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Preface

“The Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2002” is the first scientific study of the Strategic Research Center. This center was established by the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University on 19 December 2001. Though there had been much talk in Lithuania about the necessity to encourage the establishment of the so-called “think-tanks” that could perform continuous and systematic analysis of national security issues and supply professional evaluation of the most acute problems, it was only at the end of 2001 that finally this idea was successfully implemented.

In presenting this publication to the readers, it should be first of all pointed out that the main purpose of the study is to provide the readers with a wide-scale analysis and generalization of the changes, essential and significant, for the national security of Lithuania at international–systemic, regional and national levels. The book also aims to give maximum emphasis to the specificity of Lithuanian national security issues and comprehensively presenting them to a widely interested and concerned audience. The idea by our famous geographer, Kazys Pakštys, is widely known and frequently cited: ”as Switzerland is characterized by high mountains, Italy – by works of art, Finland – by lakes, so Lithuania should be called a country that is very dangerous for a small nation to live in”. The publication in question has tried to move a step further and discuss what that idea means today, and still, more importantly, what actions should be taken to at least bridle this problem if not to settle it.

It should also be kept in mind that the authors and editors guided themselves by the modern concept of strategic security studies. Following the decades of the Cold War the attitude that the assurance of the national security of each state was considered the function of its military power as an axiom in international relations was replaced by a new one. The decline of the importance of power struggle determined that military security dimension was decreasing, however the aspects of political, ecological and even individual security were in fact increasing. The changed reality could do all but affect the nature of academic security studies. Considering traditional strategic studies have analyzed military and defensive dimensions, these studies have taken a new shape in which the role of military aspects are now a part of a multidimensional approach.

Certainly, both common global development tendencies of the international security system and the current issues of the Lithuanian national security during the last decade have stimulated the appearance of numerous interesting and valuable publications. However, in spite of relevance and importance, Lithuanian national security has been analyzed as if by fits and starts, failing to find a mean which could guarantee systematic and continuous research work to bring about the best results. The existing gap within the strategic studies of Lithuania hard be filled by “The Annual Lithuanian Strategic Review”, which from now will be published in Lithuanian and English.

This circumstance makes it possible to expect the Strategic Research Center
to become a continually and productively operating scientific research institution assembling “scattered” intellectual resources for creative work.

Finally, it is a pleasure that the first object of the analysis and the strong point of “The Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review” began 2002, a year very important in the history of Lithuania. It was this year that Lithuania, having received the long-awaited and hard-sought after invitations to join NATO and the European Union, found itself closer than ever before to the implementation of its strategic foreign and security policy objectives. This is undoubtedly reflected in the scientific studies and analyses presented in this book.

_Vilnius, January 2003_

_Editorial Board_
Membership of NATO is the Impulse for Reforms

At the meeting of the leaders of NATO states, Lithuania, together with a group of countries of Central and Eastern Europe, was invited to start negotiations regarding membership of this Alliance. Certainly, this is appreciation of our long work – we can be happy and proud of our achievements, but we also have to understand that after Prague we will have to do even more. Before the meeting in Prague, we were a reliable partner, after it, we will also have to become a reliable ally. The evaluation of our achieved progress will be based on different criteria.

I said several times and will repeat it in the future that after the invitation, we are going to face hard work. Although the invitation ends up a difficult stage that required a lot of effort, it also means the beginning of another stage – a more complicated one, but certainly more interesting and requiring a lot of responsibility. I have no doubts that we are well prepared to accept all the obligations related to NATO membership.

Our task – becoming a good ally – becomes even more complicated because NATO is in the process of transformation, and this transformation changes the security system of the country and enforces new requirements for the armed forces. All the issues discussed at the Prague summit fall into three main groups: new members, new relationships and new capabilities. All the three aspects have a big influence upon Lithuania’s policy.

The admission of new states into this organisation will further strengthen the role of NATO in the world. Lithuania and other invited states will come to NATO with actual economic, social and defensive potential, new thinking and ideas about various aspects of the European defence and security policy that they will stand for as members of NATO and the EU.

The invitation to NATO is not the end of the integration into the Alliance – strengthening of security is a continuous process, not a finite act. The consideration of defence policy perspectives of Lithuania as a NATO member must first of all involve international security environment after this stage of enlargement. NATO membership is not only a positive evaluation of our reforms but also a stimulus for further change of our defence system taking due consideration of the reality of our geopolitical position.

There are no doubts that NATO membership will definitely influence relationships of Lithuania with other NATO members as well as the EU and CIS states at
the same time providing stability and confidence in the erratic world. At the moment, the attention of the world focuses on the new threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, non-controlled migration, etc. These threats require a new attitude towards them and new capabilities for fighting them. NATO is undergoing transformation and will become a different organisation with new missions and new models of co-operation.

In the face of new threats security became even more related to the development of co-operation, confidence and dialogue. Therefore, we have to further follow open and transparent attitude towards security and defence co-operation in the Baltic region as well as in other regions. The stability and security of the Baltic region has no sense if it does not contribute to the strengthening of European, Euro-Atlantic and global security in the broader sense.

It is evident that Lithuania as a small country with limited economic and demographic resources is not able to implement its foreign and security policy globally alone. This does not mean that Lithuania must not or cannot seek for the role of a regional state. There are two main requirements for this: the first is a rational and pragmatic foreign and security policy, with most effective utilisation of the existing national and public resources for the implementation of national interests; the second is international security environment favourable to Lithuania and respective adaptation of Lithuania to the changing circumstances.

The long-term state development strategy sets out an ambitious goal of becoming the leader of the region. This means playing a more active role in strengthening the security and stability in Europe.

**New members – new relationships**

The decision to enlarge NATO was not the only one passed at the meeting in Prague. One of the most important aspects that was stressed during the summit was new relationships with partners. It was decided to develop stronger relationships of a higher quality, and a set of measures for the strengthening of partnership was introduced within the framework of both the Council Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the Mediterranean dialogue, not forgetting the NATO-Russian Council as well as the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Lithuania, being the leader of a successful initiative, – the Vilnius ten group – speaks up for a versatile co-operation with partners in the existing as well as new forums.

The determined and well considered policy of Lithuania in respect of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine, also Lithuania’s readiness to share its experience of the integration and development of democracy with the Caucasus and Central Asia states that are starting to open to the West with the aim of encouraging those states to further develop relationships with the democratic world, will be Lithuania’s successive and continuous contribution to the increasing stability in Europe and outside of it.

Initiatives involving the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia into relationships based on co-operation are especially appreciated. Lithuania is ready to share its experience gained during co-operation projects with the interested states.

Due to the ten years of experience of the Baltic States military co-operation, we have functioning projects and mechanisms for strengthening trust and security.
This is a basis strong enough for further development of new and strengthening of old relations with countries of other regions. For a long time we were receivers of foreign support. Now it is our turn to share our knowledge and experience gained due to the co-operation with other interested states and regions.

As it was mentioned above, we come to NATO not only with our capabilities. Lithuania’s efforts to develop security and military co-operation projects and experience in implementing them will also become part of our contribution to NATO. Our advantage is a well-developed security and military co-operation with many NATO and partner states.

For example, we can mention our participation in the Germany-Poland-Denmark military co-operation triangle; strategic partnership with the USA and Poland, bilateral co-operation with many other states. Projects of military co-operation with Estonia and Latvia supported by the international community deserve extra attention. The whole complex of projects, including BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL, along with the Lithuanian-Polish battalion will form a part of NATO military structures.

Our dialogue with Russia and Belarus aims at enforcing transparency and predictability of relationships with a special focus on the implementation of confidence and security building measures. Priority is given to real work and actions that will develop into greater initiatives later on. Lithuania plans to take an active part in the NATO-Russia Council, and develop bilateral co-operation.

Lithuania has special relations with Kaliningrad region, and successful development of the latter is of special interest to Lithuania. Instability in Kaliningrad region would cause neighbouring countries including Lithuania serious problems associated with smuggling, organised crime, uncontrolled flows of migration and pollution. During the last several years, Lithuania managed to present co-operation with Kaliningrad region as an example of good relations between Lithuania as a EU/NATO state on the one side and Russia that develops closer and closer relations with these organisations on the other.

As regards Lithuania’s relations with Russia, Lithuania took the initiatives that corresponded to its strategy, i.e. to transfer relations between Kaliningrad and Lithuania to a higher level of quality. One of the most important projects to be mentioned was the Nida Initiative (2000) aimed at turning Kaliningrad into a region participating in the regional policy of the EU. This initiative included co-operation projects in a variety of fields ranging from education and culture, to business and investments. Lithuania is the biggest foreign investor in Kaliningrad region and the second state by the number of joint enterprises. Priorities of the co-operation with Kaliningrad region are the co-operation of border protection units, projects related to transport and infrastructure.

The second important element that helps to increase security and stability is the promotion of arms control and weapon non-proliferation. Lithuania understands arms control and non-proliferation as a prerequisite for ensuring international and national security, and signed the most important international treaties regarding arms control and non-proliferation (e.g. the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Chemical Weapons, etc.).

Lithuania considers the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty, as an important arms control and confidence and security-building regi-
me that contributes to the security and stability in Europe. In his speech at the summit of the OSCE that took place in Istanbul in 1999, the President of the Republic of Lithuania V. Adamkus said that Lithuania was considering the possibility of becoming a party of the treaty in case the terms of accession meet our national interests. Lithuania’s determination to join the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe when it comes into effect and becomes open to all the democratic states of Europe was once again expressed by the President of Lithuania in his speech at the 57th session of the General Assembly of the UN in September 2002.

Also, Lithuania does not directly relate its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and accession to the adapted CFE treaty. NATO made an official declaration that accession of candidate states to the CFE treaty is not a condition for their admission to the Alliance.

The terms of the future accession of Lithuania to the adapted CFE treaty should not prevent the development of the Armed Forces of our state and hinder interoperability with NATO. Lithuania will seek for non-discriminative membership in the CFE. After the enforcement of the adapted treaty, we will hold consultations with all the parties to the treaty and will be prepared to consider acceptable decisions regarding the terms of membership. Now Lithuanian experts are working to prepare for the practical implementation of the obligations of the treaty in accordance with the requirements of the CFE.

In 2002, Lithuania submitted its request for joining one more important instrument of arms control – the Open Skies Treaty. Expressing its will to join this treaty, Lithuania demonstrated its willingness to strengthen the confidence and security in the region.

The third important principle of Lithuania’s security policy is undivided security. On the basis of this principle, Lithuania contributes to international peacekeeping efforts in conflict regions. Since 1994, more than 1,000 Lithuanian military personnel have participated in the NATO-led, UN, OSCE peace operations in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo. Future plans of Lithuania include the expansion of the participation geography as well as the number of participants in peacekeeping operations. Only participation in international operations with partners and contribution to the efforts of NATO and the EU states to expand democracy and stability in other parts of the world will ensure a solid voice in the decision-making process that is important to the country.

Facing full membership in the two most powerful international organisations, Lithuania can with confidence resist the new threats of the 21st century. The increased co-operation between partners allowed making co-ordinated decisions facing the challenge of terrorism – from the very beginning Lithuania contributed to the anti-terrorist coalition proposing some tools for common response. This includes the strengthening of the state border control, the strengthening of anti-terrorist intelligence and counter-intelligence, allowing the USA aircraft to use Lithuanian airspace and airports, proposing to connect the BALTNET system to the analogous NATO system, and the participation of the Armed Forces in anti-terrorist operations.

At the moment Special Forces and military medical personnel contribute to anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. A Lithuanian Special Forces platoon (40 persons) participates in the USA-led operation “Enduring Freedom”, and a group of military medical personnel in the UN International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).
The Special Forces platoon carries out intelligence and patrol functions, and military medical personnel provide medical support to international military personnel as well as local residents in Afghanistan.

The threat of terrorism is mentioned in the National Security Strategy of Lithuania as one of the most important and relevant threats to national security. A growing threat of terrorism makes important such fields as exchange of intelligence data with allies, development of Special forces, development of crisis management and early warning systems, civil-military co-operation. Therefore, in the development of its Armed Forces Lithuania pays more attention to those fields.

**New environment – new capabilities**

The development of new capabilities is one of the most important aspects of NATO transformation. The necessity of new forces is dictated by the current situation in the world and emerging traditional and new threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is evident that the majority of conflicts and disturbances will emerge outside the Alliance; therefore, NATO will need forces different from those that NATO states had ten years ago and that were meant for operations within the territory of the Alliance. Although collective defence remains the main mission of NATO, in the future, the Alliance will more often carry out various crisis management and anti-terrorist operations outside its territory (“out-of-area operations”). To be able to carry out these operations member states are shifting to small but more mobile armed forces with the help of which an effective response to present challenges is possible.

It is not surprising that during the NATO Summit in Prague one of the most important issues was the strengthening of capabilities. The decisions made will have a big influence upon the states aspiring to join the Alliance, in order that their membership would not increase the existing technological gap between the USA and European countries but reduce it in the long-term. With the aim to reserve limited resources “work sharing” exists between NATO countries: each member or the group is “responsible” for capabilities in certain areas. Therefore, the aim is for the countries to strengthen the capabilities that are most necessary for current operations. In Prague NATO countries undertook to enforce capabilities in such areas as transportation of forces by air, precision guided munitions, protection from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, air surveillance network, etc. Also, the establishment of NATO Response Force was approved in the meeting.

A reliable member, which is the aim of Lithuania, must come to the Alliance with readily developed capabilities necessary for ensuring the security of the country together with allies and contributing effectively to the operations. Membership of the Alliance providing collective defence guarantees enforces a review of defence planning principles of Lithuania: the requirements for Armed Forces are changing in ensuring the defence of the country as well as the implementation of international obligations.

Since the security of the country is ensured on the basis of the principle of collective defence, i.e. in case of crisis or war, allied reinforcements would come to Lithuania, we have to prepare forces that can act together with the forces of NATO countries. There is no need for keeping a big structure of the Armed Forces; it is
enough to have small, well-prepared and armed, easily deployed and tenable Armed Forces. We are developing not military structures but new types of capabilities necessary for ensuring the security of Lithuania and NATO. Now Lithuania reviews the development of its forces and gives priority to the development of capabilities necessary for acting along with NATO. Only in this way will we be able to use the existing human and financial resources in the most effective way and to achieve the best results for us and for NATO.

The development of a new type of capabilities requires a lot of resources. Lithuania allots 2 percent of gross domestic product for defence, and the money is used for the development of necessary capabilities. The fact that until now Lithuania has been considered as one of the best-prepared candidates to join the Alliance proves that we have achieved good results. Our main principles that were the basis of our work and the reason of our current ability to offer a substantial contribution to the Alliance, are as follows: firstly, determination of strict and realistic priorities of the development; secondly, preparation of specific capabilities needed by the Alliance; thirdly, a successful use of international co-operation mechanisms. We do not intend to withdraw from them in the future.

One of our most important principles is a realistic development of the Lithuanian Armed Forces based on strict priorities. On the one hand, this means that the projection of force development must be accompanied by the evaluation of available resources. On the other hand, we have to develop capabilities to fight threats. In order to effectively use quite limited resources for the implementation of the planned defence reform as well as for a proper preparation for NATO membership, Lithuania complies and will comply in the future with the following main guidelines of the development of the Armed Forces:

- Training of staff and improving of living conditions. This is our main priority. Lithuania aims to increase the number of professionals in the Armed Forces, while the number of conscripts will be reduced. In such a way we seek to improve the professionalism of the Armed Forces. We pay special attention to further improvement of the living conditions of the military in order to attract suitable persons into the Armed Forces;
- Training, readiness and sustainability. This is our second priority. We have to further develop personal and collective training emphasising the training programs co-ordinated with NATO, prepare the necessary infrastructure and procure equipment. While estimating the levels of readiness and requirements of sustainability of different military units we take into consideration the functions attributed to them;
- Modernisation. In the nearest future, we will pay most attention to the modernisation of the military units that are nominated for carrying out operations together with NATO. In the midterm – for the programs related to logistics and sustainability. Also, we will emphasise the development of the existing armament and equipment.

In developing the Armed Forces from the very beginning, Lithuania followed the principle that the basis of the Armed Forces of the country is well-trained and supplied military personnel. Therefore, during the first decade of the development of the Armed Forces, the main focus was the development of training infrastructure,
improvement of the living conditions of military personnel, ensuring of supply. The profession of the soldier has become attractive for the population of the country.

Only after reaching good results in this field in 2001, the policy of the distribution of financial resources was changed with the increase of the part of defence expenditure for the projects of procurement and modernisation. We aim for Lithuanian armament and equipment to be modern and to meet the goals set for the Armed Forces. Lithuania is implementing six basic procurement projects – air defence systems, anti-tank systems, tactical communication systems, transport, logistics equipment and radar. At the moment 20-25 per cent of the defence budget is allocated for the procurement of modern armaments and equipment. Lithuania signed an agreement with the Government of the USA regarding the acquisition of anti-tank system JAVELIN and is the first country in Europe purchasing these weapons, also an agreement on purchasing the STINGER anti-aircraft system was signed.

The quality of the Armed Forces is determined not by equipment but by well-trained, professional military of high qualification. Therefore, the investment into the training of military personnel remains one of the main priorities. The expenditure for personnel in 2002 should amount to 50 per cent of the defence budget – this is an approximate average of NATO countries as well. Already today we have more than 1,000 military and civilian persons, educated abroad even more of them participated in international operations together with the forces of NATO countries. Their preparation and knowledge was positively evaluated by NATO officers. A modern management system of civil and military staff will be introduced in the system of National Defence ensuring the maintenance of specialists of high qualification.

The main motto of Lithuania’s integration into NATO has become and will remain the finding of our own “niche” in the structures of the Alliance forces after becoming a competent member of NATO. The participation of Lithuania in international operations shows that it is able to contribute effectively to the operations of the Alliance by providing specialist groups in such fields as military engineering and medicine as well as Special Forces. This should help to share more effectively the burden with other members of NATO facing new security challenges. The mentioned capabilities receive most attention and have already contributed to international operations. In the future, in the course of strengthening its contribution to the Alliance capabilities, Lithuania plans to enforce the development of specific capabilities.

One more way of strengthening effective development of the capabilities is cooperation with foreign partners in implementing joint projects. Lithuania has achieved positive results in this field: these are already the aforementioned projects with the other two Baltic States and LITPOLBAT, a joint battalion of Lithuania and Poland, BALTRON (Baltic Naval Squadron) and BALTNET (Baltic Regional Air Surveillance Network) projects received a very good evaluation from NATO experts. The BALTNET system is already fully interoperable with the NATO air surveillance system and can be connected to the latter within several hours. Preparations for the integration of BALTNET into the NATO air defence system (NATINEADS) are already taking place. We seek for BALTRON to become a part of the NATO naval countermine unit. Lithuania understands that in the future the number of common projects with other countries should increase. Co-operation could develop in various fields, like common procurement of armament and equipment, development of specific capabilities, etc.
In the course of the preparation of our Armed Forces for the implementation of obligations related to the membership in the Alliance, we have already achieved actual results. We have started the implementation of the reform. Again, realistic plans, based on the existing resources, have become the most important principle of the defence reform. Within the recent years Lithuania has made important decisions regarding the development of the Armed Forces. For example, the planned four combat brigades were reduced to one brigade; 47 battalions of the national defence volunteer forces were reduced to 9 battalion-size reserve units.

At the moment the basis of the Land Forces, the Reaction Brigade, intended for NATO operations in the territory of Lithuania is undergoing a stage of development that will make it fully interactive with NATO in 2006. The Rukla battalion of this brigade is at the moment ready for participation in NATO-led operations outside the territory of Lithuania. Lithuania understands that NATO membership and guarantees of collective security require an effective and solid contribution of Lithuania to the capabilities of the Alliance; therefore, it allots a major part of its resources to the development of the Reaction Brigade. In case of crisis or war in Lithuania, this brigade along with allied forces would carry out combat activities. It is important to ensure our readiness to receive enforcement from allies. Therefore, the main target of the remaining small forces is to ensure the host nations support for allies and to liquidate accidents.

Not long ago, a review of the tasks of the Naval Force and the Air Force has been carried out. Lithuania plans to maintain small Air and Naval Forces necessary for specific tasks, ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lithuania as well as the implementation of the Alliance missions. The Air Force will further develop the system of airspace surveillance. Lithuania has identified one of the existing airport partners for the host nation's support; it will allocate investment and aim for assistance from partners in order to achieve that the airport meets all the requirements. The Naval Force will develop countermine forces that will become a part of NATO Naval Forces.

The aim – maintaining the acceleration of reforms

The success of the Armed Forces reform is closely related to the political and public support for the Armed Forces as well as to NATO integration on the whole. Over 60 per cent of Lithuania’s population support NATO integration.

The consensus regarding the integration to NATO is also reached among the main political parties; this is expressed by the agreement on the defence policy signed in 2001. This document consolidates support for priority spheres of the development of the Armed Forces and obligation to allocate not less than 2 per cent of the GDP to the national defence budget. Taking into consideration the country’s economic situation the allocation of 2 per cent of GDP is sufficiently optimal financing. We plan to further use this practice and involve the political parties of the country into the dialogue on the issues of defence policy even on a larger scale.

In summary, it can be stated that Lithuania has a realistic plan supported by resources, that follows the development of reliable Armed Forces capable of ensuring the defence of the country and collective defence along with the support of allies.

We do our homework which is not special in any way, but which is very impor-
tant for Lithuania. Our target was to prepare for the moment when NATO decides to invite Lithuania and to ensure that all essential political, economic, technical and military preconditions are created for a positive decision.

We have already achieved very positive results, but there is still much to be done. The invitation to membership of NATO is the beginning of even a more complex process requiring more effort. Therefore, we are preparing for new challenges already now. We want to become good allies and hope that with the admittance of the new members NATO will become even more effective and important than up until now.
Global International System and Lithuania: Trends of Development
Globalisation and New Threats: Terrorism

Terrorism is not what could be called a new phenomenon in the world. The end of the Cold War and globalisation, however, “have let the genie out of the bottle”. In this article the author analyses issues pertaining to the definition of terrorism, tendencies of the terrorist threat (particularly, causes of the growing fatality of terrorism), the impact of globalisation on the phenomenon of terrorism and opportunities and dangers behind the fight against terrorism in the globalisation age. The article claims that during the age of globalisation terrorism becomes popular not only as a means for an asymmetric fight against the stronger opponent of the world’s “evil” states; the fight against terrorism is more and more often used as a supplementary instrument in the external and internal policies of Western world democracies. Devoid of an agreement on what terrorism is, states, facing the pressure of foreign and internal interests and/or external pressure, have become used to exaggerating the appeal of the terrorist threat, which, in turn, creates a counterproductive effect and increases security stakes.

Introduction

As soon as threats become reality, they enter academic, political and practical security agendas without further ado. What seems to be a much more difficult task is to predict and identify the threats in a precise manner and formulate a proactive security policy before the threats call in. The understanding of threats, perception of their dynamics and genuine evaluation contribute to an insightful proactive security policy. These factors come to decide what strategy is formulated, how the resources of deterrence, prevention, reaction, training and outcome management are distributed.

In the aftermath of the September 11 events in the United States, terrorism has taken control of the principal security strategy provisions, becoming one of the most important spheres of politics almost in all states of the world – at least in the countries of the so-called West – including those that have hardly ever suffered the influence of terrorism, have not had actually working terrorist organizations, have never carried a foreign policy that would have caused discontent among terrorists. Terrorism as a principal issue now has been put on the top of the agenda of all meetings that gather together heads of states, international organizations, political and economic forums. If we refer to the way the issue has established itself, almost every act of violence today is first of all assessed through the prism of terrorism.

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It may seem paradoxical to some extent, but one would find it difficult to come across a similar term that would be more controversial in modern political discourse than terrorism. Until now, all attempts to reach an agreement on the universally accepted definition of terrorism ran into political and ideological deadlock.

Terrorism is scarcely a phenomenon to be called a new one in the world. However, the end of the Cold War and globalisation have created very favourable conditions for the development of terrorism as a new type of threat. The character, motivation, targets, strategy, tactics and logistics of terrorism have been under transformation ever since. It is not difficult to note that terrorism is becoming extremely popular in the globalisation age not only as an asymmetric means of fighting the stronger enemy of the “evil” countries of the world; the fight against terrorism is more and more often used as an internal and external policy instrument in Western democracies.

In this article the author analyses issues pertaining to the definition of terrorism, tendencies of the terrorist threat, the impact of globalisation on the terrorism phenomenon and opportunities and dangers behind the fight against terrorism in the globalisation age.

Concept of terrorism: definition issues

Terrorism is a concept that should be used with special care. To start with, such an assumption is based on the fact that terrorism is one of the few words that automatically raises panic and presses to take extreme actions. One author named terrorism as a “bomb-throwing” term.¹

The definition of terrorism is important both in political and social sciences. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find any other word that would be more controversial than terrorism in today’s political discourse. Walter Laqueur’s “Age of Terrorism”, the largest book on terrorism and its causes so far, aimed to portray what terrorism failed to be, indeed². In the media and in the daily use the concept of terrorism has been used quite freely. The word “terrorism” was often used as a synonym that described phenomena such as political resistance, street riots, uprisings, partisan wars and many more. In terms of a scientific appeal the research of international terrorism as a phenomenon has remained complicated so far, given that there is still no adequate theoretical background available.³ None of the many definitions of terrorism has become universally accepted. In the most general sense, terrorism that is narrowly defined implies either the use of weapons of mass destruction, or a threat to use them.⁴ In this case, the definition would fail to incorporate the majority of the cases the world recognizes as terrorism (the September 11 events in the United States, for example). A broader definition, under supplementary circumstances, includes, among others, such phenomena like sabotage, arson, murder, various riots, etc.

In this case, one must take into account various other factors to determine, whether one of these phenomena is terrorism or not (e.g. premeditated poisoning of drinkable water), whether it is a matter that the local police should deal with or not (e.g., putting a house to fire for personal disagreements). Sometimes terrorism “masks” a partisan war (the difference is that terrorists either do not seek to take control over the territory or fail to keep it in their hands) or even an interstate war.

Terrorism has been mostly defined as a premeditated sub-state level activity or a threat directed against civil population that seeks political objectives – to ignite panic in the society, to put political protest against the state into action, to undermine or overthrow the political authority, to replace the current system of government.\(^3\) This definition includes three key elements characteristic of all definitions of contemporary terrorism: violence, private (civil) persons, and politics.

However, a long history of existence has lead terrorism to a large variety of appearances; today, the society faces a number of types of terrorism. As a result, there are many terrorists and many more perceptions of what terrorism is that slow down the quest for a universally accepted definition. The understanding and evaluation of terrorism as a threat and as a phenomenon depends also on the country. The United Nations Organization has been in pursuit of a universally acceptable definition for 20 years, but so far all the efforts ended in failure.\(^4\)

At the time when terrorism tendencies change and terrorism often loses the function of a political manifestation, accentuating the fear-raising and insecurity aspect, theoreticians of terrorism begin arguing if terrorism is a political activity or simply some type of a criminal undertaking (the UN, as well as the majority of nation states). It is said that each terrorist act can largely be considered as a mere criminal offence, against civil population, aimed at generating psychological consequences instead of producing material losses. On the other hand, the opponents claim that the same definition implies that each criminal activity can be considered a terrorist act if we assume that its main objective is to stir up fear.\(^7\) Terrorism, however, is different in comparison to the majority of acts of criminal violence just because it is always rational. Rational in a sense that there is always an understanding of a link between the means used (violence) and the results expected (namely, the political objectives of terrorists).\(^8\)

What needs to be said is that all efforts to provide a universal definition of terrorism depend on political and ideological issues. The concept of terrorism is a relative one and depends on how the party concerned defines it. In other words, what terrorism is and what it is not very often depends on who is the source of the evaluation: the victim or the person who commits violence. What one party considers a terrorist act, the other party may call a freedom fight or legitimate political resistance. Where does the dividing line between these groups lie? What factors decide what

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\(^3\) Laqueur W., “Postmodern Terrorism”, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996


act of political violence is identified as terrorism, and what is not? Who is a “terrorist”, and who is a “freedom fighter”? When does a “freedom fighter” become a “terrorist”? The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of such examples where attacks against civilians allow Israel to label its actions against the Palestinian autonomy as a war against terrorism rather than a fight of the two nations over the same piece of land. The Chechen war, in this sense, is an even “greyer zone”: there is no doubt this fight is nothing but the fight of a nation for its independence, the actions and means of which, however, meet the definition of terrorism. Therefore, every attempt to define terrorism apart from the fight for national liberation and the implementation of the right for self-determination always raises the fear of the implication that in some cases terrorism is justified, i.e. to draw a borderline between the tolerable terrorism and non-tolerable terrorism.

According to Brian Simmons, what definition is provided depends also on who the target is and who the victims of the act of political violence are. What practice shows, however, is that if it is the US citizens that are victims of political violence, 80 per cent of the cases come to be named terrorist acts. In the meantime, in all other cases, only 50 per cent of the acts of violence are defined as terrorist activities.\(^9\) Thus, the definition of the act of violence as terrorism has first of all to do with judgement and evaluation. In this context the role of the United States Government is very important in defining terrorism and classifying whether the use of political violence is legitimate, or not. The US Governmental institutions, however, have failed to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism that could be applied to and by each and all of them. Alali and Ekke offer six different definitions of terrorism the US Governmental institutions have articulated. According to these authors, such a mass of definitions and some flexibility that follows as a result have allowed the US Government to interpret terrorism “conveniently”. As a consequence, the Government may classify one group or another, one state or another as a terrorist sponsoring group or state on the basis of how their ideological orientations fit those of the US.\(^10\) Yet, the critics of a value-based approach towards terrorism claim that the judgment whether an act of violence is terrorism or not should exclusively depend on the character of the act itself, not the identity of the perpetrator or the legitimacy of the causes.\(^11\)

To sum up, efforts to define terrorism are first of all inevitably interlinked with political and ideological issues. Besides, terrorism is a very dynamic phenomenon. “The character of terrorism changed at the end of the last century giving birth to the majority of issues of definition and understanding” – one of the best known and in-depth studies of terrorism claims.\(^12\) In the meantime, however, the majority of international organizations and states define threats in their security policies and strategies on the basis of the definitions of terrorism that reflect the situation characteristic of a number of decades of the last century. At the same time, they fail to embrace the magnitude of the current problem in the entire world.

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10 Ibid., p. 3-4.
Dynamics of terrorism as a threat

Contemporary terrorism is, for the most part, international terrorism. Almost every time it brings about international implications. Purely internal terrorism, traditional terrorism, rarely exists in practice. The reason is not only that the information on terrorist attacks crosses state borders.\textsuperscript{13} When Chechen fighters took several hundred civilians hostage in the Moscow theatre in October 2002, by definition this was clearly an internal terrorist act. However, there were a number of foreign citizens involved, international actors approached the fighters (foreign ambassadors, international organizations). Besides, President Putin came to put emphasis on the international character of this terrorist act, connections to Al Qaeda and the increased terrorist threat in the world.\textsuperscript{14}

Moreover, terrorism increasingly becomes global. Terrorist groups appear to be able both to organize attacks everywhere in the world and to bring up consequences of a global impact. Indeed, the September 11 events in the United States showed that none of the countries of the world, independent of its political, geographic situation, size or power, cannot feel absolutely safe (economic consequences, spread of anthrax, insecurity and fear, etc.)

Terrorism becomes more and more fatal, that is, non-discriminating and lethal. During the last 25 years, according to statistics, the number of terrorist attacks in the world decreased (the international system and security realities as well as the attitude of the majority of states towards terrorism have changed, the majority of terrorist groups disappeared, the Soviet block, which was taken to be one of the most active sponsors of terrorism, collapsed). However, numbers of the fatalities these terrorist attacks have caused increased substantially.\textsuperscript{15} Such changes in terms of the tendencies of terrorism, in essence, reflect the result of several so-called “terrorist spectacles” – dramatic acts of violence that draw the attention of the whole world by causing heavy human casualties.

Traditional terrorism used to be of a discriminating character, directed at a precisely defined concrete group or persons (most frequently high-level political actors) and at avoiding civil human casualties. In the ninth decade, terrorism underwent significant changes – terror acts were more and more often carried out by suicides. Aimed to put fear in the society and destabilize the situation, terror acts were more and more often directed at civil population. However, even in this case terrorism was characterized by clear political objectives that made the attacks be planned so that the consequences (the number of victims, most often) they were giving birth to would draw the attention; on the other hand, they tried to avoid unduly “bloodiness” that could have caused negative reaction on the part of the society or unduly violence that could have reduced the number of supporters (IRA, Basques).\textsuperscript{16} However, recent terrorist attacks are for the major part projected in the way to cause as many civilian casualties as possible.

\textsuperscript{14} CNN News, October 26, 2002.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p. 6-7.
Numbers of reasons bring about such a growth in terms of the “efficiency” and fatality of terrorism. First of all, there are certain models that let one assume that at least some terrorists are convinced that the attention is not earned that easy as it once used to be. Politics, the media, the society get accustomed to it, which makes them less sensitive to terrorist attacks. Therefore, the terrorists are brought up to situation where they feel obliged to organize more dramatic and more destructive attacks in order to reach the same effect they could have reached by less victimizing attacks earlier.\textsuperscript{17}

Second, the means terrorists employ get increasingly modern. What makes guns and conventional explosives remain the most widely used weapons is the relative ease of buying them. At the same time they become smaller, smarter, better fit to commit murder (e.g. nail bombs to kill as many victims as possible). Efforts to acquire (and use) chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons also become more frequent and persistent. The 1995 Tokyo metro attack is widely received as the beginning of chemical terrorism. The same apocalyptic group tried to spread the virus of anthrax in Japan, though, unsuccessfully. At the same time, after the September 11 events in the United States (the linkage is not proven), the virus of anthrax spread quite widely, causing a situation that triggered a crisis. Terrorist groups more often are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons among them. As a result of globalisation and universal computerization, the threat of cybernetic terrorism is increasing: lots of scenarios have been designed that mould the potential of such kind of terrorist attacks. Casual, though real, crises verify that such scenarios have become real and possible to execute.

Terrorist groups seem unable to acquire the major part of modern weapons, first of all, chemical and nuclear weapons, unless they are helped by a state. Secret, though active, on the other hand, role of some of the states in support of terrorism is the third reason for this growing fatality.\textsuperscript{18} Five of the seven states the United Nations have identified as the sponsors of terrorism develop nuclear weapons under the aegis of respective nuclear programs, and later try to implement them. This includes the states the United States President George W. Bush addressed as the “axis of evil” in the new US security doctrine – Iraq, Iran, North Korea. State support reinforces the planning, reconnaissance, financial and logistical capabilities of ordinary terrorist groups. Besides, state-supported terrorist groups become less dependent on the support of the local community. Because of that they do not really care about the effect terrorist attacks are going to have on the public opinion. In spite of the fact that none of the world nations openly supports terrorism, Hoffman claims that some states are getting more and more keen on using terrorists as “surrogate fighters” – a secret, cheap force used for a secret war against more powerful enemies or for the sake of the annihilation of the neighbouring and inimical countries’ regimes.\textsuperscript{19} To some extent

\textsuperscript{17} Hoffman, (note 10), p. 13.


\textsuperscript{19} Hofman, (note 10), p. 15.
terrorism along with conventional war and favourable asymmetric strategy becomes a supplementary means, an alternative to direct confrontation with more powerful enemies, including the United States.20

The orientation of terrorism in the direction of the growing number of victims reflects one closely related development – the changing motivation of terrorists. Traditionally, terrorism grew on the left-wing ideologies. It gathered vitality on the removal of opponents for the sake of various concrete political objectives. Today, various religious extremist (Islamic fundamentalists) and post-apocalyptic groups, antiglobalist movements have joined the ranks of the traditional ideological and ethnic/nationalistic terrorism. Reinforced by the hatred of the United States and overall Christian civilization, all this can be considered the basis for the increasing number of terrorist attacks. Motivation may be, and most often is, a mix of several factors. Religious terrorism, or the terrorism that is at least partly based on religious imperatives has made its contribution to the increasing fatality of terrorism. The statistics of terrorist acts show that terrorism that is based on religious motives is susceptible to higher fatality and non-discriminating killing over completely different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation, morality perception, specific stance towards the world, even more than the secular terrorism.21 Usually, terrorism that is motivated by religious beliefs and hatred does not have concrete political objectives, except for a resolve to punish enemies (or everyone alien to one’s religion or cult) by killing as much of them as possible, without much attention being paid on maintaining or drafting new disciples or sponsors by way of the attacks.22 Therefore, terrorism has been increasingly losing its key traditional element – to assume responsibility over the committed crimes and declare political requirements. Furthermore, major terrorist attacks – the spectacles – are known for the fact that the majority of the groupings accused of terrorism try to deny their association with the act immediately after. Such tendency of terrorism implies that for some groups violence becomes “an objective in itself rather than a means to reach the objectives devised”.23

The character of terrorist groups themselves has transformed. The hierarchic structures and centralisation of the groups have grown weaker, too. Increasingly often the groups do act as separate units, bound together by relatively loose links and united by a common goal – most often universal hatred. Tracing one branch, cutting off the financial sources would not affect other branches. Such loose, decentralised transnational terrorist networks are hard to identify, watch and infiltrate into.24 Loosening of centralisation and control often means also fewer constraints on the selection of the operational targets, which, therefore, entails uncontrollable, usually more significant, human losses. Loosening structures of terrorist groups bring about more and more unprofessional terrorists or amateur terrorists who operate on the basis of either religious enmity, rage and hatred, or a different mix of motives that are often used by professional terrorists or states supporting terrorism for the sake of concea-

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21 Ibid, p. 20
22 Note 15, p. 7.
ling their involvement and avoiding the possible military response, or, as a result, diplomatic and economic sanctions. In general, terrorist groups become less dependent on states – states harbour and tolerate these groups; however, financing itself comes from different sources (often times, the income off the illegal activities (drugs, weapons), nongovernmental organizations’ funds, etc.) Because of this reason, it appears much more difficult to fight terrorism using conventional methods, such as economic sanctions.

In summary, terrorism is becoming a completely different kind of threat: the nature, motivation, targets, strategy, tactics and logistics of terrorism have been under transformation. Traditional terrorism still remains a major threat in some of the world regions. At the same time, however, the threat modern (new) international terrorism poses, is inevitably growing.

**Globalisation and terrorism**

After the Cold War, the family of threats expanded noticeably. This fact necessitated a wider security agenda, a need for new national and international security strategies; a need to look for new means of fighting against what comes up as a new threat. During the Cold War, national security in essence implied the defence of borders and territory against major threats of the bipolar world. Today, the majority of states, particularly in a better-developed part of the world face less acute military threats; bipolarity belongs to the past; this puts the onus on other threats. What seems to be true as well is the fact that other types of threats become more important irrespective of less acute military threats. Economic and social threats – these are the result of globalisation and increasing interdependence. Political threats are felt by those states that have retained either historically obsolete internal structures (autocratic monarchies or theocratic states), or fail to keep in step with the contemporary tendencies (communist states), or weak states – those states that fall short of implementing state functions. Everybody is aware of the environmental threats (global warming, shrinking ozone layer, and contamination of water resources). At the same time, though, only few have ever got to know what they are. Following the September 11 events, explosions in Indonesia, hostage crisis in Russia, everyone is aware of the danger terrorism poses. Moreover, terrorism turns into a permanent satellite and instrument the majority of these threats act by.

Globalisation is one of the factors affecting the new security situation in the world and the factor that explains the increasing strength of terrorist tendencies. First, globalisation has expanded the socio-economic basis of terrorism (social inequality, ethnic and religious discords, poverty and the problem of refugees, etc.). Activities of transnational corporations, growing economic integration, new fast-developing modern technologies, global communications and media expansion strengthen mutual interdependence and vulnerabilities.

For a long period of time, globalisation used to be treated as a source of peace, democracy, progress and rapid economic development of which the majority of the world countries and peoples would reap major benefits (integral globalisation) as a result. However, recent years have seen the consolidation of the positions of those who claim that the objective processes of globalisation (actively supported by transnational companies, financial and industrial communities, Western economic and
political elite, and particularly, the United States), along with positive aspects carry with themselves the lethal consequences for the world civilization (detrimental globalisation). According to them, globalisation forms a bifurcated, divided, world.29 It gives rise to conditions for developed and rich democracies to reach an even higher level of welfare and for less rich – to reach significant progress. In the meantime, as a result of the globalisation process the remaining part of the world creates conditions favourable to facilitate the enrichment of the limited political and economic elite. At the same time, the major part of the world population, unable to meet the information and modernization era, ruthless competition and abrupt changes, remains in poverty. Processes of globalisation raise a dilemma for 80 per cent of the world population who choose between “having lunch and being a lunch”, according to an illustrative comparison of P. Martin26. This is the main reason why various regions of the world view globalisation in their own way: there are plenty of people who have either suffered or believed they have suffered as a result. In this respect globalisation “gives a flush of anger” to those anti-Western regimes, ideologies, persons (including terrorists) who seek to punish Western democracies and everybody they blame for their failure. The Islamic world is the best example. This world sees itself lying in an extreme periphery of the West-dominated world – metropolis. At the same time, however, this world has managed to retain deeply felt and jealously cherished memories of the Islamic region as a cultural, economic and political centre (different to Africa or Latin America). That is why, according to A. Lieven, the attacks on the United States by Islamic terrorists in reality signify an attack not only on “the main patron of Israel” but also on the “main symbol of their own failure”.

Second, as a result of globalisation, increasing communication opportunities have created favourable conditions for the development, consolidation and geographic expansion of terrorism, making it easier for it to fulfil its core objective – publicity. In some regions of the world, new technologies have been used not only for the sake of people’s welfare. They are somewhat more often used for the production of new weapons, establishment and expansion of international terrorist organizations. Distances seem to have lost relevance in the age of globalisation. Modern information systems and technologies enable terrorists to organize attacks in any place in the world, whereas remoteness from the geopolitical hotspots is no longer a guarantee of security.28

Third, globalisation has belittled the role of the state as the subject of international relations. It has lifted the weight of other subjects of international relations – international organizations, transnational corporations and international formal and informal nongovernmental organizations, instead. In the period of global threats, the state is less and less able to defend its territory, protect private property, efficiently control information and welfare sources available to its population. M. Kennedy claims that this situation leads to the decline of the moral authority of the state. The

declining authority of the state brings about less legitimacy to it. Its main reflection is the outstanding monopoly over power and violence. Such a situation is extremely auspicious for terrorist groups to use as they “capture” the right to use force and, as a result, lessen the state authority all the more.

In summary, the consequences of the globalisation process have become a fertile soil for the expansion of terrorism. It would be an exaggeration to say that globalisation is the direct cause of the events in the United States, Afghanistan or the Middle East. Their causes lie much deeper, indeed. Indirectly, however, globalisation has made its contribution to the problems of the contemporary world and the uncertainty over the future security. Globalisation not only kindles terrorism by means of escalating a conflict between the two worlds and separate society groups, but also provides some kind of a multiplication effect. Consequences of a terrorist act that come to pass are much larger because of the increased mutual interdependence and intensive communication. These consequences spread faster and reach a virtually unlimited audience.

**Fight against terrorism in the globalisation age: opportunities and dangers**

Globalisation and the end of the Cold War have created favourable conditions for terrorism to flourish. At the same time, they have given birth to a situation of mutual interdependence in the world when no country can feel safe, when no country can guarantee its security alone. Today, terrorism seems a completely different threat compared to the one it used to be in the ninth decade of the last century. It has been further evolving. Reality, however, demonstrates that it is possible to fight terrorism in an efficient way and preclude the prospects of it becoming a certainty. By the same token, conditions meant to fight terrorism have also naturally improved (better technical means; stronger cooperation among countries in this area; countries are less motivated to support terrorism; besides, the capacities of terrorist groups are very limited). On the other hand, what comes to mind is the fact that one might find it difficult to point to a successful case of fight against terrorism, whereas failures are really dramatic and obvious.

Two aspects seem important in fight against terrorism. First, the reduction of vulnerabilities stemming from possible terrorist attacks (border control, observation of suspected persons and groups, strengthening of security in potentially dangerous places (airports, metro), i.e. prevention. What limits the success of prevention is the so-called double asymmetry. First, terrorists have attained large advantage in this case: in order to be effective, defence must take account of all points of vulnerability around the world, while terrorists only have to target the weakest point to achieve success. Second, the costs of prevention are much higher compared to the costs of an attack. For example, to protect a single airport one has to spend millions, whereas a terrorist can carry out an attack causing thousands of human casualties with a single paper point.

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Diminution of sources of the threats is the second aspect of the fight against terrorism. Economic sanctions, negotiations between the opposing parties, resolution of conflicts, removal of political discords (given that the origins of terrorism were virtually always clear, as are the political requirements) – these were the principal means of fighting traditional terrorism. Meanwhile, the sources and causes of contemporary, new terrorism do not seem that clear (globalisation, the US place in the world, national and ethnic conflicts, unequal distribution of global welfare, poverty and lack of education, religion and fanaticism). Such sources of threats are not subordinate to any separate country – this is an exclusive matter of the international-level security strategy.

International cooperation in the area of the fight against terrorism has been active so far. Until recently, however, it used to be limited due to some reasons, first of all, to a widely debated problem of consent over what acts of violence should be treated as terrorism, and what not. Devoid of consent over the object of fight, it is indeed even more difficult to agree upon the common strategy and means to achieve the devised objectives. The situation has transformed to some extent since after the September 11 events in the United States of America. What analysts of terrorism agreed upon was one thing – the world (at least the West) would have to reach an agreement over the singular definition and characteristics of terrorism as well as envisage means of a legitimate fight against it. The European Union became the first example of this. Only a few months had to pass before the Union member states reached a decision on the definition of terrorism, list of activities that were treated as terrorism, and joint means of fighting it. Besides, member states were entitled to take upon themselves national means to assure that terrorist attacks or attempts to organize them, participation in terrorist organizations, sponsorship of terrorist activities, etc. would be punished as such, not only as mere general criminal offences90. Moreover, until recently the majority of cooperation initiatives were based on the UN experience on what constituted terrorism, accumulated during the last decades of the last century. Therefore, they for the most part addressed traditional terrorism and failed to embrace new, oftentimes more dangerous, realities this phenomenon had given rise to.

The second problem of cooperation is related to the comparative importance every state delegates to the fight against terrorism in its national security strategy, driven by three main factors: (1) the threat terrorism causes to a particular state; (2) the ability of the state to fight terrorism on its own, devoid of the help of other states; (3) the comparative importance in the national security policy, if compared to other threats.31

In today’s complex world there are numbers of various risks and dangers that, despite the fact that they can be dangerous for states, the population, economy, etc., do not necessarily develop into a real security threat. In other words, various risks, dangers, threats form the so-called threats scale. The position of one danger or anot-

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her on the threats’ scale, plus the outcome, i.e. when it becomes a threat, is decided by a number of factors: when leaders of states come to perceive some developments as threats (polities), when the society comes to perceive some developments as threats (surveys, public opinion – sociology) and when there is a high likelihood that some developments might take place (security and strategic studies). Following these criteria it becomes obvious that terrorism is a real threat to the United States. First, the statistics of terrorist acts in recent years show, beyond doubt, that the US security, interests, citizens and property are the main targets of terrorists.\textsuperscript{32} Terrorist activities are the main threat to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace process (also including the neighbouring Arab states) the United States has been promoting for 25 years now. Terrorism is a formidable threat to the stability of the US allies and US commitments in the world. Finally, terrorism is a threat to democracy and its expansion, given that the Governments that have suffered from a terrorist threat at one point or another become more susceptible to the increase of their security in exchange for the limitation of the openness of the society and civil rights. Thus, being the main target of the world terrorists, the United States has long begun to pay close attention to the fight against terrorism in its security strategy. In the meantime, the situation in Europe in terms of the comparative significance of the fight against terrorism and legal reglamentation of terrorism is a different one. In reality it depends on the extent the states were forced to confront terrorist activities in the past. As a result, in some EU countries terrorism had not made it into the list of main national security threats until recently; the fight against terrorism was not given exclusive reglamentation, whereas terrorist acts were treated and punished for as an ordinary breach of law. On the other hand, in some European countries, namely those where terrorism had become a major concern (France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom) the fight against terrorism was given major prominence. These countries devised specific means and explicit sanctions to address it.\textsuperscript{33}

The issue of the prominence of terrorism seems much more acute due to its nature prone to manifest itself (different to organized crime and weapons proliferation) by solitary dramatic violence “spectacles” calculated to catch the fancy of as much people as possible. Such spectacles temporarily highlight the profile of the terrorist threat until eventually the crisis subsides and is replaced with other threats. That is why the focus of many Governments (and their readiness to fight this threat) balances between complete ignorance and exaggerated attention. As soon as Governments concentrate on a terrorist threat like this, the pendulum swings to another extremity, usually at the expense of the attention being paid to other threats.\textsuperscript{34}

Similarly, following the September 11 events in the United States, the threat of terrorism appeared in the first security strategies’ paragraphs and amidst the most important policy areas in nearly all countries of the world (at least in the so-called West), independent of their previous terrorist experience, foreign policy and interests, and perceptions of the terrorist threat in the society.

\textsuperscript{32} Hoffman, (note 10), p. 35.


Why have terrorism and the fight against terrorism suddenly become the most important priority in the major part of the world? First of all it has gained prominence because of the increased terrorist threat, new terrorism tendencies and the increasing fatality and globalisation. The latter sanctioned the situation when the consequences of terrorist acts became a threat to the majority independent on who the primary target of the terrorists was, and who was not. The September 11 attacks of the symbols of the US economic might (the Twin Towers) and security (the Pentagon) were the biggest terrorist “spectacle”. It seized heavier human losses than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had seized in fifty years, pressing the majority of Governments to lift terrorism to the highest point on the threat scale momentarily.

On the other hand, terrorism becomes popular not only as a means of an asymmetric fight against a stronger enemy of the world’s “evil” states. The fight against terrorism is often used as a foreign and internal policy instrument in West democracies. Without a common understanding on what terrorism is and what it is not the limits between terrorism and other violent activities become relative and extremely broad. To this we must add the changing nature of terrorism and the fact that it fails to keep its main feature – the assumption of responsibility and declaration of political requirements. There are, however, many reasons why governments turn prone to identify the so-called “grey zone” crimes, criminal and military activities as terrorism. First and foremost, this helps Governments, to some extent at least, justify their waning capabilities to perform the main function of the state – to ensure the security of the citizens and their property and make certain that these events never happen again, especially if they replicate and they are difficult to cope with. Along these lines, the responsibility for security is at least partly transferred into the international realm, as long as the root causes of terrorism go beyond the focus of the state security.

Second, terrorism is acknowledged as a new, specific threat. This means that special means are allowed and justified fighting it, thus it can become a powerful instrument in pursuance of foreign policy objectives and in defence of state interests. The prism of terrorism has been used for a long time already to define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the territory. Israel also exercised a pretext of a brawl against the Palestinian terrorism to make full use of all means, sometimes marginal, sometimes even contradicting the norms of the international law, in order to ensure its security and avoid an exceedingly negative reaction and discontent on the part of the international community. Russia has also been active in its efforts to disqualify the conflict in Chechnya as a “freedom fight”. It has been trying to describe the conflict as “terrorism”, and by these means allowing more freedom (and support) for its own military actions in the region. Finally, the military operations the US-led anti-terrorist coalition undertook in Afghanistan, deposition of the Taliban regime and the justification of pre-emptive strikes aimed at removing the Iraqi regime have become possible in the context of a broader, global fight against terrorism. Today, the fight against terrorism seems to be the only acceptable pretext for a military and economic intervention.

Third, some of the world’s security experts claim that the end of the Cold War brought about a new element to the interests of the US and to the majority of other states’ security politicians and experts, namely, to discover a new major “enemy”.35

Having in mind the fact that military threats have diminished in the majority of states, there emerged pressure over the allocation of means for the national defence and other, for the most part, social policies. In this sense “the worst-case scenario” and the elevation of a new threat become a powerful tool in seeking to draw the attention of Governments. It also helps create extremely strong positions in the fight over the distribution of resources. The elevation of the threat of terrorism and the prominence of the fight against terrorism has been given guarantees of the support of the public (provided it is thorny to either criticise the fight against terrorism or stand against the de-escalation of terrorist threats) not only in terms of increased financing, but also in terms of the establishment of the new specialised institutions or the consolidation of the powers of the existing institutions.

Besides, the external pressure to focus on terrorist threats and the fight against terrorism may be very strong in some countries. After the September 11 events, the first message President Bush delivered to the world was: “You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists. It is for you to decide. Those countries that choose unwisely, beware.”36 The new US foreign policy doctrine, as a result, gave an important impetus for the majority of states to lift the fight against terrorism to the top of their national security agendas, independent of the real danger they faced.

Given their aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic security organizations (the European Union and NATO), Central and East European countries have been facing a double pressure. It is expected that future member states will not become mere security consumers. Instead, it is expected that they are going to grant support for common goals, that they are going to adhere to shared policy courses and contribute to the strengthening of security in the region. For example, the new security strategy of Lithuania names terrorism as virtually the most important threat to Lithuania’s security, despite the fact that in Lithuania’s case the threat terrorism poses is not that obvious in comparison to that of the US.37 On the other hand, in the context of Lithuania’s integration into the European Union, free movement of people and ensuring of the security of the EU’s external borders, Lithuania is going to take on the responsibility over the European security. That is why the terrorist threat may increase.

Indeed, the September 11 events demonstrated that what presents a threat to some might craft opportunities for others. On the global level these events gave impetus to the formation of a unique, broader than ever, coalition against terrorism. These events have also raised hopes that the world bears in itself the potential to develop into a safer, better and more democratic entity than ever before. In the context of the global fight against terrorism, the United States got hold of the chance to implement their long-term foreign policy interests (i.e. strengthening the domination in Asia, the disarmament of Iraq). Otherwise their chances to implement the interests would have been less likely due to numerous factors: a stronger resistance on the part of the international community, the US internal policy stage and the public in the opposite case. As regards the European Union, the September 11 events happened to create an opportunity for the Union to strengthen its role as an international player and come up to a consensus over a number of initiatives aiming at strengthening common security and adding another impetus to the fight against terrorism. The

situation meant that the European Union finally arrived at a position favourable to consolidate its two weakest pillars (Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Internal Matters). On the other hand, it also unveiled the division that existed among the EU member states on such issues as the definition of what the fight against terrorism was and the means to address it.

Russia is considered to be an absolute winner in this situation: its relations with the United States have improved significantly, the role Russia plays has also increased, Russia’s involvement in the Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO and the EU) has become more substantial, Russia has been recognized to be a state with market economy (a number of experts claim this can be seen as an “acknowledgment” for Russia’s support in the fight against terrorism and operations in Afghanistan), and it has also gained more freedom for its actions in Chechnya. For Central and East European countries, Lithuania among them, the terrorist attacks in the United States and their consequences have further strengthened their aspirations to join the transatlantic security space, NATO, and substantiated their readiness and ability to contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement along with other states of the world (deployment of troops in Afghanistan, permit to use the air space and airports, strengthening of the fight against terrorism, the establishment of the legal basis, etc.) Before September 11, 2001 only a few security analysts mentioned Romania and Bulgaria among the next NATO enlargement candidates. It became reality a year later.

