmopolitan law-enforcement” with help from both military and police)\(^{26}\).

However, this similarity does not necessarily show that Americans develop their military doctrines regarding the arguments of social scientists. It is rather a reflection of deeper changes in the Western attitudes towards the military. I will return to this in the last section. As for now, there are several important shortcomings in the “new wars” conception that need attention.

Firstly, the very term “new” war and the assumption that war has undergone a transformation is doubtful indeed. For Kaldor, new wars are a kind of antithesis to the old, Clausewitzian ones. However, the Clausewitzian era is not that easy to define – Clausewitz himself admitted that contained interstate war is only a temporary phenomenon. Furthermore, he welcomed the French Revolution inspired tendencies to return the people to the business of war. In his book, Clausewitz gave considerable attention to what can be called the “irrational” factors in war: emotions, passion, national spirit, imagination, chances and opportunities. Since the “new wars” theorists have overlooked the difference between the nature and the character of war, they came to identify Clausewitz’s theory merely with modern interstate wars (“old” wars), bounded by a principle of political rationality.

It was mentioned that we can describe the character of war as warfare, the art of war or just the conduct of war: it is a product of a particular time period and specific political circumstances. The same can be said about Clausewitz’s concept of strategy – first and foremost, it is a reflection of Napoleon’s strategy. Differently, the nature of war points to the very essence of war, to its innate logic: it is an extreme representation of the phenomenon, a pure type. A majority of the characteristics attributed to the “new” types of organized violence – such as privatization of force, ethnic cleansing and brutality, pragmatic financial motives, etc. – indicate the changing character of war at best. However, the very essence of war—or war as an ontological phenomenon—is not necessarily changing in turn.

The “new wars” discourse has other empirical and theoretic shortcomings as well. At least three vague generalizations are quite distinct: “globalization”, the asymmetric character of current wars and the atrophy of the state’s autonomy. The concept of globalization is not properly defined. Firstly, causal connections implicated by it are hard to test empirically and hot academic

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\(^{25}\) The versatility of military missions, proposed in the Field manual of Stability operations reminds a few years old discussion about expanding the scope of military activities: U.S. Marines have offered an idea of a three-block war, which states that troops might be forced to engage in humanitarian relief, peace operations and conventional war simultaneously in a small area.

\(^{26}\) Kaldor, p. 11-12.
debates about the interpretation of data are still going on. Secondly, the term is haunted by political biases. Transnational cultural, economic and social networks, emphasized by Kaldor, create an image of a global village. However, the idea of such an integrated hyper-space lacks both empirical and theoretical validity. It might be useful to reflect on the role of local tendencies in the new wars. Stathis Kalyvas argues that scholars, who are leaving out of consideration historically settled local factors, such as religious, tribal, cultural characteristics, tend to romanticize old civil wars and to criminalize the new ones. Wars in Africa or Southeast Asia do not have to comply with Western conventional rules of modern wars.

The “asymmetric” character of the new wars is a vague description as well. Strachan argues that much of this popular debate is historically naïve, as asymmetry is inherent in strategy: the weaker side will always try to gain advantage by using unpredictable responses. For ages, guerrilla wars were troubling the strongest military forces of the time: it is enough to think about the Spanish uprising in the XIX c. It is important that Munkler relates the principle of asymmetry to a growing role of global media. Although there is a glimpse of truth in the assertion that media can well restrain strategic choices of counterinsurgencies, it is still not an instrument of the weaker side alone: the media is used to criminalize irregular opponents (fighters) as well.

There is no need to question Munkler’s idea that the absolute military predominance of the U.S. is leaving less and less space for waging regular conventional wars – as Michael Evans stated it, postmodern “high-tech” conflict has created its own antithesis. Nevertheless, the need to adapt one’s own political approach by recognizing the importance and complexity of contemporary irregular wars does not necessarily signify a transformation of war – and such phenomena of “asymmetric” warfare as terrorism or humanitarian intervention do not do this either. The relation between war and terrorism or war and humanitarian interventions is not that obvious; it just makes the meaning of war even more fluid.

The assumption that territorial sovereignty and the autonomy of state are no longer viable is probably the weakest part in the “new wars” discourse. The fact that growing global networks are undermining the isolationism of states does not show that territorial sovereignty is no longer relevant. The problem is that new wars break out mostly in the developing world. It means we have to deal with states that have hardly ever seen a proper scale of a state’s integrity. In the better part of the developing states, statehood covers centuries-old tribal structures, where distinct tribes developed their identities only by constantly warring with similar tribes. According to Mats Berdal, different

30 Evans, M., „From Kadesh to Kandahar: military theory and the future of war“. Naval War College Review, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_56/ai_105210224/, 2009 05 22, p. 3.
ideas of statehood, historically constituted patterns of exploitation and socio-economic, geographical, ethnic or religious sources of intensity are moulding a different idea of war31.

Of course, theorists of the “new wars” can still argue that modern wars, unlike the new ones, were actually “making states” (as Charles Tilly stated it), not destroying them. However, such creation was far from innocent: Tilly forcefully argued that war making and state making were the largest examples of organized crime32. Before asserting that new wars do not foster state-making, but erode states instead, one should take into account the fact that these wars tend to break out in states that already live in the context of an internationally guaranteed sovereignty; i.e., in the absence of manifest external threats and constant need to guarantee survival of the state. No wonder that leaders of such states are more inclined to strengthen their personal power instead of the power of the state.

3.2. Historical Precedents of the New Wars

Theorists of the new wars could have escaped many questionable assumptions if they paid more attention to historical studies. Edward Newman is right that problems with the new wars discourse lie not in the analysis of today’s organized violence, but in its assertion of a general change from the past33. Most of the new wars’ characteristics are well known to military historians. Since the times of Thucydides civil wars have been especially brutal in regard to civilians, whereas classical interstate wars have also had an element of greed: Creveld states that Napoleon’s army turned feeding “war by war” into a fine art34. Privatization of violence has many historical precedents as well. City states, condotierri, religious associations and commercial organizations (such as British East India Company) - all these non-state subjects did engage in organized, large-scale wars35.

Historical guerrilla wars, even atrocious peasant uprisings had characteristics of violence similar to the new wars. Just consider the Thirty Years war (1618-1648), which was dominated by the strategy of economic attrition, undiscriminating killing of unarmed civilians, moral degradation of military forces and privatization of violence. One could even find here a model of open war economy – after all, a considerable part of the resources had flowed into

32 Sorensen, G., War and state making – why doesn’t it work in the third world? Aarhus: Aarhus University Department of Political science, 2001, p. 3. On the other hand, some kind of sub-state structures are often created by the warlords, who are settled in a particular area. Moreover, the warring/revolutionary party serves quite successfully instead of a totalizing and indoctrinating logic of the state (Schmitt has applied this principle to the logic of revolutionary guerrilla parties).
34 Creveld, 1991, p. 77.
Germany from other European states or even from the “New World”.

However, historical guerrilla wars, revolutions, insurgencies and other “small” wars often were not granted the name of war because of their irregular character. Devaluation of these conflicts in the course of military history (together with a lack of trusted facts) is probably the reason why nowadays they might appear so new. It is also important to bear in mind that throughout the centuries the harsh realities of war were not so escalated in public space as now. And much from them has been forgotten. Of course, it would be a mistake to argue that conflicts, analyzed in the “new wars” discourse, have nothing new: globalization and its implicated social inequalities, the trade of small arms and light weapons provide rebels and militarists with possibilities that they have never had before. Nevertheless, it is too early to assert a major change from the past and a major transformation of war.

Despite the weaknesses, the “new wars” conception has its obvious strengths, too. Michael Brzoska argues that the aim of its authors was not to prove something scientifically, but to understand. Incidents that in modern conventional wars were only by-products of war are now becoming dangerous tendencies in new wars. Finally, even if tendencies in new wars recall historical realities in many ways, it still does not eliminate the desire and the responsibility to understand the particularities of our own times. What was understandable in the seventeenth century does not necessarily have to be justified in the twenty-first.

Munkler argues that he has chosen a badly defined conception of the “new wars” because it is difficult to frame contemporary conflicts into a coherent theory. But maybe there is no need for this? It is quite obvious that wars in Liberia or Sierra Leone were mainly driven by financial motives, but the character of the conflicts in India, Sri Lanka, Chechnya or Nepal was different. The role of identity politics is probably essential when analyzing wars in Bosnia, Sudan or Rwanda, but it has little to say about the cases of Angola or DR Congo. Understanding that these conflicts are not identical and thus require a set of theories has more potentiality. The main thing is that the primary elements of war, analyzed by Clausewitz, are endemic to all these conflicts. Furthermore, they all have a political character in the sense that they are expressions of interests of a particular community or group which seeks to consolidate its power by monopolizing force.

4. Alternative Points of View: the New Paradigm of War or “War amongst the People”

Apart from the “new wars”, there are other famous attempts that ques-
tion the viability of conventional warfare and assume that war has undergone a transformation – let’s start with the idea of “fourth generation warfare” (4GW). The essence of the fourth generation war is the employment of all available networks – social, economic, political, even nets of infrastructure and information. According to Thomas X. Hammes, this type of conflict is over seventy years old and it evolved from mere insurgencies. The society and battles over public mind are the decisive factors in the 4GW. Hammes is doubtful about the ability of modern conventional forces to counter evolving irregular warfare. In fact, he even proposes to see the future military threat of China from the perspective of 4GW as well.

Another attempt was made by General Rupert Smith. Smith insists that industrial war no longer exists. What has had emerged in its place is a new paradigm of war: “war amongst the people.” Smith argues that these wars are a complex combination of political and military circumstances, in which the people are the battlefield, as they become the target, the main objective of war and even the opposing force. It is particularly important, according to the General, that wars amongst the people are mainly tactical events, with just occasional forays into the operational level; hence decisive strategic victories are no more possible in them. However, the organization and training of modern military forces are just not suitable for the reality of wars among the people. Armed forces are not properly prepared for humanitarian or policing functions that become more and more important. Therefore, Smith concludes that conventional forces need changes in all the levels, starting from the conceptual one.

It is easy to notice that given alternative viewpoints and the “new wars” conception together make a cohesive theoretical debate: actually, Kaldor and Creveld both criticized the idea of the Revolution in Military Affairs as based on inherited institutional patterns and confusing terminology. The aim of all these authors is to show that the most expensive modern technologies and inherited strategic imperatives are not effective in the amorphous realm of new wars. On the other hand, technology is a reflection of well-established military structures; therefore, a badly needed change must start from reassessing the very concept of conventional war.

Creveld is probably right that in the context of today’s irregular warfare, relying on conventional attitude becomes a problem at more than only operational and tactical levels: the changed mode of warfare generates situations in which even the most disciplined troops find themselves constantly violating conventional rules. Therefore, embarrassing moral dilemmas emerge next to the military ones (and such moral dilemmas do not constrain irregular warfare).

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38 Hammes (note 37), p. 254.
39 Smith (note 29), p. 4-5.
40 Ibidem, p. 5-7, 18, 28, 375, 411.
Historically, conventions of war were changing time and again. It might be that today we witness a similar process and authors of the “new wars” are at least partly right. However, the new wars discourse can be assessed from an absolutely different angle – as a reflection of changing western attitudes towards war and war’s social function.

5. The “New Wars” Discourse - an Outcome of a Western Disenchantment of War?

Brzoska notes that in Germany the growing popularity of the “new wars” discourse coincided with changing public perceptions towards globalization and military interventions. As a matter of fact, Clausewitz also wrote that war in all its forms is a reflection of ideas, emotions and conditions, prevailing at the time. One could wonder, what kind of emotions and social circumstances lies behind the current transformation in the attitudes towards war? According to Christopher Coker, it is the disenchantment of war.

The disenchantment of war started somewhere in the era of industrialization, when relentless technological progress devalued war both in the eyes of the society and the soldiers themselves. Defining itself in terms of technological progress, Western civilization was persistently blurring out the line between man and nature at first, and between man and machine later on. The technological dictate had resulted in a creation of a post-human society, which was defining war in terms of speed, utility, precision and effectiveness. These changes directly affected the existential dimension of war, because the imperative of speed and precision had taken over the traditional values of a soldier – courage, self-sacrifice, and pursuit of glory and renown. As the space for individual initiative and creativity in war shrunk, the experience of a soldier appeared to be essentially dehumanizing (as World War II has shown). The extent of violence was too overwhelming to see it as still having a meaning. Finally, the understanding by society that war requires sacrifice - not so much for the state, but for the moral and ethical idea, embodied in the state – was undermined. This undermined understanding – Coker’s “metaphysical” dimension – was separating war from other forms of violence.

However, the same technological progress enabled the idea of a “clean”
war—a particular Western way of humanizing war again. Modern technologies can minimize the risk for soldiers, allowing them to pass beyond the “death barrier”\textsuperscript{45}. Coker argues that this process might “disenchant” war even more, as it omits the metaphysical idea of war, which is essential in transforming war’s nature. It is forgotten in the West that war is a bilateral act of violence, where both sides have to bear their part of sacrifice. Paradoxically, the attempt to humanize war has probably led to an even bigger crisis in the Western way of war. Of course, there are more factors contributing to this, like the need to respect human rights discourse or the imperative to wage war only for defence.

According to Martin Shaw, the crisis of the western way of war becomes a fundamental threat to the very legitimacy of war: traditionally, war was excluded from norms and criterions which were applied in other social fields\textsuperscript{46}. Therefore, its conduct had immunity from many ethical and moral dogmas. Because of the imperative of a “clean” war, related to the human rights discourse, war has lost its long-time immunity. This process is reflected by the “new wars” discourse too, which basically demonstrates how the “discrowned” war is moved into a field of open moral criticism. Ungovernable, sexualized and devoid of deeper meaning, new wars are absolutely de-legitimized in the presence of Western moral structures. However, a romanticized image of patriotic, gentlemanly, impersonal and contained old wars is saved as well.

Generally, the “new wars” discourse reflects a broader Western trend: recent attempts to create a war with “human face”. However, the question as to whether humanizing war is leading to war’s own negation is getting more and more important. According to some scholars, the Western militaries are degenerating: the scope of their activities is widening notably, military and policing functions are becoming intertwined and the line between defense and security is blurring\textsuperscript{47}. Throughout the twentieth century, war was defined by an unprecedented technological change. Regardless of what will mould the face of war in the twenty-first century, Western societies will first have to define their own relation to war and agree about the definition of war itself. The fact that nowadays it is so difficult to find an adequate approach to the changing character of war and to the causes of contemporary conflicts (the “new wars”) just shows that in the West we are not sure anymore what we should and what we should not grant the name of “war”.

Concluding Remarks

In summary, the main shortcomings of the “new wars” idea are two: the assertion of a general departure from the historic past and the assumption that the nature of organized violence has suffered a fundamental transformation.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibidem, p. 126 - 129, 141.
Many particularities displayed by this new type of war – such as privatization of violence, atrocities against civilians, narrow financial or commercial agendas, importance of collective memory and historically constituted patterns of hatred – indicate the changing character of war at best. However, the very nature of war—war as an ontological phenomenon—is not necessarily changing in turn. The “new wars” theorists’ intention to amplify the importance of low-intensity conflicts and civil wars, with tendencies and motives that were not given enough attention in the theory of war, is very welcomed. However, while criticizing one deterministic viewpoint, they offer another one. The previous trend to analyze wars exclusively in terms of geopolitics, power interests or political rationality in the “new wars” discourse is transformed into an attempt to criminalize contemporary wars, overstating their apolitical character and narrow opportunism.

The problem is that the authors of the “new wars” base their ideas on an inaccurate interpretation of Clausewitz’s theory (especially in the case of war’s trinity) and do not distinguish between the character and the nature of war. Moreover, they do not pay much attention to military history; new wars clearly have historical precedents: old civil wars, medieval peasant uprisings, guerrilla wars (such as Spanish resistance to Napoleon), and, finally, the Thirty Years war, were all marked by similar strategies of violence. Of course, nowadays these characteristics assume some distinct nuances. But it is essential to notice that previously many irregular wars and conflicts were not even granted the name of war. Probably this is why they seem so “new” today, especially when observing them on television, which is increasingly penetrating into the war zones.

On the other hand, the “new wars” discourse can be seen as a reflection of profound changes in Western societies: after the dehumanizing experiences of World War II, attempts to contain war once again had emerged. They represented a striving to make the war humane, which today can be easily observed in the idea of waging a ‘clean’ war. An expanding human rights discourse and the imperative to wage war only for defense have limited the opportunities for waging war, as well as for declaring it. Additionally, sophisticated technological developments enabled a belief that it is possible to have a war “with human face” – to overcome the death barrier by minimizing risks to soldiers and civilians alike. However, Coker claims that the Western attempt to re-enchant the war paradoxically devalues it even more, as the war’s nature is being changed instrumentally, without taking into account the metaphysical conception.

According to Shaw, the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) have really showed that the new Western way of war does not fit the criteria created by the West itself. Actually, it has signified a crisis in the attitudes towards war. This crisis is becoming a threat to the very institution of war, which is losing its historical immunity. The “new wars” discourse is a perfect example of the recent trend to criminalize war, by placing it into a field of open moral criticism.

48 Coker, p. 141.
On the other hand, the dispute over new wars has shown that it is not easy to decide about the very definition of war. It might be that the character of war, as well as its convention, is really changing. It might be that such a change requires not only a new attitude towards war, but a “new pacifism” as well – based on proactive and responsible efforts of peace-enforcement. However, a starting point should be the same – if we are to find a relevant approach to the character and causes of today’s wars, we must first agree on what we should or should not call ‘war’.

November 2010
The Impact of the US Military Transformation on North Korean Defence Policy

This article presents an interpretation of the US capacity to force North Korea to abandon the development of nuclear weapons, based on the analysis of the conventional balance between the U.S. and North Korea. It is also an attempt to evaluate the impact of the US military transformation on defence policy decisions of the potential opponents of the US. The first (theoretical) part of the article presents the assumptions of theoretical interpretation as well as the fundamentals of evaluating the conventional balance between the US and North Korea. The second part of the article highlights the key moments of the US and the international community’s so far unsuccessful attempts to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and explains the reasons for such unsuccessful policy. The third part of this paper analyzes the conventional balance between the US and North Korea, taking into account the conventional forces of those countries, their long-range conventional strike programmes as well as the missile defence programmes – this analysis presupposes the failure of the US to prevent North Korea from nuclear weapon development.

Preface

The US President Barack Obama in his speech in Prague in April 2009 expressed the American responsibility to strive for a world without nuclear weapons: the achievement of such goals will be possible on the condition that the states with nuclear weapons will begin the disarmament process and the states which do not possess nuclear weapons will not seek to acquire them. In the Nuclear Posture Review Report, published in April 2010, the US stressed its willingness to expand its negative security assurance and pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty. One of the few states to pose a threat to the vision of Barack Obama is North Korea, which is developing nuclear weapon and missile technologies that would enable the
use of nuclear weapon against the US. On April 5, 2009, the day of Obama’s speech in Prague, North Korea launched a rocket that could be used to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile, and on May 25 this country made a second test of the nuclear weapon. It seemed that Barack Obama’s speeches (before he was elected the President of the US) regarding North Korea, in which he urged the administration of the former US President, George W. Bush, to engage more actively in direct discussions with North Korea, could deter North Korea from such actions. Analysts express different views on North Korea’s actions as well as on the entire foreign policy of North Korea after the cold war. Recently there appeared more analytical studies, which aim to dissipate the image of North Korea as an irrational and unpredictable actor of international relations that was largely shaped by global media and was mainly escalated through the policy and rhetoric of George W. Bush, the former President of the US. Some analysts claim that the foreign policy of North Korea is determined by its strategic culture developed by Kim Il-Sung, the founder of North Korea, and that it is not itself irrational; whereas others maintain that North Korea’s policy is conditioned by its vital defence interests that can be explained rationally. Other researchers who have tried to assess North Korean negotiating behaviour also claim that North Korea is not an irrational state which could not be deterred (in fact the strategy of North Korean deterrence has already been successfully effective for more than fifty years) and that this country implements a calculated aggressive diplomatic strategy, which pursues benefits by provoking crises. Furthermore, the researchers claim that North Korea deliberately tries to build an image of an unpredictable state that is prepared to take a huge risk in case the US or South Korea would start to implement sanctions or refuse to make concessions.

The majority of analysts, while assessing the possibilities and means of the US and international community to force North Korea to give up its nuclear

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weapon programme, believe that this is possible and that the negotiations still remain the best instrument to achieve this goal. M. O’Hanlon and M. Mochizuki claim that the requirements for North Korea must be raised along with certain incentives to make reforms. Such a position is supported by other analysts who pay much attention to the consensus building within international community (especially among the states which participate in the six-party talks on North Korea’s issue). For example, Chung-in Moon and Jong Yun Bae believe that the six-party talks should be continued and that the U.S. should hold a slightly more flexible position. Wade L. Huntley also claims that it is not sufficient to deal only with North Korea, it is also very important to build a consensus among the U.S., Japan, Russia, China and South Korea; G. Chang emphasizes the key role of South Korea in building a common consensus: South Korea pursues North Korea’s engagement policy, which actually facilitates North Korean attempts to further develop nuclear weapons programme, and gives a chance for China to exploit this policy for its own benefit.

It is possible to recognize the value of such argumentation because pressure from the international community on Libya eventually forced this state to abandon its nuclear weapons development programme; and Saddam Hussein’s regime, which resisted international pressure, was overthrown. The cases of Libya and Iraq should provide North Korean leaders good reasons to abandon the nuclear weapons development programme. However, North Korea has not abandoned it yet.

With this in mind, this article aims to present another interpretation of the US capacity to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons development programme. This interpretation is rather pessimistic as it explains that the increasing US conventional military superiority against conventional forces of other states is one of the main factors which determines today and will determine in the future the North Korean policy to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal.

The idea that the growing conventional superiority of the US after the cold war stimulates the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is

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10 Despite the fact that these ideas were expressed seven years ago, they have not become outdated, having in mind the contemporary situation in the six-party talks with North Korea. See Moon Chung-in, Bae Jong-Yun, „The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis“, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 27, No.4, 2003, p.9–45.


12 However in 2008, when Lee Myung bak, who is more sceptical regarding North Korea’s intentions than his predecessors Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, was elected the President of South Korea, conditions for the consensus building became more favourable. See. Chang G., *Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World*. Westminster, MD, USA: Random House, Incorporated, 2006, p. 200–220.

not original\textsuperscript{14}. However, this article argues that this development is one of the most important factors determining North Korea’s decisions regarding further development of nuclear weapons today and in the future. The effect of this factor cannot even be neutralized by the possible US security guarantees for North Korea.

The first part of the article presents the assumptions of theoretical interpretation and the foundation of analysis that grounds the interpretation itself. The second part overviews the history of the US and international community’s attempts to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapon development, highlighting the essential problems which deprived the US and international community of attaining North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. The third part of this paper, following the analysis of conventional balance between the US and North Korea, provides conclusions regarding the US capacity to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons.

Finally, the North Korea “problem” deserves attention from Lithuania’s foreign and defence policy decision makers. Possible armed conflict between the US and North Korea is the main reason why they should care about this issue. In the worst case scenario, if armed conflict between US/South Korea and North Korea broke out, NATO would have to consider the question of support for the US and South Korea, a close ally of the US and a partner of NATO, during and after the conflict. Even if this worst-case scenario does not materialize, one should not reject the possibility of the collapse of the North Korean regime – if this were to happen, the North Korean people would require urgent humanitarian aid. In both cases Lithuania would need to react to the situation in North Korea.

1. Theoretical Assumptions and Explanatory Criteria

In the 1990s a great number of studies by US analysts and military officers were published, which suggested that the US was on its way towards revolution in military affairs and that this revolution would provide the US with an unlimited military superiority against any potential enemy. In the first decade of this century, taking into account the progress in the US military, there was an increasing number of those who claimed that the revolution in military affairs did not happen, although some elements may be recognised it. A growing wariness to openly declaring the beginning of the era of revolution in military affairs is revealed by a change of concepts in the speeches and writings of the state officials, military officers and academic researchers of the US: in the first decade of this century the concept of ‘revolution in military affairs’ was substituted with such concepts as ‘military transformation’ and ‘modernization

plus'. However, despite a decreasing belief in the revolution in military affairs after the cold war, the elements of such revolution are still visible in the US military progress. Such elements are reflected in various analytical studies that examine different ways and means by which certain states respond to the military progress of the US; the analysis based on the reaction of the US allies (the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Germany, and Israel) has received the greatest attention so far. These studies aim to reveal the view of the allies towards the phenomenon of the revolution in military affairs itself as well as to specifically identify the modernization programmes of ally military forces which reflect a response to the revolution in military affairs. In the research on the reaction of the potential US opponents, greater attention was paid to

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the response of China to the US military progress; however, there is little research on the reaction of other potential opponents (such as Russia, Iraq, North Korea and etc.).

Reviewed literature suggests no model of how to analyse the impact of the US military transformation on the potential US opponents (Iran, North Korea) which, unlike Russia and China, are not able to equally compete with the US in the field of military progress. In this article a theoretical analysis of the conventional balance between the US and North Korea is undertaken to show the impact of the US military transformation on the defence policy of North Korea. In order to reveal the shift in this balance, the following explanatory criteria will be analysed: the level of modernization of conventional forces of the US and North Korea, the tendencies of the development of the US missile defence and North Korean ballistic missile programmes, the US long-range conventional strike programme and North Korea’s capabilities to defend against this programme. The criteria of the US conventional force modernization programme as well as the US missile defence and long-range conventional strike programmes are chosen because they represent distinctive elements of the US military transformation after the cold war. The US missile defence programs are important because they enhance US conventional defence capabilities against nuclear attacks; the long-range conventional strike programs are special because they can neutralise nuclear weapons with minimal destructive power. The analysis of these criteria has the potential to reveal the characteristics of the development of the conventional balance between the US and North Korea and to highlight North Korea’s dilemmas of defence. The selected criteria make the analysis of the conventional balance shift between the US and North Korea different from a standard (classical) conventional analysis, the aim of which would be to compare the overall size of the US and North Korean conventional forces, the number of different conventional weapons or at least to compare the size of the US conventional forces and US conventional weaponry in South Korea with North Korea’s conventional forces. However, in this case the standard analysis of the conventional balance is unable to reveal the qualitative aspects of the balance shift which influences North Korea’s


20 In this article the modernization level criterion measures the capability of conventional forces to fight modern wars (e.g., US and international coalition’s military operation against Iraq in 2003).
policy to further seek nuclear weapon programme. The standard comparative analysis of all US and North Korean conventional forces during the period of 1990-2010 shows that the US has greater active conventional forces, more tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, submarines and battleships, the number of which had decreased after the cold war, yet in 2010 it still remains larger than in North Korea.\(^\text{21}\) The comparative analysis of the US conventional forces in South Korea versus North Korea’s conventional forces and weapons shows the quantitative superiority of North Korea (however, North Korean quantitative superiority becomes a marginal one if compared against both US conventional forces in South Korea and South Korean conventional forces)\(^\text{22}\). It is possible to recognize the value of the standard conventional balance in case when the conventional forces of North Korea and South Korea are compared: such an analysis shows increasing South Korean qualitative superiority in the field of conventional weaponry, which reflects the impact of US military support.

However, this article focuses on the direct impact of the US military transformation on North Korea’s defence policy. After all, the examples of the Korean War (1950–1953) and military operations in Iraq show that the quantitative superiority of the enemy forces had not prevented the US forces from achieving military victories. Furthermore, in its operational plans the US is planning to deploy from 480000 to 690000 soldiers for the military conflict with North Korea,\(^\text{23}\) which together with South Korean forces would be equal to North Korean forces in quantity (excluding the reserve forces of both North Korea and South Korea) and would undoubtedly be qualitatively superior to North Korean forces.\(^\text{24}\) The limitation of the standard conventional analysis in North Korea’s case therefore leads to the choice of the analysis of the conventional balance between the US and North Korea, which reveals qualitative changes according to the chosen criteria; such analysis explains the defence policy of North Korea in seeking further nuclear weapons development.

\(^{21}\) E.g., in 2009 US had: 1153 587 active forces troops, 7620 tanks, 28 574 armoured vehicles, 1200 active fighter aircrafts; North Korea in 2009 had: 1106 000 active forces troops, 4010 tanks, approximately 2500 armoured vehicles and about 620 active fighter aircrafts. In 1990 this balance was even more favourable to the US. See The Military Balance 2009. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, 2009, 31–44, 394–396.

\(^{22}\) In 2009 US has maintained about 25 000 troops in South Korea and South Korean active forces consisted of 687 000 troops – some 300 000 less than North Korea; besides, South Korea had about 2330 tanks, 491 active fighter aircrafts and approximately 2330 armoured vehicles, i.e., less than North Korea. See The Military Balance 2009. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, 2009, 396–398.


\(^{24}\) However, North Korea may not approve of such estimation.
2. The History of Failure: the US Attempts to Force North Korea to Abandon its Nuclear Weapons Development Programme

After North Korea had declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993, the US took leadership in managing the crisis, which could have had a negative influence not only on the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also on the entire stability of the East Asian region. On October 21, 1994 the US and North Korea agreed in Geneva that North Korea would freeze its nuclear reactors within the course of one month after signing the agreement in exchange for the US obligation to supply North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of heavy oil annually and to construct light-water nuclear power reactors that would be able to generate 2000-mega-watt energy annually. The US also agreed to provide formal assurances to North Korea that it would not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against North Korea (if the 1994 Agreement will be implemented); in addition, North Korea committed to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea shut down the Yongbyon nuclear plant and the plutonium production reactors; however the spent nuclear fuel was not shipped from North Korea.

The Agreed Framework of 1994 between the US and North Korea officially collapsed in October 2002, when the US announced that during bilateral talks North Korea admitted to the US that it had been running a uranium-enrichment programme for nuclear weapons production. Although North Korea publicly denied these accusations, in November 2002 the US suspended the heavy oil shipments in accordance with the Agreed Framework of 1994. In response to these actions, North Korea resumed the operation of Yongbyon nuclear plant, expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors from the country and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the implementation of the Agreed Framework of 1994 had not been transparent even before its formal collapse: the US intelligence had information that North Korea was secretly running a uranium-enrichment programme; besides, these suspicions kept the US from well-timed supply of heavy oil and allocation of necessary funds for the construction of light-water nuclear reactors. Therefore, in 1998 the US initiated a review of North Korea’s policy, which was essentially justified by continuous North Korea’s activities

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in developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. The review of the US policy towards North Korea expressed a direct concern about North Korea’s possible nuclear weapon development activities; however, due to the lack of direct evidence it was recommended that North Korea make ultimate and verifiable assurances that it will not engage in the development of the nuclear weapon programme and also it compelled North Korea to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime. In case such strategy failed to be realized, it was recommended that threat management measures be taken; however, according to the report, a military operation against North Korea was dismissed at that time.

The crisis which began at the end of 2002 was temporarily solved by the agreement of September 19, 2005 among North Korea, the US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. Under this agreement, North Korea was required to give up its nuclear weapons, to freeze the nuclear development programmes, to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to re-admit the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors. The US affirmed that it had not deployed any nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula and that it had no intention of attacking North Korea with any conventional or nuclear weapons. However, shortly afterwards this agreement collapsed; in July 2006, North Korea test-fired its missiles and conducted a detonation of a nuclear device in October of the same year. This crisis was temporarily solved by the agreement of February 2007 among the six states that were mentioned above; under this agreement North Korea was obliged to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear reactors, to destroy its nuclear weapons and to present a list of the nuclear materials and facilities that it possesses. Although in the summer of 2008 the US official representatives recorded obvious progress in the implementation of the agreement of 2007 (in July 2007 the Yongbyon nuclear reactors were shut down; later in October North Korea agreed to shut down other facilities at Yongbyon), however, at

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30 Deputy Administrator William Tobey, Testimony on “The North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities” before the Senate Armed Services Committee, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/congressionaltestimony/07.31.08, 05 08 2010. In his speech Tobey mentioned that North Korea would need a year or more in order to re-establish plutonium production capacities in the Yongbyon complex.
the end of 2008 a lack of progress in the six-party talks was sensed. In spring 2009, after launching a long-range missile and after facing condemnation by the international community, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks; then on May 25 North Korea tested its second nuclear device and said that this action was conducted in order to bolster its nuclear deterrence and self-defence. The US – North Korean relations became strained after March 26, 2010 when the South Korean corvette Cheonan was sunk; this had allegedly been caused by a North Korean submarine. The war-games of the US and South Korea, which took place in August 2010, were assessed by North Korea as a demonstration of an unchanging wild desire on the part of the US to dominate the world and in the Korean peninsula.

Thus, despite the efforts of the US and the international community to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapon development programme, North Korea managed to conduct two nuclear device tests: during the first test around 0.5–0.8 kilotons of plutonium were detonated, and during the second test 2–4 kilotons were exploded (these were not large-scale tests, considering that the US and the USSR during their first nuclear tests exploded more than 20 kilotons of plutonium). According to Wade L. Huntley, during the period of 1989 – 2009 North Korea produced approximately 41–67 kilograms of plutonium; such amount could be used to produce around 2 to 16 ballistic missile warheads. However, due to disagreement whether the second nuclear test of North Korea reveals any technological progress of nuclear device production, it is also difficult to estimate the North Korean progress in manufacturing nuclear warheads which could be mounted on ballistic missiles. Although back in 1994 certain US intelligence agencies warned the US Government about North Korean capacities to mount the nuclear warhead Nodong on medium-range ballistic missiles by 2000 (or even by 1995), this was not confirmed in later official or academic sources. Nevertheless, there are claims being made that North Korea is undoubtedly making progress in producing nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles.

Analysis of the US–North Korean relations after the cold war, the dynamics of which was determined by the problem of the nuclear weapon development programme, implies some preliminary conclusions: firstly, any progress in curbing North Korea’s ambitions of nuclear weapon development is blocked by differing objectives of the US and North Korea. The US maintains

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that North Korea, first of all, has to give up its nuclear weapon development programmes, and only then it will be possible to start negotiations regarding a peace treaty (which had not been signed after the Korean war of 1950–1953) as well as security guarantees and economic aid from the US. However North Korea declares that, first of all, it demands a peace treaty and security guarantees which will only then be followed by North Korean nuclear disarmament. Secondly, it seems that in principle North Korea is not prepared to give up its nuclear weapon development programme: the evidence possessed by the international community suggests that North Korea is engaged (or is trying to engage) in several parallel programmes for producing nuclear warheads for short-range, medium-range and long-range ballistic missiles. North Korea’s obligations in agreements demonstrate the state’s capability to use diplomatic means to gain its own ends, i.e. in order to develop a nuclear shield.


3.1. Elements of US Military Superiority

3.1.1. Strategic Attitudes

The US strategic attitudes which define threats and modes of response to them not only retained many significant formulations of the past, but were also complemented by important new aspects after the defence policy review of 2009–2010, which was delivered by the administration of President Barack Obama. The review of strategic attitudes sent a few important messages to the US opponents. Firstly, the US will try to preserve its military superiority against any potential opponent and to consolidate and reform international order together with its allies and partners. Secondly, the US hopes to preserve its military superiority against its opponents by diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national defence policy: the US declared that it would not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states which are the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and act in accordance with their obligations under this Treaty. In the report of the defence policy review the US also noted that although the nuclear weapon can be used in response to non-nuclear attacks (conventional, chemical or biological), the probability of such use is heavily diminished. Such confidence of the US in its military

superiority is related to the significantly increased conventional power – it is openly declared in the Quadrennial defence and Nuclear Posture reports. Although the US recognizes an increased threat of nuclear and ballistic missile attacks, it maintains that the elements of its conventional power, such as modern and rapidly deployable forces, strikes with precision-guided weapons and global missile defence, will help to deter such threats or to respond to them efficiently.

In the US defence policy review reports, North Korea is described as a state which violated the Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty, failed to comply with the United Nations Security Council’s decisions, developed long-range missiles and resisted the efforts of the international community to solve these problems. The US declares that in concert with the international community it will use diplomatic measures to solve the North Korean nuclear issue; however it does not reject the possibility of taking other measures.

US defence policy formulations should lead North Korean leaders to draw several fundamental conclusions: firstly, the US military superiority against any potential opponent and the US aim to preserve this superiority continues to remain one of the main security dilemmas for the US opponents (including North Korea); secondly, in case North Korea refuses to comply with the demands of the US and international community to abandon its nuclear weapon and long-range missile development programmes, it may face US military force; thirdly, even after abandoning these programmes North Korea will still remain a potential target of the US nuclear strike, because it will retain the chemical and biological weapons in its arsenal.

3.1.2. Increase of US Military Superiority against North Korea

It is a very challenging task to accurately assess the US military superiority against North Korea without secret intelligence data. However, the available information about the transformation pace of the US conventional forces and status of North Korean military forces provides a pretty clear picture of the growing US military superiority over North Korea. This article argues that the increased US military superiority against North Korea is determined by the following factors: the transformation of the US conventional forces, a rapid development of the global missile defence system and theatre missile defence systems, as well as the development of Conventional Prompt Global Strike Programme.

The transformation of conventional forces, which is enabled by the development of modern information and communication and precision-guided weapons technologies, provided the US conventional forces with immeasurable

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superiority over other countries. Modern technologies made it possible for the US conventional forces to collect and process information at great speed, then make decisions and take actions in battlefield quickly using sophisticated precision-guided weapons. These technologies provide a unique capability to paralyze enemy’s forces with rapid and effective military operations and to achieve final military victory. The results of the US military operations against the regimes of Taliban (2001) and Saddam Hussein (2003) proved that such conventional forces were capable of quickly and easily defeating the enemy, who was relying on regular conventional forces and traditional conventional tactics. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan proved that it is possible to achieve military victories with much smaller conventional forces than in the past: the military operation of Iraq in 2003 was successfully executed with the conventional forces, at only half the number of those used in the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

According to the former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a military force consisting of smaller and more easily deployable combat units would ensure better use of the advantages of modern technologies, that is why the US Army has initiated the land forces reform by restructuring divisions into brigade combat teams, i.e. creating smaller and more easily deployable military units and paying more attention to the reinforcement of Special forces. The administration of President G.W. Bush has even rejected further development and testing of the weapon systems which cannot be quickly and easily redeployed to conflict zones, or which ‘devour’ money that could be used to develop light conventional forces (e.g., in 2002 the development programmes of the Crusader self-propelled howitzer and helicopter Comanche were suspended). In the beginning of the first term of G. W. Bush’s presidency, the US also made the decision to substantially increase the number of strategic transport aircrafts (C-17 Globemaster, from 120 to 190 aircrafts) as they play a big role in reinforcing the capacities of the US strategic redeployment of conventional forces: the appearance of the C-17 Globemaster was perceived as one of the most important factors of successful operations of the US conventional forces in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although critics imply that not all US military victories can be attributed to the US military transformation (e.g., the success of the US military operation in Iraq in March – April 2003 was determined by a sound preparation of coalition forces and modern technologies as well as by poor preparation of the Iraqi

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39 The US further continues the restructuring of 10 active divisions and 8 divisions of the National Guard into 76 brigade combat teams and 225 support teams.
military forces\textsuperscript{41}; whereas the final success of the operation in Afghanistan was determined by a sound interaction of land and air forces – the role of both special forces and high-accuracy weapons was significant but not determinant\textsuperscript{42), the course and results of the US military operations after the cold war show that the transformation of military conventional forces creates a huge threat for North Korean conventional forces. Americans have proven their capability to deploy large forces into regions of operation, to perfectly manoeuvre them in the battlefield and to provide them with a vast supply of precision-guided weapons. Thus, the outcome of two large-scale conventional operations was the demolition of Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regimes.

The US global missile defence system should be considered another significant element of the growing US military superiority against North Korea. Although the programme of global missile defence system development\textsuperscript{43} is not yet accomplished, Americans declare that they are capable of defending against a limited number of attacks of intercontinental ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{44} The development of a global missile defence system has been speeded up since the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 with the Soviet Union; this Treaty prohibited the development of the national missile defence. Upon declaration of the US withdrawal from the Treaty of 1972, in June 2002, the US President George W. Bush justified this decision by emphasizing the threats which come from the changing security environment and also stressed the potential threat of sporadic small-scale ballistic missile attacks from certain states and perhaps even from non-state actors. The US national missile defence against incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles is based on the \textit{Ground-based Mid-Course Defence Systems}, deployed in Fort Greely and Vanderberg military bases. Washington officially declared that thirty such systems will be operating by the end of 2010. Also, the US openly declared that it will not activate fourteen additional \textit{Ground-based Mid-Course Defence Systems} because, given current strategic environment, there is no need to hurry the missile defence development. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the US confidence in missile defence system depends solely on the successful development of the \textit{Ground-based Mid-Course Defence programme}: firstly, there is a unique integration of missile defence sensors (operating in all domains: land, sea, air, space) and missile defence interceptor systems (with different ranges), which makes it possible to provide missile defence not only for the US mainland but also for US troops deployed in other regions and US allies;


\textsuperscript{43} By the term ‘global missile defence’ the US usually defines a national missile defence system; regional missile defence systems are usually defined as theatre anti-missile systems.

secondly, the US successfully develops other missile defence systems capable of destroying missiles during their launch phase (e.g., *Air-Borne Laser System, Kinetic Energy Interceptor*)\(^{45}\), post-boost phase (e.g., *Aegis System, Aegis Ashore System*) and in their terminal phase (e.g., *Theatre High Altitude Area Defence, PAC-3*)\(^{46}\). It is important to emphasize the efforts of the Clinton, G.W. Bush and Obama administrations to involve the allies (especially in the northeast Asian region) in the development of regional missile systems.\(^{47}\) Although the US has not been successful in persuading South Korea to join the regional missile defence system developed by the US together with Japan, nevertheless South Korea may be expected some day to acquire missile defence capabilities against short-range missiles, which will enhance common US, South Korean and Japanese missile defence capabilities against North Korea.

The *Conventional Prompt Global Strike* programme, unlike the transformation of conventional forces and missile defence system, has not been implemented yet.\(^{48}\) The birth of this programme is related to the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, when Americans declared their intention to develop non-nuclear attack systems in parallel with the available nuclear attack systems (development priorities of the New Triad).\(^{49}\) The Quadrennial defence review report of 2006 notes that prompt global strike capabilities are required in order to attack fixed (not easily accessible), mobile and re-locatable targets with improved accuracy in any location of the world upon the President’s order: it is planned that these capabilities will initially consist of *Trident II-D5* ballistic missiles.\(^{50}\) It is likely that conventional ballistic missiles will not be efficient enough to destroy mobile and re-locatable targets as they are most effective in


\(^{48}\) Given that the conventional ballistic missiles (but not UAV and aircraft fighters) will become a core capability of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike.


fighting against ‘soft’\textsuperscript{51} and immobile targets; therefore the global conventional strike capabilities should also include UAV and aircraft fighters which in the near future will still remain more effective in attacking mobile and fixed targets than long-range conventional ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{52}

The National Research Council’s Committee discussed three main scenarios related to the concept of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capabilities for using long-range conventional ballistic missiles: the first scenario implies that the conventional strike is directed towards the nuclear weapon-launching system of the enemy state’s in case this state tried to threaten the US or its ally; the second scenario envisions an attack at the terrorist leaders’ meeting place or at the location of the transhipment of the weapon of mass destruction; the third scenario implies destruction of the enemy’s leadership during a larger military operation.\textsuperscript{53} All these possible scenarios for using the global conventional strike and the specifics of its development capabilities revealed some potential problems, too. The concept of a response with conventional prompt strike is based on the assumption that it is possible to plan a strike and attack an enemy within less than an hour; however, this requires accurate intelligence information and a clear chain of command and communication that is absent today\textsuperscript{54}; furthermore, the plans to re-arm a certain number of the Trident II-D5 ballistic missiles with conventional nuclear warheads can raise ambiguity and destabilize the nuclear deterrence balance among nuclear states: until now, all intercontinental ballistic missiles of the US were armed with nuclear warheads, and any missile launch of such type can be interpreted by opponents as a nuclear strike.\textsuperscript{55}

Despite this critique, the US is not likely to give up the construction of Trident II-D5 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in the Ohio-class submarines; later it may also construct other types of ballistic missiles in submarines or ground-based launch platforms. In the Quadrennial defence policy report of 2010 the US declared that it intends to carry out experiments with conventional


\textsuperscript{52} Sugden B. M., 139–140.


prompt global strike prototypes, including intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the US defence budget project for 2011, presented by President Barack Obama, the costs of conventional prompt global strike programmes comprise around 4 billion dollars; these programmes also include modernization of bombers and other types of aircrafts. It seems that the allocated part of the defence budget of 2012 for this type of programmes, which should be set after carrying out the analysis of the conventional strike capabilities development in 2010, can reflect the US ability to make quite rapid progress in the development of long-range conventional strike capabilities. According to the US analysts, in the case of the successful development of the conventional prompt global strike capabilities, the US would gain lacking conventional strike capabilities at a range of 2000 to 10000 kilometres: this means that the US would no longer be dependent on the conventional strike capabilities deployed at the military bases of allied countries.

It is difficult to claim that the US military superiority will increase due to long-range conventional strike capabilities because the option for nuclear response will remain; however the US military superiority may be noticeable against those states which have no or few nuclear weapons. This is favourable to Americans as they will always try to avoid the involvement of their own forces into military operations that cost the lives of American soldiers.

3.2. Theoretical Assessment of North Korea’s Military Power

3.2.1. Ideology of North Korean Regime: 
Son’gun Chongch’i (Military First) Policy

Kim Jong-Il replaced his father as the leader of North Korea in 1994; four years later he started to pursue policy which prioritized military affairs. The National Defence Commission became the most important collegiate institution which took the levers of decision-making from the Politburo of the Workers’ Party of Korea. According to some interpretations the new ideological attitude – “Military First” – is more likely to be the result of an inner struggle of North Korean factions (related to the takeover of power by Kim Jong-Il) than a shift of essential strategic attitudes of North Korea. However the strategic goals in the beginning of the rule of Kim Jong-Il partly changed: North Korea acknowledged (although

56 In the future the capabilities of global conventional strike may be supplemented by the developed modern weapon systems (and their launching mechanisms) such as Hypersonic Technology Vehicle, Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. See: Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact Sheet, April 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/139913.htm, 05 09 2010.
57 Ibid.
without any official declaration) that the reunification of Koreas under the flag of North Korea, under existing conditions, is not feasible and that the aims of universal communism should be substituted with the ideology of survival.\textsuperscript{59} The ideology of survival is strongly based on the arsenal of nuclear weapons: even at times when North Korea partially complied with the international agreements regarding termination and destruction of its nuclear weapon programmes, North Korea used to declare that it would keep nuclear weapons as long as the US nuclear weapons pose a threat to North Korea.\textsuperscript{60}

3.2.2. Elements of North Korea’s Conventional Military Power

Evaluation of North Korea’s conventional military power has to be based on analysis of the conventional forces and short/medium range ballistic missile capabilities. Keeping in mind that North Korea’s conventional forces (in contrast to the US) were not participating in any military operations after the Cold war, its real capabilities may be assessed analysing their general development status (if they are being transformed), a level of weapons systems modernization and a quality of military training. In the end an analysis of these aspects has to show the preparedness of North Korea’s conventional forces to fight the most modern conventional wars.