Despite the globally increased terrorist threat, on the national security level some of the countries remain prone to overestimate the threat terrorism poses. In other words, they seem to be prone to “manufacture threats”. This situation is exposed to several dangers, however. First of all, given that there are limited resources, overemphasizing the threat means greater attention is being paid to it at the expense of ignoring other threats or potential threats. Such a situation might eventually become dangerous in national security terms. Besides, too much attention being drawn to terrorism satisfies the main objective of terrorists – to strive for publicity and attention. To some extent this further motivates them to use terrorist strategies in the future. Second, the fight against terrorism and security warranties are usually sought for at the expense of state openness and civil freedoms. Following the September 11 events, the US Department of Justice detained more than 1,000 people. Until now, no charges have been tabled against the majority of them. A similar situation applies to Russia: in the aftermath of the hostage crisis in the Moscow theatre many people, Chechens by nationality, have been detained. No charges have been tabled against the majority of them either. What’s more, as a result of an increased urgency of the terrorist threat, the majority of states, especially the US and the EU, severed immigration requirements for those who wanted to enter their territory, upgraded border controls, simplified the deportation regimes for foreigners and employed, among others, other control and limitation steps and economic sanctions. The European Union has for a long time been shaped into a space of freedom, security and justice. Now it is becoming “a Fortress Europe” instead. Restrictive means are justified when they become inevitable in order to ensure security. However, should they

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be too severe (especially in case of the overemphasised or the “artificial threats”), they might trigger a contrary effect, that is increase discontent and intolerance, divide the society or encourage marginal actions. The third problem (it is characteristic of any country, but particularly the United States) has to do with a tendency to overpersonalise the fight against terrorism - to search for a single terrorist, who embodies all evil. We have had Gadhafi, Abu Nidal, and now bin Laden. One can note two dangers lying there. First, “the enemy” is created both in his own eyes, and in the eyes of his followers. Despite being paradoxical, it may make it easier to recruit new terrorists. Second, the personalisation of the fight against terrorism suggests that you only need to “deal with” a few persons in order to have the problem terrorism poses solved. Practice shows, however, that this is not the way to eliminate the problem; the problem evolves.

Cooperation among states in the fight against terrorism has also been hampered by the fact that positions of the states on the means of fighting against terrorism diverged. These developments seem to be contrary to what one could have expected after the September 11 events in the US and several subsequent terrorist attacks when the major part of the world (at least the Western one) came close to a common understanding on what terrorism was and agreed to give the fight against terrorism a major prominence on both national and international security agendas. Here we see a conflict of interests of the allies (the US and European states), the fact one could hardly have expected. Some of the states in Europe, first of all Germany, are in general against sanctions for Libya, Iran, Iraq and other states they have business relations with. These countries hold that the US interests cannot bring effect by means of permanent isolation of the “disobedient” regimes alone. On the other hand, lifting up the punitive means against the regimes that support terrorism amounts to making concessions and may bear negative consequences for the countries directly threatened by terrorists. As a result of the September 11 attacks, European countries expressed their absolute solidarity with the United States. They have supported and contributed to the military operations in Afghanistan carried out by the antiterrorist coalition and destined to remove the Al Qaeda network. The positions, however, diverged over the issue of the possibility to expand the geography of military operations further into the Middle East, namely Iraq. In the process of reaching a decision on how to solve the terrorist problem, falling short of an agreement over the legitimate means of retaliation against the terrorist attacks leads the states to a dilemma: “whether to employ non-democratic means to defend democracy, or not”. The same dilemma applies to some states in Europe: the new strategy of the fight against terrorism, adopted by the United States, envisions the possibility of pre-emptive military strikes in order to avert threats posed by terrorism, nuclear weapons development, proliferation and deployment programs. Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq should become the first target of the strategy. Critics cited this strategy as another example of America’s “unilateralism”, “imperialistic arrogance” and “enormous indifference” in terms of its stance toward the position of the allies.

Note 31, p. 54.
the fact that punitive actions and military operations may be inevitable in order to beat the threat of terrorism, there is always a danger that it could multiply instability in the region and trigger off the opposite result (although it has always been emphasised that the war against terrorism is not directed against Islam, that it is aimed against the terrorist organizations and states that sponsor terrorism, the majority of the Arab world identify the ever-expanding terrorist campaign as above all the anti-Islamic campaign). Besides, some of European states feel anxious about the possibility that the employment of such pre-emptive military strikes is going to create a new extremely dangerous precedent in international politics.

Summary

The national security policy of each and every state is aimed to address a number of likely, not necessarily catastrophic, threats – “the jungles of snakes” according to one of the former US Central Intelligence Agency directors. Such circumstances drive the security policy in different directions. They also weigh down such tasks as the identification of priorities and concentration on one specific low-level transnational threat or another, such as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, etc. At the same time, however, the lack of consistency and focus limits the chances to understand, follow and adequately react to such complex threats like terrorism. It becomes even more difficult to focus one’s attention and embark on adequate means to address the ambiguous and ever-changing threat. The new terrorism is entirely international or even global terrorism, fed on religious fundamentalism and hatred, oriented towards the largest possible number of human losses and leaving behind the main characteristic of terrorism – the claim of responsibility for the committed activities and declaration of political requirements.

The end of the Cold War and the consequences of the process of globalisation created favourable grounds for the expansion of such terrorism. After the September 11 events in the United States and as a result of later terrorist attacks, the image of detrimental globalisation has begun to establish itself in the world. The previous image of globalisation as the main source of peace and progress has been replaced by concerns over the potential cultural clash of civilizations or similar calamities in the future. By way of forming the international society on state and regional level, globalisation increases the socio-economic, ethnic, religious, cultural disunity of the society. This disunity favours such social interests that do not recognise the authority of the international system and state as well as activities of the terrorist groups that represent marginal social interests. Besides, the consequences of globalisation (expansion of communications, new technologies, etc.) lay down favourable conditions for these groups to act on the global level and multiply the effect terrorist attacks exert. In the age of globalisation terrorism becomes a popular means of asymmetric fight against a more powerful enemy. As such it negates the conventional military logic claiming that in order to be successful an attack requires three times as much capacity as the defence.

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42 Pollard A. N., (note 34).
Globalisation is an irreversible process. Whether it is going to become a success or not will depend on the ability to protect oneself from negative consequences this phenomenon brings about. Today’s terrorism is a new type of threat (this fact is recognized by all Western states). Therefore, a new type of means, new methods of fight and close cooperation between states must be devised to address it. Interstate cooperation is restrained by disagreements over the definition of terrorism and legitimate means of the fight against terrorism. It is also restrained by the fact that the fight against terrorism and terrorist threats is given varying values in the national security policy. In practice, some states are susceptible to overestimation of the terrorist threat. Various reasons, internal and external policy interests and external pressure, stand behind these actions. As a result, this situation creates a counterproductive effect by increasing security stakes. Besides, to some extent due to the fact that until recently international terrorism was not defined universally as well as the failure to reach an agreement on the legitimate response to terrorist attacks, states often find themselves in a situation leading them to the violation of the norms of the international law, even for the sake of self-defence. These actions come to provoke discontent among both the states – targets of the imposed means and their own allies. Public opinion is also very sensitive to such developments. What’s more, they stimulate a further expansion of terrorism.

Therefore, the main challenges that states face on their way to success in the fight against terrorism are to find an adequate balance between democratic freedoms and state security. States must fight terrorism, not a nation, religion or civilization. It must fight actions and behaviour, but not what one believes in.
Changes in US Global Security Strategy and their Implications for Lithuania

Lithuanian membership in NATO and American engagement in Lithuania is part of an increasing American commitment to Northern Europe and the Baltic states. American involvement in our region reflects the changing American grand strategy and threat perception. What implications these changes can have for our region and what decision-makers in Washington expect from new NATO RPU members are the focal points of this article.

The author argues that in order to keep Americans committed, the Baltic states must rethink their foreign and security policy objectives, redefine old priorities and adapt them to the new geostrategic reality.

XX century in the world history will be remembered as a century of American hegemony and dominance. The world map in all continents was frequently painted different colours, with only the American continent escaping revolutionary changes. The most powerful country on this continent – the United States of America has been the guarantor of this stability. Its foreign policy remains a synthesis of old traditions and new realities.

The terrorist attacks on September 11 added a new dimension to the American threat perception that could be traced centuries back. For the first time the US was attacked on its own territory and the asymmetrical response became the cornerstone of American strategy. For the very first time after the Cold War, a clear image of the enemy appeared, the new threat was named and huge resources were allocated to fight it. Transformation of US interests, strategic concepts and threat perception resulted in the changing attitude and policy towards many regions and countries, its allies and enemies.1

The new American threat perception has a direct impact upon the Lithuanian – American relations. A growing US military assistance and political contacts, NATO enlargement and security guarantees symbolise the evolution of the American policy towards Lithuania. These changes are the subject of a double-sided process. On the one hand, in US global strategy, Europe is no longer perceived as a potential area of instability. New threats to US security come from other parts of the world, and these parts of the world now receive a major attention in Washington.

On the other hand, political, economic and cultural achievements of Lithuania and other countries in the region naturally raise American interest in the region. The US needs allies to preserve its domination in Europe and fight new threats such as terrorism.

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Changes in US global strategy raise many questions to the academic society and decision-makers around the world – what will be the future of the American involvement in Europe, what role Lithuania and other countries of the region will play in US strategy, what measures they should take in their efforts to preserve American engagement.

The purpose of this article is to reveal and define the place of Lithuania, the Baltic states and regions to which they belong in the US global strategy. Lithuania and its neighbours geographically belong to two regions. First of all, they are part of the Northern European region which encompasses the Northern part of the enlarged European Union. At the same time, together with other nations of V10 group, they are bound by the same wish to become members of NATO and to receive American security guarantees. The term Central and Eastern Europe is frequently used to define this set of countries. After NATO membership, this identification will gradually lose ground and at least in the case of the Baltic states, Central European identity will be replaced by Northern identity.

In 2002 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science published Lithuania’s Security and Foreign Policy White Paper and used the term Baltic-Central Europe. They emphasize that “the Central European and Baltic regions overlap in terms of historical experience, continental identity, cultural continuity, political evolution, and economic development.” Baltic-Central Europe, in fact, coincides with Central-Eastern (CE) and Northern Europe with the exception of the north-western part of Russia. Due to a different geopolitical orientation of the northeastern part of Russia and the rest of the Baltic Sea region, the term CE and Northern Europe will be used in this article.

Lithuania’s geopolitical orientation has many similar features to that of both Northern and CE European countries. A perspective upon Lithuania as a country belonging to both regions allows us to better define US interests in Lithuania, to relate them to the global US strategy and its regional dimension. The NATO role will be awarded special attention since it remains the most effective tool of the US foreign policy in Europe, the Baltic Sea and the Baltic states.

US Global Security Strategy

US grand strategy is a combination of both old, as the Monroe doctrine, and new, as fight against terrorism, ideas. Before WWI, US influence upon European affairs was negligible. US resources were minimal, and the political will to interfere into policies of other regions, with the exception of Latin America, was non-existent.

After WWI, America was a reluctant superpower. Wilson’s proudest creation, the League of Nations, was abandoned. The army, massively augmented in 1917-1918, was demobilised. “There were proposals made to abolish the Marine Corps, and some even wondered about preserving the State Department. The secret office that deciphered foreign codes was closed down. Economically, the nation opted for policies of almost complete self-centeredness, and the share of its national product derived from foreign trade became smaller than ever.”

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Isolationism harboured a huge potential which was later used during WWII. During WWII, the US possessed both the political will and resources to become a global superpower. According to W.Pfaff, Theodore Roosevelt simply liked war, which he thought, brought out the best in a nation. “Roosevelt would have preferred a war with Germany, but as he wrote to a friend ‘I am not particular, and I’d even take Spain if nothing better is offered’”.4

WWII marked the end of the isolationalist period in US foreign policy. The US became a global superpower, which possessed interests in all corners of the world. Its goal to retain the dominance was later expressed in new formulated doctrines.

After WWII, the USSR established a zone of influence in Eastern Europe and was expanding its influence in different areas. In response, the US created a system of military alliance to counter such expansion. As P.Taylor put it, “If the former USSR is a fortress then the best way to deal with a fortress is to surround it and seal it. In policy jargon this is known as containment, with the ring of post-war anti-Soviet alliances as the seal – NATO in Europe, CENTO in West Asia and SEATO in East Asia”.5 In 1945, J.Kennan identified three strategic areas that were not to be allowed to fall under the Soviet rule – the United Kingdom, Reino lowlands and islands of Japan.6 Indeed, the US clearly defined the geographical limits where Soviet interference would have provoked a military response.

In this two-polar world, the US was seeking domination. According to Ch.Layne, US strategy was not directed solely to the USSR – in this case, after the dissolution of the latter, the US would have withdrawn from Europe. “Having prevailed in the Cold War, the United States could have withdrawn from its costly external commitments. This did not happen, however”.7 Even during the Cold War, the US was seeking security not through the preservation of the global balance of power, but through domination and hegemony.

The US based its policy upon the determination that security first of all derives from military might in a harsh, competitive world, thus, it is better to be Number One. After the dissolution of the USSR, the US remained engaged in all parts of the world, and its security links with Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey and other allies continued to be intact. The aspiration to remain a global hegemonic power after the end of the Cold War remained the major element of the global US strategy. Even after the terrorist attacks, the US prefers military solutions to new security challenges it faces today. The US maintains its military presence in all parts of the world and preserves technological lead against possible competitors.

Geographically, Eurasia remains the major object of US foreign policy. According to Z.Brzezinski, Eurasia is the most vibrant and politically active continent on the planet.8 Six largest world economies and six biggest defence spenders are located in Eurasia. Only here the competitor to the US global hegemony may emer-

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6 Уткин Б.И. Американская стратегия для XXI века. Москва, Логос, 2000, 13 с.
ge. The goal of the US is to preserve the emergence of hostile to the US interests coalition of states.

According to Ch. Layne, “Geographically, the [US strategy] identifies Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf as regions where the United States has vital security interests. Europe and East Asia are important because they are the regions from which new great powers could emerge and where future great power wars could occur. The Persian Gulf is important because of oil." American security guarantees to Europe and East Asia are the essential parts of this strategy. Through these security guarantees, the United States retains the primary responsibility for defending German and Japanese security interests both in the core and in the periphery. Security guarantees give assurance (and provide pretext) for both Japan and Germany not to seek the status of a superpower. Ch. Layne continues: "Washington [always] wanted Western Europe and Japan to be strong enough to help contain the Soviet Union; it did not want them to become strong enough to challenge American leadership". 

As Stratfor has put it: "The United States fought World War I, World War II and the Cold War with a single goal in mind: to prevent the unification of Eurasia under any single power. The logic was simple: if any single power could marshal Eurasia’s resources, the global balance of power would tilt dramatically against the United States. Therefore, when it became apparent in the two world wars that Germany might well dominate all of Eurasia by itself or in alliance with Japan, the U.S. intervened, albeit at the latest moment possible. During the Cold War, the U.S. intervened from the beginning, having taken away the lesson from World War II that Europe could not maintain its balance of power by itself, and that late intervention by the United States increased the cost to the United States, along with the risk." 

The last but not least important feature of the US global strategy is to preserve global liberal world economy, which, in G.J. Ikenberry's words is "build order around institutionalized political relations among integrated market democracies, supported by an opening of economies." There have always been geopolitical goals of this strategy as well. In US view, “open trade, democracy, and multilateral institutional relations went together. Underlying this strategy was the view that a rule-based international order, especially one in which the United States uses its political weight to derive congenial rules, will most fully protect American interests, conserve its power, and extend its influence." The international economic system became an alternative to global power rivalry. This strategy created a vision of cooperation based on common values, traditions and stability, where all participants derive benefits from being part of this system.

In conclusion, in Eurasia, the US executes the strategy of domination using regional balances of power, which overlaps on different levels:

* .......................................................... O n the global scale the US maintains hegemonic policy. Benefits from the participation in the international economic system create interest for independent states to preserve its existence and diminish determination to challenge US

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9 Layne (note 7)
10 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem.
hegemony.

- On the regional scale, stability in three geostrategically important areas (Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf) is maintained by regional balances of power. In these regions, the US fights any attempts to create an anti-American coalition. In Europe, balance of power is assured via preservation of NATO security guarantees to Germany; in Asia – via security guarantees to South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. In the Middle East, the US seeks to prevent the emergence of a leading Muslim state (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, etc.) able to challenge US interests and rally them into an anti-American coalition.

**Strategy after the Cold War – in Search for the National Interest**

Aftermath the Cold War US strategy of domination at the regional level was not translated into concrete national interests and concepts. If earlier external threats, coming from the outside used to determine US foreign policy, later it fell under the growing influence of business, ethnic and other interest groups, thus becoming a derivative of American internal politics.

Samuel P. Huntington argued that “without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result subnational commercial interests and transnational and non-national ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.” With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faced a major threat to its security, no major issues were at stake. As General Colin Powell said, when he was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of enemies. I’m down to Castro and Kim II Sung.”

Due to the lack of existential threats, US strategy failed to articulate the main priorities. J.Nye’s analysis showed that, for example, “by focusing on certain conflicts and human rights problems, the media pressure politicians to respond to some foreign problems and not others-for example, Somalia rather than southern Sudan in 1992. The so-called CNN effect makes it hard to keep items that might otherwise warrant a lower priority off the top of the public agenda.” The policy towards Russia also suffered many changes – though the main principle remained to assure democratization of Russia and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – huge resources were put into programmes very distant from these main priorities.

William Perry and Ashton Carter have argued that the way the US understands risks to its security should be rethought. At the top of their new hierarchy, they put “A list” threats such as the one the Soviet Union once presented during the Cold War. The “B list” features imminent threats to US interests, such as North Korea or Iraq. The “C list” includes important “contingencies that indirectly affect US security but do not directly threaten US interests”: “the Kosovos, Bosnias, Som-

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17 Ibidem.
lies, Rwanda, and Haiti."

What is striking is how the “C list” has come to dominate today’s foreign policy agenda. Carter and Perry speculate that this is because of the disappearance of “A list” threats since the end of the Cold War. J. Nye argues that “another reason is that “C list’ issues dominate media attention in the information age. Dramatic visual portrayals of immediate human conflict and suffering are far easier to convey to the public than “A list” abstractions like the possibility of a “Weimar Russia,” the rise of a hegemonic China and the importance of our alliance with Japan.” 18

This explains why US policy in the regions where Washington sees no vital interest became unpredictable and was mainly a reflection of internal debates within the American administration. The most important decisions – the first wave of NATO enlargement, the Kyoto Protocol, the ABM Treaty and attitude towards arms control regime fell victims of internal quarrels rather than were an expression of national interest. This had a strong impact on the countries of the CE and Northern Europe region where US policy was inconsistent, whereas support to their aspirations reflected their possibilities to mobilise internal support within the US. One might say that the US administration relaxed in the atmosphere of total rest and tranquillity. External problems seemed to be insignificant echoes of distant events. This lasted until September 11.

Antiterrorism – a New Phase of Domination

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington had a profound impact upon the world system. First of all, this strengthened America’s determination to dominate – as it had been feared the US did not return to isolationist policies. Quite the contrary, due to the transnational nature of international terrorism, the political will to shape world politics using vast economic and military resources has received additional impetus.

Using Carter’s and Perry’s terminology, the emergence of threat “A” consolidated the American political elite. If before foreign policy was a marginal factor in US policy, after the attacks its role became of major importance. The establishment of concrete priorities made US foreign policies more streamlined and predictable.

The antiterrorist campaign was declared priority Number One. As part of this strategy, a successful military campaign in Afghanistan was launched with the potential to be extended to other regions; G.W. Bush named Iran, Iraq and North Korea as countries belonging to “the axis of evil”; for fear of attacks from hostile nations using ballistic missiles, the US withdrew from the Antballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and put huge resources into the creation of a missile shield.

US response to the terrorist acts (huge resources and will to act) showed its capacity to simultaneously project power into many distant parts of the world. According to S. Brooks’ and W. Woolfthor’s calculations, “in the military arena, the United States is poised to spend more on defense in 2003 than the next 15-20 biggest spenders combined. The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world’s dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project..."

18 Ibidem.
power around the globe. The United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications of advanced communications and information technology and the United States spends three times more than the next six powers combined. And the United States purchases this pre-eminence with only 3.5 percent of its GDP. 19

Such America’s economic dominance, in S. Brooks’ and W. Wohlforth’s opinion, “surpasses that of any great power in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily laid waste every other major economy).” 20 In 1999 the US received one third of all world’s investments and spent on research and development more than the next seven biggest spenders combined. 21

Mass culture and democratic values constitute another pillar of American dominance. Without any sense of autoirony, C. Rice in Foreign Policy argued that “American values are universal. People want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those who govern them; the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when the international balance of power favors those who believe in them.” 22

After the terrorist attacks, Americans attach greater importance to the promulgation and transfer of democratic values around the world.

For the regions of CE and Northern Europe an increasing importance of values after the September 11 attacks is of primary importance. Until that time, Americans did not pay very much attention to the cultural, religious, lingual cleavages between people. The US was a “large pot”, in which these cleavages mixed up and disappeared, and it was hard for Americans to understand why this could not happen somewhere else. Search for terrorists and their clear link with Islamic fundamentalism turned upside down all illusions that had existed before. It is hardly probable that terrorists, by blowing up the skyscrapers where seeking geostrategic objectives. They attacked because their enemies had a different kind of thinking, they had different cultural values and different perception of the world.

Therefore, countries with similar "American values" became even more valuable partners, and the expansion of democracy became an additional front against terrorism. Although being part of US domination, adherence to the principles of democracy together with traditional geopolitical logic becomes an important argument in taking important decisions for Lithuania and its neighbours.

Political, economic, cultural and military domination allows S. Brooks and W. Wohlforth to conclude that “measuring the degree of American dominance in each category begins to place things in perspective. But what truly distinguishes the current international system is American dominance in all of them simultaneously. Previous leading states in the modern era were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. … Today, in contrast, the United

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21 Ibidem.
24 Brooks, Wohlforth (note 19).
States has no rival in any critical dimension of power.” The US shows no sign of what P. Kennedy in his book *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* calls imperial overstretch – US economy remains quite strong, while investments and military budget are constantly growing.

The unipolar system has taken its final form, and no single state has enough resources to challenge the dominant power. American dominance is so evident, that in C. Rice’s opinion “theoretically, the realists would predict that when you have a great power like the United States it would not be long before you had other great powers rising to challenge it or trying to outbalance against it. And I think what you're seeing is that there’s at least a predilection this time to productive and cooperative relations with the United States, rather than to try to balance the United States.”

US dominance is reflected in new formulated doctrines. For instance, R. Hass, the policy-planning director at the State Department, recently has stated that containment strategy is being replaced by the doctrine of limited sovereignty. “Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own country.”

According to Stratfor Intelligence brief, Defense Secretary D. Rumsfeld gave power to special forces to perform antiterrorist operations on the territory of other countries provided the government of this country refuses to cooperate with the US. This signifies a novel departure in US strategic thinking. “U.S. doctrine since Sept. 11 has been that the United States would strike al Qaeda wherever it was. Ideally the host government would cooperate. If not, the attack would be carried out anyway.”

Similar actions and doctrines clearly demonstrate the growing dominance of the US, when basic principles of international law are being treated differently according to the newly formulated US foreign policy priorities. In the light of these changes, Washington has enough will and power to implement its national interests, sometimes, even against the opinion of the world community, as it happened with the ABM Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

**Europe in US Grand Strategy**

In US grand strategy, Europe plays the most important role. This reflects both geopolitical and cultural dimension in US foreign policy. The National Security Strategy approved in September 2002 clearly states that “there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world trade.”

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25 Ikenberry (note 12).
major partner in accomplishing mankind’s grand project called democratisation.

Europe’s status is based on all aspects of the European-American relationship – normative, cultural, economic and military. On the other hand, the status of an ally does not imply that the US wants to see Europe threatening American domination. US vision is a strong and allied Europe, but not strong enough to challenge the US and participate in global power rivalry.

In economic sense, Europe is the biggest US trading partner and investor into US economy. According to the US Census Bureau: Statistical Abstract of the United States, in 2001, European investment made up 69 per cent of all foreign investment in US economy. (Asia - 17, Canada - 8 per cent). A major flow of US investments was also into European economy – 52 per cent, Latin America received 29, Asia - 16 and

Canada – 10 per cent of American capital.
European countries are the main US trade partners. Even though its dominant position here was downgraded by Canada and Mexico, the European Union still has

![US main trade partners](image)

Despite its economic strength, Europe remains, as K. Waltz calls “international-political cipher.” Military structures created in the Cold War era are not suitable to fight modern war and respond to new challenges. European armies need modernisation and reforms. Even quite small EU Rapid Reaction Forces lack some vital capabilities which would enable Europeans fight together with Americans on the same battlefield.

European inability to develop strong and independent military forces preclude Europe from becoming a global superpower and competing with the US. In the future the growing capability gap might even complicate European participation the US-led international military operations. The Kosovo campaign and the operation in Afghanistan and Iraq have already shown that only several European nations could provide forces able to fight together with US forces in high intensity operations.

Due to the capability gap, the US will less and less rely on European contribution in future operations. In his inauguration speech C. Powell stressed that “we believe strongly in NATO. It is the bedrock of our relationship with Europe. It is sacrosanct. Weaken NATO and you weaken Europe, which weakens America.” However in the operation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States relied on an ad hoc coalition rather than NATO capabilities.

European military weakness has enormous repercussion for CE and Northern Europe. The weakening transatlantic link and diminishing importance of Europe means a decreasing US interest and lower level of involvement of the US into CE and Northern European affairs. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

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26 Waltz (note 15)
and Institute of International Relations and Political Science in Lithuania’s Security and Foreign Policy White Paper noticed that “the most unfavorable scenario for Lithuania would be if the U.S. manifestly disregarded the EU and took unilateral decisions on global protection. This could precipitate a rupture in NATO or the impotence of the Alliance, with a lasting impact on the primary security interests of Lithuania.”  

On the international arena, the US can rely only on the assistance of two states – the UK and France. Only these countries have armed forces that are capable of projecting power far away from their territories. Although the geographical significance of Europe has decreased during the fight against terrorism, in strategic sense its assistance will be needed in later stages. In the operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan, 8,000 soldiers out of 15,000 were from the US allies.  

In fact, it was the contribution of European countries, because only 5 non-European US allies participated in the operation, i.e. Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand and South Korea. Although the US had possibilities to end this operation by itself, it would have faced a real shortage of capabilities without the support from allies. Even a larger part of contribution from European countries is made in reconstruction works as well as assigning funding for the economy and improving the status of human rights in the country.

In US strategy, NATO plays an important geostrategic role – by providing security guarantees to European countries, the US precludes the formation of a European collective security alliance. The US has no interest in the military dimension of the EU, which could lead to the formation of a single European geopolitical entity able to challenge the US on the global arena. C. Powell has said that “our European allies are in the midst of important efforts to improve their defence capabilities. We will support any such effort as long as it strengthens NATO, not weakens it.”

US interest is to preserve NATO as a European security organisation and prevent Europeans from creating a separate EU structure with Americans standing aside.

Inside the EU, the US seeks to prevent the creation of a dominant power able to control vast economic and human resources of the continent and able to speak on behalf of all European nations. The US wishes to speak to each country individually and not to a block of countries. Therefore, further EU centralisation and integration are not in accordance with US view of the world. The United Europe with a sophisticated structure and quasi-government would imply that the EU has turned if not into a strategic enemy, then, at least into a strategic competitor able to disrupt the unipolar world order. According to the same logic, the US is not interested in the Russia-EU rapprochement. Such alliance would unite their economic and military resources and potentially could have a huge impact on the global balance of power.

To summarise, in its global strategy the US expects from Europe not competition but support and approval. The European centre of global power or local European hegemon is an American geostrategic nightmare. Such attitude towards Europe

30 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius, (note 2), p.53.
32 Testimony of Secretary of State C. Powell (note 29).
dictates US view and policy towards CE and Northern Europe.

Regional Approach – CE and Northern Europe in US Global Strategy

Europe has a very specific place in American strategy, every country that has influence on the balance of power on the continent and participates in the decision-making process, becomes an important part of US policy. The most important partners of the US are the UK, Germany, France, but, inside the EU, small states also have a disproportionately large degree of influence. This is particularly true speaking about the Nordic states. Therefore, the policy of the US regarding old and new members will be based upon their future influence and activeness in Europe.

Because of their limited resources and capabilities, Lithuania and its neighbours are viewed from US perspective as part of one or another region. With the importance of CE Europe increasing, chances of Lithuania to get more attention in Washington can receive additional boost.

Specifically, the policy of the US towards CE and Northern European regions is part of a broader policy of the US towards Europe, in which the US seeks:

- .......................................................... to get support of the countries in fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (political, economic, military support);
- .......................................................... to assure development of democratic societies throughout the world and in Eurasia, including Russia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Balkans;
- .......................................................... to sustain prevalence in Europe (to strengthen the transatlantic link, preserve the balance of power in Europe, prevent militarisation of the EU, fix borders of Russia);
- .......................................................... to maintain economic ties with the EU, to guarantee flows of investment, to expand the market for defence industry production.

US policy towards CE and Northern Europe is constructed in accordance with these general interests. This is true to both CE and Northern Europe. Because of specific features, every country in the region has a special role and tasks in US strategy, and this list shows very clearly what the US expects from Lithuania and its neighbours. On the other hand, the countries of the region have their own opinion on what role the US has to play in Europe.

Although the CE and Northern European regions are different in their economic, social, cultural characteristics, due to their specific location, the policy of the US towards them has many similarities. The main factor that unites them is the pro-American orientation, which is influenced mainly by the fact that the countries, in the sense of security, are dependent on the US and do not imagine the European security architecture without American involvement.

In Europe both CE and Northern European countries and the US seek to prevent the emergence of a dominant power – be it Germany, Russia or France. This is especially true in CE Europe, which historically was battlefield between Germany and Russia, between the West and the East. Not surprisingly, “Pechenegs, Tatars, Turks, Muscovites and

Soviets, all merge into one continuum where they mingle with 'Teutonic knights, Prussians and Hitlerites'. A. Liebich continues, “German historians have referred to Zwischeneuropa, intellectuals and politicians have translated “middle” into “centre” and have spun an ideology of ‘Central Europe’. However, being “in the middle” is hardly the same as being “at the centre.” The centre imposes itself upon history whereas the middle is subjected to it.”

Due to the complicated geostrategic situation of being squeezed between two huge neighbours, CE Europeans have developed very specific attitudes towards their neighbours. They loathe the Russians, are suspicious of other Europeans and are attracted to the Americans. For them it is true today what was true for many West Europeans fifty years ago: to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. For them NATO enlargement means that in the region which was the subject of a fierce Russian-German geopolitical competition, CE European countries will feel strong American involvement. Without Americans, the region may again become a geopolitical battlefield arena.

North European countries are driven by similar geostrategic motives. During the Cold War, a subtle Nordic balance existed in the region. This balance was based upon American security guarantees to Norway and Denmark and its ability to counter Russian influence in other countries. After the twelve years since the end of the Cold War, Northern Europeans still need American involvement that allows them to feel more comfortable not only with Russians, but also with others aspiring to become great powers on the European continent.

The second important feature of the US – CE and Northern European rela-
tionship is the asymmetry of power between them. The US speaks to the region from the position of the strong. CE and Northern European countries possess no capabilities that would make the US feel dependant upon them. The antiterrorist campaign provides a good example – the US values the input of all countries, but their refusal to participate would not harm the operation in any way. The region would grow stronger if its countries created certain specific capabilities that the US does not possess or feels urgent shortage. Such capabilities could be intelligence information, experience of working with certain regions, specialised military units, high-tech equipment, etc.

The importance of CE and Northern Europe increased during the antiterrorist campaign. If earlier the region was perceived mainly as a tool to contain Russia, now, when the US got involved in the war against terrorism, the region obtained a new status. From a zone of confrontation CE and Northern Europe became a tool to promote American values and interests.

Geographically, Lithuania and its neighbours are distant from “hot spots”, and the US, except for flights through the zone of those countries, does not need their territories for the deployment of armed forces. Trouble spots and camps of terrorists were not found in the region. There are no weapons of mass destruction here, and it does not pose any real danger of proliferation. Financial resources of terrorists were also deposited elsewhere, not in the banks of CE and Northern European countries, economic ties with Arab countries were not very close. Geographically, the Middle East and the Gulf region are becoming prioritised regions for the US, countries of Central and Southern Asia are assuming a new role (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kirghizia).

The geographical distance from the zones of conflicts and tensions means that in the strategy of the US, the role of CE and Northern Europe has dramatically changed. If until now the US paid a lot of attention to the stabilisation of our region, now the US anticipates support for the implementation of its global tasks. From a consumer of security our region is gradually becoming a supplier of security. Further attention of the US to our region will largely depend on the activity and resources of the countries of the region in exporting security to other countries and thus contributing to the implementation of US policy.

Promotion of Democratic Values

The American model of globalisation rests upon the assumption that democratic states that share similar values do not fight each other, and free trade leads to prosperity for all nations. On September 11, terrorists challenged the world, where free trade, human rights and democracy prosper. The attacks did not lead to the demise of democracy – they even more consolidated democratic nations.

J.Kurth in his article “The next NATO: Building an American Commonwealth of Nations” noticed that the regions where the American way of globalisation is succeeding are actually rather few, and together they constitute much less than half the area of the globe and much less than half its population. “These regions include almost all of Europe, much of Latin America, some of the countries of the periphery

of East Asia, and of course Australia and New Zealand. As it happens, these four regions largely correspond to the US system of alliances as it existed fifty years ago (NATO, the OAS, a series of bilateral treaties with Asian countries, the ANZUS). The extent of “globalization” in 2001 is not that different from the extent of the “Free World” in 1951. 

Here, only one big difference exists – the countries of CE Europe that are successfully becoming part of the liberal–democratic and free-market Europe. CE Europe is the region round which the two rounds of NATO expansion occurred. It is this difference that links the American way of globalisation with the American proposals for NATO enlargement.

J. Kurth continues that “today, ten years after their heroic restoration of their national independence, the Baltics have been extraordinarily successful in establishing and embodying the American values of liberal democracy, the free market and the rule of law.” US politicians frequently stress that democracy is the ultimate measure against terrorism. By offering moral and practical support after the terrorist attacks Lithuania, along other European nations, psychologically and in real terms became valuable allies to America and its people.

Even more, the new CE European democracies started to transfer democracy to other regions. Their specific area of expertise and the knowledge of their eastern neighbours can provide a significant contribution to the extension of liberal-democratic values to the Ukraine, Belarus, countries of the Caucasus or Central Asia.

The Nordic countries are already enjoying the privileged status in Washington and European capitals due to their active involvement in other regions. In early 90s, the Nordic countries devoted huge resources to Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian economic development, structural reforms and Euro–Atlantic integration. Their active policy and support to the countries in transition made the Nordics very valuable partners for all countries in CE Europe.

Until now, Washington has strongly believed in democracy in Russia. The first wave of NATO enlargement was strongly related to the fear that the admission of the Baltic states would strengthen nationalism in Russia, thus putting democracy in Russia under risk. Now the US has less illusions about democracy in Russia, especially if one compares its progress to the achievements of CE European countries.

Today, only Belarus remains a black hole in the process of turning Europe into a fully democratic continent. Therefore, in the future Poland and Lithuania will have to play a significant role in strengthening American and European efforts to democratise this country.

Efforts to expand the zone of democratic values in Europe and beyond its boundaries will further remain a factor that unites interests of America and the countries of CE and Northern Europe. This is a golden opportunity for CE and Northern Europeans to contribute significantly to American strategic goals that coincide with the European interest to strengthen security and democracy in the eastern part of the continent.

Assistance in Fighting against Terrorism
and Keeping Peace in the World

34 Ibidem.
The terrorist acts once again showed the politicians of the US the importance of military means in guaranteeing state security and prosecuting criminals. Now, those allies, who can practically – by military capabilities, financial or intelligence resources – contribute to military operations have the biggest advantage. The ability to contribute becomes one of the keys to the membership in NATO.

The creation of modern and effective military forces is the most important recommendation that the US gives to NATO countries and candidates. The US renders a large part of support to the countries of the region, and if we excluded three countries that receive the largest part of US assistance – Israel, Egypt and Jordan – CE Europe would appear as the most significant receiver of US military assistance. It reflects the interest of the American administration to see countries that can practically contribute to US military operations.

The US values the assistance from partners and capabilities provided during the operation in Afghanistan (air space, airports, special forces, economic measures). NATO candidates are especially encouraged to create units, interoperable with NATO forces. This means that the potential for them to participate in common military operations is increasing. Especially important is the contribution of partners to peace support operations. All countries that are seeking membership in NATO have deployed decent-sized capabilities in the Balkans, other countries additionally have forces in other parts of the world. This allows the US to redeploy its military and to use them in other operations.

Therefore, even though the region does not have the capabilities that could influence the world's military balance, the active participation of CE and Northern European countries in the antiterrorist campaign and peace support operations contributes to the stability in other parts of the world. Although here our region is not an independent actor, it is valuable as a promoter of the global strategy of the US.

**Geostrategic Balance in Europe**

From the American perspective, the importance of CE and Northern Europe mainly derives from its ability to influence European politics, or, more precisely, decision-making in the EU that might have an impact on the global balance of power. America shares with CE and Northern European countries common security interests, such as to keep the transatlantic link, democratise Russia, preserve NATO’s role, avoid centralisation and militarisation of the EU.

Together with the United Kingdom, CE and Northern Europeans constitute the pro-American part of Europe sharing similar threat assumptions and still considering military means as a prerequisite for national security. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in the study *Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region*, has put that “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could constitute part of a core of Eastern and Central European states that serve as “new Atlanticists,” states who have a compelling interest in keeping the United States involved in European security, who seek to ensure that collective defense remains the Alliance’s raison d’être”\(^{36}\). These countries resist NATO’s “watering down” into an

\(^{36}\) Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) *Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region*, 2002. – p.1
OSCE-type organization or outright replacement by an EU defence capability.

The countries that share a common border with Russia or Belarus are extremely cautious about EU ability to guarantee security and are looking for American security guarantees. The US also understands that countries, such as Lithuania, that has a common border with the militarised Kaliningrad district, even after the membership in the EU, first of all will ally its security policy with that of the US. Such security dependence will allow the US via CE and Northern European countries exert more influence upon EU decisions, especially those related to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Denmark, which is not fully participating in ESDP and did not become a member of the WEU, already for several decades has been playing a similar role.

Similar geostrategic objectives within Europe and beyond it make CE and Northern countries closer US allies than Germany or France. Therefore, NATO's eastward enlargement preserves and in the future will strengthen US influence in the EU even more. Kenneth N. Waltz in his article *The Balance of Power and NATO Expansion* emphasised “The Bush administration saw, and the Clinton administration continues to see, NATO as the instrument for maintaining America’s domination of the foreign and military policies of European states.” 37 The successful conclusion of the EU membership negotiations made NATO enlargement a priority in the G.W. Bush administration.

American security guarantees to CE Europeans is part of American strategy to preserve the transatlantic link and avoid duplications of European capabilities separate from NATO. After a successful integration into NATO these countries will give priority to strengthening NATO rather than deepening the EU military dimension. The Nordic countries also object the EU’s militarisation – they prefer a civilian element of European Union crises management efforts and object to the creation of a new European military machine. Their policy coincides with the American interest and will find support in Washington.

CE Europeans escaped from the Soviet domination just ten years ago and they are unlikely to easily give up their hard-won sovereignty to central authorities in Brussels. After becoming members of the EU, these countries will slow down the further European integration, especially in the military field. Their policy will coincide with the American interest to talk to Europeans separately, not as a group of countries. Washington seeks to keep a fragmented Europe that does not compete with America in world affairs. Not surprisingly, the European Commission demanded from candidate countries to accede to the whole European Union acquis without any exceptions that Denmark and the United Kingdom, for instance, had negotiated previously. 38

NATO enlargement and security guarantees to CE Europeans solve another US foreign policy objective – to prevent the formation of the Moscow-Berlin axis.

37 Waltz (note 15).
38 For instance, only when Denmark received four exceptions from the Maastricht Treaty, it managed to ratify it. The European Documentation Centre (EDC) at the University of Mannheim Protocol On Denmark The High Contracting Parties, Desiring To Settle Certain Particular Problems Relating To Denmark, http://www.uni-mannheim.de/users/ddz/edz/doku/vertrag/engl/m_proto.htm
39 Уткин (note 6)
A. Utkin has pointed out that “instead of becoming a transparent corridor between the East and the West, the Baltic states, together with Poland, the undecided Ukraine and Moldova, became a wedge between America, Europe and Russia. Their integration into transatlantic structures turned them into a zone of intense geopolitical tension between Moscow and Washington”. 39

During the antiterrorist campaign, debates over NATO enlargement ceased to be a confrontational issue between Washington and Moscow. Both Russia and America were fighting terrorists in different parts of the world. The Baltic states and their neighbours lost their confrontational status and became an integral part of a free and democratic Europe. The US also understands that NATO enlargement into the Baltic states will force Sweden and Finland to rethink their security policy and the countries might one day join the Alliance. Such move would completely change the European security architecture and consolidate Europe under American leadership.

G. Gorenburg has pointed out that “if the Baltic States’ accession to NATO proceeds smoothly, it is likely that Finland and Sweden will seek to join NATO as well within the next 5 years. These two states would contribute significantly to NATO military capabilities both in and out of area. Their admission would turn the Baltic Sea almost completely into a NATO lake. This could lead to the establishment of a real security community in the region, where cooperation among NATO and EU members would flourish, where Russia would not be threatened, where Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia could rejoin the West, and where allied militaries could work together in a very useful environment.” 40

Inside the EU the pro-American CE and Northern Europe (especially if we take the British Isles as part of the region) will outbalance other centres of power – Germany or France. The economically developed Northern European region in the nearest future could become a solid competitor to Germany – the strongest EU economy. Small but highly developed Nordic countries together with the Baltic states in the European Council will control 39 votes (approximately 12 per cent). Together with Poland and the United Kingdom, the region will control 95 votes, which means veto right in the European Council. 41

CE European countries will enjoy a similar degree of influence within the EU. After the first wave of EU enlargement, CE Europeans will control 77 votes (8 votes missing to reach the blocking minority). Provided Romania and Bulgaria join in 2007, the region’s voting power will increase to 101 votes (veto right).

After the membership in the EU, both CE and Northern European countries will enjoy a higher degree of influence and power. In addition, by coordinating their efforts, these countries may even more successfully pursue their security policy agenda that will allow them to increase their weight in the eyes of decision-makers in Washington.

Economic Cooperation

The economic dependence of the United States on CE and Northern Europe-

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39 Gorenburg D., etc. The Expansion of NATO into the Baltic Sea Region: Prague 2002 and Beyond. CNA Corp., Centre for Strategic Studies, 2002, p.2
the US market. It is relatively small. The European countries account for slightly less
than 2 per cent, US market – 0.42 per cent of the US foreign trade. Even though trade flows are constantly increasing, in the foreseeable future both regions will not become strategic markets from the US point of view.

**US Foreign trade statistics**


The defence industry sector may become a special area of cooperation. As the technological gap between America and Europe is widening, technological transfer

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Defence expenditures (mln. USD)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>666</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>132</td>
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9180  9753  9228  9351

may become one of important tools to close this gap and prepare the new allies to fight alongside Americans. NATO has always emphasised that an applicant must create modern and effective armed forces. This means to spend more on defence and procure modern weapon systems. Not surprisingly, defence budgets in CE European countries are rapidly growing, in 2000 they reached 9.3 bn. USD and will continue to grow.

Wilk A. The new members of the new NATO // http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/eRap2002/ccz_01.htm,
NATO membership aspirations so far have not resulted in acquisitions from US companies. With the exception of Poland new NATO members, the Czech Republic and Hungary, are still discussing the big acquisition projects. Both America and European countries exercise political arguments to influence decisions that will be made in Prague and Warsaw.

Lithuanian has so far maintained a leading role in acquiring US technological products. It started with tactical radios from *Harris Corp.*, later turned its attention to Javelin antitank systems from *Lockheed Martin it Raytheon Corp.*, and Stinger anti-aircraft systems from “*Hughes Missile System Company*” and “*General Dynamics / Raytheon Corp.*”42

**Lithuania and other Baltic States in US Global Security Strategy**

Common understanding of security, common values and common threat perception is the unifying factor between the US and countries of CE and Northern Europe. However, their economic inter-dependency and trade flows are not high. Those factors dictate the agenda for US policy in the region, where themes of regional stability, NATO enlargement, relations with Russia dominate versus economic themes.

US policy towards Lithuania reflects a broader US security and foreign strategy, where promotion of regional security, fight against terrorism, fostering of foreign investment, economic reforms and free trade, fight against criminality and corruption play a very important role.

The US pays special attention to internal policy aspects, such as the issues of genocide, return of property to the Jews, democratisation and privatisation, attitude towards ethnic minorities, etc. In external relations, it is important for the US that Lithuania can strengthen the US–Europe relations, contribute to fight against terrorism, participate in NATO missions, improve relationships with Russia or contribute to the development of democracy.

From the geopolitical perspective, Lithuania and the other countries of the region are not pivot areas in the grand strategy of the US. They do not play a vital role in fight against terrorism, there are no strategic resources on their territories (oil, gas, nickel, etc.), there are no important communication lines, geographically they do not control important channels or entrances to strategically important regions, and the size of their trade is a small part of the whole US foreign trade.

Even so, this quiet and relatively rich part of the world has certain features that

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42 BNS [Lithuanian Armed Forces will be armed with Stinger systems] *Lietuvos kariuomenė bus apginkluota “Stinger” raketomis* 2002 spalio 11 d.
are important to the implementation of US strategy, especially American interests in
Europe, i.e. that are mostly of regional, not global level. Europe will stay the major
object of US foreign policy, therefore, Lithuania and countries of this region will have
the largest importance in common European context.

The table shows the spheres, where Americans expect CE and Northern Euro-
pean countries can find areas for cooperation:

In order to preserve active American interest in their security, Lithuania and
other Baltic states must find areas where their efforts would make a difference for the
US. Several aspects are of particular importance:

- ........................................................................................................... as a
future member of the EU, Lithuania together with other neighbours will influence
EU decisions. The bigger influence these countries will have in Brussels,
the higher degree in influence they will enjoy in Washington;
- ........................................................................................................... Li -
tuania together with other countries may act as a force multiplier of US ef-
forts to promote democracy and fight terrorism.

Costs and Benefits of US Involvement

US involvement into CE and Northern Europe is closely linked with the antici-
pated costs and benefits of its activities. Lithuania has a vital interest to keep American
attention to the CE and Northern European region, therefore, its efforts must be direc-
ted at creating favourable economic, political or military conditions for cooperation.

Lithuania’s interest to have the US in Lithuania derives from its geostrategic
realities. During the last century, Lithuania’s chances to preserve its statehood were
dependant upon Russian expansionism. Historical experience made Lithuanians ve-
ry sensitive to changes in Russian politics. After the Cold War Russia lost the status
of a great power – this change allowed Lithuania to strengthen its independence and integrate into the transatlantic community. Imperialist ambitions of Moscow have not declined – only the lack of resources does not allow Russia to continue its traditional policy of keeping the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea at its disposal.

The membership in NATO and the EU means that for an unlimited period of time the Baltic states are withdrawn from Moscow’s expansionist plans. On the other hand, the membership does not automatically imply that these countries have completely escaped from the Russian orbit. Russia will maintain its influence primarily by using economic measures and Lithuania’s dependence upon Russian gas and oil. Provided the Russian-EU cooperation in the energy sector develops into a strategic partnership, Moscow will acquire an additional level in the region.

Russia maintains its interests in the Baltic states, but the means it uses are mainly economic. Economic sanctions or blackmail would be extremely painful to Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours. EU membership provides certain guarantees against similar measures, but does not solve Lithuania’s geostrategic dilemma of being between two – European and Russian – centres of power. Lithuania needs the third geostrategic vector that would compensate the tension that derives from the existence of the two competing centres of gravity. US presence introduces the third vector into the Baltic geostrategic equation and provides flexibility for Lithuania to balance different influences and interests.

The US also has interest in preserving stability in the region which plays an important role in the European balance of power. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis admitted that “NATO membership cannot inhibit Russian manipulations of energy supplies or efforts to ‘play the ethnic card’, but the support of the Alliance and the backing of its security guarantee can embolden the Balts to handle Russia’s baiting and coercion more effectively.” 43 NATO enlargement provides a clear indication for Russia that Cold War borders are no more valid in Europe, and in the New World Order the US plays the most important role.

A more robust American commitment to the Baltic states, which used to be a zone of geostrategic tension, means not only additional benefits but also costs for the US administration. Security guarantees are a consequence of a long-lasting American commitment to the region. L. Wallin recalls that “in the mid-90s, there were suggestions, e.g. from British and German officials, that Sweden and Finland should assume the responsibility for their security, but the proposed protectors were neither capable nor willing to take on such a role. In the US, there was a growing awareness that a Baltic ‘grey area’ could have negative implications for overall European stability and security”. 44 American concern was most clearly expressed in the RAND

43 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (note 36), p.2.
study “NATO Enlargement and the Baltic states” published in 1996. The analysis and recommendations of this study argued for a more active American policy for the Baltic Sea area in the second half of the 1990s. One outcome of this was the Baltic Charter, concluded between the US and the three Baltic states in January 1998. The Charter proclaimed “real, profound and enduring” American interest to the Baltic states. In exchange for a greater near-time American political and military engagement and explicit promises of eventual NATO membership, the Baltic states agreed to wait for a later round of enlargement.

Several reasons contributed to the lack of commitment to the Baltic states in 1996. First of all, their membership was not considered as a vital element for the security of Western Europe. R. Asmus and R. Nurick have pointed out “what the Baltic states most lack is the active support of the strongest European powers in the Alliance - Germany, France and the United Kingdom. When many NATO members ask themselves whether the Alliance would and should be willing to go to war to defend the Baltic states against foreign aggression, the answer is often muted and unclear, and sometimes simply negative.” Most American decision-makers were convinced that “the United States has no significant strategic or economic interests in these [Baltic] countries, and certainly none that are anywhere near as weighty as the very substantial strategic assets and costs that would come with a US commitment to them”.

Even at the beginning of 2001, most Western analysts were convinced that Lithuania will not be invited during the second round of NATO enlargement. For example, on 30 April 2002 an influential think-tank Stratfor published analysis called “Baltic States membership in NATO unlikely”. Stratfor argued that the military situation in the region prevents NATO from moving into the Baltics: “Defending and reinforcing the region is difficult because of the region’s broad front, limited depth and restricted lines of communication. In the event of war, the Baltic states would need to be reinforced, as Russian forces would neutralize the Baltic states in their move to protect Kaliningrad and its port facilities. NATO would need to move reinforcements overland, because Kaliningrad would make air and sea resupply difficult. The road networks, developed over years of Soviet rule, favor Moscow. Limited ability to reinforce the region would allow Russia to secure the Baltic states, leaving a large number of NATO troops waiting on the beach for rescue.”

Contrary to Stratfor’s forecast in November 2002, NATO decided to invite Lithuania and its neighbours to join the Alliance. “Suddenly” it appeared that Americans were ready to sacrifice part of their resources in providing security guarantees to earlier thought undefendable nations. This historical turn reflects decreasing costs and increasing interest and benefits of American involvement into the Baltic region.

Especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US pays more attention to the countries that share the same values and belief and are ready to stand beside America in fighting terrorism and promoting democracy. J. Kurth has pointed out that in a very short time the Baltics have successfully established liberal democracy, the free

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47 Asmus, Nurick (note 45), p. 124.
48 Kurth (note 34).
49 Strategic Forecasting Baltic States Membership in NATO Unlikely, Global Intelligence Update, 27 04 2001, http://www.stratfor.com
50 Kurth (note 34).
market and the rule of law. “If any countries ever deserved to become members of NATO by virtue of their achievements by American standards, these do.”

In addition, growing economy accompanied by successful negotiations over EU membership hinted that the Baltic states, along with the whole pro-American CE and Northern European region, could be utilised in accomplishing US interests. If earlier the American policy towards the Baltic states was directed by arguments of rebuilding historical truth, from late nineties the US has also been seeking clear geostrategic objectives and benefits.

Strategic partnership between the US and Russia, growing Baltic military expenditures and increasing military capabilities, EU membership mean lower costs of US involvement in the region. New NATO-Russia relations significantly decreased the fear of confrontation with Russia over the next wave of NATO enlargement.

Making full use of favourable circumstances, the US decided to consolidate its domination in the Baltic region, on the one hand, by providing security guarantees to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, on the other – by expecting the newcomers to be reliable partners and supporters of US interests.

The changing American attitude towards Lithuanian defence potential most obviously reveals US recommendations on major issues of Lithuanian defence policy. In 1997-1998 groups of experts from the US State and Defense Departments led by Major General Kievenaar carried out “Lithuanian Defense Assessment” where the US expressed its recommendations on the development of national armed forces.51 On Lithuania’s request a similar study was made again in 2001.52

A comparative analysis of both documents illustrates different approaches of the US towards Lithuania and the capabilities the US thinks Lithuania can provide to its allies. The first study clearly advocated the principle of territorial defence and a big force structure that comes with this principle. The Assessment gave only short notices about the capabilities Lithuania could offer to peace support operations or NATO Art. 5 operations; Host Nation Support (HNS) issues were not mentioned at all. The US recommended to allocate resources to strengthen national defence capabilities indicating that in case of aggression Lithuania should rely only on its own armed forces.

The study carried out in 2001, showed a completely different approach towards the Lithuanian armed forces. The study provides a detailed assessment what Lithuania could offer to the US and NATO, what set of capabilities and infrastructure could be used for the purposes of the Alliance. A huge attention is paid to C3I (command, control, communications, intelligence), interoperability with NATO, English language knowledge, HNS and to Klaipėda sea port and Zokniai airbase in particular. The study does not mention the model of territorial defence and expresses doubts about the static force structure – the US urges to create forces interoperable with NATO.

The changing attitude towards the Lithuanian defence model shows that the US started to consider Lithuania as a reliable partner able to participate in international US-led missions. A shift from territorial defence to more mobile deployable units and emphasis on HNS provides clear indication for Lithuania that in case of aggression it will not be left alone. So far, the US has not presented a concrete plan of

action on how the Alliance could defend Lithuania, but preliminary thinking is already under way.

The increasing US commitment to our region reflects diminishing costs of US engagement to Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours. These costs could be roughly divided into three groups:

- ........................................................................................................ Political. They derive from the negative Russian and Byelorussian reaction to US engagement.
- ........................................................................................................... Military. Military costs are associated with the demonstration of US readiness to defend the Baltics.
- ........................................................................................................... Financial. It includes direct transfer of funds to the Baltic states.

The changing relationship of Russia with Europe and the US decreases costs for effective deterrence in the Baltic region. First of all, it affects political costs of American engagement. It is not a secret that the failure of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia during the first wave of NATO enlargement was a direct consequence of prospective political costs associated with Baltic NATO membership. The logic of the Russian first approach assumed that the invitation of Lithuania could have negative consequences for democracy in Russia, and would bring Russia back to authoritarianism or even confrontation between the former Cold War adversaries.

A similar logic was heard, albeit on a smaller scale, before the second wave of NATO enlargement. Already before the September 11 events, on September 3, the Russian President Putin stated in Helsinki that he believed it was up to the Baltic States to decide whether to join or not although he saw no particular reasons for that. A shift in Russian priorities and the emerging strategic partnership with the US solved the dilemma of "unbearable costs" of being in the Baltics and made it more acceptable for American decision-makers.

NATO membership will make deterrence more robust and reliable, however, already now, according to L. Wallin, "all Partner Countries have the right to demand consultations according to Article 10 of the Partnership Agreement. In addition, armed aggression would carry a very high political – and economic – price." Furthermore, in soon Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will become EU members. This would further increase political and other costs of aggression. The EU could not passively watch a member state being attacked without jeopardizing its own future.

If negative developments in Russia lead to a situation in which radical or extremist attitudes become dominant, the deterrence effect of Baltic NATO membership should reduce the risk of Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea area. This

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33 Gorenburg (note 40), p.27
34 Wallin (note 44).
35 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (note 36), p.3.
means that Baltic membership would tend to increase the security of all Europe, concludes L. Wallin.

A hypothetically worst-case scenario in greater detail was presented in the study Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region prepared by the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis. They concluded that “should a worst-case scenario play out, the operational requirements for NATO and U.S. forces are likely to be similar to those that they would need to respond to a major threat in another theater, such as the Persian Gulf. These would include core warfighting capabilities such as strategic lift, rapid reaction forces, the ability to deliver massed air-to-ground strikes in the early stages of a conflict, air-to-ground surveillance, and special operations forces (SOF).” 55

According to the IFPA, the United States is likely to be the prime supplier of both the allied air support and special operational forces units. The present capabilities of the US would allow it to fulfil its commitments, but it is worth considering that the ability of the United States to respond could be taxed if US forces were engaged elsewhere in another major operation.

The main conclusion from the operational study on Baltic defence assumes, that “as long as Russia confines itself to conventional options, the prospects for successfully defending the Baltic states under worst-case scenarios are good. However, the defensive equation becomes complicated when the potential for Russian use of weapons of mass destruction is considered.” 56 The IFPA assumes that a hostile regime willing to attack the Baltic states outright, in all likelihood, would not limit itself to conventional options. At the very least, Alliance and Baltic defence planners should not rule out the prospect of Russian WMD employment simply because it would violate international norms or risk provoking a broader conflict.

The issue of defensibility of the Baltic states is not frequently raised in official or academic circles, no public publications are available on this subject. However, during unofficial discussions several basic models for Baltic defence come out. The first model could be labelled as “the Polish model”. It is based on a sufficient base of indigenous forces that would be reinforced in a crisis from the outside. This model requires Lithuania to develop, or allies to be ready to rapidly deploy, to Lithuania a considerable quantity of conventional armaments (tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, attack helicopters, fighters). In the second, “technological”, model reinforcements would come from ‘over the horizon’. They would be largely based on American air power and precision guided munitions. The third option is a hybrid model which rests upon the employment of modest reinforcements, but would also include “over the horizon” air strikes. In theory, there exists deterrence by the retaliation model. Attacks would be carried out against the aggressor’s civilian and economic targets using WMD.

All options have a different level of support in the US and among its allies and new members of NATO. It is clear that deterrence by the retaliation model would draw least support among all nations and the Baltic states. The US might prefer the “technological” model, assuming that financial costs associated with this model would be modest and the capabilities required already exist. The technological model is not acceptable for the Baltic states, because it rests only upon political US commitment

55 Ibidem.
and does not assure its physical presence in the region.

European NATO members would prefer the traditional “Polish” model. For Lithuania it would mean the creation of large territorial forces able to conduct large-scale operations inside the country, but barely able to participate in “out of area” NATO operations. Considering that NATO nations are moving towards small, mobile and rapidly deployable units, the territorial defence model does not seem to be a feasible model for the Baltic states.

Most likely, the final decision will reflect a compromise between the needs of the Baltic states and capacities of the allies. Such compromise means that reinforcements would come from European NATO members and from the US. The hybrid model guarantees that deterrence would include the elements of the inevitability of defence and retaliation. For Lithuania it means that deterrence would be highly enhanced by the physical presence of the US in the region. This presence might be manifested in the form of common initiatives, military training or exercises or even permanent location of US troops.

Additional costs for NATO enlargement arise from Russian policy to minimise the consequences of US engagement in the Baltic region. First of all, Russia seeks to establish political and legal limitations for America’s presence. In real terms, this means that the US will be denied the opportunity to deploy nuclear weapons and establish military bases on the territory of new NATO members. Secondly, the existing arms control regime will be extended to the Baltic states. Already in 1993, Lithuania joined the Vienna Document on confidence and security building measures and exchange of military information. In the 1999 Istanbul Summit, Lithuania declared that it was considering the possibility of the accession to the CFE Treaty, provided the accession terms were in Lithuania’s national interests. In September 2002, the President of Lithuania in his statement before the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the intention to accede to the CFE Treaty after the adapted treaty comes into force and is open to all European democracies. In addition, in 2002, Lithuania applied for membership in the Open Skies Treaty, and the Open Skies Commission at the OSCE approved the Lithuanian application. The Open Skies Treaty creates the regime for aerial observation, which aims to improve openness and transparency among state parties.

These measures diminish the reliability of deterrence since they put limitations on the presence of the Alliance on the territory of the new members. Most likely, because of political considerations, the US and other allies will be willing to pay this price. Arms control regime and limitation of troops in this sensitive area will provide additional guarantees to Russia that in times of crises no huge military potential would be concentrated in the Baltic states. These are political costs and they make a significant part of the NATO enlargement process.

US financial costs originating from its engagement in the Baltics are relatively small. The military integration of the new members of 1999 has proved to be more difficult than expected. According to L. Wallin, “insufficient knowledge of English within their militaries, slow progress in reforming defence structures and planning, insufficient resources to bring about the necessary modernization of their NATO incompatible materiel, and the unreformed attitudes and outmoded operational con-

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57 Wallin (note 44).
cepts still prevalent in their officer corps are often quoted examples of obstacles to integration. In most, or all, of these respects the Baltic states have an advantage compared to the new members of 1999 as well as to their fellow candidates.

A. Wilk in his report “The new members of the new NATO”, written for the Center for Eastern Studies, emphasized that “since armies [of the Baltic states] were created from scratch in the 1990s (without any old equipment and materiel), they did not have any significant problems with adjusting themselves to the NATO standards expected of them. (The up-to-date materiel and equipment were usually presented to them by the Western countries.) A considerable increase in the expenses for the modernisation of the armed forces is of large significance here. In the case of joining NATO, the three Baltic countries (as the only candidates so far) would have the armies already adjusted to its standards.”

NATO expects from the invitees to develop small and mobile forces, that could contribute to collective defence. On the other hand, according to the report by the Centre for Naval Analysis, “despite their relatively advanced state of preparation, the Baltic States’ small size and limited resources mean that they will never be significant contributors to NATO military forces. Their air forces are entirely dedicated to surveillance, with no attack and limited air defense capability. Their armies are currently capable of fielding no more than one NATO-interoperable battalion per country, although there are plans to increase this to a brigade per country by 2006.”

Despite their small size, the Baltic States could provide capabilities that would enhance NATO’s military capability. The CNA stressed that “most important, their inclusion will extend NATO’s air surveillance system to cover the entire Baltic Sea and a large part of northwestern Russia.”

The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis emphasises another aspect of BALTNET’s integration which is important for the US. “Collectively, all three Baltic nations comprise a cohesive strategic space that has particular relevance for integrated air and missile defense operations and the defense-in-depth of Northern European Alliance territories.” In 2002, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia announced that they were procuring new radars for the BALTNET – Lithuania decided to obtain two middle-range, Latvia and Estonia opted for one long range radar each. These plans have already triggered a negative reaction in Russian mass media, which claim that data from new radars could be transferred to American intelligence networks or the BALTNET could be plugged into the missile defence system.

Overall, the CNA emphasised that, in their estimation, when the probability of military aggression is very small, US costs associated with their integration are negligible. The CNA concludes that “the strategic benefits of the membership for the Baltic states outweigh the majority of concerns related to worst-case scenarios.”

From this perspective, the integration of small but modern Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian armed forces represents a small financial burden for both the applicants and the Alliance. The International Monetary Fund in its study “The Baltics:

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57 Gorenburg (note 40), p.11
58 Ibidem, p.2
59 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (note 36), p.4.
60 Ibidem, p.1.
61 International Monetary Fund The Baltics: Medium - Term Fiscal Issues Related to EU and NATO accession, 2002, p.3-4.
62 Official information from Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, International Relations Department.
Medium-Term Fiscal Issues Related to EU and NATO accession” has pointed out that “the Baltics are well placed to face the fiscal challenges of the EU and NATO membership. With modern tax and expenditure structures at the outset and a long tradition of prudent fiscal policy to support the maintenance of their exchange rate regimes, they can be expected to embrace these challenges in the years ahead.”

The US provides Lithuania with financial assistance that is used to prepare its armed forces to integrate into NATO. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme was created to support the training of Lithuanian military personnel in US educational institutions. In 1995, Lithuania received 200,000 USD, in 1996 – 498,000 USD, in 1997 – 520,000 USD, in 1998 m. – 650,000 USD, in 1999 m. – 727,000 USD, in 2000 – 760,000 USD, in 2001 m. – 800,000 USD support.  

Foreign Military Finance (FMF) funds were used to procure from the US military equipment for the Lithuania armed forces. In 1996, FMF funds amounted to 1.25 mln. USD (among many other items used mainly for the procurement of tactical communications equipment), in 1997 – 1.5 mln. USD (tactical communications equipment), in 1998 m. – 5.7 mln. USD (equipment for Regional airspace control centre, Military Cartography Centre), in 1999 – 4.7 mln. USD (equipment for Military Cartography Centre, the joint Lithuanian-Polish battalion), in 2000 – 4.4 mln. USD (equipment for Regional Airspace Control Centre, communications equipment), in 2001 m. – 6.5 mln. USD (antitank systems, communications equipment).  

From the overview of the US support, a conclusion could be drawn that for political support and security commitments to the region, the US has acquired reliable and pro-American partners, that have resources and the political will to act as US allies and support its European policy. The Baltic states do not expect that for the sake of their freedom the US would sacrifice its global security interest, but they feel that they play quite an important role in US European strategy. The decreasing costs of American engagement in the Baltic region and the increasing weight that the Baltics will exercise in European politics could lead to increasing US commitments and activism in the region.

**Future Areas of Cooperation**

American policy towards Lithuania is part of a broader American global strategy directed at Europe and at CE and Northern Europe in particular. Lithuania’s location of being in the middle of the pro-American part of Europe and the specifics of its geostrategic situation (borders with Belarus and the Russian Kaliningrad district) imply certain differences from the rest of the region.

First of all, Lithuania plays a more important role in constructing Western policy towards Belarus. Lithuania and Poland maintain much closer contacts with the Byelorussian position and opposition than the rest of Europe. The Lithuanian role will further increase when a regime change will take place in Belarus.

Secondly, Lithuania could play a more important role in the efforts of Western countries to integrate Russia into Europe. Lithuania, as the biggest investor in Kali-

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63 Ibidem.
ningrad district, could contribute to the transformation of this Russian district into a model for future cooperation between NATO and EU members and the country that strives to get closer to both organisations.

Despite national peculiarities, Lithuania will maintain its regional role in US global strategy. European policy and transatlantic relationship remains the main items on their agenda. Together with other countries in the CE and Northern European region, Lithuania is interested to keep American engagement in the region, transform NATO into a more effective organisation, help Russia become a democracy with market economy, keep the EU away from creating a military dimension. Concurrency of interests makes the US and countries of the CE and Northern European region natural partners on most European policy issues.

At the beginning of 21st century, the US seeks to transform CE and Northern European region into a secure and stable zone. However, in the future, the US could decide that its all objectives in CE and Northern European have been accomplished and it could, with minimal financial implications, maintain status quo in this part of Europe. In such scenario, the Baltic states would become a part of a quiet and godforsaken corner of Europe. The US could decide that all problems have been solved and decrease its engagement in the region.

Such scenario would run counter Lithuanian interest. US disengagement would mean the return of German-Russian domination and leave less flexibility for decision-makers in Vilnius. Therefore, Lithuania must find areas where it could be useful to Americans and would draw US interests into the region. The CSIS emphasised that “Lithuania can strengthen American interests in Europe by acting as a reliable U.S. ally within the Alliance and promoting Washington’s interests in security, trade, and business. Lithuania has the political will to use its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to this effect.”

Lithuania and other countries of the region must find niches where they could specialise and where their activities could play an important role in US global strategy.

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<th>Russia, Kaliningrad</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Central Asia</th>
<th>Antiterrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
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<td>Baltic states</td>
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<td>Vilnius 10</td>
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The most promising way is regional cooperation. CE and Northern Europe is a region of small states. Even larger countries as Sweden and Poland alone are not significant actors on the international arena. Only acting together, small CE and Northern European countries can develop important capabilities.

The US has always supported all forms of regional cooperation in the region. The Council of the Baltic Sea, the BALTSEA Forum, V10 Group, the Central European Initiative and other ideas have received warm responses from the US administration. From the point view of the US, two aspects are important. First, new initiatives must not lead to regionalisation of security. Secondly, initiatives must not contradict US foreign policy objectives. Here, Lithuania can play an important role in

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66 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius, (note 2), p.50.
working together with its partners in order to increase its role in certain areas:

By acting together, the countries will not only achieve their national objectives but also gain financial and political US support and greater attention in Washington. To achieve this, the initiative must be based on several principles:

- must lead to the creation of real capabilities that could be used by the partners;
- initiative must embrace Russia, the Ukraine, or perhaps, in the future, Belarus;
- participation costs must be kept at the lowest possible level;
- result of the initiative must add value to the antiterrorist campaign or to the

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<th>Interests</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Lithuania’s role in US strategy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Maintain hegemony; war against terrorism, fight against proliferation of WMD</td>
<td>Has no independent agenda, low priority</td>
<td>Lithuania as US force multiplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>Fix Russian borders, strengthen NATO, maintain balance of power, non-militarised EU</td>
<td>Similar to the US but more emphasis on intra-EU issues</td>
<td>Huge opportunities for cooperation in constructing policy towards Russia and coordinating positions on intra-EU issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Not high priority, mainly concerning common principles, such as democratic values</td>
<td>Democracy in Belarus, demilitarisation and economic development of Russia</td>
<td>Lithuania is interested to involve the US into regional matters in exchange of its support on global policy issues.</td>
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development of democratic societies in other regions.

Forums or initiatives that meet these criteria exist already. 5 + 3 + 1 meeting of Defence Ministers where major issues of Northern European security are discussed can be a good example of this. This forum should be maintained or even transformed to include the implementation of concrete military projects.

The main challenge that lies ahead is to combine these principles with national priorities. Lithuania, as a future member of the EU, will take into account common positions in the framework of CFSP, which sometimes differ from US suggestions. The US, as the world’s dominant power, and Lithuania, as a small state, naturally have different priorities in the world, in Europe and its northern part. Lithuania will pay its attention largely to regional problems, intra-European issues will gain more importance, whereas global issues as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, global stability will dominate the US agenda.

The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis concluded in a similar way by saying

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67 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (note 36), p.5.
that “the United States has exerted a fair amount of political capital to make Baltic membership in NATO a reality. It is now the Baltic states’ turn to repay the favor and prove that they are, in fact, members of the Euro-Atlantic family, ready and willing to continue to contribute their resources and personnel to the defense of common interests.” According to the IFPA, the Baltic states can do this in three ways.

First, they must continue the serious work of preparing and improving their militaries for operations with the Alliance. Expediting and expanding plans and facilities for Host Nation Support (HNS) should be a priority in this regard, as should the development of effective capabilities for operating in crisis response scenarios.

Second, the Baltic states must enhance their efforts to reach out to Russia. The confidence that NATO’s security guarantee provides should make it easier for them to engage their larger neighbour. Lithuania could serve as a bridge between Russia and the Alliance.

Finally, the Baltic states must recognize that as full NATO members, they will have a meaningful voice in the debates and discussions on key matters of the Alliance’s business. They must use this voice to support the transformation of the Alliance so that it would remain a viable defence organisation.

The US is waiting for partners’ contribution in transferring common democratic values to other regions that still suffer from instability, extremism and terrorism. After Lithuania regained its independence in 1990, it received a huge support from its northern neighbours. Now, it’s Lithuania’s turn together with other nations to support countries in the Caucasus, the Balkans or Central Asia. Its efforts in these regions would draw significant support from the US.

From the global perspective, Lithuania should enhance its cooperation with US allies in more distant parts of the world. Defence and security related cooperation with Middle East countries (Israel, Jordan, Egypt) or South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan) could have a positive impact on Lithuania’s security cooperation with the US.

In its efforts to maintain American interest, areas that involve Russian or Ukrainian participation are especially promising. Examples of such cooperation might be common projects in Kaliningrad district covering different themes – science, environmental protection or crisis management. In the future, they can be extended to cover even military projects or initiatives. An example of similar cooperation might be the Kiel initiative which is aimed at fostering cooperation between the Navies of all Baltic Sea countries. Successful sea demining operations have already been conducted under the flag of this initiative.

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Similar priorities between the US and Lithuania will remain in the future. The US will carry on with its vision – to create a stable and democratic region where friendly and prosperous nations prevail. They are bound by common values, beliefs and wish to expand the zone of democracy and free economy. During the last decade, Lithuania has achieved the status of an ally. The new status means not only privileges but also responsibilities. Security guarantees are the main expression of American interest. This is also a dividing line that separates the US-Lithuanian relations into two periods – prior to Prague and beyond.

Relations after Prague will take another character. NATO’s business – adaptation of the Alliance, its internal reforms, out of area operations – will become a more important element of a bilateral dialogue. Membership in NATO and the North EU will also require that Lithuania formulate its position on such issues as Korea or Taiwan, which have never been Lithuania’s priority. A larger spectrum of common challenges will further intensify the Lithuanian-American dialogue and will contri-
Debates on NATO’s Future

North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded with the purpose of containing and deterring the Soviet Union. The enormous threat it posed has gone away. Russia does not pose a similar threat. Thus, the following problem has arisen: is NATO still indispensable and if so, what kind of NATO is needed in the 21st century? In other words: what is NATO’s raison d’être today? Analysis of various views and opinions raised on these issues is the main purpose of this article. It gives the most attention to different standpoints of Americans and their allies in Europe and their conflicting relations, which pose a danger to the unity and future of the Alliance. Another focus is the relation between NATO enlargement and its changing nature. The Alliance’s ability to respond to new challenges to international security, whose symbol became September 11, and its role in the new global security system are explored as well.

Causes of the debates

In order to understand why debates on NATO’s future have recently become very intensive and to grasp the character of the questions discussed, we must turn to the roots of NATO. The first attempts to create an organization of the countries of Western Europe, having among others the military dimension, too, date back to 1948, when the Brussels Treaty on economic, social, and cultural cooperation and self-defense, was signed by Belgium, the UK, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and France. Yet, in the face of the growing Soviet threat, it soon became clear that a Western defense alliance capable of ensuring a balance of power in Europe was impossible without the participation of the USA. After the beginning of the Cold War, the USA did not want to repeat the mistake which it had made after World War I, when the Congress did not ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the USA did not become its member and for long years withdrew from the efforts to solve European security problems. This circumstance was one of the causes of World War II, because France and the UK did not manage to stop the fascist aggression themselves.

At the end of the forties, the source of the threat was expansionist ambitions of communism, and not those of fascism or Nazism. Almost the entire Eastern and Central Europe was in its, that is, the Soviet Union’s, sphere of control. The communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade, which started in the April of the same year, were clear evidence that without active steps taken by the democratic Western states communism could become a fatal threat to all Western Europe. That meant that it would become a real threat to the United States as well.
Under these circumstances, a treaty establishing NATO was signed in Washington in 1949. Based on the ideas of N. Spykman and other scholars in geopolitics and strategy, NATO was created as a Western defense organization the main aim of which was to stop the spreading of communism in Western Europe. The doctrines of containment and deterrence were the fundamentals of NATO’s strategy during the Cold War.

Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, defined NATO’s main goals in a concise and suggestive way as follows: to keep Russians out, Germans down, Americans in. Russians (communist countries) had to be contained; their further expansion into Europe had to be stopped. Under the circumstances, it was possible to do only with the help of Americans. Because of the entrenched American isolationist traditions, American military and political involvement in (Western) Europe was not something to be taken for granted. But when the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, the administration, the Congress and wider public became convinced that defense of Europe was an American national interest. Emaciated after the war, Europe at that time had no capacity to defend itself from Soviet divisions deployed in East Germany, which could reach the Eastern border of France in some or some tens of hours. By the way, the post-war plans to create a European defense community faltered by the French Parliament had at that time no real prospects not only because of political but also military-strategic reasons.

Some time later, the President of France Charles de Gaulle remarked that, as conceived in 1949, “L’OTAN, c’est la defense de l’Europe par les Americains”1. This saying contains much truth, but by defending Europe, Americans defended also themselves, or rather their national interests.

NATO played at least two important roles. The Alliance became a serious military power, which contained the communist expansion in Europe. It turned out to be a serious balance to the conventional and, later, to the growing nuclear power of the Soviet Union. In the post-war years, this balance of power ensured peace and protected not only Europe, but the whole world from a military conflict which could annihilate it.

Not less important was the Alliance’s role in uniting (Western) Europe. Today, when the European Union’s strength is growing and its enlargement is proceeding swiftly, it is often credited with the role of unifying Europe. Yet, the reconciliation of France and Germany, which is usually linked with Robert Schuman’s plan and the creation of the Coal and Steel Union in 1951, was, in fact, the result of the purposive American policy, including the policy conducted within the framework of NATO. There is enough evidence in support of the claim that the activities of Schuman and Jean Monnet, who was the first in the post-war years to propose the creation of super state institutions in Europe, were financed mainly by Americans. They managed to reduce the traditional enmity between France and Germany and pave the way for the admission of Germany to NATO in 1955. Germany’s admission to NATO was not only a means of strengthening the Alliance, but also a way of fettering possible revisionist German ambitions, a way to keep Germans down. It is worth of reminding that the Rome Treaty, which became a legal foundation of the European Com-

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munity (to be later transformed into the European Union), was signed two years after Germany became a member of NATO, and it is very doubtful that without this step the European Community could be established at all.

There is no need to try to describe and analyze here the later development of NATO. I would only like to mention the admission of Spain in 1982, which strengthened not so much NATO itself as a very fragile at that time democratic regime of this country and demonstrated that NATO was able to ensure political stability of its members, not only their military security. The political element in the activities of NATO was becoming increasingly stronger, especially after the political changes in the Soviet Union in late fifties and the appearance of the first signs of warming of the relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. Yet, until the end of the Cold War, NATO remained mainly a military defensive alliance. Of course, its members were bound together more and more by both common interests of ensuring security and common values, which grew in significance not only in the countries having old democratic traditions, such as the USA, the UK, and France, but also in the former totalitarian or authoritarian (West) Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. However, the main task of NATO was territorial defense of its member-countries. Discussions were going on the circumstances and possibilities of the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and other military matters, but the armed forces of NATO members, especially of its European members, were developed mainly with the purpose of strengthening territorial defense. Mobile forces capable of conducting military operations outside a clearly defined area of responsibility of NATO were not developed at a rapid pace, because they were not very important for territorial defense. Nuclear mines placed at the border with East Germany were regarded as a much more effective protection from the threatening tanks of the Warsaw Pact than mobile rapid reaction forces. The warranted mutual self-destruction in a full-scale nuclear conflict ensured security of both opposing blocks, but gave no incentive to a radical reform of the structure of the armed forces of NATO countries. The Soviet Union’s invasion into Afghanistan increased anxiety concerning Soviet intentions and plans in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere. Yet, the invasion was regarded rather as an inducement to strengthen the existing NATO’s defense capabilities and not as an incentive to start a radical reform of the armed forces.

The situation radically changed after the end of the Cold War. Admittedly, the end of the Cold War may be linked not only with the internal social and political processes in communist countries that NATO’s analysts, focused on the analysis of military and strategic factors, did not take notice of, but also with NATO’s efforts in the defense area. The Soviet Union had no possibilities to create a wide-ranging ABM system much talked about already in the eighties, although its real construction has started only recently. Although its military-industrial complex was relatively well developed, almost all economy of the country had to be involved into the process of the construction of such system. The shape of the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union was deplorable because of its natural degradation. Thus, NATO’s military might was an important external circumstance, which had an effect on the collapse of the communist system and of the Soviet Union itself. The burden of growing military expenses was simply too great for it to sustain.

Not all analysts agree that the West won the Cold War. Some claim that the Soviet Union simply withdrew from it. Yet, this difference of the opinions does not
deny the fact that after the fall of the Soviet Union and political, economic and military weakening of Russia, this country does not cause a serious and direct threat to the Alliance anymore. This statement is a fundamental presumption on which all recent debates on NATO’s future are based. Political changes in Russia do matter. Yet more important is the crude fact that Russia simply has no military capabilities to start a wide-ranging offensive and invade Western Europe. Its divisions are deployed not in East Germany, but more than a thousand kilometers to the East, the general state of its armed forces is lamentable, Germany is united, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are members of NATO. One additional fact, which is less often taken notice of, is worth mentioning. Some Western military analysts estimate that in the mid-seventies, the Soviet Union needed just two days or, at the most, two weeks to start a wide-ranging military offensive on the West after making an appropriate political decision. If Russia’s political leadership made such an absolutely unimaginable decision today, at least two years for military preparations would be necessary.

Russia still has the most of its strategic nuclear weapons intact, thus, even today it is capable of annihilating all NATO countries. But because of the very bad shape of its conventional military forces, a wide-ranging military conflict in Europe has become virtually impossible. A purely nuclear attack by Russia would be absolutely irrational. Thus, NATO’s political and military leaders and experts look at Russia’s nuclear potential, still impressive, without the previous fear. To be more exact, they are more concerned not about the very fact of its existence, but about Russia’s ability to ensure its safety. NATO was founded to contain and deter the Soviet Union and to withstand the great threat it posed. Now this threat has disappeared. Thus, it is natural to ask: is NATO still indispensable and if so, what kind of NATO is needed in the 21st century? In other words, what is NATO’s raison d’être today? Of course, when searching for an answer to this question, an account must be taken of many factors and circumstances we still have not mentioned, including new threats to international security, the relations between the USA and Europe, NATO and the EU, as well as relations between NATO, the EU, and Russia. Analysis of different views concerning these matters is the main aim of this article.

**NATO’s enlargement and NATO’s future**

We will begin from the issue of NATO’s enlargement, because when speaking about NATO’s future, the question how big NATO must be and how many members it must have is not of secondary importance. This issue is directly related to the question about NATO’s character and role in the 21st century.

In the middle of the nineties, debates on NATO’s enlargement were quite often carried on, especially in candidate countries, as if an enlargement of the old style Cold-War-period NATO was discussed. The military might of the enlarged Alliance was much debated about. Thinking in territorial terms, much was anticipated from the expected bettering of the geostrategic situation of NATO after moving NATO’s boundaries eastwards. At least Germany, which was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the first post-Cold-War wave of NATO’s enlargement (although until 2002, it was very skeptical as to the necessity of the second wave), was convinced that after it handed over the role of a front-line state to Poland and the Czech Republic, its security would increase.
But, in fact, the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO was decided mainly not by military but by political considerations. It was much more important for the old NATO countries to ensure stability and democracy in the important adjacent region than to strengthen NATO's military power. Truly speaking, Spain became a member of NATO because of the same considerations. In both cases, the Alliance had to deal with the non-democratic past of the countries to be admitted. The membership in the Alliance was regarded as a guarantee of political permanence and democratic development. The highest officials of NATO, especially civilians, like to reiterate that the unity of the Alliance is ensured not only by the Washington Treaty and common command structures but also by shared values. When presenting arguments for the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, it was possible to claim that this step would speed up the process of adopting Western values in Central Europe and to rely on the fact of the successful political and not only military integration into the “really” Western world of Spain, Portugal and Greece.

Of course, NATO refused to admit Slovakia, which was ruled in the authoritarian manner by Vladimir Meciar, but this step was meant to be a political lesson to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe: in order to become a member of an elite club you must follow written and unwritten rules of it even before you become a member. By the way, the absence of Slovakia in the first wave of NATO’s enlargement made that wave slightly questionable from a purely strategic point of view. Hungary became isolated from the other NATO members, thus indefensible.

Debates on NATO’s enlargement as an important factor, which could affect NATO’s future, have been very intensive during the last two years, and the prevalent opinions were changing quickly. At the beginning, i.e. after the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and the final ascertaining that from the military point of view they were not full-fledged members of the Alliance, the standpoint of most Western analysts and politicians related to the desire for the next fast wave of the enlargement became very skeptical. This position was strengthened by the fact that public opinion of some new member-countries, especially that of the Czech Republic, was not in favor of NATO’s actions during NATO’s Kosovo operation. The new members were not prepared militarily and, what was much worse, they were not very reliable politically.

Because of the problems related to the real integration of the new members into the Alliance in the year of 2000, many older NATO members had no intention to support a further enlargement. At that time, early membership of the Baltic countries in the Alliance seemed rather unlikely. It was actively supported by Denmark, Poland, a little more cautiously by other Visegrad countries and, what was most important, by some members of the American administration. Those experts and analysts, who supported the idea of a fast further enlargement at all, tended towards the opinion that it was advisable to limit themselves to the minimal version of a further enlargement. As the most likely candidates, Slovenia, which is the most economically developed country among the candidates, and Slovakia, where political situation changed and Meciar lost his post, have been most often mentioned. Admittedly, the proposal made by Zbigniew Brzezinski to expand NATO in two directions, to the South and the North, by admitting Slovenia and Lithuania to the Alliance, aroused some interest in NATO. Brzezinski emphasized that the admission of Lithuania, postponing the membership of other Baltic countries, was preferable since, firstly, the so-called red line, i.e. the borderline of the former Soviet Union, would be
crossed and the Alliance would show that it does not recognize the limits to its enlargement unilaterally declared by Russia, and secondly, the accession of only one Baltic country to NATO would soften Russia’s negative reaction. True, the notion that Lithuania’s membership in NATO is possible without the membership of Latvia and Estonia was the cornerstone of Lithuania’s foreign policy for a few years. From the middle of the nineties, one of its undeclared aims was the dismantling of the Baltic geopolitical region.

Yet Brzezinski’s arguments, in spite of his prestige, did not convince many policy-makers in NATO countries. These arguments were weakened, of course, by the well-known fact of his Polish origin, which was not difficult to link with Poland’s support for Lithuania’s membership in NATO.

In 2001, the situation in the debates on the enlargement of NATO started to change, and the number of supporters of a wider NATO expansion by admitting many countries simultaneously, i.e. of the so-called big bang, started to grow gradually. A few factors influenced this change. The most important was the increase of the number of supporters of a wider enlargement of NATO in the main NATO country. Many members of the administration, congressmen and representatives of academic circles began to understand two things. Firstly, because of the changing functions of NATO and its evolution from a military defense alliance towards a kind of security community having, admittedly, a developed military structure, the degree of economic development and even the condition of the armed forces of the candidate countries plays a less important role than it was thought a few years ago. For a new, less military and more political Alliance, the admission of several and not only two new members is very desirable. In such case, after making a tentative positive decision concerning Slovakia and Slovenia, it is necessary to decide, which other candidate countries could be invited to NATO: the Baltic countries or Romania and Bulgaria.

The Baltic countries meet membership criteria better than Romania and Bulgaria. Yet, the importance of the latter for NATO was clearly demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis. On the other hand, recently it has become clear that because of a slower pace of economic reforms and their economic underdevelopment, these countries will not be admitted to the EU until 2007. Seeking to expand the zone of stability in Europe, to maintain Western influence and not to disappoint their inhabitants too much, their admission to at least one of the main Euro-Atlantic organizations is clearly advisable. Some NATO countries are inclined to support the membership of the Baltic countries in NATO, others – that of Romania and Bulgaria. In this situation, likely the best solution is to admit all mentioned countries – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria – simultaneously. Thus, there would be no need to come back to the issue of the enlargement of NATO soon and have new political problems in NATO countries. In his Bratislava speech delivered in 2001, Brzezinski also supported such model of NATO enlargement.

The second reason why Americans started to look more sympathetically at the membership of all mentioned countries is likely the fact that they began to more highly appreciate the importance of their positions in Central and Eastern Europe. Because of the complication of the USA and the EU relations, it became more important to have more devotees of the USA in Europe.

The evolution of Russia’s position towards the enlargement of NATO had also some effect on the increase of the number of supporters of the big bang. In Putin’s
times it softened considerably. Many facts testified to that even before September 11, 2001. We will mention only one. In spite of the Kremlin’s official “no” to the further enlargement, already in the autumn of 2000, the Governor of Kaliningrad region, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Baltic Fleet Vladimir Jegorov openly declared that nothing would change in Kaliningrad region after Lithuania becomes a member of NATO. It was easy to conclude that if Lithuania’s membership in NATO did not affect the Russian exclave, which would be surrounded by the territory of NATO member-countries, it could not make a great impact on the geopolitical situation of the whole of Russia. For good reasons, Jegorov was much more concerned about Poland’s and Lithuania’s future membership in the EU.

At the end of 2000, Russia became more or less reconciled to the fact that it forever lost the status of the superpower it had had in the Soviet times and had to behave as a regional power that could exert only a very limited impact on the decisions made by the only remaining superpower and its allies. Besides, Russia became convinced that NATO was keeping its promise not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of its new members. The image of NATO as an aggressive alliance was strengthened in Russia by NATO’s actions during the Kosovo crisis, but after bombardments ended and especially after Slobodan Milosevic lost power in Yugoslavia, this image began to pale.

The softening of Russia’s position towards NATO’s enlargement was also related to the hope that the expanding North Atlantic Alliance would become, in purely military terms, not stronger but weaker. This estimation is shared not only by some Russian but also Western analysts. Very characteristic in this respect is the position taken up by The Economist. In May 2002, in an unsigned text, which has the status of the so-called special report, this position was defined very clearly:

Last June, in Warsaw, Mr Bush called on NATO to be ready at Prague to issue as many new invitations as possible. The alliance should ‘not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom’. Yet some of those who most value NATO’s military effectiveness – the British and German governments, some members of the United States Senate – have doubts about going much beyond the current 19 members. They worry that Mr Bush’s open-door enthusiasm really reflects his dwindling interest in NATO as a military tool.

Critics feel that to extend new invitations to Slovenia, Slovakia, perhaps the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and possibly even to Bulgaria and Romania, would inevitably dilute the alliance, turning it into more of a security talking-shop. That might make a bigger NATO more acceptable to Russia, but would reduce it to little more than an armed version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is open to all Europeans and spends its time on good works such as election-monitoring.2

The third factor is also worth mentioning: not only Americans, but also European NATO members began to see some advantages of the fast and wide enlargement of NATO. They are not afraid of the possible strengthening (or rather temporary strengthening) of USA positions in the Alliance. At least some European politicians believe that the accession of new countries to NATO in the future will create better conditions for the development of the EU Rapid Reaction Forces. The precondition of a successful advance of such forces is cooperation of most EU countries within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance.

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The USA, the EU, and NATO

NATO’s enlargement will have, without doubt, an impact on NATO’s character and import. But the changing relations between the USA and Europe (i.e. the EU) will have even a larger impact on NATO’s future. One of the factors influencing these relations is the reaction of the USA on the military ambitions of Europe. Yet this reaction must be seen in a wider perspective, and many of those taking part in the debates on NATO’s future understand that very well. During the last three or four years, the problem of the evolution of the relations between the USA and Europe and of the impact of this evolution on NATO’s future became one of the most if not the most discussed issues in academic and non-academic literature on international relations.

Daniel Rotfeld, the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, one of the leading authorities in Europe, is firmly convinced that

This [the USA-EU. – E.N.] relationship will largely determine the new role for NATO in Europe. One thing is unquestionable: in the entire history of the European efforts to integrate security and defence policies, the last two years have brought about a new quality with the adoption of the St. Malo Declaration of December 1998. Various elements have contributed to that: the collapse of the bipolar system; the lack of clear, “classic” external threats; the new status of the USA in NATO, Europe and in the world; and, lastly, the crisis situations on the periphery of South Europe, particularly in the Balkans.1

A very important reference point for Rotfeld and other participants of the debates is the St. Malo Declaration of France and the UK, which reflected a strengthened – during the years of Blair’s rule – self-perception of the UK as a European country and opened way to the creation of the military forces of the EU, which could carry out Petersburg type missions. Of course, when discussing the evolution of the USA-EU relations, participants of the debates also recall the Maastricht Treaty, which laid foundations for common foreign and security policy of the EU, as well as other political decisions made and legal acts adopted by the EU, specifically the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, and the decisions made at Köln and Helsinki.

Since the creation of the Alliance, the USA has been a politically and militarily prevalent country in NATO. Members of the American administration and congressmen constantly show their dissatisfaction with an insufficient financial and military contribution of European members of NATO to the implementation of NATO’s tasks, the most important of which is, or at least was until recently, defense of (Western) Europe itself. The USA spends a much greater part of its national product on defense than European NATO members. An exception from the rule is Greece and Turkey, but the most important reason of a relatively high level of expenses of these countries on defense is rather tense relations between these countries themselves (admittedly, they have lately become less tense), and not the common needs of NATO. As to the size of the armed forces, European NATO members outnumber the USA (1.8 and 1.3 million respectively), but European countries lack most modern military equipment, especially precision weapons, means of transport and communications, military aircraft and plenty of other things necessary for modern armies. For

the equipment of one soldier, the USA spends about three times more than European members of the Alliance. The part of GDP spent on defense in the USA was constantly decreasing during the nineties, but say in 1999, it was 3.5%, whereas the average of European NATO members was 2.4%. The biggest European country Germany decreased its military expenditures to 1.8% of GDP in 2001.

The extra 48 billion US dollars, which the USA will add to its defense budget in 2003, exceeds the present defense budgets of France and the UK taken together. Admittedly, 11 out of 15 EU countries plan to slightly increase their military spending in 2003, but American and European military efforts look very differently in their financial expression. Even a greater gap can be seen between the results of these efforts, i.e. the level of the armed forces. In 2002, the EU made some important decisions concerning these matters, but, at least from the formal point of view, that means the strengthening of the military potential of the EU, not of NATO. Americans are especially unhappy that European countries use even those modest financial means ineffectively.

The most serious blow to the illusions – if somebody still had them – that NATO was an alliance of more or less militarily equivalent and interoperable partners was dealt by the Kosovo campaign. At the February 2000 Munich Conference on Security Policy, the US Defense Secretary William Cohen told Europeans:

We simply cannot continue with a posture in which one member of NATO conducts virtually two thirds of all air support sorties and half of all air combat missions; in which only a handful of countries have precision munitions that can operate in all kind of weather; and in which some pilots had to communicate over open frequencies in a hostile environment.

Europeans had no choice but to accept this criticism. As Germany’s Minister of Defense stated at the same conference, the problem in NATO is not too much of America, but too little of Europe. During the Kosovo campaign it became clearer than ever that NATO, which was emphasizing interoperability as a demand candidate-countries must meet, itself had serious problems with interoperability, when carrying out any serious missions, in which military forces of different NATO member-countries took part.

With the aim of developing the proficiency of the European members of the Alliance to participate in NATO missions, efforts have been made recently to strengthen the military capabilities of NATO European countries without duplicating the already existing NATO planning and command structures and other recourses, which are at the Alliance’s disposal. The strengthening of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has been regarded as part of NATO endeavors to adapt to the new political and military circumstances, which came into being after the end of the Cold War. It was possible to imagine that the development of the European Security and Defense Identity may be linked with the implementation of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty, which also mentions the possibility of common defense policy. Yet in 1996, NATO’s foreign and defense ministers decided that the ESDI would be developed within the framework of NATO

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with the aim of strengthening NATO's European pillar, to better adapt to the new challenges NATO was facing and to carry out crisis management and peacekeeping operations more smoothly and effectively. The ESDI's linkage with the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (decisions leading to the development of that concept were taken by NATO already in 1994) had to additionally underscore that the ESDI was a process going on within NATO.

It is necessary to emphasize that the ESDI has been linked not with the creation of the military dimension or identity of the EU, but with the participation of the WEU in the process of ensuring security in Europe. During the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, the Western European Union was identified as the main partner of the Alliance and from the same year it started taking part in the Alliance’s military planning. The conception of the ESDI was rather simple: in case a crisis emerged in which the WEU would decide to intervene and NATO – not, the WEU would use the resources and capabilities of NATO by carrying out operations led by the WEU. And although the military forces which the WEU could use, were identified, the WEU had, in each case, to ask for permission to use them and NATO command and control structures, too. That meant that in spite of the fact that the operation would be carried out under the authority of the WEU, the resources used in it would be “borrowed” NATO resources to be given back when the operation is over; and during the period of the operation, permanent consultations with NATO would be mandatory.

Recently Europeans have become dissatisfied with the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity to be developed within NATO. They no longer want to be treated simply as a junior partner of the USA whose actions may always be vetoed by the senior partner. Europe, which is becoming stronger, more integrated and better understanding its own interests, wants to be less dependent on the USA and, at least in some respects, on NATO, in which Americans play a predominant military and political role. Of course, at least at present, the EU has no intention to take over from NATO the function of territorial defense, which has been NATO’s main task from the very beginning. But when carrying out Petersberg tasks, which were set forth in 1992, i.e. (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (2) peacekeeping tasks; and (3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, the EU seeks to become less dependent on the USA. It is worth reminding that Petersberg tasks were set out as WEU and not EU tasks, because in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was not yet in force, it was simply impossible to set them as EU tasks. Yet the WEU, which woke up from a deep winter sleep when the Cold War was over and commenced an energetic, at the first glance, but mainly token activity, in fact, had no prospects to become a permanent element of the European security architecture. Both “sleeping” and “woke”, it was somewhere between NATO and the EU (EC). It was weak because of many reasons, but the main of them was the fact that it had neither real military might NATO has at its disposal, nor real economic might, which is the foundation of the EU influence. Thus, the WEU’s present-day virtual death was to be expected.

When carrying out Petersberg tasks, the EU must rely not only upon the CFSP, but also upon common security and defense policy. Both policy areas overlap to quite a great extent. Thus, it is possible to speak about the EU’s common foreign, security and defense policy. Of course, the shape of that policy is determined mainly not by the commitment to take over from the WEU the tasks it just started to perform, but by
European interests, which, according to many analysts, cannot be defended in the world without some military capabilities. Admittedly, until recently, Japan has managed to successfully defend its economic interests in the world having very limited self-defense forces, but, it seems, the EU is concerned about far more matters than economy, and Japan’s geopolitical status does not fit it.

Western unity, which was at its height during the peak of the Cold War, is gradually fading away. The role of the USA in Europe is diminishing. Europe, whose embodiment is the permanently enlarging EU, starts to see its role in the world in a different way. It opposes American aims to maintain – in spite of a sharp decrease in the size of the American military forces deployed in the old continent – control of processes going on in Europe. Europe, which from the beginning of the 16th century until the beginning of the 20th century clearly dominated in the world, aspires in the 21st century to become one of the power centers of the world, which at least in some respects could be comparable with the USA and China. Two years ago in Lisbon the EU put forward a very ambitious task – to become around 2010 the leader and the moving force of world economy. Admittedly, the results of the implementation of this task do not look, from a two-year perspective, very impressive.

When aspiring to become one of the world’s power centers, Europe cannot ignore an important characteristic of such center – its military dimension. The united Europe needs military power not so much for its territorial defense, but rather for facing other security challenges of the modern world. Even if the military power of a self-dependent power center is devoted to performing limited tasks, it cannot depend to such a degree as today upon the military power of the other power center, i.e. the USA. This is the main reason why Europe became less interested in the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO and why the CFSP was supplemented by common security and defense policy.

The main result of Europe’s common foreign, security and defense policy is practical implementation of the decision adopted at the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999: to have 60,000-man Rapid Reaction Forces, which could be deployed at a wanted place in 60 days and could perform operations as long as one year. A successful deployment of such forces requires to have adequate means of transportation. European countries do not have enough of them. Thus, a decision to start to produce transport aircraft A-400 M has been adopted recently.

Yet, having in mind that only about 20,000 soldiers out of 60,000 could take part in carrying out combat missions, whereas others should be involved in logistic and support operations, the proposed number is clearly insufficient for a bigger operation. Therefore, military experts estimate that in 2003, the EU must have 200,000-300,000 soldiers, 300-350 aircraft and 60-80 military ships in its Rapid Reaction Forces.6

The administration of President Clinton had some reservations as to the European plans to create such forces, but, in general, its position was rather positive, although previous US administrations were opposing such plans. Yet, the standpoint of the G. W. Bush administration on European plans is, it seems, slightly less favorable. All American administrations, both previous and present, were inclined to emp-

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hasize that the creation of the EU Rapid Reaction Forces should not split NATO. Most of all they were opposed to the creation of separate, independent of NATO planning and command structures of such forces. They argued that the emergence of such structures would lead to an unwanted and even harmful duplication of the already existing NATO structure. The standpoint of most Europeans was the opposite: without their own military planning and command structures, the military forces of the EU would remain dependent upon NATO, i.e. upon the USA. In that case, they would become forces controlled by the USA, not the EU.

Europeans tend to better understand that their point of view and that of Americans on international security problems and ways of solving them do not necessary coincide. During the Kosovo crisis they were acting in a united way in spite of all problems of military cooperation. Yet, the main reason of their unity was not equal strategic importance of the Balkans to Americans and Europeans, but rather the fact that they regarded the Kosovo crisis as a test of stability and reliability of the Alliance. This situation does not have to reoccur in all possible future crises.

As Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant – the authors of the study *Europe’s Military Revolution* – indicate:

The new threats no longer unite because they are rarely existential for all NATO’s members, and sometimes concern very few of them. In most instances, their source is geographically defined, and they will affect members, which are geographically distant in very different ways – with the greatest distance provided by the Atlantic Ocean. In the new environment of limited insecurity and limited threats, the behaviour of allies is shaped less by military statistics than by cultural patterns, traditions and historical experience, coupled with specific regional interests and economic ambitions.7

These words were written before September 11, 2001. We will deal with the issue of the impact of the September 11 attack on the future of NATO later. At the moment it is important for us to emphasize that this attack did not stop EU military efforts.

So that the military forces the EU is aiming to create could act independently of NATO, it is necessary to do very much, especially in the area of logistics. Yet, the first steps towards the creation of independent European command structures have already been made: the EU established the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff, the latter, admittedly, performing at the moment the function of military expertise and not of military command. Military and technical structures, which must enable the EU to conduct military operations making no use of NATO’s resources, are being created and developed. One of the latest specific projects of the EU in this area is the creation of the independent satellite system *Galileo*. The European Council decided in 2000 in Nice that in operations, conducted by the EU using NATO resources, NATO should have the right to make the final decision. Yet in the operations, in which the Alliance’s resources would not be used, the cooperation between the EU and NATO should be limited to the exchange of information.

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Thus, the EU is, in fact, becoming a political-military alliance and not only an economic-political union. Its new status is reflected by the fact that the institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO has been going on since January 2001. It includes regular meetings at the level of ambassadors and ministers of foreign affairs. The fact that a representative of a EU country which is not a NATO member – General Gustav Hagglund from Finland – heads the EU’s Military Committee bears evidence to the EU’s aspirations to separate its military command structures from those of NATO.

Some European politicians and analysts, especially in France, are treating the EU Rapid Reaction Forces as a European Army in embryo, which in the future could perform tasks of territorial defense, and not only those of Petersberg. At the moment, such prospects do not look realistic. The European army is a vain dream for some and a nightmare for others. But if Europeans intend to take over a greater part of the burden of the defense of Europe, the creation of independent European military planning and command structures, arousing at present the resistance of Americans, is indispensable.

Admittedly, besides the already mentioned military, financial and technological difficulties related to the creation of the military dimension of the European Union, legal problems exist as well. Issues related to creating and using independent (of the USA and NATO) and united European armed forces may be solved only on the basis of a European constitution. Yet, it is quite clear that the EU will not have more or less consistent and comprehensive legal foundation at least until 2004. Some political problems exist as well. Some EU member-countries, especially those, which till recently used to define themselves as neutral, have strong objections to the possible transformation of the Rapid Reaction Forces into a European Army.

In spite of all these problems, the creation of European military forces, which could perform not only Petersberg tasks and would be substantially bigger than it was decided in Helsinki, is, in fact, a possible and, moreover, a rather probable development. Thus, the structure of the Euro-Atlantic defense would change dramatically: from unipolar presently, it could become bipolar in the future. Until now, the USA has manifestly dominated NATO. If Europe develops its military capabilities and starts to shape and implement consistent security and defense policy of its own, Europe may become the other pole of NATO, finally treated by Americans as an equal partner and not as a younger brother. In that case, from the structure where the USA in all respects prevails over all other Alliance members NATO may become a union of two partners really equal in rights.

Rotfeld, who has been mentioned earlier, wrote:

Much misunderstanding stems from the simple fact that European-US relations are and will be asymmetrical. The United States is a global power with a foreign and security policy determined by the president. The European Union is not and will not be in the foreseeable future a single state – it will be a community of states with differing priorities. Thus, so long as a genuine common foreign policy will be lacking, there will be no common security and defense policy. Therefore, Europe and the United States are incompatible in these respects.\(^8\)

Rotfeld correctly identifies the present situation. Yet, his appraisal of the prospects for the future may be put under doubt.

Debates on NATO’s future were at their height when the ill-fated day of September 11, 2001, came. The Alliance displayed its unity by invoking for the first time Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Yet, the events that followed demonstrated that the forms and ways of the response to the terrorist attack against the USA gave NATO-skeptics new arguments to support their claim that NATO had no future at all.

It is difficult to overrate the significance of the Munich Conference on Security Policy, which is likely the most important forum for debates on NATO’s future and other security issues. In February 2002, it was held for the 38th time. Addressing its participants, the Secretary General of NATO George Robertson began his speech with the following words:

A week ago, the Wall Street Journal argued that if security were a marketable product, it would be hard to find a better brand name than NATO.

Dr. Teltschik [Horst Teltschik was the Chairman of the Conference. – E.N.], the same applies to this conference. Munich is a leading trade name in its field, a venue where the most serious security issues are debated openly and honestly, among experts and key decision makers.9

Yet, is the NATO after September 11 really the best brand name for security? Key decision-makers of many NATO countries still officially support Robertson’s claims. Yet many experts have serious doubts. Writing about the above-mentioned conference in the journal Politische Meinung, Ruprecht Polenz professed:

At Munich security conference at the beginning of February it became clear:
The September 11th attacks have put the threat of international terrorism and spreading of weapons of mass destruction into foreground.

Many participants expressed concern that the USA and their European allies move away from each other. Europeans complain because of American unilateral action. Americans take pride in their right to self-defense and reproach Europeans for lack of concern in their armed forces.

Because NATO does not play a leading role in the fight with international terrorism, many fear that NATO’s significance may radically decrease. NATO may become superfluous.10

The world after September 11: the new security environment and new challenges to NATO

Security environment in the world and especially in Europe has been changing very fast since the end of the Cold War. The character of the main threats to the West has considerably altered. During the nineties, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was considered the most important threat. The increasing number of nuclear states, relatively simple ways to acquire and produce bacteriological and especially chemical weapons posed a danger that such weapons could be used in regional conflicts more widely. The world community was especially worried over

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the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used in the never-ending conflict between India and Pakistan. In the nineties, uncontrollable trade in conventional weapons, international trade in drugs, illegal migration, ecological and other threats were posing an increasing danger as well. The matter of general anxiety, especially at the very beginning of the nineties, was a possible uncontrollable downfall of the Soviet Union with its dangerous consequences; some time later, it was worried about the conflicts that flared up in the Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and were suppressed only by great efforts of the international community and, first of all, by those of the North Atlantic Alliance. Almost always terrorism was mentioned among the most significant threats to security. Nevertheless, many analysts tended to treat it more as a regional threat than a global one. The Middle East, first of all Palestine and Israel, Algeria, Northern Ireland, Basque province and a few Latin American states were mentioned as the most important terrorism centers. Though there were certain links between groups of terrorists acting in different areas, security analysts usually considered these links as technical ones, related, first of all, to the provision of weapons. It seemed that these groups had quite different aims.

Since in their practice most of politicians and especially military men followed mainly the principles of the realist paradigm of international relations, the role of non-state subjects of international relations was underestimated. Though it was realized that after the Cold War security environment changed, the changes were usually linked with the interrelations and activities of states. Therefore, security experts, politicians and the media paid much more attention, for example, to the threat (though reduced) of Russia, a possible intensification of authoritarian and expansionist tendencies in it, intentions to consolidate its influence in the so called “near abroad” including the Baltic States, its resistance to NATO enlargement or, say, to the growth of the might of China, than to the activities of little known terrorist groups in Middle and South Asia. The names of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were barely known not only to the broad public, but to politicians as well. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Afghanistan gradually became a forgotten country to the media. Nevertheless, American oil companies were seriously interested in this country as a potential Caspian Sea oil transit country and namely this fact explains why for such a long time the USA had been supporting the Taliban, which had, supposedly, to ensure stability in Afghanistan and security of the future oil pipeline, but, in fact, became the main guardian of al Qaeda. However annoying it might be, by supporting the Taliban regime and Saudi Arabian vahabites that also backed up bin Laden, the USA, in fact, contributed, even though unintentionally and indirectly, to the growth of influence and might of their enemy that on September 11, 2001, became its enemy No 1.

There is no need here to name all terror acts which special services relate now to al Qaeda’s activities. Necessary conclusions were not drawn even after the attack on the USA embassies in East Africa and the USS “Cole” at Aden harbor. Terror acts had been expected in foreign countries rather than in the USA, and terrorism was not treated as the greatest threat to security. Therefore, September 11 was such a great shock to Americans. Some affirm that it even exceeded the shock caused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Many politicians, analysts and commentators almost unanimously started to claim that after September 11 the world would never be the same as it used to be.

Of course, this claim can be questioned. Unsanctioned use of nuclear wea-
pons which could cause the Third World War, hunger, exhaustion of natural resources, ecological disasters – all these threats in the last decades have been exaggerated as well. Now the threat of international terrorism might be slightly overestimated, and after some time we will have to admit that. But there is no doubt that today terrorism is reasonably treated as the most significant threat to security, including international security.

NATO’s response to the September 11 attack was quick and determined. On September 12, NATO officially declared that if evidence that the terror acts had been guided from abroad was produced, these acts would be treated as an attack against one of NATO states and this would obligate the other states to act in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. On October 2, the Alliance declared that such evidence was produced. NATO started to act in accordance with the regulation of Article 5, which stipulates: “An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”\(^1\).