At the moment there is no proven evidence confirming the North Korean efforts to reform conventional forces because of the US conventional forces transformation. North Korean leaders looked at the successful US “Iraqi Freedom” operation as the “child’s play”, which would fail against the North Korea\textsuperscript{61}, so it is hard to believe that any initiative to start a transformation of North Korean conventional forces was launched. However, there are more convincing arguments proving that no reforms, inspired by U.S. military transformation, took place in North Korea. First of all, up to this moment North Korea has not developed or acquired the most modern information and communication technologies: North Korea has not launched any satellite into the orbit with a capability to monitor potential battlefields.\textsuperscript{62} There is no evidence that North Korea has developed or acquired modern UAV (or even combat UAV capable of destroying targets): it is believed that North Korea


\textsuperscript{60} DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman Dismisses U.S. Wrong Assertion, January 17, 2009, \url{http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm}, 05 09 2010.


\textsuperscript{62} North Korea can’t expect that other countries may come into support, except maybe Iran. However, first of all, Iran has to develop such capabilities.
in its arsenal has only Schmel type UAV\textsuperscript{63} developed by soviet constructors during the 1980s. In addition, North Korea falls behind the development of precision-guided weapons. Even though a quantity of North Korean conventional weaponry is quite impressive\textsuperscript{64}, its real conventional power suffers from very important shortcomings. Obsolete weaponry is one of the most evident problems – most of it was produced during the 1960s-1970s. For example no less than 3500 tanks are T-34, T-54/55 and T-62 models, old aircraft fighter models like II-28, Mig-15/17/19 dominates in the air forces (where only Mig-23, Mig-29 are more modern\textsuperscript{65}) and the submarine fleet is almost archaic. North Korean ground air defence systems are also obsolete because they cannot destroy high flying targets. Another problem is caused by a weakening North Korean capacity to ensure the regular combat training of its conventional forces. A severe shortage of fuel disrupts daily combat training: for example, fighter pilots are unable to fly their annual hours and fewer large scale military exercises can be arranged. Shortages of food and spare parts are also considered a huge problem limiting North Korea’s capacity to conduct military exercises and execute military operations.\textsuperscript{66} Although North Korea’s conventional forces are confronted with the above mentioned problems, these are still capable of inflicting big enough damage to US and South Korean conventional forces at the start of a military conflict: the most dangerous threat is posed by North Korean heavy artillery units located in a nearby demilitarized zone.

In contrast to deteriorating capabilities of conventional forces, the development of North Korea’s ballistic missile program is in clear progress. During the 1980s-1990s North Korea developed (by reverse-engineering soviet Scud missile technology) and deployed short-range Hwasung (range up to 700-800 km) and mid-range No-Dong (range up to 1000-1200 km) ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{67} It is believed that about 600 Hwasung and 200 No-Dong ballistic missiles are on alert regime.

From 1987-1992 North Korea started three more mid-range ballistic missile programs: Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1), Paektusan-2 (Taepodong-2) and


\textsuperscript{64} Look at footnotes 20-21.


Musudan\textsuperscript{68}. Ballistic missiles Paektusan-1 and Paektusan-2 were developed for the ranges up to 2500 km and up to 8000 km each respectively.\textsuperscript{69} At the moment there is available information about three launches of the Paektusan ballistic missiles: the first launch was made in August 1998 (Paektusan-1, flight range about 1646 km), the second one took place in July 2006 (Paektusan-2, disrupted after 40 seconds since launch: experts believe the flight range could be about 4300 km), and the third launch was executed in April 2009 (Paektusan-2, flight range was about 3200 km).\textsuperscript{70} Although no one attempt of the Paektusan-2 missile was successful, experts think that the flight range of these missiles may reach about 7000 km. According to LtGen M.D.Maples, then Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, tests of Paektusan-2 missiles in 2006 was proof of North Korea’s technical capacity to develop intercontinental ballistic missile and make that happen very soon.\textsuperscript{71}

As was previously mentioned, during the period from 1987 to 1992 North Korea initiated the Musudan missile program.\textsuperscript{72} Since North Korea never tested the Musudan missile\textsuperscript{73}, it is suspected that Russian missile engineers played a prominent role in developing this missile. North Korea may have deployed up to 20 Musudan missiles with a flight range of about 3000 km.

Assessing available open source information one may conclude that North Korea, using mid-range ballistic missiles, can reach targets in South Korea, Japan (and US military bases located in Japan territory), and Guam island in the Pacific ocean.

\textbf{3.3. Why Will North Korea Not Abandon Nuclear Weapons?}

North Korea will not abandon nuclear weapons due to the deteriorating conventional balance against the US after the Cold war. This argument is different from the nuclear deterrence theory proponents, who believe that security dilemmas force states to acquire first nuclear strike and, especially, second nuclear strike capabilities if there is an opponent threatening with nuclear weapons: North Korea’s main opponent, the U.S., has pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and have no other WMDs.

\textsuperscript{68} Musudan is a version of mid-range Soviet ballistic missile SS-N-6.
\textsuperscript{72} It is believed that year 1992 is an exact date of the start of this program.
\textsuperscript{73} Some analysts think that Paektusan-2 missile program is based on Musudan missile program. Žr. Wright D., North Korea’s Missile Program, http://www.nautilus.org/projects/dprk-policy/Wright.pdf, 02 09 2010.
For the past years North Korea’s potential to successfully confront the US in the conventional battlefield is fast declining. Firstly, North Korea has made no attempt to reform conventional forces, which afterwards would be more capable to fight the transformed US conventional forces.\textsuperscript{74} In addition, North Korea has not developed or acquired the most modern technologies, which is a prerequisite for a symmetric response to the US military transformation. Secondly, North Korea’s conventional weaponry is obsolete and some generations behind the US conventional weapons. North Korean air defence, which is critical against the transformed US conventional capabilities, would suffer exactly because of the old air defence systems: American fighters and bombers would dominate in North Korea’s airspace with precision-guided weapons destroying military infrastructure and eventually causing paralysis of North Korea’s land and special operation forces. Thirdly, North Korea is losing the capacity to inflict damage on US military forces in South Korea and Japan using short and mid-range ballistic missiles: South Korea and Japan (supported by the US) are developing missile defence capabilities, and more US battleships, which can be deployed near the North Korea, are equipped with \textit{Aegis} missile defence systems. The probability that North Korea would attack islands in the Pacific Ocean under the US control by its mid-range missiles with conventional warheads (of \textit{Paektusan-2}, \textit{Mudusan} type) is low as the total number of missiles is limited, and precision-guided technology is still underdeveloped. Furthermore, it would be against the basic military rationale – the potential benefits could be significantly outweighed by the disproportionate tough US response. At the same time, there is no sound evidence that North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (of \textit{Paektusan} type) could reach Alaska (5000-6000 kilometers distance) or the Eastern Coast of the US (more than 8000 kilometers distance). Moreover, even if a Korean intercontinental ballistic missile was launched, its danger would very likely be neutralized by the US national missile defense system. Fourthly, the US long-range conventional strike programs pose a direct threat to North Korea’s ballistic missile launch bases and their control centers, nuclear weapons development facilities as well as other vital military infrastructures (there is no data on the existing North Korean missile defense systems as well as on those systems under development). In the light of these arguments, it is doubtful if North Korea could even identify intercontinental ballistic missiles attacks against its military infrastructure and react accordingly.

\textit{Dynamics of conventional balance between the US and North Korea, which reflects continuous negative trends for the later, will force North Korea to develop further WMDs, especially nuclear weapons programs.\textsuperscript{75} This interpretation is supported by North Korea regime type’s argument (it is an additional...}}

\textsuperscript{74} Also, there is no available information concerning North Korea’s efforts to prepare assymetric measures to fight the U.S. conventional forces (for example, guerilla warfare tactics).
\textsuperscript{75} It is highly likely that North Korea clearly understands negative trends in the conventional balance between its and the U.S. forces, so an assumption that North Korea still believes in a successful military engagement with the U.S. forces is rather weak, notwithstanding North Korea leaders’ approach to Iraq war in 2003 as a „child’s game“.
very important argument helping to explain North Korea’s decision to seek nuclear weapons). North Korea is a totalitarian communist state, which has an extended record of human rights violations, and which has no respect for democratic ideals. Therefore, the current North Korean regime could never feel safe, even if it would abandon nuclear and other weapons of massive destruction, and sign a peace treaty with South Korea and the US. Saddam Hussein regime’s demolition in 2003 showed that North Korea would still probably remain a target for the US military intervention. North Korea’s “nuclear disarmament story” after the cold war is a perfect illustration of the true intentions of the current North Korea’s regime: all international agreements, which expressed North Korea’s commitment to discontinue developing nuclear weapons and dismantle nuclear facilities, failed in the end. Both Russia and China, the states thought to have a considerable influence on North Korea, are unable (or do not want) to exercise it against North Korea’s nuclear weapon policy.

Conventional balance trends between North Korea and the US and the additional supportive arguments provide a good background for some theoretical assumptions and forecasts. It is highly likely that North Korea, assessing the balance between the US and North Korean conventional forces, will not stop developing nuclear weapon programs but even speed up their development based on the available financial resources, direct and indirect foreign support (from countries like Iran, Pakistan, Syria, may be China and Russia) and technological progress. Also, the implementation of the US missile defence projects will spark North Korean attempts to initiate massive long-range ballistic missile production and complete the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. It is possible that North Korea will stop producing nuclear weapons when reliable capabilities for a minimum nuclear deterrence will be in place (may be some 20-30 intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads): that can happen around year 2025. This assumption suggests that the US military intervention against the North Korea can be expected around 2020-2025.

Conclusions

During the past several years in a number of academic publications there have been attempts to show that North Korea is not an irrational international actor, thus a well-designed and applied negotiation strategy may push North Korea to make a decision to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. This article provides a different interpretation of the US capabilities to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon development program, which argues that the conventional balance between the US and North Korean conventional forces

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76 This article has no intention to prove that change of the conventional balance between the U.S. and North Korea is the only factor, which influences North Korea’s nuclear weapon policy – no doubt, North Korea’s regime type is another quite important explanatory variable, however, it is not analyzed in depth in this article.
is one of the most important factors influencing North Korea’s continuous pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Since the end of the Cold war the conventional balance between the US and North Korea has constantly been moving in an unfavorable direction for the North Koreans. Transformation of the US conventional forces, enabled by the modern information and communication technologies, the long-range conventional strike programs, a continuous and rapid development of the global missile defence architecture caused a fast growing U.S. offensive conventional advantage against the North Korea’s conventional forces. At the moment North Korea has no real ballistic missile capabilities to be used in US mainland attacks: the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles is not finished yet and miniaturization of nuclear warheads is probably still far from complete. North Korea’s decision to abandon nuclear and other WMD programs, staying only with continuously deteriorating conventional capabilities, would probably bring the ruling North Korea’s regime to the verge of collapse: it may be that the US leaders would still play with idea of overthrowing the ruling regime and making it work, especially if North Korea violated human rights and refused to implement political reforms. These arguments lead to the conclusion that North Korea, instead of stopping nuclear weapons programs, will speed up the development of both nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in order to acquire a minimum nuclear deterrence capability.

The interpretation that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons due to the US offensive conventional advantage against its conventional defense presented in this article could come under discussion on various grounds. The primary source of criticism lies in theories which hold other than realistic assumptions for explaining interstate relations. The attempt to evaluate the impact of the US military transformation on the defense policies of other actors on international stage, however, is a novel and challenging one. The case of North Korea could be perceived as especially favorable for analyzing the impact of the US military transformation on interstate relations as the current US military transformations are mainly targeted at traditional conventional capabilities, which are actually the basis of North Korea’s military power. As the data on North Korea’s military capabilities and military exercises is of limited availability, it is particularly difficult to evaluate all the possible forms of Korea’s response to the US military transformation. In addition, North Korea’s current political and military posture (the type of the political regime, continuous inclination to non-comply with international agreements) leaves little room for doubt that the toughest response to the advancements in the US military capabilities is likely to be more rapid development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile programs. In view of that, the US and international community’s attempts to encourage North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons development programs is unlikely to be successful.

Lithuania – United Kingdom, September-December 2010
Changing European Security Space
The New European External Action Service: Between Ambition and Compromise

The article analyses institutional reforms of the common foreign and security policy initiated by the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to new institutions – the office of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Actions Service. Due to the fact that these institutions have already been labeled as the “EU Diplomatic Service”, the functioning of the national diplomatic service, which is considered an ideal model of the contemporary international affairs actor for the implementation of foreign policy, has been taken as a reference point for this analysis. The author seeks to find out whether the amendment of the fundamental ES existence-period document in essence means the institutionalization of the EU foreign policy that the use of the term “diplomatic service” presupposes, and whether legal and institutional changes will guarantee the consistency and harmony of the EU common foreign and security policy. The article highlights many contradictions and undeveloped decisions of the reform. It is complicated to speak about the birth of the EU diplomatic service because, in spite of all innovations, EU foreign policy has essentially remained a national prerogative.

Introduction

After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) again experienced great attention from politicians, diplomats and foreign policy observers. This is associated with the declared EU attempt to strengthen its influence in the world, seeking to be not only the largest trade partner and development assistance supplier in the world, but also a global player.

Traditionally, in the discourse of political scientists, several factors that will determine the effectiveness of CFSP are named. The first factor is related to the institutional architecture. Michael E. Smith states that weak institutionalization-
tion of foreign and security policy is perhaps the greatest problem of the EU. This statement is based on the assumption that there exists a two-way link between the institutional development and behavior of states. When institutions are weak, their impact on behavior of states is limited. When institutions are strong, have clear goals and unambiguous rules, the behavior of states is correspondingly adjusted. A differing impact of institutions on behavior is particularly distinct when CFSP is compared with the EU economic and monetary union. In it decisions are made and implemented by the supranational institution – the European Commission (EC); therefore, the behavior of states is predictable. There has been nothing similar, at least until now, in the area of CFSP. The second factor underlines the importance of the commonality of the Member States’ national interests. As Ramūnas Vilpišauskas points out, the main reasons of CFSP weakness and respectively the inability to adopt a united position concerning important foreign policy issues, should be sought not so much in the institutional architecture as in differences of the national interests of the Member States. This would mean that a genuinely successful and effective CFSP is feasible only in that case if the Member States will manage to agree on common national interests and ways and methods to implement or defend them. The third most often indicated factor is a common identity. For example, Dirk Jacobs and Robert Maier, who devoted their study to identity problems, came to the conclusion that a common European identity is the essential premise in seeking a politically and economically strong and militarily capable Europe in the world. In the authors’ opinion, the problem with the formation of the common European identity is that it is difficult to define due to its multilayered and multifaceted nature.

Nothing essential has happened in the past years in the common EU identity or in the common EU interest formation areas that would justify talking about the strengthening of CFSP. Therefore, hopes for a more effective EU policy in the area of foreign policy should be linked to institutional changes initiated by the Lisbon Treaty. It is known that the Lisbon Treaty, otherwise known as the Reform Treaty, came into force on December 1, 2009, and was aimed at initiating institutional EU reforms and improving work methods, first and foremost, in the area of common foreign and security policy.

In itself, this does not prove the advantage of the institutional factor in forming CFSP with respect to other factors. To decide which factor is the most important in developing CFSP, is not the aim of this article. They all have their own logic and purpose. Algirdas Gricius and Kęstutis Paulauskas tried to link them up, pointing out that a clearly articulated and globally projected EU CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests steaming from

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3 Vilpišauskas, R., ‘‘Has the voice of Europe become better heard in the world? And that of Lithuania in Europe?’’, http://myep.delfi.lt, 04 06 2010.

as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge.\(^5\).

In any case, the institutional factor is important; therefore, before undertaking further research in what determines or will determine CFSP, it is necessary to adequately estimate legal provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Besides, attention to the issues of CFSP institutional restructuring was also drawn by how the institutional restructuring was interpreted not only by mass media, but also by EU officials themselves.

One of the results of the Lisbon Treaty-initiated reforms was a new EU office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (further – the High Representative or HR) and a newly established institution – the European External Action Service (further the EEAS) – that would help implement the functions assigned to him. Both observers and the High Representative of the Union Catherine Ashton, having stepped behind the wheel of the new service, did not lose time in calling these innovations the EU Diplomatic Service\(^6\).

It is important to pay heed to C. Ashton’s words because the use of the term “diplomatic service”, if we understand it in terms of traditional diplomacy, undoubtedly presupposes the institutionalization of foreign policy towards which, at first, supporters of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and later, after its demise, those of the Lisbon Treaty, clearly strove for. And there is more. Such a term can be perceived as a specific allusion to the birth of a new state and its attempts to get established in the international arena. Such an allusion arises due to the dominant inclination to until now associate diplomacy with the international system, established after the Westphalia Peace Treaty, whose main legal entities are on territorial basis formed states with a clearly expressed power centre, and a source of sovereignty and foreign affairs of which are overseen by ministries of foreign affairs. In other words, guarding such understanding the right and duty to execute diplomatic functions only sovereign states enjoy. And although the modern international system has long become different – it is unimaginable without international organizations or even other non-governmental actors, while ministries of foreign affairs of sovereign states are no more the only organizations performing diplomatic activity on the international scale, – it is said that some organizational qualities of common diplomatic logic and diplomacy remain unchanged. Diplomacy is primarily perceived as activity associated with the implementation and coordination of foreign policy\(^7\). It is institutionalized and organized, while concrete activity is carried out by services that make up an integral organizational unit in which activity elements manifest themselves in clear and non-recurrent forms and functions. In other words, in the institutional architecture of the political

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entity, diplomatic services are acknowledged as primary institutions responsible for the implementation and in part shaping of foreign policy. Finally, diplomacy is practiced by a political entity, seeking to establish or represent its place in the international arena as well as influence international political, economic, legal and other structures within a narrower or wider geographical area – an existing or seeking this subject of the international legal system, the fact of the existence of which is acknowledged and a proposition to establish appropriate-level international relations is expressed by already established actors of the international system.

Consequently, if the functioning of the national diplomatic service is considered an ideal model of modern international relations actor for the implementation of foreign policy, declarations about the birth of the EU diplomatic service call, whether one likes it or not, for a certain comparison, hoping for a new qualitative leap in the EU common foreign and security policy.

The article is divided into four parts. The first part surveys the road of the EU institutional development in the area of foreign policy before the Lisbon Treaty. This part seeks to identify the main drawbacks that have precluded the EU from calling itself a diplomatic player. Taking into consideration these findings, the second part assesses common provisions of the Lisbon Treaty concerning the Union’s foreign policy – competencies, objectives as well as implementation instruments and principles. The task is to evaluate the scope of the qualitative change, in comparison with the provisions of documents of the previous lifespans of the EU. In the third and the fourth parts, the new institutional architecture of CFSP and organizational aspects of EEAS will be examined, comparing how and if they correspond to the organizational principles and traditions of the diplomatic services of nation states. Research results are summarized in the concluding section.

1. EU, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy before the Lisbon Treaty

When U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked: “Whom do I call when I want to talk to Europe?” he might have been puzzling over such a dilemma: the U.S. understands the need to talk with Europe, since it would like to uphold European integration processes that it initiated itself, realizes the added value of Europe in implementing certain foreign policy tasks of the U.S., yet he was not sure whether anybody in Europe wanted to talk about the issues of common foreign policy, although it seemed that debating whether to call or not implied that such ambitions were present in Europe; however, it

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was not clear whom specifically he should talk to and through the assistance of what structures. This perhaps somewhat simplified interpretation of Kissinger’s intent well reflects the complicated relationship of foreign policy and diplomacy that existed in the EU before the Lisbon Treaty.

Since its very inception, the EU has been an odd international relations actor, while its relationship with foreign policy and diplomacy has been ambiguous and often even deceptive. Though the essence of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community, the EU predecessor, was economic integration and foreign policy did not fall under the competence of the European Community, the Treaty of Rome, by creating a common trade policy and providing for the possibility to sign association treaties with third countries, de facto granted the Community an international role. Moreover, to strengthen this role and to defend its interests, the European Community, from the very beginning, employed economic and even diplomatic instruments. Though the objective of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), established in 1970, was only foreign policy “consultations”, later they developed into foreign policy “coordination” or even “common policy” – to such an extent that some observers treated EPC as a unique diplomatic experiment – “a model of the most advanced collective diplomacy in the world”. Finally, though the EU did not have the status of a legal entity, and some observers even claimed that the EU does not “exist” in the international arena, the majority of political entities in international public law acknowledged the EU as a fully-entitled (and important) participant of the international system. And not only acknowledged, but also acted as a powerful force, making the EU look for possibilities to implement self-declared or imposed on it tasks. This should not cause surprise, because the very project of the integration of Europe was a political project in the success of which the United States of America took an interest and were for a greater role of the EU in the international arena. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kissinger wanted to call Europe. The problem was that there was no one to answer the phone. There was also no common organized

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9 For example, in 1955, before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, European coal and steel community established in London its first mission.
11 For example, this was stated by the Reflection Group which was assigned the preparation of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
12 Schoutteete, P., Andoura, S., *The Legal personality of the European Union*, Working Paper, Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, 2007. The authors claim that the basis for that was set as early as 1949 in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the status of the United Nations. Having analyzed the Charter of the UN and subsequent treaties, the practice of the functioning duties and obligations of the organization., the International Court of Justice stipulated that UN members „by entrusting certain functions to the organization, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged“ . In the opinion of the Court, the rights and obligations of the international entity depend on „purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice“. 
structure for the implementation of foreign policy. In spite of the gravitation, affected by internal and external forces, towards the Community, cooperation in foreign policy remained exceptionally the business of the Member States, while diplomatic ambitions of the Community were confined to the areas of trade and assistance. EPC did not belong to the competence of the Communities; therefore, the institutions of the Communities – the Commission or the Assembly (later having become the Parliament of Europe) – did not actually participate in the political cooperation of Europe. EPC had no permanent organizational structure and no bureaucratic apparatus, the rules of conduct were obscure, instruments for common actions limited. As M.E. Smith claims, perhaps the only thing about which the ministers of foreign affairs of the Member States agreed was that EPC should remain strictly separated from the supra-state procedures of European Communities and that EPC format is not a suitable place to discuss security or defense issues\textsuperscript{14}. Although the EPC system kept evolving, forms and means of practical cooperation grew in scope and, after the Single Act of Europe came into force in 1987, EPC was officially registered and legalized as a separate area of intergovernmental cooperation of EC states, the attitude of the Member States concerning the autonomy of foreign policy and national security matters remained unchanged. A certain leap forward took place in 1992, after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, when EPC was changed into CFSP while European Communities and CFSP (as well as cooperation in justice and interior matters) were legally connected into one new institutional framework, known as the “European Union”. CFSP became a constituent part of the EU structure, its second pillar, for the first time certain objectives corresponding to the doctrine of foreign policy were formulated – to seek common values and primary interests, guarantee the independence and integrity of the Union, strengthen the security of the Union, maintain peace and strengthen international security. However, in essence, governments of the EU states remained responsible for the implementation of this policy. In other words, though CFSP became part of the EU, yet on the operational level, it further functioned more like the EPC mechanism in which the institutions of the Communities had a limited role. Essentially, the only institution of the Community which played a somewhat more significant role in CFSP was the Commission to which a representative role in political dialogues with third countries and a consultative-nature role in the decision-making mechanism of CFSP was provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. And though the difference between CFSP and EPC was obvious, because EPC \textit{strove} for the Member States to execute common policy, whereas CFSP specifically \textit{demanded} that the EU countries accept and implement common policy\textsuperscript{15}, the implementation of this


\textsuperscript{15} Article J.1 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty points out that “The union and its The The Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy”. It was signed on 7 February 1992 and came into effect on 1 November 1993. http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter1/dokpaiseska.showdoc_l?p_id=32156, 15 08 2010
provision fell primarily on the shoulders of the state chairing the Union. CFSP did not become more effective, since decision-making called for a unanimous vote of all Member States, while the historical data of CFSP activity indicates that a unanimous opinion on issues significant for foreign and national security are reached particularly rarely. Therefore, the EU constantly encountered the chronic problem of fast decision-making as well as the absence of a common EU position on the international arena which often determined a vague and weak position of the organization in the global world.

Attempts to consolidate a particular coherence within CFSP and also the establishment of the office of CFSP High Representative in 1997 did not achieve the desired result. On the contrary, judging from the perspective of third countries, it became still more complicated. Third countries found it really difficult to understand how the EU is represented in the international arena, when highest-level meetings with EU countries partners or regions partners were conducted by the chairing member state, the High Representative and the Chairman of the European Commission. Besides, the activity of individual Community institutions, which carried out functions assigned to them according to their competence, first of all in the areas of trade, enlargement, development and humanitarian assistance, brought additional confusion to external relations.

It is obvious that this situation could be changed only by initiating institutional reforms. The enlargement of the EU, the growing pressure for the EU to undertake a more active role in foreign policy and the ideas, that strengthened at the end of the 1990s, to create a federal EU, stimulated discussions about the necessity to establish a structure for the formation and implementation of CFSP. The first real attempt to introduce elements of such common structure surfaced in the European Convention held in 2002–2003 and its propositions were later reflected in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. This document provided for the establishment of the office of the EU Foreign Affairs Minister and – in order to guarantee that the functions of this official are carried out – the European External Action Service. However, when the referendums in 2005 in France and the Netherlands rejected the project of the EU Constitution, a “period of reflection” was announced. One of the most important reasons that caused the downfall of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was named as fear to hand over the issues of national security and foreign policy to supranational EU institutions. The period of discussions over the future of the EU ended in the decision of the EU states claiming that it is necessary, in one form or another, to renew a set of fundamental principles according to which the EU is governed. The result was the Lisbon Treaty that was signed in 2007 by Heads of EU States and Governments and came into force at the end of 2009. In part, it amended the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
2. Basic Principles of the Lisbon Treaty on Foreign Policy

2.1. The Status and Limits of Competences of the Legal Entity

The review of CFSP development indicates that one of the most important reasons that precluded the creation of common EU foreign policy and the institution for the implementation of this policy, was the reluctance of the Member States to hand over their competences concerning foreign policy and national security issues to the EU. This, in its own turn, had a decisive impact on how the Member States are inclined to treat the EU in the international scope.

The EU claims to become a full-fledged diplomatic actor were for the first time formulated in the Maastricht Treaty, pointing out that the purpose of the EU is “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense”[16]. However, the status of the legal entity was not granted to the EU by the Maastricht Treaty. This should be considered a paradox, because logic states that without legal personality it is impossible to establish identity.

The Treaty of Lisbon resolved this ambiguity but only in part. Only in part, because, though in the Treaty of Lisbon it is ascertained that “[t]he Union shall have legal personality” (Article 47 TEU)[17] thus endowed with powers to sign international treaties or join international organizations, at the same time the Lisbon Treaty confirmed the “Declaration concerning the legal personality of the European Union” (No. 24), which notes that “the fact that the European Union has a legal personality will not in any way authorize the Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.”[18]

Yet it still remains unclear where the Union competencies in the area of foreign policy begin and end. In the part defining the competences of the Union (Article 2 Point 4 TFEU) it is only said that “[t]he Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy”[19]. Thus, there is no reference either to the exclusive competence, when it is only the European Union that can enact legal acts and the Member States can only implement them; or to the shared competence when the Member States can pass legally binding acts in case the European Union did not do that; or to the supportive competence when the EU passes acts intended to support or supplement the policy of the

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19 Ibid, p. 50.
Member States. As W. Wessels points out, CFSP in this respect is unique, because in other areas of policy limits of competences are clearly defined\textsuperscript{20}. The exclusivity of CFSP is still more confirmed by the provision, that CFSP “is subject to specific rules and procedures” (Article 24 TEU)\textsuperscript{21}.

It remains unclear how the Union intends to define competences in CFSP area. Theoretically the field of the EU diplomatic service might completely disappear because the “Declaration in relation to the delimitation of competences” (No.18) emphasizes: “in accordance with the system of division of competences between the Union and the Member States as provided for in the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”\textsuperscript{22}.

They Lisbon Treaty did not confer on the European Union any additional exclusive powers. In the Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy (No 14) it is clearly stated that “the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament”\textsuperscript{23}. Differently from the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty does not hold a single article establishing the superiority of the law of the European Union over the national law in the area of CFSP. Similarly, the Lisbon Treaty did not create state-like symbols, for example a flag or an anthem. Also, such concepts as “constitution”, “law”, “minister of foreign affairs”, used in the Constitutional Treaty were removed.

In general in the Treaty many defense-related provisions with respect to the EU legal entity and competencies were established. One of them, inscribed in Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy (No.13), it is stated that “the provisions in the Treaty on European Union covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the creation of the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of an External Action Service, do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organizations”\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid, p. 344
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid, p. 343
\textsuperscript{24}Declarations No.13 and No.14 on common foreign and security policy, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, p. 343.
2.2. CFSP Objectives and Tasks

Another feature of the situation before the Lisbon Treaty was the absence of clearly articulated objectives in the area of foreign policy and a program for the implementation of this policy. Without a clearly defined CFSP, the institution of a fully-fledged diplomatic service is practically unimaginable. What do provisions of the Lisbon Treaty stipulate on this issue?

It is recorded in the Preamble of the Lisbon Treaty that the Member States have determined “to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense in accordance with the provisions of the Article 42 TEU, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world”\(^\text{25}\). It is possible to decide what the objective to reinforce the European identity could mean on the grounds of another provision recorded in the Preamble – the EU will draw inspiration from “the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inalienable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”\(^\text{26}\).

In general, judging from the emphasis on values and normative foreign policy objectives, the EU diplomacy should exceptionally follow values-based principles “which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”\(^\text{27}\) (Article 21 TEU). This article also lends itself to the conclusion that the EU shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with only those countries, and international, regional or global organizations which also share the referred to principles\(^\text{28}\).

Value-related ambitions can also be discerned in other objectives presented in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, indicating that the Union will define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

- safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
- consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations

\(^{25}\) Ibid, p. 16.
\(^{26}\) Ibid, p. 15.
\(^{27}\) Ibid, p. 28.
\(^{28}\) Ibid, p. 28.
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
• foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
• encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
• help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
• assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and
• promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance29.

An article has been written in the same vein, which describes the manner of the Union’s relationship with the wider world. (Article 3 Point 5 TEU). In addition to other things, it states that “in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens”30. The reference to the protection of citizens is a new element in common foreign and security policy. It might mean consular protection; however, this provision first of all appeared due to the demand by France to establish protection from consequences of the globalization31, which also indicates a clearly expressed value-related aspect.

Notwithstanding that the objectives identified in the Lisbon Treaty raise questions as to the possibilities of their implementation, within the context of this article, it is important that the provisions of the Treaty indicate that the EU identifies itself not only as an economic bloc, but also as a certain political power, capable of disseminating and seeking to disseminate its ideas beyond the geographical limits of the EU. To this end, it first of all plans to employ diplomatic and political means; however, a military component also emerges in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union stipulates that, in order to ensure the operational capacity of the Union, necessary civilian and military assets should be drawn, so that they may be used on missions outside the Union. Article 43 specifies that such missions comprise joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization

29 Ibid, p. 28-29
operations. It is also pointed out that all these missions may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

The provision concerning Solidarity is important. Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union introduces the Solidarity clause which stipulates that “the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. The Treaty also provides for a solidarity clause of a defensive nature; however, more complex procedures are applied for its implementation and the Parliament of Europe should be informed (Article 222 Point 3 TFEU).

Summarizing the objectives and tasks of CFSP in the Lisbon Treaty, it is possible to claim that they are both ambitious and vague. Ambitious due to their “missionary” nature and expansiveness for the implementation of which traditional and new diplomatic means and methods, effective management and a corresponding budget would be necessary. Vague because they carry no meaning as to how the concrete agenda of the EU CFSP would be shaped. For instance it fails to answer whether and how the EU will develop relations with states whose scale of values is different, but with respect to which it has a distinct pragmatic interest.

2.3. Instruments and Principles of CFSP Implementation

Another thing that commands attention is the discrepancy between the ambitious objectives set for CFSP and legal instruments entrusted to the Union for the implementation of CFSP. The experience of the EU integration processes indicates that the greatest success attends those policies whose implementation is consolidated by a legal base – regulations or directives. In the area of CFSP such a possibility is not provided for: Article 24 of the TEU stipulates that for common foreign and security policy “the adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded”. CFSP implementation instruments that the Union has at its disposition are provided for in Article 25 of the Treaty of European Union which reads that:

the Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by:
(a) defining the general guidelines;
(b) adopting decisions defining
   (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union;
   (ii) positions to be taken by the Union;
   (iii) arrangements for the implementation
   of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii); and by

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33 Ibid, p. 148
(c) strengthening systematic cooperation between the Member States in the conduct of policy.\footnote{Ibid, p. 31.}

It is also important to note that the Treaty has no provision for common strategy and confines itself to a less obliging formulation stating that “the European Council shall identify […] the Union’s strategic interests, objectives and define general guidelines” (Article 26 TEU).\footnote{Ibid, p. 31.}

For the execution of operational action, the EU diplomatic service can also expect other means which, alongside their duration and the conditions for their implementation, will have to be laid down by the Council (Article 28 TEU). There is also a provision stipulating that for the implementation of CFSP national and Union resources can be used (Article 26 Point 3 TEU). However, within the context of this research, the most significant conclusion is that the most important instruments, identified in the Treaty for the execution of common foreign and security policy, fall into the domain of Council competencies.

It is obvious that success will depend not on the instruments but conduct and principles of the Member States – the commitment of the Member States to unreservedly support the Union’s CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and comply with the Union’s action in this area as well as refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations (Article 24 Point 3 TEU).

Perhaps the only more important novelty is that now a more flexible voting order for CFSP decisions has been set forth: individual states are allowed to abstain, decisions can be adopted by qualified majority or most of the states have the right to operate independently, yet decisions with military implications or those in the area of defense are still required to be adopted unanimously.

3. The New Institutional Architecture of CFSP

Generally, the implementation of foreign policy of sovereign states is clearly regulated and defined. And although it differs, depending on the political system of the state, decision-making and implementation of decisions, the system is clear. A member of the Cabinet of Ministers—most frequently the Minister of Foreign Affairs—is responsible for the formation and implementation of foreign policy. In the institutional architecture of state governance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes a high place in compliance with its powers, while its head in the Cabinet of Ministers is considered in many countries as second office with respect to its significance (in coalition governments, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister). Ministers of Foreign Affairs are traditionally also responsible for
many diplomatic functions, e. g., receiving of leaders from foreign countries and diplomatic visits to other countries.

The essence of the EU institutional reforms was also to make the architecture of foreign policy clearer, to pool resources necessary for foreign policy, thus enhancing the effectiveness of CFSP. The main actors and competencies of the new institutional CFSP architecture after the Lisbon Treaty are reflected in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Commission</th>
<th>The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security policy</th>
<th>The European Union Foreign Affairs Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a member of the EC, the HR can only be appointed with the consent of the President.</td>
<td>- HR = one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission’s President whose functions in the Commission are:</td>
<td>- HR = Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of competences of the Commission:</td>
<td>- be responsible in the Commission for its commitments in the external relations area</td>
<td>- chairs the Foreign Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- commerce</td>
<td>- coordinate within the Commission other aspects of the Union’s external actions</td>
<td>- initiates and formulates possible decisions for the Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- neighborhood and development</td>
<td>Being a member of the Commission, the HR is responsible for the decision of the European Parliament on no-confidence in the Commission</td>
<td>- convenes an extraordinary meeting within 48 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission can submit joint proposals in other areas of external actions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Representatives of the HR (EEAS) chair:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- working groups (with reservations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy and Security Committee (PSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- head EUSR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

European Parliament
Twice a year discusses progress in CFSP area
Can submit inquiries and recommendations to the HR and the FAC Committee of Foreign Affairs

Figure 1. Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty

In comparison to the institutional architecture of CFSP before the establishment of the Treaty of Lisbon, the greatest changes are associated with the introduction of the offices of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the President of the European Council. Also a new institution was established – the European External Action Service – whose objective is to assist the High Representative in executing his function, alongside changes in place and subordination of other CFSP actions-related elements, such as the Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations (DG-Relex), Political Planning and Early Warning Unit (policy Unite), and defense policy-related units – Civilian–Military Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Combat Capability (CPCC), military personnel (EUMP), Situation Centre (SitCen) as well as in Policy and Security Committee (PSC), the main institution until then, which assisted the Council in shaping CFSP and ESDP and in some other working groups of the Council as well as EU special representatives (EUSR).
3.1. The High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

According to the project, the central institution in the new CFSP institutional architecture had to be the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy. This office only partly corresponds to the former post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy because it is not only the title that differs (provisions for the “European Union” and “foreign affairs” surface) but also the competences and the place in the architecture. These attributes, practically unchanged, were transferred from the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, though the inherent in the constitutional treaty office of the “Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Union” was replaced by a more neutral office of the “high representative”.

The first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy became a representative of the United Kingdom, Baroness Catherine Ashton. Based on the provisions of the treaty, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the Commission President appointed her to this office (Article 18 Point 1 TEU). The European Council may end her term of office by the same procedure. In addition to that the HR, at the same time being one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission President, is a subject to a vote of approval by both the President of the Commission (Article 18 Point 1 TEU) and the European Parliament (Article 17 Point 7 TEU).

Pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, she is assigned to execute functions which until now, in the order of rotation for the length of six months, used to be carried out by the chairing Member State, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy/Secretary General of the EU Council and a member of the Commission responsible for external relations. As a member of the Commission, the High Representative fulfils the duties of the Vice-President of the Commission. Using the EU jargon, the HR wears as many as three hats, and that makes the CFSP architecture quite complicated.

Based on Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on European Union, the High Representative is assigned certain tasks:

- to conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defense policy (CSDP);
- to preside over the Foreign Affairs Council;
- to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action;
- to be responsible in the Commission for its commitments in the area of external relations;
- to coordinate in the Commission other aspects of the Union’s external actions;
- to conduct political dialogue with third countries and express the Union’s position in international organizations and at international conferences.
Thus, the HR has responsibilities related to leadership, initiative, the submission of proposals, coordination and representation. The HR will have a significant challenge, namely, to ensure the set policy direction and its support by consistent use of EU resources and national assets, adhering to the decision making order foreseen in the Treaty. The Treaty presupposes that the task of the HR is not to manage different measures for the Union’s external actions, but to ensure their coherent application.

3.2. The European Council and the President of the European Council

At the strategic level, the main measures for the Union’s external actions are concentrated within the European Council. In other words, the Council plays a leading role in the area of CFSP. In the Lisbon Treaty, the Council is formally acknowledged as an EU institution which “provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development” and defines its “general political direction and priorities” (Article 15 Point 1 of the TEU)\(^{37}\). These competences of the European Council within the area of CFSP are reiterated in Article 26, Point 1 TEU with a supplement which states that the Council also defines common foreign and security policy, including defence related matters as well as the Union’s strategic interests and tasks\(^{38}\). However, it does not exercise legislative functions and meets only twice every six months, although when necessary because of international events, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council may be convened “to define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of such developments” (Article 26, Point 1 TEU )\(^{39}\). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Council will not have a major influence on day-to-day foreign matters. In this respect, the position of the President of the European Council is of greater significance. It is a new position designed to improve continuity and consistency of work. Long-term chairing has replaced the former six-month rotation system. The President is elected by qualified majority of the European Council for a 30-month term and may be reelected.

The role of the President of the European Council in CFSP is defined by Article 15, Point 6 of the Treaty on European Union: “The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”\(^{40}\). This provision raises the issue of the interaction between the President of the European Council and the HR and particularly the wording “at his level” and “in that capacity”.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, p. 23.
\(^{38}\) Ibid, p. 31.
\(^{39}\) Ibid, p. 31.
\(^{40}\) Ibid, p. 23.
As compared with the functions of the HR provided for in the Treaty, specific responsibilities of the President of the European Council in the area of CFSP are unclear. The Treaty only identifies that the President of the European Council must chair the Council and ensure preparation for its work as well as “shall endeavor to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council”41 which can imply both ordinary cooperation and leadership. However, since both the HR and the President of the European Council are new positions and there has been no precedent of their cooperation, in many cases their relationship will depend on personal ambitions and the interpretations of their mandate. It cannot be excluded that both officials may seek to consolidate their status and role in the area of external actions at the expense of each other. The provision that after every meeting of the European Council, its President must present a report to the European Parliament (Article 15, Point 6 TEU) also leads to some ambiguities regarding their responsibility, although it is the HR’s responsibility to inform the EP about the developments in CFSP.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of administrative capabilities, it will be more difficult for the President of the European Council to manage CFSP affairs because in his work he will rely on the General Secretariat of the Council, whose scope and diplomatic experience cannot equal the EEAS. Besides, during the implementation of the institutional reform, some important functions of the Secretariat related to external activities were limited while transferring them to the realm of the EEAS.

3.3. The Foreign Affairs Council

On the basis of the general guidelines and strategic directions defined by the European Council, common foreign and security policy is shaped and decisions necessary for defining and implementing this policy are made by the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 16 Point 6 TEU). Key measures for external actions by the Union are within the competence of this particular Council. Like in the case of the European Council, this once again proves that, in essence, EU governments are still responsible for foreign and security policy; however, unlike previous practice, foreign affairs will be monitored not by a Member State chairing the Council on a rotational basis, but by the HR. It is a very significant innovation, the importance of which is also emphasized by the fact that the Presidency of other Council configurations will be held by Member State representatives in the Council on the basis of rotation (Article 16, Point 9 TEU). In terms of the institutional structure, such division of competences raises a number of questions regarding coherence of foreign policy. It is not yet clear what will be the ultimate role of the chairing state within CFSP and whether no friction between different actors will be caused, because before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, it was one of the key areas of the activity of chairing

41 Ibid, p. 23
states. Another fact that raises concern is that even though by the Lisbon Treaty a decision was made to divide the former General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) into the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), thus seeking to eliminate a possible collision between the chairing state and the HR, it is very difficult to draw a clear boundary between the competences of these councils. To answer the question where today traditional foreign policy and the area of diplomats’ activity end and where general affairs begin and vice versa is extremely difficult. This will have implications for the CFSP related activity center – the Political and Security Committee (PSC), chairing of which was handed over by the Council to a representative appointed by the HR, although the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER) will be further presided by a Member State representative presiding over the General Affairs Council. A threat to consistency and coherence will also come from chairing different working groups, because the groups that acted in the assigned areas of external relations and first pillar (such as trade, development cooperation or expansion) will continue to be chaired on a rotation basis, although the groups that have worked only in the area of CFSP or that have closely cooperated with the PSC will be chaired by a member of the EEAS. (As far as mixed competence groups are concerned, ad hoc decisions will be made.)

The Treaty on the EU did not change the decision-making process. Article 24, Point 1 of the Treaty on European Union states that “[t]he common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise”\textsuperscript{42}. Thus, within CFSP, unanimity remains a standard decision making procedure.

Exceptional cases laid down in the Treaty are defined by Article 31, Point 2. It states that by qualified majority the Council:

- adopts decisions defining an action or position of the Union on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives (referred to in Article 22, Point 1);
- adopts a decision defining an action or position of the Union on the proposal submitted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at a specific request from the European Council made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative;
- adopts all decisions implementing a decision defining an action or position of the Union;
- appoints a special representative (in accordance with Article 33 TEU)\textsuperscript{43}.

Thus, qualified majority voting has very limited use: it is used merely for general actions and only in the case of their practical implementation, but not in the case of a decision to take them in general.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, p. 33-34
If a member of the Council declares that because of essential and specifically defined reasons related to national policy it does not intend to endorse a decision which is to be adopted by qualified majority, it is not voted upon. In close consultation with the relevant Member State, the High Representative seeks a solution acceptable to that state. In case he does not succeed, the Council may, by qualified majority of votes, request to pass the issue on to the European Council for a decision by unanimity\(^{44}\).

The second point is of great importance. If the HR proposes a decision which requires qualified majority, first of all, he has to refer to the European Council and only afterwards can submit the matter to the Foreign Affairs Council. Qualified majority is achieved when a decision is approved by 55 per cent of the Member States, representing at least 65 per cent of all population. When the Council acts not according to the proposal of the Commission or the High Representative, the required majority of the Member States rises to 72 percent (Article 238, Point 2 TFEU). In order to block the adoption of a legislative act, at least four states must vote against the project. The new mechanism will enable 75 percent (as from April 1, 2017 – 55 per cent) of the Member States to request re-discussion of the proposal within “an appropriate period” (Declaration on Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 238(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, No 7).

\[\text{Figure 2. Decision-making procedure}\]

\(^{44}\) *Ibid*, p. 33-34
3.4. The Commission

As is known, the European Commission promotes the general interests of the European Union and is the impetus of the integration process. Prior to the institutional reform, the role of the Commission in external relations was limited to the areas of economy and trade; therefore, many experts had expected that the institutional reforms of the EU would add weight to the EU in dealing with international issues.

It is hard to decide if this has happened. In essence, a lot will depend on the HR’s position and actions. On the one hand, taking into consideration that the HR, as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, “brings” additional functions from elsewhere, he could strengthen the influence of the Commission in external actions. This would help him/her, within the framework of the Commission, perform the functions which are laid down in Article 18, Point 4 of the Treaty on European Union: to implement the Commission’s obligations in the field of external relations and coordinate aspects of other external actions of the Union. On the other hand, considering the fact that almost the whole role of the Commission within CFSP is assigned to the High Representative, one should not disregard the fact that the role of the Commission in the area of external relations might decrease provided the HR decided to identify himself more with the Council. As a matter of fact, Article 22, Point 2 of the Treaty on European Union foresees that together with the HR, the Commission may submit common proposals, but it can do it only in other areas of external actions. It indicates that the Commission General Directorates were not deprived of all their mandates in the area of external relations, but, at the same time, some issues arise as to what those mandates of the Commission are in the area of external relations and what those other aspects of external relations are which are laid down in Article 18, Point 4 of the Treaty on European Union.