When NATO was created, it was thought that an armed attack against one or a few states of the Alliance was to be expected in Europe and that the USA would be the main power, ensuring the repulse of such an attack. The state attacked on September 11 was not a European state – NATO member, but namely the USA, which since the end of the Cold War had been feeling safe as never before. In the last decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century, the USA military expenses made up about 40 percent of the world military expenses\(^2\), and the state’s military might was unrivaled. The basis of the USA’s military might was its economic power: during the nineties, the part of the USA in the world economy increased from 25 to approximately 30 percent\(^3\). Nevertheless, the blow was struck against the most powerful country from the military, economic, technological and many other points of view. Military, technological and economic might did not protect the country from the attack, which went down into history as the most striking example of an “asymmetrical” war. By rough calculations, the preparation for the attack cost al Qaeda about 100,000 USA dollars, while the caused material damage reached 90 or even more billion dollars. Terrorists lost 19 people, whereas the number of their victims amounts approximately to 3,000.

Having started to act according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Alliance demonstrated the unity which had been expected from it during almost all years of its existence. True, this unity slightly faded after the end of the Cold War, when the common enemy of all Alliance members, the powerful and aggressive Soviet Union ceased to exist. The existence of a strong enemy is known to be the major factor ensuring the cohesion of a coalition. But in the autumn of 2001, it turned out that a new and not less dangerous enemy appeared or, to be more precise, became active. This enemy – like communism – had an international character and it was quite natural to expect that the response to the international threat would be international as well. Quite often NATO is characterized (or at least was characterized) as the most successful military alliance in the history of the world. Therefore, in

\(^3\) See ibidem, p. 266.
spite of the fact that NATO was founded in response to the threat of a different nature, the experience of its members in military cooperation prompted many to expect that NATO might and had to become the most important international organization coordinating the fight against international terrorism. The United Nations, the other possible candidate for this mission, simply did not possess the necessary military resources to cope with the threat of international terrorism and, due to its nature, was able to play only a secondary role, political rather than military.

The USA, as a NATO state, was able to take advantage of the membership in the Alliance and seek that the operation in Afghanistan would be conducted as a NATO operation and the Alliance itself would become the leader, center and headquarters of the fight against international terrorism. But the USA, practically immediately, rejected such possibility and decided not to use the resources of NATO as an organization. True, some NATO AWACS planes with international crews were redeployed from Europe to the USA in order to help control the USA airspace, while the USA would use their AWACS planes in Central and South Asia; the Alliance’s warships were redeployed in the Mediterranean Sea for the same purposes; NATO reinforced coordination of intelligence activities, but, in fact, this was practically all that NATO, as a unified organization, did in preparing for the operation in Afghanistan and conducting it.

This clearly secondary role of NATO in the operation and, we should add, in the whole context of the fight against international terrorism makes many politicians and analysts call into question the significance and future of this organization. As we have already mentioned, such doubts arose straight after the end of the Cold War, but never were they so loud and numerous than during the year following September 11.

Why didn’t Americans wish NATO to start acting in real terms according to Article 5 and were not interested in the collective response of the whole Alliance to the challenge of international terrorism? There are several reasons, and some of them were identified and analyzed in debates on NATO’s future.

One of the most frequently mentioned arguments was the bitter experience of Americans in cooperating with Europeans in the operations led by NATO. During these operations it became evident what was theoretically known long time ago. The gap between the military power of the USA and its European allies, especially concerning modern military technologies, was so deep that Americans were forced, although they did not want, to carry out the greater part of purely military and especially air operations; Europeans seemed to be capable only of peacekeeping. But probably the most important conclusion of Americans was the following: a committee is unable to conduct military operations; from the point of view of Americans, even selecting and discussing specific bombing targets during the Kosovo crisis lasted painfully long.

Americans decided that from a purely military point of view, formal allies were nearly of no use. They rather encumbered them than contributed to successful and quick military operations. That is why after September 11, Americans decided to act, in fact, unilaterally despite the Alliance’s good will. Following the principle formulated by G. W. Bush’s Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that “the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission”, they created a broad non-formal international coalition, in which, of course, NATO countries participated as well, but not NATO as an alliance. The coalition was led by the
USA, which was not restricted in its actions by decision-making procedures used in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Formal NATO participation in the campaign of Afghanistan was, of course, additionally complicated by the fact that this country was far beyond the limits of NATO’s responsibility area as defined by the Washington Treaty. Besides, the support of some countries, for example, Russia or Pakistan, especially in the first stage of the campaign, was undoubtedly more significant from the practical point of view than the support of European NATO members, except, probably, that of Great Britain.

The relatively easy victory in the war against the Taliban, of course, does not mean a decisive victory in the war against terrorism. Al Qaeda was weakened but not destroyed. According to some data, it acts in more than 60 countries all around the world and is quite strong even in Afghanistan. The attempt on Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai’s life indirectly confirms that.

There is much to be done in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan itself, especially in restoring the country’s economy and the government which would be capable of keeping control of the whole country. But the campaign against terrorism cannot confine itself to Afghanistan only. Of course, this campaign already involves diplomacy, law enforcement and cooperation between intelligence services. First of all, in the fight against terrorism it is necessary to target its sources: finances, fanatical ideologies, situations and crises that facilitate the recruiting of new terrorists. For example, it is hard to believe that al Qaeda will be defeated if the problem of Palestine remains unresolved.

Here we come to the crucial question: is NATO really capable of becoming the headquarters of the fight against international terrorism as at least some of its leaders would wish. The solution of many important tasks concerning this fight is not quite within NATO’s (or at least the present NATO’s) competence. The European Union may become an even more helpful partner to America in solving some of these tasks than NATO. But as we have already mentioned, prospects of the relations between Americans and Europeans, who increasingly identify themselves with the EU, are rather hazy.

The most recent problem regarding these relations that came to light after the (partial) victory in Afghanistan has to do with Iraq (or its leader Saddam Hussein) that the USA has identified as its enemy No 2 (enemy No 1 is, of course, bin Laden and his al Qaeda). The only superpower is seeking to use its military might, which, according to it, was very efficiently used in Afghanistan in order to change the regime in Iraq. Though there is not much evidence of Saddam Hussein’s direct links with al Qaeda, Iraq possesses some weapons of mass destruction or, at least, has the capability to start their production very soon. Such weapons may be used in even more dangerous acts of terror and that, according to Americans, is a sufficient reason to eliminate Saddam Hussein whose international reputation is more than bad.

The discussion on the necessity to do it by means of a new military operation reveals that the opinions of Americans and Europeans regarding the way of solving international conflicts are quite different. Bush and Rumsfeld are convinced that the world without Saddam Hussein would be a much safer place to live in. Most politicians in the world, including Europe, agree. But at the same time, many analysts and political leaders are convinced that a new war against Iraq would make the world an even more dangerous place to live in. Disagreements between Europeans (except,
maybe, Tony Blair, but certainly not all Britons) on this and many other issues of international politics – from the solution of ecological problems to the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction – pose, most likely, not lesser threat to the global security than international terrorism. The unity of the West has been a guarantee of international security for more than fifty years. As many experts and analysts notice, at present this unity is fading. Now, after a year that has passed since September 11, Europeans and Americans are less united than on September 10, 2001, not to speak about September 12 of the same year. Europe’s unconditional support to the Bush administration declared immediately after the events of September 11 has faded almost as suddenly.

Of course, Lord Robertson would disagree. However, many analysts are convinced that the old and the new continents are drifting apart. The analysis of the reasons of this process is quite a complicated task. We have touched upon some aspects of them earlier. A more detailed analysis of the factors that undermine this unity is not the purpose of this text. I just want to emphasize that this process, as Robert Kagan correctly noticed, looks very different from the American and European points of view.

Europeans blame Americans for unilateralism that they, like the rest of the world, cannot accept and admit its legitimacy. In their opinion, when Rumsfeld claims that the mission must determine the coalition and not vice versa, he throws doubt, at least indirectly, upon the very necessity of the existence of permanent coalitions and alliances, including NATO itself.

Americans affirm they are simply forced to act unilaterally. They often recall the words of Madeleine Albright, who once said that “we will behave multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must”. The reason of such attitude, as we have already mentioned, is simple: because of the gap between the military capabilities of the USA and Europe, Europeans, from the military point of view, are more often a hindrance to Americans than help. Their participation puts political constraints on the USA, but their real military contribution to any serious operation is of little importance.

Americans and Europeans look at the world from different perspectives, that of power and that of weakness. Europeans are not less egoistic than Americans: being militarily weak, they are interested to solve problems in diplomatic or other non-military ways. They are simply unable to solve them by using military power they do not possess. The dispute over the International Criminal Court reveals much of what divides Americans and Europeans these days.

Europeans [...] are trying to advance their vision of international civilization, with a web of international laws and institutions assuming authority over individual nation-states. Not surprisingly, the world they're trying to create looks an awful lot like the European Union, where rules and laws are more important than military power. And not surprisingly, they're none too happy about the militarily dominant United States placing itself above or outside their new international legal system before it's even begun.

Americans respond that the European Union itself came into being and was able to progress only because it was founded and was developing under the safe military wing of Americans. The world beyond the European Union is absolutely different because in it, military power was and remains to be more important than international law and international institutions. In this world, unfortunately, sometimes it is necessary to act unilaterally.

The future of NATO will virtually depend on how successfully Americans and Europeans (European states – NATO members) will solve their disagreements. But the future of the Alliance will depend on other factors as well, not only on the relations between its members, but also on the relations of the Alliance with other states. In the 21st century, China pretends to a status of one of the world power centers. But it will take many years for its economic power to be transformed into a credible global military power, and, for the time being, it is not clear whether it would really pursue this purpose. Japan, for example, whose economic situation during the last ten years has become unenviable, but which was developing very dynamically for quite a long time, never set such a task. As for external factors affecting the future of NATO, its relations with Russia, by all likelihood, will play a much greater role.

They used to be quite complicated, but during the recent two years the situation has considerably improved. After September 11, 2001, these relations acquired a character of real cooperation. There is no need to speak here at length about the changes related to their deepening institutionalization – these are quite well known. The North Atlantic Alliance, which closely cooperates with Russia, has much better perspectives in the 21st century. Of course, these perspectives will depend on the tendencies of Russia’s domestic development. Yet, it is quite clear today that the cooperation with Russia is crucial in the fight against international terrorism and other new or relatively new threats to international security.

A more complicated problem is with whom Russia will wish to cooperate more closely – with the whole Alliance, the USA or the EU. Unilateral tendencies becoming more and more evident in the present foreign policy of the USA administration are a great concern to Europeans not only because of the above-mentioned reasons, but also because they are afraid that the USA may strive for the cooperation with Russia on a unilateral (or, to be more precise, bilateral) rather than a multilateral basis. It would become another threat to the unity of the present North Atlantic Alliance and may complicate the relations between Americans and Europeans even more.

In conclusion, I should state that in the international politics of the 21st century NATO will not play such important role that it was playing in the second half of the 20th century. But that does not mean that this role should be insignificant. If the Alliance manages to revise its functions and goals and to reorganize its structures in such a way that they could meet new challenges to international security, if European NATO members succeed in reducing the gap between their military capabilities and those of the USA, if in the future the USA administration values the assets of multilateral actions more highly, NATO may become, as its Secretary General is seeking, a significant center of the fight against terrorism and other security threats of the 21st century. There is no other organization in the world having such great experience of close and effective cooperation in the field of defense and security. Resources of NATO can be used in the fight against terrorism much more effectively.
Yet, after the last bombing in Bali and the terrorist attack in Moscow, not to mention less significant terrorist acts in many other countries, it becomes more and more evident that some kind of a global organization which could fight against international terrorism worldwide is needed. It is less clear how to create such organization and how it could operate. It is rather doubtful that NATO, whose regional character is reflected in its very name, can evolve into such global organization. Admittedly, during the last ten or more years, the Alliance has acquired great experience in expanding both its functions and the geographical area of its activities. Its enlargement in Europe is going rather smoothly, and within the Partnership for Peace framework it is already cooperating with some faraway countries of Central Asia. Some kind of NATO’s Partnership for War against terrorism program is not unimaginable.

Due to many political and technical reasons, the creation of a new international anti-terrorist organization seems, however, a more rational solution. The reformed NATO could become its strongest pillar. On condition, of course, that Americans do not decide that they will defeat international terrorism without an international help.
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Lithuania in the Context of NATO Enlargement

This article is aimed to provide an analysis of the circumstances and problems related to Lithuania’s integration into NATO. It presents an overview of the path of Euro-Atlantic integration Lithuania has taken as well as the reasons behind the favourable outcome of NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002, discusses factors which have had an impact on NATO enlargement and their interplay: a general development of the geopolitical landscape in Europe and Lithuania’s efforts to receive an invitation of membership. The context of NATO enlargement is used to review Lithuania’s security policy, relations with Russia, as well as the influence of Russia as a specific and exclusive factor in the processes of NATO enlargement. The article concludes with a summary of Lithuania’s foreign policy objectives and priorities for the post-Prague period.

The Prague Summit and Lithuania

The outcome of the NATO Prague Summit and the significance of the invitation to Lithuania to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in particular will be fully appreciated, apprehended and analysed only after some time, but already today, in the mood of elated emotions, we can make first generalisations. The invitation means a conclusive consolidation of Lithuania’s independence. The invitation testifies that Lithuania has firmly anchored in the community of Western states as part of a united and free Europe and no longer is a hostage to the changing Eastern-Western winds. We are abandoning the concept of “immediate abroad” for good and are acquiring new, greater and real possibilities of developing friendly equitable relations with neighbouring countries. The invitation means a totally new quality of security and stability for Lithuania that will allow us to focus our attention and efforts on a more rapid solution of economic, social, ecological and other issues.

The invitation also means work. Hard and demanding work to secure Lithuania’s presence in the West. Work within a new family by the rules of the new family. If we are part of the new system, the invitation also means responsibility not only for ourselves, but also for the future of Europe as a whole.

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Shaking off the “special case” label: Lithuania’s path of Euro-Atlantic integration before the Prague Summit

Looking back at the path of Lithuania’s integration into NATO until the Prague Summit, I would dare say that the largest achievement over the past twelve years is that Lithuania and the other Baltic States in the area of geopolitical security have not become the so-called “special case”. And there was a real threat this might have happened. The majority of politicians, diplomats and political scientists in Europe and the USA used to say that the Baltic States’ membership of NATO may destabilise security in the Baltic region and Europe. Attention was drawn to the particular sensitivity of Russia to this issue since for fifty years Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the USSR (regardless of the fact that this was done illegally!). Hence, our natural strive for the same type of security (based on NATO and the EU) enjoyed by other new democracies in Europe might have troubled the unpredictable Russia. Lithuanian diplomats were consistently fighting against this “special case” label, because there was simply no other alternative. In his address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly session in Vilnius on 29 May 2001, Lithuania’s Foreign Affairs Minister Antanas Valionis said: “As regards discussions on “special case”, we do agree that Vilnius is indeed “special” and that we have a soft spot for basketball. But, frankly speaking, here in Lithuania we are sick of this “special case” labelling in the context of NATO enlargement. Are we (i.e. the Baltic States – G.Č.) a “special case” all because we follow the same fundamental political principles, i.e. the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, a democratic political set-up, political pluralism, civic society and market economy? <....> Let’s be frank. The only “special” item here is that there exists an anachronistic fear that inviting the Baltic States to join NATO could trespass the mythical red line. We, however, look at it from another perspective: the invitation of the Baltic States would constitute a historical victory of justice, and would rightly place the three Baltic nations, whose destinies bear a tragic imprint of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact followed by Soviet occupation and Yalta, in European matters.”

How did we win then and were not turned into “a grey zone” – “a special case” of Europe? I believe the key to our success was our ability to prove to NATO members over twelve years of independence that Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia are predictable states. A predictable behaviour always earns the trust of partners and the sense of security in cooperation. We proved that our Western orientation is our ultimate destination, that never again we will emerge somewhere in the expanse of the CIS. A perfect illustration of our consistency is the fact that during 12 years of independence we have had almost eleven cabinets of “every hue”, and, nonetheless, have not changed Lithuania’s foreign policy directions and priorities.

The time factor is also highly important. Indeed, time was needed to build up a political and economic context as well as to change stereotypes of thinking of our Western partners. Several years ago, an ambassador of a small NATO member state told me: “Do you know what is your (i.e. the Baltic States’ – G.Č.) major problem? The problem is that for the most of Europeans a journey to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is still an adventure”… My colleague was right. I recall perfectly well how visiting foreign guests during the first Conference “Vilnius Nine” in May 2000 or
even during the 2001 May NATO Parliamentary Assembly session in Vilnius were sincerely amazed by a “discovery” that mobile communications worked in Vilnius! In addition, Vilnius is a city of good restaurants and cafes; Lithuania is a home country of delicious beer! This only illustrates a phenomenon of general unawareness or of very low awareness – over 50 years of Soviet occupation we have been simply forgotten. Concern for new candidates was felt during Lithuania’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures too – who are these Lithuanians, what type of foreign policy will they follow, won’t the Balts become some sort of “Che Guevarras”, will they be capable of building up a solid, peaceful and responsible foreign policy towards its neighbours. Time was needed to answer these questions and to answer them by work rather than declarations. The Prague Summit has demonstrated that we have succeeded in that. We have proven. We have convinced. After all, those 12 years may seem not such a long period, particularly in light of the post-Prague heights. Although I remain convinced that the famous phrase of the said ambassador that “going to the Baltics is still an adventure” remains a challenge for us in the future.

A positive development of the Lithuanian–Russian relations and the constructive policy of Vilnius towards Moscow has been of great significance for Lithuania’s aspirations to Euro-Atlantic integration. A streamlined withdrawal of the Soviet army from Lithuania, the concluded inter-state treaties, development of trade, tens of initiatives and cooperation projects, “internationalisation” of the issue of Kaliningrad, drawing of the European Union’s attention have all ensued manifold political dividends for Lithuania in the eyes of NATO members. To my mind, we may fairly reasonably state that among the Baltic States Lithuania has played a role of a driving force in persuading NATO member states that we know how to talk with Russia and that we use a civilised and Western-type terminology. During a dinner in the spring of 2002, a defence minister of a large NATO member state admitted to me that NATO's concern was that after joining NATO the Balts might stick out their tongue at Russia… Now we have already proven that we embrace a double responsibility – both as future NATO members and as eternal neighbours of Russia, that good relations with Russia was our aim rather than a political show. Indeed, Russia is progressing more slowly, remains highly unpredictable, is burdened with post-imperialistic complexes, and yet this very background has helped to manifest even more clearly Lithuania’s constructive and pragmatic policy. Later in this article I will come back to the analysis of Lithuania’s security policy in the context of its relationship with Russia.

Of considerable importance for Lithuania’s integration into NATO and the process of enlargement as a whole were the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Firstly, there was some sort of confusion and a non-escalated concern among a few NATO aspirants – whether, in light of new threats and challenges of the 21st century, NATO enlargement was to survive as a priority of the USA administration and governments of other NATO member states? Right from the start, Lithuania demonstrated its political solidarity and practical contribution to fight against terrorism. The USA positively assessed a clear stand of Lithuania within the anti-terrorist coalition, resolute statements of Lithuania’s political leaders, a rapid favourable response from the USA requesting the issue of a long-term diplomatic authorisation for flights over the airspace of the Republic of Lithuania, participation of Lithuanian military doctors and other forces in concrete actions of the coalition. In his letter of 26 September 2001 to the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, President George W. Bush said
that the best preparation for NATO membership was exactly what Lithuania was
doing already, namely, acting as an (NATO) ally. Today we may state that the terrorist
attacks in the USA had a boomerang effect but not the one the authors of these attacks
might have attempted for: they have consolidated and accelerated the process of
NATO enlargement in political terms, have put the conditions in place favourable
for an extensive NATO–Russia cooperation, which, in its turn, has helped Lithuania
and the other Baltic States shake off the “special case” label faster.

The process of NATO enlargement:
factors and their interplay

The decision on NATO enlargement has always been political, i.e. enlargement
is impossible without a clearly stated wish by NATO members to enlarge. However, the process of enlargement itself is composed of many components and factors: it entails the political will of NATO to expand, general global geopolitical developments, Western orientations of the values of aspiring countries, development of the V-10 process, home policy reforms, economic development, amplification of armed forces and development plans, Membership Action Plans and Partnership for Peace Programmes, our administrative capacities, the level of corruption, etc. In short, this is a whole package of issues. The development of some of them was beyond the aspirants’ will, but affected the enlargement process; others made the aspirants search for solutions, i.e. do the so-called “homework”. A decent homework could not yet guarantee an automatic acceptance to the Alliance, though it was closely related to NATO’s political will to enlarge, and vice versa.

As regards countries of Western Europe, it should be noted that NATO enlarg-
ishment is not only about an altruistic deed. It is also about the expanding the zone of
peace and stability, recognising the values of the Western civilisation. At the same
time, the zone of the Western influence has also expanded. NATO is getting stronger,
and the security of its individual members – both current and new – is enhanced. A
process of consolidating a united, safe and free Europe under the flags of Western
democracies has been brought to an end. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson
talked about the necessity for the Alliance’s enlargement during the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations: “First, NATO enlargement is not about accumulating military
capabilities against “the other side”. There is no “other side” at the moment. The
context of NATO enlargement today is about community-building: about overco-
mingle the divisions that still exist in Europe. It is about improving the security and the
stability of Europe as a whole. Europe can never be truly stable if there are divisions
between a prosperous, self-confident West and a less prosperous, less confident East.
One half of Europe simply cannot be kept at arm’s length forever. And let me be very
clear: this applies to every democratic country in Europe. In the new Europe of the
21st century, geography can no longer be destiny”.1 The distinguished political scien-

1 Lord Robertson, “NATO’s Challenges: Illusions and Realities” Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations, 19.06.2001.
tist Zbigniew Brzezinski, when speaking at the Vilnius Group premiers’ meeting in Bratislava on 11 May 2001, underlined that: “NATO enlargement may not be valued only in terms of military benefit, although it is clear that each Ally has to make a contribution to the common security. By itself, NATO enlargement reinforces common security in Europe since it eliminates geo-politically ambiguous regions”. During the NATO Heads of State Meeting in the USA on 23–24 April 1999, the famous Washington Declaration was made, wherein the states of the Alliance confirmed that they would continue NATO’s “open-door policy” also following the first wave of enlargement: “Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.”

Hence, we witness an obvious political will of the Alliance to enlarge. However, despite official commitments by NATO members to follow the “open-door” policy, it could be felt that the enthusiasm over enlargement right after the Washington Summit faded. There were a number of reasons for that: the first wave of enlargement just being over, there was a wish to wait, not to rush, and to see how the new entrants would make it. Several NATO member states in Europe already felt having fulfilled their objectives of the reinforcement of security, while the candidates for the second wave did not seem to be highly appealing – their armed forces were either modest or large but in a catastrophic state – a true Soviet-type legacy. A tribute was then paid to the Balkan crisis. The Baltic States were trying hard to shake off the “special case” labels and were setting themselves free from other stereotypes brought about by the above-mentioned “time factor”. Today, looking in retrospect, the process of enlargement from the summer of 1999 to the summer of 2001 seems logical and even sufficiently dynamic, back then, however, a certain degree of anxiety and non-clarity was being felt. Aspirants were thinking hard how to keep the issue of the Alliance’s enlargement as a top priority in NATO capitals, while NATO members were occupied with contemplating how to safeguard the reliability of NATO’s “open-door” policy and consolidate it with some sort of flesh. This is how the V-9, in the beginning as the Vilnius Nine and later as the Vilnius Ten after Croatia’s joining, came into existence as a policy of political solidarity and cooperation of NATO aspirants, this is how Membership Action Plans for these aspirant countries were developed, i.e. concrete homework that each candidate committed to do and which we are going to talk about later.

I would dare say that at the start in many NATO capitals the V-10 process was met with scepticism. Journalists named it as a big bang scenario of NATO’s enlargement. In diplomatic circles, concerns were being expressed that such type of enlargement might trigger unnecessary tensions, deteriorate relations with Russia. At the beginning, the enthusiasm of the Vilnius Ten members was far from being unanimous. In a way, everyone was “for it”, however, the minds of some high-level politicians of V-10 countries were harbouring the notion of “sneaking in by one at a time”. Others voiced complaints, such as what do we need these Balts for; they would be nothing but a millstone round our neck… And yet the first Vilnius Conference in May 2000 proved to be a success. Aspirants demonstrated their ability to work toget-

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her in a team. The Vilnius Declaration clearly formulated the following aims of the V-10: building a united, indivisible and free Europe, NATO – a guarantee of security and stability in Europe and America. The Vilnius Declaration concluded with a call to the Alliance’s heads of state to deliver on their promise made during the Washington Summit the creation of a united and free Europe. On the occasion of the Vilnius Conference, President Valdas Adamkus received a letter from the USA President George W. Bush in which he underlined his support to the leaders who gathered then in Vilnius to discuss the role of NATO in the future Europe. “USA security is inseparable from security in Europe, while strong NATO is a basis for security”, the letter read. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson made a speech at the Vilnius Conference that received a wide coverage in foreign press. Even as a first try, it was quite a successful one, which largely determined the further course of the Vilnius process. The key events to be mentioned are: the V-10 premiers’ meeting in May 2001 in Bratislava, V-10 foreign ministerial meeting in June 2001 in Tallinn, in October 2001 – in Slovenia, in December 2002 – premiers’ meeting in Bucharest, in July 2002 – premiers’ meeting in Riga. We can maintain very firmly that the Vilnius Ten made a substantial contribution to the processes of NATO enlargement, helped to maintain the discussion on enlargement issues in NATO capitals. In cooperation with the V-10, the process did not become anything else but an affirmation and manifestation of political solidarity and team-working capacity of the aspirants. The basis for appraising each aspirant became individual “homework” appraising each aspirant’s efforts.

In the context of NATO enlargement, the position of the USA as the leader of the process was a major driving force both during the first and the second waves of enlargement. The address by the USA President in Warsaw on 15 June 2001 demonstrated that the USA administration had already made strategic decisions with regard to the further enlargement of the Alliance. The address focused on the future of Europe and the project of the unification of Europe: “Today, I have come to the centre of Europe to speak of the future of Europe – but Warsaw is closer to Ireland than it is to the Urals. And it is time to put talk of East and West behind us. Yalta did not ratify a natural divide, it divided a living civilisation. [...] No more Munichs. No more Yaltas. [...] All of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom – and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe – as Europe’s old democracies have. [...] Next year, NATO’s leaders will meet in Prague. The United States will be prepared to make concrete, historic decisions with its allies to advance NATO enlargement”\(^3\).

Hence, on 15 June 2001, the USA determined to embrace a large-scale NATO enlargement. This address by the USA President stirred up discussions in Europe too. The scenario of a robust enlargement gradually prevailed in Europe. The French President Jacques Chirac, during his visit to the Baltic States, said very outspokenly he was in favour of inviting Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to join NATO; positive developments were also taking place in the German Bundestag. Traditionally, we received a strong support from Denmark and the new NATO entrants – Poland, the

\(^3\) “No more Munichs. No more Yaltas – lift up your hearts” – Remarks by the President in address to faculty and students of Warsaw University, June 15, 2001.
Czech Republic and Hungary. In practical terms, what happened then was a direct echo of the call by Z. Brzezinski in his famous speech at the Bratislava Conference of V-10 premiers on 11 May 2001: “NATO’s enlargement shall be neither a “bookkeeping exercise”, nor a bureaucratic game “guess who?”, nor a political market <...> The time has come to escape from the twilight state”.

I believe we can state that the terrorist attacks of September 11, in fact, speeded up the culmination of discussions (with these never gaining the momentum) on whether or not to enlarge NATO. The events consolidated and accelerated positive trends on the issues of NATO enlargement following the address by G. W. Bush in Warsaw. For many it became finally clear that enlargement was essential. From a political level, the discussions reached a highly important technical level assessing the aspirants at their performance of annual membership programmes and reform processes in armed forces and other fields.

In the wake of September 11, Lithuania took a determined approach and demonstrated, in political and practical terms, its solidarity with the USA, adhering to the principle “act as an ally”. On the basis of the meetings that I had back then with USA diplomats in Vilnius, Brussels, Washington and elsewhere, I may state that Lithuania was appraised for demonstrating an approach which was far more optimistic in comparison with several other candidates on the prospects of NATO enlargement in the period of the global anti-terrorist campaign. We demonstrated that NATO enlargement had been and would remain on the agenda of the USA administration, that a new stage of the USA–Russia cooperation in fight against terrorism would not reduce the possibilities of the integration of Lithuania and other Baltic States into the Alliance. Moreover, such thinking was not grounded only on expectations, but was also backed with information, knowledge, a wide-ranging and deep cooperation with diplomats and politicians of the USA and other NATO member states. Further developments showed that the analysis of the situation was also right that the terrorist attacks against the USA should encourage enlargement as a way to secure stability in a wider area as well as practical and real cooperation in fight against terrorism. During that difficult period it was vital not to make a stop (which was not the case), continue our internal preparation for the membership, including maintaining the level of 2 per cent GDP spending on defence funding, take an active position with regard to the anti-terrorist campaign free from any elements of a virtual political show and link it to our NATO agenda.

The NATO foreign affairs ministerial meeting in Reykjavik on 14–15 May 2002 continued with positive trends of enlargement. The adopted NATO Reykjavik Communiqué stood out for its definitiveness reflecting not only the political will of the allies, but, most importantly, concrete modalities of enlargement. Paragraph 6 of the Communiqué reads: “At their Prague Summit in November this year, our Heads of State and Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. This will confirm the Alliance’s commitment to remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In Reykjavik it was decided that the aspirant countries invited to join the Alliance in Prague would join the Alliance all at the same time prior to next NATO Summit. The Communiqué also reads that the accession

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4 Final Communiqué. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Reykjavik, 14th of May 2002.
protocols of the invitees shall be signed not later than in the spring of 2003. It was also agreed to continue the implementation of Membership Action Plans and to use them to facilitate the integration of the invitees into NATO structures. The political will of NATO member states was also illustrated by the fact that in Reykjavik no additional requirements were established which the aspiring countries should have to fulfil, which we feared a little. The MAP was approved; Partnership Goals and other documents formulated the implementation of the objectives before and after the Prague Summit.

**Russia’s impact on the process of NATO enlargement**

We have to admit straight away that Russia’s impact was immense throughout the whole process of NATO enlargement, which is logical given that Russia has always been and will remain a “heavyweight” geopolitical player. Although Russia has never enjoyed nor will ever enjoy the right to veto decisions on NATO enlargement, its direct influence could always be felt – during numerous international conferences, consultations and negotiations there would always be an issue on what had to be done to make Russia feel comfortable during NATO enlargement and help it “save its face”. The period between the first wave of enlargement in 1999 and the second one in the middle of 2001 was extremely difficult. In talks with NATO member states, Russia adopted the “cold war” approach underlining categorically its emphatic “no” to NATO enlargement encompassing the Baltic States. In his speech in Bratislava on 11 May 2001 the Czech President Vaclav Havel very precisely pointed out the reasons behind such behaviour of Russia: “The first lies in the inert mode of thinking which persists from the Soviet era when NATO was for decades portrayed by the totalitarian regime and its media as the Soviet Union’s arch-enemy. To a certain extent, this was valid: Although NATO had no aggressive intentions, and was not even willing to help those European countries under Soviet domination against whom their alleged Soviet ally perfidiously launched military invasions, it made no secret of the fact that it was designed to contain Communism and that the Soviet Union was its strategic adversary. Nowadays, the situation is completely different, both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are gone, NATO now pursues other objectives than it did during the Cold War era and desires to be a partner with Russia – but it appears as if Russia has failed to understand or, in fact, to notice this. Time will hopefully change that, at least if the new ruling forces in Russia opt for reality rather than for populism”.

A second reason, much more cogent than the first one, according to Mr. V. Havel, was the problem of Russia’s identity. “It seems to me that Russia – despite the remarkable progress it has made towards democracy and market economy - is somehow still grappling with a problem with which, to my knowledge, it has grappled for more or less its entire history, that is, with the question of where it begins and where it ends; what belongs to its domain and what is already beyond it”.

Lack of a natural self-confidence of an entity that is sure of its identity, and thus also of its boundaries, seems to be replaced by a slightly imperialistic rhetoric accom-

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1 Address by Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic at the Conference “Europe’s New Democracies: Leadership and Responsibility”, Bratislava, 11th of May, 2001
panied by a national bombast, which we know so well from people like Mr. V. Zirinovsky, but which appears in Russia in a more cultured form on a much wider scale. For example, I find it almost absurd that such a large and powerful country should be alarmed by the prospect of three small democratic republics at its borders joining a regional grouping (NATO - GČ.) which it does not control; or, that it should feel a need to build around itself an additional cordon sanitaire – at a time when hundreds of transcontinental missiles could destroy Moscow from Nevada, or New York from the Urals, in a matter of minutes”.

Today Prague has gone down into history. The second wave of enlargement has already taken place. Bearing in mind that the above speech by Mr. V. Havel was made only a year and a half ago, a conclusion may be drawn that over a very short period of time Russia’s position has undergone a remarkable evolution from an open confrontation to a relatively calm resignation with NATO enlargement. I will try to review possible causes for that.

Firstly, it is a strong and consistent support of the USA and other NATO member states to the “open-door” policy. During the NATO Washington Summit on 23–24 April 1999 which concluded the first wave of NATO enlargement, NATO member states confirmed their resolve to continue the “open-door” policy, i.e. to accept new European democracies which, in addition to a strong wish to join NATO, met NATO membership criteria. Indeed, there were various misgivings that we would have to queue at NATO’s doors until we catch cold in a draught… Thanks God, this did not happen. NATO states demonstrated the reliability of the “open-door” policy and loyalty to the idea of a free and unanimous Europe. Such position of NATO facilitated understanding among Russian politicians that their policy of an emphatic “no” to NATO enlargement would bear no fruit and that enlargement would happen anyway. An extremely categorical tone of Russia with regard to the membership of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of the Alliance as often as not would boomerang against Russia. It would only reinforce our arguments that the Baltic States could not stay in “the grey zone”, since sooner or later this grey zone would eventually become a tension spot in Europe.

Secondly, the reason for the evolutionary change in Russia’s position was related to the first one. Russian diplomacy became aware that by bitterly opposing NATO enlargement they would not win anything. Hence, strict anti-NATO rhetoric was set on a milder tone (though it has never been abandoned altogether) and talks were started on the possibilities of deepening and widening the NATO-Russia cooperation. As early as in March 2001, at a meeting during the official visit of the Lithuanian President V. Adamkus to Moscow, the Russian President V. Putin noted that Lithuania’s membership of the Alliance was Lithuania’s concern alone. On 3 September of the same year, during his visit to Finland, at a press conference V. Putin thus replied to a question about Russia’s view on the membership of the Baltic States in NATO: “It is up to the Baltic States alone to make decisions on their security policy and Russia does not intend to burst into hysteria on account of this”1. This illustrates that the tendency of a tempering hostility of Russia to NATO enlargement started much earlier than the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA which became a powerful stimulus to place the plans of developing the NATO-Russia cooperation from a theoretical to a practical dimension.

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1 ibid.

2 Reuters, John Acher, 03.09.2001.
A special mention should to be made of the fact that the evolution of Russia’s position was also affected by internal democratic processes inside Russia. A “milder” tone with regard to NATO enlargement allowed V. Putin to win a more solid place (and voice) for Russia in the West, while at home it helped to reconcile the public opinion with decisions which Russia could not change, i.e. NATO enlargement.

The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council on 28 May 2002 became a child of a “deeper” cooperation between the West and Russia. The statement of the establishment of the NRC opens as follows: “Today, we have launched a new era in NATO-Russia cooperation.” The Rome statement “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” reads that the Council will work adhering to the principle of a consensus, i.e. not according to the formula “19+1”, but “20”. This is a clear attempt to disperse an obsolete “block-like” atmosphere that prevailed in the former NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Today, during NRC meetings, the Russian Ambassador does not sit in front of the ambassadors of NATO member states, but according to the alphabetical order of the English language – between Portugal and Spain. The NRC has a wide scope of activities covering fight against terrorism, crisis management, issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, measures of weapons control and trust, “theatre missile defence”, search and rescue operations at sea, etc. In its statement, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the establishment of the NRC since it was indeed in line with foreign policy objectives of Lithuania—by being part of the West, to develop good neighbourly relations with our neighbours in the East. Lithuania hopes that the work of the NRC will bring about tangible results. As a fully-fledged member of NATO, Lithuania will make its contribution to the work of the NRC, availing of its long-standing experience and ideas.

Hence, we may state that Russia, not having a direct impact on decisions of NATO enlargement, yet played a significant role affecting the political mood and even the speed of enlargement. Time will show what the true intentions were behind Russia’s tempered criticism of NATO’s eastern enlargement and a more pro-Western policy approach. Will the NATO-Russia Council be used as a tool to destroy or dilute the essence of NATO as a most efficient and powerful security organisation in the Western world, will Russia finally feel as an equal partner in the Western cooperation, will the NRC become quite a good stimulator for promoting and instilling Western values and a European inter-state cooperation model in Russia?

**Lithuania’s policy of building security and trust and Russia**

In the context of cooperation with Russia, Lithuania’s security policy pursued after the restoration of independence may be described, without much modesty, as a significant and positive factor that made a major contribution to the creation of Lithuania’s image as a serious and solid future partner in NATO. Lithuania’s security policy has always been very clear, transparent, polite, resolute and consistent. Since 1994, when the then Lithuanian President A. Brazauskas sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner requesting to accept Lithuania to the ranks of the North Alliance, it took a lot of patient work to prove a relatively obvious truth that  

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8 NATO Statements, Rome Summit, 28.05.2002  
9 Ibid.
Lithuania’s membership of NATO did not pose any threat to Russia, that NATO, as well as the European Union, secure our fully-fledged and equal participation in Euro-Atlantic and European processes. On this occasion I frequently recall a view voiced in one of the British dailies that the Baltic States could not pose any threat to Russia even if they wished… Various ostensible bugbears and fears marked the path of Euro-Atlantic integration not only in Russia, but also in the Western world; a degree of concern still remains, which maintains the promotion of security and trust in Europe and the Baltic Sea region as a prioritised area of Lithuania’s foreign policy.

The interest in security and stability manifests itself firstly in an active participation in multilateral initiatives and structures consolidating openness, predictability and mutual trust in the military field. As one of such structures, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may be mentioned, which over several decades has built a substantial institutional set-up for promoting security and trust and in whose activities Lithuania is actively participating. In this context, the so-called Vienna Document on measures building confidence and security should be mentioned, whose latest amendments were introduced in 1999. The Vienna Document revived and improved trust building measures by means of foreseeing a mandatory exchange of information in the military field, in defence planning, during military exercises and operations, as well as possibilities for regional initiatives. While consistently discharging commitments assumed under this document, Lithuanian institutions submit the required information to other participating states in the OSCE on a regular annual basis and also receive and carry out site visits to military units and regional inspections.

Another important component promoting security and confidence in Lithuania is the Treaty on Open Skies. This Treaty regulates the procedure for monitoring flights of aircraft belonging to the states, parties of this Treaty, above the territories of other participating states. Although the Treaty was signed as early as in 1992, it entered into force only as from 1 January 2002, when Russia and Belarus deposited ratification letters. In May 2002, Lithuania submitted an official application for the membership of this Treaty, which was approved by the Open Skies consultancy commission on 22 July 2002. Following ratification in the Seimas of Lithuania, the Treaty will become effective for Lithuania after 60 days following the deposit of the ratification letters. There is no doubt that Lithuania’s participation in this Treaty will further contribute to building openness and mutual confidence between neighbouring countries in the military area.

Moreover, Lithuania expects that the conditions necessary to adapt an agreement for the ratification of the CFE Treaty will be fulfilled, and this Treaty will be made open for new members. In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 12 August 2002, President V. Adamkus stated clearly that Lithuania would seek to accede to the CFE Treaty.

Apart from participation in multilateral initiatives, for the past decade Lithuania has been actively involved in developing additional bilateral confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) with neighbouring states. These measures are mostly based on the provisions of the said OSCE Vienna Document and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The official start of the policy of bilateral confidence and security building measures may be deemed to be a statement by the President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus on 26 March 1998. In order to further
build an atmosphere of openness and mutual confidence, the statement proposed that the neighbouring states apply additional measures of openness, such as notification about major military exercises, exchange of additional inspections and military data verification visits. Inspired by this statement, we addressed Russia proposing to agree on additional inspection visits, exchange of military information and early warning about major military exercises. The negotiations at the beginning of 2001 resulted in a successful agreement on an additional military data verification visit per year, on the basis of which Lithuania was entitled to perform checks of Russia’s military units in Kaliningrad region. In addition, we also agreed to exchange, on an annual basis, additional information about armed forces present in Lithuania and Kaliningrad region, under the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. In March 2001, during an official visit of President V. Adamkus to Moscow, Presidents of Lithuania and Russia welcomed agreements on bilateral security and confidence building measures, noting that Lithuania and Russia were planning to initiate further joint actions in this field as well as enter into bilateral contacts between military services of both countries.

It is gratifying to note that the earlier mentioned agreements with Russia did not remain only intentions on paper, but are being put into practice. Last July, Lithuania carried out a data verification visit to Kaliningrad region, an exchange of information under the CFE Treaty took place at the beginning of 2002. On 10 April 2001, 10 Russian military officers took part in military environment courses in the Nemenčinė Refresher Training Centre for Servicemen (with the help of the USA and Sweden). In June 2001, Lithuania’s Ministry of National Defence and the USA Defence Department organised in Lithuania a seminar – military exercises entitled “Civil-Military Emergency Planning 2001”. The seminar was attended by a group of Russian delegates. Since 1997, Lithuania has been inviting military observers from Russia to key military exercises of a calendar year in its territory. A number of visits by senior officers of the Defence Ministry and Armed Forces commanders have been organised: a visit by V. Valuyev, the Baltic Fleet Commander, the Vice-Admiral of the Russian Federation, in September 2001, two visits by the Lithuanian Minister of National Defence L. Linkėvičius in 2002 to meet the Russian Defence Minister S. Ivanov. In September 2002, Klaipėda was paid the first visit by the warships of the Russian Federation – minesweepers “A. Lebedev” and BT 212. In addition to the warships, the military orchestra of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Federation also paid a visit. Prior to the visit, Lithuanian Days were organised in Kaliningrad were Lithuania was represented by the military orchestra and the basketball team of the Motorised Infantry Brigade “Geležinė Vilkas” of the Ministry of National Defence.

Intentionally, wishing to underline their importance, did I mention these military to military events. I recall a meeting with Vice-Admiral V. Valuyev, who back then, in the autumn of 2001, paid his first visit to Lithuania. When sharing his impressions about Vilnius, the Vice-Admiral expressed his amazement that when they, i.e. a group of Russian officers, dressed up in uniforms, were walking in the city nobody (!) abused them verbally or threw stones at them… Indeed, a better understanding of each other helps to dispel still prevalent myths or outright lies of the old Soviet propaganda. The Vice-Admiral concluded the reception hosted on the occasion of the visit with the following toast: “NATO is not a stumbling block to friendship”.
It should be noted that the feature of Lithuania’s security policy to be modern, contemporary and to react rapidly to the nuances of the development of the geopolitical situation depended on the improvements of the regulatory framework. In 2001-2002, the National Security Strategy was drafted which was adopted by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 28 May 2002. At the beginning of 2002, the Law on International Operations, Military Exercises and Other Military Events of Military Cooperation was amended. The new version of the law reduced the restrictions applicable to defensive cooperation with the CIS. Under the new formula of the law, the authorisation to enter Lithuania for a limited period of time may be granted to CIS military units participating in exercises under the Partnership for Peace (PiP) or other international exercises organised in cooperation with member states of NATO or the European Union. The law provides for a legal basis for the participation of Lithuanian troops in exercises organised under NATO’s international cooperation programmes in CIS countries and international operations taking place in their territories. The adoption of the National Security Strategy (NSS) means the beginning of a new phase in quality terms – a transition from the post-Soviet objectives of reconstruction (and a corresponding thinking in security policy) to Lithuania with a different type of functioning – as a modern and mature democracy with a functioning market economy and consistent integration into NATO and the EU – communities cherishing Western values. The NSS states the absence of a direct military threat to Lithuania from abroad, hence, no foreign state is Lithuania’s enemy. Within the meaning of the National Security Strategy, international security is seen as indivisible, which is why safeguarding of peace and stability in other regions is seen as a complementary part to building a secure future for Lithuania. Considerable attention in the NSS is attached to “new threats”, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, smuggling, drug trafficking, corruption, etc. It is absolutely clear that upon Lithuania’s accession to NATO, the composition of priorities of security policy is to change alongside the arsenal of implementation measures. The NSS will, therefore, have to be revised and adapted accordingly to reflect the new period.

Hence, Lithuania’s security policy clearly reflects the features of Lithuania’s “maturity” as a state, its consistent efforts to implement good neighbouring relations, in particular, with Russia. The indicated aspects contribute to our better presence and appreciation by the international community. More than once have I heard positive responses to Lithuania’s policy towards neighbours, whereas bilateral confidence and security building measures with Russia (and Belarus) are presented as a model for the openness in the military field contributing towards security in Europe.

Certainly, there are certain problems in the relations with Russia. We, as Russia’s neighbours, can do only part of the job. Just like any other policy, security policy cannot be unilateral. Reciprocity is needed. We hope that such vital and yet “frozen” issues on the Russian side as the ratification of the border treaty and the signing of the readmission treaty, etc. will pick up speed.
Lithuania’s “homework” and NATO

Though briefly, I would still like to refer to Lithuania’s Membership Action Plans and their significance for the integration into NATO. Although the Alliance’s decision to enlarge is a political act, we can firmly state that without Lithuania’s efforts to implement MAPs a chance of being invited to NATO in Prague would have been minimal. Understanding the political and practical significance of MAPs, Lithuania actively participated in this process from its very start.

During the first wave of NATO enlargement, when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted to the Alliance, there were no membership action plans. However, life has shown that the candidates did not have enough time to prepare for the membership, and the Alliance found itself facing major practical challenges, when integrating, in political and military terms, the new entrants which were invited in 1997 and admitted in 1999. Therefore, the NATO Washington Summit in 1999 proposed candidate countries a pre-accession programme – the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

The essence of the MAP process is as follows: through consultations with NATO, the aspiring countries shall define aims and requirements they should fulfil so that their membership of the Alliance would not weaken the organisation or diminish its effectiveness. Such aims are based on the principles laid down in the 1995 NATO Enlargement Study as well as those stipulated in annual national membership action plans. NATO officers and the Alliance’s members closely follow the implementation of these aims and submit their appraisals and proposals to the candidates on a regular basis. The structure of the MAP was specially built to cover a full range of criteria of the preparation for the membership. The MAP is made up of five composite sections: political/economic, defensive, resources, legal and security.

The aim of the MAP’s Political/economic section is to secure continuity and irreversibility of democratic reforms, to prove that a candidate country has really instilled the principles of freedom and democracy in their society (democratic elections; the rule of law; respect for human rights; civil control of the army; freedom of the media; protection of ethnic minorities and their integration into society; fight against corruption and terrorism, etc.), that the aspiration of membership is based on a realistic consensus of political forces and societal consent, that a candidate has a functioning market economy which will allow making a contribution to the Alliance rather than building security at the expense of other members of NATO. The aim of the MAP’s Defence section is to establish such direction for the development of national armed forces which would allow for an effective organisation of defence of the home country by means of accepting assistance from the allies, to provide such assistance to other allies (the famous principle of NATO “all for one and one for all”) and to contribute to non-Article 5 missions undertaken by NATO, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, etc. On the basis of this particular section of the MAP, Lithuania initiated and, drawing on the resources of its own and NATO member states, is effectively implementing its defence reform, whose aims and composition have been coordinated with the Alliance. The purpose of the Resources section is to secure that defence development plans, coordinated with the Alliance, should have really available sums of money, whereas the purpose of the Legal section is to abolish any legal hindrances for Lithuania’s accession to the Washington Treaty and dischar-
ge the commitments enshrined in this Treaty. The key objective of the section on Security is to ensure that upon membership of NATO, Lithuania should be able to credibly protect extensive flows of classified information, or, in other words, should credibly guard secrets confided to it by the Alliance. To this end, Lithuania has introduced procedures for the verification of credibility of individuals dealing with classified information, took protective measures in line with the Alliance’s standards on physical protection of information, introduced protective procedures and measures applied in NATO with regard to information transmitted by wire, radio and electronic means.

Even a very short description of the sections illustrates how politically significant for Lithuania and for its image in the eyes of future NATO partners was the successful implementation of the MAP (alongside the adoption of the EU acquis), which was of seemingly “technical nature”. The MAP process allowed for time-saving, “not reinventing the wheel”. The MAP contributed to the promotion of reforms inside Lithuania even in the fields other than the military. Therefore, it was useful both to us (even if we had not received an invitation in Prague) and NATO. I would dare say that the successful implementation of MAPs in Lithuania and other Baltic States encouraged the political will of NATO member states for the enlargement into the Baltic States and ensured the invitation to membership in Prague.

**After Prague: what is next?**

“A golden province of Europe”

After the Prague Summit, a question that arises naturally is what will happen next? While attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to talk about short-term and medium-term objectives, i.e. about the period from the invitation in Prague to the “true” membership of Lithuania in NATO in 2004 and the post-membership period.

The key motto of the post-Prague period should be “not to relax, not to rest on the laurels”. The invitation does not yet mean membership; right are those politicians and diplomats who state that all work is yet ahead. It is, therefore, self-evident that Lithuania’s security policy agenda will be dominated by the tasks related to the successful completion of the strategic aim of NATO membership. Firstly, this implies attention to ratification processes in NATO member states as well as at home, continued cooperation within the V-10 group, further implementation of the Membership Action Plan. Particular attention must be devoted to the implementation of the Lithuanian defence reform and maintaining financial commitments. Lithuania, as before, will carry on its active participation in international military exercises in various formats: in joint projects of the Baltic States, in cooperation with Danish and Polish forces, etc. It is necessary to continue an active participation in the regimes of arms control and confidence building measures (the OSCE Vienna Document, bilateral security and confidence building measures with Russia and Belarus, conventions on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regimes and cooperation agreements). There are many objectives important from the “technical” point of view, such as the extension of the Lithuanian mission at NATO in Brussels, reconstruction of corresponding structures in Vilnius – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, – issues of human resources, refresher training, etc.
In 2004, Lithuania will become a fully-fledged member of NATO and the European Union. This will substantially change the quality of Lithuania’s security policy. Two out of three key objectives of Lithuanian foreign policy (membership of NATO, membership of the EU and good neighbourly relations) will have been implemented. Shall we, having completed these strategic for the existence of the Lithuanian state projects, not lose the sense of direction, will we be able to adapt politically, psychologically and institutionally? Clearly, many previous provisions of security policy and working methods will have to be revised and redefined. It is likely that such review will take place in the form of a new version of the National Security Strategy or, maybe, by amending the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security. It will be possible to keep the sense of direction by realising the key issues of Lithuania’s concern. Even after the membership of NATO and the EU, many efforts will be needed trying to “catch-up” with the states of the Western world and later to maintain Lithuania in the community of Western states as a fully-fledged member. I would, therefore, think that Lithuania’s foreign policy will need new projects and ideas that would allow to reinforce, in quality terms, Lithuania’s cooperation with its “new families”, i.e. NATO and EU member states (with the West!). This may become a serious challenge, because this work is not as apparent on the surface, revolutionary or expressive as the slogans in favour of the unification of Europe. This calls for many more administrative capacities (resourcefulness) that are difficult to build and do not make newspaper headlines. In other words, there will be the need to learn to work according to the Western routine in a good sense. Lithuania’s activities in various international forums (V-10, NB8 security policy dimension, 5+3+1, the USA-Baltic States Charter, etc.) will inevitably have to be reviewed through NATO’s and the EU’s perspective. The membership of these organisations will open additional opportunities for Lithuanian diplomacy in the fields of economy, energy and ecology.

We will not miss the direction provided we continue adhering to the principle that the basis for the security in Europe is a strong transatlantic link. The transatlantic link is a guarantee of the future of NATO as a defence alliance. Hence, alongside all other members of the Western community, we will have to cherish this link as well as see to it that it is not ousted by old local ambitions, so well-known from the books of history, disguised as “new” ideas of the security architecture…

December 2002
Changing European Security Space
Changing Security Regime in the Baltic Sea Region

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason – Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991–1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic–Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only end by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could become such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PIP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO–centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Introduction

Despite many important changes in the Baltic Sea region and renewing dynamism of the security system, it is universally recognised that the region was and remains one of the most stable places in Europe. As bloody conflicts raged in the former Yugoslavia in the last decade, reporters more than once compared the Baltic region with the Balkans in order to stress that, despite the similarity of sounding of the names, the troublesome Balkans could learn much from the stable Baltic area. It seems that today we already have a quite exhaustive answer to the question as to why the Balkans are so unstable. The problem has been analysed very thoroughly, while the question about the Baltic region’s stability has received much less attention. This is understandable – stability is not a thing that hits the headlines frequently. However, at a closer look, one sees that the phenomenon of regional stability is perhaps not less

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interesting that the problem of regional conflicts. The fact that grandiose changes that
took place in the Baltic Sea region over the last decade of the 20th century did no
impact upon its stability and the existing conflict pressures had not transformed into
open conflicts and use of force, forms a sufficient basis for raising a question what
supports such stability and what are the mechanisms of its reproduction and pros-
pects of its further development.

Answers to these questions should be first of all sought in analytical literature
devoted to the problems of the Baltic Sea region security. It should be noted that,
generally, these problems receive really much attention on the part of researchers.
Over the last decade a multitude of articles and books on this subject have been
published; it is difficult to count conferences and workshops devoted to it. The Baltic
region studies have been developed intensively both in the Baltic States themselves
and in the research centres of other countries. A visitor to the web sites of the most
famous research centres and universities will undoubtedly find literature on the sub-
ject of the Baltic Sea region security1. Voices of researchers from the smallest of the
Baltic Sea States are heard more and more frequently2. As quite many countries are
situated around the Baltic Sea, it has become a tradition to hold international con-
ferences or launch international projects and publish collective monographs in which
official or unofficial expert opinions from all countries of the region on various
regional security aspects are presented3. Admittedly, the number of monographs by
individual authors is smaller. The number of authors is proportional to the number
of countries covered by the monographs. Usually they are devoted to the Nordic or
the Baltic States rather than to the Baltic Sea region as a whole4.

Thus literature is really abundant and one just cannot encompass all the sources
available. The abundance of publications on the Baltic security issue not only
testifies to comprehensiveness and exhaustiveness of its study but also leaves little
space for innovations. After the familiarisation with the literature, one gets an im-

2 Probably the Latvian Institute of International Affairs holds the leading position among Baltic
3 See for example: Wellmann C., ed., The Baltic Sea Region: Conflict or Cooperation? Region –
December 6–8, 1991, Munster; Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1992; Joenniemi P & Vares P., eds., New
Actors on the International Arena: The Foreign Policies of the Baltic Countries, Tampere: TAPIR,
1993 (Research Report, No. 50); Petersen N., eds., The Baltic States in International Politics,
the 21st century, Riga and Stockholm, 1997; Mouritzen H., ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and
Europe After the NATO and EU Enlargements. Report of the Frosunda Conference, Frosunda, April
20–21, 2001, Stockholm: SIPRI, 2001; etc.
4 The following publications are nevertheless worth mentioning: Hidden J., Salmon P., The Baltic
Nations and Europe. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century, revised edition,
www.is-s.eu.org/chaillot/ch333e.html, accessed June 1, 2002; Perry Ch. M., Sweeney M.J., Winner
A.C., Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic–Baltic Region. Implications for US Policy, Brassey’s, 2000;
Vaahtoranta T., Forsberg T., “Post–Neutral or Pre–Allied. Finnish and Swedish Security Policies on
the EU and NATO as Security Organizations”, Working Paper of the Finnish Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, Helsinki, 2000, no. 29; Clemens W. C. Jr., The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory
pression that it would be difficult or practically impossible to say something new about these problems. Various aspects ranging from “hard” security to “soft” security, from foreign policy of individual states to the strategic balance and dynamics of the region have been examined. Therefore, the efforts of a researcher studying the Baltic Sea region security problems could be compared to an attempt to discover an unknown island in the Baltic Sea.

It is obvious that today one cannot expect to discover such island in the Baltic Sea, but nevertheless white spots can always be found in the system of knowledge built by us. And, as regards the above-mentioned issue – how the Baltic region’s exceptional stability could be explained – such studies are not so numerous. Among the latest publications, mention should be made of an article by Rikard Bengtson1, in which the author seeks to find an answer to the question as to which conditions of a stable regional peace are already in place and which are still lacking. Though the definition of a stable peace is quite complicated, the conclusion drawn by the author is simple: “the analysis shows that the extensive web of cooperative schemes in place in the region shows the promise of a move towards stable peace”2. Thus the study, though identifying current trends, is focussed on future prospects.

Future is the main concern of perhaps the largest study on the Baltic Sea region that has appeared in recent years: a collective monograph edited by Olaf F. Knudsen, entitled “Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region”. The collective nature of the monograph means that the range of the aspects covered is very wide, while the analysis of the problem is based on various theoretical approaches. However, despite the common title of the book the very phenomenon of the Baltic Sea region stability has not become a subject of direct study. It is interesting to note that, though at the beginning the authors usually do not deny that the region is stable enough, in the course of analysis attention becomes focussed on the ways to strengthen stability further. In other words, an assumption is as if programmed at the subconscious level of the authors’ minds that the region is actually not so stable as it seems, and that real stability still needs to be achieved. Therefore, this book, just as a number of other publications, pursues a “normative” objective: to provide guidelines on what should be done further. So it is not surprising that these studies do not give a more exhaustive explanation of the stability phenomenon itself. It is namely this gap in the analytical literature that the present work intends to fill.

The main assumption or working hypothesis underlying this project, which should assist in searching for an answer, is the idea that there exists something behind the individual foreign policy actors in the Baltic Sea region that maintains stability, because no power in the region is seeking to satisfy its interests to a full extent. And that “something” is nothing but adherence to certain standards of behaviour, which are probably generated by certain international institutions. In this case, the motives inducing the states of the region to act in a specific way are not of primary importance. The most important thing is the fact that the existence of certain norms and rules can be observed in practice. In this context, it is worthwhile to remember Stephen Krasner’s definition of international regimes (1988), which has already become classical:

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2 Ibid., p. 355.
international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”.

If we agree with the assumption that, in the Baltic Sea region, security issues are mostly regulated by norms, rules of behaviour or conventions acceptable to all local actors, then we have a sufficiently strong basis for the formulation of a hypothesis that a definite security regime has been manifesting itself (has formed or is forming) in the region over the last decade, and it is namely this regime that generates stability observed in the region.

The application of this definition of the security regime to specific regions may be a bit doubtful. This is really problematic because, as shown by analysis of relevant literature, it is virtually impossible to provide an unquestionable definition of a region. But in this case we have not relied upon a strict geographical definition of the Baltic Sea region. The focus of attention embraced not only the Baltic States but also all other actors that for some reason were, in one way or another, involved in or related to the control and regulation of the central conflict line, i.e. the dilemma of the security of the Baltic States and Russia. Therefore, in principle, an international security regime functioning in a region must not necessarily be regional itself. In this case one should speak about the specificity of the regional operation of a regime with wider coverage.

Thus the main objective of this research project is to try to characterise the security regime forming in the Baltic Sea region including the transformations of its principles and norms over the last decade, from the end of the Cold War up to the present, when the Baltic States are on the threshold of the NATO membership, and a new shape of co-existence of the West and Russia is emerging.

The very concept of “the security regime” helps define the basic methodological approach of the study – neoliberal institutionalism. This theoretical approach9 formed in the 1980s as a reaction to the neorealist theory of international relations elaborated in Kenneth Waltz’ book “Theory of International Politics”10 in 1979. Neoliberal institutionalism agrees with neorealism that states and balance of power play a central role in international politics. However, at the same time this school notes that, while placing emphasis on the competitive nature of international politics, neorealism underestimates the fact that states not only compete but also cooperate and even create certain international norms, rules and institutions, which, in turn, start influencing policies of these states. Therefore, according to the theorists of neoliberal institutionalism, in order to grasp international political processes, one must analyse both the states’ power balance and the existing international institutions with their inherent norms and conventions of international behaviour. Numerous international institutions and organisations of various types are established for the purpose of uniting the states’ efforts in attaining certain aims or of simply facilitating

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interstate cooperation; however, according to the representatives of this school, in certain circumstances, international institutions may even play a decisive role in resolving or regulating problems of international politics.

Finally, one must note that, along with the principal neoliberal institutionalist approach, the study also employs historical analysis, by means of which the author attempts to identify the stages and specificity of the changes that have taken place in the area of the Baltic Sea region security as well as to describe the evolution of the main institutions engaged in security issues, first of all CSCE and NATO. The main stages which suggested the structure of the paper had been identified according to substantial changes in the constellation of regional security. The first stage covers a period from the end of the Cold War till the end of 1994, when the legacy of the Cold War was intensively eliminated in both the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe as a whole. The second stage, from 1995 till 2001, is substantially a period when the main actors of the region still could not make final decisions and considered several alternatives for the future security regime in the Baltic Sea region. The year 2001 may be regarded as a kind of threshold when a NATO-centric security regime supported by two main pillars – the balanced groups of NATO states and NATO partners – was finally established in the region.


During the Cold War, the confrontation between the superpowers and their allies was diluted by certain specificity in the Baltic Sea region. A rather peculiar model of security regime had formed in this region, called the Nordic Balance by analysts. This meant that the confrontation in the Baltic Sea region was not direct as in Germany; the areas under the influence of the superpowers and their allies were delimited by neutral buffer states, Sweden and Finland. Even the neutrality of these two states had different features. Though formally neutral, Sweden was, nevertheless, connected with NATO by numerous informal security ties1. Meanwhile, Finland was forced to sign an unfavourable Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement (FCMA) with the Soviet Union in 1948. Under this agreement, Finland practically lost the opportunity for pursuing an independent national security policy, even though the Soviets, in exchange for this restriction, did not interfere with Finland’s internal affairs, and the country could independently develop economic and cultural ties with European states. Thus unwritten security norms and rules in this region were slightly different from those of Eastern Europe, and though nobody was very much satisfied with them, there were neither intentions nor possibilities for changing them substantially.

The dynamic process of changes in the Baltic Sea region after the Cold War and the end of global confrontation transformed the main lines of potential interstate conflicts in the region. The main point of conflicts and the source of security dynamics shifted to the sphere of relations of the restored Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – with Russia. But for the huge difference in the power of the small Baltic

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Republics and Russia and the peculiar geopolitical position of the Baltic States denying Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, the significance of this conflict line would not be so great. The security of the Baltic States poses a problem first of all because the Baltic region will always remain the one of strategic importance to Russia. In spite of the fact that Russia’s interests are much wider and cannot be concentrated upon a single region, Russia does not wish and cannot withdraw for many reasons. Therefore, the Russian–Baltic relations have created and should continue to create a pressure in the region first of all due to significant differences in these states’ attitudes towards the security problem. Other countries of the region and international institutions unavoidably had to react to these pressures. All this constituted a conflict axis around which the new security regime of the Baltic Sea region started to form.

1.1. Main Changes in the Baltic Sea Region after the Cold War

Changes in the Baltic Sea region started a bit later than in Eastern Europe. If by the end of 1989 almost all Central European states had liberated themselves from the communist rule and restored their sovereignty, in the Baltic region, the forthcoming changes were foretold by national liberation movements in the three republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – still controlled by the Soviet Union. But Moscow did not intend to abandon control over them in spite of fundamental changes in its posture on the international arena. Even the issue of Finland, whose sovereignty was restricted by the FCMA agreement of 1948, was not discussed publicly at that time, though the unifying of Germany, accomplished in 1990, meant that, substantially, any restrictions on sovereignty of Germany and its former allies should be finally removed. Therefore, the most important change that provided an impetus for fundamental developments in the Baltic Sea region was not Gorbachev’s policy aimed at ending the confrontation with the USA and its allies, but the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. The disappearance of this empire from the political map made both a substantial change in the geopolitical situation and opened entirely new opportunities never considered earlier.

It was due to this substantial change that the Baltic Sea region changed beyond recognition during 1991–1994. All the states of the region, just as other Central and Eastern European countries, regained freedom and sovereignty and could establish such mutual relations as they deemed necessary. Therefore, much depended on the choice of orientation and security policy by the governments of the states no longer restricted by external limitations. For example, in 1991, Sweden, one of the region’s most important states, decided to join the European Community and submitted an application to the European Commission; in May 1992, the Swedish Parliament revoked neutrality, the Swedish foreign policy principle of long standing, and announced that Sweden would remain neutral only in case of war. This opened an opportunity for Sweden to cooperate with other states and organisations in peacetime and to seek membership of the European Community.

Important developments also took place in the security policy of Poland – another Eastern European state important for the Baltic region. During the Cold War, this country found itself in a quite ambiguous situation in terms of security. Its sovereignty was considerably restricted by both the power of the Soviet Union and security guarantees provided by the latter. Western territories acquired by Poland
after World War II were a kind of compensation for the lost eastern lands, which today form part of the Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. However, together with the “regained” western lands Poland received a threat that, in case of a change in the international situation and uniting of Germany, part of its territory may once again become an object of claims on the part of Germany. Therefore, it is very important for the stability of the region that Poland would regulate its relations with its neighbours Germany, the Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania – without any intermediaries. Poland managed to achieve this by 1994.

The main thing, however, that the Baltic Sea region states wished to secure after the collapse of the Soviet Union was, undoubtedly, final and irrevocable dismantling of the relics testifying to the former Soviet predominance on the eastern Baltic seacoast: the above-mentioned FCMA in case of Finland and the withdrawal of Russian troops in case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The initial term of the validity of FCMA treaty concluded by Finland and the Soviet Union in 1948 was ten years, but in 1955, it was re–written so as to extend the term up to twenty years. The term was extended again in 1970 and 1983. Even in March 1991, the 43rd anniversary of the agreement was marked as usual. Thus it seemed that, despite substantial changes in Europe, the Soviet Union tended to change nothing and maintain the Nordic balance regime in the Baltic Sea region which was advantageous to it. However, the failure of the communist putsch in August 1991 revealed that the Soviet Union was no longer in a position to stop changes in the Baltic Sea region.

The key interest of Finland in these negotiations was, undoubtedly, a wish to eliminate any hint to the spirit of the previous FCMA; it strove that even no mention of it would be made in the text of the new agreement. According to the Finnish negotiator Jaakko Blomberg:

All in all, the difficult heritage of the FCMA treaty was buried without a notable discord, and the new treaty included no special bilateral security policy obligations that go beyond those already binding all European States on the basis of agreed–upon general conventions12.

Thus multilateral international agreements (such as the UN Charter, the Final Act of the European Conference for Security and Cooperation in Helsinki and the Paris Charter) outlining the states’ standards of behaviour rather than a complicated history of Finnish–Russian relations formed a framework for a new treaty. In other words, Finland sought to place new relations with Russia into a wider international context and to finally stop the sad practice of the past “special” relations.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Baltic States was probably one of the principal incitements that changed the entire geostrategic situation in the Baltic Sea region. While the Soviet Union was a dominating power in the Baltic Sea region, the Russian Federation as its heir received only insignificant areas on the Baltic seacoast: the Kaliningrad exclave and St. Petersburg region. However, such change in the situation gave rise to a new line of conflict.

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between the Baltic States and Russia, with the ensuing threat to the regional security. A possibility of direct Russian intervention was not the main cause of the pressure. The new Russian state and its political leaders could not question the Baltic States’ independence itself – at least with regard to the earlier development of mutual relations when Russian politicians attempted to use the Baltic States in their competition with the Soviet Union’s leaders. However, as the Soviet Union disintegrated and was replaced by Russia, both the legal form and content of bilateral Baltic–Russian relations had to change inevitably. Though nobody disputed the independence of the Baltic States, the choice of the status quo of their relations with Russia was rather wide as of the end of 1991. The Baltic States still accommodated the armed forces controlled by Russia; the economy of the new states was fully integrated in the economic space of the former Soviet Union; many Russians – immigrants from the Soviet Union – lived in the Baltic States, who suddenly found themselves living abroad as the Soviet Union collapsed. Therefore, it is quite natural that in this period the Baltic States and Russia faced many unresolved issues related to the dismantling of the Soviet Union’s legacy.

From the standpoint of the regional security, the main problems for the Baltic States, just as for the entire Central and Eastern Europe, included the withdrawal of the army controlled by Russia and the legalisation of state borders, former administrative boundaries of the Soviet republics. Soon it turned out that reaching an agreement on these issues with Russia was quite difficult for the Baltic States. Russia’s unwillingness to agree was determined by both objective and subjective reasons. Russia had to meet the obligations of the army withdrawal from East Germany and Poland. Furthermore, the withdrawn troops had to be accommodated in new places of deployment, which were overfilled or not yet fitted out. Russia inherited a huge army from the Soviet Union, which held the entire democratic world in pressure but which was clearly excessive for the purposes of Russia’s defence. For this reason the Russian government was interested in delaying the withdrawal, at least from the Baltic States, as long as possible. Therefore, no date of the withdrawal was mentioned at the beginning of the negotiations; later, 1997–1999 started to be mentioned as the deadline for the withdrawal\footnote{The first negotiations between Russia and all three Baltic States on the issue of troop withdrawals took place on January 31 – February 2, 1992. The talks with Lithuania and Latvia concluded with an agreement that troops would begin to leave the Baltic States in February. But no indication of a date for the completion of troop withdrawals was given. The talks between the Russian Federation and separate delegations from all three States appeared to be making little progress. In May 4–7, 1992, the Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Fyodor Sholov–Kvedayevyev accompanied by a delegation including Col.–Gen. Valery Mironov, Commander of the North–western Group of Forces toured Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In response to Baltic demands for an immediate troop withdrawal, the Russian side repeated that the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from the Baltic States before 1997–99 would depend on the material provision for the servicemen.}.

Thus the only way for a speedy resolution of the problem of the foreign army’s withdrawal that the political leaders of the Baltic States could choose was immediate internationalisation of the problem, making it a problem of the entire international community. In this situation the Baltic States had considerable opportunities as members of the principal international organisations, the UN and CSCE.

Strict internationalisation of the problem of the Russian troops’ withdrawal was a tactics that brought both success and certain costs to the Baltic States. Their relations with Russia worsened to such an extent that they could even be called a
regional “Cold War”. The reason for the conflict was the legal status of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia. Of the three Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia had proportionally bigger Russian-speaking minority\textsuperscript{44}. Therefore, while there was no discrimination of Russian-speaking population under the Lithuanian Law on Citizenship and these persons could receive Lithuanian citizenship without any obstacles, the situation in Latvia and Estonia was completely different.

During the summer of 1992 Russian officials began to link the withdrawal of troops from Estonia and Latvia to the issue of the Russian minority rights. In addition, Russia was now in a position to link the withdrawal not only to the situation of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States but also to strive for internationalisation of this issue in response to the Baltic States’ attempts to make the troop withdrawal problem international. Already in 1992 Russia applied to the Council of Europe and CSCE drawing these organisations’ attention to the human rights’ situation in the Baltic States.

Russia’s Cold War with Latvia and Estonia, which started in 1992, impeded the conclusion of troop withdrawal agreements; therefore, Russia conducted the withdrawal from these states on its own discretion. It was only on 30 April 1994 that the Presidents of Latvia and Russia signed an agreement under which the 10,000 Russian troops remaining in Latvia were to withdraw. A handful of Russian servicemen 500–600 personnel, were to remain to operate the Skrunda radar station on the Baltic coast until its closure some years later. In July, at the talks with President Meri in Moscow, Yeltsin agreed to withdraw the remaining 2,000 Russian troops from Estonia. Under a separate agreement signed in July, some 200 Russian specialists were to remain at the Russian submarine base in Paldiski, which had to be dismantled under civilian supervision, by September 1995. The last Russian units officially left Estonia and Latvia on 29 August 1994.

1.2. Stabilizing influence of international institutions in 1991–1994

As one could have noticed, with important geopolitical changes in the region under way and new foundations for the relations in the area formed, the influence of international institutions that were active in the region, CSCE in particular, was very important if not crucial. In case of Finland there was no direct involvement of CSCE but the provisions of CSCE, documents laid a basis for a new interstate relations agreement with Russia. Meanwhile, the role of CSCE in resolving dilemmas concerning the Baltic–Russian relations and in maintaining regional stability was crucial in most cases. Without any doubt, the influence of CSCE induced Russia to change its position on the withdrawal of its army from the Baltic States and to decide on the completion of this process in 1994, along with the withdrawal of the remaining troops from Germany and Poland.

The stabilising role of CSCE and the Council of Europe also manifested itself in managing the rising conflict between Russia and Latvia/Estonia over the position of the Russian-speaking population. Through the internationalisation of the issue, Russia expected that international institutions would make Latvia and Estonia grant

\textsuperscript{44} According to the latest census figures, ethnic Russians formed 8.7 percent of the Lithuanian population, as against the 30.4 per cent in Latvia and 28.1 per cent in Estonia.
citizenship to all present residents; however, as it turned out later, the international community, though tending to mediate in settling the situation, nevertheless rejected the idea of linking the issue of national minorities with that of the withdrawal of troops. Numerous delegations of foreign inspectors and observer missions did not find any serious violations of human rights in the Estonian and Latvian laws on citizenship and naturalisation. Therefore, one even has grounds for asserting that it was owing to the influence of international institutions that “Russia’s internationalization of ethnic issues in Estonia and Latvia created a situation that, in terms of balance, worked in favour of the Baltic States”\(^\text{15}\).

Thus, in the period from 1991 to 1994, CSCE played an undoubtedly central role in the Baltic Sea region as regards the establishment of rules and norms of the States’ behaviour in the area of security relations. Other international institutions active in Europe and relevant to the Baltic Sea region’s security – NATO and the European Community – were focused on internal restructurisation processes and did not undertake a more active role in the security issues of the region. In 1992, the EC member states that wished to deepen integration and to enrich it with a political and economic/monetary union encountered a crisis of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; the crisis was overcome only in 1993. Therefore, an attempt of the Baltic States to raise the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops at the Council of the Baltic Sea States (initiated by Denmark and Germany, members of EC), failed\(^\text{16}\).

NATO, which was experiencing the time of changes, adaptation to new conditions and establishment of a new dialogue with former antagonists through NACC, also did not demonstrate any activity or wish to participate in the Baltic Sea region’s security issues. Nonetheless NATO did not withdraw from the security problems of the region and made it clear that it intended to exert “a stabilising influence” there. On 11–16 March 1992, the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner visited Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Through his tour he repeated NATO’s pledge that no “security vacuum” would be allowed to develop in Eastern Europe. He insisted that all countries of the region would benefit from NATO’s stabilizing influence, but warned that the alliance would not be able to offer formal security guarantees or membership.

However, though CSCE demonstrated that it was an organisation capable of regulating security issues and implementing conflict prevention under “peaceful” conditions, it appeared that the organization was helpless in case of crisis when one

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\(^{16}\) On March 5–6 1992, foreign ministers of all 10 Baltic littoral states met in Copenhagen, Denmark, and agreed to establish a Council of the Baltic Sea States. The German–Danish initiative brought together Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. Its aim was to create a community in which assistance could be given to Russia, Poland and the three former Soviet Baltic States to transform themselves into free-market societies. However, the Danish Foreign Minister and co-chairman of the meeting Uffe Ellemann-Jensen emphasized that the Council would be closely linked to existing European organizations. He foresaw the Baltic region as a “region within the European Community” and said that regional cooperation would “facilitate the linkages of the European Community with the non-member countries of the region”. On March 6, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania attempted to raise the issue of the delay in the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from their territory. However, Ellemann-Jensen stressed that the work of the Council would not duplicate that of existing international organizations and that security matters fell outside the scope of the new body.
had to act very quickly or even apply force to control the conflicting sides. The CSCE’s attempts to manage the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration failed: the resolution of conflict prevention problems in Moldova, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia was very difficult.

Therefore, its is quite natural that Central and Eastern European states, having restored their sovereignty successfully, nevertheless experienced a certain deficit of security and tended to look for more solid security guarantees than those offered by CSCE. As early as 1992, there appeared signs showing that the former Warsaw Pact members from Central Europe intended to seek active membership of NATO, seeing this as the fundamental aim of their policy of “returning to democratic Europe”. Thus, at the end of 1993, the issue of NATO’s eventual enlargement to Eastern Europe and explicit opposition of Russia became, perhaps, the most often discussed issue on the political agenda. In October, the pressure was further increased by an armed conflict between the President and the supporters of the revolted Parliament in Moscow. Finally, unexpected results of the election to Russian Parliament, where the Liberal–Democratic Party headed by the Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and communists received a majority, prompted the leaders of the three Baltic States to declare, at a meeting in Tallinn on 13 December, that their countries ask NATO to help ensure their security. Taking account of the situation, NATO countries had to decide on this urgent issue and give an answer, both to the countries wishing to join the organisation and to Russia.

However, this time a decision was adopted that NATO enlargement should be advanced slowly in the form of natural evolution, starting limited–scope defence agreements with individual Central and East European countries37. As it is known, the NATO summit meeting in January 1994 approved this plan, entitling it “Partnership for Peace (PfP)”

The PfP became a very important instrument of the stabilisation of the security situation in Eastern Europe, and its importance was increasing. Though in 1994, it was decided, to launch a CSCE reform and to reorganise it into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1995, its role and significance, at least in the Baltic Sea region, was decreasing because this organisation, focused on conflict prevention and management, did not dispose of the necessary means and could not respond to security strengthening needs of the states in the region. Meanwhile, the PfP, though having no intention to replace CSCE or push it out, inevitably became an important framework in which the NATO’s stabilising effect became much more strongly perceived than before. It was of vital importance that “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document” clearly stated that “NATO will consult any active participant in the Partnership if the Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security”38.

37 At the informal NATO Defence Ministers meeting on October 20–21, 1993 in Travemünde The US Defence Secretary Les Aspin denied that delays in admitting new members showed deference to the Russian opinion and said “it is not that we are afraid of Russian threats”. Les Aspin said that the question of new membership had been considered in the context of the US proposal for series of limited defence arrangements, or “partnership for peace” between NATO and individual eastern European countries. Underlining the merits of this plan which was said to have been unanimously endorsed, Aspin said that it would lay the “military groundwork” for eventual integration of new members into NATO.

The PfP and Russia’s joining it finalised the process of dismantling the old security regime and meant the formation of a new security situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The resolution of Sweden and Finland on joining the PfP was of particular significance for the Baltic Region. Thus, by the end of 1994, the PfP involving all states of the region became another unifying factor along with CSCE. In a sense, one may say that “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document” as it became a document setting out the most important norms and rules of the security regime established in the Baltic Sea region. On the other hand, one may also say that, after the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic States and Poland was completed at the end of 1994, when the implementation of the PfP started, the Baltic Sea region finally lost its specificity that had been shaped in the years of the Cold War, becoming an integral part of a wider security system. But further evolution of events showed that such conclusion would be a hasty one, because the security system of both the Baltic Sea region and Europe as a whole was still under formation, at least because the normalisation of Baltic–Russian relations was not completed yet. The Cold War between these states that started in 1992 did not end with the withdrawal of the army.


The year 1995 was, in a sense, a turning point in the development of the Baltic region security system because the main conflict line threatening security in the region acquired a new quality upon the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland and the Baltic States. The unequivocal resolution of Poland and the three Baltic States to relate their security guarantees with the projected membership of the North Atlantic Organisation was the main reason for disagreement and pressure. Meanwhile, Russia adhered to a provision that the Baltic Sea region was secure enough—no state posed a military threat to any other state; therefore, NATO enlargement was an unnecessary and provocative step that had to be opposed. This was probably the main factor that complicated relations between the Baltic States and Russia after the withdrawal of the Russian Army. Though the global Cold War had ended, the “minor” Cold War that started in 1992 continued in the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, the status of the security atmosphere in the entire region was to depend on further development of security relations between Russia and its former subordinates.

2.1. Deadlock in the Baltic–Russian Relations

Until the decision on NATO’s enlargement to the Baltic Sea region is adopted, Russia feels obliged to take any measures to ensure that such scenario would not be turned into reality. Two main lines may be identified in this policy. The main line is an attempt to discredit the Baltic States in the eyes of NATO states—countries not suitable for the membership in the Alliance. The following main measures of this policy could be mentioned:

• demanding that the situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia be improved, at the same time indicating that the unwillingness, or, to be more exact, inability of these countries to integrate the Russian community in their societies raises doubts over their democratic nature and respect for minority rights;
• refusing to finally settle the issue of state borders. Russia has signed a state border treaty with Lithuania only (1997). However, up until now (June 2002) the treaty has not been ratified and has not come into effect thus the Lithuanian–Russian border (Kaliningrad region) is, in essence, a temporary one. The status of Russia’s borders with Latvia and Estonia is also temporary though no treaties have been signed as yet. Thus Russia clearly seeks to demonstrate to NATO states that the latter risk to accept countries with undefined borders, thus involving the Alliance into territorial disputes;

• ......................................................................................................................... using the problem of military transit to Kaliningrad region via Lithuanian territory. In this case, also, Russia and Lithuania have just a temporary agreement on the conditions of movement via Lithuania’s territory of troops withdrawn from Germany; the agreement was reached at the end of 1993. Even upon completion of the withdrawal from Germany, Lithuania could not succeed in agreeing with Russia on new transit conditions; therefore, the old temporary agreement remained in force as a compromise solution. By this, Russia seeks to demonstrate that Lithuania as a state is not capable of resolving military transit issues; therefore, again, the entire Alliance will be mixed up in these problems.

Without any doubt, this list could be continued with more examples, among which “unintentional” violations of the Baltic States’ territory or air space should be mentioned; Russia as if seeks to demonstrate that the protection of the borders of these states will burden the Alliance.

Thus, even after the withdrawal of the Russian army, the Baltic–Russian relations did not substantially change or improve because neither party intended to change their totally opposite positions towards security policy. A Finnish analyst Raimo Väyrynen is absolutely right in asserting that

Stalemate is perhaps the best way to describe the current Baltic–Russian relationship; both parties consider the major concessions impossible, while Russia as the bigger power is unwilling, and possibly, unable to use force to break the political logjam19.

Of course, this deadlock of Baltic–Russian relations does not mean that the states have ceased communicating. However, their relations have not been fully normalised despite the withdrawal of troops and therefore, give rise to pressures in the entire region20.

In essence, a situation has formed where the sides of the conflict cannot and, to tell the truth, are even not interested to make concessions and seek an agreement. A certain “vicious circle of insecurity” has formed in the Baltic Sea region, and the main actors cannot get out of it by their own efforts. Therefore, policy measures


20 At the web site of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs we could find the following estimation, which is valid for Latvian and Lithuanian relations with Russia as well: “A primary factor hindering the pace of developing relations is the incomplete basis of interstate treaties. Lacking are primarily such mutual agreements as an agreement on borders, an agreement on trade and economic co-operation and an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation”. See: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Estonia and Russia”, http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_175/1430.html, 01 06 2002.
pursued by them are focused on influencing international environment and, first of all, pushing NATO in a certain direction rather than on attracting one another. In other words, there has been no substantial change in the situation since 1995 – it has only become clear that this security dilemma may only be resolved in a wider international context, probably upon developing a security regime acceptable to both conflicting sides. However, as decisions of such nature are born very slowly, a situation of uncertainty and waiting has formed in the Baltic Sea region. The parties have found themselves in a certain transitional period the ending date of which could not be stated by anybody.

Thus, upon the dismantling of the legacy of the Cold War, a new security dilemma arose in the Baltic Sea region; a search for alternative solutions for the dilemma became the main issue on the political agenda. According to the nature of the main security problem – in 1995, the region did not differ much from Central Europe because the Czech Republic’s Hungary’s and Poland’s goal to join NATO could be explained by the same motives. Similarly, Russia’s evaluation of this aspiration of the Central European countries was negative and Russia openly opposed it. Nevertheless, peculiarities of the situation in the Baltic Sea region was lent by the proximity of Russia and by special posture of Sweden and Finland because these countries chose, this time voluntarily, a security policy strategy different from that of Central European and Baltic States. They, first of all, decided to seek membership in the European Union, not in NATO, and to participate in the formation of the common EU foreign and security policy. While the Baltic States foremost made a bid for NATO but not for the EU membership.

### 2.2. Search for Alternative Security Guarantees for the Baltic States

In spite of the consistent official policy of the Baltic States aimed at continuing NATO pre-accession, there have been numerous proposals, ideas and discussions on how the Baltic security issue and, at the same time, the security regime of the entire region, could be settled alternatively, leaving the Baltic States beyond NATO temporarily or even for ever. Though these discussions did not have any practical impact upon the policies of the Baltic States, they were sufficiently important in the sense that they had to assist both NATO member states and Russia in deciding on further attitudes toward the Baltic States.

Probably the main idea that was widely discussed at that time was the “regionalisation” of the Baltic Sea region’s security, creation of a kind of regional security regime with its participants restricted to military non-aligned Baltic and Scandinavian states. For example, in May 1996, Douglas Herd, the former British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, proposed to establish “a Baltic security sub-zone”21. At first sight the idea seemed quite logical because the Baltic Sea region consisting of small democratic and peaceful countries may easily form a classical regime with common norms, rules and decision-adoptions procedures. It seemed clear that norms of cooperative security rather than unilateral attempts to ensure security by military means would easily take root in the region. By the way, this proposal received immediate

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support in both Bonn and Moscow. Even Sweden supported it in part. However, the Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson expressed only a qualified support for the idea during its visit to the USA in August 1996. The Prime Minister stressed that though Sweden would have been the largest participant in this group it did not undertake to act as a guarantee of the Baltic States’ security, since the status of Sweden as a non-aligned state did not permit it to assume any military obligations in respect of the Baltic States. Therefore, according to Persson, the governments of the Baltic States know very well that, in order to balance the eventual restoration of Russian imperialism, they need a much greater help than that offered by the northern neighbours.

In the context of the debate concerning the security of the Baltic Sea region, a novel proposal from Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick, Rand corporation analysts, was met with greatest attention. In the summer of 1996, Asmus and Nurick wrote that the Baltic States would probably not get into NATO with the first wave of candidates and, until the issue of their future NÀTO membership is decided, the speedy accession of Estonia to the European Union and making its status equal to that of Sweden and Finland would constitute an alternative for the Baltic States membership of NATO. To tell the truth, this proposal was presented only as a temporary answer to the question as to what could be undertaken after the Baltic States will not be invited to the Alliance at the Madrid meeting in July 1997. The authors of the study recognise that:

NATO – and only NATO – can create the overall security framework, which will make it easier for the EU to enlarge to the Baltic States and easier for non-NATO countries to become more involved as well\(^2\).

Finally, speaking about alternative ways of ensuring security of the Baltic States one should not forget that there were people, both in Russia and the West, who thought that NATO enlargement to the Baltic States was a wrong and irresponsible undertaking. As an illustration we may present reasoning of a Swedish researcher Lena Jonson. While studying Russian policy toward CIS countries she notes a large gap between what Russia declares and what it would like to do in respect of the so-called “Near Abroad”. Not in a position to use military force, Russia makes use of the new states, weaknesses and tries to interfere with the internal political processes and exert influence that is beneficial to it. The researcher is of the opinion that this conclusion may also be adapted to the security of the Baltic States. Therefore, the response of the West should be appropriate:

In terms of the Baltic States’ vulnerable national security, the eventual threat from Russia would more likely include the use of political pressure rather than military force or threats. Subsequently, the West answers to this challenge would be help to minimize all economic and political vulnerabilities of the Baltic States in relations to Russia\(^3\).

A logical conclusion, made on the basis of Jonson’s and other similar reaso-

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ning, would be that not NATO enlargement but the Baltic States' accession to the EU would be an adequate measure to resolve the issue of the security of the Baltic Sea region, since membership of the EU would provide the most important security guarantee – smooth socio-economic development of the States, restricting Russia's possibilities for directing these processes in a way favourable to Russia.

2.3. First Wave of NATO Enlargement and Russia's Security Guarantees

During the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in 1997, a piece of news that was not very joyful for the Baltic States was announced that is that consideration of their applications for NATO accession was to be postponed for an indefinite future. Only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to start accession negotiations in July 1997. However, the Madrid meeting stressed – which was very important for the future – that NATO enlargement was a process which did not end with this stage of admission and that NATO would continue to pursue its policy of "open doors" based on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, the Baltic States had to console themselves with the following recognition of their efforts contained in a single sentence:

At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members\textsuperscript{24}.

However, there were probably two factors important for the security situation of the Baltic Sea region and its further development. First of all, the State which both belonged to Central Europe and was important for the region – Poland – was invited to NATO. The Polish–Lithuanian border became the first border of the Baltic States with a NATO country. This gave a certain hope for the future that NATO’s enlargement will be continued.

Another fact that seemed very important for the Baltic region occurred before the publication of the Madrid declaration. This was Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris on 27 May 1997\textsuperscript{25}. The Act confirmed once again that NATO and Russia did not consider each other as adversaries. Under the Act the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was founded as a forum of consultations and joint decisions in case of agreement by the parties. The document also identified problems on which consultations between NATO and Russia could be held: prevention of conflicts, distribution of mass destruction weapons, exchange of information on security and defence matters, conversion of defence industries, environmental protection, civil safety etc. It was stated in the Act that, upon signing the document, NATO did not become subordinate to any other organisation or state and that it did not intend to modify its obligations to present and future NATO members in the security area. The Act contained no


guarantees for Russia concerning the stopping of NATO’s enlargement.

Such document regulating NATO–Russian relations was undoubtedly a new phenomenon in security environment; it demonstrated, for the first time, that there existed certain principles, norms and rules that could be subscribed to even by the former Cold War antagonists. This was a step forward in comparison with a quite limited agreement between NATO and Russia within the framework of PIP. However, on the other hand, it was obvious that the document as though lacked a certain link which would unite the two forces that still seemed opposing rather than collaborating. This was perhaps owing to the fact that each side viewed the importance of the Act differently and had different expectations. By forming a Permanent Joint Council, NATO member states expected to mitigate Russia’s negative reaction after the forthcoming announcement in July that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will be admitted to NATO after two years. Meanwhile, Russia probably expected that it would have greater influence over NATO’s decisions and would be able to stop further enlargement, first of all, to the Baltic Sea region, after the accession of the above–mentioned countries. Tending to treat the signing of the Act and NATO’s decision on limited enlargement as Russia’s victory, Russia now evidently decided that it was high time to take over the initiative and to start pursuing a more active policy in the Baltic Sea region. The most obvious manifestation of such modified Russian policy, a kind of détente, was Russia’s decision to sign a state border treaty with Lithuania in 1997 and, within this framework, offer Lithuania and other Baltic States to enter into a treaty on security guarantees.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 22 September 1997, Yevgeny Primakov, Russian Foreign Minister (who had replaced Andrey Kozyrev in 1996), officially stated that Russia was interested in the stability of the Baltic States and wished to ensure their security. According to Primakov, Russia could undertake to guarantee their security upon signing agreements on good neighbourhood relations. In the opinion of the minister, such agreements could develop into a regional security pact. Algirdas Brazauskas, President of Lithuania, heard the same statement during his official visit to Moscow in October. Yeltsin guaranteed that no unexpected things were awaiting Lithuania on the part of Moscow. As one could forecast, Lithuania and other Baltic States rejected Russia’s initiative. It was stated in a document published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania that “neither unilateral security guarantees legalised in the form of a treaty nor regional security pacts can safeguard the security of Europe, including Lithuania. In the opinion of Lithuania, the security and stability space in Europe will be extended by the Baltic States’ integration in the European Union and NATO”226.

Why a proposal, so attractive from the first glance, was rejected? One can hardly find an explanation better than that provided by Zbigniew Brzezinsky, as early as 1991, in his book “The Grand Chessboard”:

…the Russian Democrats simply could not grasp the depth either of the Central European’s resentment over half a century of Moscow domination or of their desire to

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be part of a larger Euro-Atlantic system.27

Thus the détente in Russian–Baltic relations was quite short. No further progress took place in these relations. Finally, the Permanent Joint Council of NATO and Russia appeared to be completely ineffective; its work was finally stopped due to Russia’s protest against NATO’s actions aimed at resolving the Kosovo crisis by military force.

2.4. Temporary “Settlement” of the Baltic Issue

After NATO made known its decision to enlarge, a new situation started forming in Europe, with new contours of security architecture, where a place could be found for the Baltic States. Therefore, though it seems paradoxical, namely the Baltic States could adapt their policy to the changing situations most easily. Nothing had to be changed substantially—only the work started within the PfP and EAPC framework had to be continued. Having not received an invitation to NATO, the Baltic States had to satisfy themselves with, and successfully made use of their status of countries almost universally recognised as NATO candidate countries. They understood that NATO faced serious difficulties in including them in the first round of the enlargement. But the first successful enlargement formed a solid basis for the final settlement of the region’s security problems in the way desired by the Baltic States.

All the Baltic States after the “first rejection” were trying to substantiate their membership credentials by participating as fully as possible within the PfP, trying to demonstrate that they were not only “consumers” of security, but were and would be, a valuable asset for the Alliance as a whole. Baltic participation in Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) was therefore symbolically very important. In Bosnia, Baltic forces worked together with Swedish, Finnish and Polish contingents in a Nordic Brigade, operating side by side with Russian troops, all under the US command and under NATO auspices. The Baltic States also often participated in PfP annual exercises like the Baltic Challenge. All three countries also participated in the PfP Planning and Review Process, which was designed to advance interoperability and increase transparency among Allies and partner countries. The desire to strengthen ties with NATO in order to ultimately join the Alliance, had already positively influenced cooperation among the Baltic States in security and defence fields (BaltBat), and had also speeded up internal defence policy reviews.

Meanwhile the USA, with regard to the urgency of the Baltic problem and seeking to demonstrate that the door to NATO remained open, initiated the US–Baltic Charter of Partnership, which was signed in January 1998. The primary importance of this document for the Baltic States and their security was related to the fact that, probably for the first time on the highest political level, it was confirmed by the signature of the US President that their wish to join NATO was treated sufficiently seriously. While the Baltic Charter did not specifically provide a US guarantee of Baltic security or NATO membership, it declared that the ultimate goal of the signa-

tories was to incorporate the Baltics into European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defence institutions. Although the Baltic Charter did not specifically guarantee that the Baltic republics would become members of NATO, the US Administration statements left little doubt that the United States was committed to helping create conditions for the Baltic membership within NATO’s ongoing enlargement process. The administration support for the Baltic membership in NATO was confirmed during the Baltic Charter signing ceremony when President Clinton declared, “America is determined to create conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through the [NATO’s] door.”

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The period 1995–2000 was the years when debates took place and preparations were made for the decision on which of the two Baltic Sea regional security scenarios was more suitable and, therefore, worth greater political support. One of the basic scenarios proposed, which, despite its attractiveness, seemed unreal enough, was NATO’s consistent development and final involvement of the Baltic region in the Euro–Atlantic security zone. As an alternative, the idea of “regionalisation” of the Baltic Sea region security was advanced in one form or another. The debate particularly intensified when a decision not to include the Baltic States in the first wave of the enlargement was adopted. However, this specific security regime based on a special regional agreement or a regional security pact appeared to be unacceptable to the Baltic Sea states except Russia. In this context one may also mention debates initiated by the European Union and certain actions aimed at forming the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). To tell the truth, the title of this initiative is slightly misleading because it has nothing to do with defence and cannot constitute an alternative to NATO, which is a collective defence organization and plays a leading role in crisis management. The ESDP applies only to the so-called “Petersberg tasks”. Nevertheless, the Baltic States supported the EU’s Headline Goal for 2003 (Catalogue of Forces), but their contributions are the same as those they pledge for NATO operations.

Thus no turning point in defining the security architecture in the Baltic Sea region occurred in the period concerned. A situation of uncertainty was preserved. On the one hand, the Baltic States were never told that they would not be admitted to NATO in the future. On the contrary, they became as if official candidate countries for the accession to the Alliance. The evolution of NATO’s strategic concept recorded in the NATO summit meeting in Washington was of particular importance in this respect. On the other hand, the prospects of NATO membership of these countries nonetheless remained quite vague because NATO–Russian relations were sharpened by dynamic changes in the international situation, ineffectiveness of the NATO–Russian Permanent Joint Council, and Kosovo crisis; therefore, speedy and wide development of NATO, where the Baltic States could probably find a place, became quite doubtful. Anyway, the NATO–Russian agreement of 1997 was particularly important for the developing Baltic Sea region, at least formally. The very fact of NATO–Russian attempts to create a new regime of mutual relations was significant. It was only a lack of political will that impeded the use of the infrastructure built. However, as it appeared later, situations may sometimes form when political will
changes quite quickly.

3. 2001: the Lacking Link Found?

In 1999–2000, the discussion over the European security architecture and NATO enlargement as if quieted down because it became clear that it was not yet time for principal decisions. Changes in power had matured in the two most important states of the process, the USA and Russia. The second term of office of the US President Bill Clinton was nearing its completion and a pre-election campaign started. Meanwhile, Russia was struck by a replacement of leadership initiated by President Yeltsin, the war in Chechnya was renewed in 1999, finally, Yeltsin himself announced about his resignation on the eve of 2000 – as always, unexpectedly. Therefore, the presidential election had to take place in Russia in March 2000.

However, it did not seem that positive developments were expected in the international situation after the completion of changes in the governments of the USA and Russia. On the contrary, it sometimes appeared that the new Russian President, Vladimir Putin, tended to make its opposing position towards the West stricter and even attempted to form a bloc of states hostile to the USA. The new Russian President visited China, North Korea, Cuba and even Libya. Authoritative trends apparently strengthened within Russia. Meanwhile, when George W. Bush after a complicated vote recounting procedure was elected President and took over the direction of the US foreign policy, contradictions between the USA and its allies in Western Europe as if became sharper. The governments of the largest West European states were quite sceptical in respect of the US initiative to start creating a national anti-missile defence system and of statements concerning the USA’s potential withdrawal from the Balkans.

In this context the issue of the future of NATO’s enlargement had as if retreated to the background. Since it was only in November 2002 that principal decisions were expected, such uncertain situation gave birth to various enlargement scenarios and speculations. Some believed that even if NATO was going to enlarge in this situation of uncertain relations with Russia and disagreement with West Europe, the enlargement would be very limited – only Slovenia and Slovakia would be admitted from the important defence and strategic points of view. With regard to the Baltic States, the commentators were particularly cautious. Even such alternatives as the repetition of the scenario selected by the EU in 1997 were seriously considered. As it is known, the EU then decided to invite only one Baltic state, Estonia for negotiations. Now such experience could be adapted for NATO’s enlargement by inviting Slovenia, Slovakia, one of the Baltic States – Lithuania, because of its relatively small Russian minority and geographical contiguity with NATO. In such a case one could expect that Russia would not be antagonised completely, at the same time showing it that NATO was moving forward, slowly, but in a planned way\(^{29}\).

However, all these speculations as if lost their basis after the new US administration publicly expressed its position on NATO enlargement for the first time. The Baltic States and all other states willing to join NATO heard good news from Presi-

dent Bush in June 2001 during his visit to Poland. At his meeting with teachers and students of the Warsaw University the President said:

I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings. The question of “when” may still be up for debate within NATO; the question of “whether” should not be. As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas. Let us tell all those who have struggled to build democracy and free markets what we have told the Poles: from now on, what you build, you keep. No one can take away your freedom or your country.

Next year, NATO’s leaders will meet in Prague. The United States will be prepared to make concrete, historic decisions with its allies to advance NATO enlargement. Poland and America share a vision. As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.

The expansion of NATO has fulfilled NATO’s promise. And that promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward39.

One can see that the statement was sufficiently clear and strict; but, at that time, few noticed that Russia’s reaction to this statement was reserved and calm as never before. Later in the summer, Putin took a further step toward acknowledging the inevitability of the enlargement by expressing the view that Russia might itself want to join NATO, as an alternative to his preferred option of seeing NATO disappear. As it appeared later it was not an accident but a manifestation of the first changes in Russian foreign policy. There were also other signs of these changes. Already from the very start of 2000, albeit giving mixed signals regarding Russia’s pro-Western orientation, the newly elected President Putin paved the way for a more constructive co-operation. As a result, already in May 2000, the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) resumed its work, which was ceased in protest over NATO’s air campaign against Serbia, and further on gradually expanded its agenda. It was followed by the opening of NATO’s information office in Moscow in February 2001. Nevertheless, the turning point took place on 11 September 2001. Putin’s position in respect of the dreadful terrorist acts in New York, expressed clearly and unequivocally, testified to the fact that finally a basis for the US–Russian rapprochement appeared. In other words, the missing link – “the common enemy” – that both sides wished and had to fight – was found.

The consequences of these changes for the Baltic Sea region were, perhaps, best characterised by the British weekly “Economist”, which presented overviews of the latest developments in the Russian–NATO relations, particularly having regard for the projected NATO enlargement and possible Baltic States’ membership of the Alliance, which, according to the magazine, had seemed impossible five years ago. Now the Baltic States may expect an invitation to NATO because Russia, after such radical changes on the international politics stage and emergence of new threats, ceases being intractable and sees no sense in fierce opposition to the admission of the Baltic States; Russia can even afford to say that NATO enlargement is no longer

39 Bush G.W., Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html, 01 06 2002.
relevant to Russia’s security. Even more, Putin is now in a position to explain to the
domestic opposition and the Russian hard-liners that NATO is losing its military
importance because the organisation is not very useful in fighting terrorism, as shown
by the military campaign in Afghanistan – the USA adopts the most important deci-
sions unilaterally and selects partners for specific operations at its own discretion31.

Thus at the beginning of 2002 it became clear that the issue of NATO’s enlarg-
emnt to the Baltic Sea region was in substance resolved. However, the final shape of
the region’s security regime depended on specific legal and institutional results to be
brought by the rapprochement between Russia and NATO. This was cleared up in
Reykjavik in May 2002 where a meeting of NATO’s and Russia’s foreign ministers
was held. An agreement on a closer cooperation between NATO and Russia was
finalised in Reykjavik. The document entitled “NATO–Russia Relations: A New
Quality”32 formally establishing the NATO–Russia Council was signed in Rome on
28 May 2002 during the NATO–Russia summit meeting.

Formally and officially, the document should facilitate and strengthen fight-
ing against the main threat of the 21st century – international terrorism. The main
difference between this document and the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997 lies
in the clause under which Russia will participate in the adoption of NATO’s deci-
sions. Up until now NATO states first adopted a decision and then acquainted Russia
with it. This has been the main cause of Russia’s dissatisfaction. Now Russia is going
to be involved in consultations. For this purpose a new council headed by the Secre-
tary General is being formed. However, not all security issues will be covered by the
council. The council, just as the Act of 1997, will be a place for agreeing on the
cooperation in fighting international terrorism, on disarmament and joint aid in case
of natural disasters. The activities of the council will help form a common attitude
toward the prevention of distribution of mass destruction weapons, joint work aimed
at developing the anti-missile defence system, performing of peacemaking opera-
tions etc. However, at the same time the document does not provide for Russia the
veto right in resolving issues related to NATO’s enlargement33. In addition, NATO
does not refuse one of the central provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states
that an attack against any country of the Alliance means an attack against the Alliance
as a whole. Therefore, in such a case NATO will not be obliged to ask Russia’s
permission to fight the aggressor.

Of course, today it is difficult to say how this new NATO–Russia Council will
act and whether it will not experience the fate of the previous Permanent Joint Coun-
cil. According to the commentators from “Radio Liberty”, the format of the latter
council also provided conditions for cooperation; however, problems arose because
Russia did not show any will for such cooperation. Now, with Russia having equal

31 “Putin’s unscrambled eggs: Russia, NATO and even the Baltic states may end up friends”,
Economist, March 9, 2002.
State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, http://www.nato.int/
33 Fact Sheet “NATO–Russia Council”, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020528-
3.html, 01.06.2002.
34 Radio Liberty, “New relations between NATO and Russia”, http://www.svoboda.org/archive/
tl_world/0502/II.051602–1.asp, 01.06.2002 – in Russian.
rights with NATO’s members in resolving the issues of the Rome Declaration, there are grounds for expecting such political will to exist.34

If the NATO–Russia Council will be an effective one, one may expect that the states of the Baltic Sea region should become members of the Council upon joining NATO. Therefore, their security relations with Russia should acquire a new quality, which could be called the embodiment of the new security regime in the region. Anyway, the main parties to the conflict line in the Baltic Sea region – Russia and the Baltic States – would be finally placed in a wider international context, which, in its turn, would provide conditions for final normalisation of their relations and enable to end this “minor” Cold War.

Conclusions

To summarise the results of the study, the development in the security regime of the Baltic Sea region could be shown in this simplified table format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Main Challenges</th>
<th>International legal acts containing principles, norms and rules important for the region’s security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>before 1991</td>
<td>• Cold War</td>
<td>• UN Charter,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Nordic Balance</td>
<td>• Russian–Soviet FCMA Treaty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• CSCE: Helsinki Final Act</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States</td>
<td>• NACC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• PIP Invitation and Framework Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 – 2001</td>
<td>• Miniature Cold War between Russia and the Baltic States</td>
<td>• EAPC / Enhanced PIP programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• First NATO enlargement</td>
<td>• NATO – Russia Founding Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Search for alternative solutions of the Baltic States’ security problems and rejection of the security “regionalisation” alternative</td>
<td>• US – Baltic Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>since 2002</td>
<td>• Fighting terrorism as new grounds for NATO–Russia rapprochement</td>
<td>• Rome Declaration “NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Admission of the Baltic States to NATO</td>
<td>• North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance’s Strategic Concept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changing security regime in the Baltic Sea region

Both the entire study and the table presented clearly show that the institutions limited to the Baltic States themselves and even the European Union are practically significant only as facilitators for the so–called “soft” security issues, which have nothing in common with defence. The attempts to raise the issues of the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at the Council of the Baltic Sea States as well as the idea of the regional security pact were rejected at once and without any wider discussion as not adequate to the scope of the problem. Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of a classical regional security regime with common norms, rules and decision–adoption procedures, this assumption appears to be sub-
stantially wrong for one simple reason – Russia, though today it is not the Soviet Union already, cannot accommodate itself in this regional format.

The regional security regime in the Baltic Sea region, with all the rim states (and Russia) included, could not successfully exist due to the obvious dominance of Russia. However, the regime itself could not exist without Russia because the main conflict line and the greatest security challenge in the region are related to this country. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of the Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function.

We could see that CSCE had successfully coped with this task in 1991–1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However, it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic–Russian relations. As it is known the conflict acquired another shape upon the withdrawal of the Russian army: a miniature Cold War between the Baltic States and Russia started, with its periods of sharpening of conflict and détente. Meanwhile, CSCE could undertake practically nothing to contribute to the ending of this war. In the best case, it could preserve the status quo but could not act as a sufficient factor helping to settle security problems. Therefore the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable to conduct an equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could become such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and the PIP, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia – the Permanent Joint Council, which begun its activities with the decision to start enlarging the Alliance by admitting three states of Central Europe. Thus, the stabilising role of NATO was strengthening and it was increasingly present in the region. However, one must state that even this role was not an adequate factor that could determine the final normalisation of the Baltic–Russian relations. Therefore, the security regime that existed in the Baltic Sea region almost up to 2002 can be characterised as a preserved situation of uncertainty, the resolution of which was constantly postponed for the future.

Finally, in November 2002 when the last lines of this study are written, it appears that after long hesitations and preparations NATO has at last decided on admitting the Baltic States to its ranks. Therefore, one may say that the formation of the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is getting a new quality level. It will become a more NATO-centric regime than before because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. There is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia whose partnership relations with NATO were established in the Rome Declaration of 28 May 2002. Thus, in the future, the Baltic Sea region’s security regime could transform into a structure supported by two main pillars and embrace all the actors in the region:

- the states of the Baltic Sea region – NATO members – Germany, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia;
- the states of the Baltic Sea region – NATO partners – Sweden, Finland and Russia.

Of course, for the time being it is not clear how the structure will work, and if it will work at all. We will see this from the development of relations between Russia and the Baltic States, however, today it seems that all preconditions exist for ensuring security and stability without ignoring or leaving anybody overboard.
European Security: New Challenges and Prospects for Co-operation

New threats after the Cold War have imposed a claim for new instruments of prevention and defense, consequently changing security relations between states and their co-operational perspectives. The future of European security had become very obscure. Observing the complexity and multitude of various processes on the global stage as well as crucial changes in the international system and aiming to better understand European security perspectives in this chaotic environment, institutionalization of the European security system, was chosen as the main object of this article.

The main purpose of the article is to estimate the process and perspectives of the institutionalization of the European security system. The first part of the article is devoted to major changes in the global security agenda after the Cold War. Factors, which influence or might influence security of the European region, are identified. Analysis of possible institutionalization of the regional security system in Europe is conducted in the second part. In two last parts the article looks at the opportunities of the NATO and the EU to become the cornerstones of an effective European security system.

European history is a history of the rise and fall of civilizations, a history of permanent wars, conflicts, peace agreements, state coalitions, etc. Major developments in Europe have always had a strong influence on other parts of the world. Europe can also be associated with culture, progress and values that for centuries have influenced the development even of the farthest corners of the planet. For a long time European security was related to the stability and peace within Europe. Europe was considered secure if major European powers were in peace among themselves. Events of XX century, however, urged to reconsider the perspectives of European security. First of all, Europe became divided into two antagonistic blocks of the East and the West. Secondly, the significance of other regions to European security relatively increased.