The Commission, or rather the President of the Commission, will have certain limited influence within CFSP during the procedure for appointing the HR, since he/she can be appointed only upon the approval of the President of the Commission (Article 18, Point 1 TEU). However, since the HR is appointed by the European Council, it is doubtful that the President of the Commission would decide to worsen relations with it. The opposite is more likely: since different procedures are established for appointing the HR and other members of the Commission (the members are appointed by the President of the Commission), the issue of loyalty to the Commission may arise. Finally, because of the intensive diplomatic schedule – frequent visits abroad, negotiations, participation at international conferences – the HR may lack both time and energy for activity in the Commission, whereas because of the constitutional provisions of the Treaty and the character of work, he/she will be forced to spend more time among Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States.
(socializing as well) but not in Commission meetings. This, in its turn, may also reduce the importance of the role of the Commission within common foreign and security policy.

### 3.5. The European Parliament

Although by the Treaty of Lisbon the legislative powers of the EP were expanded – an ordinary legislative procedure is now applied in over 40 new policy areas – the role of the EP within CFSP has been slightly modified. The role of the European Parliament within CFSP is defined by Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union which states that the HR must regularly consult with the EP on key aspects of common foreign and security policy as well as common security and defense policy and basic choice issues, inform it about the evolution of these policies and give due consideration to the position of the European Parliament. It is also stated that “The European Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defense policy.”

The EP has the greatest powers within the area of CFSP during the new budgetary procedure which establishes full equality between the Parliament and the Council when adopting the annual budget. In accordance with the new provisions, a multi-year financial program must be coordinated with the Parliament (consent).

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the ambitions of the EP, which acts according to the new provisions, have grown in the area of CFSP. This can be illustrated by EP actions during the process of setting up the European External Action Service. The EP was constantly urging to set up a common European diplomatic service. It urged the Council, the Commission and the Member States to use the opportunity, offered by setting up the EEAS, to shape a more coherent, consistent and efficient foreign policy. Exercising greater control powers over the EC than over the HR (e.g. during the elections of the Commission President), the EP was striving to retain the EEAS as integrated in the EC structure as possible, primarily by using the budgetary procedural and political accountability leverage, and, at the same time, urging the Commission, when performing preparatory work related to the EEAS, to use its full influence as an institution, seeking to preserve and further develop the Community model in external relations. And although according to some EP members, for example, Chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs

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48 Ibid, p. 11
Committee Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament succeeded in achieving it\(^49\), such statement was not true. A very promising beginning of the preamble to the decision of the Council that “the European Parliament will continue to play its full role in the external action of the Union” annuls the provision laid down in Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union stating that “The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions”\(^50\). So, the only more considerable power that the EP will have regarding diplomatic service and, consequently, CFSP, will be during the adoption of the budget. All other activities will be of a more informational than guiding nature.

### 3.6. The Court of Justice of the European Union

As before, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union does not include matters of CFSP (Article 24, Point 1 TEU and Article 275 TFEU). However, there is one provision. Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that “The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”\(^51\). The mentioned articles indicate that the Union has exclusive competence in the areas of the customs union, in the establishment of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the Euro as well as in common trade policy. It is also stated that the Union has exclusive competence to conclude international agreements when their conclusion is provided for in the legislative act of the Union or when it is necessary for the Union to exercise its internal competence, or provided their conclusion may affect common rules or change the area of their application.

### 4. The European External Action Service

The European External Action Service is assigned to assist the High Representative to exercise his responsibilities. Article 27, Point 3 of the Treaty on European Union states that in its work, this service acts in cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States and consists of officials from respective departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Com-


\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 37.
mission as well as the staff assigned from national diplomatic services. The structure, competences or functioning of the EEAS were not referred to in the Lisbon Treaty. These modalities of the EEAS were later defined by a separate decision of the Council which was prepared by a high-level working group (created by HR Ashton) including representatives from the Council Secretariat, the Commission, the chairing state and several most influential EU Member States. This working group had to reach a compromise on the sensitive issues which had been postponed by the Lisbon Treaty makers in order to avoid the fate of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. After the intensive six-month negotiations which were repeatedly discussed at the meetings of the Permanent Representatives of the Council (Coreper), the Foreign Affairs Council, the Commission and the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, the Council decision on setting up the EEAS was adopted on 26 July, 2010. The negotiations and results on the establishment of the EEAS once again revealed the complicated birth of CFSP and the ambitions of the Member States not to lose control of their foreign policy.

4.1. The Nature of the EEAS and its Activity Areas

Three possible variants of the legal status of the EEAS and its activity planning were discussed. The supporters of a limited EU diplomatic service were in favor of the EEAS as a European office type institution. In the first case, it would be similar to the Publications Office with very limited administrative and budgetary autonomy. This proposal did not comply with the legal acts, since the establishment of the EEAS was defined by the Treaty, whereas European offices are usually set up by one of EU institutions. Another proposal was to grant the EEAS status as a EU agency. This choice would have given the EEAS a higher degree of autonomy, enabled the HR to draw up an operating budget for the EEAS and the EEAS would have been empowered to implement it. Moreover, the HR would have had the right to make decisions on the employment of EEAS officials, but administrative and budgetary freedom would have still remained limited. Therefore, the supporters of a stronger diplomatic service were seeking to set up a new institution/service similar to the European Ombudsman’s office. However, this variant was also rejected because none of the institutions within CFSP agreed to hand over part of its competence to the new institution. For instance, most influential EU Member States sought a decision which, on the one hand, would grant the HR and the EEAS greater powers, but on the other hand, would limit their independence, “tying” them to the Council as much as possible. The EC and the EP were seeking the same objectives. In order to reach a compromise between different CFSP actors, both EC President José Manuel Barroso and former HR for CFSP Javier Solana and most of the Member States supported the EEAS as a

52 Ibid, p. 32.
“sui generis”-type service. A decision was made that the EEAS will not be a part of either the Council or the EC, but functionally it will be an autonomous body of the EU with legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives.53 Nevertheless, the EP and the EC managed to make the EEAS administratively closely connected with the Commission. Close administrative links mean that the Commission or the General Secretariat of the Council are charged with some administrative functions: maintenance of buildings, daily personnel management, data processing, telecommunications and personnel security, administration of access to documents, etc. This decision has certain logic: duplication of the activity would be avoided, costs would be reduced, and the HR could perform his functions using not only the EEAS resources but also those of the Commission and the Council. However, in principle, such a decision should be treated as a compromise in the argument that has been going on since the Convent times – progress has been made, but reasons for different tensions to emerge still remain.

Similar tensions may also occur due to not fully drawn lines between the competences of the Commission and the EEAS. The HR’s mandate has room for interpretation as to what specifically means to coordinate “other” aspects of the Union’s external actions. This prompted some major EU countries to strive for EEAS competence not to be limited to CFSP matters overseen by the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG-Relex) of the EC, but be extended to other areas of external relations overseen by the Directorates for Trade (DG-TRADE), Enlargement (DG-ENLARG) and Development (DG-DEV). The representatives of the Commission and the EP viewed these attempts as “the shift towards the intergovernmentalism” or even as an ambition of some of the Member States to usurp the ES enlargement budget.54 The Directorate-General for Trade and the Directorate-General for Enlargement remained within the Commission, whereas the Directorate-General for Development was transferred to the EEAS in spite of the EC’s objections. On the other hand, management tools and instruments that had been administered by this directorate were left in the Commission. However, according to the decision of the Council, the EEAS will be responsible for the programming and management cycles of these instruments (in the first place, while providing political guidelines), whereas the Commission will be in charge of more technical functions. This kind of work distribution will hardly contribute to the efficiency of CFSP.

There were no problems concerning the separation of competences between the EEAS and the General Secretariat of the Council. Although some countries proposed a limit to the key structure of the General Secretariat of the Council comprising EU external relations, CFSP and ESDP, i.e. the Directorate-General for External Relations of the Council (DG E) and the policy planning

and early warning unit (Policy Unit), most Member States were in favor of a larger EEAS and supported the proposal to transfer all CSDP and crisis management structures – the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conducts Capability (CPCC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) – with the exception of the SITCEN staff performing auxiliary functions for the Security Accreditation Authority.\textsuperscript{55}

4.2. Management and Structure of the EEAS

From the organizational point of view, the EEAS will not differ from typical ministries of foreign affairs; it will consist of a central administration with its headquarters in Brussels and the Union’s delegations in third countries and international organizations. However, the approved management of the EEAS reflects the complicated outcome of the negotiations between the EC, the EP, the HR and the Member States.

The Parliament rejected the original proposal on the structure and functioning of the EEAS submitted by HR Ashton noting that the management of the EEAS was in the interest of only a few powerful Member States (i.e. Germany and France) seeking to usurp the EEAS, because, according to it, the Executive Secretary General who should manage the EEAS would not be accountable either to the Parliament or to the Council. Such a proposed model of EEAS management was named by some EP members as “French-style”, according to which the Secretary General would hold enormous power\textsuperscript{56}. Parliament members warned that in case such a proposal was approved, the Secretary General with his two deputies would run the EEAS web “like a spider”\textsuperscript{57}. The main critique of the Parliament members consisted in the fact that the proposed structure did not have politically legitimized deputies. The HR himself cannot have them either since the Lisbon Treaty does not provide for them.

The critique from the Parliament was partly considered in the proposal amended and adopted by the Council. It was decided that the EEAS, like previously, would be run by the Executive Secretary General who would take all necessary measures to ensure smooth functioning of the EEAS, including its administrative and budgetary management, which would guarantee efficient coordination of the activity of all central administration branches as well as the interaction with the Union’s delegations. The Executive Secretary General will be assisted by two Deputy Secretaries General. However, unlike the original proposal, this one provides for one more directorate responsible for the budget and administration matters alongside other Directorates General


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
within the central administration structure of the EEAS. The Council decision envisages that according to regular rules of employment, the HR appoints the Directorate General responsible for the budget and administration who acts in accordance with the same budget lines and administrative rules applicable in the part of Section III of the Union’s budget which falls under Heading 5 of the Multi-annual Financial Framework. As translated from the EU bureaucratic language, it means that in this way the Parliament gains certain influence in EEAS management because it approves the budget.

Other Directorates General comprising the central EEAS administration reflect EEAS activity areas that have been discussed earlier. First of all, these are several directorates General which consist of geographical divisions covering all countries and regions of the world as well as multilateral and thematic divisions. They also include the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and Conducts Capability, the European Union Military Staff and the EU Joint Situation Centre which are placed under direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative and which assist him in performing his tasks of conducting the Union’s CFSP in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, while taking into consideration other competences of the Union following Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union.

The central administration of the EEAS also includes the strategic policy planning department, the legal department, departments responsible for inter-institutional relations, information and public diplomacy, internal audit and inspections as well as protection of personal data.

4.3. The Delegations of the Union

One of the key innovations implemented by the Treaty is, undoubtedly, the establishment of the Union’s delegations in third countries and international organizations. They are mostly associated with the emergence of EU diplomacy, often dubbed as embassies, although such a term cannot be found either in the Treaty on European Union or in the Council Decision on the Structure and Functioning of the EEAS. The delegations are constituent parts of the EEAS, and they formally became such as from January 1, 2010, when all of the approximately 130 EC delegations in third countries and international organizations were renamed into the European Union delegations.

Article 221 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union defines that all Union delegations will be placed under the authority of the HR. However, the Treaty on the EEAS does not mention the dependence of the delegations. The Council Decision had to define their interrelationship. By it, the delegations were assigned to the EEAS, although taking into account

different responsibilities defined in the Treaty which are connected with representation of the EU in external relations, there was a question whether they should be part of the EEAS.

The issue of delegation staff subordination was dealt with in a similar way. The Commission tried to maintain its influence, though eventually a decision was made that all staff members of the delegation in spite of their status and even if they belong to the Councils of the Commission would be placed under the authority of the Head of the Delegation who would oversee its overall activities. He is accountable to the High Representative for the general management of the delegation’s work as well as for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union. The operation of each delegation is periodically evaluated by the Executive Secretary General of the EEAS; the evaluation includes financial and administrative audits.

However, full autonomy of the delegation was not defined because in the areas where the Commission has the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties, it may also, following Article 221, Point 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, issue instructions to the delegations and these instructions must be executed under overall responsibility of the Head of the Delegation.60 The European Parliament also succeeded in establishing its interests in the activity of the delegations since the delegations will have to take into account the needs of the EP and other institutions of the Union in their contacts with international organizations or third countries to which or in which these delegations are accredited.61

Nonetheless, future cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States deserves special attention. Although the Council Decision emphasizes that the Union’s delegations closely cooperate and share information with diplomatic services of the Member States,62 considering the fact that foreign policy in principle has remained a national prerogative, the scope and depth of the cooperation will depend on a specific issue of foreign policy. At least so far, cardinal changes in either mutual cooperation or in the host country behavior model have not yet occurred.

4.4. The Staff

The Council decided that the staff of the EEAS would consist of officials from the services of the Council and the Commission External Relations services as well as the personnel from diplomatic services of 27 Member States. Most of the Member States held the opinion that the size of the service must correspond to the scope of competence and functions of the EEAS. This size will be specified later. It is planned that the EEAS will comprise 5,000-6,000 officials, although ac-

60 Ibid, p. 34.
61 Ibid, p. 34.
62 Ibid, p. 34.
cording to High Representative C. Ashton, in order to fully perform the functions, up to 8,000 employees would be necessary. The planned size of the EEAS equals the number of employees of the diplomatic service of a big European country. For example, the German diplomatic service has 6,000 employees. However, the EEAS will be smaller in size as compared with the US foreign service, which has 11,500 officials.

Since the staff of the EEAS is recruited from three sources, the Member States emphasized that it was important to them to have a sufficient number of national diplomats in the EEAS who would hold different level positions. Almost all Member States agreed that the staff should comprise not national experts seconded by the Member States, but personnel having the status of temporary agents to ensure that all EEAS staff members have equal status and equal working conditions. The Council adopted this particular provision, not excluding the possibility of temporary employment of other seconded experts from the Member States when necessary.

It was agreed that the EEAS staff would be appointed by merit and adequate recruitment procedures would be observed. It implies that the HR would play the key role, including his approval of the final decision. It is also important that the principle of geographical balance has been established and the temptation to implement a quota-based system has been avoided.

It was also agreed that once the EEAS is fully staffed, the Member States in the Council would be represented by no less than 1/3 of the personnel, whereas the compliance with this provision will be guaranteed by presenting an annual report to the Council on the occupation of posts in the EEAS. Besides, in order to ensure transparency, representatives with an advisory vote from all Member States, the Commission and the Council are invited to participate in the process of staff selection. They are obligated to select the best potential candidates for the final decision of the HR.

It is predictable that the recruitment of the staff from different sources will pose a problem of common identity. Will a representative of a Member State in the EEAS represent common EU interests rather than the national interests of his own state? Will a German, Briton or Lithuanian always retain greater loyalty to the blue flag of the EU than to the colors of their own countries, especially being aware that special representatives, and those seconded by the Member States will conclude fixed-term service contracts with the EU, which means that they will not be indifferent as to how their further home career will develop.

Most probably, it is not accidental that the original idea based on four-year rotation of the EEAS staff between national foreign ministries and EU institutions was rejected in favor of a longer contract. One of the motives for such a decision was an ambition to develop a common identity. It refers not only to a different nationality. Unlike the prevailing practice in the countries, EU institutions comprise personnel with very different education and experience who often have nothing to do with international relations or diplomacy. To this end, a European diplomatic college is intended to be set up which, in
close cooperation with respective institutions of the Member States, would provide Union and Member States officials, who perform responsibilities within external relations, adequate training services based on coordinated study programs, including services in the areas of consular and diplomatic procedures, diplomacy and international relations as well as in the history of the European Union and methods of its activity.

4.5. The Budget

Although the countries agreed that after the Lisbon Treaty comes into effect, the strengthening of CFSP will require additional financial resources from the EU, negotiations on the EEAS budget became one of the main obstacles precluding the EEAS from starting its activity soon. The HR tried to attain the greatest financial independence possible, whereas the EP claimed a greater role for itself. Having stronger control powers in respect of the EC than the HR, the EP opposed the creation of a separate section referring to the new service in the EU budget, thus making the EEAS similar to other EU institutions. The aim of the EP was to finance the EEAS from the Commission section provided for in the EU budget. Eventually, a compromise was reached. As mentioned before, having made a decision to establish the EEAS as a *sui generis* institution, a new EU budget section “*The European External Action Service*” was made, but the finances assigned in it will be allocated only to cover EEAS administrative expenditure. Meanwhile, the activity of the EEAS will be financed from the section of the Commission budget. Therefore, the separated administrative and activity budget may limit the increase of the influence of the EEAS.

According to the EU budget first approved after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, in 2011 the EEAS was allocated 464,1 mln Euro. A major part of this sum was allocated at the expense of the Commission and the Council, having transferred to the EEAS the staff that had monitored external matters in these institutions – 1,114 from the Commission and 411 from the Council Secretariat. From 464,1 million Euro, 140,2 million were assigned to the staff management at the Headquarters, 43,8 million – to the maintenance of buildings, equipment and operating expenditure at the Headquarters, 279,9 million – to the management of delegations.

It can be seen that these finances have been earmarked for administrative costs. However, the influence of the EU in the world will be determined not only – or, not as much in – the strength of the diplomatic service but rather the finances allocated for the implementation of different programs of foreign policy, the administering of which remains within the remit of the Commission. Theoretically, the EEAS could claim a part of the 8 billion Euro sum which in the EU budget was allotted for strengthening the role of the EU in the world

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and which is equal to approximately 6 per cent of the overall EU budget\textsuperscript{64}. Is that a lot or a little? By comparison, in the fiscal year of 2010, the US State Department budget with all foreign programs made 55 billion dollars. The figures speak for themselves.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that over more than fifty years of the unification of Europe considerable progress has been made in the formation of common foreign and security policy. The Lisbon Treaty is the latest step in this direction. It implemented some significant institutional reforms which altered the modalities of the formation and implementation of CFSP that were created after the Maastricht Treaty. The greatest innovations are the established offices of the permanent President of the European Council and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the European External Action Service designed to assist the High Representative to perform his functions. Soon afterwards, political observers named the EEAS as a EU diplomatic service and the High Representative as the chief of the EU diplomacy. The present article tries to answer the question whether we can really call them so and what EU institutional innovations look like as compared to the traditional definition of diplomacy and national diplomatic services.

A brief retrospective revealed the main drawbacks to treating the EU as a full-fledged diplomatic actor. The EU was not yet a legal entity. The areas of foreign and security policy were beyond the competences of the Union. The objectives of CFSP were mainly of a declaratory nature, while the policy itself lacked content. And finally, even though the countries agreed on common foreign policy, there were no legal instruments for its implementation.

Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on foreign policy only partly eliminated these drawbacks. On the one hand, they provided possibility for the EU to become a full-fledged actor in the international system, i.e. bestowed legal entity status; on the other hand, the Member States, neither giving a mandate to the EU to pass legal acts nor defining clear competences of the Union in foreign policy, put the Union on a leash, the length of which will depend on their will. Meanwhile, CFSP experience suggests that the Member States will not have much will to limit their competences on the issues of foreign policy and national security. EU diplomatic activity is likely to limit itself to declaratory though ambitious repetition of CFSP objectives laid down in the Treaty because it will be difficult to find a common denominator for a particular foreign policy agenda. In other words, it will be difficult to transform common values and ambitions into a specific common policy. It is obvious that the success of

CFSP will continue to depend not on EU diplomacy but on the behavior and principles of the Member States.

In terms of the organization of diplomatic service, it is worth mentioning that the office of the High Representative is not clearly and unequivocally defined as the key and the only institution that performs management functions of EU foreign issues and implements EU policy in these areas. Provisions of the Treaty on the institutional architecture within CFSP have not been sufficiently defined and leave much room for interpretation. The procedure for the appointment of the HR is also complicated. Under the qualified majority vote provision, the HR can easily become a hostage in the game between the Member States which would hinder the HR in efficient performance of responsibilities delegated to him. All this creates the threat of inter-institutional conflict. It is evident that in everyday activity he will be carefully watched by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and his colleagues in the Commission and the President of the European Council. For the same reason, the High Representative faces the risk of becoming a double or even triple personality. This, in its turn, may adversely affect the activity of the EEAS; the fact that the EEAS administrative and operating budget is separated also adds to that. However, the EEAS has a lot of attributes similar to national diplomatic services: organizational structure, assigned functions, subdivisions abroad. In terms of EEAS efficiency, the greatest and potentially most dangerous difference might be related to staffing – staff recruitment from different sources will cause the problem of identity and loyalty.

In conclusion, it may be said that the new structure created for the implementation of EU common foreign and security policy is similar to a “hybrid”: ambitions to implement foreign policy exist, they are expressed as institutional innovations, but the implementation mechanism itself does not follow the organizational logic of a diplomatic institution.

From the perspective of third countries, CFSP has remained complicated and “hard to crack”. The dilemma of a single telephone number for Europe has not been resolved. Many still do not understand the difference between Van Rompuy and Barroso; why Barroso (the President of the Commission) and not Van Rompuy (the President of the European Council) presents the annual report defining the Union’s situation and setting further guidelines for the future; what do Sarkozy, Merkel and other Heads of States or Governments of the Member States have to do with this; what else does Baroness Ashton do, and in general, why are there so many of them and why are they so different and disagree so much. In short, who should Kissinger speak with after the Lisbon Treaty remains unclear.

Words are very important, especially in the world of diplomacy. The fact that the EEAS is the EEAS and not a diplomatic service or a MoFA and the High Representative is not a Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaks for itself. This shows that the states are not yet ready to transfer foreign policy and national security matters to a supranational institution.

What is next?
There is no doubt that the High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy as well as the European External Action Service will try to justify their existence and ensure cohesive use of different measures for EU external actions. In the period of relative calm, rather good results may be achieved. But how is this going to be achieved provided the EU faces serious challenges, e.g. the Iraq war when the positions of the Member States on foreign issues point in cardinally opposite directions? It will be impossible to keep this form without taking further steps in a federal direction. And then the issue of the fate of national diplomatic services will arise.

However, the Member States are not yet ready for this step. History shows that major institutional changes in the EU occur at an interval of approximately twenty-five years. Meanwhile, the High Representative and the European Council will seek to win their place in the diplomatic world, while the Member States will try to increase their influence in this structure.

Vilnius-Washington, June-December 2010
Europeanization Tendencies of the Foreign and Security Policy of the Baltic States

The article attempts to look at the foreign and security policy (FSP) of the Baltic States through the prism of the Europeanization concept. By associating Europeanization with loyalty to EU norms and construction of European identity, it analyzes the impact of the EU on the FSP of the Baltic States while seeking membership and after having become EU members. On the way to the EU, the Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States was essentially conducted in one direction – from top to bottom (from the center to national states). On the one hand, it was an instrumental rather than value-related rapprochement of the objectives between the FSP of the Baltic States and CFSP. On the other hand, during this period the national Europeanization projection also came to light – the requirements of the EU were used as a protective shield to justify unpopular decisions of both domestic and foreign policy. When the Baltic States became EU members, the instrumental interpretation of the EU remained, yet the efforts of the states to impact the common foreign and security policy of the EU by shifting national interests to the EU level strengthened. The foreign and security policy of the Baltic States, as in a distorting mirror, reflects the EU CFSP inconsistency related to the indetermination of the EU as a specific political object. In a sense, the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States is more consistent than that of the European Union. In the policy of EU neighborhood and Eastern partnership, they emphasize not the instrumental, but the normative aspect, urging that the values-related fundamentals of Europe be treated seriously.

Introduction

The Baltic States belong to a rather specific North Baltic region whose essential political dominant for a long time was Russia (the Soviet Union). Having played the role of the catalyst for the downfall of the Soviet Union, and afterwards having successfully overcome the main stages of the restoration of the democratic state and having chosen the way of integration into the Western security community, they embody in their recent history the essential tendencies of the post-soviet political transformation of Europe. After the restoration of independence, the Baltic States took the first steps in relations with the EU and
NATO in 1990/91. In 2004, they became members of the EU and NATO. The first stage of their “return to Europe” was finished. As published in the magazine “The Economist”: “Of all the stunning transformations that have changed the map of Europe since 1989, the Baltic States’ shift from Soviet captivity to membership of the top western clubs is among the most remarkable”.

Generally, when analyzing changes in post-communist states, their triple transformation is researched, i.e. the implementation of statehood usually associated with the establishment of a nation state, democratization, and the development of a market economy. When exploring the newest tendencies in the change of post-communist states, more and more attention is paid to a fourth dimension of analysis – their relations with international organizations – which may be defined as “the integration of new or newly independent states into an international system marked by complex interdependence”. When analyzing the role of such organizations as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, NATO, the EU and others, an answer is being sought to the question, “What influence do transnational actors exert on domestic and foreign policy of states and where are the limits of this influence?”

This article focuses on the influence of the EU on the Baltic States’ foreign and security policy treated as the construction instrument of the state’s international identity. The article also tries to answer the question whether the Baltic States in their own way exert influence on the common foreign and security policy of the EU. While analyzing these issues, the article will attempt to look at the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States through the prism of their Europeanization process. The article consists of three parts: Part One - the relationship between the Europeanization and foreign and security policy; Part Two - the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of the Baltic States before their membership in this organization; and Part Three - observations after they became members of the EU. In spite of the similarities of the Baltic States’ foreign and security policy, the author of the article attempts to explore them as separate actors of the international policy, though in certain cases they function as a unanimous political actor – the Baltic States.

1 The relations between the EU and the Baltic States did not start from scratch. During the years of the Cold War, there were quite a few informal contacts between EU institutions and unofficial representatives of the Baltic States. These were mainly emigrants that had left their countries before WWII or after it. See: Lasas A. „Guilt, Sympathy, and Cooperation: EU–Baltic Relations in the Early 1990s“, East European Politics and Societies 22 (2), p. 347–372.
5 Ibid., p.3
1. The Baltic States and Europeanization

After the restoration of independence in the political discourse of the Baltic States, two primary conceptions of the state’s establishment came to light from the very beginning: the restorationist and the integrationist. The first relates statehood to the reconstruction of basic values and geopolitical attitudes of the pre-war nation state; the second is oriented towards a cosmopolitan integral Europe, towards becoming a “normal” Western state. This duality in the foreign policy of the Baltic States manifests itself as the tension between the construction of a nation state identity and integrationist foreign policy practices. The identity of a nation state calls for the exclusion or sovereignty policy, while the essential foreign policy objective of the “return to Europe” or to the Western security community requires the policies of inclusion and integration implied in normative Europeanization. According to Douglas Brommesson, Europeanization is “a top-down process based on logic of appropriateness, where states with a close relationship to the EU, i.e. candidate or member states, develop a commitment to a European centre, and their normative point of departure is changed.” A European identity is being formed which is marked by the loyalty of the state to European norms and the commitment to protect them from external influence. On the other hand, Europeanization is not only the implementation of the norms handed down from the top (the centre), but also a process during which member states use the EU as an instrument for shifting national interests to the European level. Generally, the implementation of norms handed down from the top is associated with small new states, whereas the instrumental EU treatment is associated with major influential states. The role of the instrument, coordinating the top and the bottom, i.e. the norms of the centre and member state’s interests, is attributed to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU. In the relationship between EU member states and the CFSP, the top and the bottom merge. This process relies on Brussels directives and foreign policy visions and objectives of a member state (Table 1).

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Table 1: Europeanization and national foreign and security policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europeanization</th>
<th>National foreign and security policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Projection of the European Union (from the top) Adaptation and policy rapprochement Adjustment of a member state to EU membership requirements</td>
<td>Increasing political influence of the centre</td>
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<td>Adoption of common objectives</td>
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<td>Priority of common policy Internalization of EU norms and policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>National projection (from the bottom) Influence and contribution of a nation state to the CFSP</td>
<td>A state seeks to increase its influence in the world</td>
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<td>A state seeks to exert influence on foreign policy of other EU states</td>
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<td>A state uses the EU as a protective shield to justify unpopular foreign policy decisions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shifting of national policy objectives to the EU level</td>
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Source: Reuben Wong (2007) and Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson (2009)\(^{10}\)

Europeanization in foreign policy is not a passive process; it is the relationship between integration (adaptation) and national differentiation, in other words – the interaction of inclusion and exclusion. In the relationship of the Baltic States with the EU, it is possible to detect tendencies of both inclusion and exclusion. They are rather directly associated with interpretation peculiarities of Europe in their political discourse. Seeking to become members of the EU, the Baltic States treated Europe as a community of nation states, the security of which was guaranteed by NATO. As Martin Marcussen and Klaus Roscher point out, this image of Europe is usually “employed” by those states that orientate themselves to the liberal nationalist identity. The latter is marked by “We” here confined to one’s own nation and state\(^{11}\). It is not by accident that foreign and security policy of the Baltic States, while seeking the membership of the EU, was orientated towards national security, territorial defense grounded on conscription, and construction of nation state identity. In the Baltic States political discourse after they became EU members, the ever growing role falls to the conception of Europe as a normative power\(^{12}\). This modifies their foreign policy; they seek to become a part of the normative power. We will try to expand on this interpretation of the Baltic States’ interaction with the EU.


2. Foreign Policy of the Baltic States on the Way to Europe

The response of Western states to the aspiration for the EU and NATO membership shared in essence by nearly all states of the post-soviet space was the promulgation of common membership criteria known as the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995). The criteria were supplemented by the creation of their implementation control and evaluation mechanism. The aspiration process towards the membership of NATO and the EU becomes a process of the construction of the Baltic States according to the model of Western democracy calling for essential political and economic reforms as well as changes in foreign and security and defense policy.

The EU and NATO can be described as constitutive institutions which, by submitting to Government characteristics and objectives of a member state, substantially contribute to defining the identities, values, and interests of the actors. Frank Schimmelfennig claims that the EU basis is a post-nationalist liberal identity, the cultural content of which is confined to political culture. Respectively, the EU grants membership to those states which accept its liberal values and which firmly adhere to its liberal norms, i.e. personal freedom, civil freedoms, and political rights. Thus, the EU enlargement to the East is grounded on the principle of conditionality. Let us look into what changes took place in the Baltic States when they attempted to comply with the membership criteria and how their aspiration towards the EU membership affected their political identity as well as foreign and security policy.

After the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1993–1994, the Western direction of the Baltic States’ foreign policy became irreversible. Good relations with neighbors and the membership of the EU and NATO became primary foreign policy objectives. Though seeking the same objectives, the Baltic States operated separately like rivals emphasizing their geographic and historical exclusivity. At that time their political identity acquired geographical definitenss. Estonia considered Finland its primary partner on the way to the EU. In the speeches of its President and other officials, the identity of Estonia as a

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14 Russian troops were withdrawn from Lithuania in August of 1993, from Estonia and Latvia a year later.

15 In foreign policy this manifested itself as disagreements regarding the establishment of maritime boundaries between Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania and Latvia. The agreement on maritime boundaries between Lithuania and Latvia was signed in only 1999; however, Latvia has not ratified it yet.
Nordic State took root. Politicians of Lithuania, after Poland was granted the status of a NATO candidate state and became acknowledged as the strategic partner of Lithuania, defined Lithuania as Central European or a Central Baltic European country. Meanwhile, Latvia, lying between Estonia and Lithuania, sought much more strongly than its neighbors a closer cooperation of the Baltic and, in a broader sense, of the Baltic Sea region states. It identified itself as a Nordic Baltic or Baltic Sea State. This, at first glance caused astonishment as geographical self-imposed opposition to the Baltic States was an important part of their self-awareness as nation states seeking “to return to Europe”.

As Klaus Eder maintains, historically the space of Europe got divided along specific social axes. These are North–South and West–East axes related to technical and social progress and to backwardness. The North West of Europe is associated with progress, the South East – with backwardness. This normative shift of Europe to the North West began in the 17th century alongside secularization and institutional implementation of democratic ideas. The new uncivilized North – Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavian states – began to oust the old civilized South Europe. Metaphorically it is possible to claim that the South of Europe is its soul, the North West – its mind. The social differentiation of the European geographic space possesses not only a spatial dimension, but also that of time. The North West is faster, the South East – slower. In this context, the integration of Europe can be treated as an attempt to neutralize different speeds of the old Europe and synchronize its development in space and time. Estonia, associating itself with the North, has chosen a rational, pragmatic, fast way to Europe. Meanwhile, Lithuania turned to the South, not only because of the strategic partnership with Poland, but also seeking “to return home” as a civilized European state. Latvia is closer to Estonia than to Lithuania. This different spatial self-localization of the Baltic States is reflected in their foreign and security policy as a choice between the provisions of pragmatism and idealism.

Alongside the geographic identity, the international (functional) identity of the Baltic States is forming and constructed depending upon how they see their role in the new place of their ideological localization – in Europe or broader – in the West. The international identity constitutes a changing narrative on which a state’s place and role in the international system is substantiated. The international identity is mostly related to the Baltic States’ attitude and relations with Russia, a neighbor common to them and an important international policy actor. After declaration of independence, the Baltic States acted as a

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16 The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Tomas Ilves stated in 1998: I see that Estonia has been suffering for several years from insufficiently considered policy of other Baltic States. Estonia is a post-communist Northern State, but not a Baltic State. Cited according to: Ozolina Ž., „The Impact of the European Union on Baltic Cooperation“, COPRI Working Papers 3, 1999, p.15.

17 A positive attitude of Latvia to the cooperation of the Baltic States is illustrated by the establishment of the Baltic Unity Movement in 1997.

bridge between the East (Russia) and the West (Europe) as “a land of contacts”. In foreign policy, such a conception of international identity corresponded to a widely discussed, yet never implemented neutrality policy. The metaphor of a state-bridge and the idea of neutrality related to it were discarded in 1994–1995 when the membership of NATO and the EU became the primary objective of foreign and security policy. It was replaced by the metaphor of a state-bridgehead of Western civilization\(^{19}\). The concept of Europe as a constituent part of Western community embodying Christian values corresponded best to the image of the Baltic States – the bridgehead of the West. In order to strengthen this conception, Samuel Huntington’s idea of the conflict of civilizations was often resorted to, particularly in Estonia. The Baltic States considered themselves to be a wall separating Western civilization from non-Western Russia.

Beginning in 1997 when the prospect of the Baltic States to become EU members became more realistic\(^{20}\), motives of the Baltic States as the outpost of Europe surfaced in the construction of their identity\(^{21}\). It was emphasized that the Baltic States in relations with the post-soviet space disseminate the values and norms of Europe, becoming its representatives. In foreign policy, the identity of the outpost was institutionalized by participating in the activity of the EU Northern dimension as well as in the EU Eastern policy. It was anticipated that the Northern dimension “will help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania adapt to their new role, which will make them a central actor in developing co-operation between the EU, Russia and nearby CIS countries”\(^{22}\).

The surveyed change in the international identity of the Baltic States does not lead to the juggling with metaphors; it indirectly indicates the degree of coming closer to Europe and is directly related to changes in relations with Russia. It is in the relations with Russia that the EU influence on the Baltic States’ foreign policy manifests itself most. Russia is not only a neighbor of the Baltic States, but a strategic partner of the EU, an important EU supplier of energy resources. For example, such EU states as Germany and France have long-standing and deep traditions of cooperation with Russia. The Baltic States also have a long experience of relations with Russia which essentially differs from the European one. It is a long existence within the Russian empire\(^{23}\), a brief respite of independence in 1918–1940 later followed by nearly 50 years of Soviet Union occupation (1944–1991). The latter period was particularly destructive not only for the statehood of the Baltic States, but also for their


\(^{20}\) In July 1997 the Commission of Europe approved “Agenda 2000”. Estonia was invited to start negotiations on its membership of the EU in 1997, Latvia and Lithuania – in 1999.


\(^{23}\) Estonia and Latvia were a constituent part of the Russian empire in 1721–1915, Lithuania in 1795–1915.
national identity and mentality of the population. Because of the deportations of the Baltic States’ inhabitants to Siberia and losses of the armed resistance in war and post-war years, the demographic composition of the population changed substantially, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. During the Soviet period Estonia and Latvia became multinational states24.

After the restoration of independence in 1991, there were apprehensions not only of a direct Russian aggression, but also of its destructive economic and political influence by using Russian-speaking inhabitants. Estonian and Latvian politicians saw in them “the fifth column” capable of destroying the state from the inside25. Most probably this can explain why citizenship laws unfavorable for Russian-speaking people that had come during the years of Soviet occupation were adopted in Latvia in 1991 and in Estonia in 1992. These laws stipulated that only the inhabitants of Estonian and Latvian States between the wars (1918–1940) and their descendants had the right to citizenship. Others having settled there during the occupation years had to undergo a complex naturalization procedure. In Lithuania, a zero option citizenship law was adopted according to which all people living in Lithuania at the time the law was passed enjoyed the right to citizenship.

It is not surprising that the political Copenhagen criteria became the essential problem in Estonia and Latvia when seeking EU membership: namely, the requirement to respect and protect the rights of minorities. At first glance, a problem of domestic policy turned into an international policy issue, the solution of which was sought by OSCE, the Commission of Europe, the European Council, the United Nations and, certainly, by Russia. Experiencing the “adaptation pressure of the EU”26, Estonia and Latvia changed their citizenship laws in the direction of compliance with European norms27. However, it should be pointed out that these changes even today do not meet Russia’s expectations.

The aspiration to membership in the EU and NATO also had an impact on solving the issues of border agreements between the Baltic States and Russia. Estonia and Latvia strove that their territory be defined in compliance with the

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24 During the soviet period, the number of Russian nationality inhabitants in Latvia increased from 8.8 per cent (1935) to 34 percent (1991), in Estonia from 8 percent to 30 percent. See: Vares P., Zhuryari O., Estonia and Russia, Estonians and Russians: A Dialogue. Tallinn: The Institute of International and Social Studies, 1996, p.9.
26 See: Maniokas K., Europos Sąjungos plėtra ir europeizacija, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2003, p.94.
peace treaties of 1920 with Russia\textsuperscript{28} pursuant to which part of present Russian territory belonged to them. With the EU and NATO summit meetings that had to evaluate whether the Baltic States meet the membership requirement close at hand, both Estonia (1996) and Latvia (1997) renounced their territorial requirements to Russia. In spite of this, the border treaty between Estonia and Russia was only signed in 2005, yet even today, it has not been ratified by Russia. Latvia and Russia signed the treaty even later – in 2007; in the same year it was ratified by both countries. Lithuania signed the land border treaty in 1997, but Russia ratified it only in 2003. The relations between Lithuania and Russia are dampened not by the issues of Russian minority rights, but by Lithuania’s energy security problems connected with its dependence on Russian energy resources and issues of the military and civilian transit of Russia’s Kaliningrad district through the territory of Lithuania. However, the issues of guaranteeing national minority rights periodically emerge in the relations between Lithuania and Poland.

A brief survey of the Baltic States’ way to the EU makes it possible to point out that during that period both the self-awareness in the international space and the implementation of their foreign and security policy remained within the framework of nation state identity, characteristically premised on the idea of external threats. A positive identification with Europe was followed by the dissociation from non-Europe, thus emphasizing the threat of Russia. However, in public discourse, Europe is perceived not only as a part of the West, but also as a cultural threat to national identity. This tendency persisted even after the Baltic States started direct negotiations for membership. When harmonizing the legal system of Lithuania with the EU \textit{Acquis Communautaire} without changing laws, bargaining was underway for exceptions which slowed down the establishment of European norms, restricting the state’s sovereignty\textsuperscript{29}. Advancing towards European norms has remained within the framework of the principle of conditionality.

In essence, Europeanization of the Baltic States’ foreign and security policy took one direction - from top to bottom (from the center to national states), and it was an instrumental rather than a value-orientated rapprochement between the objectives of the Baltic States’ foreign policy and the CFSP, complying with EU membership requirements. Aspiring to the membership, both domestic and foreign policy of the Baltic States was inevitably adaptive. Clearly defined membership requirements and a well thought-out control mechanism of their implementation left no particular space for the candidates’ initiative. Being restricted by the commitment to comply with \textit{Acquis}, to timely close negotiation departments or to seek compatibility of their defense struc-

\textsuperscript{28} Estonia, comparing its territory with that that belonged to it according to the Treaty of Tartu of 1920, lost about 2,000 square kilometers. A part of the former Latvian territory, pursuant to the Treaty of Riga of 1920, at present belongs to Pskov district of Russia. To Lithuania, the treaty with Russia of 1920 was not so important. Comparing with the period between the wars, the territory of Lithuania has expanded: for the first time in the history of the country, both Vilnius and Klaipeda belong to it.

\textsuperscript{29} See: Maniokas, footnote 26.
tures with those of NATO, the Baltic States differed only in their place at the table of “advancement”. Lithuania was among the most advanced on its way to NATO, while Estonia – to the EU. However, during this period the national projection of Europeanization surfaced. European Union requirements were used as a protective shield to justify unpopular internal and foreign policy decisions such as closing down the Ignalina nuclear plant and introducing visas for border residents.

3. The Baltic States in the European Union

At the end of 2002, following successful negotiations, alongside five other states of the post-soviet space, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Malta and Cyprus were invited to become EU members. The EU decision to accept as many as eight states of the post-soviet space was hardly to be explained by the arguments of instrumental rationality. It is not coincidental that in academic works analyzing EU enlargement, such notions as “normative order” “the community trap”, “rhetoric action”, “communicative rationality”, “Europe as ‘value-based community’”, “EU collective guilt and responsibility” emerge.

Frank Shimmelfennig, who devoted a lot of attention to EU enlargement issues, claims that in the policy of the enlargement towards the East, Europe became hostage to its own normative identity under construction: “once caught in the community trap, states can be forced to honor identity- and value-based commitments”. This idea is illustrated by Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen who explain the active support of Denmark for the Baltic States’ EU membership by the pressure of its European identity.

Attempts to clarify where the integrating force of the EU lies ask what attracted the states that had just escaped “unions” (the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and are concerned about establishing their national identity even as the term of normative power is becoming more

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33 Lasas, Footnote 1.
34 Shimmelfennig, Footnote 31, p.77.
and more established. Ian Manners regards the European Union as a prime example of normative power. The concept of normative power embodies the ability of Europe to peacefully promote its core values beyond the boundaries of the EU. It is a power that, while realizing itself through ideas and opinions, is capable of changing the concept of “normality” in international relations. Speaking with the world in normative terms, the EU constructs itself (through the dichotomy the Self/the Other) as a specific institution different from other existing political forms whose identity “pre-disposes it to act in a normative way”.

The narrative core of the normative power Europe is based on the principles of liberal democracy (democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms). This narrative creates international EU identity whose purpose is to substantiate the impact of the EU on world order to universalize the normative EU basis. It gives critical assessment of the European past, particularly the experience of World War II, whereas the European integration is conceptualized as the enlargement of security communities and new regionalization, creating common identity and promoting the spread of EU norms and values all over the world. This emerging identity is not the sum total of national identities, but is based on common principles and norms.

The New Neighborhood Policy (NNP), initiated in 2003 and approved in 2004, is related to the construction of the international identity of the EU as a normative power. Its strategy report reads: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States... In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting these values” (italicized by G. M.). The nature of cooperation with neighborhood states depends on the results achieved in the implementation of these values, i.e. the neighborhood policy is based on the already tested principle of conditionality, but is not related to an EU membership perspective.

Having become members of the European Union and NATO, the Baltic States were faced with a task of reformulating key foreign and security policy
goals and finding their place within the CFSP of the EU. The neighborhood policy provided an institutional framework for these objectives and new content for the construction of their international identity. The Baltic States are enthusiastically taking the role of the ambassadors of EU normative power in the post-soviet space. Cooperation with the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan is becoming a major direction of foreign policy of the Baltic States.

However, the Eastern direction of the EU NNP is also an important area of interest of Russia’s foreign policy; the EU and Russia are competing for influence in the neighboring states. Having eagerly accepted the role of an instrument in this competition, the Baltic States activated the construction of the identity of Russia as the Other of Europe. The perception of Russia as a threat remains the key motive in political discourse of the Baltic States, particularly during the period of their rapid economic growth in 2003-2007. The issues related to the moral assessment of the tragic consequences of the Soviet Union’s occupation and reparations for the damage are constantly being raised; there are concerns that the dependence on Russian energy resources may turn into its influence on the countries’ domestic policy and a threat to national security. Seeing Russia as a threat is turning into political decisions: the Seimas of Lithuania passed a resolution demanding reparation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation; in 2005, the Presidents of Estonia and Lithuania refused an invitation to Moscow to the celebration of the 60th anniversary of Russia’s victory in World War II; all Baltic States condemned Russia and actively supported Georgia in its conflict with Russia in 2008. Together with the Members of the Parliaments from other Eastern and Central European States, the Members of the European Parliament from the Baltic States constantly raise issues concerning the responsibility of Russia (the Soviet Union) for millions of

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lost lives. The Baltic States suggest that the old European states should view Russia soberly, stop romanticizing its elemental power and unpredictability, and evaluate the potential threats lying in its restrictions on democracy as well as its imperial ambitions.

Treating Russia as a state that does not meet European standards, the Baltic States construct and stabilize their identity as nation states. However, while showing commitment to a European centre and demonstrating determination “to defend European values vis-à-vis the rest of the world”, they construct the European identity, i.e. they Europeanize. This, at first glance, paradoxical Europeanization within the framework of the logic we/they is related to the specifics of the NNP. As Pertti Joenniemi points out, with the European Union turning into a traditional, whole entity resembling a nation state, the neighborhood policy performs a role of the transformation of the European space, promoting its differentiation. It is obvious that in recent years the neighborhood policy “worked as a form of indecision accompanied by both inclusion as well as exclusion”. Criticizing the NNP for not giving the neighborhood countries an EU membership perspective, the Baltic States are striving to overcome this duality.

Although all Baltic States consider participation in the NNP an important instrument for joining the common foreign and security policy of the EU, the intensity of their participation is different. The Baltic States’ joining the NNP coincided with the period of their economic growth. They willingly responded to being called the “Baltic Tigers” and were ready to share their recipes for success with other states. Lithuania was, for some time, the most active and ambitious in this role as a teacher, whereas Latvia was the most passive. Estonia regarded itself as a technologically advanced state, especially in communication technology and e-government development. Implementing the objectives of the policy of “the new possibility and pragmatism”, Latvia focused its attention within the NNP on economic problems and intergovernmental issues of border crossing.