During the Cold War the scheme of European security was comparatively clear and was based on deterrence policy of two hostile camps. Two military alliances were functioning in the region. Security identity of European countries depended on their affiliation with a certain block. Each block had clear enemies and clear threats. The cooperation inside the block was maintained trying to ensure an adequate response to the threats stemming from the other block. The alliance was a possibility to
mobilize and pool common resources to fight for a common purpose. At the end of the Cold War the disappearance of a clear enemy ruined the identity of the communist block, which had been maintained by forceful means. The end of the bipolar world order also aggravated problems, which had emerged as consequences of technological advance and globalization. During the Cold War those problems were constrained by deterrence policy and came into light when the significance of this poucy diminished. Thus, after the Cold War the problematic of security expanded into the areas earlier assumed as marginal ones. International migration, international crime, globalization of ecological problems, rapidly expanding economic crises, social instabilities, ethnic conflicts, terrorism became the main challenges for security and stability in Europe and in the rest of the world.

The new threats have imposed a claim for new instruments of prevention and defense, consequently changing security relations between states and their co-operational perspectives. The future of European security had become very obscure.

Observing the complexity and multitude of various processes on the global stage as well as crucial changes in the international system and aiming to better understand the perspectives European security in this chaotic environment, European security or, to be more precise, institutionalization of the European security system, was chosen as the main object of this article. However, the concept of European security is very complicated in itself. Two major problems related to the definition of European security might be pointed out. The first one is an ambiguity of the security definition and the second one is a variety of competing concepts of Europe.

Security analysis in general terms is conducted by answering three basic questions: 1) what is to be secured?; 2) what are the threats? and finally 3) how is security attained? In other words, it is a study of threat management and use of security measures. A classical definition of security states that security is the absence of a direct military threat for a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, a contemporary concept of security is much wider than the classical one. It defines security as the absence of threat to existing values. Nevertheless, due to the limitations of the volume, the article mainly concentrates on the analysis of freedom from direct coercion as the major value to be protected.

The answer to the question ‘What is to be secured?’ is related to the choice of the analysis level. The most widely used scheme of security analysis contains five major security levels: international systems, international sub-systems, units, sub-units and individuals. The choice of the level defines the object of the study. It should be also noted that because of the complexity of contemporary security, a distinctive line between levels is very blur. Events on the global arena can cause a reaction on an individual level and vice versa. Although the analysis of European security requests concentration on the regional security level, globalization and an increasing interdependence among states make an exceptionally regional analysis of not full value. It is impossible to understand European security without a wider insight, which includes the analysis of the main global security trends and their implications on the regional level. Therefore major global security trends are also debated in the actide.

Trying to define the borders of the region concerned, one has to take into account the complexity of the concept of Europe. Various historical, cultural, political and institutional factors determine different definitions of the region. With regard to Europe, which extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok, it is understood in the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Geographical criteria limit Europe with the Atlantic Ocean on one side and the Ural mountains on the other. In a political sense, Europe is identified with respect of human rights, consolidated democracy and functioning free market. Limits of this identity are the borders of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The article bases on the political definition of Europe, which also includes candidate countries. Countries which at least in the nearest future will not become EU or NATO members, but whose security is inseparable from common European security is also be discussed in the article.

The main purpose of the article is to estimate the process and perspectives of the institutionalization of the European security system. The first part of the article is devoted to major changes in the global security agenda after the Cold War. Factors that influence or might influence security of the European region are identified. Analysis of possible institutionalization of the regional security system in Europe is conducted in the second part. In two last parts the article looks at the opportunities of NATO and the EU to become the cornerstones of an effective European security system.

**Global trends in the international system: impact on European security**

The world after the Cold War became a chaotic entity moving in an uncertain direction. It was difficult to understand in this turmoil who was a friend and who was an enemy, with whom one had to cooperate and who was supposed to be a threat. After the Cold War scientists of international relations almost unanimously announced that the international system\(^2\) changed. All categories of the international system were modified at the end of the Cold War: capacity and intensity of states’ interactions, processes, units and structures\(^3\). However, the same scientists failed to agree on major features of the newly emerging international system. Thus, there are still a lot of competing images of the contemporary international system. After September 11 several authors claimed that the post-Cold War international system and world order\(^4\) were changing again and that yet another new world order was emerging\(^5\). However, it is more likely that the events in New York and Washington DC are not to be perceived as the causes of major changes in the international system and world order,

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they rather only prompted processes that had already started after the Cold War (or even during the Cold War). These processes, in their turn, might be understood as a long-lasting transition from the old world order to the new one that due to the multiplicity of factors involved, which are interacting and moving in various directions, have not acquired a clear shape yet. Several trends in international surroundings and interstate relations therefore deserve a special attention as the ones that will undoubtedly affect the shape of the new world order, the roles of states, their interactions and security.

First of all, the speeding up globalization affects non-state actors so that they are increasing both in their number and power. These actors are acting in very interrelated post-industrial societies. Globalization for a long time was perceived as a possible source of peace and progress; it turned out, however, that it also had negative consequences. The effects of globalization were not equal to everyone. While one part of the world was enjoying economic prosperity, scientific and technological progress, security, etc., the other one continued to live below the poverty line and was suffering from famine, diseases and violence of authoritarian regimes. The world once again seem to be splitting into two parts: winners and losers. The disappointment of the losers began to express itself in different forms of violence: mass demonstrations, destruction, terrorist attacks. Violence turned towards Western democracies globally enforcing their values and changing traditional political, economic and social systems of underdeveloped countries. Seeking to implement the idea of democracy universally, democratic states created a new enemy which, although neither powerful nor rational, but combining traditional values and technological advances, became a serious challenge to the democratic world. On September 11 the democratic world faced a threat, which was different from the traditional ones, especially in terms of destructive power and uncertainty. The fact that the most powerful state was chosen as a target demonstrates that an uncontrolled expansion of those threats does not have any limits and that even the most powerful countries cannot feel secure.

Barry Buzan claims that a two-fold world is emerging after the Cold War. This world consists of two very diverse parts: one part is an economically strong and democratic center, the other one is a non-democratic economically underdeveloped and chaotic periphery. XXI century has posed a new challenge for the democratic world - to control the chaos arising in the periphery.  B. Buzan thinks that the main mission of center states, which can also be called a mature anarchy, therefore is to assure stability both in the center and in the periphery. Only center states, if acting together, taking advantage of modern security assurance means and pooling up their financial resources, are capable of stopping the expansion of post-modern threats, basically stemming from the periphery. Thus, security of the world depends on the efforts, determination and solidarity of center states in fighting those threats, also cooperating with countries of the periphery.

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A second important feature illustrating the world after the Cold War is the unprecedented speed of technological advance and the diminishing significance of space and time. Natural barriers and long distances do not protect countries from external threats any more. New means of communication have made the world much smaller. A relaxed control of state borders has triggered the intensification of transborder economic, political, financial and social flows. An uncontrolled expansion of negative phenomena related to those flows has become yet another challenge to the post-Cold War world.

Intensifying interactions among states and non-state actors, blurring border lines between the internal and external policy have caused the necessity to reconsider the strict division between direct military threats and marginal ones associated with non-military security aspects. In the contemporary world they often overlap. New types of threats that came into light after the Cold War also proposed a search for new means to fight them. It was necessary to make a reevaluation of military strategies and structures.

In the Balkans both Europeans and Americans realized that armed forces of the major European security organization NATO were not ready to deal with regional conflicts9. The military campaign in Afghanistan just reaffirmed the suspicion that new-type armed forces were necessary to deal with conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Politicians and military officers agreed that most of new missions had to be carried out by special forces equipped with the most modern technological armaments. They also recognized the significance of modern air forces in the new missions80. New military strategies became related to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)81.

In order to restructure military capabilities adapting them to the contemporary needs of security, major reforms of the military sector are to be introduced and defense expenditure increased. However, not every country is determined to take those necessary steps. European Union countries are especially sensitive regarding any increase of defense expenditure, thereby enlarging the gap, which has already existed between USA and European military capabilities, especially in terms of modern technologies. The constantly increasing USA military advance might become a serious obstacle to common Euro-American military operations even in the framework of NATO. Outdated armed forces and armaments together with insufficient financing not only complicate joint actions of the allies, but also threaten the firmness of the transatlantic link, which is the cornerstone of international stability.

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RMA means sophisticated management, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, data links and precision guided munitions.
In the context of the newly emerging world order, the changing balance of power and the altering global security problematic status of Europe in the world and its security perspectives have also to be reconsidered. During the Cold War the European security system was characterized by the effect of suppression or voluntary obedience\(^\text{12}\). Security interests of (West) European countries were subordinated to the security orientation of the dominating power (the USA), which deployed its military bases in the region. K. M. Fierke has compared this structure to a family\(^\text{13}\) which, restrained by NATO, was the main guarantor of European security during the Cold War. After the Cold War relations between the USA and Europe began to deteriorate and there was an observable anxiety regarding the perspectives of the Euro-American partnership and its influence on European or even global security and stability. It was thought that frequent disagreements between Europeans and Americans might turn the ‘center’ block into a victim of inner contradictions and weaken its power, which is of the utmost importance in the face of post-modern threats. However, in order to estimate the validity of these fears, the main sources of disagreements between Europeans and Americans have to be considered.

First of all, Europeans are not satisfied with the unilateral policy of the USA in the international arena. Unilateral actions and renouncement of international commitments might endanger international regimes, which reflect long-term efforts of the world community to maintain at least a minimal degree of certainty in the anarchic international environment. The unilateral policy of the USA in Europe is perceived as an erosion of the cornerstone of European security: international law and order. In this light, the USA military campaign in Iraq is to be considered as an important test for the transatlantic link.

Another test for the European-USA friendship may be the Anti-Missile Defense (AMD) system, which will also have inevitable consequences for European security. The AMD will change the European nuclear balance placing European countries at a disadvantaged position, also providing them with new obligations and new dangers. The installation of the AMD also means the end of NATO as a nuclear alliance, hence aggravating disagreements in NATO structures. Most European countries perceive the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missiles as a basis for international disarmament and fear that the AMD might ruin the fragile regime of arms control and non-proliferation. The installation of the AMD would reduce the European-American interoperability in the future both in assuring global security and also defending Europe. As soon as the AMD system starts to function, the ability of European countries to join American military coalitions will diminish as Europeans will not be protected against the counter-attacks of so-called rogue states including states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Secondly, although the USA and the EU remain the closest partners in the economic domain, disagreements or even serious quarrels of economic origin are becoming more frequent. It is likely that the growing EU economic potential will just stimulate these disagreements.


Some scientists of International Relations tend to explain contradictions between the USA and Europe referring to different images of the international system\(^4\), which cause, in their turn, different approaches to international cooperation, different interpretations of international law and, finally, different definitions of threats and means to fight them. Europeans do not recognize the traditional definition of power and condemn any expression of violence. It might be observed that Europe is becoming a relatively isolated entity relying on rule of law, good will and cooperation where violence is not tolerated, human rights are respected, and welfare is guaranteed to all citizens. Robert Kagan has compared this entity to a post-historic welfare heaven, “eternal peace” of Kant\(^5\). Europeans live (or at least used to live) a secure life inside their own world having a NATO shield to protect them from external threats. However, the model which functions effectively in Europe does not fit for the rest of the world where many non-democratic states, causing a lot of insecurity challenges, still exist. Therefore Americans tend to rely on another vision of the world, which might be yet compared to the anarchic world of Hobbes\(^6\), where international law is ineffective, agreements between states are neither respected nor trusted and security is based on military power.

However, the unilateral policy of the USA, the disagreements of economic origin and the ideological gap may only partly explain misunderstandings between the allies in the security domain. Yet another important factor causing different understandings of the world and different actions of the allies is a shift of political and military power towards the USA. Europeans, who lag behind Americans in the military domain, due to their military inability are more preoccupied with problems that might be solved by political means and huge financial resources\(^7\). The asymmetry in military power also causes a different understanding of threats. A weaker Europe faces less threats than the powerful and globally acting US. Types of threats also differ. On the one hand, the most important ones for Americans are: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, unstable states. On the other hand, Europeans stress the importance of ethnic conflicts, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental problems. It is likely therefore that different security interests and definitions of threats in Europe and the US have to be related more to European capabilities rather than to cultural, economic and philosophical factors.

Responding to the fastening globalization, democratic states will have to think and act more globally when forming their national security and foreign policies. Europeans also would be forced to change their strategies of the Cold War and increase their contributions to global security. However, it does not mean that Europeans have to completely devote themselves to the military aspects of security. USA Senator Richard Lugar\(^8\) in March 2002 admitted, that Europeans would pay the biggest share of the Afghanistan reconstruction bill. Europe also takes care of the most financial aid and development programs in the Middle East, Asia and Africa provi-


\(^{15}\) Kagan, (note 14).

\(^{16}\) Kagan, (note 14).

\(^{17}\) Kagan, (note 14).

ding non-military means necessary to ensure security, which are particularly significant for a full security policy cycle. It is even more important that Europeans would continue providing non-military instruments rather than re-orienting themselves towards the completely military strategies. Underestimation of non-military security aspects might lead to the realization of pessimist predictions of some International Relations scientists presuming that the end of the world will come not as a war between civilizations, but as a riot of the poorest nations against the rich countries as predicted by Marx\(^\text{19}\). Even the largest military resources will be of no use trying to suppress this riot.

Both Americans and Europeans realize the necessity of mutual cooperation, trying to control the threats stemming from the non-democratic periphery. As the USA is important for Europe because of military security guarantees, Europe is useful for Americans because of its growing political and economic influence and also of non-military instruments of security. Therefore, it is likely that the contradictions between the allies, which came into light after the Cold War, will not ruin the vitally important for both sides transatlantic partnership. It might be assumed that the cooperation between Europe and the USA in the security field will be maintained and will be carried out on the basis of labor division, taking advantage of the areas where countries have the best potential.

After the Cold War one of the superpowers ceased to exist. Russia took over the rights of the former USSR but did not inheritate the same status and power. Nevertheless, Western countries still looked at Russia with uncertainty. Russia was difficult to understand and predict. Western countries could never be sure of the direction of Russian foreign and security policies. It was impossible to predict whether Russia would choose to cooperate with center states or together with unstable democracies (many of them are still strategic partners of Russia) would fight against the democratic world. Today Russia is drifting towards the West and is perceived as a more reliable partner as it used to be earlier. Still, estimating the possibilities and willingness of Russia to cooperate with Europeans, several important factors are to be taken into account. On the one hand, Russian foreign policy towards the West is strongly influenced by the Russian culture containing deep anti-Western traditions\(^\text{20}\). On the other hand, Russia has many problems in Asia related to the geographical extension of Russia. These problems induce Russia to cooperate with the West. Cooperative initiatives between Russia and Western Europe are also stimulated by a similar understanding of potential threats and measures to fight them\(^\text{21}\). The most dangerous threats for Russia today are the same post-modern threats Europeans face. Russia however is not able to fight them without the European aid, especially the financial one. Thus, cooperation with Europeans in the economic, political and military fields is in Russia’s interests.

Although, the ambitions to regain the super-power status are still vivid in some political and military spheres Russia has ceased to be a superpower. It has become a regional power: still strong enough to protect itself from external enemies.

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\(^\text{20}\) MacFarlane S. N., “Russia, the West and Europe Security”, Survival, 1993 Autumn, p.10.

\(^\text{21}\) Гринин Д., Россия и основные институты безопасности в Европе вступила в ХХI век, Москва, 2000, c.88.
however weak economically and lacking resources to solve problems related to the internal stability and welfare. Although Russia is experiencing enormous economic difficulties, which in their turn cause the backwardness of the military complex, and it is not perceived as a direct threat in the West anymore, the danger of post-modern threats coming from Russia has just increased. Safe Europe is impossible without safe Russia, therefore, Russia has to be included rather than excluded from European or global security systems. Thus, European countries have to be especially interested in cooperation with Russia. The areas for potential cooperation in the security domain between Russia and both the USA and Europe are constantly growing, and Russia has good chances of becoming an important pillar of European security.

Nevertheless, it is too early to claim that positive changes in the Russian-Western relations are long-termed. Some of the so-called rogue or unstable states are strategic allies and trade partners of Russia, and there are no signs that Russia disassociates from them. No one can be sure that the ambitions to regain the superpower status would not become prevailing among the political or military elite. On the optimistic note, shift towards the West was not so sudden and might be seen as a part of a wider strategy perfectly matching the general program of economic and social reforms. As far as the reforms would remain a priority for the political elite in Russia, good relations with the West are almost granted.

Summarizing, it could be stated that European security on the global level essentially depends on common efforts and the success of center states aiming to neutralize negative consequences of globalization and the results of cooperation between center and periphery states in political, economic and security areas.

Prospects of the regional security system in Europe

Although security levels overlap very frequently, in the contemporary world events on the global stage have significant consequences on the regional or even individual level and vice versa, the best way to analyze the prospects of institutionalization of the European security system is to rely on the regional security level, yet taking into account global security trends. The classical security complex theory claims that every region is composed of various complexes of states: friends and enemies, potential friends and potential enemies. A security complex might be defined as a group of states sharing the same understanding of security and the same threats. Security of those countries is indivisible and is to be analyzed integrally. Although it might be assumed that Europe is composed of several security comple-

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24 Trenin D, “Russia - within - Europe: working toward a new security arrangement” http://www.eu-sec.org/trenin.htm  
25 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, (note 1) p. 11.  
26 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, (note 1) p. 12.
xes, due to the intensifying interactions among European countries and the growing importance of de-territorialized post-modern threats, the best way European security could be analyzed is as a security of a single entity, a security of the European security complex. B. Buzan describes Europe as a regional system, because power relations and ties of escalation interlink European countries into a single entity27. Historical, cultural, economic and political ties connect countries of the same region, and contemporary threats prompt them for even a broader and deeper cooperation. States cannot deal with threats, which are not constrained by state borders and expand extremely fast, on their own. Security can only be achieved in close cooperation of all countries of the region. However, attention should be paid to sub-regional dividing lines in Europe, which may indicate different levels of security and insecurity inside the region. To this purpose, Europe could be divided into three sub-regions: Western Europe (in the Cold War definition), candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, countries, which at least in the nearest future will not become EU or NATO members, but whose security is inseparable from common European security (Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus) and, finally, Balkan countries as a special case. Due to the events of the last decade, Balkan countries could only be analyzed as a periphery of Europe, which does not yet adhere (although some countries do, e.g. Slovenia, Croatia, etc.) to the criteria of the political definition of the European region, but yet are important for the overall security of the region and therefore have to be included into the emerging system of European security.

It is not easy though to ensure an efficient cooperation in an anarchic international environment where there are so many conflicting interests and uncertainty. Usually institutions are considered as the most effective form of cooperation. In the international environment institutions play yet another role, they assure transparency in an anarchic international sphere and diminish negative consequences of the uncertainty trap. Thus, institutions are not only an opportunity to fight threats in common, but they also have a restricting effect. They affect strategies of states, provide them with opportunities to choose and, finally, change costs-profits scales. Institutions may vary from international conventions and regimes to formal organizations and might be considered more than the sum of common resources. On the international scene they become important variables in themselves.

Cooperation among states in the security domain is important because of four major functions: 1) collective defense, 2) collective security, 3) security management and 4) out-of-area intervention28. Each of these functions involves different institutional mechanisms. If institutional capabilities do not correspond to the functions implemented, relying on an international organization might cause serious security problems. When obvious changes appear in the security agenda, states have to seek for new means to ensure security, reevaluating international surroundings and reconstruc-

27 Buzan (note 10) p.240.
dering national interests and foreign policy preferences of the most influential actors.

Contemporary security policy is a long-term security building cycle, which involves political, social, economic and military security measures.

![Functional dimensions of security policy](image)


Patrick Keatinge asserts that the cycle of contemporary security policy could be best explained dividing it into three functional dimensions: prevention, defense and crisis management. He believes that the contemporary security system in Europe might work on a similar basis as “Concert of Europe”, relying however on a more complicated form, which involves multilateral institutions and non-state actors. According to an ideal model of contemporary security policy, states cooperate on the basis of labor division that provides them with the advantages of the economy of scales in diplomatic, economic and military means and maximizes the ability of small states to become part of the security building process.

A long-term security policy today is closely related to the preventive measures of security and “civilian capabilities” (confidence building, cooperation etc.). Although defense and collective defense remain important instruments when fighting traditional threats, they become less relevant when actions are to be taken immediately. In these cases, crisis management instruments are preferred. Crises management instruments offer an entire spectrum of measures from a direct coercion to indirect restrictions in the framework of international organizations. It is important hence to find and maintain the right balance of various measures.

After the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the map of European security structures was reconsidered. It was assumed that a new security order had to be created on the overlapping structures of the EU, NATO, the

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Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Small roles in maintaining regional stability were envisaged for the Council of Europe (CE) and the Council of Baltic Sea Countries (CBSC)\footnote{Winn N., “Europe: Old Institutions, New Challenges” in Jones C., Kennedy-Pipe C. ed., International Security in a Global Age: Securing the Twenty-first Century, London, Portland :Frank Cass Or., 2000. p.80.}. These organizations were expected to cooperate and provide a wide range of security instruments necessary to ensure a full security cycle. However, this new security architecture was based on Cold War organizations, which had been established to work in a completely different environment and to deal with threats of a different origin, therefore it did not reflect the changes in the security environment.

The inability of the existing structures to respond to new challenges and fulfill crisis management functions properly came into light in the Balkans. There was an observable inadequacy of norms, procedures, mechanisms and institutions. The events of September 11 just reaffirmed the unreadiness of the contemporary security system to neutralize new threats. It became obvious that the structures, objectives and instruments of the existing organizations did not correspond to the needs of XXI century and that it was necessary to search for more effective institutional forms.

Discussions on the necessity of new security institutions or reforms in the existing security system started immediately after the end of the Cold War. There was a wide agreement among security experts that the most proper system in the contemporary security environment was a cooperative security system. A cooperative security system is based on a bilateral and multilateral cooperation among states and institutions. It contains four interlinked security rings: individual security, collective security, collective defense and promoting stability\footnote{Cohen R., Mihalka M. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, Garmish, Partenkirchen: George Marshall Center, 2001. p.1.}.

The individual security ring is basically related to promoting and protecting human rights within the boundaries of the system. The significance of this level especially increased in XXI century due to new trends in the interpretation of international law. During the last decade there have been many cases when the protection of human rights was perceived as a more important value than the territorial sovereignty of a state. These trends approximate the world to the Kantian vision of the world\footnote{Winn, (note 30) p.93-94.}, where peaceful states in some cases are allowed to implement coercive actions against un-peaceful ones using illegitimate violence against their citizens.

The collective security ring concerns the maintenance of peace and stability within a common area. Organizations operating in a collective security ring are inward-oriented (UN, OSCE) and are meant to restrict members of the system, hereby differing from organizations of collective defense, which basically are outward-oriented and protect members of the organization from external threats. Some organizations encompass both rings of security (NATO). Properly functioning institutions of a collective security ring are very important dealing with post-modern threats, yet a collective defense ring is necessary when fighting traditional threats.

The essence of the ring of promoting stability is maintenance of stability in other regions using political, economic and, if necessary, military instruments. EU
Commissioner on External Relations Christopher Patten in his speech on the changing security environment has noted that it does not matter how strong a state is, it could be the strongest one in the whole world, however it is not able to survive on its own. “Smart” bombs are important, however smart aid is even more important as it is also important to try to include unstable states into the international community rather than exclude them31. In the modern world, where the gap between rich democracies and poor unstable states of the third world is increasing this security ring gains a special significance.

Contemporary security, which faces both traditional and new post-modern threats, might be assured only combining all four rings of security. Hence, an effective security system in XXI century has to be able to work in all the directions that are listed above and provide necessary structures, institutions and instruments.

Table 1
Capabilities of existing security organizations to take part in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Individual security</th>
<th>Collective Security</th>
<th>Collective defense</th>
<th>Promoting stability</th>
</tr>
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<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a cooperative security system

There are four major security institutions in Europe: the UN, the OSCE, NATO and still developing Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of EU.

Taking a look at Table 1, it might be assumed that only NATO is capable of ensuring measures in all security rings32. However, the validity of this statement should not be overestimated. First of all, NATO was initially created as a collective defense organization, thus, trying to ensure security at all levels it has to change. On the other hand, the role of the EU, especially promoting stability in the regions outside Europe, is eventually becoming more distinct than that of NATO just it is not so evident. To promote stability, the EU uses non-military measures, which might be not so obvious as military ones, however still very important aiming to ensure that all stages of the security policy cycle are completed. An eventual development of EU common defense was also envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty33, thus, in a few years

32 Freedland, (note 33).
33 The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. Treaty of EU, Maastricht, 1991, http://europe.eu.int/eur_lex/eu/treaties/index.html
the EU might also be capable of taking collective defense ring tasks. Finally, due to the mixing up of the threats of the 4th and 5th Articles of the North Atlantic Treaty\(^{36}\), the definition of defense might be extended and include more aspects related to current activities of the EU. Still it is unlikely that at least in a short term the EU will be capable of ensuring security in the region without a major involvement of NATO and the US armed forces.

As far as there is no security organization fully matching the criteria of cooperative security and it is unlikely that any would be created soon, security in Europe can only be ensured by joint actions of the existing security organizations working on the basis of the division of labor. It could be noticed (Table 1) that just marginal roles in the cooperative security system of Europe are envisaged for the UN and the OSCE. These organizations due to the lack of political consensus are ineffective and basically implement functions of a political forum. On the other hand, in order to legitimate operations of NATO and the EU outside the region, a mandate of the UN is necessary (although not in all cases). The lack of a mandate however did not prevent NATO from carrying out military operations in the Balkans. Yet this precedent is not seen as an optimal solution, therefore, it is expected that the OSCE and the UN will continue the implementation of the legitimizing function in the newly emerging security system in Europe.

Karl Kaiser presents a scheme of the European defense system based on the division of labor between the two organizations\(^{37}\) (The same scheme was also proposed in 1999 in the Washington Summit):

- ................................................................. Large-scale military operations - NATO forces under the USA command;
- ................................................................. Missile or air attack against European countries - NATO forces under the command of European countries (ESDI in NATO);
- ................................................................. Small-scale military aggression, crisis management and military actions in areas not accessible for NATO due to the restrictions of the 5\(^{th}\) Article (EU CSDP).

Although this scheme of the defense ring may change, it is likely that the essence of the division of functions between NATO and the EU, where traditional defense remains the responsibility of NATO and the EU takes mainly Petersberg tasks, will be one of the major principles of the European cooperative security system. It is also likely that this model will be reflected in other security rings: the EU will be more attached to the civil and economic aspects of security and NATO will stick to military activities.

\(^{36}\) Article 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened. Article 5: The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

However, the efficiency of the cooperative security system depends not only on the proper functioning of certain organizations, but also on the results of their common actions. Aiming to make the EU-NATO cooperation function properly, a better coordination of EU and NATO activities is to be introduced. Robert Hunter emphasizes that the cooperation between the EU and NATO has to be developed in six areas: 1) operational planning; 2) contingency planning; 3) planning of defense and capabilities; 4) procurement planning; 5) cooperation of the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee including members of Euro-Atlantic partnership countries; 6) common crisis management⁷⁸. NATO and the EU have to use a common methodology for command, control, communications and intelligence. Coordination of enlargement processes might also positively influence prospects of cooperation. The success of the European cooperative security system will also depend on the results of the processes occurring in the EU and NATO: a) the results of NATO modernization and enlargement; b) the final product of CSDP development; c) consequences of EU enlargement⁷⁹.

External and internal behavior of the most influential actors on the global and regional arena will also be reflected in European security prospects. It is likely that for ten or twenty years several categories of states will continue influencing security of the European region and therefore will be crucial actors of the European security system⁸⁰: 1) the USA, 2) EU countries participating in NATO and CSDP and 3) states, which are impossible to integrate into NATO and the EU at least in the nearest future (some Balkan countries, Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine). The most important countries in the listed categories yet are: the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Although Russia was not always recognized as a European country, it undoubtedly has to be considered as part of the European security complex. Only involving Russia into common actions European security can be achieved.

Patrick Keating proposes three scenarios for European security. The developments of various scenarios depend on the configurations of three major variable groups (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consolidated cooperative security</th>
<th>Tentative cooperative security</th>
<th>Adversial Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive democratization of Russia</td>
<td>Transitional problems in Russia</td>
<td>Revanchist nationalism in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU triumvirate in concert (Great Britain, France, Germany)</td>
<td>Uncertain triumvirate in EU</td>
<td>Fragmented triumvirate in EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening co-ordination within and between multilateral institutions</td>
<td>Competition or incoherence between multilateral institutions</td>
<td>Optional resource to weak multilateral institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁸⁰ The USA as a NATO member directly participate in the regional security system.
Table 2

Three scenarios of European Security

Keatinge defines the contemporary European security system as a tentative one⁴¹, which probably will turn into a consolidated cooperative security system in the future.

Other important variables for the future European security system are: trends in global environment, namely, the ability of the international community to neutralize negative consequences of globalization, the success of the USA fighting global challenges, evolution of China and a lot of more factors which are still difficult to predict.

Security of Europe however cannot be isolated from the processes happening in the neighboring regions, therefore, it is crucially important to create modern structures for cooperation with states of other regions trying to include them, at least partly, into the system of cooperative security. Adam Rotfeld claims that the new post-Cold War security strategy of Europe has to include Asian countries (especially Pakistan, India and China)⁴². Not all countries might be included into long-term cooperative structures though. A long-term cooperation is only possible among countries which are closely interconnected by firm political, economic and other links, have common identity, common rules, laws and common institutions to develop constructive relations. Apart from the interests which are common to all states - that is, to ensure sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country - states cooperating for a long time have also other aims related to the welfare of their citizens, economy, ecology, culture, law and values of more global origin: respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy. These objectives are distinctive features of a cooperative security system. Non-democratic states might work together with democratic ones and even attain satisfactory results in political and military fields. In a longer perspective, through changing interests and common understanding, cooperation might even prompt democratization of non-democratic countries⁴³, however, most often cooperation between democratic and non-democratic states is only temporal and is maintained as long as it satisfies interests of both sides. It is likely that cooperation with countries, which do not match the criteria of cooperative security, in the meanwhile will be executed in the framework of ad hoc coalitions formed as a response to a specific threat. The USA Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has emphasized that the character of the mission has to determine the composition of the coalition, there can be no single coalition for different missions, different missions should be fulfilled by different coalitions. A key for the success is a flexible and effective coalition⁴⁴.

Ad hoc coalitions might also work as a proper solution in the cases when the

⁴¹ Keatinge (note 29) p. 34.
⁴³ Cohen, Mihalka (note 31) p.38.
⁴⁴ Van Ham, Kugler (note 6) p.10.
risk is difficult to predict and evaluate, for example, uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, civil wars, disturbances of the flows of vital resources, terrorist attacks, sabotage and ecological catastrophes. Because these challenges might arise at any time at any place, it would be very difficult and expensive to establish permanent institutions to deal with them.

European countries may also turn to ad hoc coalitions if EU and NATO structures are not adapted to new security needs. In 1997, the EU failed to agree upon the decision regarding the intervention to Albania. The major reason of this failure was the fact that Great Britain and Germany were not concerned with this conflict. Italy, France, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey (with the participation of Denmark, Austria and, at the end of the operation, Belgium) eventually had to form an ad hoc coalition of willing outside the EU framework, which in a close cooperation with the UN and the OSCE conducted the operation Alba. The military campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq were also conducted avoiding institutional structures of NATO.

Summarizing, it should be stated that at the regional level European security will basically depend both on the actions of the states which only partly belong to the region (the USA and Russia) and also on the success of the cooperation among European countries and between multilateral organizations. The effectiveness of the cooperative security system will also be influenced by coordinated and effective activities of major European security institutions, where the most important variables might be: the results of NATO modernization and enlargement, evolution and efficiency of European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and, finally, the consequences EU enlargement. These processes are discussed in two last chapters of the article.

Modernization and enlargement of NATO

In the meanwhile, NATO remains the only effective security organization in Europe. The future of CSDP is still vague, the OSCE and the UN lack unity, capacity and effectiveness to solve problems of contemporary security.

At the individual security level NATO states not only ensure the security of their citizens, but also take care of the promotion of human rights outside the Alliance. Seeking to stop violations of human rights in Kosovo, NATO conducted a military campaign. On the other hand, cooperating with countries of unstable regions, NATO indirectly prompts them to adhere to the major principles of democracy and respect human rights.

Assuming that liberal democracies do not fight among themselves, the restrictive function of the collective security level might be eliminated in the European cooperative security system. On the other hand, after EU and NATO expansion to the regions where democracy is still extremely fragile, the situation might change. The collective security level will gain importance if Russia, the Ukraine or other important players on the regional scene, which due to objective obstacles so far cannot become full members of those organizations, are included into the structures of the organization on a partial basis.

Collective defense in NATO still might be imposed relying on the 5th Article of the Washington Treaty. Although for the first time this article was applied only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, hence it was applied already in new circumstances - a further application of this article might become problematic. The
major challenge of XXI century post-modern threats is an object of the 4th Article of the Washington Treaty. The imposition of this article for the collective defense however might be complicated because of the lack of an imperative norm.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which was created on the basis of the former, the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the recently established the NATO - Russian Council, also the NATO - Ukraine Joint Commission, the Mediterranean Dialogue are perfect examples of institutional arrangements illustrating NATO’s aim to promote stability outside the borders of the organization. To achieve this aim, the Alliance also uses other instruments. Most common are crisis management, the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI). Moreover, NATO enlargement proves that NATO seeks to involve more initiatives related to the promotion of stability outside the borders defined by the 6th Article of the Washington Treaty.

Although NATO activities embrace all rings of security and it has all chances of becoming the cornerstone of the European cooperative security system, NATO also faces a lot of problems, which result from the inconsistency of old Cold War instruments and structures with the new functions of security policy. These problems raise doubts about the ability of NATO to effectively fight against the challenges for European security in the future.

In the Rome NATO Summit of 1990 it was announced that Europe entered a new era and that the new Europe needed NATO of a new quality. On the other hand, the former US Defense Secretary William Cohen declared that one of the most important tasks of the contemporary security organization - peacekeeping - was not the main mission of the US armed forces, nor was it a major task for the majority of NATO members. Peacekeeping missions requested a different preparation and different capabilities. NATO was not ready to deal with the new challenges. First of all, due to the lack of peacekeeping instruments, NATO has become incapable of ensuring a full cycle of security policy. Secondly, NATO’s ability to fight against yet another dangerous challenge of the present time - proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - is also doubted. Thirdly, NATO’s activities are limited by the definition of the 5th Article, thus, if NATO seeks to provide an adequate response to contemporary threats, it has to take into consideration the global character of threats and become an organization capable of acting globally. Nevertheless, the Alliance still does not possess legal possibilities to act in territories outside the space of the Alliance.

\[\text{Article 6: For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:}\]

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.


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*Press Advisory: Basic Publications (note 8).*  

ce. Finally, an imperfect structure of NATO has become a major obstacle for its efficiency\textsuperscript{46}. Deficiencies in the structure have especially elucidated during the military campaign in the Balkans. Therefore, seeking to guarantee effective and flexible actions in Afghanistan the US made use of the capabilities of allies avoiding bureaucrati-
tized political structures of NATO.

Seeking to retain defensive capabilities of the Alliance, reforms of military command structures and measures were introduced in the last decade of XX century. It was envisaged to implement the reforms in several directions: mobility, logistics, permanence and effective functioning, command, control and informational systems. In 1994, to implement the new tasks the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was endorsed. The same year NATO started the Partnership for Peace program (PFP), which envisaged a cooperation in the military field between NATO and non-NATO countries. The formation of a mobile, flexible Rapid Reaction Force was started, of which the Allied Common Europe (ACE), Mobile Force (AMF) and the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) were especially important for Europeans. Forces for peacekeeping were planned to be established in the framework of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), providing lightly armed European forces with the functions of civil administration, police, conflict management, election organization and observation, and, finally, monitoring of the media\textsuperscript{47}. The Washington Summit proposed the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) aiming to improve NATO’s capabilities adopting them for crisis management functions. NATO Summit in Prague in November of 2002 was also concentrating on basically two issues: what is the mission for NATO in XXI century and what is the most proper structure for the new tasks. The emphasis was made on new command structures, which earlier were based on geographical responsibility and now require more flexibility and mobility.

The actions taken by NATO to respond to the new problematique of security were positively assessed in NATO’s New Strategic Concept\textsuperscript{48}; however, it is worth admitting that the perspectives of the Alliance to become an organization of cooperative security are still vague and will depend not only on the success of further reforms of organizational structures but also on other factors.

One of the most important variables to influence the efficiency of the organiza-
tion is the relationship between the USA and European allies. Strategies on how to respond to global challenges and threats differ in the USA and Europe. Frequently Americans and Europeans tend to even define challenges, risks and threats differently\textsuperscript{49}. One of the main causes of these variations is the constantly increasing gap between Europeans and Americans in the field of modern technologies. All NATO countries reduced their defense expenditure and military capabilities after the Cold War. However, due to the advantages of the effective distribution of the defense budget in the USA, the power of the USA military forces has not decreased. Europeans are lacking far behind almost in all fields of military capabilities. This gap might become a serious obstacle for the interoperability between the allies even in the framework of NATO.


\textsuperscript{47} Howorth J, “European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?, Chaillot Paper No.43, 2000 November, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{48} Van Ham, Kugler, (note 6) p. 20.
In Afghanistan the cooperation between the USA and the allies was based on bilateral agreements rather than on NATO structures. One of the reasons forcing Americans just minimally rely on the support of its allies was that Europeans did not have sufficient capabilities required by the USA for this operation. Although after almost a decade of reforms European armed forces are larger and more efficient than they used to be several years ago, because of the prioritization of the territorial defense, Europeans still lack capabilities to be used to deal with new threats.

The division of labor between Europeans and Americans in Bosnia, where Americans acted in the initial stages of the conflict and were making the most important decisions, whereas Europeans were just fulfilling peacekeeping tasks, is often illustrated with an example of “making a dinner” and “washing the dishes” and frequently causes disagreements between the allies. Americans call Europeans “free riders”. Europeans are not satisfied with unilateral actions of Americans. On the one hand, Americans are right when accusing their allies in Europe for feasibility, on the other hand, labor division does not have to allow the asymmetry of the political power where Americans make use of the power of global decision-making and Europeans can only support the unilateral policy of the USA. Hence, if the NATO structure is not reformed to provide Europeans with the ability to form flexible coalitions and take a more active part when solving security problems of the region, they may turn away from NATO, transferring the cooperation into EU structures or starting to form ad hoc coalitions. Still, as NATO is the only possibility for Europeans to retain USA military capabilities in Europe, which are vitally important for Europeans, it is unlikely that Europeans would be the ones to withdraw from NATO. On the other hand, if the majority of military operations rely on ad hoc coalitions, with the USA involved, NATO might become rather a political organization than a collective defense alliance. Even though it fulfills just political functions, it can still play an important role in changing the strategic map of Europe with the help of non-military means.

Julian Lindley-French believes that aiming to solve the main problems of NATO concerning the USA - EU relations, first of all fruitful consultations between the Alliance partners where both parties are provided with equal power have to be restored. Secondly, Europeans have to have the ability to command not only over entirely European missions, but also over those in which Americans are taking part. Therefore, NATO structures have to be reformed. Thirdly, EU and NATO planning structures have to be coordinated. Fourthly, Great Britain or France has to take leadership in European missions.

The success of NATO modernization and effectiveness will inevitably rely upon the consequences of NATO enlargement. The inability of candidates in capabilities domain might become a burden for the Alliance. Because the candidate states essentially continue to rely on the principle of territorial defense, problems might also arise in threat assessment. It could be very difficult to the political elite of those countries to convince their voters that their country, instead of defending its own

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53 Lindley-French, (note 19) p. 66.
55 Rotfeld, (note 42) p.9.
people and land, has to reorient its defense strategy to fight global threats. Although it is obvious that new members will not bring significant military resources into the Alliance, the process of the enlargement is an essential part of the Alliance’s strategy aiming at uniting and stabilizing Europe\textsuperscript{34}. The membership of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will widen the area of political stability in Europe. Moreover, the inclusion of some of new members (Romania, Bulgaria) will transfer NATO infrastructure closer to problematic regions\textsuperscript{35}, thus ensuring better conditions to fight threats stemming from those regions.

Seeking to evaluate the perspectives of the enlargement, a few important factors are to be taken into account. First of all, the volume of the enlargement will expose a direct influence on the internal structure of NATO which will have to be reform. The impact of those reforms on the effectiveness of NATO is still unclear. The reforms of NATO command structures that have already started are not always estimated in such a positive light as they have been assessed in the New Strateg Concept though. Karl Feldmeyer has noticed that reforms in NATO instead of an objective aim to improve military efficiency often become a reflection of redistribution of political influence among its members\textsuperscript{36}. It is even more complicated to predict consequences of further implementation of reforms after new members join the Alliance: having more members, it would be more difficult to reach a consensus. NATO’s capability to retain dynamism and effectiveness will depend not only on the ability of members to reform defense structures, foreign and defense policies, but also on economic perspectives and social political coherence in candidate countries\textsuperscript{37}. NATO enlargement will stimulate the already existing problem of free riding. Moreover, the behavior of new members does not allow one to hope that the problem will be solved soon. Entering NATO, Hungary has obliged itself to increase defense expenditure up to 1.8 per cent of GDP (although the requirement of NATO was 2.0 per cent); however, in 2001, according to SIPRI data, it hardly reached 1.3 per cent\textsuperscript{38}. On the other hand, this data does not tell if these resources were used effectively. NATO experts note that armed forces of new NATO members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) are insufficiently financed and, in most cases, are not ready for common actions with NATO\textsuperscript{39}. It is worth mentioning that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the most economically developed states in Central and Eastern Europe. The support for the Alliance in these states was also one of the highest in the region. Yet it is hard to predict the hardships Romania and Bulgaria might cause in the domain.

After the NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, which was held on 14-15 May 2002, the NATO-Russian relations entered another stage. The NATO-Russian Council started its activities on the 28th of the same month. It was agreed that NATO members and Russia would cooperate as equal partners in the areas of common


\textsuperscript{37} Croft. (note 36) p.110.

\textsuperscript{38} Croft. (note 36) p.105.

\textsuperscript{39} Lokenwood Ch., Butcher T. “NATO puts plans eastward enlargement on hold.”, *Daily Telegraph*, 3 April 2000.

\textsuperscript{40} Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Reykjavik, May 14, 2002.
interests, however retaining prerogative of NATO to act independently. NATO would have an absolute autonomy when dealing with collective defense issues, though the majority of the 4th Article issues would be solved in cooperation with Russia and taking its interests and opinion into account. The NATO-Russian Council made a very positive start in six months it has been in action. There was an observable willingness on the Russian side to participate in the activities of the Council. The inclusion of Russia into NATO structures undoubtedly brings NATO closer to the cooperative security model, however, it is still difficult to claim that a warm-up in the Russian-NATO relations is a long-term occurrence. Russia has not made a clear message what exactly it expects from the Council. The enlargement of NATO, especially the membership of the Baltic countries, might bring into light problems related to the negative attitudes in the Russian society towards the Alliance and its expansion and hereby pro-Western orientation of Russia. Reconsideration of the directions of security and foreign policies of the Russian Federation would undoubtedly influence the activities of the NATO - Russian Council and would have reflections on the overall efficiency of the Alliance. On the other hand, it has not to be allowed that the Russian involvement into NATO decision-making processes would turn the Alliance into an ineffective organization of collective security similar to the OSCE or the Council of Europe, whose members are incapable of adopting common decisions even on very broad issues.

Summarizing the main directions of NATO reforms, it might be concluded that aiming to adapt to the new security environment, the Alliance has changed both internally and externally. And still, to become a flexible cooperative security organization, it has to solve many important issues. First of all, NATO has to continue structural reforms and prevent the use of reforms for the expansion of influence. Secondly, the solution of the 5th-Article problem would considerably increase the effectiveness of the organization. Thirdly, if NATO members decide, that peacekeeping missions are not a task for the Alliance and leave them for the EU, common structures for the coordination of different instruments and functions of security policy would be necessary. Fourthly, the future of NATO will depend on its ability to solve problems concerning the USA - EU relations. Fifthly, a successful enlargement, although probably decreasing the effectiveness of the organization in a short term, in a longer perspective would enhance the capabilities of NATO and its involvement in the cooperative security system. Finally, the strengthening of the structures for the cooperation with non-member countries would create a favorable environment not only for the maintenance of security outside the organization, but also would work as a wonderful basis for common activities fighting global threats.

Security and Defense Identity of the European Union

The growth of economic welfare, consolidation of common values and similarity of traditions in Europe became an important reason prompting European countries to seek for even deeper integration. An exclusive position of foreign policy was challenged. Since 1986, coordination of foreign policy was carried out in the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Yet in Maastricht it was formalized with the creation of the second pillar of the EU: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The inclusion of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) into
CFSP might be estimated as an inevitable necessity to supplement the already existing political/diplomatic and economic/commercial instruments of the EU with a security dimension and instruments of defense policy. On the other hand, it was a response of Europeans to the accusations of Americans for an insufficient involvement of Europe in security issues. ESDI (in the framework of NATO) proposed by the US in 1994 and CSDP envisaged in Maastricht were expected to become the cornerstones of the new European security system. However ESDI (in the framework of NATO) did not retain its significance. Moreover, after the St. Malo meeting in 1998, the process of the CSDP development gained a double speed, therefore compelling the skeptics of it to recognize that the perspectives of CSDP were not totally hopeless.

The Cologne European Council agreed to transfer WEU functions to the EU39. In Helsinki decisions on the establishment of European Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) were adopted. Agreeing on the Headline goal Europeans committed themselves by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks40 up to 15 brigades or 50,000 – 60,000 persons. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and thus to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at a very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year41. In Leaken these forces were announced capable of conducting some crisis-management operations42. In Copenhagen it was also agreed to take over peacekeeping functions in Bosnia and Macedonia. It was expected that RRF would be announced operable by the beginning of 2003, however the issue of operability was delayed for the summer. In December of 2002 a NATO and EU agreement on CSDP was reached. The EU has acquired the right to use the infrastructure of NATO for its missions.

After the introduction of the security and defense dimension the European Union ceased to be simply an economic block and became a real security organization. However, prospects of CSDP, which is still under formation, are difficult to foresee. A lot of various factors related both to the evolution of the EU and also the international environment may influence a further development of CSDP. Still, it is worth noting that the EU already has capabilities to ensure necessary instruments in all rings of security. EU countries, the majority of which are also NATO members, attract special attention to the issues of human rights inside and outside the organization. Constant EU aid for the Third World countries or states in conflict, reconstruction funds flowing from EU just reaffirm the fact that the EU takes an active role in ensuring security at the individual level. Comparing the EU and NATO, it is worth

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40 In 1992 WEU countries signed a Petersberg Declaration declaring their readiness to make available military units to implement so called Petersberg tasks containing humanitarian tasks, rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000p.htm
mentioning that there is an obvious division of labor between the two organizations also on the individual security level: NATO basically using military means and the EU taking the responsibility for non-military aspects.

Moreover, it is likely that as EU common identity, in general terms, grows stronger, it will also strengthen defense identity. On the other hand, as the significance of post-modern non-5th Article threats emerging from the regions remote from Europe is increasing in the contemporary world, it could be possible that instruments to ensure security provided by CSDP will be more relevant than those of NATO even in terms of collective defense.

After the Cold War it was understood that security was indivisible and it could only be attained if all members of the system (or at least of a security complex) were participating in common efforts to ensure security. Seeking to promote stability and security in the regions outside the organization, the EU was constantly carrying out a lot of programs of economic aid, cooperation and development. Promoting stability outside the region became a long-term EU strategy. After the dissolution of the SSSR, European Communities signed co-operational agreements with former republics of the Soviet Union and members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization65. Political radicalism and constantly growing migration from Northern Africa forced Southern EU countries to seek for a common preventive strategy, which would neutralize undesirable consequences of those processes. In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Council was established in Barcelona aiming to enhance cooperation between the EU and other states of the region. States participating in the initiative66 signed an agreement for the cooperation in military, economic, financial, cultural and other areas. Seeking to ensure stability in the region, EU countries also decided that unification of Europe was an open process accessible for all nations of Europe sharing the same interests and objectives67. Hence, EU enlargement becomes an important factor in itself in ensuring security and stability in Europe.

The EU has extended its security building measures. It already operates in all rings of security. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that CSDP and the EU (as an organization) have big chances of becoming a key element of a cooperative security system in Europe. However, further perspectives of CSDP will also depend on how the EU will solve problems related to the internal aspects of the organization, its relations to other countries and other international organizations.

Decisions of Cologne, Helsinki and the later European Councils committed EU members to take part in defensive non-5th Article military operations in the framework of Petersberg tasks. However, the existing definition of Petersberg tasks is very ambiguous and therefore might negatively influence the development of CSDP and even endanger security of the region. Problems of the definition of Petersberg tasks might be divided into two parts: ambiguity of the territorial commitment and

65 Agreements on trade, economic and commercial co-operation were signed. Later these agr. were changed by Europe (Association) Agreements. In 1995 in Paris European Stability Pact was signed aiming to enhance co-operation among Central and Eastern European countries and promote their dialogue with the Western states.

66 Agreement was signed by EU on one side and Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and authorities of Palestine on the other. Keatinge, (note 31) p.19.


68 Croft, (note 56) p.102.
vagueness of the content of future operations. Scenarios of the deployment of European military forces have been under discussion since 1995. A possible distance of future operations varied from 2,000 to 6,000 km distance from Brussels. It means that the closest operations would not extend eastern boarders of the enlarged EU, the farthest yet might reach Afghanistan, Middle Asia, etc. 66 The character of future missions according to the existing Petersberg tasks definition is also very vague and might involve even big-scale conflicts, such as the Gulf War. It has to be noted that very diverse both in terms of quality and quantity capabilities would be necessary in those circumstances. Only when the problem of the definition is solved, it will be possible to estimate how much and what kind of capabilities the EU has to create and, finally, what institutional structure is the most proper to coordinate these operations.

The process of the enlargement happening in parallel with the internal reforms of the EU will inevitably influence the further development of CSDP. Two important aspects of the enlargement are to be underlined. The first one is financial problems related to EU internal reforms and the inclusion of relatively economically weak candidate countries. The second one is the problem of stability rising because of the territorial expansion of the EU. Too fast an enlargement might weaken the institutional power of the EU and also its economic and political stability. Thus, the solution of external security challenges by integrating unstable regions into the EU will, on the other hand, bring in new risks: migration of delinquency, economic and social inequalities, which might stipulate conflicts and so on. Most of candidate countries are experiencing economic difficulties, whereas democracy in those countries is not as stable as it used to be assumed earlier 69. The fear of tanks and missiles coming from the other side of the Iron Curtain has changed to the fear of an uncontrolled migration and threat of international crime 70.

Another important problem lies in the fact that EU enlargement brings EU borders closer to unstable countries. The admission of Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania would bring the EU closer to the Ukraine and Belarus, the membership of Cyprus would cause a direct contact with the Middle East. The inclusion of Turkey (if possible at all) would make Syria, Iran and Iraq EU neighbors. The extension of borders may involve EU countries into long-lasting and costly conflicts with unstable neighbors and therefore negatively influence the stability of the region.

The EU readiness to deal with unpredictable crises is also an important variable judging the prospects of the Union to become a cooperative security organization. However, the effectiveness of measures might be reduced by the principles of intergovernmentalism and unanimity incorporated in the second pillar of the EU. Most of security analysts recognize that an efficient CSDP is possible only if supranationalism and the majority vote are introduced instead or one of EU members takes a leading role. Although this scenario of EU development is hardly possible at least in a short term, in order to neutralize at least some of the problems posed by intergovernmentalism and unanimity, the principle of constructive abstention was introduced in Nice 71.

66 Winn, (note 30) p.79.
70 Treaty of Nice, Brussels, 14 February 2001, SN12471/01 REV1. Art.24(3).
Constructive abstention guarantees a right for member states to abstent when voting on the initiatives which are not acceptable for them, thereby avoiding blocking of a decision. The principle of enhanced cooperation, which provides a group of states with an opportunity to seek for a deeper integration in foreign and security policy domain even if there is no clear consensus in other areas\textsuperscript{73}, may also provide with at least a partial solution of the problems caused by intergovernmentalism and unanimity. On the other hand, it is often argued that the Nice Treaty granted even more power to the largest states of the EU and Euro-bureaucrats that may in time prompt fragmentation of the EU and challenge its efficiency, therefore the general impact of this treaty on CSDP might be controversial.

One of the most important problems of CSDP is insufficiency of military capabilities which manifested itself in the Balkans. Americans estimated the activities of European allies in Kosovo in an extremely negative light\textsuperscript{74}. They resumed that Europeans were experiencing major difficulties in the mobility of armed forces, also in the areas of command, control and communications. Conflicts in the Balkans also brought into light deficiencies in strategic intelligence, anti-missile defense, airlift, precision guided missiles and other fields related to modern technologies. Europeans even failed to provide a sufficient amount of military personnel and conventional weapons.

The lackage of military capabilities in Europe is a result of insufficient financing and improper distribution of the defense budget. In 2000 defense expenditure in the USA was 296,373 million USD, which estimated 3 per cent of GDP; total defense expenditure of European allies was just 164,559 million USD and respectively estimated 2.1 per cent of the average GDP\textsuperscript{75}. Although eight EU NATO members increased their defense expenditure in 2001\textsuperscript{76}, an essential improvement of European capabilities was not observable mainly because the distribution of money was still far from perfect. The biggest share of defense budgets in European countries was assigned to finance oversized and technologically outdated armies; on the other hand, large share of the defense budget in the US was invested in modern technologies. In a longer perspective these shortcomings may not only make Europeans incapable of acting independently, but also threaten to complicate the interoperability of European and American armed forces in common actions. EU capabilities to assure sufficient financing for CSDP are still vague.

The implementation of the Headline goal alone will cost Europeans several billion USD each year. It is also worth mentioning that real costs of the Headline goal will be quite bigger than it was expected earlier. Due to rotation and selection of soldiers, military personnel required to participate in different missions will increase from 50,000 - 60,000 to 200,000 - 230,000 soldiers; consequently, the amounts of the necessary logistics, military equipment and other capabilities will also increase. Moreover, it is hardly expected that this problem will be solved before EU countries significantly increase their defense budgets and reconsider distributional strategies.

\textsuperscript{73} Smith I. D., “Evidence to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives”, Wednesday 10th November, 1999.


\textsuperscript{75} Grant Ch., “A European view of ESDP”, http://www.cucec.org/grant.htm
The largest armies in Europe, i.e. those of Germany, Greece and Italy, in sum possess 760,000 soldiers, which estimates more than 55 per cent of the US armed forces. However, the money that is assigned for the armaments in these countries estimates just 10 per cent of this spent by the US. The EU expenditure for scientific research amounts only one fourth of the American expenditure and basically is the money of Great Britain and France. According to the data of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, Europeans would need at least 35 billion USD in the upcoming decade just to reduce the gap which exists between the armed forces of EU and the USA. In 2002 the US again increased its defense budget and plans to allocate 3.7 per cent of GDP for military purposes, yet the EU stays far behind with only 2 per cent of GDP. The gap between Europe and USA military capabilities is likely to remain increasing in the future and, if not considered, might become a serious challenge for the EU, NATO and the stability of the whole region.

Although European politicians are convinced that commitments of the EU are not as global as those of the USA (Asia and the Middle East) and the implementation of European missions will require less resources than USA operations, expanding closer to unstable regions and trying to protect its members, the EU, even against its will, might get involved in conflicts demanding enormous resources. In addition to interoperability challenges, the issues of coordination of actions and resources have also to be addressed. The Berlin Communiqué envisaged the WEU access to NATO assets, which was later confirmed with the “Berlin plus” formula. This formula, however, provides just a partial solution of the capability problem and would be of no use if NATO resources were needed by Americans to fight global threats. On the other hand, due to insufficient and improper financing of military capabilities, Europeans may become incapable of acting together with Americans.

Trying to reduce the gap between the USA and EU states, also to adapt European armed forces to the new missions which require flexibility and mobility, Europeans were fulfilling reforms of their armed forces: France in 1994 - 1996, Germany in 1994 - 2000, Sweden 1995 - 1999, Great Britain in 1993 - 1998. The main objective of these reforms was creation of small professional armed forces equipped with modern armaments giving up the dependence on conscription. French armed forces became fully professional in 2002. Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg also have fully professional armies. The numbers of conscripts were significantly reduced in Spain and Italy. Reforms are still going on in other EU countries.

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77 Decisions were taken in Berlin in 1996 to cover NATO support for operations led by the WEU, known as the “Berlin arrangements”. In 1999 new arrangements for EU known as “Berlin Plus” were agreed upon, which are wider and deeper than those for the WEU. The Berlin Plus package consists of four elements: 1) assured EU access to NATO operational planning, 2) presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets, 3) NATO European command options for EU-led operations, including DSACEUR, 4) adaptation of NATO defense planning system to incorporate availability of forces for EU operations. http://www.nato.int/uk/docu/es-di.htm
79 Grant, note (75).
80 Lindley-French, (note 19) p.10.
Positive results of those reforms already became visible in the Balkans in 2002. European countries provided 60 per cent of armed forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, while the share of the USA was approximately 20 - 25 per cent. Moreover, the behavior of European units was recognized as very efficient. Thus, despite still large shortcomings in the field of military capabilities, European armed forces already show positive trends in dealing with the challenges of the contemporary world.

The problems of military capabilities are closely related to the difficulties experienced by the European defense industry. Key challenges in the domain are: the fragmented structure of the industry, conflicting interests and the insufficient market. Although some positive trends might be observed in this field (in 2002 Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy established the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), in 1998 the Memorandum of Intentions on the coordination and harmonization of some fields of defense policy and procedures was signed by Sweden and Spain, major European defense industry companies are consolidating (EADS, BAE Systems, etc.), Europeans are not yet able to compete with Americans.

An effective system of cooperative security in Europe is impossible without the participation of Russia. European security is tightly linked not only to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation but also to the consequences of still happening processes of democratization and transition to market economy. If the USA reallocates the majority of the resources to fight global threats, Europeans might become too weak to solve regional problems. Therefore, especially in dealing with post-modern regional threats, Russia is becoming crucially important to the EU. Both Russia and the EU recognize the advantages of cooperation in the areas of security and defense. The Russian-EU relations in the domain are constantly intensifying and changing their format. If earlier Russia tended to deal with European countries on a bilateral level, now more often it addresses the European Union as a single entity. During the EU-Russia Summit in October 2000, the EU announced that it was willing to enhance the dialogue and cooperation with Russia on security and defense issues. Participants of the meeting agreed to establish special consultations and develop a strategic dialogue on security issues important to the EU and Russia, elaborate consultations in the fields of arms reduction, arms control and non-proliferation and, finally, to develop cooperation in crisis management. The most recent cooperative initiatives are on fighting terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of WMD.

The cooperation between the EU and Russia has not excluded defense industry. Until recently Europeans have not been much interested in aeronautics and satellite technology, there were neither big-scale programs nor infrastructural basis to implement these programs in Europe. However, the situation changed in 2000 with the establishment of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS). Moreover, developing its activities, in 2001, the EADS together with the Russian Aerospace Agency signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement in which both parties agreed to pool joint resources to implement certain projects.

Nevertheless, for a further and closer cooperation political will in Russia and the EU is necessary. Reforms of military structures in both technological and ideological sense have to be fulfilled; major changes in defense industry have to be introduced. The future of the EU - Russian relationship will also depend on what role in the

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82 Kremenyuk, (note 22).
European security architecture Europeans plan to propose for Russia.

Although after September 11 the importance of CSDP is frequently underestimated, it might be presumed that significance of CSDP increased. First of all, a successful development of CSDP would let Americans to concentrate on fighting terrorism. Secondly, the significance of Petersberg tasks, which are the main responsibility of CSDP has increased after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC. Immediately after September 11 the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana affirmed the EU anti-terrorism program\(^{52}\), which shows that the organization effectively reacts to the changes in international security environment. Moreover, the anti-terrorism program envisaging a wide range of new instruments could prompt the development of CFSP and CSDP.

Nevertheless, despite major achievements in developing CSDP and CFSP in the political and security domains instead of relying on EU institutions, EU states are still more willing to behave unilaterally. Thus, there is still much to be done to ensure a further progress of CSDP and to strengthen its position in the European security architecture. Future opportunities of CSDP will inevitably depend on the EU success in clarifying the definition of Petersberg tasks, solving problems posed by intergovernmentalism and unanimity and, finally, the success in providing sufficient military capabilities. On the other hand, the destiny of CSDP will also be influenced by the results of EU cooperation with NATO, the USA and Russia.

Conclusions

Changes in the international system and security problematic resulted in the reconsideration of the prospects of European security in the newly emerging international order and the search of the most proper means to ensure security in the region. European countries are facing the threats that are stemming externally, therefore European security will depend on common efforts and the success of center states aiming to neutralize negative consequences of globalization, results of cooperation between center and periphery states in political, economic and security areas, behavior of Russia and, finally, on the success of the USA military forces fighting threats of military origin. Thus, in the military domain the strengthening of the transatlantic link has to become one of the major priorities of the EU. The future EU-US cooperation is likely to be based on the division of labor, taking advantage of the fields in which countries have the best capabilities. Probably, the cooperation with Russia will also be structured on the same scheme, where joint activities of Russia and European countries will cover the areas of EU responsibility (“soft” security issues and regional coooperational initiatives).

On the regional level, prospects of European security are closely related to the future behavior of the countries only partly belonging to the region (the USA and Russia), that is, what roles they will play in the regional security system. On the other hand, a lot will depend on coooperational perspectives of European countries. Security of the contemporary Europe on the regional level therefore is likely to rely on the

system of cooperative security based on bilateral and multilateral cooperation, covering all interlinked rings of security.

The success of the cooperative security system in guaranteeing European security depends, first of all, on the effectiveness and coordinated actions of major institutions of European security: the EU and NATO. Secondly, it would be inevitably influenced by the results of NATO modernization, enlargement and success in developing structures for the cooperation with non-member countries. Thirdly, proper progressive evolution of CSDP is also crucially important for the effectiveness of the cooperative security system. Therefore, the issues of clarification of Petersberg tasks, alteration of intergovernmentalism, unanimity and strengthening of military capabilities are to be addressed. Externally, the evolution and efficiency of CSDP are inevitably related to the development of the EU-NATO, EU-USA and EU-Russian cooperation.

Aiming to respond to the challenges of XXI century, the institutional system of European security has changed. The emerging system of cooperative security, although yet far from being perfect, is constantly being adapted to the current problematique of security, thereby increasing its ability to ensure security at the regional level. It is still too early to talk about the opportunities of this system in the global domain where there are still many non-democratic and unstable peripheral states, which behave relying on completely different principles from those required by the cooperative security system. Alongside interests that are common to almost all countries - to assure sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state – the countries that participate in the cooperative security system have other aims which might be related to the welfare of their citizens, economy, ecology, culture, law and values of a more global character (human rights, rule of law, democracy). Nevertheless, it is likely that the cooperation, occurring in the framework of the European cooperative security system and changing the rules of security relations, norms of behavior, interests and general understanding of security, may pass onto a more global level in a longer perspective.
Lithuania’s Eastern Neighbors
Russia’s Foreign Policy after September 11**

The article deals with the issue on Russian foreign policy in length of one year – from September 2001 till October 2002. It’s evident, that the attacks of terrorists on the Twin Towers in New York signalled the turn in Russian foreign policy under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin from confrontation with USA and Euro Atlantic organizations to the cooperation with the said opponents. The turn was influenced by the objective bankrupt to confront with the West. Otherwise, the domestic high popularity rating of President Putin and his image of the State’s consolidator, what has been originated on the brutal represses of Chechnya’s separatism and the authoritarian concentration of power, served for the taken, non popular in Russia, course of ally with the West and particularly with USA.

It’s shown within the article, how fluctuated the emphasises of Putin’s policy in the analysed period, i.e. from the cooperation of USA and Russia in crushing the Afghanistan’s Talibs, from the entering into the pact START – 3 and establishing NATO - Russian Council to the reactivated flirtation with Peking and Phenian, and the blackmail with the rockets “Satana”. It is also established, how Putin’s diplomacy relates the brewed Iraq crisis and the case of Chechnya militants in Georgia Pankisi pass and how for the pro western political course was obtained the transit through Lithuania to/ from Kaliningrad.

In sum, Putin just modifies the previous Russian (Eugenie Primagov) so called multipolar World strategy. The emphasises of Putin’s political line point up not the fort- bright blocking of USA power, but the game of diplomatic in the concert of Great Powers, where Putin himself appears as a good player. The democracy itself doesn’t take the priority in Russia and Putin’s policy, meanwhile, doesn’t lead to structural integration with the West, but far to the specific contiguous of Russian and the West structures. On the one part Euro Atlantic military structures enter into the post Soviet Union space – into Baltic countries, also Transcausasia and Central Asia, on the other part the Russian energetics’ capital penetrates to Central East Europe and Balkans, Russia preserves and even expands its influence upon Central Asia and the Far East.

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Introduction

Today it is common to regard the terrorist attack against the Trade Centre Towers on September 11, 2001, as the boundary date in the development of international relations. The idealists treat that event as a precondition for the entire civilised world to unite against a common threat that arose – terrorism. The realists are more sceptical and they are not inclined to believe that the customary competition for power between countries would disappear. In this context, following the events of September 11, 2001, the foreign policy of Russia is often regarded as a catalyst for this dilemma. It is thought that the nature of further international relations will greatly depend on what policy Russia is going to pursue – whether it will unite with the most developed countries of the world against barbaric manifestations or will make use of the situation to regain its former power. Such opinion is sufficiently wide-spread irrespective of the fact that Russia is no longer a superpower able to dictate its fashions to the world\(^1\).

The fact that the President of Russia Vladimir Putin was the first to telephone the US President George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks to express his condolences and solidarity has been often mentioned of late. The idealists treat this fact as a guideline testifying to the fundamental strategic change in Russia’s security and foreign policy, which marks the beginning of a new epoch in the relations between the East and the West, and Washington and Moscow, in particular. Even the concept that September 11 re-established the bipolar system has appeared. The difference is that now the USA and all other members of the anti-terrorist coalition, including Russia, form one pole, whereas barbaric states and international terrorist organisations belong to the other pole.\(^2\)

Apart from all that, ringing declarations about the end of the Cold War started to be made, as if what was said a decade ago has been forgotten. Then followed the adjustments – it was not the Cold War that has apparently ended, but “the period following the Cold War”, that is, the post-post-Cold-War era\(^3\) has started. The truth is, it is strange that such optimistic sophistication can be presented in all seriousness in the post-modern era.

The sceptics do not leave it unanswered. Their doubts are based on the following arguments: what can one expect from the President, a regular KGB officer

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\(^1\) A vivid illustration: during his visit to Moscow in October 2002 Prime Minister of Israel A.Sharon characterised Russia as a superpower. Though it is common knowledge that currently by its economic capacity Russia can equal to such countries as Holland or even Portugal.

whose one of the first initiatives upon taking over presidency was bringing back the
national anthem of the USSR, who during the period of his rule took draconian
measures to annex Chechnya and transformed Russia’s political system in the direc-
tion of authoritarianism? How seriously can we take the statements about Moscow’s
good will with respect to the West, when a year ago under Vladimir Putin’s rule new
strategies of security and foreign policy oriented towards the search for “a peculiar
road” of Russia and by their nature hostile to the West were adopted? It was not by
chance that within such context a joke that Vladimir Putin expressed his condolences
to Bush … before the September 11 events took place became widespread.

The realists, when reasoning about the course of Russia’s foreign policy towards
the rapprochement with the West declared by President Putin, were inclined to treat it as a
temporary and situational course, which was based, all in all, only on quid pro quo calcu-
lations with respect to Chechnya, the Baltic States and financial issues urgent to Russia.

The year following September 11, 2001 is too short a time to either confirm or
deny the above-presented approaches. Contradictory arguments can be found in
the development of the events of the past year. On the other hand, the sum of these
arguments provides a certain basis for making a judgement about the trends in Rus-
sia’s foreign policy.

1. Experience

One of the basic problems that occurred in the foreign policy of the new
Russia following the downfall of the USSR was the incompatibility of the real possi-
bilities with the image of the former world power, which was still prevailing in the
country. That problem could be solved in many different ways. The first post-Soviet
Foreign Minister of Russia Andrej Kozyrev tried to conceal the above-mentioned
incompatibility in a peculiar way. It is known that during the initial period following
the end of the Cold War idealistic visions about the disappearance of basic contradic-
tions between the East and the West, about a universal distribution of liberal democ-
Racy, about institutionalism as the main paradigm of the future international system,
etc., still prevailed in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kozyrev tried to
cover Russia’s weakness by emphatically taking part in joint actions with the large
Western states and by building new international institutions in which power and
incapability of a separate state had “to melt”. For some time the Western leaders,
particularly the then US President W. Clinton, helped maintain the illusion that the
new Russia was almost as powerful a state as the former USSR had been. There was
even a certain “honeymoon” in the relations between Washington and Moscow.

3 Graeme P. Herd, Ella Akerman, Russian Strategic Realignment and the Post –Post–Cold War
4 Česlovas Laurinavičius, Raimundas Lopata, Valdžios perdavimą įryko, o kas toliau??// Tarptautinė
politička: komentarai ir interpretacijos, Vilnius, Eugrimas, 2002, pp. 153–155; Vladas Sirutavičius,
Iš Kremliaus vėl girdėti didžiavalstybinės melodijos/ op.cit. 151–158.
5 Richardas Krickus, Rusijai būtina visam laikui atsišklyti didžiubės sindromo// Daily Lietuvos rytas,
2002 03 02, No. 50.
6 S. Neil MacFarlane, Russia, the West and European Security// Survival, Vol. 35, Autumn 1993, 3–25;
Marek Menkiszak, Wybrane zagadnienia problematyki bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej// Polska I
However, realities still manifested themselves, and Russians began to feel ever stronger that they did not live in the country that everybody feared and respected. Difficulties in the interior transformation and failures in the economic policy were also added. It became fashionable to lay blame for the difficulties and offended ambitions on the West and on the United States of America, in particular. Kozyrev was accused of the course of co-operation with the West without the Court of Appeal. It was stated that such course only undermined Russia’s authority and contributed to the establishment of absolute dominance of the USA in the world.

Ievgenij Primakov, who replaced Kozyrev, represented the real politik traditions. His conception of foreign policy was based on the following principle: the world should not be one-poled, it must have many poles. This meant that Russia did not only have to co-operate with the USA, but also to do its utmost to limit the power of the USA by all possible means. As a balance to America, Primakov started forming different unions and geopolitical blocks from the states, which were hostile to the West. Thus, the so-called “the six of Shanghai” appeared, and strategic relations with Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea were renewed. Hence, Russia started pursuing the traditional policy of the balance of forces (or the policy of “the zero sum”). At the same time, the image of Russia as an Eurasian power was propagated. Briefly speaking, the foreign policy carried out by Primakov increased the gap between Russia’s ambitions and real possibilities. Such line of policy complied with the visions of the nationalists and the so-called dezavventions, and Primakov’s authority was rapidly strengthening in the country. However, the Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999 (when Russia, having provocatively severed relations with the West, found itself in isolation) revealed the weakness of Russia’s foreign policy more than anything had done that before. That crisis actually marked the downfall of Primakov’s strategy.

Upon coming to power, Vladimir Putin, basing himself on the experience of his predecessors, could have drawn the following conclusions: it is senseless to carry out a conflicting policy with respect to the West, however, it is risky to co-operate with the West without having authority inside the country. In any case, Vladimir Putin started, first and foremost, to concentrate power in his hands. Having made use of the terrorist acts in Moscow and Volgograd, he resolutely waged a new war in Chechnya. The war fostered nationalism and chauvinism, and such atmosphere was convenient for Putin to restrict democratic freedoms and build the so-called “vertical line of power”. A wave of criticism came from the West. However, due to the extent of the scoring ratings of Vladimir Putin in Russia, criticism from the outside weakened.

At the beginning of his presidency Putin avoided making profound changes in the foreign policy. His first visits to China, North Korea, Cuba perfectly matched his foreign policy. However, these visits, quite possible, only confirmed the conclusion that the prospect of modernisation of Russia was possible in co-operating with the West rather than with the backward and aggressive states.

It is known that after the failures of Primakov and President Boris Yeltsin, the relations with the West worsened. A number of interior and exterior circumstances interfered with their renewal. In this sense, the terrorist attacks in New York and

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Washington presented a good chance for a change. From the point of view of foreign policy, at that time solidarity with America corresponded with the orientation of the entire civilised world, whereas from the point of view of home policy, condemnation of terrorist acts – no matter where they manifested themselves – was in line with the so-called anti-terrorist campaign against Chechnya.

By the way, it should be noted, that President Putin’s solidarity with America was far from being approved in Russia, and some people did not even try to conceal their disapproval. Representatives of the generals (Leonid Ivashkov) and liberal democrats (Leonid Mitrofanov) referred to the assistance provided to America as “a geopolitical suicide”. In their opinion, the terrorist acts committed by Islamists against the USA, apparently signified the agony of Western democracy, therefore, it was better for Russia to stay away and wait for a suitable moment when it could again become autocratic in the world.

On the whole, it is believed that President Putin had made up his mind to take the course towards the West before September 11 already\(^a\). However, it is not clear how far he planned to go. Hardly could he have planned such strategic orientation, towards which Konrad Adenauer turned Germany in his time. Most likely, the course planned by Vladimir Putin had to run somewhere between the traces left by Kozyrev and Primakov.

2. Steps Taken towards Co-operation with the West

2.1. The Rout of the Talibs

Concrete assistance to the Americans in crushing the Talibs of Afghanistan as the breeding ground of terrorism was the first steps that President Putin took in the co-operation with the West. True, these steps are interpreted differently.

When Russia posed no obstacles to taking military actions against Afghanistan (though it could do that through the Security Council of the UNO), such behaviour of Russia could be interpreted as a desire to involve Americans into a risky war. Then a great many Russian generals and politicians openly forecast that America would get involved and find itself in a similar crisis as it had been in during the Vietnam War. It is known that the case was different. The Talibs were crushed severely and in the shortest time possible. In this way, the USA once again proved its unequalled military power in Afghanistan, and the above-mentioned forecasters had to swallow a bitter pill.

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\(^a\) Graeme P. Herd, Ella Akerman, op. cit.

\(^b\) Arminas Norkus, Maskvos žaidėjai – įgudę// Daily Lietuvos rytas, 2002 09 07, No. 207.
the relations of the latter with the Chechen fighters. Therefore, the Kremlin’s interest to weaken the pressure of Islamic radicalism from the South seemed quite understandable, irrespective of the fact that its was done at the expense of the demonstration of the USA power. According to the Director of Moscow Institute of Strategic Studies A. Konovalov, by means of its policy with respect to Afghanistan, Vladimir Putin “for the first time managed to buy security for the USA taxpayers’ money rather than for the blood of the Russians”. On the other hand, judging from the activity shown by Russia in contributing to the restoration of normal life in Afghanistan, one can forecast that in the future that activity and influence will increase. Thus, by means of elementary pragmatism, President Putin could achieve in Afghanistan what the Soviet leaders failed to achieve during the war that lasted for a decade.

However, another step – permitting (or making no objections to) Americans to build their bases in the former Soviet republics of Middle Asia and Georgia – clearly overstepped the limits of the traditional policy. True, this step was also related to both the Afghanistan campaign and a danger of the Islamic radicalism. Nevertheless, the permission for the American military forces to cross the boundaries of the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States, signified already practical and immediate military co-operation with the former strategic rival No. 1 on the arena of the “Moscow Monro” doctrine that had seemed autocratic until that time. This was not the case even during the so-called Great Patriotic War.

By the way, attention should be drawn to the fact that the penetration by the USA is going on along the parameter of the southern borders of Russia. This tendency particularly frightens Russian geopoliticians. They are afraid that NATO, which is enlarging from the West, will unite with the so-called GUUAM (the regional unit embracing Moldova, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan), and Russia will find itself within the surrounding ring – as if according to the scenario of “anaconda” of the USA geopolitician Alfred Mahan. It is clear that the context of this or similar scenarios only increases one’s surprise at the originality of the Kremlin’s position.

The decision-making technology with respect to the above-mentioned steps is not clear enough. This would require a special investigation. One thing is obvious: all these steps met with a strong opposition in Russia – especially with respect to the USA military bases on the territory of the former USSR. However, the process was going on because it was the President of Russia Vladimir Putin who provided impetus for the support. For example, after the information about the deployment of American officers in Georgia at the end of February 2002 was disseminated, the Foreign Ministry of Russia lodged an official protest to the US Government. However, shortly after that, in one of his speeches President Putin actually denied that protest, stating that he saw nothing wrong in the fact that Americans should take part in the anti-terrorist action in the Caucasus, like they did in Middle Asia11. Such course of events reminded of the famous revolutionary period of perestroika, when non-standard political moves initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev led to the incompatibility of actions of Soviet institutions. However, at the same time, such situation reminded of the so-called “Gorbachev’s syndrome”, which meant both an increase of the state leader’s popularity abroad and the same leader’s breaking away from the prin-

principles prevailing in his state.

Vladimir Putin, at least thus far, has escaped Gorbachev’s fate. In this respect, a peculiar phenomenon could be observed. On the one hand, a general manifestation of the moods in Russia meant a universal disapproval of concessions made to America. Opposition to America was on the increase. For example, the assessment of the performance of the sportsmen at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City brought on anti-American hysteria\(^1\) in Moscow. However, on the other hand, disapproval of the foreign policy of Russia being pursued was not related to President Putin. At the same time, the rating witnessed that Putin’s popularity was quite high. This case would require a special social psychological study, however, one thing is obvious – it testifies to the importance of authority in Russia.

\[2.2. \text{The Issue of Anti-Missile System}\]

It is known that the administration of the Republicans headed by G.W. Bush Jr. has taken the course towards the creation of anti-missile system since the very beginning of its rule. Practically, this entails new huge expenditures. The US economic and technical potential provides the Americans with some luxury, however, no other state, including Russia, can afford this. If the Americans succeeded in creating such system, it would mean for Russia that the nuclear missile potential that it possesses would no longer guarantee its strategic priority over the USA within the framework of the Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, doctrine. In other words, Russia would lose its last attribute, which maintains its image as a superpower.

Russia could oppose to such perspective in two ways. Firstly, by making use of common propagandistic measures of the Soviet times and by means of diplomatic channels, it was possible to develop dissatisfaction of separate countries with the plans of anti-missile systems and to form such moral climate in the world that the USA would not dare to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ABM, 1972. Secondly, having made its citizens tighten their belts, it was possible to try to maintain the remaining potential of the strategic missiles (about 6,000 warheads) or even to extend it. True, in both cases a doubtful effect was foreseen due to different reasons. However, somehow or other, one can maintain that President Putin has not exhausted the above-mentioned possibilities. At the end of 2001, after G.W. Bush announced his withdrawal from the 1972 Treaty, Vladimir Putin’s reaction was moderate. He called it a mistake, however, at the same time, he expressed hope that the decision of the USA Government would not damage the relations between the two countries. It was obvious that President Putin put up with the reality that America was not to be overtaken from the strategic point of view. He even failed to make use of the available propagandistic reserve to appeal to Europeans, who were dissatisfied with the unilateral actions of Americans. According to the statement of the military expert Aleksandr Golc made in one of television programmes “Vremena”, because of this position, President Putin had received a protest letter signed by nearly one hundred high

\(^1\) During the Olympic Games the famous artist Zadornov tore the USA visa into pieces during the television programme, the anti-American Resolution was adopted at the Duma, Grigoriy Jevlinski, one of those who tried to appease the rage, was publicly attacked, etc.
Russian officials.

In May 2002, President Putin and the US President Bush signed a new Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions called START –3, according to which both parties undertook to reduce the number of warheads from 6,000 to 2,200-1,700. At that time, Russian political commentators stated that the signing of the treaty meant some concession on the side of Americans. At first, they did not want that treaty at all. And the very fact of the signing of the treaty demonstrates that the USA and Russia were worth each other in the sphere of missile armament. However, another assessment of the treaty is possible, too. Actually, the treaty testifies that Russia refuses its plans to increase the number of warheads12. Hence, it will not seek to keep the Americans in fear of their possible annihilation. Perhaps it was due to this fact, that after signing the above-mentioned treaty, discussions about the essential end of the Cold War epoch renewed. In other words, the treaty meant that the countries were stepping back from one of the main parameters of the Cold War – Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD.

2.3. Restoration of Relations with NATO

The September 11 events contributed to the restoration of the relations with NATO, which broke off following the Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999. When Vladimir Putin visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels on October 2, 2001, he did refer to Russia’s possibility to join that organisation. It actually happened half a year later: on May 27, 2002, the Joint Council of Russia and NATO was established in Rome. Within the framework of that Council, the Russian generals were able to sit down with the representatives of NATO states at the same table as equals according to the “20” format and consider various issues of international politics and security.

True, within the framework of the Council, Russia failed to acquire the veto right in solving the issues of the enlargement of the Alliance as well as security issues of its individual members. Moreover, Russians did not manage to get the desired rights in the sphere of the sale of weapons13. Therefore, many people in Russia expressed doubts about the necessity of the new institute. However, the ongoing discussion evidenced that the Kremlin was determined to firmly pursue the line of cooperation with NATO. By the way, with negotiations about the prerogatives of the Council going on, it was again possible to notice the incompatibility of the positions of separate Russian institutions – like on the issue of the USA bases in the Trans-Caucasus and Middle Asia14.

The problem of NATO enlargement is especially difficult for Russia. True, even during the visit of the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus to Moscow in the spring of 2001, it was evident that the Russian authorities were inclined to put up with the prospect of the membership of the Baltic States in the Alliance. Though strong dissatisfaction was expressed in Russia on this account too. A peculiar struggle between “the hawks” and “the doves” was going on. “The hawks”, that is a number of the representatives of Russia’s political establishment (Sergei Rogov, Vechiaslav Niko-

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14 Richardas Krékus, NATO ateitį įvartoja ir Rusijos rūpesčiai// Lietuvos rytas, 2002 04 27, No. 96
nov, the above-mentioned Ivashov and others) from time to time gave clear hints to their authorities that the latter should relate Russia’s joining the anti-terrorist coalition to putting a stop to NATO enlargement. At a minimum, they required to relate the membership of the Baltic States in the Alliance to the extension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Reductions to the Eastern Baltic region. (By the way, Russians’ request was approved by some allies in the southern flank. However, the opinion of Americans, that there was no relation between the membership of the Baltic States in the Alliance and the issues of Conventional Armed Forces reductions, took the upper hand.) Briefly speaking, many people in Russia understood the restoration of the relations with NATO as a usual concession to the West.

Meanwhile, “the doves” argued that in the changing international situation NATO was losing its importance and there was no sense to break lances over its enlargement. There were sound grounds for such arguments. In the heat of the anti-terrorist campaign, sceptical remarks made by the US administration with respect to NATO and orientation towards “flexible coalitions” of the new type in the fight against terrorism declared by President Bush in fact strengthened doubts about the perspective of the Alliance itself. The question “What NATO are we joining?” was asked in the Baltic States. When the global re-grouping of forces started in connection with the anti-terrorist coalition, the rapprochement of the USA and Russia faced a relevant question – what form and meaning should the trans-Atlantic axis acquire? No matter what the future of NATO actually is, the discussion in Russia amortised, in a sense, the issue of the enlargement of the Alliance, which in many cases is merely a psychological one.

2.4. The Issue of Strategic Raw Materials

With the situation in the Middle East growing sharper due to Islamic radicalism, the USA was made to re-consider priorities of the regions from which it received the basic amount of raw energy materials. It was only Russia that could equal the Middle East in its resources of raw materials. Therefore, the so-called geoenergetic aspect began to play an ever more important role in the USA-Russia relations. Recently, special preparations have been made to start direct transportation of oil by tankers from Russia to the USA through Murmansk and the Far East ports. The policy with respect to these subjects, which, one way or another, would participate in the geoenergetic co-operation between the USA and Russia, has begun to change accordingly.

In the person of its President Putin Russia stopped blocking the international treaty on the use of oil resources in the Caspian Sea and, following the negotiations that lasted for more than four years, the possibility to lay a pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea (Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan) was raised in the summer of 2002. Russia and the USA should become guarantors of this

\[17\] “We think that NATO is already the past. This organisation did not participate in the war waged in Afghanistan because it operated in a very conservative way. The Russians would have been much more effective in the first stage of the war”, said one of the Kremlin functionaries who did not want his name to be disclosed.


[18] In one of his interviews the Russian politologist Sergej Karaganov stated: “The Americans understand that the process of the downfall of the Arab regimes has started. Therefore the role of Russia and its oil is sure to grow” // Financial Times, 2002 03 18.
pipeline. At that time, a number of bilateral agreements between Russia and Kazakh-
stan, between Russia and Azerbaijan, and between Russia and the Ukraine on trans-
portation of oil and gas to the West were signed. This testifies to Russia’s striving to
become by itself, or by joining its neighbours, the former vassals, a strategic supplier
of energy raw materials to the West.

Here it is worth mentioning President Putin’s activity with respect to the
Ukraine. In the first half of 2002, he met with the President of the Ukraine Leonid
Kuchma as often as five times. The agreements reached testify that Russia no longer
objected to transportation of gas from Russia to the West through the Ukraine. Ear-
lier it was planned to lay the pipeline through Belarus. Does it mean that Russia will
not take to the policy of cheap blocking and blackmailing the countries which co-
operate with the West (the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.) and will no longer support
Lukashenka’s parasitic and anti-Western regime in Belarus? The question remains
open. Anyway, it was in the summer of 2002, that disagreements between President
Putin and Lukashenka came to light. The main reason of these disagreements seems
to have been Lukashenka’s refusal to privatise oil and gas enterprises in Belarus to
which Russian companies laid claims. For example, the company “Jukos” wanted to
purchase an oil refinery in Mozyr, the largest enterprise of that kind in the region (for
more detail see the article by Raimundas Lopata).

Within the context of transportation of raw energy materials from Russia to
the Western countries, it is worth remembering the fate of Mažeikių Oil Refinery. It
is known that in 1999 the refinery was sold to the USA company “Williams”, which
planned to refine oil brought from Russia and sell it to the Western market at a profit.
By the way, in selling the company, Lithuania created exceptionally favourable
conditions for the US company “Williams”. Hence, through the geoeconomic interest, it
was sought to provide Americans with additional impetus to establish themselves in
the region geopolitically.

For nearly three years the business was slack because Russia blockaded trans-
portation of oil to Mažeikių. One may guess that impetus for the things to get moving
from the dead point was given by a number of meetings of President Bush and Presi-
dent Putin during the period between the autumn of 2001 and the spring of 2002.
Anyway, in June 2002, “Williams” finally managed to reach an agreement on supply
of oil with the Russian company “Jukos”. However, the matter did not rest at that.
Hardly two months following the agreement had passed, and “Williams” withdrew
altogether, letting “Jukos” have all the positions.

Such castling may be accounted for by specific circumstances related to the
financial problems inside “Williams” in America itself. However, having looked at
the region more broadly, it is not difficult to see that Russian oil and gas companies
are trying to establish their positions in a similar way in other countries of Central–
Eastern Europe – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and even Sloveniai. Hence, Russia’s impact is broadly extending towards the Baltic and the Medi-
terranean Sea basins. Having in mind history and Russia’s geopolitical theories as
well as the signal which is ever more often coming from the West – not to interfere
with Russia’s energy transit – the following interpretation of the latter processes
offers itself: it seems that Russia, without using tanks and making a lot of noise,
undertook to solve one of its most cherished geopolitical ambitions – to participate
in the region of Central-Eastern Europe and to have influence on the European
continent on the whole, as well as to have access to the world waters.

3. Steps backwards

Major steps that Russia took from September 2001 to the summer of 2002 in the sphere of foreign policy were understood by many people in Russia as unilateral concessions to the West, and, first and foremost, to the United States of America. However, since the summer of 2002 a certain crisis in the course of the rapprochement with the West has been felt.

At the beginning of June 2002, the President of Russia Putin took part in the meeting of the heads of the so-called “the six of Shanghai”. This showed that Russia, though after a certain break, did not intend to forget the levers, which it formerly tried to apply against the West and especially against the USA. The reaction of President Bush is interesting indeed: when the meeting of “the six of Shanghai” started, he telephoned President Putin personally and announced good news that at last Russia had been granted the status of a market country. Hence, President Bush managed to pay back an old debt as if confirming, at the same time, that America needed Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia did not stop taking steps backwards. It was at the beginning of summer that the most famous cases of the recent period started to be escalated: the case of Georgia’s links with terrorism and that of “the corridor” to Kaliningrad Oblast. In July the tension eased, however, in August Moscow’s tone became sharper again. The Minister of Defence of Russia Sergei Ivanov became especially active as to the issue of Georgia. He appeared on television nearly every day making some statements in a military line. For example, on August 8, he spoke about Georgia expressly sharply calling its policy “double-faced”. Georgia was continued to be attacked during the following days, too. On August 16, Ivanov himself unexpectedly made a statement that Russia was not going to destroy its famous rockets SS-18 (“satana”)11. It was obvious that the scenario of demonstrating force was being developed, only the final results of that scenario were not clear.

On August 18-19, the news appeared in the mass media that Russia was supposedly preparing a huge 60-billion-dollar-worth co-operation agreement with Iraq. Since at that time the USA was already openly preparing for war against Iraq, the news might have been understood as a clear hint about the amount of money for which Russia would agree to sell Iraq. (By the way, forestalling the events, it should be noted that it was already in October that Washington, as though, responded to that hint of Russia and offered to write off all Soviet debts provided that Russia made no objections at the UN Security Council to taking military actions against Iraq).12

At the end of August, the Prime Minister of Russia Michail Kasjanov arrived in Peking. According to the statements made, he conducted successful negotiations over the issues of trading in weapons. The Head of North Korea Kim Jong Il arrived in Russia at that time. President Putin himself welcomed him warmly in Vladivostok. Official discussions were held about the railway connecting Siberia with ports of

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12 Broadcast of Russian Television, Flirting with the “Axis of Evil”// Daily Lietuvos rytas, 2002 08 31, No. 201.
13 Programme of Russian television “Vremia”
14 Programme “Post Scriptum”.
South Korea and about its transit line through the territory of North Korea. However, the underlying implication of that visit was a signal to Washington that Russia had its opinion about the so-called states of “the axis of evil”.

In response to these steps taken by Russia in its foreign policy, the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld openly spoke about the crisis in the relations between Moscow and Washington. According to Rumsfeld, when Moscow advertises its relations with such countries as Iraq, Syria, Cuba and North Korea, it wants to tell the whole world that it has nothing against co-operating with terrorist countries\textsuperscript{3,5}.

4. Dividends

Despite Rumsfeld’s sharp words, the situation was not favourable for dissociating Russia from the concert of the countries or simply ignoring it, as was the case during the Kosovo crisis. At that time, Washington’s strategy was related to Russia’s factor in the Middle East closely enough. On the other hand, the investments of Putin’s policy were already sufficient for the West to expect dividends. A further development of Georgia’s case vividly illustrates the situation that has formed.

4.1. Georgia’s Case

As has already been mentioned, in the summer of 2002, Moscow began to strain its relations with Tbilisi. The pretext for that was the Chechen fighters who concentrated in Pankisia mountain gorge that belonged to Georgia and from which they staged raids against the Russian Army in Chechnya. The President of Georgia Eduard Shevarnadze tolerated the Chechens in Pankisia as a certain counterbalance against the constant pressure that Russia exerted on Georgia (the pressure was built up by supporting separatists of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by regularly reminding Eduard Shevarnadze of his “crimes” against Russia when he was the Foreign Minister of the USSR, etc.). On the whole, the nature of the crisis being escalated showed that now Moscow took aim at Georgia as an independent state, and particularly at Shevarnadze himself, rather than at the Chechen fighters in Pankisia. For some time, Washington did its utmost to appease the passions, however despite that they only increased, naturally depending on the way the tension over Iraq increased.

At the beginning of September, actions of Washington itself started to get out of tune. The US Agency for National Security unexpectedly (on September 5) disseminated information about a recorded telephone conversation between one of al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and an unidentified person in Georgia, which had been kept confidential for a year. The conversation took place several minutes following the terrorist attacks in New York, and these attacks were discussed in the course of the conversation. On September 9, President Bush telephoned President Putin; according to the US Ambassador to Moscow Aleksandr Vershbow, the Iraq issue, as well as other “common interests” were discussed. And on September 11, President Putin issued an ultimatum to Georgia threatening to start military actions in the mountain-gorge in Pankisia. It should be noted that Russian television, having broadcast a

\textsuperscript{3} Arminas Norkus, “Flirting with the “Axis of Evil” // Daily Lietuvos rytas, 2002 08 31, No. 201.
reportage about the ultimatum, shortly after that showed how President Putin was telephoning President Bush to express his condolences and solidarity in connection with the anniversary of the terrorist attack against the USA. The performance did not end with that. Soon the information was transmitted from the USA State Department, which assessed the threat issued by Moscow to Georgia as groundless both from the legal and political points of view. However, at the same time, the statement made by Vershbow in Moscow put the accents on al-Qaeda’s links with Chechnya\textsuperscript{24}. The entire course of events in Georgia made one thing clear to Shevarnadze – the Chechen fighters in the mountaingorge in Pankisia will have to be sacrificed.

4.2. The Case of Kaliningrad Oblast

A drama of somewhat different nature developed around the issue of Kaliningrad Oblast. It seems that the adviser to President Putin Gleb Pavlovski initiated it, when in the spring of 2002 he declared on television that after Lithuania and Poland become members of the European Union, visa-free communication by railway and motorcars should be preserved between Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast, like that between the FRG and West Berlin during the years of the Cold War. At first, this statement was not taken seriously. All the more so that communications between the Foreign Ministries of Lithuania and Russia about the future procedure for introducing visas had been held since the end of 2001. The reaction of the European Commission was straightforward: there can be no “corridors” of another regime in the Schengen zone, especially those that are open to such country as Russia which is unable to put its own borders in order and is unwilling to sign readmission agreements. Vilnius and Warsaw took corresponding positions on this matter: according to their statements, privileges of visa-free movement will have to be abolished in 2003 for the citizens of Russia who travel to and from Kaliningrad Oblast; should Russians want to reach Kaliningrad without obtaining visas, they have to go by plane or ship.

Pavlovski’s statement, however, was not just empty words. Moscow cancelled the consultations about the introduction of visas and developed enviable diplomatic activity to prove that visas were unacceptable. The humanitarian and moral aspect played the central role in the argumentation of Russians. It seemed that with the European Union enlarging and the conditions of citizens of its countries improving, the situation of the Russian citizens would worsen. Moscow diplomats used President Putin’s authority as a trump card. According to the special representative Dimitrij Rogozin, the solution of the issue of Kaliningrad Oblast would be a signal for the Russians to decide whether President Putin had made the right choice in taking the Western direction\textsuperscript{25}. Moscow’s activity started to bear fruit in the middle of summer. At first, the heads of France and later the leaders of other EU states started expressing their opinion that the Russians should have visa-free communication with Kaliningrad Oblast. By the way, Washington, though keeping aside, also regarded the requirements of Russians with favour.

It should be noted that the attention of all countries, somehow naturally, was

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directed towards Lithuania, and it was through its territory that the communication had to be established. Meanwhile, from Russia’s side Lithuania felt pressure exerted not only by the official Moscow, but also by the so-called people’s democracy. Pickets were organised in front of Lithuanian Embassies in Russia, newspapers were flooded with articles of anti-Lithuanian nature, the Duma of Russia addressed the issues of lawfulness of Lithuanian territories and until now it has not been ready to ratify the agreement on the border with Lithuania signed in 1997.

It seems that the essence of the crisis created is as follows: Moscow is escalating the issue of visa-free transit to Kaliningrad Oblast, because it is afraid that due to EU enlargement, the Oblast may simply distance itself from Russia. The tendency has already been observed that the population of the Oblast travel more often to European countries than to their formal motherland. However, seeking to bind the Oblast to Russia, Moscow, at the same time, is renewing the fetters for Lithuania and other Baltic States, too. It is nothing new to maintain that in his time Stalin annexed the Oblast of the former Kaliningrad, seeking to attach the annexed Baltic States to the USSR. There is no guarantee that after the special corridor has been introduced for the civilians, within some time, Moscow will demand that such corridor should be introduced for military purposes, too. Hence, the case of communication with Kaliningrad may be treated as the gravitation dilemma of the two opposite directions.

Moscow diplomats, however, are trying to prove the opposite. They maintain that Russia wants “to go to the West” and adopt the European order. However, to do that money is necessary. First and foremost, money is needed to put in order Russia’s southern borders, which are the main crossing point for illegal migrants. Having put its borders in order, Russia could sign the readmission agreement and really follow its provisions. Then the pressure exerted on the European countries by illegal migration would be really reduced. Thus, Europe should help Russia become Europeanised rather than push it away.

With the summit meeting of the European Union and Russia approaching (it is to take place in November 2002), the perspective of a compromise is in view. Moscow seems to agree to adopt the project of a simplified control of communication through the territory of Lithuania, which is financed of the European Union. However, it is still unclear, when Russia is going to ratify the agreement on its border with Lithuania, when it is going to sign the readmission agreement and, what is most important, it is unclear, how the mechanism of sanctions would function if Russia started violating the procedure of the transit regime. All this means doubtful prospects for Lithuania to join the Schengen zone.

5. The Balance of the Year or the Conclusions

The first thing to be stated is that during the past year, the gap between Russia’s real possibilities and the picture that the Russians have about Russia’s possibilities has decreased considerably. Russia is no longer afraid to admit that the USA is the most powerful country in the world and that Russia, all in all, is only a regional state of limited possibilities.

President Putin managed to establish friendly relations, quite conforming to the realities, with the governments of all Western states. Russia is gaining authority. Its voice is heard and its opinion is taken into consideration.
Currently, Russia is trying to act within the framework of a classical concert of the large powers. Such paradigm of action turned to be favourable for bringing out President Putin’s diplomatic skills. President Putin proved to be a good player of political poker, who manages to win, having started the game with a bad playing card.

Putin’s Russia has not, at least thus far, turned in the direction of strategic integration into the West. Russia’s policy still contains elements of conflicting balancing. (These elements, most likely, are necessary for home rather than foreign policy considerations.) By the way, the policy of such nature is also determined by the recent US orientation towards “flexible coalitions”.

Anyway, looking for analogies to the course pursued by President Putin, one may say that the strategy of de Gaulle’s foreign policy would be much closer to him than that of Adenauer. The only difference is that the main ambition of the rebellious de Gaulle was the independence of the foreign policy of France within the framework of Euro-Atlantic integration, whereas Putin’s strategy contains the ambition to restore the Eurasian empire.

On the basis of concert co-operation, there is a certain overlapping of Euro-Atlantic and Russia’s structures. In one case, the impact of the European Union, NATO and simply that of the USA is spreading into the zone of Russia’s traditional dominance. Such tendency has been observed in the so-called GUUAM space, that is, in the Ukraine, Georgia, Middle Asia. On the other hand, Russia’s influence is spreading to the space of the development of Western structures, that is, to Central-Easter Europe, the Baltic States and Afghanistan. Such overlapping of structures of the West and Russia contains the elements of stability and integration, conflict and destabilisation. What tendency will prevail, is an open question.
Strategic Importance of Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation

The authors of the article analyse how the policy of the Russian Federation towards Kaliningrad Oblast could influence main national interests of the Lithuanian Republic – the integration into the EU and NATO. Thus two main problems are discussed in the article: first, how Russia seeks to use the problem of military transit to/from Kaliningrad Oblast, stopping Lithuania’s Euro-Atlantic integration; second, the interaction of what factors within the context of the EU enlargement could influence decisions on visa and civic transit issues. It is emphasized, that the EU enlargement creates a pressing need for in-depth modernisation of the Oblast (for the implementation of which Russia is not ready and lacks capacity). Neither Russia nor the EU (including candidate countries) is interested in the potential worsening of the socio-economic situation in Kaliningrad region. Due to this reason, successful crisis prevention should be an important interest for all regional actors. Nevertheless, analysis of their positions reveals that there is a lack of strong political determination to decide the Kaliningrad issue substantially (by resorting to unconventional tools, breaking the status quo), as the problem of successful adaptation of the oblast (together with the relevant values) is not placed high on the regional actors’ agenda. The analysis of Russian military transit from/to Kaliningrad Oblast indicates that the Kremlin was seeking political agreement on military transit in the hope of holding Lithuania in its sphere of influence. The presumption is made that Russia could again try to legitimate the military transit through the territory of Lithuania even if Lithuania is invited to join Euro-Atlantic structures.

Introduction: Objectives and Tasks

The principal objective of the present paper is to elucidate how Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation may influence Lithuania’s major national interests: the integration into the European Union and NATO. In other words, to analyse how Russia can make an effective use of Kaliningrad Oblast in seeking to influence Lithuania’s strategic objectives, and what resources Lithuania has to neutralise the threats that are being posed. Kaliningrad Oblast (hereinafter referred to as KO) is most westerly territory

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of the Russian Federation\(^1\). It could be regarded as an exclave of the Russian Federation. Though KO is separated from the main part of Russia by the territories of Lithuania and Belarus, it borders on the Baltic Sea all the same and thus has a direct link with other Russian ports. Unlike other exclaves and enclave territories in the West, which are dynamic units well oriented towards the global economic system, KO is a backward, underdeveloped region from the social point of view. Economic and social backwardness of the Oblast alongside a relatively high degree of its militarisation can be regarded as an eventual threat to Lithuania and its strategic aspirations to become a member of the EU and NATO.

The identification of Russia’s policy with respect to KO, as well as the establishment of threats arising from KO, becomes especially pressing at present. On the one hand, the NATO Summit Meeting in Prague is approaching during which the second stage of the enlargement of the Alliance should be announced. Lithuania is mentioned among the most realistic candidates of the second wave of NATO enlargement. It is often stated in Russia that in case Lithuania is invited to join the Alliance, Russia will be forced to take retaliatory military measures to strengthen military capacities of KO. It is also noted that after Lithuania has become a member of the Alliance, the balance, established by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement, would be upset. Seeking to influence Lithuania’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Moscow also escalates the issue of military transit through the territory of Lithuania demanding that the regime of military transit should be reviewed by adjusting it in accordance with the standards of “international law”\(^2\).

On the other hand, Lithuania, seeking to become an EU member, should join Shengen acquis, which would mean the introduction of visas for the residents of the Russian Federation travelling through the territory of Lithuania to/from KO. According to Moscow, such measures would violate its sovereign rights and would worsen the socio-economic situation in the Oblast even more and would isolate KO from the remaining part of Russia. On the basis of such arguments, the Kremlin firmly rejects the idea of changing the visa regime and demands that a special free transit corridor to KO should be created.

**Historiographic-problem related review of literature.** In assessing available literature on the KO issue it becomes obvious that, till the beginning of the 90s of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, the authors devoted most attention to the military aspects of the Oblast: its demilitarisation and ways of neutralising KO as an eventual military threat, etc\(^1\). Such was the case because a large part of the Army being withdrawn from Germany was deployed in KO. It is also noted that at the turn of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\)-21\(^{\text{st}}\) centuries even more attention was focused on the impact of the EU enlargement on KO, and such attention was dictated by the beginning of the negotiations between Poland and Lithuania and the

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\(^{1}\) Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation covers 15,100 square kilometres, its population totals 926,000 people, of which 415,000 people live in Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad Oblast is inhabited by people of different ethnic backgrounds: the most numerous ethnic group is Russians (78%), Belarusians (10%), Ukrainians (6%), Lithuanians (4%). Also about 12 thousand Germans and 9 thousand Poles live in Kaliningrad Oblast. The administrative structure is as follows: 13 districts and 9 towns. The level of urbanisation of Kaliningrad Oblast is quite high – 78.2% of the population live in towns. (see Joenniemi P., Prawitz J., eds., *Kaliningra: Amber Region*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 32–56).

\(^{2}\) This position was expressed during the President of Lithuania Valdus Adamkus’ visit to Moscow at the beginning of March 2001 (see daily *Lietuva rytas*, 31 March 2001).

\(^{1}\) The latest review of “the Kaliningrad issue” is presented by Lopata R., “Naujausios kaliningradistikos apžvalga” [The latest review of kaliningradistics], *Politologija*, 1, 2002, p. 96 – 104.
European Commission⁴. It was understood that the EU enlargement was unavoidably related to the side effect on third countries, including Russia and KO as its integral part. 
In the perspective of Poland’s and the Baltic States’ (Lithuania in the first place) membership in the EU, the threat of Kaliningrad’s lagging behind the neighbouring countries socially and economically and its turning into the “double periphery” (with respect to both the EU and the Russian Federation) becomes especially important.

Western authors, having analysed the eventual military impact of KO on the process of NATO enlargement towards the East Baltic region (such as R.D. Asmus, R.C. Nurick, L.D. Fairlie, F.S. Larrabee, Ch. Wellmann and others) usually note the following: first, that the enlargement of the Alliance in the direction of the Baltic States would in essence surround KO in which “a huge military power of Russia” is still concentrated. This “negative factor” turns the Baltic States into a special case and complicates their accession to the Alliance⁵; second, the issue of military transit through the territory of Lithuania complicates Lithuania’s situation because it repeats the precedence of Western Berlin during the period of the Cold War and in the future it may become the centre of a conflict between Lithuania and Russia⁶.

In specifying the main aim of the paper, two major tasks have been addressed in the below presented study: first, to analyse how Russia tried (and is still trying) to take advantage of the issue of military transit seeking to put a stop to the process of Lithuania’s Euro-Atlantic integration and possibilities available for Lithuania to minimise the arising threats; second, to elucidate the factors whose interaction would enable the problem of the visa issue to be solved successfully.

The paper is based on the supposition that KO plays an important strategic role in the policy pursued by Russia with respect to Lithuania. By making use of the “problems” related to KO, Moscow seeks to change Lithuania’s pro-western (eventually pro-American) geopolitical orientation.

Structure of the paper: Taking into account the aims and objectives set, the paper consists of four main parts. The first part presents a brief overview of the strategic importance of KO during the period of the Cold War. It is stated that already during the Second World War, the Kremlin sought to annex a part of Eastern Prussia together with Königsberg, hoping thereby to influence the pro-Soviet orientation of a future Poland and to ensure control of the Eastern Baltic region for itself. The second part of the paper is devoted to discussing how the strategic importance of KO developed after 1990-1991 before two principle scenarios of the development settled into shape: the scenario of the polygon of economic reforms and that of a military bastion. Also attempts have been made to answer the question how changes in the Russian policy following 11 September 2001 can influence the development of the scenarios.

The third part is concerned with the issue of military transit of Russia through the territory of Lithuania to/from KO. Several suppositions are taken as a basis: first, current military transit of the Russian Federation raises no problems of a political level and therefore it cannot complicate Lithuania’s process of Euro-Atlantic integration; second, Russia, seeking to legalise the issue of military transit by means of a

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political agreement, hopes to leave Lithuania within the sphere of its influence. First of all a brief historical overview of agreements on Russian military transit is presented (1993-1995); second, possible scenarios of the escalation of military transit are specified, and third, several eventual variants of Lithuania’s response to such pressure on the part of Russia are provided.

The fourth part addresses the settlement of the “Kaliningrad issue” within the context of the EU enlargement as the crisis prevention case. The analysis is based on the supposition that conditions of two types are enough for a successful crisis prevention: a sufficient political will and the power of decision-makers. The basic attitude of the paper is that if for a larger part of regional figures the Kaliningrad issue does not become an important value/interest to which priority would be given, it is likely that the crisis prevention will experience failure. Feasible possibilities of settling the issue of the visa regime will be discussed within this context.

1. Strategic importance of Kaliningrad oblast during the Cold War

The fate of Eastern Prussia was decided as early as the end of 1943, at the Conference in Teheran. The allies of the Conference – the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union – considered various issues that were urgent for the post-war Europe: the borders of Poland, the future of Germany, etc. It was in Teheran that the issue of the fate of the Baltic States was practically settled7.

At the beginning of the war, the western allies, the British and the Americans, supported the aspiration of the Poles to hand Eastern Prussia over to Poland as a compensation for possible territorial concessions to the Soviets. Evicting Germans from Eastern Prussia was also approved of. As early as December 1941, they tried to convince Sikorski that Poland was going to annex the whole of Eastern Prussia and that thus it would be possible to easily come to an agreement on the eastern borders of Poland. It is interesting to note that in 1943 Litvinov maintained the same idea to Harry Hopkins. However, at the Teheran Conference, Stalin, basing his statement on the fact that Russia had no ice-free ports in the Baltic Sea, demanded that a part of Eastern Prussia, including the Königsberg Port, should be given over to Russia8.

In the end the British and the Americans agreed to support Stalin’s aspirations in Eastern Prussia at the future peace conference, which had to finally resolve all the territorial and border problems. The question arises – why did the fate of a part of Eastern Prussia become so important to the Soviet Union?

By setting territorial requirements Moscow was solving several strategic tasks that were of importance to it. In seeking to acquire only a part of Eastern Prussia (the Königsberg Port together with a small territory) – the other part of Eastern Prussia had to be given over to Poland – Stalin tried to force the latter to participate in the division of German territories. In annexing German lands, Poland would be set against Germany and in the post-war years would seek for support in the Soviet Union. Hence, wishing to withstand the territorial claims of Germany, Poland would

8 By the way, it was already during the First World War that Czarist Russia had plans to annex the lower reaches of the Nemunas River, and eventually the whole of Eastern Prussia.
be forced to seek support in the Soviet Union. In this way the only possible post-war orientation of Poland would become a pro-Soviet orientation. In Stalin's geostrategic plans Poland's control was necessary on account of two important reasons: first, in his opinion, only a satellite sovietised Poland could guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. From the point of view of the Kremlin only such Poland could fulfil the function of an effective protective buffer in the case of a military conflict with the West. Second, the re-established independent and pro-western Poland could have become a serious obstacle to the expansion of the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe.