Lithuania’s participation in the NNP was followed by the construction

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46 In 2004, the Declaration on the Anniversary of 17 September 1939 by the Members of the European Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis, Bronislaw Geremek, Valdis Dombrovskis, Toomas Hendrik Ilves was signed by 86 Members of the Parliament; however, that did not suffice to adopt it. The ideas put forward in it were developed in the Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism of 2008 and the OSCE Vilnius Declaration of 2009. These declarations proposed that the European Parliament should announce 23 August the Day of remembrance for the victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. In 2010, the Seimas of Lithuania adopted the law providing for criminal penalties for public justification or negation of international crimes, including crimes committed by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany against Lithuania.

47 Brommesson, footnote 8, p.228.


49 Joenniemi P., „Turning into a Sovereign Actor? Probing the EU through the Lens of Neighbourhood?" Geopolitics, (forthcoming).

of a new image of the country as a center of the region. In fact, practically all official documents and official speeches of 2004-2006 associated with foreign and security policy emphasize that Lithuania is striving to become “a dynamic and attractive centre of interregional cooperation, which spreads the Euro-Atlantic values and the spirit of tolerance and co-operation across the borders and unites cultures and civilizations”\textsuperscript{51}. Some culture scientists and historians ascribe the ambitious foreign policy of Lithuania to the influence of its glorious past\textsuperscript{52}: in the 15-16th centuries, Belarus and a part of Ukraine were subject to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; a common Lithuanian-Polish state existed for several centuries (1569-1795). The identity of Lithuania as the leader of the region imposes on it the duty “to be a firm advocate of the development of Western democratic values and security, which supports countries seeking to take the European path”\textsuperscript{53}. In the political discourse of Lithuania, the narrative of Europe as normative power is transformed into the construction of the identity of Lithuania as the center of the region\textsuperscript{54}. While constructing the identity of the country-regional center, Lithuania relied on the normative model which, according to President Adamkus, imposes a duty to pursue a moral foreign policy based on principles rather than one-day interests. A gradual withdrawal from the identity of the regional center coincided with the reinforcement of pragmatic tendencies in the country’s foreign policy.

Similar tendencies are also reflected in the construction of the national identity of other Baltic States. The narrative of the inter-war golden age is replaced by a new history of success where the key role falls to economic reforms and information society. Challenging the center of Europe, the Baltic States refuse the imposed role of pupils imposed on them; they are the carriers of progress to the East, proposing to the EU the ways leading further to the East\textsuperscript{55}. During the period of economic crisis, with the “Baltic Tigers” turning into “kittens”, they were further pursuing the Eastern policy, getting actively involved in the implementation of new initiatives of the EU – the Eastern Partnership and the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Their role as the teachers of the transition to democracy was supplemented by the experience of handling the crisis. It is not coincidence that at the beginning of 2011 an Eastern Partnership Training Center was established in Tallinn. The Baltic States are striving to supplement the Eastern partnership policy with the provision of an EU membership perspective for the aspiring states\textsuperscript{56}.

\textsuperscript{53} The annual speech of the President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, 2005.
\textsuperscript{54} Miniotaite G., „Europos normatyvinė galia ir Lietuvos užsienio politika”, Politologija 43 (3), p. 3-19.
\textsuperscript{56} Poland and Sweden take the opposite position. In 2010, in their letter to the EU Vice-President Catherine Ashton their Foreign Ministers claimed that EU enlargement at the expense of the former Soviet republics was impossible.
In their attempt to become full-fledged participants of the EU common foreign and security policy, the Baltic States soon noticed that the commonness in that policy within the field of their greatest interest, i.e. the relations with Russia, was merely good intention foiled by different interests of the states. It was evident that Russia was allowed to treat the new and the old states of the EU in its own way. Almost at the same time, it concluded an agreement with Germany on building the Nord Stream pipeline unfavorable to the Baltic States and closed the pipeline providing oil to the oil refinery plant of Lithuania.

It should be pointed out that the Baltic States are not unanimous in their relations with Russia. The closest in its position to the old European states is Latvia. It was the only Baltic State that positively evaluated the Nord Stream project and took a moderate position on the events regarding the “Bronze Soldier” in Tallinn in 2007. Lithuania is trying to shift the solution of problems with Russia to the European level. Despite its dependence on Russian gas and oil, it is trying to guarantee their supply not by strengthening bilateral relations with Russia, but by attempting to influence the relations between the EU and Russia. In 2008, Lithuania supported Poland’s veto on the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia, demanding to supplement the agreement with guarantees for the Baltic States’ energy security. After Poland had changed its position, Lithuania was the only EU state to assess the agreement critically. Lithuania’s attempts to implement EU energy policy directives providing for liberalization of the energy market, separating gas supply from pipeline management, encountered fierce opposition from the main shareholders of the “Lithuanian Gas” “Gazprom” and the German E.ON – Lithuania pays more for natural gas than any other EU state. Latvia and Estonia that treated the EU directives in a more flexible way managed to negotiate a lower price for gas. In further perspective, the attempts of Lithuania in the de-monopolization of the energy market should prove economically justified, providing all EU states hold a unanimous position on this issue.

The sentiments of disappointment over the incapability (unwillingness?) of the EU to speak with one voice are increasingly evident in all Baltic States. Vytautas Landsbergis expressed this disappointment in a radical form typical of him: “The EU is lost. In my opinion, it cannot find and it actually is not looking for a stronger foundation for its existence and its future.” This might have led to reinforced pragmatic foreign policy tendencies in the Baltic States which manifested themselves in a more moderate position regarding Russia and a turn toward more active support for the regional policy of the EU. In 2010, in the Victory Day celebration in Moscow, not only the President of Latvia, but also the President of Estonia participated. Both presidents expressed their support

for the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the EU and Russia. At the end of 2010, there was a successful official visit of President Valdis Zatlers to Russia which is already called historical in Latvia. Neither the Lithuanian President nor the Prime Minister avoid personal diplomacy in their relations with Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The warm-up in relations between the USA and Russia that became evident in 2009-2010 as well as the rapprochement of Poland with Russia also contribute to it.

Striving for unanimity in the EU foreign and security policy, alongside the “de-masking” of Russia and curbing its ambitions, the Baltic States consider their task of the reinforcement of the Euro-Atlantic ties to be of no less importance. Having been attached by the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the “new” Europe in 2003, they were and still are consistent supporters of USA foreign policy. The Baltic States, as members of the “Vilnius-10” who approved the anti-terrorist initiatives taken by the USA in the aftermath of September 11, support USA policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Stephan Mull, former USA Ambassador to Lithuania, defined the pro-American posture of the Baltic States and Poland as a voice of the new EU member states which is heard with satisfaction in Washington and which cannot be ignored by Brussels. In spite of changing circumstances, the Baltic States do not refuse the role of stabilizing Eastern Europe and strengthening transatlantic relationship. Positively assessing the attempts of the EU to enhance the military dimension of security, they further associate their security with maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship. However, with the beginning of the Barack Obama era and with the lowering of the prestige of the USA as a guarantor of the Baltic States’ security, they are attaching more and more significance to the cooperation between the Baltic and the Nordic States in the area of security.

In Lieu of Conclusions

After a brief review of the tendencies of Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States, it is worthwhile to come back to the table presented in the first chapter, supplementing it with the characteristics of the Baltic States.

60 At the beginning of 2011, President Dalia Grybauskaitė emphasized that “close relations between the Nordic and Baltic countries were a priority of Lithuania's foreign policy“. See: http://www.lrp.lt/Lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/glaudus_baltijos_ir_siatures_saliu_bendradarbiavimas_uztikrins_sekminda_regiono_ateiti.html, 2011 02 23
Table 2: Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europeanization</th>
<th>National foreign and security policy</th>
<th>Baltic States’ (BS) foreign and security policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Projection of the EU. Adaptation of a state and rapprochement of policy (from the top).</td>
<td>Increasing political influence of the center.</td>
<td>Adoption of <em>acquis</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption of common objectives.</td>
<td>Participation in the implementation of the EU Northern Dimension Initiative, New Neighborhood and Eastern Partnership policies, the Strategy for Baltic Sea States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priority of common policy.</td>
<td>Priorities of BS foreign and security policy comply with CFSP directions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization of EU norms and policy.</td>
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<td>2. National projection (from the bottom).</td>
<td>A state seeks to increase its influence in the world.</td>
<td>BS as teachers of democratization in the post-Soviet space. Rapprochement with the Nordic States. Lithuania – claims for the regional center.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A state seeks to exert influence on foreign policy of other EU states.</td>
<td>Critique of NORD Stream, support for the USA in the Iraq conflict, support for Georgia in its conflict with Russia, strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A state uses the EU as a protective shield to justify unpopular foreign policy decisions.</td>
<td>EU energy policy requirements are used to justify the increased tension in relations with Russia (Lithuania).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shifting of national foreign policy objectives to the EU level.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled by the author
As can be seen from the table, Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States is taking place as an interactive process between the top (EU center directives) and the bottom (member state initiatives). A brief survey of foreign and security policy presupposes that in aspiring to EU membership, instrumental orientation towards provisions from the center was predominant; the principle of conditionality called not only for democratization of domestic policy, but also for the consideration of the directions and principles of the CFSP. After the Baltic States became EU members, the instrumental ES interpretation remains; commitments to the center pass through the prism of national interests. Attempts of the states to make impact on the common foreign and security policy of the EU, shifting national interests to the EU level, are increasing.

The process of Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of the Baltic States is indivisible from the construction of national identity. This process is marked by the tension between nation state identity (expressed by the metaphors of a bridge, a bridgehead and an outpost of the Western civilization) and European identity associated with common political culture and goals of integration in foreign and security policy. On the one hand, as nation states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania emphasize their exclusivity and national security needs. On the other hand, as part of Europe, alongside other ES states, they are striving for the formation of the conception of “normality” in international relations.

Having become EU members, the Baltic States intensified the rhetoric of the perception of Russia as a threat, constructing it as an insecure and unpredictable state. They, in particular Lithuania61, are trying to convince other EU states that the “peculiar” Russian way to democracy and its imperial ambitions in foreign policy pose a threat not only to the Baltic States, but also to the existing world order. Within this context, the relations between the Baltic States and Russia may be seen as a consistent implementation of the identity of normative power Europe, expanding the space of “normal policy” by peaceful means. Being active members of the EU Neighborhood and the Eastern Partnership policy, the Baltic States urge the EU to pursue an open-door policy related to the Eastern neighborhood countries, thus constructing their identity as European – democratic, civilized and civilizing – states, true ambassadors of the normative power Europe.

The duality of the Baltic States’ foreign and security policy, like a distorting mirror, reflects the inconsistency of the EU’s CFSP. Today the EU is still an “unidentified political object”62, moving back and forth between a Westphalian superpower and a neo-medieval empire63. To a certain extent, the

61 The tendencies of highlighting the threat from Russia are particularly clearly seen in the 2010-2011 interviews and publications of President Valdas Adamkus and Vytautas Landsbergis.
63 Ibid., p.12.
foreign and security policy of the Baltic States is more consistent than that of the European Union. Within the EU neighborhood policy, they emphasize the normative rather than the instrumental aspect, promoting a serious attitude to the European core values.

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Lithuania’s Eastern Neighborhood
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The Military Doctrine of Russia and Practical Realities

This article surveys a strategic document regulating the military policy of Russia – the military doctrine of 2010 and its practical realization. The main characteristics of the doctrine are analyzed; the doctrine is compared with previous doctrines. Attempts are made to explain how the doctrine’s provisions regarding the threat of NATO to the national security of Russia are related to practical actions of security and foreign policy under realization; at the same time, the article raises the problem of the instrumentality of this document in Russia’s diplomatic policy, the goal of which is to considerably increase its influence on processes taking place in the international system. The author discusses how the main directions of the new military policy – a radical transformation of the military and its initial results – are constructed in the doctrine. The article emphasizes that the optimization and modernization of the armed forces that is going on enhances the military power of Russia, yet the political regime is not oriented towards democratic changes. Both in military policy and in other national security matters, the power of decision-making in essence largely depends on the unilateral decision of the president. This, without any doubt, gives a serious basis for talking about increased threats to the national security of Lithuania.

Introduction

On February 5, 2010, an important document defining the military policy came into force in Russia – a new military doctrine considered one of the essential strategic planning documents declaring the fundamental statements about defense (including preparation). More specifically, the document presents a viewpoint on the defense of the state by military means that also points out the main internal and external “dangers” and “threats” to the national security.

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The aim of the article is to discuss essential provisions of the doctrine by focusing most of the attention on Russia’s position towards NATO as a primary threat and on the armed forces’ modernization provisions and their practical realization.

This concrete and extensive instruction for the armed forces indicates military threats and military dangers, defines goals and tasks of the military policy, details priorities and directions of the development of the military as well as presents provisions on military–economic provision. The doctrine complements and extends the national security strategy by military provisions, but its separate articles are also associated with the conception of Russia’s foreign policy. The compilers of this doctrine singled out the two most important problems of this document – the assessment of a NATO-posed threat and Russia’s plans on the employment of nuclear weapons. Thus, the doctrine should be considered not only an exceptional military-nature document of the state, but also a strategy which reflects the outline of Russia’s internal and particularly foreign policy. Moreover, the doctrine actually performs a certain instrumental role in the diplomacy of modern Russia. Its content has been influenced by two factors: a strengthened internal potential of the state and a foreign policy directed to realize one of the main goals – to strengthen the status of the state in the world.

The military doctrine of 2010 can be called defensive with certain exceptions. Most of the content of the document is taken up by provisions testifying that military power is necessary to ensure the security of the state, its allies, and citizens. However, as we will see later, defensive categories are not completely dominant. In several places the defensive position is changed into an attack for the sake of defense. We can doubtless consider the doctrine a continuation

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1 Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 23. Factual characteristics of the doctrine: the preparation of the new „Military Doctrine of Russia“ began from the summer of 2005, when President of the Russian Federation V. Putin set the task in the Security Council to prepare a new document about the military policy that became a priority objective of the Security Council’s working groups. It is common knowledge that the mastermind and implementer of the military reform was Chief of Russia’s General Staff J. Balujevsky, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council since 2008, a mentor of the military doctrine development. In 2007–2008, Russian press was flooded by reports about the soon-to-be-made-public doctrine; however, the official declaration of the Security Council of Russia about the creation of the doctrine was announced only in 2009 and it came into force on 5 February 2010 when President of Russia D. Medvedev approved it by his signature.

2 The political scientist Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Centre has aptly named three primary ambitions of modern Russia: first, to strengthen its influence on former states of the Soviet Union by creating a certain bloc in which Russia’s interests would take a privileged position; second, to guarantee equality with the leading power centers (EU, USA, China); third, Russia believes that it has the right to participate in discussing the most significant world problems, Дмитрий Тренин, Модернизация внешней политики России, http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2010/03/25/trenin.html#, 12 December 2010.
of the analogous document of the year 2000 because it only elaborates more concretely, deeply and clearly how the security of the state will be realized in the coming decade.

It should be mentioned that the doctrine sports quite a few statements formulated in a vague diplomatic parlance, providing for unlimited interpretation possibilities. One of the essential differences can be discerned in the final part of the doctrine. The doctrine of 2000 ends with the commitment of the state “to guarantee a consistent and firm execution of the military doctrine”, whereas the new one states that “the provisions of the military doctrine can be specified in compliance with the changing character of military dangers and threats, tasks set for ensuring military security and defense and also development conditions of the Russian Federation”. Thus, this sentence of the doctrine grants the Kremlin, i.e. the president, broad possibilities not only to flexibly interpret the approved provisions, but also to effectively and unilaterally change them.

1. Security Challenges for Russia: NATO – “Danger” No.1

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, i.e. a military defensive alliance, has been rated first on the list of main military dangers. According to the authors of the doctrine, the external danger to Russia’s security lies in the following actions executed by NATO: first, by assuming global functions implemented in violating the norms of the international law; and second, by expanding the military infrastructure of members of the organization on the borders of Russia, including the admittance of new members. Thus, Russian politicians, by taking advantage of the doctrine, at least publicly declare their loyalty to the traditional attitude to the world when the primary enemy was the USA and its allies in Europe, to be more precise, provisions that were formed during the time of the Cold War. All the more so in the doctrine of 2000, NATO and the USA are not named (not emphasized categorically), at least directly as the

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3 J. Balujevsky, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, named two major reasons that forced Russia to place NATO at the top of the list of dangers: rapid modernization of the strategic offensive weaponry in the 21st century and “material and ideological support of Georgia”. Заместитель секретаря Совета безопасности Российской Федерации Юрий Балуевский, „Индекс Безопасности”, http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/sirus4-10/Interview-Baluevsky.pdf, 2010 11 20.

4 Among the 11 possible most important dangers to the security of the state, it is possible to name several additional that are directly related to NATO and the USA. For example, the third danger on the list is defined as “the deployment of military contingents at the initiative of a foreign country (a group of countries) on the territories bordering on the Russian Federation and its states allies as well as in the adjacent waters”. The fourth danger is “the establishment and deployment of the strategic missile defense systems that undermine global stability and violate the established balance of forces in the nuclear field, as well as the militarization of the outer space and deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems, precision weapons”. Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 12.
danger of the most important potential military threat, though the first enlarge-
ment of the alliance gained practical application in 1997 after the admittance of
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. This at first seemingly “old-fashioned”
attitude should be considered a pragmatic ambition of Kremlin politicians to
enhance Russian positions in the would-be consultations and negotiations with
NATO, seeking to influence the shaping of the European security policy. Here
is how Kremlin politicians word the goal of military security: “by employing
various means to deter another state or a group of states to weaken the role
and importance of Russia as a subject of international relations”. Yet the Euro-
Atlantic direction remains one of the most important in Russia’s security and
foreign policy; therefore, it is possible to state that we are witnesses to a new
and complex diplomatic game of states.

Let us see how the relations between Russia and NATO fared during the
period of the formation of the doctrine and after its adoption. This will help ac-
curately answer the question of what strategic goals Russian politicians sought
instructing the designers of the doctrine to assign this “obsolete” wording an
exceptional role. For nearly the last two decades, the enlargement of NATO has
been going on in spite of the negative attitude of Russia. The only obvious result
of Russian diplomacy is the NATO–Russia Council, performing consultative
and practical cooperation functions concerning the most demanding security
issues. It has been in settling concrete problems (terrorism, non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, fighting drug trafficking, crises management)
that the positions most often differed. Since the very beginning of the second
NATO enlargement “wave” in 2004, Russia’s hostile attitude toward this or-
ganization has been strengthening while its leaders more and more often and
persistently kept declaring in their public speeches the right to defend their
interests in the neighboring states.

Such an attitude of mutual distrust, in spite of the dialogue in progress,
was strengthened in Russia by two factors: first, the stabilization of Russia’s
internal situation during Putin’s first term in office and the consistent strengthen-
ing during the second (mostly due to the export of energy resources) produced

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1 To be truthful, in the doctrine of 1993, “the expansion of military blocs and unions” is named in the list
among the major military dangers. The “main threat” in the doctrine of 2000 is the increase of military
forces at the borders of the Russian Federation. Consequently, in both cases NATO is also kept in mind.
11. Traditionally, anti-Western declarations on the part of the authorities are rather intended for internal
use. The more so based on the newest (03 02 2011) sociological poll on Russia’s enemies by Jurij Levada
centre, the USA (40 per cent, for comparison in 2009 – 51 per cent) and NATO (32 per cent, 2009 – 34
per cent) rank second and third, after the internal enemy No.1 – the fighters of Chechnya. Есть ли у
2 А. И. Коповянский, В. И Лутовинов. Военная безопасность Российской Федерации и ее обеспече-
ние в современных условиях. Москва, 2009, с. 21.
3 I. Oldberg, Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev, Stockholm, Swedish Institute
of International Affairs, 2010, Nr.1, p. 16–17; T. Janeliūnas, NATO ir Rusijos strateginės partnerystės
viržai, in Beieškant NATO Lietuvoje: pasiekimai, nesekmės, perspektyvos, Vilnius:Vilniaus universiteto
leidyka, 2010, p. 78.
conditions for attempting to regain the lost firmer positions in international
politics; and second, a real threat in the closest perspective to encounter the third
wave of the enlargement emerged. To put it more precisely, the Council failed
to become an effective tool, providing Russian diplomacy with possibilities to
exert weighty influence on the enlargement plans of NATO.

True, the cooperation of Russia and NATO was marked by attempts to
achieve qualitative results; however, they did not yield practical outcomes. The first attempt to build a long-term partnership failed completely because of
different “weight categories” and interests of the negotiators and inability to
reach compromise solutions. The ambition of Georgia and Ukraine to become
members of the Alliance was one of the most significant reasons for the dete-
rioration of the relations, while Russia’s military response to the developments
in Georgia became one of the most obvious practical examples of the clash of
its interests with the Alliance.

Consequently, the dynamics of such political realities coincided with the
final stage of the preparation of the doctrine. It is possible to state that from this
moment on, Russia declared its principle position – it would not permit anyone
or anything to ignore its interests and would employ all means possible, inclu-
ding military ones as well, to reach its goal. Thus, the strengthened potential
of the great regional power enabled Russian politicians to finally formulate
and begin to realize the principle strategic goal – to participate in the security
policy of Europe as an equal partner. Russia’s ambition to be one of the main
parts of the multi-polar world by employing “multi-vector diplomacy” and its
negative attitude to the dominant role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic direction
were recorded in the “National Security Strategy Until 2020” adopted in 2009.
Thus, the Kremlin’s diplomacy has undertaken a unilateral initiative – dialogue
and cooperation with the Alliance on the continuity of the enlargement at the
new political discourse level.

The first diplomatic initiative occurred during the last autumn month
of 2009 when President of Russia D. Medvedev proposed a project of the “Eu-
ropean Security Treaty”. By the way, at the same time, the Security Council
supported the project of the military doctrine. The President’s proposal can be
considered a cardinal rearrangement of the existing security system since all
European countries were invited to sign the Treaty, the participants of which
cooperate on the basis of the principles of “indivisible and equal security”
taking into consideration, under obligation, security interests of each Treaty
participant. Article 10 unveils the proposition to all states in the Euro-Atlantic
and Euro-Asian space, ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as well as to

8 For example, the NATO–Russia Council (before 2008) developed a conception on international peace-
making operations, yet this document was not publicized.
9 K. Paulauskas, NATO šiandien: pasiklydę transformacijoje?, Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga
10 According to the compilers of the document, Russia’s national security is concerned about the policy,
pursued by NATO in two principle directions: first, the expansion of the Alliance’s military infrastructure
at the borders of Russia; second, the attempt to assign NATO a global role.
the most important international organizations, including NATO and CIS, to sign this Treaty\textsuperscript{11}.

At the same time, the Kremlin decided to make the diplomatic assault still more intensive by employing new actions aimed at increasing the pressure on the West. The military doctrine pronouncing NATO the primary danger for Russia was approved on the eve of the Munich Conference on Security Policy. The new NATO security strategy, NATO missions, and actualities of regional security were discussed in the doctrine. At the conference the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov, resorting to a rather sharp rhetoric, criticized the policy executed by the West: the inability to guarantee security in the region, NATO’s expansion to the East, and the instigation of a new Cold War. Even an ultimatum-level position was expressed implying that in case the West further continued the current policy, the tension would keep increasing\textsuperscript{12}.

Consequently, in 2010, by demonstrating internal strength, Russia kept further accelerating the diplomatic process, or to be more specific, propagated this president’s initiative at different top-level meetings including negotiations with heads of individual states, as for example, with the Chancellor of Germany, A. Merkel. Russia did not get a principled answer from the leaders of the West because comments were limited to short phrases, making it clear that in the near future there were no intentions of changing the status of the institutions responsible for security\textsuperscript{13}. In the first half of 2010, Russian diplomacy, having pooled all means possible, tried to force the West to react to its unilaterally proposed radical changes, but did not achieve any tangible results.

The answer of the West to Russia’s diplomatic initiatives and military doctrine can be considered NATO’s new “Strategic Concept for the Security and Defense”, declared on 19 November 2010, in which the main direction of the cooperation policy with Russia remained unchanged. Just as previously, the strategic importance of cooperation with Russia is emphasized, that “NATO poses no threat to Russia” is declared, and the cooperation mechanism – consultations, practical cooperation and NATO–Russia Council – is unchanged. The most painful issue for Russia – NATO enlargement plans\textsuperscript{14} in the neighboring states, belonging to the zone of its interests – is also being solved without major changes. The network of NATO’s partnership programs in the East is

\textsuperscript{11} Article 1 of the project reads: “all actions in the security area which will be executed by the signed countries, individually or together with others, and also within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions shall be carried out only taking into consideration the interests of all participating parties. Article 4 suggests that emerging problems should be solved by participants through consultations, a conference and an extraordinary conference. Проект Договора о Европейской безопасности, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/6152, 2010 12 15.
\textsuperscript{13} T. Janeliūnas (footnote 7).
being continued within the institutional framework of NATO–Ukraine and NATO–Georgia Councils\textsuperscript{15}.

Thus, we see a rather complicated and paradoxical situation when both countries, claiming to call themselves strategic partners manifest diametrically different, rather hostile positions in their official strategic documents. Besides, judging by President D. Medvedev’s annual report to the Federal Meeting presented after the declaration of NATO strategy, the Euro-Atlantic direction in Russia’s security policy remains only one of the important ones, i.e. it is not granted the highest strategic priority level. In their documents, in a diplomatic way, decisions adopted in Lisbon are discussed, allusions are made as to “modern partnership based on security indivisibility, mutual trust, transparency and predictability”, while Euro-Atlantic security perspective with Russian initiatives is treated with “cautious optimism”\textsuperscript{16}. Today it is obvious that the newly-born cooperation between NATO and Russia in the first decade of the 21st century was not strategic, stable, or bearing results and did not become a new stimulus in the direction of strategic partnership.

It is safe to state that the statements about NATO’s danger No.1 to Russia’s security recorded in the military doctrine are an instrumental means in the big diplomatic game in seeking to ensure favorable positions (freedom of maneuver) in complicated negotiations. For example, in the “Foreign Policy Doctrine” approved in 2008 with regard to relations with NATO, provisions are laid to first of all “make use of the political dialogue and practical cooperation to the utmost” in solving common threats and only afterwards, the Alliance’s actions, analogous to those mentioned in the military doctrine\textsuperscript{17} and not meeting Russia’s requirements are listed. After a lapse of two years, in his annual report, President D. Medvedev still emphasized the significance of the West: Russia needs the USA for “intensive economic cooperation”.

The European Union is treated in a similar way for the sake of the “Partnership for Modernization”\textsuperscript{18}. Thus, the cooperation with the West for modern Russia is important in the military sphere for strengthening the security of the


\textsuperscript{17} Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd, 2010 12 02.

\textsuperscript{18} Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию, 30 ноября 2010 года, 13:00 Москва, Кремль http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9637, 2010 12 01. In the opinion of the political scientist D. Trenin, the leaders of Russia realize the significance of the West to the state’s technological modernization, the success of which depends on the investments of rich countries. Moscow is improving relations with the West by building “modernistic alliances” with Germany, France, Italy, “recharging relations with the USA”; a perspective surfaces for the partnership with NATO, particularly regarding Afghanistan and in the area of air defense. The expert maintains that for Russian foreign policy to become modern and stable it is necessary, first of all, to “irreversibly demilitarize Russia’s relations with the USA and NATO”. Дмитрий Тренин, Какую роль могла бы играть Россия в новом десятилетии, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?lang=ru&fa=42205. 2010 12 12.
country and particularly vitally necessary in the economic and technological areas.

Another important element of the doctrine in terms of both international and regional security is related to nuclear weapons employment strategy. The nuclear deterrence strategy holds a central place in the documents of Russian security policy doctrine. The first doctrine (1993) stipulates that a nuclear weapon can be used in case of a global war only. In the second doctrine, Russia reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons in two cases: in the first case, as retaliation after nuclear or any other kind of mass destruction weapon has been employed against it or its allies; in the second, at the start of the aggression while using conventional weapons in “critical to Russia’s national security situations”\(^\text{19}\). In the third doctrine, an essentially identical position is provided, just having changed the wording of the last five words to “the threat to the very existence of the state”. Thus, the employment of this most effective type of weapon is narrowed still further, and this, beyond a doubt, should be treated as a positive step, testifying that the employment of nuclear weapons established in the new doctrine is possible for an exceptionally defensive purpose only. Finally, it should be mentioned that a considerable reduction of the nuclear weapon arsenal in compliance with the New START Treaty has no negative influence on the national security of Russia.

It might be possible to believe this axiom; however, practice is far more complicated and less clear. First of all, it is doubtful that military doctrine provisions related to nuclear weapons are of a general nature, therefore they can be easily interpreted. Here, the decisive right to make a decision (Part III, article 22 of the doctrine) is granted exclusively to the President of the Russian Federation whose decision will be essentially based on the subjective perception of the threat. Secondly, as is well-known after the Russian President signed the doctrine, “The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020” were also approved. However, one can only speculate about the content of the document that was not publicized. On the other hand, the doctrine does not touch upon the strategy of the redeployment of nuclear weapons, though it can be extremely relevant as can be seen from a very complicated context for negotiations between Russia and NATO on anti-aircraft defense\(^\text{20}\). This shows that nuclear weapons can serve the Kremlin not only as a “backup” strategy, but also as an instrument of pressure in its diplomacy with the West.


2. Military Policy of Russia: The Complex Reform of the Armed Forces

In the third and broadest part of the doctrine, the key goals of the military policy are defined and a detailed perspective of the development of the armed forces is presented: the goals of the military forces in peacetime and during aggression, major objectives of the development of the armed forces, the aims of military planning, and priorities are set. First of all, we will give a panoramic view of the essential moments of the military policy: prevention of potential conflicts and characteristics of the employment of military forces.

Prevention of military conflicts envisages the employment of numerous initiatives of different nature within the framework of cooperation from both unilateral and multilateral and international organizations, including the European Union and NATO. Attention should be drawn to the fact that the authors of the doctrine put clear emphasis (in the doctrine of 2000, it is entered as a priority) on the importance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and on “enhancing its potential”. In this way, Russia is continuing to play a diplomatic game while demonstrating that it has an alternative to NATO – its own, Russian, variant of this organization. The CSTO, even considering the weakness of this organization, offers an additional opportunity for Russia to assert its dominance in this principle zone of interest and, at the same time, substantiates and extends the employment of the Russian army outside the state’s borders under the CSTO mandate. While pondering over the perspectives of the Russian foreign policy, political scientists of the Kremlin agree, diplomatically claiming that Russia must seek collective security and become involved in “one or another military-political alliance”\(^21\).

When compared with the previous doctrine, emphasis is placed not only on the personal security of Russia as security of its allies is also constantly being discussed, i.e. Russia is unambiguously proclaiming its zone of responsibility. A separate article diplomatically declares “expansion of the circle of partner countries and development of cooperation with them on the basis of common interests”—of course, in accordance with all norms of international law\(^22\). In practical policy, this would primarily imply the CIS space; however, it is also indicative of Russia’s intentions to strengthen its influence in active involvement in a wider global context as one of the gravity centers.

\(^{21}\) Russian military experts claim that the establishment of the collective rapid reaction force has just started and, judging by the objectives set to it, the yet unestablished military force needs “radical reorganization”. А. Карнаухов, В. Целуйко, Военная доктрина России и состояние ее Вооруженных сил. Теория и реальность, Новая армия России, Москва:Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, 2010, с. 119; А. И. Коповянский, В. И Лутовинов (footnote 6).

\(^{22}\) In the doctrine of 2000, there is no formulation giving a clear outline of the employment of military force outside state borders, but it is essentially dealt with only with its use in stopping an aggressor who has violated state and territorial integrity as well as in international military conflicts or peacekeeping and peace restoration operations. Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 12.
However, one of the most controversial parts of the doctrine concerns the employment of military forces. At the very beginning, Russia declares that it can rightfully (pravomerno) use its armed forces - “to protect its citizens outside of the Russian Federation, in accordance with commonly recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of Russia” (sentence 20). Also provided for is another possibility for defending citizens abroad (sentence 26) - “in order to protect the interests of Russia and its citizens, the maintenance of international peace and security, the formation of the Russian Federation armed forces can quickly be used outside of Russia in accordance with (v sootvetstveyi) commonly recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of Russia and federal law”.

The solid safeguards (treaties, norms of international law) are unlikely to give cause for concern over the employment of military power, yet due to some circumstances, a closer look should be taken at this actual issue. First, this streamlined diplomatic formulation of the problem allows the decision-making party to make a number of different interpretations justifying the use of force, i.e. the criteria of measuring the interests of the state and its citizens, especially those living outside Russia, are quite ambiguous. From the perspective of the security of neighboring states - non-allies, this is “the most dangerous” formulation of the defense doctrine, which, under certain circumstances, could allow Russia to execute offensive military actions. The newest legal changes realized by the Kremlin in the pre-doctrine period helped to simplify the procedure of the use of military force outside Russia even more and, most importantly, gave the president the right to take a decision, as K. Giles puts it, “consulting less and under slightly more diverse circumstances”23.

On the other hand, attention should be paid to the fact that military policy in the doctrine is formulated not as a rigid code of laws, but dynamic provisions which can be changed primarily by a decision of the President of Russia “by federal laws”. This decision is dependent on the subjective attitude of one person24. On the other hand, the employment of Russian troops outside the territory of the state in defending the citizens’ interests is becoming almost formally legitimized.

In Part 3 of the military doctrine “Military Policy of the Russian Federation”, the conception of the development of military forces is widely viewed. It is interesting that the doctrine defines the objective and complex outline of the reform of the Russian armed forces which has been undergoing intensive implementation in practice for several years. For this reason the military reform is a particularly important moment in the assessment of the doctrine. In the doctrine of 2010 the theoretical basis is rather widely, yet specifically formed.

24 The Russian political scientist Sheinis also highlights the excessively great power (by the Constitution, individual laws or their respective treatment) of the President of Russia to unilaterally solve key issues concerning national security despite the fact that this concept is not referred to in the Constitution. В. Л. Шейнис, Национальная безопасность России. Испытание на прочность (часть III), Полис, 2010, № 2, c. 79–76.
By the way, most probably as a legacy from the previous doctrine, which contained many general statements, beginning with the polysemous word “to improve”, words with a slightly more concrete content, such as “to enhance quality” or “to provide” are used. The main tasks of the armed forces in war and peacetime are determined, major priorities with the purpose and tasks of military planning are indicated, and ways of their implementation are particularly consistently set here. In essence, a radical military reform without using the word “reform” is described – the structure, composition and strength of military forces are determined according to the predicted extent of threat, capabilities of the state and other parameters including demographic factors. For example, such evident innovations are envisaged as the establishment of strategic and operational systems in the military infrastructure, creation of permanent readiness units and their provision, optimization of the system of military education, and further development of the contract system. Mention is made even as to the necessity to have state and civil control over all activities of executive authorities in the field of national defense.

Let us see what modernization measures foreseen in the doctrine are being implemented, the more so because this structure inherited from the time of the Soviet Union has seen no radical reorganization with the exception of the reduction of the number of troops. The first (2008-2009) and the second (2010-2012) stages are aimed at the fundamental reorganization of the military organizational structure and its control, radical downsizing of the number of officers and reorganization of the officer training system. The first task – the military has been reorganized or is in the final stage of reorganization according to the three planned levels: the military district, the regional command and the brigade (a new permanent readiness brigade), a fundamental reform of the Air Force organizational structure and its control has started. The optimization process of the military has begun – in the middle of 2010, two-thirds of the officers were dismissed from the military. The system of military education is undergoing its first tests: training of new officers has been stopped, the number of higher military institutions is being reduced, and the professional training system is being changed. This enhances military professionalism, mobility, and preparedness to participate in different military actions.

It may be stated that today Russian military reformers enjoy considerable support from the political command and have financial resources at their disposal necessary for the realization of modernization. The successful start

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25 In the doctrine of 2000, in the chapter on the military organization of the state, among general declarations beginning with the word “to improve” or “to increase effectiveness”, there is a sentence which refers to the underlying task - the implementation of the complex military reform, yet no details are provided.
gives reason to believe that practical implementation of the military reform set in stages for a long period of time is not going to face a variety of serious problems such as weakening political support, lack of substantial financial resources, or strong opposition from the military. There is no doubt that the work done today, considering the miserable traditions of the failed reforms in Russia, witnesses the qualitative progress of the military forces and the increased possibilities for the implementation of the task set forth in the doctrine to guarantee state sovereignty and its territorial integrity. At the same time, another concluding idea should be stated – reforms of the military forces increase Russia’s military power whereas the principles of the ruling of the political regime remain untouched by modernization making the direction of evolution still vague.


Military modernization is not feasible without one more important constituent – provision of modern armaments and equipment to the troops. In the last, extensive Part IV (making one-third of the doctrine text) called “Military and Economic Security of Defense”, tasks, principles and directions of defense technical provision are detailed. We are going to touch upon the main tasks. Alongside adequate financing and optimization of expenses, the issue of complex rearmament of the military (first of all, strategic nuclear forces, permanent readiness military units, etc.; however, there is no mention of the Navy and the Air Force) with modern multifunctional weapons, military and special equipment are laid out. It is intended to create new types of accurate acquisition weapons and develop their information security, establish major scientific and industrial structures, maintain the state monopoly of the strategically most important enterprises, ensure technological independence of the state, and finally, increase quality and competitiveness. And the key task is to maintain the effective high technology multi-sector that can satisfy the needs of the armed forces and ensure the strategic involvement of the Russian Federation in the global market of high technology products and services28.

A list of numerous complex tasks is presented which shows that in this field ambitious plans, not mentioned in the doctrine approved 10 years ago, are sought to be implemented. Of course, it is not only the most ambitious, but also the most problematic part of the military reform, the realization of which directly depends on the economic potential of the state. The beginning of military rearmament coincided with the protracted procedure of the approval of the doctrine. Let us take a look at the situation of the rearmament of

the military and see the first achieved results. One should bear in mind that so far military provisions have been simply catastrophic, and it was only the uninterrupted arms export that ensured the survival of the military-industrial complex in the stagnation period.

It is true that this process started earlier, when the state armament program for 2007-2015 was announced; however, in practice it was only in 2009 that the first small-scale batches of new weapons reached military units. This fundamental problem, unsolved for nearly two decades (provision of new weapons ended in 1991-1992), is attempted to be solved by upgrading the old armaments. Modernization of the tank park is being implemented most successfully. In 2010, a Graney class nuclear submarine, the building of which started in 1993 and which is capable of launching long-range missiles equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads, entered service. In 2009, work started on another Graney class submarine, the Kazan. So, the first small-scale qualitative changes can be seen, though the process is still slow.

Major tasks (the state arms development and procurement program) are designed to be implemented in the period of 2012-2020, i.e. approximately until the time a new doctrine is developed. As is known, a task has been set by 2020 to provide the army with no less than 70 per cent of new armament and material. This part of military modernization of the military requires not only considerable time, but even more material expenditure and human resources (intellectual potential). There is no doubt that today the domestic situation in Russia is noticeably more favorable than a decade ago and provides practical possibilities to start to essentially solve the perennial problems of state defense: financing of the military is rapidly increasing (in 2010 – 2.6 per cent of GDP, in 2011 – 2.9 per cent); and due to domestic orders and growing export, the military-industrial complex is recovering (according to armament sales, in 2009, with 18 per cent, Russia took second place after the USA with 39 per cent). However, the military-industrial complex will need considerable time to recover after the stagnation period in order to be able to develop industrial capabilities, modernize production, create new examples of modern weapons and start their serial manufacture. For example, it is claimed at the highest political and military level that new technologies are the weak point of the military industry. In other words, after the task has been set, considerations

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of how to essentially realize the technological breakthrough in a number of branches of the military industry started. It is difficult to stimulate this process, particularly when encountering state capital corporations that have no direct contact with risks in a competitive environment. So, a lot of internal problems have accumulated in state corporations and they are hard to overcome through additional financing only or by means of administrative leverage.

Top officials who are in charge of the Russian armament program admit that the military industry lacks the necessary capabilities for the production of different types of weapons. This is the main reason that made Russian politicians and military officials procure a modern assault ship, the Mistral, from France and 14 unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel. These were but the first steps, and in the future, this may turn into standard practice. The state that provides itself with all types of armaments used a simple principle that has long been applied in the world – you buy what you cannot make yourself. Russia had not followed that since the time of World War II. It should be acknowledged that this is a certain novelty in the Russian military policy. The initial results are rather limited, yet as compared with the earlier situation, it is evident that the first concrete step forward has been made. With reference to the mentioned initial results of rearmament, an obvious inadequacy between the tasks declared in the doctrine and practical possibilities of Russia (at least within the planned period of the program) can be seen. It is likely that even under favorable conditions the rearmament program will not be fully implemented. It is evident that even the increasing financing will not suffice to provide the whole military force (for example, the Navy) with modern armaments. Yet, in terms of tendencies, we can be sure of one evident issue that the military-industrial complex and procurement of military equipment from abroad will enable the Russian military, rapid reaction units in particular, to have new armaments and material at their disposal.

Дмитрий Семенов, Время прорывных технологий, http://www.redstar.ru/2011/02/02_02/1_01.html. 2011 02 11

33 These corporations ignore President D. Medvedev’s decrees to give priority attention to the development of new technologies. Госкорпорации должны кардинально повысить расходы на НИОКР, http://state.kremlin.ru/commission/20/news/10186, 2011 02 02. Russia also uses another method – procurement of modern weapons produced in Western countries (the Mistral, unmanned aerial vehicles) is lucrative seeking to start production according to their license or trying to copy them.

Concluding Remarks

In terms of quality, the Russian military doctrine of the year 2010 can be regarded as a new edition of the previous doctrine, where guidelines for military policy are formulated and concrete tasks for the nearest perspective are set. However, the doctrine is not an exclusively military strategic document; changes in home and foreign policy of modern strengthening Russia are reflected and intertwined in it. It can be said that the doctrine has become one of the tools of tactical and strategic warfare in Russia’s energized “multi-vector diplomacy”, a certain landmark in information warfare whose pragmatic objective lies in gaining as great a power to dominate in international politics as possible. The indefiniteness of the doctrine provisions, broad possibilities for their free interpretation, still greater concentration of decision-making in the hands of personalized authorities and the statement about the possibility of protecting Russian citizens by military means give reasonable grounds to speak about an increased threat to the security of the neighboring countries. Having added the statement about NATO and the USA as “potential partners and, at the same time, potential enemies”, it is possible to speak about the strong tradition of the Russian anti-Western policy.

Less than a year after the approval of the doctrine, it is possible to claim that its provisions concerning modernization of the armed forces are being practically realized and this is indicative of the tendency of the gradually increasing military power of Russia. At the same time, military modernization is being carried out, maintaining status quo of the present type of the political regime whose transitological perspective remains vague; besides, in following this perspective, it is hardly possible to become part of the West. Again, it must be stated that the Russian authorities do not comply with their own provisions concerning the enhancement of democracy and civil society as the main national interests which are included in “The National Security Strategy”. The military doctrine reflects the contradictions found in the home and foreign policy of modern Russia and does not help give an answer to the essential question – will the country take a turn to gradual rapprochement with the West or will it look for its own way?

April 2011
The Russian Military Reform
2005-2015

Unlike previous downsizings of the military forces which were called reforms, the present military reform is designed to essentially change all the forces. Its preparation took a long time. Although officially it was launched at the end of 2008, the first ideas that the Russian Military would have to be effective, used at peacetime and in war and be maintainable by the country emerged as early as 2005. This reform is going to take a long time and will be carried out in stages. Though it is planned to be completed by 2020, it has reached the point today that makes it impossible to go back to the pre-reform state. With the Russian political authorities showing their strong will to complete it, in 2012-2015 nearly all structural reorganizations will be finished and the remaining years will be devoted to rearmament. After successful implementation of the reform, the Russian Armed Forces may become one of the best militaries in the world. This study is intended to discuss the objectives of the reform, peculiarities of its stages, the foreseeable result as well as the ways which the Russian political authorities plan to use to achieve this result.

Introduction

The military reform that the Russian Federation is undergoing at present is widely discussed by the military personnel, it is daily referred to by top leadership and politicians, reports on it are provided by the country’s mass media. The Western press shows far less interest in this reform. To many countries, Russia is no longer an ideological adversary posing a military threat and has become just a national state trying to establish itself among the states of the world.

This study has been prepared on the basis of information provided in the Russian press, the Internet, TV and other mass media sources. An attempt has been made to reconstruct the changes that have already taken place in the Armed Forces and forecast what may happen and what result can be expected.

Reorganizations of Russian military structures have taken place since the very collapse of the USSR. There have been plenty of them, so it is difficult
to track down when one of them ended and another one began. The present reform, too, at its beginning was considered by many to be one more venture of the new minister. Nevertheless, a closer look taken at what has been done, is being done and is planned to be done, makes it possible to state that what Defense Minister Anatoly Serdiukov and President Dmitry Medvedev are doing today is a well thought out reform which President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov started long ago. It is worthwhile to remember that when Putin came to power, the first step for stopping the disintegration of the Armed Forces of that time was the promulgation of the new military doctrine\(^1\). Reorganizations launched before were based merely on reducing forces, therefore they did not yield the desired results, and the military forces were getting weaker and disintegrated.

Being aware of that, the political authorities of the country then made a decision not to make cosmetic changes but to carry out a fundamental reform of the Russian military. In October 2003, then Minister of Defense S. Ivanov presented a document drafted by the Ministry of Defense “Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” which was unofficially named the Ivanov doctrine. He specified what kind of armed forces Russia wanted to have. On October 2, 2003, this document was approved and the Ministry of Defense was ordered to outline a vision for the reorganization of the military so that it would be able to carry out tasks assigned to it.

1. The Concept of the Future Russian Military

In September 2005, at a Defense Ministry Collegium meeting headed by S. Ivanov, Chief of the General Staff Army General Yuri Baluyevsky delivered a report on the improvement of combat readiness of the Russian Armed Forces. In his report the General presented not only the proposed vision of the military which complied with the Ivanov doctrine’s requirements\(^2\), but also a concrete development plan. Of course, at that time the plan was not made public; nor is it made public now. Nevertheless, having looked through the changes that have occurred in the recent years, having assessed statements made by the authorities and commanders, it becomes obvious that the plans are to establish essentially new armed forces. The reform will have an impact not only on the military, but also other armed structures of the country (the system of internal affairs, state security institutions, etc.). Upon its completion, “the Russian Armed Forces, maintaining strategic deterrence potential and combat readiness of the forces, at peacetime and in emergency, must be capable of successful participation with its standby readiness capabilities, without additional mo-

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1 This Doctrine was approved by the Russian President’s Decree No 706 of 21 April 2000 and was renewed by Decree No 146 of 5 February 2010, http://www.mil.ru/849/11873/1062/1347/1818/index.shtml.

2 Мясников В, „Сергей Иванов обкатывает свою доктрину“, Независимая газета, 19 августа 2005 г.
bilization, simultaneously in two military conflicts of any type as well as be capable of performing peacekeeping operations both autonomously and as part of international forces3.

To fulfill these requirements, the Russian General Staff has planned:

- to change the concept of employing the Armed Forces (to foresee the employment of the Armed Forces in peacetime and war);
- to change the composition of the Armed Forces (to form new structures of military forces for peacetime and war);
- to make military command and control system (C2) effective;
- to change the composition of the military personnel (the corps of officers – noncommissioned officers – soldiers);
- to create an effective state system of the maintenance of the military (to change personnel training and armament systems, etc.)

Unlike the USSR military, which could be used only in wartime and with additional preparation, i.e. mobilization, the new Russian military in peacetime must be ready to successfully participate in 2 military conflicts (local conflicts, regional wars) and one peacekeeping operation immediately, without preparation, i.e. rely not on mobilization but on the ready reserve4. In this case, the use of nuclear weapons is not foreseen. Besides, it must be capable of waging a global conflict after a preparatory period, i.e. after completing mobilization and turning into a wartime structure. In this case, nuclear weapons may be used.

To achieve this goal, the suggestion has been made to reform the Armed Forces by applying the principle of functional employment of forces. According to it, the military forces must be divided into two parts. The first, the bigger part, is to be forces ready to execute and executing military actions, or, as it is now popular to say, operational forces. The second, the smaller part, is to be forces designed for military administration, strategic planning, training and supply of the military personnel and forces, etc., i.e. the institutional army. This distribution will have to remain in wartime, too. The reserve and mobilization will be used to increase only the operational forces.

The operational forces would consist of strategic, operational and tactical level capabilities. At the strategic level, these would be strategic commands. Each of them would be in charge of all land, air and sea conventional capabilities within the territory assigned to them (i.e. it would be a joint command). It would act in the strategic direction intended for it without any changes either at peacetime or in war. They would replace the now existing military districts

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3 The original: "Вооруженные силы РФ должны быть способны в мирное время и в чрезвычайных ситуациях, сохраняя потенциал стратегического сдерживания и выполняя задачи поддержания боеготовности, войсками (силами) постоянной готовности без проведения дополнительных мобилизационных мероприятий успешно решать задачи одновременно в двух вооруженных конфликтах любого типа, а также осуществлять миротворческие операции как самостоятельно, так и в составе многонациональных войск", Мясников В., „Сергей Иванов обкатьывает свою доктрину“, Независимая газета, 19 августа 2005 г.

4 Литовкин В., „Сердюков пересматривает стратегию“, Независимая газета, 23 декабря 2008 г.
which in peacetime have preparatory and administrative functions and can wage war only after having undergone a relevant reorganization, i.e. having formed fronts on their basis.

An intermediate link between these commands and fighting forces would be operational commands. They would be responsible for the implementation of particular objectives of the operation and would fight using several or a dozen brigades assigned to them. In essence, this would be the equivalent of modern armies and corps. A new self-sustaining brigade should become the key fighting unit.

The institutional part would be under the control of the significantly decreased Ministry of Defense. Strategic, i.e. nuclear, the planned space and air defenses\(^5\) and, possibly, the strategic reserve (rapid reaction, mobile) forces would remain under its subordination. Besides, it would also have land, air, sea forces staffs, administration, mobilization, personnel training, supply, etc., capabilities. The institutional part would be responsible for the supply of operational forces and the total readiness of the country for fighting (mobilization).

After this reform, the Russian military structure would be similar to modern Western (e.g. USA) military structures, where armed forces branches are given forces training tasks, whereas strategic or regional commands “wage war”.

2. The Process of the Military Reform of the Russian Federation


As early as 2004-2005, the General Staff headed by J. Baluyevsky prepared the concept of the Strategic Command. 2006 was devoted to the preparation of a plan of reform of the Russian military structure and its implementation.

Prior to launching the reform, it was necessary to not only practically test by experiments the effectiveness of the new military organization\(^6\), but also break through the resistance of the military elite who were saturated with the thinking of previous eras. The first opposition to the proposed concept emerged right after its preparation began in 2004\(^7\); however, a true conflict occurred only at the beginning of 2006 when at a meeting on the reform held in Moscow, a part of the then Russian Armed Forces command showed fierce opposition to it. To appease the opposing generals, Ivanov then called the reform “an

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\(^5\) Бабакин А., “Надвигается существенная реорганизация вооруженных сил”, Независимая газета, 9 декабря 2005 г.

\(^6\) „На пути к новым Вооруженным Силам“, Красная звезда, 25 января, 2007 г.

\(^7\) Плугатарев И., „Военачальники бунтуют“, Независимая газета, 5 ноября 2004 г.
experiment”, but, at the same time, he said that approximately three hundred generals would have to be dismissed. Most probably, the reform opponents were appeased by the idea that by the time the experiment was completed with the ideas verified and a new structure of the Armed Forces created, most of them would have retired already.

In May 2006, Defense Minister Ivanov traveled to the Eastern Military Districts of Russia where he introduced the principles of the concept and declared the start of the experiment. To guarantee success of the reform, it was important to carry it out by those interested in attaining the best result; therefore, middle link generals were chosen. In case of success, they would be offered the implementation of the reform as well as leading positions in the new organization. Being aware of that, the Russian authorities concentrated all personnel matters under single control. As early as September 2005, by the President’s decree Army General Nikolay Pankov became the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense responsible for all military assignments. The search for reliable and confident of successful reform generals as well as a very strange practice of appointing commanders to their positions may be considered to be distinctive features of the preparatory stage of the reform. It seems that those commanders who were trusted at the beginning were appointed by the President’s decrees. Those commanders who had to be verified were appointed by the Defense Minister’s orders. This principle was adhered to until the very official beginning of the reform. When the reform was launched, all appointments of the commanders were made solely by the President’s decrees. Here are some examples.

In September 2006, by the President’s decree General Colonel Vladimir Bulgakov was appointed as the Commander of the Far East Military District. Under his command, during the exercise “Baikal 2006”, the concept of the Strategic Command, i.e. how this Headquarter could wage war, was first tested. By the President’s decrees, the following appointments were made to command: the Siberian Military District - General Colonel Alexander Postnikov (April 2007), the newly created Experimental Strategic Command – General Colonel Nikolay Tkachiov (September 2007). In the exercises “Vostok 2007” and “Vostok 2008”, this command further tests the capability of the Strategic Command to fight. As early as 2007, by the President’s decrees the following appointments were made: Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Colonel Alexander Zelin, Black Sea Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Alexander Kletskov, North Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Nikolay Maksimov, Pacific Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Konstantin Sedenka and Baltic Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Viktor Mardusin. All the appointees are young, capable of serving in the military in the coming 8-10 years, or are highly experienced generals who have participated in wars, and who are well aware of the situation in the military and are interested in the necessity and success of the reform. Most of them have successfully coped with the assigned tasks during the experiment and are successfully continuing their service.
In July 2008, with the experiment nearing the end, one of the initiators of the reform and its mastermind Y. Baluyevsky was promoted by the President’s decree. Since he had completed his job in the General Staff, he moved to the position in the Security Council of the Russian Federation and would be in charge of monitoring the overall execution of the reorganization.

During the preparation period, it was by the Defense Minister’s orders that in September 2007 Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky was appointed who was shortly afterwards informed about the decision to transfer the Navy authorities to St Petersburg, and in December 2007 Leningrad Military District Commander General Colonel Valery Gerasimov was appointed. It was already by the President’s decree that the latter was appointed to the position of the Commander of the Moscow Military District in February 2009, i.e. after the declaration of the official start of the reform. By the Defense Minister’s orders others were also appointed: Chief of the General Staff General Colonel Nikolay Makarov and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Colonel Vladimir Boldyrev. Boldyrev has already been replaced. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Postnikov, has been appointed by the President’s decree.

Apart from Y. Baluyevsky’s promotion, some other interesting events took place at the end of the experiment. In February 2007, Ivanov, a former military, was replaced by Serdiukov, a civilian. Ivanov moved to the position in the Government and remains one of the patrons of the reform. The appointment to the post of the Minister of Defense of a civilian who had never before had anything to do with military personnel should help implement new decisions and fight against the opposing military personnel. After the experiment ended at the end of 2008, the already mentioned experimental Strategic Command headed by Tkachev was disbanded.

The President’s decision, announced on October 15, 2008 by Serdiukov, on approving the new organizational structure of the Russian military encompassing three levels – military district (strategic command), regional (operational) command and brigade – meant the official beginning of the reform. For the first time, having introduced the vision of the future military, the Minister also presented a wider draft of the institutional military organization. He announced that in 2012, from the 21,813 military personnel of the central military body and military command and administration structures only 8,500 will remain, from then existing over 355,000 officers only approximately 150,000 will be left after the reform and from 1,107 generals – only 877. The number of high-ranking officers will be reduced, but the number of lieutenants will increase. The downsizing will be executed in stages. Although the functions of the General Staff will not practically change, nearly 1,000 positions will be eliminated. The Main Operations Directorate will undergo the greatest changes: from 500 only 200 will remain. Other directorates, including the Main Intelligence Directorate, will also be downsized. Previously, the General Staff

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8 Гафутулин Н., „Мобильность, боеготовность, престиж“, Красная звезда, 15 октября 2008 г.
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prepared all plans and they were implemented in other staffs. After the reform, the Staff will be executing only strategic planning. Operational plans will be prepared by strategic commands in the directions entrusted to them and they will be implemented by operational commands and forces.

2.2. The First Stage. Reorganization of the Tactical Link – Transition to Brigades (2008-2009)

The reform itself was planned to be carried out in stages. The first stage of the reform, the end of which was intended to be December 1, 2009, whether accidentally or not, became “hidden” from outsiders. As early as December 2007, the moratorium declared by Russia on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) no longer allowed foreign military inspectors to conduct inspections and monitor Russian forces. The Russian Federation also stopped supplying information about its Armed Forces provided for in the CFE Treaty.

During the first stage of the reform, it was planned to disband divisions and create new brigades. It is difficult to explain why the first stage of the reform was divided into two parts: by July 1, 2009 and by December 1, 2009. Considering the fact that in March 2009, 5 brigades of the new organizational structure had already been formed and the first experimental exercises of this type of the brigade had been carried out in the Siberian Military District, an assumption can be made that most probably the emphasis on the first part of the stage was the last test of the new structure. After that, massive formation of new brigades started. During the first part of this stage, 46 brigades of the new type were declared to be formed, while during the second one 40 more new brigades were declared. Having looked through a huge pile of information sources, as of July 2009, 141 motorized rifle, tank, artillery, rocket, Special Forces, communications, logistics, etc., brigades were found in the Russian Ground Forces. As many as 54 of them were brigades of the new type and had been created since the beginning of the reform. The majority of them, as many as 30, were motorized rifle and tank brigades. In the European part of Russia, in the Leningrad Military District, four new brigades appeared, two of which were motorized rifle brigades. The Moscow Military District already had five of them: three motorized rifle and two tank brigades, while in the North Caucasus District there were eleven, including nine motorized rifle brigades. Still more brigades of this type came into being in the military districts situated beyond the Urals. In the Volga-Urals Military District ten new brigades were found, three of which were motorized rifle, one tank and two rocket brigades. In the

9 Поросков Н., „Товарищи потенциальные противники…“, Время новостей, 11 ноября 2008 г.
10 Поросков Н., „В российской армии созданы пять общевойсковых бригад“, Время новостей, 19 марта 2009 г.
11 Миранович Г., Тихонов А., Худолеев В., Земляниченко А., „Бригада набирает силу“, Красная звезда, 17 февраля 2010 г.
12 Тихонов А., „Ночная проверка боем“, Красная звезда, 18 июня 2009 г.
Siberian Military District there were thirteen – three motorized rifle, one tank, two artillery and one rocket brigades. In the Far East Military District there were thirteen brigades, ten motorized rifle brigades included. As can be seen, at the beginning, just like the experiment, the reform was being carried out in the East; therefore the majority of brigades were formed there, too. The results of the first part of the stage (by July 2009) are presented in Table 1.13

### Table 1. Brigades of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation as of July 1, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>VOLGA-URAL MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>SIBERIAN MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorized rifle</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>13 (6)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne assault</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket artillery</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defence</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiotechnical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic reconnaissance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>141 (54)</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>21 (6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>29 (8)</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 (9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>27 (14)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After July 1, new brigades continued to be formed. As of December 2009, there were already 164 motorized rifle, tank, artillery, rocket, special forces, communications, engineer, logistics, etc., brigades found in the Ground Forces. Thus, twenty-three more completely new brigades appeared. The total number of the new brigades which until then did not exist amounted to seventy-eight. It is highly possible that the previously existing brigades were also being re-

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13 The summary table compiled by the author, recording Ground Forces brigades mentioned in various open sources. The number of the newly formed brigades from the beginning of the stage to 1 July 2009 is given in brackets.
organized into brigades of the new structure. Similarly to the first part of the stage, the majority of brigades were formed in Siberia and the Far East; however, some of them were also established in the European part of Russia. One more peculiarity of this stage of the reform is the planned redeployment of nearly thirty newly formed brigades and their location in completely new places\textsuperscript{14}. The results of the second part of the stage are presented in Table 2\textsuperscript{15}.

Table 2. \textit{Brigades of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation as of December 1, 2009}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>Leningrad Military District</th>
<th>Moscow Military District</th>
<th>North Caucasus Military District</th>
<th>Volga-Ural Military District</th>
<th>Siberian Military District</th>
<th>Far East Military District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigades</td>
<td>Motorized rifle</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>13 (6)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>11 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airborne assault</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket artillery</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air defence</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radiotechnical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic reconnaissance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>164(78)</td>
<td>18 (6)</td>
<td>29 (14)</td>
<td>29 (9)</td>
<td>18 (9)</td>
<td>33 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results almost correspond to the data officially published in open sources and speeches of military command, indicating the number of brigades remaining after the reform (172 brigades\textsuperscript{16}) and that of the newly formed

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\textsuperscript{14} Литовкин Д. „Генерал армии, главком Сухопутных войск Владимир Болдырев: Сухопутные войска должны стать компактными и мобильными“, \textit{Известия}, 25 июня 2009 г.

\textsuperscript{15} The summary table compiled by the author, recording Ground Forces brigades mentioned in various open sources. The number of the newly formed brigades from the beginning of the stage to 1 December 2009 is given in brackets.

\textsuperscript{16} Божьева О. „Незаконное вооруженное реформирование“, \textit{Московский комсомолец}, 12 ноября 2008 г.
brigades (80\textsuperscript{17} - 82\textsuperscript{18} - 85\textsuperscript{19}). As can be seen from the tables presented, some of the brigades are not known. It does not mean that they do not exist; simply no information was found about them in open sources.

Nearly each newly formed brigade participates in exercises shortly after its formation. For example, during the exercise “Kavkaz 2009” conducted in the North Caucasus, 7 new brigades were tested\textsuperscript{20}. Brigade exercises took place in training ranges beyond the Urals, in the Moscow Military District (Mulino range), in the Western part of Russia (“Osen-2009”: Ladoga-2009 and Zapad-2009). After the exercises, each new brigade practically became a standby readiness military unit.

It is planned that the number of standby readiness brigades capable of acting within one hour after receiving the signal will increase from 76 to 90\textsuperscript{21}. They will be staffed 95-100 percent. The remaining brigades will, most probably, be reserve brigades. They will be staffed with a smaller percentage of personnel or will have just received new military personnel; therefore, they will have a longer period for preparation to respond.

All the brigades have conscripted and contracted servicemen, but their numbers are different in different type brigades. For example, a motorized rifle brigade can have 80 percent of conscripts and 20 percent of contracted servicemen\textsuperscript{22}, whereas in an air defense brigade the situation can be the opposite.

Another interesting fact is that after the reform all units of the new military structure, the new brigades included, will have new flags. In his interview, the Director General of a company producing military heraldry said that for the year 2009 they have to produce 90 new flags, whereas in previous years the company had already produced about 200\textsuperscript{23}.

Almost simultaneously with the reform of the Ground Forces, the Air Force reform was being carried out, while the Navy was likely to be left for later time\textsuperscript{24}. At present, previously existing Air Force regiments and divisions have already been reorganized. An air force base in the Air Force has become an analogue of a Ground Forces brigade. Squadrons of fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopters and other aircraft are going to be deployed there. It has been declared that the bases will be of three categories\textsuperscript{25}. The first category will include bases of 5-10 squadrons and they will be designed to support all the forces. Lower category bases will support specific forces, e.g. the Ground Forces or the Navy. It is interesting that only part of the air bases are under the Air Force. Today, there are several dozens such bases; however, statements have already

\textsuperscript{17} Интервью с ген. лт. С. Антоновым, Эхо Москвы, 2009 m. liepos 17d.
\textsuperscript{18} Интерфакс-АВН, „23 дивизии Сухопутных войск России расформируют за три года“, 2009 m. lapkričio 11 d.
\textsuperscript{19} Интерфакс-АВН, „Российские Сухопутные войска готовы отразить нападение противника на любом стратегическом направлении“, 2009 m. rugsėjo 27 d.
\textsuperscript{20} Денисов В., “Новая армия новой России”, Красная звезда, 16 июля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{21} Литовкин В., „Сержанты командуют генералами“, Независимая газета, 19 июня 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{22} Васенин В., „Обойма Макарова“, Российская газета, 23 марта 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{23} Князьков С., „Прикосновения к святыне“, Красная звезда, 29 июля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{24} Гаврилов Ю., „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{25} Гаврилов Ю., „В ожидании времени “Ч“, РГ (Неделя), 8 октября 2009 г.
appeared that only eight of them may be left. A great number of the new air bases will probably be placed under the Air and Space Defense Forces (ASD), the Navy, and, probably, the Ground Forces (helicopter bases).

Different Russian sources mention 69 new air bases. This makes more than “55 new air bases” referred to in different statements. The distribution of air force bases at the end of the first stage is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Air Force Bases of the Russian Federation as of December 1, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE COMMAND</th>
<th>NUMBER OF AIR BASES</th>
<th>AIR BASES (No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF STAFF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2457, 6996 uav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>86, 877,714, 922, 6960, 6965, 6992, 6996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>320, 6978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>265, 6984, 6986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>999, 3624, 6969,6970, 6971, 6972, 6973, 6974, 6975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant aviation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1449, 3918, 6950, 6951, 6952,6953, 6954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aviation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3919, 696, 6956, 6957, 6958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air and Space Defence</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>?, 30, 420, 4215, 6956, 6959, 6962, 6963, 6964, 6967, 6968, 6975, 6977, 6979, 6980, 6981, 6982, 6985, 6987, 6988, 6990, 7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52, 2512, 7050, 7051, 7053, 7054, 7057, 7058, 7061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems that already at this stage 24 air bases and 13 new Air and Space Defense brigades are subordinate to the detached from the Air Force and newly formed Air and Space Defense Operations Command. They are distributed over the entire territory of Russia. The Air Space brigades were created on the basis of part of Air Defense units which had earlier belonged to the Air Force and they are armed with the S-300, S-400 systems and fighters. Some of them have their own air bases. Together with missile attack early warning stations belonging to the Space Troops they should provide the basis for the establishment of the Russian Air and Space Defense.

26 Садчиков А., „Уйдут на базу“, Известия, 9 июня 2010 г.
27 Литовкин В., „Минобороны приоткрывает карты“, Независимая газета, 14 ноября 2008 г.
28 The summary table compiled by the author, recording different Air Force bases mentioned in different open sources. “?” stands for the bases the deployment site of which is known, but their numbers have not been identified yet.
29 Собщение Интерфакс-АВН, 21 ноября 2008 г.
2.3. The Second Stage. The Operational and Strategic Link – Operational and Strategic Operational Command (2010-2012)

The main emphasis of the second stage of the reform, which apparently is taking place today, is the reorganization of the higher part of command and control of the Forces. It is officially said that the new structure will help to get rid of one command link – the division. The old structure had the following chain of command: regiment-division-corps-army-military district (wartime front). In the new structure, the regiment-division link will become the brigade, the corps-army will become the operational command and the military district (one or some of them joined) will turn into the joint strategic command. Thus, in essence, not only brigades will be introduced, leaving no regiments or divisions, but the level of the corps and army will be joined, i.e. one of them (corps, most probably) will be eliminated.

Very little is said about operational commands. According to the available information, in the Ground Forces and in the Air Force these commands are formed on the basis of previously existing armies, while in the Navy – on the basis of flotillas and fleets. It may be stated today that about ten operational commands are being or have been created in the Ground Forces and seven operational commands have already been formed in the Air Force. There have been first hints about some flotillas or even fleets being transformed into Navy operational commands. For example, plans to reorganize the Caspian Flotilla into an operational command and include it in the Black Sea Fleet have been mentioned30. The Russian President’s Decree of September 1, 2009 puts the Black Sea Fleet under the control of the Commander of the North Caucasus Military District and thus significantly lowers it status31. Alongside commands being formed on the basis of fleets, specialized operational commands, e.g. submarine forces, start coming into being as well32.

The establishment of new commands, foreseen in the concept of the reform and, tested by experiments, is inevitable; however, due to different reasons, their establishment has not been widely spoken about. For quite long even the supreme command had claimed that there would not be any strategic commands, simply every military district would be reorganized. The first official confirmations about their establishment but not necessarily in every district appeared at the end of 2009. Summarizing the results of the exercise “Ladoga 2009”, the Commander of the Ground Forces stated that the President’s decree on establishing strategic commands instead of military districts was to be signed by the end of the year33. According to him, strategic commands will concentrate huge forces in their hands. Not only the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Airborne Troops assigned to their territories, but also the

30 По материалам информационных агентств, „Каспий соединили с Черным морем“, Независимая газета, 17 июля 2009 г.
31 Литовкин В., „Со стратегическим размахом“, Независимая газета, 11 сентября 2009 г.
32 Интерфакс-АВН, „В ВМФ России создано командование подводных сил“, 12 декабря 2009 г.
33 Гаврилов Ю., „В ожидании времени “Ч“, РГ (Неделя), 8 октября 2009 г.
forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Federal Security Service and other departments will be under their subordination. Strategic commands will carry out all necessary planning in the directions entrusted to them and will be responsible for all executed or planned operations not only on the Russian territory but also outside its borders.

As has already been mentioned, regardless of the voiced ideas that each military district will be turned into a strategic command, it seems that the reform is going to be carried out according to the plan developed in 2005. This plan intended not to tie to the existing structures, i.e. military districts, but follow the strategic lines. Four Ground Forces Strategic Commands will most probably be formed, one for each strategic direction: in West, South, North and East. It is likely that the established Air and Space Strategic Command will also retain its status of a strategic command and in the future – a structure which will have control over the Russian nuclear forces.

The “Western” Strategic Command will encompass the forces which today are under the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts as well as the Baltic and the North Sea Fleets. The Strategic Command Headquarters will be located in St Petersburg. It is planned to be called the Western Military District. The attachment of the Baltic and the North Sea Fleets even more strongly supports the above mentioned claims that Naval operational commands may be formed on the basis of fleets, too.

The “Southern” Strategic Command, or the Southern Military District, will comprise the present North Caucasus Military District Forces, part of the territory and forces of the Volga-Urals Military District as well as the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla. As has been mentioned, it is highly possible that the flotilla will be incorporated in the Black Sea Fleet, whereas the latter will be reorganized into a Naval Operational Command. The District Headquarters is planned to be located in Rostov-on-Don.

The “Central” Strategic Command will be assigned a major part of the Volga-Urals Military District and the Forces of the Siberian Military District. It will be called the Central Military District and its Headquarters will be in Yekaterinburg.

The “Eastern” Strategic Command will have under it the Far East Military District Forces, the Pacific Fleet and the Kamchatka Flotilla. It will become the Eastern Military District with its Headquarters in Khabarovsk.

It is possible that alongside the Ground Forces strategic commands, specialized strategic commands responsible for specific activities, e.g. air and space defense, nuclear weapons or mobile rapid reaction forces, may come into being. The end of this stage is planned to be the year 2012, but some strategic commands seem to have already been formed (e.g. Air and Space Defense). The establishment of the four Ground Forces Strategic Commands itself will be completed by 1 December 201034. The boundaries and the directions of actions of these strategic commands are presented in Figure 1.

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34 РИА Новости, „Количество военных округов сократят до четырех“, Правда.Ру, 28 мая 2010 г.
2.4. The Third Stage. The End of the Reorganization – Optimization and Rearmament (2012-2020)

Several tasks are likely to be dealt with in this stage. First of all, it is planned to complete the optimization of the entire structure, which comprises not only the forces of the Ministry of Defense but also those of other Russian armed structures; it is also planned to create the wartime structure and provide armaments to the forces. All this should be finished by 2015-2016. Another task consists in substantial rearmament of the formed organization with a new type of armaments. This must be done by 2020.

The total number of the Russian military personnel planned after the optimization period will be around 1 million\(^{35}\). Almost all Armed Forces will be ready to wage war at once\(^ {36}\). The Ground Forces should consist of 270,000 servicemen\(^ {37}\). These forces will be compact. From 1,890 Ground Forces military units and formations, 172 will remain, 76 to 90 of which will be standby readiness units\(^ {38}\). The rest will be reserve units, each of them having a fixed period of preparation for action\(^ {39}\). From 340 Air Force military units, 180 will

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\(^{35}\) Коновалов А., „Армия для страны, а не наоборот“, Огонёк, 8 июня 2008 г.

\(^{36}\) Божьева О., „Незаконное вооруженное реформирование“ Московский комсомолец, 12 ноября 2008 г.

\(^{37}\) Коновалов А., „Армия для страны, а не наоборот“, Огонёк, 8 июня 2008 г.

\(^{38}\) Литовкин В., „Сержанты командуют генералами“, Независимая Газета, 19 июня 2009 г.

\(^{39}\) Черняк И., Гаврилов Ю., „Армия при цели“, Российская газета, 24 сентября 2009 г.
remain\textsuperscript{40}, the number of strategic-missiles units in the Armed Forces will be reduced from 12 to 8, number of units in the Space Troops – from 7 to 6, and in the Airborne Troops – from 6 to 5\textsuperscript{41}. The number of mobilization storehouses and training institutions, rear bases and other military installations which are not standby readiness units will also decrease.

During this stage, reserve and mobilization units are planned to be formed\textsuperscript{42} and issues related to the establishment of military territorial infrastructures (defense regions) are planned to be solved. A number of brigades of the new organizational structure created today are most likely to become key units of the reserve. On a regular basis or as required, they will be staffed with reservists and conscripts, refreshment training done and, if need arises, will be capable of reinforcing forces in a particular region. It has also been discussed as to how to transform them into standby readiness units faster. They are planned to be staffed with servicemen from other standby readiness brigades deployed in other regions of the country, redeploying them to a new location by military or civilian aircraft. Upon arrival at the new location, they will take over the armaments of the reserve brigade and will be ready to act\textsuperscript{43}. Such reserve brigades (about twenty infantry and artillery brigades) have already been formed in the Siberian and the Far East Military Districts. As to the remaining part of Russia, reserve brigades will, most likely, be far fewer in numbers, while in some places, e.g. in Kaliningrad Region,\textsuperscript{44} the Leningrad Military District\textsuperscript{45} or North Caucasus they are not planned at all. Another part of the wartime structure will be military equipment storages, officially called arsenals. They will probably have the structure of the new brigade and the necessary armaments and will become the basis for the formation of wartime units.

Finally, steps will be taken to establish the place and role of other Russian military structures and departments, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the like, within the overall military organization. According to Defense Minister A. Serdiukov, the reconstruction process of these structures has also started\textsuperscript{46}.

The optimization process of the structure is accompanied by a comprehensive renovation of the standard military procedures and norms base. Judging from commanders’ speeches, the tempo of renovation is fast. In June 2009, General V. Boldyrev speaks about a ready package of forty new military norms, standards, methodical instructions, statutes and other documents required for military activities, which will be verified during the exercises “Ladoga” and

\textsuperscript{40} Литовкин В., „Минобороны приоткрывает карты“, Независимая газета, 24 ноября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{41} Гаврилов Ю., „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{42} Литовкин В., „Публичный день генерала Макарова“, Независимая газета, 17 декабря 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{43} Бондаренко А., „Оперативный резерв для остронного гарнизона“, Красная звезда, 22 мая 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{44} Интерфакс-Северо-Запад, „Россия-Балтфлот-Реформа“, 21 ноября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{45} Интерфакс-Северо-Запад, „Россия-Ленво-Реорганизация“, 29 ноября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{46} Гаврилов Ю., „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
“Zapad”\textsuperscript{47}. In March 2010, Chief of the General Staff N. Makarov mentioned 148 more new documents to be verified during the exercise “Vostok 2010”. By October 2010, all the necessary documents were planned to be prepared, approved and started to be used on 1 January 2011\textsuperscript{48}.

Nevertheless, the main stress of the optimization of the structure lies in the final restructuring of combat support and combat supply links, military training institutions and the like but not of combat forces. Radical changes are planned within the structure of military rear. One of the key amendments provided for in the Ivanov doctrine suggests that the principle of exterritorial supply of the forces should be refused. Previously, a lot of effort, forces and expenses were devoted to transporting stores from one arsenal in one region of Russia to another. Now the forces will be supplied on a territorial basis. The new brigades will practically have everything they need in their own arsenals\textsuperscript{49}, whereas the necessary replenishments will be provided from local resources. This will help to significantly reduce the number of rear forces, storehouses, arsenals and the amounts of the necessary stores. The Ministry of Defense is planning to disband 277 now existing military storehouses and installations and establish on their basis 34 complex bases of rear logistics and technical maintenance of all forces\textsuperscript{50}.

To enhance the logistics supply, understaffed rear military units will be disbanded. Regiments have been discarded. All of them will be replaced with fully staffed standby readiness units – brigades and battalions. By the end of 2010, in every military district it is intended to form at least two logistics brigades directly subordinate to it\textsuperscript{51}. All nine understaffed automobile brigades previously belonging to the rear forces have already been disbanded. Instead of them, 20 standby-readiness fully staffed separate automobile battalions have been formed. Each operational command will have one, and the strategic command will have two such battalions\textsuperscript{52}. Some of the new battalions have been transferred to new locations of permanent deployment. For example, the standby-readiness separate automobile battalion, formed on the basis of an automobile brigade of the former Moscow Military District, was redeployed to North Caucasus\textsuperscript{53}. To guarantee everyday supply to the brigades in their permanent deployment areas, it is planned to hand over all non-military services to civilian structures or even private companies. To this end, an experiment is being carried out in one of Moscow and three of Siberian Military District brigades. During the experiment, all service work of military units (food and laundry service, territory maintenance, etc.) is done by civilian enterprises\textsuperscript{54}.

\textsuperscript{47} Литовкин Д., „Генерал армии, главком Сухопутных войск Владимир Болдырев: Сухопутные войска должны стать компактными и мобильными“, Известия, 25 июня 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{48} Васенин В., „Обойма Макарова“, Российская газета, 23 марта 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{49} Литовкин Д „Минобороны в поисках нового облика“, Известия, 18 ноября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{50} Интерфакс-АВН, „Россия-Армия-Тыл-Реорганизация, 11 ноября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{51} Тихонов А., Потехина А., Елисеева М., „На передовой и в тылу“, Красная звезда, 25 июня 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{52} Интерфакс-АВН, „Россия-Армия-Преобразования, 21 ноября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{53} Интерфакс-АВН, „Войска Северо-Кавказского военного округа (СКВО) усилены 474-м отдельным автомобильным батальоном“, 26 октября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{54} Литовкин В., “СиБО переходит на аутсорсинг“, Независимая газета, 25 июня 2010 г.
The result of the optimization should lie not only in the changed number of the military personnel but in its composition as well. As has been mentioned, all peacetime military forces will comprise about 1 million, whereas wartime forces will comprise 1.7 million servicemen. It is planned to cut approximately 200,000 officer positions and totally discard 140,000 praporshchiks (warrant officers). The first step has already been taken, discarding about 40,000 unfilled military positions. As of 1 December 2009, the Russian Military has no praporshchiks and only about 20,000 of them were left to serve in the newly created sergeant positions. The next step was to gradually discard lieutenants who graduated from military departments of civilian higher education institutions and were called up for their two-year military service. They make up about 7,500 and there will be none of them left by 2010. 26,700 officers who were serving during the declaration of the reform and have already reached the age set for service, will not be spared either. It is planned to dismiss all of them together with those 9,100 servicemen who by the end of the first stage, i.e. by December 2009, will have served the set time of service. Downsizing of military positions is being carried out. As assessed by the Ministry of Defense, the reorganization of military storehouses and bases as well as automobile brigades alone will make it possible to eliminate approximately 12,500 military positions, including almost 5,600 officers and praporshchiks. Positions of military medical personnel and some educational institutions are being turned into civilian ones. In the Air Force, it is planned to eliminate about 50,000 officer positions. Moreover, in order to cut the number of officers and to increase the number of servicemen employed by contract, a step was taken which, most probably, has been unseen throughout the entire history of the existence of the Russian military. Officers who graduated from military schools are either immediately dismissed or they are offered a job by service contract in the position of a sergeant or even a private. Such facts have been recorded in the Railway Troops and the Northern Fleet.

Although it has been announced that all these reductions should be completed by 2016, it is likely that this will be done earlier. The situation is presented in Table 4.
As has been foreseen\textsuperscript{61}, the military training system is undergoing essential changes. Instead of the previously existing fifteen military academies, four military universities and forty six different military higher education institutions, ten large educational institutions are planned to be established. Three of them will be military scientific and research centers, six military academies and one military university. This year already, in Moscow, Podmoskovie and St Petersburg military scientific and research centers will start functioning\textsuperscript{62}. They will be responsible for officer training and for scientific research work in specific areas of military science\textsuperscript{63}. In total, the number of military higher educational institutions has been reduced by nearly one third, while the remaining were assigned to respective scientific and research centers and will become their branches. Today, a number of schools have been closed, and twenty more are going to be closed by 2013. It has been decided to temporarily stop the training of new officers; therefore, starting with 1 September 2010, all military schools in Russia will train sergeants\textsuperscript{64}. In nineteen\textsuperscript{65} of them Sergeant Training Centers are at present being established. One of the first was founded in Riazane\textsuperscript{66}. Conscripts will be trained in separate Training Centers. The entire new professional military training system should look like this (Figure 2)\textsuperscript{67}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{The Number of Officers in the Russian Military}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & BEFORE THE REFORM & THE END OF 2009 \\
\hline
Generals & 1,200 & 780 \\
Colonels & 60,000 & 8,000 \\
Officers & 355,000 & 150,000 \\
Non-commissioned officers/midshipmen & 142,000 & 0 \\
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\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{61} The Ivanov doctrine foresaw that the military training reform had to be completed in 2010.
\textsuperscript{62} Иванов В., „Военная реформа: мнения Минобороны и экспертов“, Независимая газета, 18 декабря 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{63} Гафутулин Н., „Мобильность, Боеготовность, Престиж“, Красная звезда, 15 октября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{64} Литовкин Д., „Погоный минимум“, Известия, 29 июня 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{65} Белоусов Ю., „За содействием – к журналистам“, Красная звезда, 19 мая 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{66} Александров А., „Миссия выполнима“, Красная звезда, 16 июля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{67} A composite drawn by the author table fixing educational institutions mentioned in different open sources.
The last task of this stage is to rearm the new structure. By 2010\(^{68}\), the amount of new armaments in the forces should make up not less than 30 percent. Later, by 2020, it should reach 70-100 percent\(^{69}\). At present, new brigades are being armed with available new armaments and their modernized versions. In 2009, several motorized rifle brigades had already been rearmed by new tanks T–90 and armored combat vehicles BMP–3\(^{70}\). Old armaments were altogether eliminated in some military districts as well. In the forces of the Moscow Military District, at the beginning of 2010, there remained only new and latest modification armaments (T–90, BMP–3)\(^{71}\). In 2010, the forces will see an additional influx of about 250 tanks T–90, the new air defense system “BUK–M3”, the missile system “Smerch”, “Uragan”, “Grad”\(^{72}\). In 2011, over three thousand items are planned of completely diverse new materiel and armaments, such as tanks T–90A, combat infantry vehicles BMP–2M, BMP–3, self-propelled artillery systems “Chosta” 2C–19, “Msta–S, armored personnel carriers BTR–70M, BTR–80, trucks “Kamaz”. It is planned to arm 5 brigades with the aforementioned weaponry\(^{73}\). Most of the new brigades in Siberia and the Far East were organized on the basis of armed military units equipped with

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\(^{68}\) Other sources (for example, A. Medvedev (24 05 2010), names the year 2015, not 2012.

\(^{69}\) Черняк И., Гаврилов Ю., “Армия при цели”, Российская газета, 24 сентября 2009 г.

\(^{70}\) Бородин Ю., „Экзамен на профпригодность“, Красная звезда, 20 ноября 2009 г.

\(^{71}\) „Russia moves forward with modernization”, Jane’s Defense Review, May 12, 2010.

\(^{72}\) Худолеев В., “Сухопутная мощь отчизни”, Красная звезда, 26 февраля 2010 г.

\(^{73}\) „Генерал армии, главком Сухопутных войск Владимир Болдырев: Сухопутные войска должны стать компактными и мобильными”, Известия, 25 июня 2009 г.
old armaments since no new armaments were available. Newer armaments are being rapidly transferred from the European part of Russia to these areas. The Air Force is also being renovated. It was declared that in 2010, 30 helicopters and 28 combat aircraft should be acquired\(^74\) and by 2015, it is planned to obtain about 400 new helicopters Mi–28, Ka–52, Mi–8M\(^75\). Apart from armaments, acquisition of other military equipment is particularly important; for example, equipment intended for the improvement of the command and control (C2) of the army. In addition to procedures, effective C2 of the forces depends on the state of the means of transmission of information and commands (in essence, equipment of communications). If C2 procedures are almost ready, tested during exercises Kavkaz 2009, Ladoga 2009, Zapad 2009, Vostok 2010 and will be approved, then the state of the means of communications in the Russian military today is rather poor. About 85 per cent of the means of communications in use are hopelessly outdated\(^76\). President N. Medvedev, visiting the headquarters of the Moscow Military District and inspecting communication equipment used in the military, expressed satisfaction that the new-generation radio station “Azar” had already been created. At the same time, he ordered to replace all old, analogous means of communications by new digital ones by 2012. Today, they are already being supplied to tactical units of brigades and, by the end of 2010\(^77\) the entire tactical chain of the military should be equipped with new means of communications.

To ensure lacking and later complete rearmament, general plans and programs for the rearmament of the forces are being revised and financing for the acquisition of armaments and equipment is being augmented. The new rearmament program, covering the period 2010–2020, will shortly be approved. The program plans to specifically name the types and amounts of the necessary armaments submitted by forces, whereas financing should be channeled directly to the producers but not to the forces\(^78\). For the financing of the new program it is foreseen to allot 13 billion roubles by 2020 – which would approximately make up 1.3 billion roubles each year. The Ministry of Defense holds that the amount is not sufficient and asks for more – 36 billion roubles\(^79\). It is likely that the allotted amount may increase. Recently a decision has been adopted to compensate the inflation in 2009–2011; therefore, the financial means assigned at present will be supplemented by additional 40–70 billion rubbles. State orders of Russia for the financing of the military complex are illustrated in Figure 3\(^80\).

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\(^74\) Литовкин Д., „Генштаб отчитался о сокращении командиров“, Известия, 23 декабря 2009 г.
\(^75\) Интерфакс-АН, „В ВВС России к 2015 году поступят 400 новых вертолетов“, 20 мая 2009 г.
\(^76\) Таравский А., „Связь решает все“, Красная звезда, 22 мая 2010 г.
\(^77\) ТВ РТР передача „Вести“, 19:00, 23 мая 2010 г.
\(^78\) ИТАР-ТАСС, „Госпрограмма по вооружению на 2011–2020 годы будет утверждена
\(^79\) Литовкин В., „Россия в арьергарде гонки вооружений“, Независимая газета, 4 июня 2010 г.
\(^80\) Generalized data announced in different open sources of Russia in 2008–2010.
Apart from budgetary means for the acquisition of armaments, the Ministry of Defense was empowered to take measures in order to obtain supplementary, non-budgetary financing. The Ministry of Defense sells military infrastructure and old armaments that have become available during the reform and retains the obtained money. This generates quite a lot of supplementary recourses. For example, the initial price of an object on sale in St Petersburg is 400 million rubles. In Podmoskovie and in Moscow it is 212 million and one billion five million rubbles respectively. The reform produced hundreds of such objects available for sale. A decision has been made to allow military personnel to organize lotteries as well. The Ministry of Defense hopes to pool about 3 billion rubbles in 5 years. Though all the money can theoretically be used elsewhere, apparently the greatest part of it will be assigned to priority programs, among them for the acquisition of new combat materiel and armaments.

To more effectively resolve problems concerning rearmament and the supply of new military equipment, by the decree of the President, Vladimir Popovkin was nominated the Vice Minister of the Defense Minister. Previously, he was just a deputy of the Defense Minister responsible for armaments.

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81 Presentation “Управление государственного заказа Министерства обороны Российской Федерации сообщает о проведении аукциона по продаже высвобождаемого недвижимого военного имущества, Красная звезда, 25 мая 2010 г.

82 “Управление государственного заказа Министерства обороны Российской Федерации сообщает о проведении аукциона по продаже высвобождаемого недвижимого военного имущества”, Красная звезда, 17 июня 2010 г.

83 Интерфакс-АВН, „Министерство обороны РФ предложило провести 16 государственных лотерей, чтобы профинансировать развитие Вооруженных сил”, 24 мая 2009 г.
will further be in charge of the rearmament of the military, yet his status has been elevated. The former Federal Subordination Agency for the provision of armaments to the Armed Forces is being assigned to the Ministry of Defense. Its new head, who used to work in the area of state taxes, will be responsible for the reduction of corruption and implementation of state orders. Thus, the implementation of the new armaments program should improve and the part of the orders by the Ministry of Defense in the general portfolio of orders will substantially increase.

3. The Military of the Russian Federation after the Reform

3.1. The New Brigade

Establishing a new brigade structure, Russia grounded it on the standpoint that in the future, even during a global conflict, warfare would not be conducted on entire fronts. That means that primary combat units should be autonomous, strong and mobile. Divisions are obviously too large for this. A brigade has become an optimal combat unit. The latter in most cases will have to fight independently without “neighbors on the right and left”. The USA, having a well-developed global positioning system (GPS), quite a lot of particularly precise armaments (PPA) and a powerful Air Force, has made it sure that it will always and everywhere in the world be able to support its brigades by fire. Russia is not capable of that yet. In spite of great efforts, Russia’s global positioning system “Glonass” is still inoperative and particularly precise armaments cannot be used without it. Besides, the Air Force has no and in the nearest future will have no sufficient aircraft to always support its forces by fire from the air. Thus, the new brigade in combat will have to rely on its own fire capabilities. Lack of precision will be compensated by a larger amount of artillery shells and missiles; therefore, instead of previous 1–2 artillery battalions the new brigade will have four: two self-propelled, one antitank and one reactive “Grad” artillery batteries. Motorized rifle battalions will also be reinforced by support fire capabilities. With reference to its fire power, the new brigade will nearly be equal to the old division.

To defend itself from the adversary, it will have a strong air defense component – two air defense battalions. In addition to these, their brigade will probably have three motorized rifle and one tank battalions, reconnaissance, engineer and logistics battalions, staff supply, radiological, chemical and biological defense, electronic warfare and medical companies. In comparison

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84 Сообщение РИА Новости, 17 мая 2010 г.

85 However, there were some hints that a variant of a brigade with four motorized riflemen battalions each of which possesses a tank company is also possible.
to the old divisions which were large, heavy and immobile, the brigade will be sufficiently strong and very mobile: 4-5,000 troops, 41 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, 36 self-propelled and 18 reactive artillery systems, a lot of antitank and air defense systems. The planned new motorized rifle brigade structure is provided in Figure 4.

After the fire power, the capability to rapidly re-deploy within large distances is one of the most significant characteristics of the brigade capability. Though in the new brigade all combat systems will be self-propelled, in addition to that a sufficient number of other means of transport are planned. The Russian military personnel think that the main brigade employment arena will be our continent; therefore, its re-deployment will be mainly ensured by railway and by self-propulsion. Numerous exercises demonstrated that the new brigade can re-deploy within several days over hundreds and even thousands of kilometers in the combined manner (railway–self-propulsion).

A particularly rapid method of long-distance re-deployment of the brigade has also been foreseen. It is likely that this method will be applied in case a demand arises to strengthen the eastern borders of Russia. As we have already mentioned, in Siberia and the Far East areas, a presence of tens of ar-

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86 The figures are by the author obtained by generalizing data supplied in various sources.
87 The scheme is drawn by the author and registers structural parts of the new brigade mentioned in various open sources.
88 Сергей Скоков, начальник главного штаба сухопутных войск РФ, интервью, Эхо Москвы, 10 октября 2009 г.
89 Литовкин В., „Гремя огнем, сверкая блеском стали”, Независимая газета, 2 октября 2009 г.
maments arsenals has emerged. They have all brigade-level armaments and materiel, but few personnel. It is planned to staff such arsenals–brigades with the personnel of other brigades, by simply taking the troops of one stand-by readiness brigade and moving them to the necessary area by air. The troops will just draw armory weapons and materiel and in twenty-four hours or more will be ready for combat actions. This re-deployment method is planned to be tested during “Vostok 2010” Exercise⁹⁰.

In addition to motorized rifle brigades, Russia’s Ground Forces will also have new-structure tanks, artillery, reactive artillery, special purpose, communications and other separate brigades. Self-sustainability and mobility requirements, just as motorized rifle brigades, are applied to all of them. There is very little information about their structure and capabilities in open sources. All those brigades will be distributed to operational commands, so that they could support primary carriers of the military burden – motorized rifle brigades.

### 3.2. The New Operational Command

The new operational command will take the intermediate link between the strategic command and military capabilities – brigades. The exact number of operational commands is not disclosed, yet it is probable that there may be 15–20. The great majority – about 10 – will belong to the Ground Forces. The primary task of the Ground Operational Command will be planning and execution of concrete military ground operations. They will be supported by corresponding capabilities from air and sea. In most cases land operational commands will be established on the basis of former armies. It is likely that each of them will have under their subordination from two to six stand-by readiness motorized rifle and tank brigades, one–two artillery and reactive artillery brigades, several smaller units, such as an separate automobile battalion and so on.

At present, in the Air Force there are seven operational commands, four from which – the 1ˢᵗ, 2ⁿᵈ, 3ʳᵈ and 4ᵗʰ are ordinary operational commands of military forces. They have aircraft at their disposition to support the Ground Forces. Since their number coincides with that of strategic commands, it is likely that each strategic command will receive one such command. The remaining three operational AF commands are specialized, that is their mission will apparently be not just support of Ground Forces operations, but specialized missions. For example, the operational command of distant aviation will probably be responsible for strategic bombers, strategic air command and, perhaps, reconnaissance organization. The operational command of transport aviation will probably be responsible for strategic re-deployment and ensuring the activity of other forces (for example, airborne troops, etc.). The operational command of Air

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⁹⁰ Бондаренко А., „Оперативный резерв для островного гарнизона“, Красная звезда, 22 мая 2010 г.
and Space Defense will probably be in charge of air and antimissile defense organization on the territory of the state.

The Navy is now only known to have established the operational command of Submarine Forces. This specialized command should be responsible for the activity of submarine vessels armed with nuclear missiles. On the basis of present fleets several ordinary operational commands will be established, the main task of which, as in case of respective AF commands, will be support of Ground Forces actions. Though no more information about the establishment of planned specialized military naval operational commands is available, it is feasible that after Russia has received the ocean-going fleet or has created capabilities for the transfer of expeditionary forces by ocean, there may be established commands for the planning and execution of these activities.

Speaking about the forces that are being reformed or restructured at present, such as airborne, strategic missiles or space troops, it should be pointed out that there are indirect signs indicating that they may also be reorganized into corresponding specialized operational commands.

Thus, an operational command is the intermediate part of the command and control link with concrete tactical capabilities assigned to it with a concrete strategic command in the lead. Depending on the tasks assigned to the command, strategic commands will be able to reinforce them by attaching to them the necessary capabilities from their reserves.

3.3. The New Joint Strategic Command

The strategic command will become the supreme link in the future command and control chain. As it was mentioned, by 1 December 2010, four ordinary land strategic commands will be established which will be responsible for strategic planning and activity according to territories and directions entrusted to them. Each of them will be joint and will have at its disposal several Ground, Air or Sea Forces operational commands. Some separate stand-by readiness capabilities will also be subordinated to them. Judging from the available data, strategic commands could enjoy direct subordination of reconnaissance, special forces’, airborne assault, electronic intelligence, logistics, NBC defense, engineer, tactical rockets, territorial communications, material supply and the like brigades. These entire brigades or their parts (battalions) could be attached to corresponding operational commands to execute concrete tasks.

As has been mentioned, strategic commands will be established on the basis of military districts. It is likely that the staff of an ordinary strategic command will be much smaller than the current staff of the military district and will be about 300 military personnel strong91.

Though this has not yet become public, grounded on certain statements

91 Литовкин В., „Зачистка по-сердюковски“, Независимая газета, 11 марта 2010 г.
it is possible to make an assumption that, at the end of the reform, in addition to ordinary strategic commands there may emerge specialized ones. For example, the establishment de facto of operational commands for distant aviation and Submarine Forces prompts the assumption that they will be responsible platforms for shipping nuclear weapons and possible restructuring of strategic purpose missile troops into a specialized strategic purpose missile operational command logically leads to the establishment of joint strategic command of nuclear forces. Another example could be the attachment of already existing transport aviation operational command and possible airborne operational command to a theoretically feasible “rapid reaction or mobile forces” strategic command.

3.4. The New Armed Forces and Branches of the Army, Wartime Structures and the Reserve

Based on the available information, the three current types of the Armed Forces (the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy) and the three branches of the Army (strategic purpose missiles, airborne and space forces) will remain. Since today the types of the Armed Forces are in the completion stage of the reform, it is possible to make an assumption that in the nearest future the Army branches will follow.

As has been mentioned, after the reform the Russian Armed Forces will be divided into two groups. The larger part of each of them will belong to the so-called operational forces. These will be strategic commands, operational commands and combat, combat support, combat service support brigades and other units of Ground, Air and Naval Forces. The smaller part will remain in the structures, assigned to administer, train and supply operational forces. Previous, separate staffs of the Ground, the Air Force and the Navy will drastically decrease and will become directorates of the renewed General Staff. Alongside educational institutions and structural units tasked with armaments matters, they will constitute the non-combatant, i. e. the institutional part of the military.

It is possible that a similar future in the coming years will also fall to the staff of the Ground Forces and branches of the Army: strategic missiles, airborne and space troops. The greater part of them will most probably become operational forces. It is also possible that the former airborne troop’s structure will not change and divisions will remain. They are even planned to be reinforced. Air defense and other capabilities are intended to be established in them and some of them will even be assigned subordinated air transport capabilities, such as helicopters. This change as well as the recent decision to

92 Литовкин В., “Парад реформ не затормозил”, Независимая газета, 14 мая 2010 г.
93 Литовкин В., „Единый государственный экзамен по-сердюковски”, Независимая газета, 26 июня 2010 г.
transfer Airborne Forces aviation to the Air Force makes it possible to assume that these forces will be transformed into mobile rapid reaction forces. Current staffs of the forces will split into operational commands and into small elements in the General Staff. The latter alongside the educational institutions of army branches will become the institutional army.

There is almost no available information in open sources about the intended wartime structure of the Russian military. Judging from common knowledge, it is possible to assume that in wartime quite a lot of new military units will be established in the Russian military by using arsenals of peacetime armaments. The army of the interior that today is under the Ministry of Interior and is facing soon to be carried out reforms94 may be transferred to the military. This is also confirmed by during the recent years established practice to assign officers of the Ground Forces to the commanding positions of the Interior Army.

As early as the beginning of 2009, in several radio interviews, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Russia Gen. Col. Smirnov hinted at the new concept of the military reserve and mobilization. According to it, conscription will remain and will even increase. The reserve will be formed only from troops that have served under contract in concrete positions (e.g. tank driver, section leader). Contracts will be signed with them and they will be assigned to parts of the reserve to carry out the same duties they used to execute during their contracts. They will be regularly trained, will receive salaries and pensions. To fill the rest of the positions in reserve units, conscripts that have already finished their service will probably be accepted and mobilized in case of necessity. They will not be considered reservists. The principles of this concept are not contradicted but rather confirmed by recently voiced ideas of Chief of General Staff that the list of military positions occupied by contract-bound troops will be revised. Their number in the forces may decrease and that of the conscripts may increase95. The only positions that will remain agreed upon as important for combat capability, such as a section leader, tank commander, combat vehicle driver, etc. regular riflemen, machine-gunners, grenadiers, target acquisition specialists of artillery pieces, etc., will be draftees. Thus, it will be possible to improve the training quality of troops serving under contract (future reservists), increase salaries and at the same time to train a greater number of reserve privates (conscripts that have served) for the mobilization reserve96. The necessary documentation is currently in preparation and the system will come into force in 2016. Keeping in mind that Russia’s military after the mobilization will hold 1.7 million troops and comparing that with the old military which after the mobilization had to amount to nearly 5 million97, the downsizing is considerable.

94 Гаврилов Ю. „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
95 Васенин В., „Обойма Макарова“, Российская газета, 23 марта 2010 г.
96 Интерфакс-АВН, „В российской армии существенно сократится численность контрактников“, 26 мая 2010 г.
97 Гаврилов Ю., „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
4. Problems and Reform  
Implementation Obstacles

Every state attempts to demonstrate its achievements and conceal failures. Russia is not an exception. The reform right after its declaration encountered and continues to encounter a multitude of objective and subjective problems and obstacles. They are rather numerous and diverse as to their origin (political, economic, social, psychological, etc.). This study will expand only on those problems that cause the greatest interest of the society. They can (roughly) be joined into groups. The first comprises economic problems and obstacles. It is the financing of the reform, state of the military industry, provision and employment problems concerning those dismissed into the reserve. The second group covers morale issues in the military. It is the opposition to the reform, military corruption and crimes, hazing, service dodging and so on. Most of them have already been mentioned in the previous parts of the study while speaking about the stages of the reform and their implementation. Here, we will provide only that information that has not been touched upon.

A considerable amount of money was allotted for the reform, but the crisis largely affected its financing. First of all, this prevented the implementation of the plans to staff all stand-by readiness brigades with professional troops. The idea of a hundred percent professionalization of the Russian stand-by readiness forces was ruined. Pay too meager, unresolved everyday-life problems of troops-professionals and other causes precluded the implementation of ambitious plans. Though officially it has been declared that the first stage of universal army staffing with professionals has already been completed, it may rather be the last. Conscripts are coming back to the brigades. First of all, this will reduce the previously mentioned desirable number of 80–90 stand-by readiness brigades to 40–50. Secondly, even in stand-by readiness brigades conscripts will serve. Notably, it has never been in Russia’s plans to renounce conscripts. A more intensive training of conscripts made it possible to cut their training time up to 3–5 months, thus providing conditions to create a system where a brigade staffed by conscripts could become that of a stand-by readiness in half a year. As previously mentioned, troops serving under contract will remain. In the opinion of the Russian military command, their number will be augmented from the today available 150 thousand up to 200–250 thousand98 at the end of the reform.

The crisis and shortage of financing had a considerable impact on the supply and armaments of the new army. It is often pointed out that the primary problem is old armaments. It is true, yet it should be emphasized that at present not only Russia, but also most other states are not capable of acquiring sufficiently new weapons. Everywhere armaments are being reduced by lea-

98 “Армия России: новый облик”, Красная звезда, 10 июня 2010 г.
ving only the newest ones. Most attention is being paid to their modernization. Russia has chosen the same way. From colossal arsenals only those armaments that were the latest and most suitable have been chosen. Here is an example. Having selected and modernized the best, the least used tanks from a couple of tens of thousands, Russia has produced a rather powerful approx. 4000 strong tank park. Tanks T–90 (on T–72 basis) and modernized T–72BM are capable of fighting in contemporary battles particularly with a similarly armed opponent. The newly nominated deputy of the Minister of Defense for rearmament V. Popovkin said in a radio interview that in 2009 they managed to break the formerly dominating tendency for combat materiel modernization and maintenance. From 2009, the greater part of orders for the military industrial complex is acquisition of new armaments and materiel99. In 2010, nearly one third of all means allotted for the military industrial complex were for the acquisition of new armaments. Russia has already taken serious steps towards the creation of new future armaments.

A great problem that emerged during the execution of the reform was provision of dismissed officers with accommodation and their further employment. According to the data of the Defense Ministry, the number of the dismissed from the service officers with no available quarters amounts to 112.9 thousand100. They have all been promised accommodation by 2012. The financing of the construction of flats for retiring and discharged from armed forces military personnel has increased. In 2009–2010, it was planned to obtain 90,700 flats101. In 2009, the Ministry of Defense obtained 45,644 flats of this type102 and is planning to acquire still more in 2010, up to 51,900103. True, in many regions the program is still lagging behind, the quality of accommodation and other problems are being encountered; however, these problems are being slowly solved. Understanding how important it is to employ still young discharged captains and majors that constitute about 100 thousand, the Ministry of Defense announced that starting in 2009, it would form an institute of cadre reserve104. There are plans to employ most officers having specialties in the subunits of the newly being established controlling company “Oboronservis”, structures of the military industrial complex105, assist them in establishing their own business, related to providing services for the Armed Forces, organize re-qualification courses, etc.

Russia plans to resolve all these and other problems by further increasing financing allotted to the national defense, which from 2.6 per cent of the GNP

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99 Интервью с первым заместителем министра обороны В. Поповкиным, Эхо Москвы, 20 февраля 2010 г.
100 Еленский О., “Шок и трепет” нового армейского облика, Независимая газета, 29 мая 2009 г.
102 Ibid
103 Мохов В., “Жилищный форсаж“, Красная звезда, 29 июня 2010 г.
104 Поросков Н., „Шагреневая армия“, Время новостей, 11 ноября 2008 г.
105 Гаврилов Ю., „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
declared in 2010 should increase in 2011–2012 up to 2.9 per cent, in 2013 – to 3.0 per cent of the GNP and later will keep increasing up to 3.1 per cent.106

Corruption and crimes among military personnel continue to remain a great problem. This is best confirmed by the behavior of officers or reform opponents who will be dismissed after the reform. The number of financial crimes, thefts in structures and military units that are being restructured and particularly those that are planned to be eliminated has considerably increased when it became clear that the reform was unavoidable. Generals, colonels and junior rank military personnel began to steal military assets and take bribes. Before the declaration of the beginning of the reform, at the end of 2008, this problem was under consideration even in the Federal Assembly of the Russian Parliament. Then, the Ministry of Defense announced that only in the pre-reform year of 2007, military personnel committed 36,530 financial crimes, over ten thousand military personnel were charged with money embezzlement. The total damage caused to the state exceeded 1 billion 856 million rubles. During the second half of the year 2008 alone, more than 1,000 corruption cases were disclosed.107 This problem is being fought against. The same presentation points out that in 2007 and during the first half of 2008 more than five hundred officers, among them sixteen generals were sentenced for corruption. The situation did not improve in 2009 either. Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia, Sergej Fridinsky said in one of his interviews that through the incomplete year of 2009, 20 generals were charged, 1,611 officers were sentenced from which as many as 160 were commanders.109 During the three years that Minister A. Serdiukov was in office, 44 generals were discharged, from them as many as 34 had served in positions of the highest military hierarchy.110 The Military Procurator’s Office investigated the affairs of most of them, several officers committed suicides. The Military Procurator’s Office of Russia is still very busy investigating criminal acts committed by junior rank officers.

The amount of service pay plays not the least role concerning the troops’ morale. In essence, the inadequate pay has already ruined the first attempts to ensure the attractiveness of the service under contract. Taking this into consideration, military pay will be revised. Chief of General Staff Makarov remarked in many of his interviews and statements that in 2012, the average pay of junior officers will be 58–78 thousand rubles, that of senior officers will be up to 150 thousand rubles. Divisional or brigade commanders’ pay will amount to 200 thousand rubbles per month.111

Hazing continues to remain a great headache in the Russian Armed Forces. One of the conditions for its existence is the exterritorial principle of conscription service which is further applied; thus, in units, troops from diffe-

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106 Владыкин О., “Деньги оборонке не помогут“, Независимая газета, 10 июня 2010 г.
110 Литовкин В., “Зачистка по-сердюковски“, Независимая газета, 11 марта 2010 г.
111 Сообщение Интерфакс-АВН, 21 мая 2009 г.
rent regions and nationalities serve. This is confirmed by current mass fighting between different nationality conscripts in one of the newly-formed brigades in Siberia Military District\textsuperscript{112}, ethnic disagreements in one of the military units of Leningrad Military District\textsuperscript{113}, etc. The military command of Russia realizes that in part the problem is caused by the fact that in civilian society life is far from good. Yet, the primary means for the solution of this problem lie in the strengthening of the military legal basis, and the possibility to revise and partly renounce the exterritorial principle of service. It is also planned to improve the general conscription quality by calling up more conscripts with secondary and higher education. One of the possible solutions now being proposed is a change in the age of conscripts. Senior conscripts are expected to behave more seriously. There are also attempts to resolve hazing on the basis of spiritual guidance with the assistance of the church. In December of 2009, an office of the deputy of the commander for work with believers (a military chaplain) was established in the Armed Forces. The first chaplains have already started their service\textsuperscript{114}. However, one of the primary ways for the solution of this problem is considered the employment of forces. If adequate financing makes it possible to constantly keep military units busy in the places of their deployment, training ranges and missions, hazing should be substantially cut.

The possibility to dodge compulsory service has a particular impact on the morale of conscripts. Though in recent years a revised order of the exemption from the conscription and improved conscription quality yielded positive results and reduced the number of those dodging the draft (Figure 5)\textsuperscript{115}, yet, in 2009, having practically completed the reorganization of the tactical chain of the Armed Forces and having called up for compulsory service a record number of conscripts (305 thousand troops\textsuperscript{116}), it grew up to 17,742\textsuperscript{117}. In the opinion of the Military Command of Russia, the year 2010 will be most difficult. It will be necessary to decide the fate of more than 189 thousand Russian citizens who are currently dodging service\textsuperscript{118}.

\textsuperscript{112} Литовкин Д., „И их генералы идут под арест“, Известия, 7 июля 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{113} Зея Н., "В Литовкин Д. „И их генералы идут под арест“, Известия, 7 июля 2010 г. военную часть атаковала диаспора", gazeta.ru, 12 апреля 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{114} Алексеев В., Мельников А., „Батюшки для внеслужебного времени“, Независимая газета, 25 декабря 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{115} Белуза А., Литовкин Д, „Новобранцам не до смеха“, Известия, 3 апреля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Литовкин Д., „15 дивизий отказываются служить“, Известия, 2 апреля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
Figure 5. The Change in the Number of People Dodging Compulsory Military Service

Conclusions

Having evaluated what has already been done in the Russian military, what is currently being done and what is planned for tomorrow, it is obvious that the reform has become irrevocable. One way or another, it will be completed. What conclusions can be drawn and what can be expected?

First of all, it is obvious that this is not an ordinary propaganda reform, many of which have already been carried out. This reform has been well thought out, substantiated by the analysis of the contemporary foreign militaries and latest wars, and adjusted for the establishment of a new type of the military. Its fundamentals are presented in the Ivanov doctrine and theoretically supported. Moreover, before it was begun, it underwent nearly two years of testing and only later was officially begun to implement.

Secondly, it is likely that after this reform, Russia will completely renounce the idea of its stand-by readiness for a global war that has been prevailing until now. The Russian military will be constantly ready to fight local wars and resolve local conflicts. In the Georgia–Russia conflict Russia demonstrated the importance of rapidly winning a local war, aborting military actions and, in negotiations, under the pretence of a nuclear potential, consolidating the achievements reached.

After the reform, the functioning, command and control, and structure of the military personnel will drastically change. Stout generals and colonels, and warm rear positions will have to be forgotten. Redundant or officers with little potential will be mercilessly discharged, many military positions turned civilian. The tempo of reductions is colossal, drastic and cruel. Whatever has been planned for the reduction by 2016, has nearly been reached today. Most newly formed brigades are currently commanded by forty-year-old colonels for whom the success of the reform is the issue of their personal future.

The military will become comparatively small. 1 million troops at peacetime and 1.7 million after the mobilization is a very normal army size for such a
country as Russia. This will considerably reduce its mobilization capacity, and make it possible to practically channel all the financing for the necessary maintenance and operations of the available combat readiness of the military.

Finally, after the completion of the reform, with Russia further retaining the moratorium of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), that is by not following the limitations concerning the deployment of armaments provided for in it, at the borders of the Baltic States and at the same time of NATO, there will emerge, perhaps not so numerous in numbers, but considerably qualitatively reinforced Armed Forces. The deployment sites of new brigades in the former Military Districts of Leningrad, Moscow or even Kaliningrad are thus far unknown. It is feasible that the deployment of brigades, capable of starting actions within several hours after the received signal not far from the borders, and the retained naming of NATO in the current military doctrine of Russia as one of the main sources of threat can have an impact on the security of the entire region.

Trakai, June 30, 2010
The Rise and Fall of Belarus’ Geopolitical Strategy

By deploying a combination of foreign policy analysis tools at the system, state and, to a certain extent, individual level this article is undertaking to trace the trajectory and some critical junctions of Belarus' foreign policy strategy in the 21st century. Special focus is given to the implications of president Alexander Lukashenko’s recent crackdown on domestic opposition for the mechanism of geopolitical balancing between Russia and the West that has been in place for more than a decade.

The world financial and economic crisis has sharpened contradictions between Belarus and Russia and forced Minsk to seek ways for cooperation with Western partners. After the beginning of the normalization of relations with the European Union the Belarusian authorities have intensified its policy of balancing between the East and the West. For Minsk the EU’s role in this arrangement has grown beyond its previous rhetorical importance. Belarus has actively tried to equalize its Eastern and Western policy poles and also to complement them with a new “Southern arc” by boosting relationships with Asian, Latin American, and the Arab states.

Under the conditions of globalization Minsk started to use networking geopolitical technologies to promote cooperation with China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Libya, Syria and other states, which are geographically distant, but whose political and economic interests are in various degrees compatible with those of Belarus. In this way Minsk has attempted to become a political and economic player outside its traditional geopolitical zone and to compensate for the costs of problematic dealings with its neighbors Russia and the EU.

Meanwhile, because of a reluctant and forced adaptation to the external environment Belarus’ foreign policy remains extremely contradictory and despite some correctives it retains many inadequate tenets.

A brutal dispersal by the Belarusian authorities of a peaceful action of pro-democratic forces on the day of presidential elections (December 19, 2010) and the following massive political repressions became a watershed that marked the failure of the regime’s preceding domestic and foreign policies, exposed its obsession with power and destroyed the balancing mechanism for its geopolitical ‘avatars’ designed individually for the East, West and ‘South’.

Introduction

An ample observation has been made to the effect that “a strange mixture of social rhetoric (“we must keep the best from the Soviet era”), advocacy of a union state, of confrontation with the West, and elements of ethnic myths (inclu-
ning the Battle of Grunwald, in which forces from the territory of modern-day Belarus helped defeat the Teutonic Knights)" took root in Belarus and created an identity that does not appear stable and has many "faces" or "avatars".

Almost twenty years of Belarus’ independent foreign policy allows the identification of some of its basic characteristics. It has several constants and a peculiar conceptual continuity dating back to the first years of independence. These constants embrace a number of aspirations, principles and priorities: “search for a neutral status”, non-nuclear and multidirectional (“plurivectoral”) policy and the priority of good-neighborliness (since 1999 the formulation has been a “belt of good-neighborliness”). Still, so far only the non-nuclear principle has been achieved, understood as a status of a non-nuclear weapon state as a result of a voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons that remained in the territory of Belarus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The “constants” include also serious problems bedeviling Minsk’s relations with the United States and the European Union. A decade and a half-long conflict between Belarus’ authorities and the West featured the confrontation of democratic and authoritarian values, application of sanctions, pressure, but also various incentives addressed at the Belarusian regime so as to make it stop repressions against the opposition, civil society and the independent mass media and to encourage democratic reforms in the country. So far this protracted conflict has repeatedly lapsed into Minsk’s aggressive self-isolation and yet another impasse, rather than lead to a constructive resolution of the Belarusian dilemma.

Belarus’ foreign policy is extremely contradictory, which is largely explained by the fact that it has to adapt itself to the international environment that does not correspond to the ideas of the ruling elite about the normative world order. This may produce reactions stimulated predominantly by self-reflection on the “objective reality,” but not by the reality itself.

The implementation of Belarus’ foreign policy has been inconsistent throughout its whole history and at times moved in a zigzag course. While the non-nuclear status has been achieved (albeit with regular regrets voiced by the Belarusian president), “aspirations for neutrality” already with Alexander Lukashenko’s first term in office have been replaced with the creation of a military alliance with Russia and Belarus’ membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Similarly, instead of developing “plurivectoral” East-West relations Minsk has opted for asymmetric, impulsive and erratic integration with Russia that culminated in the signing of the bilateral treaty on the formation of a Union State (1999) endangering Belarus’ independence.

2 Alexander Lukashenko was elected to his first term as president on July 10, 1994. The presidential post was introduced by the Constitution adopted on March 15, 1994. Prior to that Belarus was a parliamentary republic.
This integration drive, however, started to wane soon after the treaty had entered into force in 2000, and eventually the provisions of the agreement remained unfulfilled. Instead, a new accent has been put on the real “plurivectoral moment”, in contrast to the hitherto declared one.

Belarus’ relations with Russia have noticeably deteriorated since 2007 with recurrent bilateral annual crises due to the growing prices of Russian gas and oil and various “trade wars” that reflected tensions on quite a few political issues, from Minsk’s non-recognition of the independent status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to its reluctance to join the Customs Union along with Russia and Kazakhstan without being promised clear economic advantages.

One more unfulfilled foreign policy priority has been the efficient use of the country’s “advantageous geopolitical position” for international transit (or a ‘bridge between the East and the West” in the wording of the 1990’s).

Despite the ritual official statements to the effect that the state’s priority in ensuring regional security is the formation of a “belt of good-neighborliness” with the countries, which have a common border with Belarus3, a conspicuous long-time foreign policy failure has been Minsk’s far from friendly relations with the EU and NATO and the unsettled border issue with Ukraine.4

The few accomplishments to be mentioned in this regard are bilateral agreements on additional confidence and security-building measures in the military-political sphere concluded by Minsk with Ukraine and Lithuania (2001), and with Latvia and Poland (2004). The world financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 has sharpened contradictions between Belarus and Russia and along with the realization of the futility of self-isolation it compelled Minsk to seek ways for mending relations and cooperating with Western partners.

Meanwhile, because of a reluctant and forced adaptation to the external environment Belarus’ foreign policy has remained extremely contradictory and despite some correctives it has retained many old tenets. The supreme goal for Lukashenko has been that of regime security with other objectives subordinated as instrumental ones.

The nature of the authoritarian regime has once again “triumphed” over rationality during the December 2010 presidential elections in Belarus and dramatically set back both the uncertain signs of domestic change for the better and the prelude to a full-fledged normalization of relations between Minsk and Western capitals.

By deploying a combination of foreign policy analysis tools at the system, state and, to a certain extent, individual level this article is undertaking to trace the trajectory and some critical junctions of Belarus’ foreign policy strategy in the 21st century.


4 The bilateral treaty on the common border was signed and ratified by the two countries, but it has not entered into force because the Belarusian side is procrastinating with the completion of the necessary diplomatic procedures.
Special focus is given to examining the mechanism of geopolitical balancing between Russia and the West that has been in place for more than a decade and evaluating the impact inflicted on it by Lukashenko’s recent crackdown on domestic opposition.

1. Geopolitical Power Wire

1.1. Four Level Geopolitical Game

Over the period of its existence the Lukashenko regime has been able to gradually build up a four-level system of geopolitical balancing. Although unstable and situational, it often yielded for Minsk important political and especially economic advantages.

In his address to the Belarusian Parliament and people delivered on April 21, 2011 Lukashenko reiterated that Belarus has a particular place in Europe that necessitates a “balanced interaction between the two poles of power”. The latter is achieved by means of the “strategy of an equal proximity to the East and West” that allows it to benefit from the geographical position and the transit and industrial potential of the country.5

This geopolitical system includes:

1. With regard to the Russia – balancing between independence and integration.

2. With regard to the European Union – balancing between political self-isolation and normalization with prospects for economic cooperation.

3. Simultaneously with Russia and the European Union – balancing between:
   - “safeguarding Belarus’ independence from Russia“ – for the EU and
   - “safeguarding common values and interests from the West“ – for Russia.6

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6 According to Lukashenko Belarus is the ‘last rampart’ preventing NATO tanks from lining up at the Russian border near Smolensk. Also, it has allegedly become a ‘ground zero’ of US global politics aimed at subordinating Russia and Western Europe and today Belarus is the only ‘corridor’ that connects Russia with the EU and stays beyond US control. - See, for example; “[President Lukashenko’s] Meeting on Home and Foreign Policy Issues.” July 26, 2005, http://www.president.gov.by/en/press16355.html#doc
4. Together with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and countries of the “Southern arc of cooperation” (SAC)\(^7\)

- balancing between the North and the South and attempts to use the political representation by the NAM and SAC states in international organizations so as to neutralize criticism of the Belarusian authoritarianism by democratic states (in fact, the latter dichotomy has been reinterpreted as safeguarding the sovereign right of states for their own specific ways of development\(^8\))

and

- using NAM and SAC states’ financial, trade economic and energy potential as a safety or compensatory mechanism to prop up Minsk’s positions in difficult times, especially during crises periods in its relations with Russia and/or the West (in other words, throwing the weight of some of their resources on the scales to equalize the emerging troublesome disequilibria).

This seemingly impressive construction can nevertheless turn out to be mere wishful thinking when empirically tested. The factual economic, political and military/security dependence of Belarus on Russia prevails over its formally possessed independent status. This can be easily proved by the counterfactual scenario of Moscow’s non-recognition of the December 2010 presidential elections in Belarus as legitimate (in addition to the real fact that both the EU and the US have questioned their legitimacy and Lukashenko is being treated as only a “de-facto” state leader). In this case the regime would have encountered first the international and domestic legitimacy crisis to be followed by destructive political, economic and social strains, especially if Russia would not agree to rescue its ally by financial, trade and economic means but would have treated it as an opportunistic client state to teach a lesson to.

Indeed, in its dealings with Russia Belarus has traded its geopolitical and military-political loyalty for economic preferences. Minsk has been in a state of permanent bargaining and giving promises (often only partially or completely unfulfilled, or with dramatically delayed implementation) about such sensitive issues for Russia as the Constitutional Act of the Union State, the introduction of a single currency, the diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

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\(^7\) A propagandist of the official line and head of the department of foreign policy at the President’s Academy of Management holds that now that Minsk is dealing not only with its two traditional poles but also with partners in other continents it is conducting already not a “plurivectoral foreign policy” but already a “real and powerful global geopolitics.” Driven by its own calculations. See Tzarik, Yuri. “Geopolitika Belarusi: pozitsiya v mire, liderstvo v regione.” December 7, 2010, http://www.bgr.by/project/geopolitika_belarusi_pozitsiya_v_mire_liderstvo_v_region

\(^8\) http://www.president.gov.by/press46194.html
the selling of Belarusian property, joining the Customs Union and the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force, the creation of the Single Air Defense System, etc.

The “balancing mechanism” has recurrently failed and in recent years has been losing its efficiency because Lukashenko’s opportunist line has caused growing discontent in the Kremlin.

In the following sections international system and state level analysis will be complementary. In searching for the causal explanations of the demise of Belarus’ geopolitical balancing mechanism (GBM) the author will draw on James Rosenau’s concept of a penetrated political system as “one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the allocations of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.”

1.2. Belarus’ Network Geopolitics: Balancing Disequilibrium

Under the conditions of globalization Minsk started to use network geopolitical technologies to promote cooperation with non-European states, which are geographically distant, but whose political and economic interests are in various degrees or situationally compatible with those of Belarus. In this way Minsk has attempted to become a political and economic player outside its traditional geopolitical zone and to compensate for the costs of problematic dealings with its neighbors Russia and the European Union and also the United States. This refers in particular to diversifying trade markets and supplies of energy resources and attracting investments.

The Belarusian network geopolitical concepts of the “pillar states” look like an adapted version of the erstwhile US theory of “pivotal states,” which proceeded from the premise that in every geopolitical region there is a key state, on which regional relations and stability are predicated.

These concepts are of significant practical value for the Belarusian authorities. Some of the countries that have been enlisted as ‘pillar states” for Belarus’ interests in distant geopolitical regions are Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and Cuba in Latin America; China, Iran, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand in Asia; South African Republic, Nigeria and Ethiopia in Africa and

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also the Persian Gulf states. They constitute a “wider arc” of Belarus’ foreign policy in the Southern hemisphere.

Belarusian network geopolitics may have various and sometimes quixotic forms or ‘avatars’. Minsk itself has repeatedly claimed to play the role of a ‘pillar state’ in Europe on behalf of the Non-aligned movement as the only European member-state in this organization.

![Belarus' geopolitical 'pillar states' and 'arc of cooperation'](image)

Within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Minsk proposed the creation of an “institute of partnerships” with a view to expanding the organization’s “sphere of influence” and international role and expressed confidence that not only the neighboring states would be interested but also states in other continents.

After the beginning of the normalization of relations with the European Union in 2008 the Belarusian authorities have intensified its policy of balancing between the East and the West. For Minsk the EU’s role in this arrangement has grown beyond its previous rhetorical importance because the latter’s new “Eastern Partnership” program promised many real benefits.

After its previous unsuccessful attempts to democratize Minsk the Euro-

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13 Interview with Sergei Martynov (note 10).
pean Union, for its part, joined Belarus’ geopolitical game of balancing by trying to apply what was sometimes referred to as the strategy of engagement.

The new equilibrium became qualitatively different from what it used to be since 1997, when as a result of Minsk’s authoritarian policies its relations with the EU and the US were frozen and entered a long period of a “cold war”.

Previously Lukashenko utilized primarily the “bugaboos” of the aggressive West, anti-NATO phobias and pan-Slavic myths so as to bargain the indispensable role of Belarus for the military defense of Russia for its huge economic preferences. Then Minsk’s behavior ideally fitted the pattern of a client-state. This time it was looking for additional means of ensuring economic and energy security from Russia.

At the same time, having started to create at the turn of the century its “Southern arc” a decade later Minsk found that the new geopolitical construct failed to serve as a substitute for a regular full-fledged relationship with its natural European partners, or as a quick fix for its problems with Russia.

2. Balancing Mechanism Undermined

2.1. Energy Challenges and Responses with Uncertain Outcomes

For more than a decade the Belarus-Russia energy policy model “fitted the immediate political and economic interests of the ruling elites on both sides.” In one opinion, energy it is not so much about balancing foreign policy between Russia and the EU as on “using any improvement in relations with one of the two to extract concessions from the other.” However the wider context of this article shows that energy issues are indeed part of the balancing foreign policy equation.

Belarus depends on imported energy sources by about 85 percent and has for years enjoyed considerably reduced prices on their supplies from Russia. After a serious conflict with Russia over its energy supplies during the winter of 2006-2007 Minsk undertook vigorous efforts to mitigate its energy dependency. Russia embarked on a pragmatic style of relations with the post-Soviet states and declared transition to world market-based prices on gas and oil. For Minsk there were no ready and affordable solutions to these issues that had been supported by any economic and political requisites. As Lukashenko publicly admitted, Belarus had no available energy resources that might serve

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16 Ibidem.
17 Earlier bilateral rows over energy supplies happened in 1997 and 2004.
18 In 2007 Minsk managed to agree with Moscow on a gradual transition to world prices on energy resources, but ever since disputed the terms, pace and time frame for price increases.
as an alternative to the Russian ones, and “even if there are, we have not fully elaborated upon them.”

A long and difficult process has been started to establish a productive dialog with potential new energy partners. A series of conceptual documents and programs to enhance the state’s energy security have been developed in 2007-2010. Special attention was paid to launching the project of the Belarusian nuclear power plant, although its future role in reducing energy dependence is highly dubious because it will be credited and constructed by Russia again.

In August of 2010 the Council of Ministers of Belarus adopted the Strategy for the Development of the State Energy Potential. It defined as alternative prospective energy suppliers the Caspian, Central Asian, South American regions and the Persian Gulf states. According to the document diversification of gas supplies will be provided for through the participation of Belarusian organizations in its exploration and production abroad and also as a result of the realization of projects on the construction of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) terminals in Lithuania, Poland and its deliveries from these and other countries, including routes via Ukraine. It is hoped that these measures will considerably reduce dependence from Russia.

The Energy Strategy envisages oil supplies from Azerbaijan, Venezuela, and the Gulf states via sea ports in the Baltic and Black Seas and states that oil discharge from sea vessels will be economically expedient at the ports of Odessa and Yuzhny (Ukraine), Ventspils (Latvia), Klaipeda (Lithuania), and Tallinn (Estonia).

The Belarusian government’s Action Plan for 2011-2015 envisages a diversification of supplies of oil, natural gas, electricity and coal, and the reduction of the share of the dominant energy supplier, i.e. Russia in the country’s gross energy consumption to 70-71% by 2015. This will be supplemented with the optimization of logistics, the construction of gas and oil terminals and pipelines in adjacent countries, and an increase in the production of oil in Venezuela and Iran, where joint projects are already underway.

In 2010 Minsk and Caracas concluded several oil agreements which provide for annual deliveries to Belarus of up to 10 million tons of oil in 2011-2012. To save on considerable transportation expenditures swap contracts have been concluded allowing to replace part of the Venezuelan oil with Azerbaijan shipments to the port of Odessa.

In July 2010 an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on oil deliveries was signed in Kyiv by Belarusian and Ukrainian officials. The Ukrainian

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side is committed to provide facilities (seaports, railways, and pipelines) for the transshipment and transportation of oil to Belarus. The volume of deliveries was set at about 4 million tons a year from May 2010 through April 2011 to be subsequently increased to 10 million tons a year. In February 2011 Ukraine started shipping Azerbaijani crude oil to Belarus via the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline.

Other possible routes for Belarus to import Venezuelan oil include the ports of Klaipeda in Lithuania, Ventspils in Latvia and Muuga in Estonia. Technically, it is possible to use spurs of the Druzhba pipeline for transporting oil from Klaipeda and Ventspils to the Navapolatsk refinery in Belarus. However this opportunity has been blocked in recent months by LatRosTrans, a company that operates the pipeline spur on Latvian territory and which is controlled by the Russian capital.

Source: http://www.belta.by/newinfimages/00000000642_872551.jpg

Figure 2. New oil delivery routes to Belarus


Another important change undermining the previously profitable (for Belarus) oil supply and processing mechanism is the drastically reduced revenues from exports of oil products, which used to provide the country with the lion’s share of currency before 2010. In addition to a combination of global negative trade and economic factors the most prominent one has been tougher Moscow energy policy. On one hand, Belarus cannot do without Russian oil by severely reducing or replacing its imports, on the other, the currently operating agreement signed in 2011 obliges it to purchase the stipulated volume, again, on less-than-before (but still advantageous) terms. The less the amount purchased, the higher the price.

In 2007 natural gas comprised 62.7 percent and oil 30 percent of the country’s Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES). On gas there is a “structural over-dependence” on the availability of low-cost gas (de facto Russian). Natural gas is the basis for the generation of 87 percent of heat and of 97 percent of electricity. Over the past five years Russia more than tripled prices of natural gas for Belarus, though they are still lower than those at the European market.

Belarus’ dependence on gas has remained basically unchanged. Although within the Unified Economic Space (UES) that is being created there is a formal opportunity to diversify gas supplies and reduce the reliance on ‘Gasprom’, in reality this is problematic because gas produced by Kazakhstan has already been accounted for in contracts with Russia. Other potential gas suppliers from Central Asia also lack immediate spare export gas capacities. This necessitates looking for suppliers in the Gulf and other regions.

Meanwhile, the construction of terminals for receiving and the regasification of liquefied gas in the neighboring countries will take time and money. The same is applicable to all measures designed to diversify Belarus’ energy supplies.

2.2. The Dual Use of Balancing and its ‘Boomerang Effects’

The balancing mechanism was “reformatted” by Moscow when it took control of it so as to reengage and “tame” its restive ally who seemed to be drawn into Western projects and exposed to the risk of being lost as an important element of the Russian political, economic and military strategy.


30 The UES is the next stage of the development of the Customs Union comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. It is planned to become functional on January 1, 2012.
Despite tense interstate and spoilt personal relations between the countries’ leaders (suffice it to recall Medvedev’s comments on his video blog at the beginning of October in 2010\(^{31}\)) the Kremlin decided that its long-term geopolitical interests have priority over changing a problematic head of the allied state. An outcome of such a change (with no prepared or ready replacement at hand) would have brought uncertainty and risks of Belarus’ drift to the West, which, in turn, would imply one more failure of Russia’s foreign policy and a blow against its plans in the post-Soviet space, as well as weakening of the domestic political positions of the “duumvirate” of Medvedev and Putin.

Although the detailed contents of the commitments agreed upon during the meeting of the two presidents in Moscow on December 9, 2010 were not made public,\(^ {32}\) it goes without saying that their key elements were continued subsidies for the Belarusian economy which exceeded 52 billion USD over Lukashenko’s 15-year term in office.\(^ {33}\)

Under the agreement on the creation of the unified economic space starting from 2011 Belarus is receiving all Russian oil duty-free. At the same time, Minsk agreed to pay duties to Moscow on exports of oil products from the processed Russian crude. As a result, according to preliminary estimates, in 2011 alone Minsk will gain about 3,9 billion USD, while Russia will lose about 5,3 billion USD.\(^ {34}\)

Lukashenko admitted that even if he would have been forced to “surrender, as they say, for four billion a year,” he was ready for that, because “what matters is that we have obtained as much oil as we need…”\(^ {35}\)

Minsk’s energy concerns encompassed the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant (BNPP) and its financial backing. These issues had been discussed by the two sides since 2008 with no final solutions found. The December meeting of the Belarusian and Russian presidents in Moscow opened the way to the final phase of negotiations. In March 2011 it was reported in the mass media that draft agreements on the parallel operation of the two countries’ power systems and on the construction of the BNPP had been finalized and talks were underway on the terms of issuing a Russian credit for the construction work.

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\(^{31}\) See Dmitry Medvedev on relations between Russia and Belarus: “The senseless period of tension in relations with Belarus is certain to come to an end.” October 3, 2010, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1052

\(^{32}\) On December 9, 2010 presidents Medvedev and Lukashenko had a separate one-on-one meeting before the summit of the Customs Union member-states. It took place in the run up to the presidential elections in Belarus and against the backdrop of tense relations between the two presidents, who had not met for several months but exchanged personal insults through the mass media. After the meeting Lukashenko said that the quarrel was settled. “Lukashenko ‘poteshilsya’ s Medvedevym.” December 10, 2010, http://www.rosbalt.ru/2010/12/10/799420.html


Additionally, Minsk received the cheaper arms and military equipment it needs for the modernization of the army and also for the materialization of its rationale of strengthening state security in the face of mounting international challenges.

A role in the unexpected settlement of the interstate discord was also played by a Wikileaks publication at the beginning of December 2010 of materials on the plan for the defense of Poland and the Baltic states against the Russian aggression that was allegedly adopted by the NATO Lisbon Summit two weeks earlier.\(^{36}\) This gave another start to Moscow’s suspicions about the Alliance and raised salience of Belarus as a military outpost for Russian political and military elite.\(^{37}\)

On December 27, 2010 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the federal law on the ratification of the Russian-Belarusian agreement on the advancement of military technical cooperation that was signed a year before (adopted by the Duma on December 8 and by the Council of the Federation on December 15).\(^{38}\) On February 9, 2011 Medvedev signed the federal law on ratification of the inter-governmental agreement “On the Mutual Supplies of Military, Dual-Purpose and Civil Goods during Periods of Heightened Aggression and in Wartime” (signed in Moscow on December 10, 2009) and on the same day he submitted to the Duma for ratification the bilateral agreement “On Creating a Unified Communications System for the Regional Group of Troops (Forces) of Belarus and Russia.”\(^{39}\)

In exchange for such benefits Lukashenko promised to ratify before the new 2011 year the package of documents on the creation of the Unified Economic Space among Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which he managed to complete by December 30.

In addition, at the Moscow meeting of the CSTO Collective Security Council on December 10, 2010 Lukashenko assumed chairmanship of this structure, which he had evaded since June 2009. Thus, the bargain succeeded.\(^{40}\)

Moscow’s promise of massive economic support relieved Minsk of the need to look for other urgent means of rescuing itself from the inevitable crisis.

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36 See: Alesin A. «Wikileaks was right on time». Belorusy i rynok. December 20, 2010.
38 The treaty determines the order of supplies for the national Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and special services.
39 It sets a regulatory framework for coordinated management of the regional group of troops of the two states and outlines a unified system of views and approaches to coordinate their communication planning.
40 Belarus was supposed to take up chairmanship in the CSTO at its Moscow summit on June 14, 2009, however Lukashenko refused to take part in it because of the “milk war” with Russia. (“Sekretariat ODKB: Belarus ne hochet predsedatelstvovat.” January 11, 2010, http://www.belaruspartisan.org/bp-forte/?page=102&news=54942). Other conflicts between the two allies followed. Apparently so as to add up one more bargaining instrument in its disputes with Moscow Minsk did not assume chairmanship in the CSTO for about a year and a half and Russia had to perform a “temporary technical chairmanship” of the organization.
Having obtained external political and economic guarantees of its survival the regime did not hesitate to use force on December 19 against its most active and therefore dangerous domestic opposition. By doing this it foiled the scenario of normalizing relations with the EU and the US that had been relatively steadily unfolding in the preceding months and dealt its own blow (following the one from the Kremlin) on the “balancing mechanism,” destroying its second competing pole to the satisfaction of the remaining Eastern gravity center. In the end, Belarus avoided morphing into “another Yugoslavia”, and Lukashenko avoided becoming “another Marshal Tito”.

Minsk ‘subcontracted’ to get actively engaged in Russia’s geopolitical and geo-economic planning of the post-Soviet space including the Customs Union, the UES, the Eurasian Economic Union, the expansion of the CSTO functional capabilities into peacekeeping and crisis management, etc. Lukashenko opted in favor of the more convenient and acceptable of Moscow’s post-imperial projects and rejected the course of approximation with the European Union that was associated with dangers of democratization for the authoritarian power and its subsequent collapse. In fact, this was a choice for the sake of staying in power and for the geopolitical designs most conducive to that.

Eastern partnership initiated by the European Union and the UES, promoted by Russia as a stage along the way to the Eurasian Union, are two competing geopolitical projects. The Belarusian leadership chose the UES, deemed in the given circumstances as a more advantageous option that promised future economic benefits not tied up to political conditions such as regime democratization. Therefore the EU lost in the “contest.”

However, it may also be true that the events of December 19 and their follow-up have been associated with no real or immediate achievements for the players involved. Not only the West but Russia as well gained nothing but problems, although of a different kind. Due to this zero gain for the two key external players the paradigm of Minsk’s traditional in-between maneuvering has collapsed. Still, “leaders evaluate gains and losses in political terms – domestic politics is ‘the essence of decision.’”

41 Deputy Minister of Economy of Belarus Andrei Tur believes that the Customs Union offers great opportunities for promoting commodities abroad because it opens up a vast market of three states with the population of almost 180 million people where Belarusian enterprises and entrepreneurs can come with their products without customs payments. Particularly promising in his opinion are logistics and transit spheres. - See “Tamozhennyi sozuz predostavliajет Belarusi bol’shijе vozmožnosti dlja prodvizhenia tovarov za rubež.” February 14, 2011, http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/economics/Tamozhennyi-sozuz-predostavliaet-Belarusi-bolshie-vozmoznosti-dlya-prodvizhenija-tovarov-za-rubezh---Tur_i_542542.html

42 See TV program “Kartina mira” of February 13, 2011 on the channel “RTR Belarus”, http://www.ctv.by/km/~news=50226


3. The Belarusian Regime after 12/19: a Strategic Defeat?

Belarus’ strategic position in 2011 may be described as a major strategic defeat of its authorities, both domestic and external. This has several main reasons.

On the face of it lies the disproportionate resort to force against the peaceful rally of democratic forces on the evening of the day of presidential elections in Minsk and the continuing repression against not only the participants in the rally, but against all democratic activists, civil rights defenders, opposition political parties, youth and civil society organizations siding with the opposition.

The final report by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) published in February of 2011 concluded that Belarus had a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments for democratic elections. The document stated that the December 19 presidential election in Belarus was marked by numerous and serious violations at key stages of the electoral process. Most presidential candidates and hundreds of citizens were detained on election night, among them journalists, human rights activists and other civil society representatives.45

Many independent estimates of the election results questioned the official ones by stating that ballots cast for Lukashenko were not sufficient for his victory in the first round and anyway were much lower than officially reported. It contributed to the nervous reaction of the authorities and the brutal suppression of protest moods on election day and after.

Currently there is no political consensus in Belarusian society. The gap has widened between the democratic forces opposed to Lukashenko’s rule and outraged at the continued suppression of their rights and liberties on the one hand and regime supporters on the other.

The numbers of dissenters have become so substantial46 that the Belarusian president had to appeal to them in his New Year address to the nation and pledged to reckon with alternative opinions:

I am addressing my [New Year] greetings also to our minority. You should know that you are being treated as an inalienable part of our society, with its own goals, views and aspirations. You have your position, a special conception of the world order and our country’s development. This is

46 According to sociologists the so called “unorganized” political opposition in Belarus numbers about 2.3 million out of 7 million people 18 years of age and older. – See: Nikoluk S. “Aleksandr Lukashenko I dva milliona storonnikov oppozitsii.” Novaja Europa. October 5, 2010. The survey conducted in Belarus at the end of October of 2010 by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies showed that 33.7% of those polled defined their attitude to Lukashenko as “rather or very negative.” BelaPAN, November 23, 2010, http://www.n-europe.eu/article/2010/10/05/aleksandr_lukashenko_i_dva_milliona_storonnikov_oppozitsii
your right that no one can take away from you. But you should know that that your opinion is not indifferent to us. And along with the overwhelming majority of our people we will struggle for you and your views. We will look for ways to your minds and hearts because otherwise it is impossible to unite the society, preserve the country and accomplish the tasks that we are facing.  

The EU and US responded with strong statements and sanctions to press Lukashenko to stop the repressions and free the new political prisoners.

Many analysts were skeptical about the “rapprochement” between Belarus and the EU in 2008-2010 and even analyzing the standoff between Minsk and Moscow a month before the 2010 presidential elections some of them concluded (though mistakenly) that it was a calculated imitation in the actual game aimed at harvesting in the end the legitimation, credits and other benefits from both Brussels and Moscow.

As the Belarusian president met with top executives of several Russian mass media on March 18, 2011, he stated that a dialogue with the West was impossible, because “they are indecent people: they say some things but think different things” and blamed Western states for working to subvert the regime while trying to lull its vigilance prior to the presidential elections. Later in an interview to the Washington Post on March 28, 2011 Lukashenko admitted that he was not planning to get engaged with the Americans or the Europeans in any more political games. “We did a number of steps closer to your direction. You cheated us, and we don’t believe you,” he said.

The official Minsk response was a per saltum U-turn from at least a declaratory route toward “liberalization” that marked the 2010 presidential election campaign. Thus, the base conditions for the continuation of a constructive dialogue between Minsk and the West were violated. At the same time, the resort to force annihilated the minimal prerequisites for civilized domestic political communication among the authorities, the opposition and pro-democratic forces aimed at finding ways of cooperation between the state and the civil society.

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49 That was, of course, a reluctant and inconsistent simulation, more symbolic and superficial than substantive. It could not even last long enough to yield any tangible results. But hardly there was something like the above-mentioned double-pronged strategic design. Should there be one it would not be viable. The conflict between Minsk and Moscow was a real one. If the situation evolved further down the road on both the “Eastern and Western fronts” Lukashenko could lose power within the next several months. He tried to prevent at least this accelerated scenario from being implemented.
Conclusion

The dismantling of the previously existing geopolitical balancing mechanism from which Minsk has benefitted for more than a decade came at a time when its “clockwork” was almost at the apex of its capability. In 2010 all of its key elements (players) were at work: the EU and, to some extent, the U.S.; Russia; the “Southern arc” states and Belarus itself.

The EU and the US have been augmenting their real substantive roles and provided the trajectory of normalizing relations with Belarus developed in an unhampered way these roles could acquire a new positive quality.

Conversely, the role of Russia was negative in the sense that it was serving as a “trouble maker” for Belarus’ economy and energy sector, and like a critic or almost a political opponent of president Lukashenko.

The “Southern arc” states were gaining their importance as potential alternatives (although partial) to Russian energy and financial resources and trade markets.

The first principal move to dismantle the GBM was initiated by the Kremlin, which could not accept the risk of Minsk drifting further to the West with its competing project of the Eastern partnership and ruining Russia’ geopolitical plans in Eurasia – the creation of the Customs Union, the UES and the Eurasian Union in the future. The move was timed for the final stage of the presidential election campaign in Belarus.

Minsk was extremely concerned with the unsettled prices on Russian energy supplies in 2011 and generally on Moscow’s political and economic course after gas and trade wars and bitter exchanges in the mass media that marred their relations throughout 2010. In fact, had Moscow refrained from providing support to Lukashenko on December 9, ten days before the election day (December 19), that would have certainly reduced his rating and could imply that the Kremlin was planning to apply economic sanctions and even go as far as not to recognize the elections as legitimate.

By pledging formidable economic and political support at the decisive period of time in the run up to the presidential elections in Belarus, Moscow has once again “penetrated” the Belarusian political system. It simultaneously and decisively influenced the Belarusian regime’s domestic and foreign policy decision-making options. In short, it was a move intended to “keep Russia in, Belarus down and the West out.”

The fact that Belarus’ political system has been vulnerable to external penetration is nothing new. One of the illustrative examples was Moscow’s ‘mediation’ in its domestic political crisis in 2006, when it saved Lukashenko from impeachment and reassured the Belarusian authoritarianism of its future sustainability. The president himself stressed on many occasions that “Russia does not detach itself from the development of the domestic political situation in Belarus.”

At this time this was a multiple penetration by Russia of Belarus’ political system intended to influence and change the country’s leader’s preferences and the eventual political outcomes at the individual, state and the system level (GBM).

The second and third moves destroying the GBM came from within the political system of Belarus. The theory holds that “instead of selecting among alternative foreign policy actions that serve the national interests, decision makers select among foreign policy actions that serve their own domestic political needs, or that help them survive.”53 This applies to the spectrum of foreign policy deals, which the Belarusian president reached in Moscow on December 9 – 10, 2010.

The third move was a brutal dispersal by the Belarusian authorities of a peaceful action of pro-democratic forces on the day of presidential elections and the following massive political repressions. It swung Belarus’ official relations with the West back into the cold.

These generalized three moves made by Moscow and Minsk marked the failure and change of the preceding foreign policies of Belarus’ regime and destroyed the external balancing mechanism for its geopolitical ‘avatars’.

April 2011

National Security Issues
The Reform of Higher Education in Lithuania and the Actualities of National Security

The paper emphasizes that higher education is becoming a factor of national security by producing conditions for development of society and the state; countries that have developed higher education the most are highly developed and secure. The relationship of the middle class as the most important national security agent to higher education and the status of the public good of the latter are emphasized separately. The primary problem lies in the fact that it is the disproportions in the development of higher education that determine the increasing gap between developed and developing countries. Backwardness is a factor in the loss of national security. Critical assessment is given to the inconsistently prepared higher education reform which from the instrument of the projected strategic breakthrough turned into a crawling-out-of-difficulties process. Causes of such a situation can be discerned not only in the indefiniteness of the national interests of a small and far from strong state in the European space of research and studies under formation as well as in the globalization-induced uncertainty, but also in the lack of corresponding competences, disregard of experts, and short-term party interests. The article summary states that contradictory and inadequate political decisions in terms of the needs of national security in the area of research and studies are pernicious not only to higher education itself, but become a cause of the backwardness and insecurity of society and the state. A strategy for consecutive and gradual reforms is presented as an alternative to radical and, therefore, ineffective reforms.

Introduction: the Problem

To guarantee national security, a combination of knowledge, power, and wisdom is necessary and it is inconceivable without the contribution of higher education. Since the middle of the 20th century, the tendency of the growing dependence of national security on scientific research, high technologies, and university studies has been observed. The truthfulness of the statement is easy to substantiate with just a cursory examination of the national security...
structure: internal security – economic sufficiency, healthiness, social and political stability; external security – military, geopolitical, ecological, economic, informational security. If national security is defined in terms of dynamics, then its conception is supplemented by concepts of society and state development. Regarding the issue of the significance of higher education to national security, we will notice that the most developed and secure countries are those that have developed higher education, countries where higher education is the public good. An abundant middle class, making up approximately two-thirds of society members, testifies that higher education is truly a mark of public “goodness”. Representatives of the middle class are marked by the capability to sustain themselves on what they earn; professionals live on what they earn, yet, in modern societies, people can become professionals only having obtained higher education. It is the middle class that is most interested in the accessibility of higher education. The middle class is the indicator of higher education as the public good.

The primary problem lies in the fact that it is the lack of higher education development that determines the increasing gap between developed and developing countries. Backward countries are the ones that are losing their national security. Advanced-development countries have created the productive system “research – high technologies – qualified personnel resources – new product – welfare and security”. This chain makes its owners – societies and states – competitive civilization agents not only in terms of economic and military power, but also in the sense of social capital. Higher education has achieved the trajectory in which not only new knowledge systems are created, but also new economic and social structures of the society are constructed. With knowledge having become the essential production factor, both the nature of labor and the way of human life change. Thus, higher education is not a singularly cognitive construction – it is a social, economic, and security category.

The national security of Lithuania is the security of a small and far from strong country. The society is awash with discontent and mistrust; the shortage of both economic and social capital is felt. In terms of national security we lack the middle class, the characteristics of which are inseparable from competences and professionalism granted by higher education. External challenges to security are not decreasing; on the contrary – they are becoming more complex. Ecological hazards, economic crises, geopolitical pressure, and a variety of reactions to a country at war are far from a complete list of external challenges. The need arises to actualize the issue of both external and internal security and identity and power relation.

In Lithuania, a prolonged and ineffective discussion is under way: some

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2 The strength of a state is defined as: 1) administrative capability of state institutions to implement (not just to adopt) decisions also taking into consideration negative results of the consultations with citizens; 2) economic and military potential. The first component calls for additional explanation: even a very weak state can declare that it defends human rights, but it can do nothing in a case of the violation of human rights; political rights and civil freedoms are meaningless without substantial support by the state (Ch. Tilly. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 15-16).
state that the system of higher education has wasted itself and is incapable of carrying out its mission; others acknowledge the limits of the higher education system, yet associate them with the disunity and inconsistency of the state higher education policy. By the way, all concerned agree that the reformation of higher education is necessary. But such a result of the discussion is not sufficient. It is mandatory to “obtain” one more result, i.e. to agree on a method and means for reformation of higher education such that new knowledge could be applied.

Though research and studies in Lithuania are now defined by reformation categories, it is not yet possible to say that higher education could already be defined by success categories, particularly by categories that could indicate such a flow of knowledge which becomes the basis for national identity and power. The situation of higher education in Lithuania can be defined as contradictory: the declared priority of research and studies is not being implemented and separate changes in higher education are as of now called its development. If higher education in Lithuania had not been reformed by 2008 because of the lack of will of certain political forces, it does not mean that later it can be reformed in whatever way by efforts of will of other political forces.

Therefore, how can a small and far from strong state create a major higher education component indispensable for guaranteeing a greater national security?

1. Three Sequences of Facts

1.1. Possibilities for a Small and Far from Strong State in Developing Higher Education

The statement that in modern societies, knowledge economics, the distribution and redistribution of knowledge, and not assets have become the most important internal policy issue sounds trivial. However, the question of how to generate the flow of such knowledge that would produce something to distribute and redistribute sounds far from trivial. Research, particularly the fundamental one, is not possible due to the cognitive flight of thought alone; large and long-term investment is necessary. The state of Lithuania allots little means for scientific research and studies. A still smaller portion of such means is allotted by the private sector. Lithuania can be attributed to the number of countries that develop scientific research in a limited way. The indicators – whether they are scientific publications or patents or, finally, a portion of GDP allotted for research – do not meet the criteria of the states leading in the area of research. 0.6 – 0.8 per cent of GDP is designated for research. Meanwhile, for the financing of research, Ireland allots 1.83 per cent, Czech Republic – 1.32 per cent, Finland – 3.52 per cent and the average of the EU is 1.94 per cent of
GDP. In Europe, we are side by side with our neighbors Poland and Latvia as well as Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Lithuania is aware of economic possibilities for developing research. But there is no justification for the ineffective use of meager means. Studies, without developed scientific research, cannot qualitatively fulfill their functions.

The ties between research and the world of activity in Lithuania are weak because industry largely remains at the level of low and medium technologies and has no need for the application of scientific research; corporate scientific research centers are not built. The situation is partly accounted for by the structure of Lithuania’s GDP, for example, in 2009, public administration and social services constituted 21.2 per cent, industry – 20 per cent, trade – 16 per cent, real estate – 15.7 per cent, transport and communications – 15 per cent, construction – 6.3 per cent, agriculture – 2 per cent, financial mediation – 1.8 per cent, hotels and restaurants – 1.3 per cent. It seems there is no reason to make claims for universities because the economy needs more drivers than IT specialists. In Lithuania, the application of high technologies generates 4–6 per cent of GDP. The situation is completely explained by the fact that the business portion in the financing of research in Lithuania constitutes only 13 per cent or 3–5 times less than in the countries leading in this area. A serious hindrance to the application of research is a factual absence of a research institute within Lithuanian industry. Under such conditions, the institutions of research and studies cannot find common language with the world of activity.

If research is the means to solve problems that cannot be overcome by the available experience, consequently, a shortage of scientific research signifies if not civilization-related backwardness, then at least a lack of reflexivity. At the same time it means that civilization problems are not solved in Lithuania and in the long run might not even be formulated. There are already people argumentatively claiming that the research policy in Lithuania does not reflect global challenges.

### 1.2. Higher Education Policy without Single Priorities

After a more careful analysis, the declaration of higher education priority has become a phenomenon of self-deception and conceals irreversible processes of the Lithuanian higher education backwardness. There are abundant argu-
ments for the statement that Lithuania has no integral state policy on research and studies: there exists only preparatory reasoning, copying of European priorities without linking them to the resources of scientists and means, and a collection of uncoordinated documents containing priority lists that are not identical. The situation is “standard”, Lithuania lacks strategic management. The situation has been thoroughly explored by a group of scientists from Vytautas Magnus University. The vagueness (indefiniteness) of priorities is a result of the absence of dialogue between higher education and state institutions as well as attempts to politically control research at one time or another. The organizational structure of higher education in Lithuania is also not clear. The distribution of competences among the Ministry of Education and Science, the Lithuanian Research Council, and the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences in solving national issues of higher education management is not obvious (for example, the Lithuanian Research Council prepares a document for the distribution of slots of master-degree studies for universities according to study areas, whereas the Council of Higher Education has become a “personnel department” for the formation of University Councils).

At the height of the reformation of higher education, the structural support of the EU was distributed without taking into consideration the development needs of research and studies. Lithuania allots for research and studies a relatively smaller portion of means from the EU structural funds than Estonia, Slovenia or Latvia. Lithuania follows the same direction that has led Portugal and Greece nowhere because they have also allotted the bulk means of the structural funds for the development of infrastructure, but not human resources. To tell the truth, the mentioned figures and the directions of development do not markedly single out Lithuania from many other countries of the world: all states, beginning with No. 31 on the list of countries in the world, do the same.

1.3. National Security without the Development of Internal Resources

Concentration on the role of the EU and NATO concerning the external security of Lithuania is insufficient argument for caring less about the internal national security resources. It should be pointed out that the data supplied in Section 1.1. testify that being unable to define Lithuania as a country of high development, we have no arguments to define it by using categories of backwardness. Lithuania is a “catching-on” country, i.e. a country that has internal resources for development, but needs external assistance for their activation. Thus, we emphasize that security guarantors are not exceptionally external: we have internal security resources that must be activated and augmented.

Unfortunately, the situation is becoming threateningly similar to “third

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9 Bakanauskas A., Kvedaravičius J. et al., 2008.
world” countries. Not only the economic, but also the academic emigration is increasing. Although the number of academic community members leaving Lithuania is relatively small (3–4 per cent), we have no arguments to ground the claim that it should not keep increasing in the near future. Those shaping the policy of higher education, supporters of a radical research and studies reform, have persuaded society that research and studies in Lithuania are allegedly very backward. Meanwhile, they themselves failed to propose a suitable reform scenario and did not manage to find the human and financial resources necessary for that. The reaction of society was instantaneous with resulting academic emigration. The academic emigration merging into a single flow with the economic emigration threatens Lithuanian society and the state with growing backwardness, the scope of which can in the long run equal that of “third world” countries. Lithuania has yet no middle class or “social relatives” class which becomes a guarantor of many things (stability, civil society, democracy, security) only when it constitutes 60–70 per cent of society members: the double emigration hinders the institutionalization of this class even more. Only 19–22 per cent of the people are representatives of the middle class.10 The most problematic thing is the fact that it is the potential representatives of the middle class that emigrate. The hope that emigrants will return of their own accord, recovery of intellectuals through the international network of research and studies, is of little comfort – an academic community of this type does not become a systemic component of Lithuanian society and the state.

The stimulation of research and studies by only market measures is rather the satisfaction of private interests, having little in common with national interests of Lithuania; the state and society might remain without professionals of separate directions. Without national experts on energy, separate countries and cultures, dubious for national security political decisions in the areas of energy and defence have already been taken.

2. Analysis and Discussion

It is pointless to discuss the issue that research and university studies in Lithuania should be reformed. The discussion should focus on why research and studies included in the list of national priorities make no headway. Is it because they have reached natural internal limits in their development or because these limits have been reached as a result of undervaluation of the role of research and studies in influencing social and economic development as well as national security? The discussion should also focus on whether the chosen means for reformation are adequate for the problems being solved, and whether the lack of effectiveness of the chosen means has been predetermined by

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an erroneous assessment of the situation concerning what is worth-reforming in higher education in Lithuania and the world. Answers to these questions will impact a more precise answer to another question: how or in what way could research and studies in Lithuania actually be raised to a higher stage of development? The question whether the development of research and studies has crossed a critical limit beyond which there are no possibilities to reform higher education in Lithuania productively should not be avoided either.

The research of Lithuanian higher education in different contexts including national security is becoming more intense of late.\textsuperscript{11}

2.1. Higher Education in Lithuania – between the State Policy and Political Control

2.1.1. Definitions of State Higher Education Policy and Political Control

There is no shortage of people thinking that science develops only according to its own internal logic and in conformity with the laws characteristic of it. Thus the freedom of science and its independence from the surrounding world is stated. At the same time, it should be pointed out that most scientific hypotheses, theories, and models emerge under the influence of economic, social, political, and security factors. In this sense, science is not an independent value. Science is a system in one or another form integrated into society; it is its own institute associated by instances of feedback. It is possible to claim that the development of science depends on how much the culture of a concrete society is open to scientific ideas.

Higher education is controlled in order to seek certain political objectives. Political interference is possible in all cases when problems of the functioning of society or its separate subsystems arise, the problems for the solution of which require scientific analysis. But such political interference in research as well as studies can be of a dual nature.

On the one hand, it is state policy\textsuperscript{12} or long-term and consistent attention to specific products of research and studies which help solve concrete problems of environment protection, energy, healthcare, education, transport, etc.. State policy on research signifies interference even in internal scientific processes,


\textsuperscript{12} Here policy is given the meaning of the expansion of possibilities and activity fields.
believing that in such a way the choice of scientific research problems and the formation of new scientific study areas can be accelerated. At the same time, this does not mean regulation or control of cognitive scientific processes or the restriction of academic self-governing. Yet, this can mean the rearrangement of the organizational structure of research. This kind of influence on research is acceptable, particularly when the objective of the regulation and control of research is determination of the relationship between the internal scientific product – the new knowledge – and its application. Such political interference is rather confirmation of the “genetic” relationship between formation of the political agenda and affairs in the academic world.

The state policy on research and studies includes:

- a political dialogue with the institutions of research and studies;
- determination of the priorities of research and studies of the state;
- assurance of financing for research and studies;
- state orders for specialists and technologies;
- optimization of the organizational structure of state research and studies institutions;
- training of scientists;
- accountability of the institutions of research and studies;
- social guarantees of scientists.

On the other hand, the regulation and control of the academic world may not coordinate with the inherent principles of the development of research and studies, violate them, and thus, hinder the functioning of this important sphere of society and the state. Such a situation usually arises in two cases. First of all, it surfaces because the very preparation of state policy on higher education requires a certain scientific potential. State institutions, individual politicians, and functionaries often lack the knowledge necessary to make decisions and try to compensate for this by “political will”, administrative resources, and “free play of market forces”. In such a case, attempts are most often made to deny that research itself shapes the attitude of politicians and society to problems the solution of which calls for scientific methods. In the other case, it is attempts of a concrete political regime to apply specific products of research and studies to the life of society and the state while implementing dominant interests and ignoring public interests. Since political regimes change relatively often, the political control of research and studies is short-lived and inconsistent.

The political control of research and studies, opposed by the academic world, manifests itself in:

- restriction of the autonomy of the institutions of research and studies;
- absence of transparency in financing research and studies;
- publication of biased data on the state of research and studies;
- regulation of the content and order of studies;
- representation of political forces in the management of institutions of research and studies.
The condition for the elimination of the success and political control of the state policy on higher education is a constant political dialogue between universities, other centers of research and studies, and state institutions, as well as the ability of the latter to understand and assess the peculiarities of academic organizations.

2.1.2. The Assessment of the Reform of Research and Studies

In assessing the reformation of research and studies, it is necessary to single out defining levels of its causes, preparation to implement, and the first results. We choose the Law on Science and Studies of the Republic of Lithuania as an original “denominator” of the analysis of these three levels.

The Law on Science and Studies (further – LSS) has become the most serious reality of the development of Lithuanian research and studies. Two considerations of LSS in the Constitutional Court within half a year of its adoption testify that the reformation of higher education in Lithuania began in a problematic way. It is becoming clear that this law contradicts the Constitution. On 28 October 2009, the Constitutional Court provided arguments for the claim that LSS is somewhat an instrument of the political control of research and studies. The functions of university councils are qualified as incompatible with the university autonomy principle and, in this sense, contradict the Constitution. On 12 December 2009, the Constitutional Court provided arguments for the claim that LSS can restrict the Constitutional right of advanced students to free education. However, intellectuals of liberal views ignored the decisions of the Constitutional Court.13

There are alternatives for the statement that LSS has been prepared to enhance the political control of higher education. The first alternative – the compilers and legislators of the Law simply lacked competence in the area of higher education. In separate cases, the Law ignores objective conditions of experimental research and training of scientists, periodicity of studies processes; the initiators of the reform demonstrated insufficient orientation in the development of cognitive, demographic and other internal processes of research and studies in space and time. The second alternative – the initiators of the reform literally identified the reflexive reconstruction of higher education with its reformation. In general, the reconstruction of reality is the privilege of younger generations. It seems that the leaders of the current generation “divide” research and studies “into separate pieces” (because only in this way can they perceive the whole) and then try to “fit the pieces” to again form a whole, but, as usual in such cases, they are left with “superfluous parts” and nothing is improved.

Even prior to the reform, it was possible to discern several of its contra-

dictions or the unbalanced situations of the reform causes, objectives, means, or terms.

The reformation of higher education in Lithuania was delayed though discussions had been going on for a decade. The preparation for the reform was long, but it started hastily, without having formed a consistent state policy on higher education. The reform prerequisites were not precisely defined: the systems of research and studies as allegedly degraded; the investment in science and studies as ineffective; the number of students as groundlessly high; the profession of a scientist as unattractive to the best; the stimuli for the quality of studies as nonexistent.14 The final self-persuasion of radical reformers to start the reform in 2009 was the statement that Lithuania would face the threat of intellectual bankruptcy15 if the reform of higher education were not to start as soon as possible.

Persons noticing that the indicators of Lithuanian research have come close to those of separate “third world” countries do not see that in recent years, Lithuania has come even closer to the “third world” according to other indicators as well.16 We are lagging behind not only in the areas of patents and scientific articles, but also in direct foreign investment and the export of manufactured goods produced by applying particularly advanced technologies.

Political means were resorted to in order to prove a very low quality of studies to instigate public discontent. The latter failed to manifest itself; all the interested parties – students, parents and employers – assessed the quality of studies in Lithuania as average, consequently corresponding to the level of the socio-economic development of society. The report of international experts publicized in 2007 defines the state of Lithuanian research and studies as average.17 Taking into consideration the indicators of Lithuania’s economic development, this is a totally understandable situation. But most important is the fact that other means and deadlines, not those applied in a catastrophic situation, are truly necessary. Meanwhile, the inadequately – only negatively – assessed state of higher education in Lithuania was followed by an inadequate vision of reform.

The unrealistic assessment of the state of research and studies in Lithuania is not the outcome of time shortage. The methodology of radical appraisers is permeated with the principles of market fundamentalism. It is only the

16 According to the GDP per capita in 2008, Lithuania ranked 50th in the world (data by the IMF); the nearest members were: Hungary (18,500 USD), Antigua and Barbuda, Estonia, Poland, Croatia, Equatorial Guinea (16,850 USD), Lithuania (15,800 USD), Russia (15,050 USD), Gabon, Libya, Latvia, Chile, Argentina, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Botswana (13,400 USD). In 2009, according to the GNI, Lithuania (11,870 USD) was ranked 68th (PB data) and was not yet added to 66 high income state and territories (more than 11,905 USD per capita).
pragmatists of the Free Market Institute and low technology businesses who understand the idea that Lithuania has too many students and therefore, people, with higher education. In the age group of 25–34, 38.9 per cent of Lithuania’s inhabitants have higher education (ISCED 5–6) (8th–9th place in the EU), in the age group of 35–44 – 28.1 per cent (12th place in the EU), in the age group of 45–64 – 23.9 per cent (9th place in the EU). These figures cause optimism only at first glance. If we strike from these numbers persons who finished college (previously known as post-secondary schools) the greater part of which, in terms of studies content, has nothing in common with higher education, we would find a problematic situation – about 18 per cent of the population with a higher university education. This figure is close to the number of the middle class representatives in Lithuania. It is another matter that the structure of work places in Lithuania is in inverse proportion to the tendency of the population’s education; working places, corresponding to the nature of work in the information society, constitute the majority.

It is not even the afore-mentioned figures that testify to the absurdity of the statement about the surplus of people with high education diplomas in Lithuania; it is absurd as to its definition because it means that Lithuania could have too many innovations and too much development and security. Graduates from universities and colleges should be treated not only from the point of view of the labor market, but also from that of social union (cohesion); it is they who are the key resource of the Lithuanian middle class – the guarantor of the stability of society and the state.

It is also worth mentioning that the course of how Japan is overcoming the ecological catastrophe is defined not only by the traditional culture of the country, but also by the level of higher education of the population of the country.

In the area of university management reformation, heed was not paid to the fact that Western universities undergo reformation because they cannot in the environment of new challenges, concerning activity effectiveness, adapt the populist academic democracy created by the events of 1968. Here, the populist academic democracy means the situations when students gain the right to point out to professors what and when to teach and who should lead academic subdivisions, to freely choose study subjects and to decide for themselves to what qualification degree their study plans correspond. At the end of the 20th century, the reorganization of the “universities of all groups” to “academic universities” governed by professionals began. Self-governance of Lithuanian universities had not yet crossed this line of the (un-)controllability of academic organizations. At the same time, the governance of academic organizations becomes more complex and requires more management competences. Due to this

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19 In Japan, 34 per cent of the population has higher education. Japan strives to increase the portion of the population with higher education diplomas in the nearest future to at least 40 per cent.
reason, scientists and lecturers often get into conflicts with the administration of their organizations. The LSS has not improved the situation; on the contrary, by granting more powers to the administration and proposing more freedoms to the academic community, it has created an explosive mixture.

In the radical vision of the Lithuanian higher education reformation, we can recognize four distinctly expressed motives: reengineering of the academic culture; new public management; the so-called “student’s money basket” (state-financed study slots); and uninterrupted economic growth and its unavoidable financial contribution.

A particularly strong motive is that of reengineering or a complete eradication of the memory and experience of the past and creation of a completely new academic culture. However, scientific research indicates that a new corporate culture never surfaces in an empty place and does not become “sterile”.20 Unfortunately, Lithuania belongs to those countries in which there exist historical premises and political motives a priori not to value the continuity of activity. In the case of Lithuanian higher education organizations, reengineering attempts arouse their partly inadequate reaction to definitions of a new autonomy. A complete rendering of higher education institutions state-owned property is a recent past; therefore, the academic community is very sensitive to any proposal to (just) discuss the issues of higher education autonomy and take autonomy for granted.

Problems of the governance/management of universities and science institutes are actualized in the reform in such a way that it is possible to believe that “management will save the world”. Human, financial, and material resources become insignificant in the background of new public management. The new management relates perfectly functioning organizations to market principles and presses the conviction that democratic representative governance is restricted. Thus, it is not coincidental that the reformation of Lithuania’s higher education is related to the restriction of the role of internal representative structures in research and studies institutions and to the strengthening of external structures’ and rector’s individual governing. The experience of Austria, Finland, Germany, and other countries, where the greatly overestimated activity of university councils has not justified itself and the quality of university councils is deteriorating, is being ignored.21

The regulating purpose of the “student’s money basket” has also been foreseen from the positions of the new management: free movement of students should determine “redundant” programs of studies, even separate universities. The experience of other countries in applying the “student’s money basket” proves that in such a case, entire professions become “redundant”. Only radical

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reasoning can hope that students will optimize the network of universities in Lithuania. This does not altogether correspond to the two attributes of research and studies development: erudition and academic movement of students. The number of “student money baskets” does not reflect the scientific capability of the university, only the public opinion formed in one way or another with respect to it. The distribution of “student money baskets” to groups of study programs, moreover, guarantees of it “as long as one lives”, restrict not only the accessibility of studies, but also the possibility for students to change study programs.

The principle of “student money basket” satisfies separate individual interests, but it does not satisfy public interests. The experience of the Netherlands – a rich country – shows that loans decrease higher education accessibility to those who choose, but not the “pragmatic” studies: art, languages, education, etc., whereas students from low-income families practically do not apply to the banks and rather choose some additional work activity and thus considerably lower their study achievements. The present student body of Lithuania does the same when they find themselves in the same situation.

The more effective the economic indicators of university reformation, the more problematic are the social consequences. By becoming market participants, universities lose the status of the instrument of social cohesion. The requirement of the economic usefulness of studies doubtless creates a financial basis for a better quality of studies, but in this case, universities lose the “social aspect” and higher education accessibility problem becomes very acute. Under stricter budget saving conditions, problems mentioned by universities are called “immaterial”.

The model of the enhancement of higher education quality is particularly contradictory; fewer students and fewer institutions of research and studies would allegedly mean the allotment of more means for the individual student and the scientist. Is that sufficient for the success of the reform? That “fewer” developing into the “more” is, at best, a direct perception of the quality of higher education “in itself”. But higher education is a powerful instrument of the formation and reproduction of the society social structure. In high development countries, universities are “factories” of the middle class. The significance of higher education lies in the fact that by granting qualification, it also grants advantages of the use of social and economic possibilities; therefore, it is that area of society in which social groups fight for policies and superiority. Modern society will always be for the accessibility of higher education. In a peculiar way, the reform crosses higher education out from the list of good public things, legitimizes the reproduction of social inequality and intensifies the issue of internal security.

It is necessary to assess one more context of the higher education reform. The development of higher education is expensive; competitive research and studies are very expensive. The reform of higher education was prepared while

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orienting towards economic growth. The latter, as it is well-known, has become problematic not only in Lithuania and not only in the nearest perspective. The economic depression has unpredictably disturbed the plans for the financial provision of the reform. The structural support of the EU is of great help, but parallel to this, it is necessary to take up learning to live under conditions of permanently limited economic growth as well as see Lithuania in complex economic positions.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that higher education is being reformed in all of Europe. But tendencies of scientific research and development of studies in Europe and Lithuania are totally different (Table 1).

Table 1. Dominant tendencies of higher education development in Europe and Lithuanian realities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European tendencies*</th>
<th>Lithuanian realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Determination of scientific research priorities</td>
<td>Scientific research priorities are too general and in no way define the place and role of Lithuania in this labor division (cooperation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enhancement of research financing and diversity of its sources.</td>
<td>The enhancement of research financing and diversity of its sources is not taking place. Business cannot become a true source of research financing because in Lithuania only one out of five enterprises conducts scientific research. In Finland, Italy or the Netherlands such enterprises make up 70 – 75 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enhancement of the scope of scientist training.</td>
<td>The scope of scientist training is not growing. The number of state-financed slots for doctorate studies in 2010 covered 60 per cent of the level of 2009. This contradicts the EU support when enterprises of high technologies employ scientists. In 27 countries of the EU, there are on average 6,500 researchers per million inhabitants, whereas in Lithuania – 4,000. Therefore, not only the scope of the training of scientists and other researchers is diminishing, but also the perspective of real cooperation between science and business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Establishment of competence centers.</td>
<td>The establishment of competence centers has begun without the enhancement of the scope of scientist training and specification of scientific priorities. The open access of the integrated valleys of science, studies and business will be a genuine problem because the number of those seeking to make use of the most modern scientific research infrastructure will not be too large; we are threatened with a shortage of human resources.</td>
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</table>

5. State impact encouraging the development of higher education sector.

The sector of higher education is being truly downsized. There have been attempts to save the situation by re-qualifying post-secondary schools meanwhile expecting from them, for example, the German Fachhochschulen effect. But colleges in Lithuania have not become real participants of the system of higher education (first of all because of the near-sighted state policy on scientist training, actually on their deficit policy). Foreign experts also noticed the uncertain status of colleges in Lithuania.**

6. Aspirations for the harmony of studies accessibility and quality.

The quality of studies is sought at the expense of studies accessibility. Downsizing of state-financed slots of studies and absence of economically sound studies loan system separate the numerous lower class of Lithuania from higher education by financial means.

7. Renunciation of state monopoly and establishment of private universities, disappearance of boundaries between state and private universities.

State monopoly is formally renounced, but equivalent private universities are actually not established and the ones that do function are small and not competitive.

8. Commercialization of universities, a possibility to get bank credits, conclusion of agreements with industrial corporations, creation of commercial programs.

The commercialization of universities is restricted (in essence, it is not taking place) by refusing to grant them the ownership of the land and real estate, by prohibition to borrow and automatically decide the issue of the investment in scientific research and studies. What is left are commercial programs which, in a poor country, are not accessible to the major part of the population.

9. Ever decreasing state interference in the activity of research and studies institutions, liberalization of higher education system, granting of greater autonomy to universities.

Statements about the “ever decreasing state interference in the activity of research and studies institutions, granting of greater autonomy to universities” are nothing else but declarations. Universities cannot even admit students independently. The inversely proportional dependence between the financing of research and studies and the extent of the autonomy of universities is observed.

A part of the indicated differences is explained by real differences in Lithuanian possibilities. It is not real to consider a Western-type financing of scientific research and studies in Lithuania. Yet it is impossible to rationally explain why the “great reform” does not grant research institutes and universities the right to independently invest in scientific research and studies.

While reasoning about the tendencies of higher education development in Europe, we should not get the impression that there everything functions fluently. There the wish of universities to have more autonomy is also articulated; it is as well necessary to strengthen the “poles of the knowledge triangle (research, studies and innovations)”.

To complete this part of the analysis with a compilation of the unexpected results of the Lithuanian higher education reformation:

- incompatibility of LSS with other laws hinders universities and research institutes from carrying out changes necessary for their future and disturbs their governance;
- selection of university council members is spontaneous;
- university studies have become less accessible increasing the inequality of the accessibility of higher education;
- academic emigration has increased;
- the principle of the “student money basket” eliminates separate directions of studies, consequently, the would-be professionals of these directions;
- scientific potential has remained scattered without the amalgamation of universities and joining of state research institutes to universities;
- the optimization of the number of research and studies institutions has become a means to get additional financing, but not a direct goal for enhancing the quality of research and studies;
- research and studies institutions – the experimental systems – are ignored while new ones are being established duplicating their functions;
- the reform has neither simplified nor accelerated investment in the higher education system;
- students’ admission, loans for studies and grants, legal status of higher schools, reorganization of governance, merging of higher schools and other issues related to the implementation of the reform are not coordinated and wreak havoc in research and studies as well as in state governance institutions, but worst of all – cause confusion in society.

The compilation of unexpected and surprising reform results is so great that it is possible to claim that the reform has failed. To tell the truth, knowing its pre-history leaves no room for surprise; radical criticism of higher education has developed into equally radical science reformation mistakes. It is well-known that unsuccessful reforms are in most cases the result of imposed change. A change is effective, i.e. turns into development, when a consistent and reasonable state policy is prepared. The unbalanced mixture of reform causes, goals, means, and deadlines determined its narrowness and, in some cases, even its harmfulness.
2.2. A Variant of the Scenario of Lithuanian Higher Education Development

After what has happened to the “great” research and studies reform, only a gradual, but urgent change process is possible. A “total reform” was resorted to though its causality and the consistency of means had not been properly assessed; mistakes were made – the elimination of which is now only possible by making consistent efforts.

The well-known academic authority of the previous age Karl Raimund Popper, guided by the principle of situational rationalism, substantiated piecemeal engineering possibilities; he juxtaposed the conception of partial consecutive and stage-based changes to Utopian engineering, marked by a perfect advance moral goal and stimulated by the conviction that this goal is inevitably achieved in a single stride. “Social life is so complicated that few men, or none at all, could judge a blueprint for social engineering on the grand scale; whether it be practicable, whether it would result in a real improvement …”\(^{23}\) Applying operationalism to this universal, let us resolve, first of all, to attain a state where the relative part of the population with higher university education does not decrease any more and the assumption that Lithuania will become a bachelor-training country in the future is not grounded.

The situation in Lithuania’s higher education is dangerous because the consequences of failures can cause irreversible processes of backwardness in Lithuania. To prevent this from happening, it is more reasonable to design partial and consecutive reform measures provided by the human and financial resources of the higher education reformation. Only in this case is it possible to discover how to coordinate and adjust to one another the most important processes (governance, investment, innovations, movement of students and teachers, university network organization, etc.). Only in this case is it possible to achieve the point where LSS could be coordinated with other laws of the Republic of Lithuania and not contradict them. Designing a gradual mode of reform is all the more reasonable because in case of separate failures, they are localized, making losses simpler and cheaper to rectify. In such a case, the principle stating that the solution of concrete failures is of greater virtue than knowing what the greatest final good is should be followed. Common sense dictates that it is prudent to take small steps and learn from little mistakes. Such steps are sensible if they are made in the direction set by the integral and strategically orientated policy of higher education.

These are possible steps of an effective higher education reformation, i.e. development (not only a change):

- agreement on the development priorities of higher education at the level of political and expert systems;
- reorganization of higher education governance;
- organization of strong universities;
- search for compatibility of higher education accessibility and quality.

2.2.1. Agreement on the Development Priorities of Higher Education at the Level of Political and Expert Systems

It is not easy—if possible at all—to coordinate the opinion of experts with the democratic form of policy formation; most likely, this is an ongoing process. It is even more complicated to accomplish it in unstable democratic countries where a change of government most frequently determines cardinal changes in policy. Lithuania belongs to these countries.

Research and studies institutions have the “inherent right” to decide what scientific research and studies they will conduct. State policy does not annul it, but it expresses the “inherent right” of the state to allot budgetary appropriations for particular directions of scientific research and studies. The attitude of society toward higher education has a great impact on this. In the case of private financing, the academic community cannot undertake activities that seem of importance to it either. In most research directions, the needs for research financing have drastically increased; the variety of financing sources is increasing correspondingly. The state has long stopped being the only financing source of education, though frequently is the largest source. In Lithuania, this source will absolutely remain the largest even in the distant future. This, in its turn, predetermines too great a dependence of research and studies institutions on the state.

We have no illusions that in a democratic system, the opinion of experts cannot be discussed. But in democracies it is possible not to abstract political decisions from conclusions of experts and not to grant power of decision-making to non-professionals. Democratic policy should not be held hostage to the disregard of authorities. Expert decisions generally follow strict research argumentation and are separated from the conflict of interests. Meanwhile, politicians are “positioned” between the ambitions to essentially find the best ways for the solution of public problems and the acknowledgement that such decisions are not reached objectively, but must be found on the basis of argumentation, grounded on the conflict of interests.24

We have presented these well-known ideas in order to once more emphasize that in Lithuania the normative environment of higher education should not develop without the participation of expert systems that ruling politicians are trying to eliminate. Expert systems should not be confused with “expert groups” created while looking for a counterbalance to experts. Aside from everything else, the system of higher education is special in that it is an expert system. However, this is not a sufficient counterargument over the tendency when the development of research and in part studies is more and more dependent upon politicians and society – the tax payers – and upon whether they will want to pay for research discoveries and studies. Scientists-experts themselves should be perfect negotiators while competing for research financing.25

Accord is necessary concerning:

- possibilities of fundamental research;
- level of technologies;
- support for humanities and social sciences;
- student flows in separate areas of studies.

The priority of state investment in higher education, highlighted in Leuven (2009), at the meeting of ministers responsible for higher education from the countries of the Bologna process,\(^\text{26}\) cannot be practically implemented in Lithuania. This means that with the creation of the united European space of research and studies and knowing scientific research financing possibilities in Lithuania, Lithuania will inevitably become an academic province unable to conduct fundamental research while individual Lithuanian scientists will work in European research centers.

The potential of small states to develop “great” research is limited. In such a case, state research policy is only the encouragement of individual scientists and separate research cells to participate in the international scientific research network. These scientists or research cells have meager possibilities to become the “nuclei” of the scientific research network or structures initiating and coordinating corresponding research and science disciplines. Most often efforts are pooled for the research of national culture. In order not to become a country of only applied scientific research, it is necessary to create attractive legal and financial-economic conditions for the establishment of foreign fundamental research centers (their branches) in Lithuania.

One priority group of higher education development should be from the list of the united research and studies space of the EU. These priorities should reflect the perspectives of the development of Lithuania and work for the future of Lithuania, but simultaneously function as the export of new knowledge. The second group of priorities should be adapted to the closest interests of Lithuania. In this sense, the landmark for research (and studies) in Lithuania can only be medium-level technologies. Several niches of high technologies (biotechnologies, IT, laser production) do not predetermine the nearest perspectives of Lithuanian industry. Lithuania is a country of small and medium enterprises (generating over 65 per cent of GDP) and low technologies (products produced by applying high technologies make up only 3 per cent of the export, employees – 2.5 per cent). Authoritative analysts understand the situation and have created a corresponding discourse:

The predominant in Lithuania conviction that knowledge economy is created by branches of high technology industry has a negative impact. Economy based on high technologies is rather an exception than a rule. The cooperation of Lithuanian research and business in making innovative processes more active should cover not only industry

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branches of high technologies but also traditional ones. Experience indicates that there are no low technology industry branches; there are only low technology enterprises incapable of assimilating innovations. Even in such countries as Denmark low technology industry dominates. The system of innovations should transfer the cooperation of research and business to the level where enterprises applying both low and high technologies are involved.27

A wide-ranging discussion28 about the role of the humanities and social science should be highlighted, from the point of view of our analysis, as a process that has formed the actualization mechanism of the identity. The linking of the identity and national security by a real connection will be more successful depending upon the broader development of the humanities and social sciences as well as corresponding university studies.

Among small European states, Lithuania distinguishes itself by a relatively small number of students in the humanities, natural science, mathematics, computer science and the arts. At the same time, in Lithuania there are relatively many students in social sciences and engineering. (In Europe, the number of social sciences students is relatively larger only in Latvia, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Turkey; in engineering – more students only in Finland, Romania and Portugal).29 On the one hand, such student flows in Lithuania weakly correlate with identity actualities of Lithuania; on the other hand, they contradict the demands of the dominant medium-level technologies. Attempts to reduce the state-financed number of social science students in 2010 is only the result of the reduction of the state-financed number of places in general and has nothing in common with the redistribution of student flows. Meanwhile, for example, the relative number of students in natural science, mathematics and computers remains inadequate for the declared development tasks of corresponding areas.

2.2.2. The Reorganization of the Governance of Higher Education

In the last decade of the 20th century, in most European countries, the reformation process of higher education governance began. The governance of universities in separate countries varies; however, common tendencies can be discerned.30 Processes of granting universities autonomy (and not only in the academic sense), their “denationalization” and governance liberalization are under way. By the way, making universities autonomous is not a given. People are often apt to forget that academic autonomy is inherent; the community, whose essential value is the truth, is autonomous \textit{ad hoc} and this autonomy

cannot be abolished because knowing is inseparable from its subject. Modern universities are in compliance with such an agreement for which they would be accountable to society and responsible for their scientific research and studies programs while the state would carry out the strategic governance of the entire higher education system.31

The example of the Netherlands represents well university governance reformation attempts of the continental European countries. (At the same time, the Netherlands is also an opposite example – there still remains a great inequality in the possibility to attain higher education; the reaction of the student body to this situation is well-known). In the Netherlands, the institutes of the external and internal university control were reformed first. At the internal level, the functions of supervision and executive university governance performed respectively by the Council of Observers and the Executive Committee, made up only of university representatives, are separated. The external university control is executed by the National Education Inspection and Accreditation Committee. These institutes control the quality of studies, effective use of resources, and equality of education accessibility. The Central Finance Institute controls the transfer of state monetary resources to universities. “Denationalized” universities are granted property rights for buildings and equipment, can obtain credits, decide how many employees to hire and under what terms, and determine which and how many students to admit to studies. “Denationalized” universities themselves establish agencies-mediators for dealing with general matters and making agreements with state bodies. The governance of universities in the Netherlands has become even more liberal than in the homeland of university autonomy, i.e. Great Britain, particularly knowing that there, after the year 1992, the scope of regulation of the higher education system has increased (a greater responsibility for a part of budget expenditure): greater attention is paid to the regulation of the number of students and their distribution to study directions; greater attempts are made to control scientific research directions.

In Lithuania, these means of higher education regulation are relevant:

- The redistribution and delimitation (non-duplication) of the competencies of the Ministry of Education and Science, the Lithuanian Research Council, Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, and the Council of Higher Education; the authorization to work on the tasks of the preparation of the national higher education policy (determination of the priorities of scientific research and studies, optimization of the national university network, argumentation of state budget appropriations);
- Granting the “student money basket” a competitive indicator significance that would preclude it from becoming the only and decisive factor determining the fate of study programs. Otherwise, while following in

the footsteps of the demographic tendencies and emigration, we will, in general, remain scientists without clear direction. Scientists with certain direction are absolutely necessary not only for the execution of scientific research and studies, but also for the formation of national interests and state policy in order to implement them. The network of universities should be optimized by applying state policy means;

- The adaptation of the councils of universities and research institutes to solve governance tasks of academic organizations and preparation of the inventory of council members’ competencies as well as specification of their nomination order;
- Supplementing the research and studies governance structure by agency-mediators established by universities and research institutes themselves. Agency-mediators are established not with the status of “state agent”, to whom the Government or the Ministry of Education and Science delegate a portion of their authorization, but with the status of “university agent” to whom universities transfer a part of their autonomy.

At present, two main university governance models exist in the world. One model is marked by institutional and financial autonomy, based on the principle of economic rationalism and a close relation with the world of activity with strong self-governance and indirect state control. The second model distinguishes itself by the hierarchy of university governance, strong state regulation (most often by direct ministerial regulation), weaker relations with the world of activity and larger state orders. It is sensible to call the first model Anglo-Saxon and the second – European-continental. The American higher education system is one of the most decentralized in the world; in essence, there is no national system. There universities would rather coordinate their actions by competing among themselves. The USA is the only country where, during the last two to three decades, no consistent state intervention in the governance of universities has taken place. The distinguishing attribute of the Anglo-Saxon model is the delegation of ministerial functions to specialized agency-mediators. In Great Britain, collegiate institutions, the largest of which are the “Universities of Great Britain” and the “Association of Colleges,” represent universities in the dialogue with authorities.

The elections of university rectors, causing lots of emotion and in no less degree, problems, are not, in fact, a principle issue. The rector could be elected in the college of electors composed of university Council and Senate members. The recall of the rector would be possible if this were the decision of the Council and the Senate separately. In general, it is more important to foresee a common competence of the Council and the Senate for the solution of the issues significant for university life.

The governance of research and studies institutions should be multi-layered (scientists, teachers, students, etc.) and multi-stage (the Council, the Senate, the rector), but in any case, dominated by professionals in certain areas.
2.2.3. The Organization of Strong Universities

In the Glasgow conference of EUA in 2005, the importance of strong universities in creating a strong Europe was highlighted. The attributes of strong universities are responsibility and openness, constant improvement of the governance activity of research and studies, adequate financing, and autonomy. At the meeting of higher education ministers from the countries of the Bologna Process in London in 2007, the significance of various, adequately financed, autonomous and accountable universities was also emphasized.

In Lithuania, we hear rather often that we need a “world-level” university. But it is more sensible to consider the alternative of just “good” universities known to many countries around the world. This alternative presupposes the specialization of scientific research and a corresponding consolidation of scientists in 5–7 state universities, 2–3 of which would be club members among the ranks of the 300–500 best world universities. Small, but rich and strategically coordinated Denmark has five universities in the ranks of 500 world universities and they are almost equally distributed in each hundred. Vilnius University has the possibility to cross the threshold of the club of best world universities in the near future. Other amalgamated Lithuanian universities could aspire to positions on the list of the 1,000 best world universities. So far, Lithuanian universities are recognized only according to Ranking on the Web criteria. We remind critics stating that the aspirations raised are of little importance that the process of the amalgamation and merging of universities is under way in the world; therefore, such aspirations of Lithuanian universities should be beyond doubt. It would be a Danish analogue (besides the above-mentioned, four more Danish universities rank on the list of 1,000 best world universities). The assumption about at least one Lithuanian university getting on the list of the first 200 world universities would be quite real; the largest Lithuanian universities have at their disposition consolidated budgets of 200–300 million. In Lithuania during recent years, a total of 800–900 million LT per year is allotted to the development work of scientific research and technologies. The annual budgets of the leading world universities amount to billions and in some cases are 2 to 3 times larger than the budget of the Republic of Lithuania. It is more reasonable for Lithuania to have some high class universities ranking above average than to consolidate the entire academic potential into two or three large ones that will still be unable to compete for leadership in the world and Europe.

Scientific research potential in Lithuania can be enhanced by choosing another way. To achieve the recognition of Lithuanian universities in the world, it is necessary not only to merge universities, but to extend the process...

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33 London Communiqué. 2007.
34 A separate case is Slovenia where the entire higher education potential is pooled in two universities: Ljubljana (60 thousand students) and Maribor (21 thousand students).
of attaching state research institutes to universities. The continuous distribution of Lithuanian research potential in universities and research institutes cannot be called rational. But the tolerance of state research institutes is a smaller problematic situation than non-establishment of corporate research centers. Are Lithuanian corporations truly devoid of possibilities to initiate and finance scientific research? It is probable that the establishment of integrated research, studies, and business channels in Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda will enhance the potential of universities and improve relations between research and business.

2.2.4. The Aspiration for the Compatibility between the Accessibility of Higher Education and Quality

With university studies having become a mass phenomenon in modern countries, the gap between the accessibility of higher education and quality has increased. It is worth mentioning that the more qualitative the academic organization, the more closed it is and the greater its requirements and competitions. The greatest problem is how to coordinate the authoritativeness of knowledge (the expertise) with democratization (mass character); how to achieve that knowledge could at the same time spark public debates and would be applied by professionals. The quality of studies lays the foundations of professional competencies, whereas the accessibility of studies – the foundations for the sharing of knowledge and social harmony. In seeking greater quality, the accessibility is inevitably decreased, i.e. inequality increases. The requirement for quality can cross the line beyond which the separation of a portion of society members and reproduction of social inequality begin.

The territorial concentration of higher education for geographically small Lithuania is not the greatest concern. It is much more important to evaluate whether the rejection of the territorial dispersion of universities would help us become major or minor leaders of certain scientific research and studies and, with only a slight rise in the standard of living, would guarantee, in the social sense, equal accessibility of higher university education.

Since higher education plays a considerable role in the strengthening of social harmony and reducing instances of its inequality, students should reflect the territorial and social variety of the society in all stages of their development in higher schools and should have possibilities to complete their studies without dependence on their social or economic status. This would correspond to European tendencies.

The research and studies of a small state will inevitably “work” in broader than national markets. In Lithuania, as a member of the EU, there are no

grounds for the concern that graduates of higher education institutions will find no employment in other EU countries. We should be concerned about the fact that the qualified labor force from other countries does not choose Lithuania. Restricting the accessibility of studies by the demands of the internal economy market, we risk the limitation of the intellectual society potential which, by the way, is necessary not only in the production of society assets, but also in personal lives of society members when aspiring towards greater self-expression. The accessibility of studies should not be measured by the criteria that maximizes only economic profit. Thus, problems of the quality of studies should not be solved at the expense of the limitation of their accessibility. They must be solved without lowering higher education standards (to the extent that is possible in the environment of mass higher education) and by encouraging students to overcome them.

Conclusions

The current state of higher education in Lithuania does not completely satisfy the needs of national security. It is insufficient to say that higher education in Lithuania is developed or undeveloped in compliance with the possibilities of a small and not strong state. In 2010, we must state that discontent with the state of Lithuanian higher education is determined by the contradictory LSS and the higher education reform that is not going smoothly; research and studies have not been reformed timely and properly. Because of that, the institutionalization of the middle class – the most important national security agent – is facing difficulties. Losses of the development of Lithuania because of the ineffectiveness of the higher education system reform are a most genuine danger to national security. At the same time, it is necessary at the level of state strategy to define higher education as a factor controlling national security, whereas the state policy, concerning scientific research and high technologies as well as university studies, should be perceived as a condition for the welfare, trust and cooperation, and stability – the primary guarantors of internal security. In such a case, it would be possible to create external security preconditions, testifying to the preparedness of society and the state for external challenges: whether it be a natural disaster or a geopolitical or military calamity.

That the development of Lithuanian research and studies is hindered by the lack of consecutive and consistent state policy is not the principle conclusion of the conducted research. It becomes principle only when we add that the preparation of the argumentation-based, consistent and long-term state higher education policy is failing not only because of the indefiniteness of the national interests of a small and far from strong state in the European space of science and studies under formation, as well as in the globalization-induced uncertainty, but also in the lack of corresponding competencies, disregard of experts, and short-term party interests.
The formal declared part of higher education policy (*politics*) and its real practical part (*policy*) have little association. The political control of frequently changing party forces has become the alleged link between the two inadequately constructed policy parts. Its result is a change without development and, at the same time, one more area of life in Lithuania has become less coordinated. The incredible breakthrough, projected by the supporters of a radical reform, has turned into the obvious getting bogged down, predicted by consistent critics. Now the difference between higher education reform rhetoric and actions is clear. The analysis of the latter is a truly sobering occupation. A part of the consequences of the reform – let us just remember the academic emigration and the ignoring of the training of certain directions specialists – can be qualified as stopping the development of Lithuania and, in part, dissociating higher education from the needs of national security.

The years of the reform have created a new situation in the higher education of Lithuania. Certainly, this situation calls for comprehensive analysis. The viewpoint that the current higher education of Lithuania can be developed by way of consecutive gradual reforms and still remain for the public good is worth considering.

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Civil Society and National Security: A Theoretical Survey of the Problem

The article provides a theoretical analysis of the interaction between the state national security policy and civil society in order to find out the causes arising from the contradictions of this interaction. Grounded on the survey of the development of the conception of civil society and civil consciousness, the controversial nature and complexity of the problem are disclosed. Causes of the contradictions between civil society and the national security system are analyzed in the context of a civil identity conception on the basis of the analysis of value-related priorities. The historic integrity of civil society and the state, as the subject of national security, is surveyed in the discourse of both traditional and contemporary theories. The article presents the insights of the authors on further interaction of civil society and the state in the area of the defense of national security interests.

Introduction

Since the start of the global antiterrorist campaign – after September 11, 2001 – threats to both international and national security have become a constant topic of discussion. During the recent years, politicians, public men, scientists, and representatives of international and public organizations more and more often have been speaking about threats to civil society. Not only international terrorism, but also fighting against international terrorism is being named as threatening phenomena, causing danger to modern civil society. Fighting against terrorism, concerns related to safeguarding the security of the state, national security and defense tasks make state institutions, far from rarely, restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens. Such restrictions or, moreover, prohibitions become dangerous to society and the democratic state since they impede its civil development and formation and development processes of its civil consciousness. However, civil society itself sometimes is treated as...
a premise creating favorable conditions for terror attacks\(^2\). While analyzing the interaction of the state national security policy and civil society, the latter does not seem to be unambiguously positive: civil society is a guarantor of the national security of the state; on the other hand, tasks of the national security policy can become and are indicated as one of the most important threats to modern civil society itself\(^3\).

In order to disclose contradictions that emerge as the result of the interaction between civil society and state national security, it is necessary to analyze not only the determinants of this interaction, but also the essence of civil society itself. The analysis of the conceptions of civil society, civil consciousness, civil self-awareness and civil identity would help reveal the complexity and contradictoriness of civil society as a public and political phenomenon and also perceive the ambiguous relationship with the system of the national security of the state.

The Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Basics of National Security stipulates that “The system of Lithuania’s national security is based on the activities of the state institutions and participation of every citizen of Lithuania, on the open civil society, aware of the dangers and its responsibility, civic minded and prepared to defend the freedom of Lithuania”\(^4\). Human and citizen’s rights, freedoms and personal security are pointed out to be among the main objects of the national security, whereas citizens, their associations and organizations alongside the state and its institutions of national security and defence as well as other institutions as subjects for ensuring the national security. The Law has established a direct dependence between the national security system of Lithuania and Lithuania’s civil society; their interaction seems natural and self-explanatory and that constructs the integrity of relations between the national security policy of the democratic state and the creation and development of its civil society. Tasks of national security policy of the State in Lithuania are not directly associated with the threat to civil society and political activeness. Actual threats to the population of the country lie in the fact that, by participating in civil actions, they can lose their jobs, be treated as oddities in their neighbourhoods, be verbally attacked, slandered, suspected of self-serving stimulus in their actions or their lives can be threatened\(^5\). The identification of threats to civil consciousness indicates that the civil society of our country is only in the initial stage of its formation. Lithuania’s situation presupposes the actuality and conceptuality of the creation of civil society as the aim as well as the problem.

A versatile analysis of factors and processes of civil society formation is important for present-day researchers; however, the case of Lithuania makes it imperative to pay particular attention to the relationship and interaction between the civil society of the country and the national security system. In the discourse of problems of the Lithuanian civil society now under formation, we can single out two aspects: first, the attitude of the citizens to the issues of national security and defence; second, the role of the national security system in creating and developing civil society in the country. At present, the issues of national security and state defence are practically eliminated from the theoretical discourse of civil consciousness concept and active citizenship conception. In the insights presented by Lithuanian scientists, civil consciousness of the population is most often understood as their active involvement in the political life of the country, in the solution of social and economic problems, in the activity of communities, etc. In the program documents, submitted by civil organizations, the problems of the national security of the state are most often limited to the tasks of ensuring energy security. However, in the “Long-Term Program on Civil and National Development” approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, it is pointed out that civil consciousness is “awareness of the person’s rights, responsibility and obligations to the democratic State, activity for the good of society, defence of the rights, freedoms and democracy of co-citizens, striving for the welfare of Lithuania.” This definition of civil consciousness covers a very wide spectrum of civil activity of the population – including their participation in the solution of problems of national security and defence of the state. Therefore, it is not clear why tasks of ensuring the defence and security of the state are not integrated (ignored or simply forgotten?) into the conception of the activeness of Lithuanian citizens.

The aim of the article is to provide a theoretical survey of the interaction between the national security policy of the state and civil society, to disclose causes arising from the contradictions of this interaction, grounded on the analysis of the problematic nature of the development of the conception of civil society and civil consciousness and relations of the individual and collective identity of the personality within the context of the conception of civil identity.

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It is difficult to unambiguously define the concept of the national security of the state because both in the scientific literature and everyday-life discourse its interpretation is rather diverse. Traditionally, the conception of national security implies both the conception of safeguarding the sovereignty of the State by employing political, economic and military powers as well as the diplomatic capabilities of the country and its defensive means from the danger which also include defense from external adversaries and other threats and safeguarding of state secrets. However, as B. Buzan claims “the very nature of the security concept precludes from formulating its accurate definition” because it integrates in itself various phenomena (military, political, economic environment protection, etc.) of State and security life as well as different security levels (i.e. individual, national and international).

The national security of Lithuania is understood as the creation of conditions for a free and democratic development of the Nation and the State, the protection and defence of the independence of the State of Lithuania, its territorial integrity and constitutional order, whereas the national security system of Lithuania shall be the aggregate of approved for this purpose provisions, principles and forms of activities of the State and the citizens, measures, laws and other legal acts, as well as the institutions established by the State for this purpose, principles of their activity and means of their mutual interaction. The definition of the national security of Lithuania encompasses the level of national security and in essence focuses on the sectors of the state’s political and military life, i.e. where state institutions have established themselves the strongest. However, the conception of national security itself, developed in the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Basics of National Security, also covers other areas of the state and society life, i.e. economy, culture, ecology, demography, public order, etc. Long-term programmes of enhancing national security, approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (for example, ensuring environmental safety, rational use and protection of national resources, support for natural population growth, crime prevention and control, national program for fighting against corruption, protection of cultural heritage, etc.) reflect those problems of our country which are perceived as threats to the security of the existence of the Nation and the State. As David A. Baldwin claims, in contemporary society, national security interests are more often associated with states’ policy on issues of domestic and foreign policy than the very conception of national security and it is because of that that in solving national security

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issues priorities are granted to human rights, economic interests, criminality, social injustice, etc., but not to the traditional threat to national security — i.e. external military threats. This means that priorities of national security are determined by people or their groups according to the system of their values or taking into consideration the nature of threats to certain values.

One of the essential theoretical premises of the conception of national security should be the conception of values and hierarchy in terms of the person and the State. It is the values-related aspect of national security that is emphasized in both early definitions of national security which were formulated by Walter Lippmann, Arnold Wolfers, the National Security Council of the USA and later treatments by Amos Jordan and William Taylor. As early as fifty years ago, Arnold Wolfers pointed out that the concept of national security (like that of national interest) is very suitable in the political discourse of international relations to define the exclusiveness of political objectives. The scientist stressed the moral dilemma that politicians have to constantly solve in the political discourse of national security: the relation of national values that must be defended with fundamental values, such as freedom, justice and peace. Scientists Charles Andrain and Joseph Smith claim that the problem of values becomes particularly important from the point of view of the national security system of each state because states for which such values of democracy as tolerance, citizens’ rights and freedoms become priorities are much more resistant to external and internal threats since values consolidate society, presuppose respect and trust for state institutions of the country and strengthen its political system. Paul Bracken, while exploring the problematics of mutual relations between society and the military, states that the contradictoriness of the interaction between the USA civilian part of society and military personnel is determined by different value systems of these two parts of society, the compatibility of which is achieved by focusing attention on national values as a priority. Thus, it is possible to claim that values can consolidate society, by becoming the guarantor of the national security of the state, but can also divide it by becoming a threat to the national security system. Yet, it becomes undefined which of the values is the consolidating and which one the disintegrating factor; which values — universal, democratic or national — should

become values-related priorities in enhancing the national security system of the state. Therefore, the values-related issue in the national security system in essence becomes the issue of values-related priorities and at the same time a problem for enhancing the national security system of the country.

Essentially, the problematics of values-related priorities and values-related orientations is directly associated with the interaction between the national security and civil society because it can determine both the contradictoriness of their interests and their unanimity. From the theoretical point of view, if such values of modern civil society as respect, freedom, tolerance, justice and the like become priorities of the state (i.e. national values), there should not exist any contradictions between the interests of the national security system and civil society because national interests of the country and the interests of civil society should coincide. By the way, the main condition of this compatibility is a mature civil society. On the other hand, the declaration of obscure “national values” as priorities can become a perfect front for state authority institutions to cover narrow interests (private, corporal or of certain interests groups) under the umbrella of the defense of national security interests of the country. A legitimate question arises: what are national values, what is their relation to civil and individual values? Since value-related priorities are closely connected with tasks and objectives of the national security policy of the state and values-related orientations are one of the essential composite parts of both individual and personal identity, the conception of civil identity and its manifestation in contemporary society becomes very significant. The statement, claiming that at the clash of individual and collective identities, essential value-related differences determining contradictions between the civil society and the national security system are formed, can become an object of discussion. Philosophers, pedagogues, historians, psychologists, sociologists, representatives of political and other sciences present different definitions of identity. Identity is the expression of the individuality, property and exclusiveness of the personality, since each individual must himself construct his identity and its expression in terms of the family, society, state and the world. In the opinion of Peter Jarvis, identity, just as thinking, is a social construct acquired through experience. On the other hand, the phenomenon of identity cannot be perceived as something uniform, stable and constant because personalities construct their individual identities throughout their lives, and this process is affected by very diverse factors (national, social, religious, cultural, regional, professional, etc.). As Christopher Lasch points out, in contemporary society, identity features change, because both persons and things lose their definiteness.

and continuity. According to Martin Zilinek, in modern democratic society, national consciousness and the cultural identity of the nation can be interpreted only in a multicultural context, since the culture and national values of each nation naturally interact with other cultures and value-related systems of other nations. Thus, the identity of the modern individual is not the result of the personality, but that of the influence of identities of various social groups (ethnic, national, state, continental). It is the interaction of the latter that should be treated as the civilization of humankind.

In the opinion of Manuel Castells, identity categories can be divided into two groups: imposed and created. The former have historical and geographic roots. The latter are created in the process of constructing a social action while seeking spirituality and meaning. Material for constructing identity is supplied by history, geography, biology, production and reproduction institutions, collective memory and personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations. Individuals process these materials and rearrange their meaning according to social definitions that “make up the basis of the system of their own structure as well as space and time.” Gellner, while analyzing modern civil society and its connections with civil society of the ancient city and other forms of its historical development, emphasizes that one of the essential features of modern civil society lies in the conception of individual identity: the identity of the modern individual has been chosen and not imposed/ascribed.

Describing modern society as a network society, Castells claims that at the end of the 20th century, as a balance for globalization and cosmopolitanism processes, the world saw an explosion of a wave of massive numbers of cultural identities, which gave birth to the ambiguous interaction of state institutions, social movements and different identity forms. Castells, emphasizing the influence of collective identity on modern political processes, provides the insight that the content and meaning of collective identity for the shaping of individual identity determine the nature and aims of the factors constructing it. The scientist points out the forms of the creation of modern identity, i.e. the legitimizing identity, the resistance identity, the project identity.

Dominant institutions of society, having the aim to expand and rationalize their domination over social actors, introduce legitimizing identity. The author points out that on the basis of legitimizing identity civil society is established which is named as the aggregate of organizations and systematized and organized social actors which reproduces identity rationalizing sources of structural do-

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24 Castells M., (note 22) p. 18.
mination. Resistance identity “is construction of defense identity with reference to dominant institutions and ideologies when the value-related solution is granted a contrary meaning and at the same time borders are strengthened”26. The identity in question stimulates the establishment of communities based on collective responsibility. Social actors, on the basis of project identity, arising from community resistance and using all culturally available resources, shape a new identity, defining their status in society, and at the same time seeking to transform the whole social structure. Supporting Gramsci’s conception of the dual nature of civil society, Castells sees in institutional identity an interaction between the power of the state and institutions of civil society, whereas in the resistance identity he finds what separates these institutions. However, the scientist states that in network society institutional identity has been struck by a fundamental crisis and project identity, arising from resistance, is becoming dominant. The new collective identity is shaped by dissociating itself from both civil society and state institutions. Castells’s conception seeks to substantiate the hypothetical idea that in the contemporary world the conception of civil society is losing its traditional cultural, social and local definition. However, additionally, the mentioned civil identity theory discloses the mutual interaction mechanism of civil society and the state: civil consciousness, as the expression of individual and collective identity, is affected by two identity forms – legitimizing and resistance. Therefore, civil society as a counter to the power of the state is determined by objective differences (social, cultural, political, religious, etc.) of these two identities.

Having summarized the supplied theoretical insights, it is possible to state that the concept of national security in scientific literature is not sufficiently defined and implies many contradictions and problems. Yet, at the same time it is possible to claim that the State is the primary national security object27. However, the system of the national security of the state is an inherent part of its political system since, as has been mentioned before, the state with its national security, defense and other institutions and citizens of the state constitute an aggregate of the holistic national security system and integral subject-object interaction. Nonetheless, the issue of value-related priorities is capable of destroying that integrity and creating favorable conditions for the realization of various threats.

2. Integration of Civil Society and the State in the Discourse of Traditional Theories

Differences of value-related orientations and complex mechanisms of the formation of civil identity cannot completely explain the contradictoriness

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26 Ibid, p. 25.
in the activity objectives of the national security system and civil society. In order to perceive the relationship between civil society and the national security system of the State, it would first of all be necessary to find out its relationship with the state political system and its institutions. In the development of the European civilization, this relationship has kept changing, as by the way, the very conception of civil society and civil consciousness.

Aristotle formulated the initial concept of civil society as the idea of political community, i.e. koinonia politike – a society of free, equal citizens who have influence on the management of the state. The identifying of civil society with political community is not accidental: each citizen of Ancient Greece identified himself with the state, its political, social, economic, and cultural life. In his conception Aristotle grants the idea of political society not only political, but at the same time also an ethnic meaning because political communities consider the establishment of harmonious and just social environment by employing powers of state institutions and laws as the objective of their activity. John M. Cooper provides the insight that Aristotle’s “politike koinonia” should also be analyzed as “politike philia”, which is understood as a special feeling of communality, political friendship (or partnership) and solidarity without which a results-bearing political activity in the state and success of the political community are impossible. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato emphasize that “politike koinonia” is a unique example of collective community (or joint organization) in which striving towards separate objectives is based on the communal ethos. Thus, we can state that Aristotle’s conception of civil consciousness covers the amassed political operation of all community members for the benefit and good of the whole community (and at the same time of each individual), paying attention to the fact that the individual is not excluded from the whole community.

In Ancient Rome, the conception of civil society and concept of civil consciousness changed: it was begun to identify civil society with public affairs by separating them from private, family ones. The concept “societas civilis”, introduced by Cicero, though being the Latin translation of Aristotle’s “politike koinonia”, is identified with “res publika” and is defined as a “multitude of people, having a unanimous opinion of legal norms and common interests, a gathering”. These changes were determined by transformations that had taken place in the outlook of the individual and social changes in the life of the state (i.e. the separation of individual life from the public one). Cicero bases the conception of civil society on the feeling of communality which is characteristic of people and makes them curb their individual, often egotistical interests, for the good of the whole community. Thus, Cicero was the first in


29 Cohen J. L., Arato A. Civil Society and Political Theory, USA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994, p. 84.

30 Ciceronas, Apie valstybę, see Filosofijos istorijos chrestomatija, Vilnius: Mintis, 1977, p. 430.
the European tradition to identify civil consciousness with communal interests by opposing them to the personal aims of individual activity, yet meanwhile perceiving civil society as the organization of individuals and their groups coordinating, with the help of laws and state institutions, individual interests for the good of communal ones. Notwithstanding this “separation”, in Cicero’s conception, the state itself is not separated from civil society and, in essence, these concepts are identified as the same because state institutions had to solve communal (i.e. “public”) affairs. Thus, in this respect, Cicero remains faithful to Aristotle’s conception of civil society\^{31}: and the concepts *politike koinonia* and *societas civilis* imply both the state and society, thus determining the unity of civil and political society.

In the Middle Ages, the problem of society was not given much attention; however, the growing socio-political separation among state institutions, the governing elite and the major part of society made thinkers seek answers to questions regarding the legitimacy and morality of state institutions. Representatives of Christian philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Nicolaus Cusanus), trying to substantiate the relationship between the authorities and society guided themselves by the standpoint that the state with its political institutions is an unquestionable given and a “natural expression of human morale”\^{32} which predetermined the conception of civil consciousness as loyalty to the authorities. Thinkers of the Middle Ages, though trying very hard to retain the ancient tradition of the unity of the state and civil society, gave a stimulus for the development of the philosophical, social and political thought while looking for answers to questions about the relationship of the state and society and developing the idea of civil society construction.

The modern era was notable for the breakthrough in natural sciences, huge changes in production, political and social life that in their own turn determined new reflections on the idea of civil society. The premises of the existence of a transcendental state were not a sufficient basis for new socio-political and economic realities; therefore, thinkers (Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Emile Durkheim, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, etc.) tried to understand the essence of the relations between the state and society while analyzing the origin of the individual and the state and the dimension of their mutual relations. Supporters of the conception of social agreement (social contract) were the first to separate civil society from the state attributing to both the functions of social and political life regulator: the function of state institutions is to normalize the life of community members vertically, whereas the function of civil society is to arrange the relations among people horizontally. According to Hobbes, the nature of the state is natural, just as the nature of the rights and freedoms of each separate individual, because the main function of state institutions is to restrict the latter for the sake of the objectives of peace and

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common defense. In Locke’s view, to prevent abuse of power against society members, civil society is indispensable as a counter to state institutions. The philosopher identifies civil society with political community whose activity aim is restriction of political powers of state authorities. Regarding human civil rights as inherent and identifying civil society with political community, thinkers of the Enlightenment epoch perceived civil consciousness as a natural human political activity, restricting egotistical interests of individuals and the excessive authority of institutions for the benefit of the overall good. It should be pointed out that Hobbes was among the first philosophers to bring attention to the aspect of the relationship between state security and civil society, giving priority to the former (i.e. state security and defense matters) as a reflection of common interests of society (also, the affairs of civil society itself).

The new development stage of the conception of civil society is related to G.W.F. Hegel’s and Alex de Tocqueville’s scientific insights. These thinkers identify civil society with a new development stage of Western civilization (i.e. the paradigm of liberalism and democratic state), entirely separating it from the conception of the functions of state power institutions and political society. Tocqueville saw civil society as a community defending private business interests and public matters within the boundaries of civil law and he treated political society as the defender of general interests of the state and the whole society. Analyzing the interaction between political and civil society, he is aware of the mutual influence and interaction of the activity of these two forms of society organization: civil society facilitates the activity of political associations, while political society strengthens the positions of civil organizations and communities within society. Hegel singled out three activity segments and areas of interest of modern society, i.e. family, civil society and state. He rejected the synonymy of political community and civil society characteristic of the ancient tradition, relating the preconditions of the formation of the latter to the changes in modern society, i.e. with market economy demands and ambitions of individuals to better satisfy their needs, seeing within that harmonization of the principles of individualism and universalism. In Hegel’s opinion, as a phenomenon of modern society, civil society is an association whose members share common activity with the intention of satisfying their private individual needs, at the same time restraining their individual egoism for the sake of common interests. In the philosopher’s conception, civil society is regarded as the basis for the politico-economic system and a connecting segment between “polis” (national state) and “oikos” (family).

Hegel’s conception of civil society was developed in the theories of Karl

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Marx and Antonio Gramsci, where the dividing line between the two structural types of modern society – civil and political – was still more radically defined. Marx determined civil society as a form of a public system which depends on the development of production forces and production relations as well as the level of consumption, and he pointed out that the political state depends on civil society. Emphasizing the economic determination of civil society as a social phenomenon, Marx claims that it is the basic phenomenon of society life and, at the same time, he separates it from the superstructure, i.e. the state. Gramsci grounds his conception of civil society on criticism of the conception of the traditionally formed state, claiming that the state cannot be regarded as a merely legal and political formation. In his conception, the state is a combination of two social forms – political and civil – as well as also a result of historic interaction and of organic unity and opposition. The statement by Francesco Guicciardini that for the existence of the state two vitally important things are necessary, i.e. the armed forces and the church, which, according to Gramsci, may be interpreted in different ways: as force and agreement, state and church, politics and morality, law and freedom, etc., and as political society and civil society. It means that if political society (its conception includes not only bodies of state power, but also its political institutions and the legal system) is formed and functions on a coercive basis, then civil society is a matter of consent. Gramsci’s conception of civil society encompasses all forms of private, “non-state” public life (i.e. family, education system, trade unions, etc.) and eliminates the Hegelian civil society associations with market economy and production relations. In Gramsci’s view, civil society comprises the basis of modern political society because a modern state may function and implement its political objectives and tasks only with the help of the institutions of civil society (i.e. not only force, but also agreement is necessary). Some researchers find a certain contradiction in this conception of civil society: according to Eugeniush Gorsky, the relations of the Gramsci civil and political society are intertwined in too complicated a way and his conception of civil consciousness also presupposes the political nature of an individual, encompassing the conscious activity of an individual and his participation in the political life of the state and also becoming of a citizen as part of the state. It should be pointed out that this contradiction can be seen not only in Gramsci’s, but also other thinkers’ (Durkheim, Hobbes, Lock, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tocqueville, etc.) concepts: attempts to separate political and civil societies inevitably encounter their mutual ties, influence and interaction.

Having summarized the early conceptions of civil society, we can claim

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that the traditional conception of civil society implies a holistic approach to the personality as a person, citizen, politician, member of a community and society. Such attitude determines the unity of society and state interests. It means that in the absence of difference between civil society and political society, there is no contradiction or conflict between the national security system and civil society: all state matters (including threats to it) are regarded as representation and defense of the interests of citizens. When reflecting on the changed socio-political situation, the thinkers of the Enlightenment epoch were searching for the dividing line between the state and civil society. The separation of the latter from the political one inspired the thinkers and researchers to analyze the interaction of civil society, as a social institute, with state institutions and state policy and, consequently, with the national security system.

3. The Discourse on the Conception of Modern Civil Society

Historical practice shows that with the change in social conditions, the concept of civil society and civil consciousness also changes. Reflecting on the historical experience of theoretical development, the modern conception of civil society and civil consciousness shows the widest spectrum of attitudes. Civil society and civil consciousness have been studied in the context of both political and social theories, emphasizing both personal identity and behavior and the relationship of these phenomena with state institutions and political phenomena. Although the historically formed essential conceptions of civil society in modern science have acquired new theoretical insights, the traditional dilemma of the politicality vs. non-politicality of civil society remains most urgent to researchers.

Ernest Gellner claims that civil society is becoming theoretically more real than democracy. In his view, the conception of civil society includes the aggregate of different non-governmental institutions which are strong enough to counterbalance the state, but only as long as it does not prevent it from fulfilling its role of a peacekeeper and arbitrator of the interests of the majority of society. Gellner considers modern society as the preventer of state dominance and society division, at the same time the indicator of the limitation of political and social impact of this measure.41

In his analysis of the peculiarities of socio-political relations in industrial society, Ralf Dahrendorf stresses that the relations between state economic powers and political institutions are entwined in a very complicated way. Analyzing the particularities of social relations in industrial society, he points to production relations as prevailing and emphasizes their authoritarian cha-

acter. In Dahrendorf’s opinion, modern political society is constructed according to the analogue of production relations. He claims that political society is analogous to industry according to the number of influenced individuals, the character of the influence and the intensity of the effect. He identifies political society with the state, at the same time separating it from civil society. Being one of the key representatives of the conception of “social conflict”, Dahrendorf denies the functionalist theories of “social equilibrium” and notes that modern (i.e. industrial) civil society is a community of non-state institutions and organizations whose activity is aimed against state institutions and also against political society.

David Harvey maintains that under conditions of neo-liberalism, the movement of non-governmental organizations is growing, expanding, creating an integral organism oppositional to state powers which is called “civil society”, and which gives the illusion of being a power plant of political and social transformations. According to Harvey, within the conception of civil society, wide scope non-governmental movements are trying to fight against the ruling political parties, state institutions, seeking, at the same time, to retain the dimension of sociality (i.e. non-politicality), thus losing the relevance of their role and their importance in the solution of political problems and social matters.

Continuing and developing Hobbes’ conception of civil society, Robert David Putnam points out that when people start cooperating without any coercion, they join together by common interests. He maintains that belonging to civil society primarily implies active participation in public matters. However, Putnam supports Toqueville’s idea that civil society strengthens rather than weakens a democratic state: the activeness of citizens and public organizations enforces state institutions and the government to comply with the value system of the democratic state, and take decisions which reflect the interests of the majority of society. In this way, civil society becomes both an objective of individuals and a political tool.

According to Alasdair C. MacIntyre, members of civil society are united not only by common interests, but also by common moral values. It is from the definition of the conception of civil consciousness in a definite community that the perception of justice arises, based on which concrete requirements for political institutions are set. MacIntyre claims that it is imperative for civil society to have confidence in power. Taking a decision and choosing one variant from

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several alternatives, a member of civil society must have sufficient information about strong, weak and problematic sides of the possible alternatives.\textsuperscript{48}

The conception of the integrity of civil and political societies is expanded by Terence H. McLaughlin’s theory of the perception of citizenship where four features of the content of the conception of citizenship are distinguished: individual identity; virtues required by citizenship; political involvement expected from the individual; social prerequisites necessary for effective citizenship.\textsuperscript{49} The range of the features varies from minimal to maximal expressions of the concept’s features. In the minimalist view, identity is regarded from a merely formal, legal, juridical viewpoint. In the maximalist view, identity is a far wider concept perceived in social, cultural and psychological aspects, because a citizen must perceive himself as a member of the existing community with a shared democratic culture, duties, responsibility and rights, a sense of the common good, fraternity, etc. In the minimalist view, virtues, e.g. loyalty, responsibility, are primarily interpreted as being, by their nature, in a definite place at a definite time. By contrast, in the maximalist view, a citizen is required to have a broader perception of loyalty and responsibility; virtues are extended to more general and universal perceptions, such as justice, equality, employment, so as to create better social conditions for all citizens. Political activeness, as one of the manifestations of citizenship, in the minimalist view, regards a citizen as a private individual who is required to vote wisely, whereas the maximalist view gives priority to active participation of a citizen in the democratic process. According to the minimalist view, a guarantee of formal legal status is sufficient for social prerequisites. In the maximalist view, different forms of social problems should be taken into account in pursuing the ideals of equality and the good. Thus, according to McLaughlin, the maximalist conception of civil consciousness which requires a citizen to have a comprehensive understanding of democratic principles, values and rules, willingness and ability to participate in the political processes of the democratic state, implies, in essence, that civil society is identified with political society.

Having surveyed various conceptions of civil society, a wide spectrum of opinions and major trends of the conception of interrelations of civil and political societies can be seen. Scientists of the postmodern epoch follow, in essence, the theoretical attitudes which were formed during the Enlightenment epoch and later became traditional: civil society is regarded as an aggregate of a wide activity spectrum (ranging from economic to cultural matters), encompassing non-state organizations and various associations, reflecting common interests of separate individuals and acting against the dominance of state institutions in the democratic state. McLaughlin, Putnam and MacIntyre tend to treat modern civil society as an integral segment of a postmodern democratic state, at the same time identifying it with political society. The position of the mentioned

scientists envisages active participation of citizens in all political decisions of state matters, thus determining the non-contradictoriness between the interests of civil society and the national security system. A very strict definition of civil society as nonpolitical society is characteristic of the conceptions by Gellner, Dahrendorf, and Harvey. The conception of civil society as an opponent of state power institutions might presuppose its separation from the state political system and, consequently, from the national security system. However, the supporters of the conception of “non-politicality” of civil society do not dissociate from the determination of the political activity of civil movements and organizations. Thus, tackling the dilemma of “politicality vs. non-politicality”, civil society conceptions do not offer an adequate explanation of the causes of the opposition between civil society and the national security system of the state.

Developing the theories of Hobbes and Locke and providing conceptual insights into the issues of modern state and national security, Barry Buzan analyses the problems of national security within the discourse of the relationship between state and personal security. Buzan emphasizes the fact that the contradiction between individual and national security is unavoidable, because this contradiction is rooted in the very nature of the state and individual relations: implementing the role of a representative of collective interest and a regulator of socio-political life, the state becomes both a guarantor of individual security and, at the same time, a source of a threat to individual security. On the other hand, in Buzan’s opinion, an individual himself may become a guarantor of state national security and a source of threat to it. Buzan does not directly analyze the problem of the relationship between national security and civil society; however he claims that “it is possible for individuals to set up or join organizations of many kinds aimed at improving their security”, which “can be political in nature, working as pressure groups on governments and trying to turn state policy in directions more conducive to the security needs of the individuals involved”. Thus, according to Buzan, individual security is supplemented by an additional level of collective interest which, interposing itself between the individual and the state, involves in the domestic model of security not only polarization between the individual and state, but also their reciprocal interaction. A link with the conception of civil society can be seen in the conception of Buzan’s “level of collective interest”. The researcher’s position implies the necessity of politicality of civil society as a representative of the collective interest and does not oppose it to its state power institutions. In Buzan’s view, social organizations should be treated as representatives of collective interests of separate individuals, as an intermediary between an individual and the state in the area of the implementation of national security policy goals. Additionally, Buzan identifies the level of interest of individual security guarantee with the collective one; however, he identifies social (i.e.

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51 Ibid., p. 88.
civil) organizations but not the state and its institutions as a representative of the collective interest. This attitude not only implies dissociation between an individual and state, but also presupposes the opposition of civil society (as a representative of individual interests and a guarantor of individual security) to state institutions (which are identified with a representative and defender of national security interests).

In the academic discourse of Lithuania, the paradigm of civil society is analyzed within the context of political science (Vaidutis Laurėnas, Saulius Šiliauskas, Jolanta Palidauskaitė, Mindaugas Degutis, etc.), sociology (Romualdas Grigas, Anelė Vosyliūtė, etc.), philosophy, cultural science and educology (Bronislovas Bitinas, Irena Zaleskienė, etc.). In the academic discourse of Lithuania, the conception of civil society is based on the analysis of the relationship between an individual and the state.

In the opinion of some researchers, civil society, its formation and development in Lithuania is closely related to the processes of the formation of the national state; therefore, the conception of civil consciousness is tightly connected with the manifestation of nationality and patriotism in the world outlook of an individual and his development process. Libertas Klimka holds the opinion that civil consciousness stems from a spiritual bond with the native place that gave a person his life, native language, primary socialization and cultural medium. Meilė Lukšienė offers a definition where civil consciousness means seeking a compromise between an individual and the state which in certain forms enables him to live within a big community and retain cultural identity. Other scientists (Alfonsas Vaišvila) voice an attitude which more closely corresponds with the contemporary context and argue that contemporary civil consciousness implies consciousness and involvement of a citizen in the creation of national state institutions, using them, adjusting them to the protection of his rights and needs, and a voluntary commitment to his state as to the common good. In Grigas’ opinion, civil consciousness is hardly conceivable without national consciousness; therefore, participation in the creation process of the nation, the consolidation of nationalism and civil consciousness as well as expression of these features constitute an essential part of the meaning of human existence. The discourse on the harmony between civil consciousness and nationality is reflected in the Long-Term Program on Civil and National Development, approved by the Seimas of Lithuania, where civil consciousness is defined as “a person’s perception of his rights, responsibility and duties in a democratic state, activity for the good of society, defense of the democracy

of co-citizens’ rights and freedoms, seeking well-being for Lithuania.” Such scientific discourse presupposes the unity between civil society and state.

In the opinion of other researchers, the new geopolitical situation of Lithuania and new global processes in the international arena prevent the harmony between nationality and civil consciousness, open up new aspects of the conception of civil society. According to Zaleskiene, the relationship between a concrete citizen and the state, as a key component of civil consciousness, is disappearing because states are losing clearly defined boundaries, new integral formations are emerging and, therefore, civil consciousness is perceived in too narrow a sense. Vaidutis Laurenas claims that the rise and development of civil society in Lithuania may be characterized by contradictoriness, i.e. non-politicality vs. politicality, systematicity vs. non-systematicity, consolidation vs. fragmentation, locality vs. globality. Although the researcher states that political coordination of civil society cannot be centralized and state-dependent, he believes that the emergence of the political component of civil society is necessary since “separation between civil society and the state does not offer a greater chance for their interaction and, consequently, for the modernization of the two.” In his opinion, in the conditions of modern globalization, nationalism, as a foundation of civil society, is insufficient because in Lithuania nationalism primarily stimulated anti-systematicity of civil society and lessened the role of the state in the process of its formation.

The paradigm of civil society prevailing in Lithuania presupposes the unity between civil society and the state, which, in its turn, determines the common interests of civil society and the national security system. Such scientific discourse does not offer an explanation for the occurring contradictions. However, the analysis of the conception of civil society made by Laurenas could lead to the assumption that the genesis of the contradictions between civil society and the national security system lies in the political system of the state, i.e. the contradiction which occurs while distinguishing between political power institutes and goals and the manifestation of the activity of civil society.

The theoretical insights presented in the chapter presuppose the questions: If social (or civil) organizations defend collective interests of citizens of the state, then whose interests do state power institutions defend? Is state national security a collective interest of all citizens (or the majority) or is it a collective matter of state institutes? No comprehensive answers to these questions have been presented. It may be ascertained that contemporary scientific theories have not gone far from Hobbes and Locke’s ideas related to the state, civil society and national security. A boundary between a civil community and
state institutions, though theoretically substantiated, in contemporary global society has no longer sufficient grounds to account for the differences in value orientations, conflict of interest and contradictoriness in activity goals. The world has become too complicated and multifaceted, whereas individual and social relations have intertwined too much. Therefore, it is difficult to identify all the factors affecting the interrelation between civil society and the national security system; likewise, it is difficult to determine civil society itself as well as the concept, goals and tasks of the state security system.

Final Remarks

The theoretical insights presented in the article suggest that the conception of civil society and civil consciousness is pluralistic, not combinable into one definition, tolerating interests of different layers of society and granting them the right to express their political and social attitudes and ideas as well as participation in the country’s life and state management. Comparative historical analysis proves that the theories of civil society and civil consciousness encompass a wide range of viewpoints, attitudes and actions from conscious identification with the state or community to the involvement in its political and social processes expressed by a positive or negative action. Notably, although various theoretical trends emphasize different elements of the phenomenon of civil consciousness, they do not deny the importance of other theoretical trends.

As a social phenomenon, having become a reality of postmodernism, civil society remains an object of contemporary scientific discussion: under the conditions of pluralism, the definitions of civil society have acquired new theoretical reflections, retaining the traditional controversial attitude to its relationship with political society and the state.

The contradictoriness of the interests of civil society and the national system of the state may be explained by the controversial conception of civil society. However, the genesis and development of civil society does not reveal the main differences between the state policy pursued by the institutional state governing apparatus and the interests of civil communities and movements. It can be stated that civil society is political in both its goals (to represent and defend common interests of the people of the state, democratic system, universal human values, etc.) and the character of its activity (civil activity is, in essence, political like that of state power institutions). This viewpoint might also presuppose the unity of interests between civil society and state national security.

The analysis of the conception of civil identity is also an insufficient basis to maintain that the interests of national security and civil society are incompatible. Since contemporary identity is multifaceted, composed of many components, variable, capable of being a matter and result of personal choice,
open, susceptible to different external effects and modern society has become so complicated that it is impossible to retain a single identity in it, the civil identity of an individual may become the main identity, uniting all members of society and their groups. To this end, the interaction between civil organizations and state institutions is necessary.

As a political phenomenon of the tradition of ancient democracy and the republican system, civil consciousness presupposes a constructive interest of state power institutions in further development and expansion of civil society. Dealing with practical everyday problems and controlling the authorities, contemporary society forms the aggregate of fairly strong groups to counterbalance the dominance of the state, to represent and defend the interests of individuals and social groups, including the issues related to individual and collective security. Cooperation between civil society and state institutions in a democratic state may be based on common national security interests of the state.

However, state institutions, pursuing their own narrow interests, often try to control civil initiatives and the activity of civil communities, which leads to distancing and self-distancing of the latter from political power and political activity. The de-politicization of civil society is a dangerous phenomenon: on the one hand, in this way civil society becomes a source of threat to the state itself, its power institutions and the national security system; on the other hand, confining of the activity of civil society to merely economic, social, cultural and similar communal interests becomes a threat to civil society itself because it creates distrust in the very essence of the conception of civil consciousness.

Contemporary civil society is not an opposition to democratic power institutions nor is it a loyal element of the political system. Civil society is an autonomous and integral part of the political system of the democratic state.

Vilnius, October-November 2010