Territorial claims of the Soviet Union in Eastern Prussia were important from another point of view as well. Annexation of a part of Eastern Prussia was inseparable from Moscow's aspiration to have dominance in Lithuania and eventually in the Eastern Baltic region. It should be remembered that when the issue of Königsberg was discussed at the Teheran Conference, the fate of the Baltic States was in essence decided too. It is known that at the Conference the US President Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's request that plebiscites should be conducted in the three Baltic States without international control after the Soviet Army had liberated them⁹. Virtually this meant that the Baltic States were recognised as a sphere of interest of the Soviets. The requirement of Moscow to transfer a part of Eastern Prussia to it had to dissociate Lithuania from Poland and hence to establish the dominance of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Baltic region.

Thus, in summing up, the conclusion could be drawn that territorial claims in Eastern Prussia were an important constituent part of Stalin's strategy. Its basic purpose was to establish the dominance of the Soviet Union, first and foremost, in the Eastern Baltic region and later in Central Eastern Europe thus guaranteeing the national security of the Soviet Union. The territorial expansion in Eastern Prussia was already a sign, though not too distinct, of Stalin's intentions by taking advantage of the most favourable circumstances, to become established in the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe. These intentions became ever more obvious at the Yalta Conference and shortly after the war when Stalin began gradually, but single-mindedly to realise the so-called idea of the "security band", that is, with the help of the system of satellite states to separate the Soviet Union from Germany and finally from Western Europe.

It is true, shortly after the war the possibilities of annexing to Lithuania the part of Eastern Prussia that had been given over to the Soviets were considered, however, the newly acquired territories were incorporated into the Russian Federation as early as April 1946. (It is interesting to note that it was then that the pro-Soviet orientation of the post-war Poland became clear. The coalition headed by the Communists won the elections to the Sejm of Poland).

During the years of the Cold War, almost universal militarisation of Kaliningrad Oblast was carried out. After the socio-economic infrastructure that existed up to that time was destroyed, no new infrastructure was practically developed. Instead, a large navy base was formed in the Oblast together with other bases of the Soviet Union located in the Eastern Baltic region, which permitted to exert control over the

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Baltic Sea. In 1956, the Command Post of the Navy was transferred from Leningrad to KO, the town of Baltijsk became the main sea base in the Eastern Baltic region. The 11th Army of Guards was also stationed in KO. Both offensive (for example, the operation of disembarking in Southern Sweden) and defensive operations (to defend the western borders of the Soviet Union against possible NATO aggression) were planned for the armed forces concentrated in KO. About 200,000 military personnel were said to have been stationed there shortly after the downfall of the Soviet Union10.

2. Kaliningrad oblast in the context of national interests of Russia

Re-establishment of the statehood in the Eastern Baltic region, disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russia as an independent figure of the international policy, created preconditions for reconsidering the perspectives of KO development. At the end of the 90s of the 20th century, the intellectuals, politologists and politicians proposed several possible scenarios of the development of the Oblast. It was proposed to transform the region into the so-called “Baltic Hong Kong”, or, in other words, to create an ex-territorial free trade zone in KO at the same time granting the Oblast a relatively great autonomy. This idea was based on the supposition that KO, due to its convenient geographical position, could become an important centre of economic co-operation in the Baltic Sea region. (It seems that by creating a free trade zone the Russian authorities made the first steps towards the implementation of this project). Another scenario supposed the creation of an independent “fourth (Russian) Baltic” republic. Some Russian intellectuals and Lithuanian politicians supported this idea, however, this idea enjoyed no popularity with KO society itself. A part of radical Russian politicians were for the maintenance and development of KO as a military advanced post or military garrison of the Russian Federation. In this way it was sought to still more strengthen relations of Kaliningrad Oblast with Russia11. True, it should be noted at once that none of the above-mentioned scenarios has been consistently implemented.

Several principal political and economic factors determined indefiniteness of KO perspectives. Firstly, a complicated and contradictory process of Russia’s federalisation. The fact that Moscow – “the centre” – did not have a clear concept of the regional policy and hardly imagined the perspectives of KO development should also be made mention of. Secondly, a complicated socio-economic situation both in Russia and KO. The Kremlin did not have enough resources for settling the problems that existed in KO. On the other hand, it seemed that “the centre”, fearing that separatist tendencies could strengthen, avoided serious economic reforms in the Oblast. The fate of the Free Economic Zone (FEZ) and the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) clearly demonstrates Moscow’s inconsistency in the sphere of economic reforms. The Law on the Free Economic Zone adopted in 1991 had no effect altogether and eventually

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was repealed in 1993. It is true, in 1995, the Duma of KO adopted the Law on the Special Economic Zone; however, it failed to produce the desired effect either. Poor administrative skills of the local political elite, a high level of corruption and inertia of the society had a negative impact on the processes of “the modernisation” of the Oblast and its economic-social transformation. In analysing the perspectives of KO development in the middle of the 90s, a pessimistic scenario was most often forecasted. It was supposed that the inconsistency of socio-economic reforms, their postponement alongside a relatively high degree of militarisation of the Oblast could turn KO into the centre of tension, which would pose a threat to general security of the Baltic Sea Region countries.

One could maintain that gradually two strategies have crystallised in the policy of the Kremlin with respect to KO: the first strategy treated KO as a special strategic region; the second one is the strategy of KO being a polygon of economic reforms. Thus the following question arises: which of the said strategies will dominate in the policy of the post-empire Russia and will be realised, and how this will influence the security of the Baltic States and, that of Lithuania, in the first place.

In the Russian policy, the strategy of KO as a military advanced post, first of all was based on the principle that strengthening and modernisation in the sphere of military potential, first and foremost, should put a stop to NATO enlargement towards the Eastern Baltic region and guarantee Russia’s dominance in the region. It was thought that maintenance of a sufficiently strong and modern military group in KO made Lithuania practically undefended from the military point of view. This would be an argument against Lithuania’s accession, and on the whole, accession of the Baltic States to NATO. On the other hand, it was explained that Moscow, responding to NATO enlargement, would be forced to strengthen its military potential in KO. And such remilitarisation of the district would not contribute to increasing security in the Baltic Sea Region. Hence, in the strategy of Russia, the idea of KO as a military advanced post had to fulfil the function of containment. In other words, to reduce the possibilities of rapprochement between the Baltic States and NATO. Therefore the political-military elite of Russia assesses KO as a “peculiar strategic region”, and maintenance of such a militarised region or a bastion as well as strengthening of its military potential is regarded as a constituent part of the concept of national security and defence. It was not by chance that in 1994 the military status of KO was changed, the Oblast became a “special defensive region”, which was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. (In January 1994, the President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas sent a letter to NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner containing an official request to accept Lithuania to NATO). In the same year, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Sergei Shachrai underlined that demilitarisation only limited Russia’s sovereignty in KO and proposed to expand the military naval base. In the summer of 1996, the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, when visiting Kaliningrad and the Baltic naval base ensured that the region would always belong to Russia and in essence rejected the idea of demilitarisation. Russian officers warned that in case of NATO enlargement in the direction of the Eastern Baltic region, a tactical nuclear weapon could be deployed in KO.

True, the first stage of NATO enlargement, during which Poland, that has a direct territorial contact with KO, was invited to join the Alliance (1997), showed that the doctrine of retention and the idea of KO as a military advanced post was not too effective. This tendency manifested itself even more in 1999 when Poland became a member of the Alliance, and the concept of “the open door” was approved during the NATO Summit in Washington and nine candidate countries were nominated (including Lithuania). In 1997, during his visit to Sweden, the then President of Russia Yeltsin stated that the Army of the forces of the northern western group would be reduced in number by as much as 40 per cent. According to the data presented by military analysts, about 15 thousand officers were stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast in 1998. The potential of the military navy decreased considerably too. During the period from 1993 to 1998, the number of offensive helicopters decreased from 48 to 42, that of fighter planes – from 35 to 28, the number of submarines – from 15 to 2, that of frigates – from 24 to 4, the number of patrol boats – from 140 to 30. Only the number of tanks increased from 750 to 1,000. According to experts, the armed forces currently stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast do not even reach the quotas established by the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement. At the same time it should be noted that the decrease in the number of armament and the armed forces in the Oblast was influenced by the incapacity of the “centre” to allocate sufficient funds for the maintenance and modernisation of the Army. This became especially obvious in 1998, during the so-called financial crisis period.

In this context, the concept of KO as a polygon of economic reforms was begun to be considered ever more actively. It was thought that due to its convenient geographical position the Oblast could function as an important economic centre of the Baltic Sea Region, as a temporary bridge for cargoes from the West to the East and from the East to the West. True, to restructure the infrastructure of the region, it is necessary to put the administrative system of the Oblast in order, to define the relations between the centre (Moscow) and the periphery (KO) more exactly by granting more independence to the Oblast, to create favourable conditions for foreign investment, etc. In other words, structural modernisation of the Oblast was necessary. Having acquired a certain experience in the sphere of economic and social reforms, it would be possible to apply it to other Russian regions, which are farther from the centre, too. The EU enlargement process encouraged the need to devote more attention to the socio-economic issues of KO and the dynamics of the region. From the point of view of Russia, in case of the membership of Poland and Lithuania in the EU, KO would be encircled by the EU states, and this would have a negative impact on the economic-social dynamics of the Oblast. However, in case of successful co-operation between the EU and Russia, it would be possible to mitigate the consequences of the EU enlargement, and KO could serve as a bridge between Russia and the EU. At the Summit meeting of the Russian Federation and the EU held in October 1999, the states noted that KO could potentially become a model of successful co-operation between Russia and the EU or a “pilot” region. Eventually, the idea of a “pilot”

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13 In 1998, the Commander of the Baltic Navy Admiral V. Jegorov asserted to Lithuanian diplomats that the number of soldiers in Kaliningrad Oblast totalled 25 thousand.

region meant granting of a special status to KO. It seemed that Moscow’s dialogue with Brussels on the KO issue and the concept of the “pilot” region, could have become a good impulse for social-economic modernisation of the Oblast. However, this did not happen. In March 2001, the Government of the Russian Federation, having considered the plan of measures for the socio-economic development of KO and assurance of vitality, refused to define perspectives of the development of the “pilot” region15. In essence, the plan specified only those measures with the help of which the centre sought to extend the limits of its competence. One may think that in this way the Kremlin tried (it is quite likely that tendencies of such a policy will be important in the future too) to obtain as many compensations from the EU as possible for the impact of the enlargement and to strengthen its influence in the Oblast.

The conclusion would offer itself that KO further remains important for Russia, first and foremost, from the strategic point of view: the Oblast is regarded as an important geopolitical lever enabling to ensure Russia’s influence in Lithuania and in the Baltic States on the whole. True, measures by means of which the Kremlin implements its objectives change. Russia, which for a long time stated that the EU enlargement towards the East (contrary to NATO) did not pose a threat to its national interests, at present strengthened its political pressure on the EU, hoping to obtain concessions on the issues of civil transit and visas. At the same time, Moscow put up with the fact that the Baltic States were invited to join NATO and no longer escalates the issue of KO military threat16. Nevertheless, the supposition cannot be rejected that Russia may try to make use of the sensitive issue of military transit to/from KO seeking to put a stop to the process of ratification of the Alliance enlargement.

3. Military transit of the Russian Federation to/from Kaliningrad oblast

Seeking to better understand how Russia, while exerting political pressure on Lithuania, will make use of the problem of military transit, it is necessary to review the issue of the genesis of military transit through the territory of Lithuania.

Though formally Moscow started demanding to sign an agreement on military transit to/from KO of the Russian Federation through the territory of Lithuania already in 1992, the Lithuanian government rejected such an idea17 in protection of the country’s sovereignty. Instead, the official Vilnius and Moscow made a verbal agreement

17 In January 1993, Č.Stankevičius, the head of the Lithuanian state delegation for the negotiations with Russia, informed the Lithuanian Foreign Minister P.Gylys about a draft agreement on the military transit submitted by the Russian delegation in the negotiations which included proposal for Lithuania “to award Russia the right of free military transit through the territory of Lithuania to Kaliningrad Oblast, likewise to allow military transit transporting of the Russian armed forces withdrawn from Germany”. See: the Archives of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (LFMA). [The author wants to express special appreciation to the personnel of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the presented opportunity to use the Archives of the Ministry.] Also see: Stankevičius Č. V., Derybos su Rusija del kartuomenės išvedimą iš Lietuvos [Negotiations with Russia about the Withdrawal of the Army from Lithuania], Vilnius: Leidybos centras prie KAM, 2002, p.73.
that there would be no complications for the movement of the Russian Federation troops to and from KO. At that time, the Russian military were satisfied with such arrangements, as the issue of the Army withdrawal was more important for them.

It was within this context, that the procedure of Russian military transit through the territory of Lithuania was starting to take shape. In should be emphasised that Moscow in essence acknowledged the absence of levers at its disposal to retain Lithuania within the framework of the Soviet legitimacy, nevertheless it was making consistent effort to hold Vilnius in the sphere of its influence.

Russians, apparently, related the implementation of this aim first of all with the resolution of the issue of military transit through the territory of Lithuania. Even though from the summer of 1993, Lithuania was free from the presence of the Russian Army, nevertheless the country was surrounded with it on all sides. On the one hand, there was movement from the West to the East, as the Army was being withdrawn from East Germany, and on the other hand, there was some movement from the East to the West, as Russia had to ensure supply of its military formations concentrated in KO. In addition, military forces of the Russian Federation continued to be deployed in Latvia (and Estonia). It should be noted that a part of the Russian Army withdrawn from Latvia and Estonia was channelled to KO.

Hence, it is understandable that already in January 1993, Lithuania “agreed to allow Russia” to use Klaipėda port in transporting its military formations from Germany “homeward bound as well as to/from Kaliningrad”\(^\text{18}\).

During the negotiations between Lithuania and Russia, which took place in mid September 1993, it was essentially agreed on the Russian military transit from Germany through Lithuania alongside with a compromise over payments for it. It was also agreed on the cooperation in the area of air, sea and river transport. Finally, on 4 November the Lithuanian President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas went to Moscow for his first official visit where he met with the RF President Boris Yeltsin. In the course of negotiations important agreements were discussed, though they were not signed due to technical obstacles. Therefore, it was agreed that the RF Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin would come to Vilnius in the middle of November to sign these documents.

On 18 November, the RF Prime Minister Chernomyrdin arrived in Vilnius on an official visit. He noted that in the course of negotiations mention was also made about military transit from Russia to Kaliningrad through the territory of Lithuania. He stated that it was decided that agreements for regulating all the issues related to military transit would be signed as soon as the first quarter of 1994. Ten agreements were signed on the same day, the most important of which was the agreement signed by the Lithuanian and Russian Prime Ministers Adolfas Šleževičius and Victor Chernomyrdin on economic relations which granted Lithuania the most-favoured-nation status in trade and ensured tax free transit of goods through the territories of the countries concerned.

It should be noted that another equally important agreement was signed to regulate transit transportation of Russian armed forces and military cargoes withdrawn from Germany through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as

\(^{18}\) Stankevičius, (reference 17), p. 72 – 73.
an agreement providing for relevant tariffs and payments. This agreement established the procedure for the movement of the Russian Army through the territory of Lithuania which was expected to become effective from 18 November 1993, but be valid not longer than until 31 December 1994.

This constituted the famous November 1993 “Agreement Package” which has since been regulating a whole range of areas of the Lithuanian-Russian relationship. Nevertheless, the implementation of the agreements was far from easy. The rules regulating the passage of the Russian Army through the territory of Lithuania came into effect immediately, though the ratification of the agreement on the most-favoured-nation status in trade, which was important for Lithuania, continued to be delayed, in fact all through 1994. As the agreement between Lithuania and Russia on the passage of the Russian Army through the territory of Lithuania was effective only until 31 December 1994, all through the year of 1994, Russia was actually pressing Lithuania to sign a special transit agreement granting Russia special rights to freely execute military transit to/from KO through the territory of Lithuania by rail, air and road transport.

In late 1993 and early 1994, Russia submitted to Lithuania several draft agreements on military transit. Upon having analysed those draft agreements and “having assessed the possible consequences of the military transit”, the Lithuanian working group for talks with the CIS states, as early as in March 1994 decided that “no bilateral or multilateral agreements on military transit should be signed with individual countries” and proposed to prepare uniform rules on the transportation of military and hazardous cargoes through the territory of Lithuania approved by the Government and valid for all countries19.

Moreover, it should be noted that in late 1993 and early 1994, there occurred important changes in the Lithuanian internal and foreign policy. On 23 December 1993, under the pressure from the opposition, the Seimas of Lithuania adopted a resolution which recommended the Government to submit an official request for Lithuania to be accepted to NATO and prepare the foreign policy conception of the country20. On 4 January 1994, the President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner with a formal request for membership in NATO.

An interesting fact is that on the same day – 4 January – the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Vilnius prepared a note to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a request to explain “the order for the issue of permits for military transit transportation from Latvia and Estonia to/from Kaliningrad Oblast”, as from 1 December 1993 Lithuanian authorities were allegedly not dealing with those issues. On 6 January already the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow received a note prepared (on 5 January) by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that “transit transportation of military units through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania to Kaliningrad Oblast and back have recently become complicated.” Pending the conclusion of an agreement on military transit, Moscow requested Vilnius not to hinder the transportation of military units21.

19 Pastabos apie karinį transita [Comments on the Military Transit]. LMFA archives.
21 See LMFA Archives. Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered to those Russian notes only on 14 March. It was stated in the note of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the Russian Federation that transportation of military cargoes was regulated by the November 1993 agreements.
On 19-20 February 1994, an incident occurred on the border of Lithuania. Without due permission to do so, Russia sent a train with military cargoes. The train was detained by Lithuanian officials. As early as 28 February, the head of the Lithuanian negotiating team Ambassador Virgilijus Bulavas informed that Lithuania was going to prepare its own regulations on military transit while in the interim the procedure which was previously valid in respect of the Russian Army withdrawn from Germany was to be applied\textsuperscript{22}.

On 9 March 1994, pending the approval of the regulations on transporting dangerous and military cargo, the Lithuanian Government adopted a decision pursuant to which, such transit transportation was in the interim to be regulated by the 18 November 1993 agreement and protocol on Russian military transit transportation from Germany via Lithuania. The Russian side found such position unacceptable.

Instead of agreeing with the general regulations on transporting dangerous and military cargo proposed by Lithuania, Russia continued demanding a special political agreement tailor-made for Russian military transit to Kaliningrad. Thus in June 1994, at a meeting of the working groups, the head of the Russian delegation tried to convince the head of the Lithuanian working group for talks with the CIS states that Lithuania had to abandon the attitude based on emotions, use propaganda to convince the society, and sign a “political document” with Russia. The Russian side argued that on this occasion Russia could not decide the issue in the same way as it dealt with the withdrawal of the Army, i.e. without an agreement\textsuperscript{23}.

The requirement of Russia to sign a political agreement was met with a particularly strong resistance on the part of the political opposition in Lithuania. The opposition believed that by signing a political agreement with Russia on military transit, Lithuania would automatically be included into the Russian military-political sphere of influence and find itself under certain political commitments in respect of Russia, while the Lithuanian freedom of manoeuvre on international scale would be considerably more restricted and far more dependent on Russia than before. Under the pressure of the right parties, the Lithuanian Government also decided to give up political agreement and just limit itself to adopting unilateral technical transit regulations. Seeing the lack of support to its proposal on the Lithuanian side, Russia in its turn started finding fault with the technical regulations proposed by Lithuania.

Thus no definite agreements were reached in the first half of 1994. In pursuit of its own goals, Russia continued postponing the ratification of the economic agreement signed on 18 November 1993, and started issuing threats that it would limit gas and oil supply and apply other measures of economic pressure. The doubling of taxes on import to Russia could be attributed to the latter. The Lithuanian Prime Minister Śleževičius characterised such economic policy of Russia as aggressive and hinted about a possibility of limiting electric power supply to KO. Double taxation applicable to the export of Lithuanian goods to Russia was disadvantageous not only for Lithuania but likewise to Russia itself. On 19 August, the Moscow Mayor Jurij Luz-

\textsuperscript{22} Stankevičius, (reference 17), p. 73.

\textsuperscript{23} At the same meeting the regulations on military transit prepared by Vilnius were presented to the Russian delegation. The Russian officials in essence approved them though concurrently put forward several requests of their own: passage of 2–3 trains a year with army conscripts through the territory of Lithuania; military transit by road; no customs control for military transport.
hkov visited Vilnius and promised to encourage the Russian Government to renew relations with Lithuania. The Mayor expressed his concern about the notable decrease in the exports of relatively cheap Lithuanian goods to Moscow brought about by double taxation. The same was reiterated by Vladimir Shumeiko, the Chairman of the RF Federation Council who visited Vilnius on an official two-day visit on 5 September. He acknowledged Russia’s delay in granting Lithuania the most-favoured-nation status in trade. He maintained that the document would have to come into effect before the agreements on visa-free travel and military transit were signed.

In the summer of 1994, Vilnius prepared the final version of the regulations on military transit and sent it to be evaluated by foreign experts who concluded that Lithuania’s position in unilaterally establishing regulations on the military transit could be justified by the fact that it was requesting no military transit through the territory of the Russian Federation. On 16 September, a meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian delegations which was also attended by the President of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas was held in Vilnius. The head of the Russian delegation, the Deputy Foreign Minister S. Krylov noted that Moscow was awaiting the draft agreement prepared by Lithuania and would welcome an expedited completion of the work. The President expressed a similar attitude by stating that the agreement on military transit was expected to be prepared without delays and lengthy discussions.

On 29 September 1994, the Lithuanian Prime Minister Šleževičius announced that the regulations on transit transportation of dangerous and military cargo through the territory of Lithuania were prepared by the Government. On 3 October, these regulations were approved by the Government Resolution No. 938. The discussion process of the issues of military transit was accompanied by constant reproaches of the opposition to the Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party (LLDP) concerning a possible loss of independence and the “ambiguous” position in respect of Moscow. The opposition maintained that the ambiguity of the Government’s political position on this issue and the confidentiality of negotiations, where vital decisions for Lithuania were taken just by a narrow circle of persons, presented a great danger.

“Still the question remains”, spoke the leader of the opposition Vytautas Landsbergis in the conference held by the Conservative party on the issues of transit on 12 November 1994, “how far have the leaders of Lithuania gone with their obscure promises and commitments”.

It was most probably late in the autumn of 1994, that Lithuania’s position in negotiations finally took shape, the essence of which could be described as follows: military transit should not be stopped, negotiations should continue, however, entering into any binding agreements with Russia should be avoided, and the regulation of transit should be submitted to the rules established by Lithuania on sovereign grounds. Such attitude of Lithuania was also supported by the US Deputy Secretary of State Lynn E. Devis who visited Vilnius on 26 October 1994. During her visit she

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24 See, LFMA archives.
stated, “I believe that whatever is the decision, it would not prevent Lithuania from becoming a full member of European political and military organisations, nevertheless the issue ought to be resolved in such a way that it would not impair the sovereignty of your country [Lithuania]”.27

It is, however, necessary to note that the attitude of other Western countries towards the Russian military transit via Lithuania was different from the American position. Thus, on 21 December 1994, the German Embassy to Lithuania promulgated a statement on behalf of the European Union states where the official Vilnius was invited to conclude an agreement with Russia28.

The following day after L.Davis’s statement, Šleževičius announced that the regulations adopted by Lithuania were to come into effect on 1 January 1995, and “they were not subject to negotiation with any foreign state”29. On 28 October, this position was reiterated by Algirdas Brazauskas.

Nevertheless, Russia continued to press Lithuania into signing an agreement on military transit, and refused to acknowledge the regulations established by Lithuania on 3 October. On 11 November, the Russian negotiation delegation headed by Isakov visited Lithuania. Nevertheless no agreement was reached at that time either. On 17 November, Šleževičius repeatedly announced that the unilateral regulations on transit established by the Government of Lithuania were to come into effect on 1 January 199530.

The next round of negotiations was held in Moscow in late December 1994. The Lithuanian negotiating group was headed by Albinas Januška, the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the head of the Russian negotiators was S. Krylov, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. It looked like no agreement would be reached that time either. The Russian side based their arguments on the fact that military transit from Germany was over, and demanded a new agreement to guarantee that the order of transit would be changed only by means of bilateral negotiations. The Lithuanian delegation refused to accept such a position. Vilnius offered an outcome from the impasse by suggesting a return to the idea of the exchange of notes. Thus it would enable to continue applying the old transit procedure established by the agreements of November 1993, which meant postponing the enforcement of the October 1994 regulations, concurrently rendering unnecessary any formal bilateral agreement.31 After this suggestion, the Russian delegation asked for an adjournment of the negotiation.

Finally, in the aftermath of the negotiations of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys held in Moscow on 18 January 1995, it was announced that the Lithuanian Government extended for the benefit of Russia the period of validity of the military transit rules established on 18 November 1993 by the agreement between the Governments of both countries on the transit of Russian Army and military cargoes withdrawn from Germany via Lithuania. According to Gylys, those rules were expected to be effective until the end of 1995, subject to prolongation.

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27 Stankevičius, (reference 17), p. 75.
28 Ten pat, p. 77.
29 Ten pat, p. 76.
31 LMFA archives.
Lithuanian Foreign Minister maintained that it was a victory for both sides. He insisted that differences between the regulations in force from January 1995 and those adopted by the Government in the autumn of 1994 were only of technical character. The new regulations were expected to be more specific and provide for the possibility of transit by air. Flights over the territory of Lithuania were allowed exceptionally upon special permits. In explanation why the new transit regulations did not come into effect on 1 January, P. Gylys stated. "It was not a categorical attitude of Lithuania, just a negotiating position."

In response to the concession made by the Government of Lithuania in extending the validity of the so-called “German” regulations, Russia finally allowed the implementation of the most-favoured-nation regime in trade with Lithuania. On 18 January 1995, the Lithuanian Ambassador to Russia R. Kozyrovicius received two notes of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of them informed about the coming into force of the agreement on trade and economic relations signed on 18 November 1993, effective on the date of the presentation of the note concerned. By its other note, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified about Russia’s consent to the proposal of the Lithuanian Government to further apply the existing procedure of transporting dangerous and military cargoes through Lithuania. Practically since the beginning of 1996, Russia’s military transit has been conducted by regulations which were approved by the Lithuanian Government; for every transportation of military cargo and military staff Russia must ask for permission in advance.

The agreement established in the notes of 1995 could be estimated in two ways. This agreement could be treated as a compromise. This kind of assessment could be supported by the fact that Vilnius did not manage to make Moscow accept the regulations on military transit adopted by Lithuania, while Moscow was not able to make Vilnius sign a political treaty on military transit. At the same time, the exchange of notes could be regarded as a victory of the Lithuanian diplomacy. It is worth to stress that notes were based on the agreement of 18 November 1993, which fixed military transit of the Russian Federation from Germany and did not legitimize the military transit through the territory of Lithuania to/from KO. This means that with the completion of the “German” transit, Moscow had no legal ground to claim that the Russian military transit via Lithuania was legitimised permanently. Thus it is necessary to note that the agreement of November 1993 conditioned temporariness, as it referred to the transit of Russian troops withdrawn from Germany. It is important to emphasize that there is no legal treaty between Lithuania and Russia to legitimize the Russian military transit to/from KO via territory of Lithuania. After all, the entire practice of the Russian military transit via Lithuania testifies that Moscow approved of Lithuania’s unilateral decision to temporarily permit military transit. (Moscow did not object to the changes Vilnius made in the regulations of military transit which were related to the process of the Euro-Atlantic integration.)

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33 Stankevičius, (reference 17) p. 78.
It is clear that Russia was seeking to formalise the military transit by a political treaty thus actually retaining Lithuania in its sphere of influence. Moscow tried to realise this endeavor by relating it primarily with economic issues and procuring a sufficiently strong support in Lithuania itself. Taking into consideration President Putin’s foreign policy course towards the cooperation with the West (and especially the US) it is hardly probable that Russia will make an attempt to direct any hard pressure upon Lithuania on the military transit issue. Of course this doesn’t mean that the Kremlin abandoned its strategy to legitimize military transit by a political treaty. It is worth to stress that Moscow holds chances to raise the question of military transit in the context of the EU and NATO enlargement. On 17 January 2001, the European Commission stated that the current military transit was regulated by special agreements between Lithuania and Russia and underlined the necessity to review those agreements within the context of the enlargement, having in mind the Lithuanian commitments within the framework of the implementation of the EU directives on the transportation of hazardous cargo. (The EU does not introduce any definite requirements, and the issue of military transit is not included in the negotiations chapters35.) So there exists a possibility that the West would recommend to Lithuania to arrange the legal side of military transit of the Russian Federation through its territory. In such context Moscow could again raise the idea of a political treaty with Lithuania.

4. Kaliningrad issue in the context of the EU enlargement

Contrary to NATO, the EU enlargement eastwards, according to the official position of Moscow, poses no threat to the national interests of Russia. In fact, most of researchers acknowledge that in Russia, the positive or “positively neutral” image of the EU and its enlargement is essentially based on the belief that a united and strong Europe is capable of forming one of the world pillars for creating a balance against hegemonic ambitions of the US, as well as on the conviction that the EU is a civilian-economic block of wealthy and liberal European states (military-political factors are still, by inertia, dominating the spectrum of threats to the Russian statehood). However with the EU accession negotiations of the Baltic States and Poland gathering momentum, attention of the international community was shifted towards the issue of Kaliningrad Oblast as a potential Russian exclave surrounded by the EU member states.

The EU enlargement is inevitably related with side effects on third countries, including Russia and KO as its integral part. In the light of the future membership of Poland and the Baltic States (prominently Lithuania) in the EU, the threat of Kaliningrad’s socio-economic lagging behind the neighbouring states becomes especially relevant. Two scenarios for the development of the Oblast are usually mentioned as the most likely36: KO may become a “double periphery” (both in regard to the EU and the Russian Federation) – with Poland and the Baltic States enjoying the benefits from the elimination of restrictions on internal trade and the freedom of movement, KO would find itself isolated from its neighbours, as Common Market countries, and

35 Laurinavičius etc., (reference 34), p. 68.
subsequently from Economic and Monetary Union and Schengen Treaty members. However, if Russia and the EU will manage to cooperate effectively in order to minimise possible negative effects of the EU enlargement to KO, the Oblast might even turn into a bridge between the EU and Russia.

An underlying prerequisite for the realisation of the optimistic scenario is active and constructive cooperation of the EU-Russia both in minimising possible negative effects of the EU enlargement to KO (with the help of various technical mechanisms) and comprehensively supporting economic development of KO (thus helping to use positive opportunities created by the EU enlargement). And this inevitably requires a certain degree of flexibility from both sides as well as firm resolution to change the existing practice\textsuperscript{37}.

Anyway, Kaliningrad’s extraterritoriality as well as the position at the crossroads of Russia and the EU forces Moscow and Brussels to search for a common solution of the problem (hereby stimulating the development of a closer relationship). At the Russian Federation-European Union Summit in October 1999, both parties underlined that KO is potentially capable of turning into a model of successful cooperation between Russia and the EU to be emulated by other Russian regions. In other words, KO could become a “pilot region”, and the success of its realisation would determine further evolution of the EU-Russia relations to a large extent.

However, even researchers cannot come to an agreement regarding the position, importance and at the same time ‘mission’ of KO in the relationship between Moscow and Brussels. Following one position, a geographical location of KO in the context of the EU enlargement has a potential to contravene the routine practice and procedures and by itself represents a unique opportunity (a historical chance) to unify Europe de facto. In solving the Kaliningrad problem, a new practice is being developed, when Russia is converted from the object of the EU policy into a partner involved in the designing of the European architecture\textsuperscript{38}. Therefore, there are growing expectations that this will eventually result in the implementation of the vision raised just at the end of the Cold War that the EU (former EC), as a civil power, unifying wealthy liberal European states, is able to undertake a leading position in the changing European environment, in which military powers are not relevant anymore\textsuperscript{39}. More than that, the project of the integration of Western Europe itself was launched from an attempt to address safety problems by means of economic integration. Having in mind that the relationship with Europe bears strong symbolic implications for Russia, sharing of the responsibility for KO with Brussels would encourage a settlement of the discussion of the attachment of Russia to Europe in a positive way, and at the same time that would facilitate answering questions related to Russian identity, value system, selection of a vector for economic and political development\textsuperscript{40}.

\textsuperscript{40}Лещуков И. «Россия и Европейский Союз: стратегии взаимоотношений», см. Тренин Д., ред., Россия и основные институты безопасности в Европе: вступая в ХХI век, Москва, 2000, с. 26.
On the other hand, one may notice ‘competition’ between the entire Russian North-West region (particularly Pskov, Leningrad area, already bordering on the EU) and KO for a status of a pilot region⁴¹. Having in mind strict conditionality of the financial support of the USA as well as disagreements of Moscow with Washington because of the predominance of the latter in the international policy, Moscow naturally seeks for closer cooperation with the EU as well as its member states. The attractiveness of the partnership with Western Europe is determined, inter alia, by already existing commercial Russia’s dependency and the need for investments. Meanwhile, the attention paid (by both Brussels and Moscow) to KO within this context is far from being primary - first of all because of the peripheral importance, both in geographical and economic terms (and at the same time because of the peripheral position held in the range of priority interests). Thus, in the opinion of ‘sceptics’, the success of the realisation of a pilot region in KO will not make a decisive impact on the relations between Russia and the EU, therefore, these states do not feel committed to break the routine practice and the established mechanisms for the good of the development of KO. Respectively, the probability is rather negligible that ‘the Kaliningrad issue’ will result in a positive outcome and the region itself will become a laboratory for cooperation between the EU and the RF, which will establish new quality of relationship between Brussels and Moscow and overcome the division of Europe into the West and the East.

There is a clear link between the importance of the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue for the interests of the key actors and the realisation of the successful development scenario of the Oblast in the expanding Europe. If the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue fails to become a significant interest/value of priority importance, it is hardly possible that the Oblast will manage to escape the crisis – turning into a “double periphery”, separated from the neighbouring regions by socio-economic backwardness.

5. Raising of the Kaliningrad issue on the agenda of Russia and the EU

Lithuania started to raise the Kaliningrad issue in the context of the EU enlargement in various discussions and seminars quite a long time before the opening of the EU accession negotiations. During the last decade, KO underwent transformation in the foreign policy of Lithuania: from the main threat to security into an advantage – an opportunity to play an independent role of the leader in the south-east of the Baltic Sea region, truly contributing to promotion of stability in the area.⁴² Lithuania’s active and positive policy towards KO became one of the fundamental elements in the relations between Lithuania and Russia. At the beginning of 2000, on Lithuania’s initiative, an agreement was concluded with Russia on several projects of regional cooperation within the framework of the Nordic Dimension (in the areas of gas supply, transport, environment). During the last decade, the active policy of Poland and especially of Lithuania, directed at retaining close cooperation with KO and

preventing its isolation, became an integral part of the foreign policy, aimed at ensuring security and stability in the region\(^{3}\) (in the foreign policy of Poland and in the Warsaw-Moscow relations, KO takes an important but not an outstanding place\(^{4}\): the efforts of Poland, as a “stability exporter” are primarily directed towards the Ukraine, and to some extent to Belarus\(^{5}\).

The attitude of Russia towards KO, as its eventual enclave in the territory of the EU, mostly held a responsive character in the initial stage of 1998-1999: in 1998, Russia had nothing against KO being involved in the Northern Dimension Initiative. In 1999, Russia (together with Lithuania) even put forward a suggestion to discuss the issue of KO at the meeting of European foreign ministers on the Northern Dimension\(^{6}\).

The break-through came in October 1999, when in Helsinki summit, the Russian delegation, headed by the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation V. Putin, presented the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union and its Position on the Northern Dimension. The Russian position on the Northern Dimension in principle expressed approval of the Initiative and even called for a closer cooperation than the EU was ready to offer\(^{7}\). Russia expressed a request for the application of the conditions for regional cooperation (including the experience of Euroregions), valid on the Russian-Finnish border, in respect to regions bordering with Poland and the Baltic States as well (even before their EU membership). The countries participating in the Northern Dimension Initiative were requested to soften the Schengen regime towards Russia.

The focus of the medium-term EU-Russian Relationship Development Strategy was put on ensuring Russian interests within the expanding EU, including Kaliningrad’s interests: “within the framework of the contacts with the EU, to concentrate on guaranteeing the interests of Kaliningrad Oblast, as an entity and integral part of the Russian Federation, and an active participant in the regional cooperation process, by creating the necessary external conditions for the functioning and development of the Oblast”\(^{8}\). In the sphere of trade, Russia even expressed its interest in concluding a separate agreement to safeguard the interests of KO in the context of the EU enlargement, and to transform it into a pilot region.

The turning point in the EU political attitude towards KO was the Enlargement Strategy Paper published alongside the Regular Reports on the progress of the candidate countries, which stated that KO would experience a particular impact of the EU enlargement by turning into a Russian enclave within the EU. The document also provided for the development – in cooperation with Russia, Poland and Lithuania

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nia – of a strategy to ensure better prospects for Kaliningrad’s prosperity within the context of Lithuania and Poland joining the EU.

By then, the EU treated the issue of KO as part of its foreign policy with respect to Russia. Both the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which came into force in 1997, and the 1999 EU Common Strategy on Russia\(^49\) were based on the notion of Russia as a non-differentiable territory. These documents did not recognise the specifics of KO and there was likewise no special policy envisaged in regard to the Oblast, thus ignoring the fact that the development of the region is affected not only by bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the European Union, but also by the processes in Poland and Lithuania related to the preparation for the EU membership and the accession negotiations with the EU.

In the framework of the Northern Dimension (even though it is based on the recognition of the uniqueness and importance of northwestern Russia, including KO, for regional cooperation), KO was regarded as a separate region, but the responsibility for the development of KO was left in the remit of the Oblast itself by indicating that Kaliningrad’s ability to take advantage of the possibilities presented by the EU enlargement will depend upon the quality and speed of the internal adaptation of the Oblast (especially in the sphere of customs and border control, combating organised crime and corruption, structural reforms and public administration).\(^50\) The Northern Dimension Action Plan viewed the problem of KO as the issue of adaptation not negotiation, thus ignoring any possible negative EU enlargement effects on the Oblast or the need of reducing thereof.

Which reasons made the EU to avoid raising the Kaliningrad issue in the context of the enlargement? First of all, this clearly reflects a fully understandable wish of the EU to avoid opening the ‘back door’ in the EU accession negotiations for Russia. Taking into account the existing asymmetry in the relations between Lithuania and Poland on the one side and the European Union on the other, such a tendency restricts capability of both Lithuania and Poland to participate in the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue. However, situation with Russia using ‘Kaliningrad card’ in the EU accession negotiations would be even more unfavourable for the candidate countries. Therefore, though issues of transit between KO and the rest of Russia finally moved to the plane of negotiations between Moscow and Brussels only after Lithuania and Poland had closed justice and home affairs chapter in the accession negotiations, discussions on KO took place within the framework of two separate mechanisms even before that: with candidate countries – on the basis of the Association Agreement, and with Russia – on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Candidate countries took part in resolving issues of transit as future EU member states (thus – partners in negotiations within the EU), but not as a separate party at the EU-Russian negotiating table.


Secondly, the dynamism of the EU in resolving the Kaliningrad issue (despite the pragmatic interest to involve the Oblast into the process of regional integration: the increasing volume of energy imports from Russia forces to consider Kaliningrad’s inclusion into the European infrastructure and transport networks) is significantly restrained by equally cautious position of the EU in its relations with Russia: the EU, recognising the sovereignty of Russia in KO, avoids emphasising the necessity to pursue a policy towards KO different from that applied with respect to Russia as a whole. And the project of pilot region in itself presupposes the need for “special” regional decisions.

6. The EU enlargement as a challenge for Kaliningrad region

The EU enlargement principle, which states that the Union may not expand at the expense of deepening, determines the fundamental condition for the EU membership, requiring candidate countries, even before they become actual members, to fully transpose the EU acquis communautaire, which regulates, inter alia, free movement of goods, people and services within the internal market, as well as between the EU and third countries. Despite several precedents existing in various areas of the current member states, new member states will not be entitled to get permanent derogations or to freely choose desirable policy areas for integration.

Pursuant to Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the provisions of the acquis may not affect the rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded between a member state and any third countries before the membership. On the other hand, member states are obliged to take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities with the acquis. In practice, this is implemented by negotiating for amendments in agreements with third countries or withdrawing from such agreements. Consequently, the agreements, which belong to the exclusive competence of the Communities, are denounced or their administration is transferred to the European Commission (as in case of fisheries’ agreements).

In the specific case of KO, the adoption of the acquis would mean that the present visa and trade regimes, introduced on the basis of bilateral agreements to ensure the link between the Oblast and the remaining part of Russia, and its openness for relationship with the neighbouring states, will be denounced or modified on Lithuania and Poland becoming EU members. Precisely due to its exclaves situation, KO may be affected by the consequences of the EU enlargement to a greater extent than the remaining regions of Russia situated on the border with the expanding EU. In other words, the specifics and importance of the “Kaliningrad issue” in the context of the EU enlargement is determined by two interrelated factors: ex-territorial status of KO and its location on “the crossroads” between Russia and the European Union.

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Maintenance of Kaliningrad’s openness for contacts with the outside world is an important interest of the Baltic Sea region states. However, the application of the acquis may significantly impede the relations not only between KO and the neighbouring states (future EU member states), but with Russia as well. Bearing in mind the unique geographical location and an exceptionally high level of dependence on the import of products, as well as close private contacts with neighbours, guaranteeing the unimpeded movement of persons and goods, including energy supply, between KO and the remaining part of Russia ought to be regarded as the interest of vital importance for KO when Lithuania and Poland become EU member states.

With the Amsterdam Treaty coming into force in 1999, visa policies and border control were transferred to the competence of the Communities, and the Schengen system (providing for the removal of free movement barriers within the Schengen area and a more stringent control of external borders) became a part of the EU acquis. Due to this reason, even though the Schengen membership is conditioned by the requirement of conformity with additional criteria and subsequent conclusion of a separate agreement, the major part of the Schengen acquis is already mandatory for candidate countries. Russia is included into List I of the Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, which means that its citizens require visas to cross the EU border. The Regulation provides for the visa requirement for both entry for an intended stay in a member state or in several member states and entry for transit through the territory of a member state or several member states, except for transit at an airport. Therefore, Lithuania and Poland, as the EU candidate countries, have to cancel the visa-free regime for the citizens of the Russian Federation, including the inhabitants of KO. Implementing the negotiation commitments under the chapter of Justice and Home Affairs, on 1 October 2002, Lithuania’s Government decided to denounced the Provisional agreement between Lithuania and Russia on the travel of both countries’ citizens (thus cancelling the existing visa-free transit regime for train passengers). From 1 January 2003 (when this resolution comes into force) to 1 July 2003, citizens of Russia, permanently residing in KO, will be allowed to cross Lithuania’s border, travel by transit through its territory and to stay on the territory of Lithuania for 30 days without visas. Poland will denounce currently existing privileges for Russian citizens from 1 July 2003.

While becoming the EU member states, Lithuania and Poland will have to join the EU Common Trade policy. This means mandatory adoption of customs

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56 Сморохинская Н. В., «О преобразовании Калининградской области в пилотный российский регион в рамках сотрудничества России и ЕС в 21 веке». Предпроектное исследование для Института Восток–Запад, Программа трансграничного сотрудничества в России, 2001, с. 7.


tariffs, trade protection instruments and agreements with third countries. Trade relations between Russia and the EU are regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1994. From the day of their membership in the EU, Lithuania and Poland will have to accept this Agreement as an integral part of the acquis, and will have to apply with respect to Russia a higher common external tariff than is currently applied in Lithuania. In addition, having in mind low competitiveness of Kaliningrad–produced goods, the advance of proximity of the EU market towards KO will in itself not only fail to improve the situation in the Oblast but is even likely to make it worse: the Russian export (including that from KO) will be negatively affected by non-tariff barriers of the EU technical norms and standards.

The fact of Lithuania and Poland joining the Community Customs Code and the common transit system is not expected to affect the existing bilateral agreements with Russia, as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provides for transit through the EU territory exempt from customs or any other transit duties (except for transportation and administration charges). On the other hand, it is feared that, due to the currently existing problem of the low capacity of border crossing points\(^\text{59}\) as well as the inability of Russia to finance the development of its part of transport corridors\(^\text{60}\), transit flows are quite likely to by-pass KO.

Another problem is the supply of KO with electric energy. At present, about 90 per cent of the electric energy consumed in KO is supplied by transit through Lithuania. With Lithuania seeking to join, via Poland, the Central Europe electric energy grid, which, in its turn is connected to the main European power grid, there emerges the problem of electric energy supply to KO. Possible technical solutions include the development of capacities for autonomous electric energy production; preservation of the connection to the Russian power grid; or joining the Central European power grid.

Apart from these problem areas, which are the main issue of the current EU-RF negotiations, in the context of the EU enlargement, the augmenting threat of Kaliningrad’s socio-economic backwardness in comparison with its neighbouring states drawing benefit from the EU membership is becoming increasingly evident. This threat is indirectly related to the EU membership requirements; therefore, it is not subject to elimination by technical or procedural agreements. The tightening of customs procedures and border control may undermine the shadow economy, which is estimated as accounting for over 60 per cent of the region’s gross domestic product, and will inevitably reduce the citizens’ income\(^\text{61}\). The situation is complicated by the fact that KO fails to exhibit any relative advantages which are necessary for socio-economic adaptation to new conditions (being encircled by Europe), while Russia does not have the necessary resources for the economic modernisation of the region\(^\text{62}\).

\(^\text{59}\) Хлопцинский А., Федоров Г., «Калининградская область: регион сотрудничества», Калининград, 2000, с. 204–205.


\(^\text{62}\) Ibidem, с. 6–10.
7. Meeting the challenge: positions of main regional actors

7.1. Negotiations on the visa regime

Currently, the negotiations between Moscow and Brussels are mainly focused on the issue of cancelling the visa regime for KO residents and especially for Russian citizens, travelling to/from KO by transit.

In October 2000, Russia submitted to the European Union a Letter of Concern on the impact of the EU enlargement on KO. In the letter, Russia emphasised the vital necessity of ensuring free movement of persons, goods and services between KO and the rest of Russia by air, land and sea through the territories of the “neighbouring EU states”. According to the Russian position, the visa-free regime must be retained for the movement of KO inhabitants to Lithuania, Poland (or Northern Poland), Latvia (and possibly also to the territories of other “neighbouring EU states”).

Following the recommendations of the EU Enlargement Strategy Paper and in response to the Russian Letter of Concern on the possible direct effects of the EU enlargement, on 17 January 2001, the European Commission approved the Communication “the EU and Kaliningrad”44. In this document, the Commission for the first time recognised that, due to the exceptional geographical location of KO, it may experience greater effects of the EU enlargement than other Russian regions or other third countries. Nevertheless, the Commission stated that no exemptions of the acquis might be applicable to KO. The same visa and border control regime will be applied in respect of KO as that applicable to Russia as a whole. The Commission emphasised that introduction of visa regime in itself should not impede the movement of people between KO and the rest of Russia, as well as the EU candidate countries. The Commission suggested that the problems related to the movement of persons were resolved by means of technical measures provided for in the acquis and belonging to the national competence of member states: by issuing long-term multiple visas, determining low prices thereof, by establishing new consular representations, improving the capacity of border-crossing points. A certain flexibility was indicated only in regard to small border traffic – the European Commission pointed out the preparedness of the EU to develop acquis regulating this area. The European Commission also committed itself, while taking into account the unique geographic position of KO, to explore a possible impact of the current transit acquis on the region and possibilities to use special mechanisms provided for in the acquis.

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45 “Kaliningrad citizens should get free Schengen–visa for Poland, Lithuania and Latvia”, Uniting Europe 136, 19 03 2001, p. 7.
restricted transit between KO and the remaining territory of Russia (principle measures proposed by Russia were the visa-free transit regime for Russian nationals, non-residents of KO, travelling by trains, buses or private cars through the territory of Lithuania, Poland and Latvia along the previously agreed routes). Changing its previous position on the visa-free regime for Kaliningrad residents, Russia asked that Schengen visas be issued free of charge for Kaliningrad inhabitants for the duration of one year to enter the territories of Lithuania, Poland and Latvia.

On 19 March 2001, the Russian Foreign Minister I. Ivanov submitted to the European Commission the “Comprehensive Analysis of the Communication” as Russia’s official reaction to the EU proposals on Kaliningrad66. In this new document, Russia reiterates the suggestions of 6 March concerning the visa regime and underlines Moscow’s concern over the border crossing regime not only for the inhabitants of KO, but likewise in respect of other Russian citizens in their movement to and from KO, because KO, as an integral part of the Russian Federation, cannot be separated. In April 2002, Russia presented the European Commission a document analysing modalities of the practical implementation of the idea of “corridors”, through which, free movement of goods and persons between KO and the rest of Russia would be ensured.

In other words, Russia seems to have easily abandoned its request for the provision of visa-free travels for Kaliningrad inhabitants to Lithuania and Poland: the priority of Moscow has clearly shifted from the emphasis on avoiding the isolation of the Oblast from the neighbouring countries to preventing Kaliningrad’s isolation from the rest of Russia. The EU and candidate countries’ response to the Russian demands was clear: no visa-free corridors; no ‘grey zones’ between Russia and the area of the Schengen treaty in the future; the implementation of the acquis in the area of movement of persons (introduction of the visa regime for Russian citizens) is an integral part of requirement for candidate countries, preparing for the membership in the EU; in order to address the Russian concerns, it is necessary to increase capacities of border-crossing posts and to make full use of the visa regime flexibilities, provided for in the acquis. On 13 May 2002, General Affairs Council adopted a common line, on the basis of which, citizens of the countries included into List I of the Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001, must be in possession of visas attached to valid travel documents, when crossing the external border of the EU member state (this requirement applies for transit as well)67. However, before becoming members of the Schengen treaty, Lithuania and Poland will issue national visas to third country nationals, and will be able to make use of flexibilities allowed by the acquis, including multiple entry visas, free visas or low visa fees for certain categories of travellers, as well as exemptions from the visa requirement, for example, for the holders of diplomatic passports.

After Lithuania and Poland closed the chapter on Justice and Home Affairs in the EU accession negotiations, and the deadline for implementation of commitments with regard to the introduction of the visa regime for all citizens of the Russian Federation made in the course of negotiations was approaching, several EU member

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66 “Russia’s official reaction to EU proposals on Kaliningrad”, Uniting Europe 138, 02 04 2001, p. 6–7.
states started demonstrating support for higher flexibility than provided for in the common line, and as the EU-Russia summit failed to reach any progress, in summer 2002, Moscow strengthened its pressure on both the existing and future EU member states. A threat to boycott the EU-Russia summit meeting to be held in November 2002, if no solution to the problem is found by that time, promises to restrict transit through Lithuania and denounce the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, links with the ratification of the state border treaty, speculations in relation to the ‘illegal’ attachment of Klaipeda region to Lithuania – these are just a few manifestations of the pressure. In August 2002, the EU member states got a letter from the President of Russia V. Putin, proposing to start discussions on a reciprocal visa-free travel regime for Russian and EU citizens. Until such a regime comes into force, Russia proposed a transitional period to maintain and adjust simplified arrangements for railway and automobile transit of Russian citizens from KO and back through Lithuania as a future member state’s territory. The issue of securing free communications between Russia and KO will determine not only conditions of vital activities of KO as an integral part of Russia, but to a considerable extent a further vector for Russia’s relations with the enlarging EU. Therefore, V. Putin proposed to sign a Memorandum of Intentions at the November Russia-EU summit in Copenhagen, which would solve the issue in a mutually acceptable way.

At the beginning of September 2002, D.Rogozin presented Russian proposals for the Memorandum of Intentions described by Russian diplomats as “a maximum effort of flexibility and willingness to compromise”. In the proposed Memorandum of Intentions, Russia finally withdrew its request for the visa-free transit through the territory of Poland and the visa-free transit by car through the territory of Lithuania. However, as regards Lithuania, the EU was invited to establish a simplified procedure for the movement of Russian citizens to and from KO by railway and bus. Following the document, the EU and Russia should increase their cooperation in facilitating the movement of people and goods to and from KO, in particular through providing the EU financial and technical assistance to Russia in equipping border-crossing points, making air and ferry transportation between KO and the rest of Russia less expensive.

On 18 September 2002, in response to this Russian initiative, the European Commission’s Communication “Kaliningrad: transit” was announced, in which the European Commission proposed a free-step strategy in solving the problem of visa-free movement between KO and the rest of Russia.

At the initial stage, after the abolition of currently valid advantages for Russian citizens travelling between KO and the rest of Russia by railways and trains, ‘facilitated transit documents’ (essentially equivalent to multiple-entry transit visas) would be issued by consular authorities of the EU or candidate countries. Lists of Russian citizens who frequently travel between KO and the rest of Russia (and would be eligible for this procedure) would in advance be provided by Russian authorities; however, transit countries would retain the right to disqualify persons applying for the facilitated travel documents.

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The EU will be ready to further examine the Russian proposal on the visa-free transit by non-stop trains only at the second stage, i.e. after the accession of Lithuania. Once the technical obstacles have been overcome, any decision on this option could only be taken by the enlarged EU on the basis of a thorough evaluation. Adoption of a positive decision would not imply that Russia would obtain extraterritorial rights analogous to the ‘corridor’ concept. Lithuanian authorities must retain the right to refuse entry and carry out controls during transit. The EU would need to provide legally binding guarantees to Lithuania that the acceptance of any of the above proposals would in no way present an obstacle for Lithuania to join the Schengen Treaty as well as to lift internal EU border controls.

In response to the Russian proposal to start discussions on the visa-free travel regime between Russia and the EU, the European Commission suggested the eventual establishment of the visa-free travel regime at the third stage (by linking such an option with progress in cooperation in the areas of fighting against illegal migration and crime).

On 30 September 2002, the EU foreign ministers in principle agreed to the European Commission’s proposals, which were evaluated as providing adequate basis for further discussions with Russia. However, taking into account the claim of France, Italy and Spain to start a feasibility study with regard to visa free non-stop trains immediately, the EU Common Affairs Council obligated the European Commission to discuss a possibility to prepare such a study even before the enlargement with Lithuanian authorities. Besides, foreign ministers made a reference to the possible amendments to the Schengen acquis taking into account the unique situation of KO. However, the foreign ministers underlined the need to set political and legal guarantees to Lithuania that any development of the Schengen acquis would not delay or prevent full participation of Lithuania in the Schengen regime, including the lifting of internal border controls.

Lithuania’s position with regard to the Commission’s Communication was based on emphasising the need for political, legal and financial guarantees and calling for horizontal application of measures proposed by the EU (i.e., all measures should be applied by all member states, not only by Lithuania). Feasibility studies of the non-stop train idea might be prepared only after Lithuania’s accession to the EU. The initial Moscow’s reaction to the proposals of the EU was emphatic: introduction of the visa regime is not acceptable for Russia in any form (in the form of neither electronic ID cards nor facilitated transit documents), while the only reasonable concessions from the side of Russia would be a conclusion of readmission treaties and strengthening of Russia’s southern border controls. However, at a later stage, Moscow softened its position, by recognising the facilitated transit document as an interim solution of the problem.

The Brussels European Council of 25 October 2002, stressing the need to respect the sovereign right of any state to safeguard the security of its citizens by controlling its borders and the movement of people and goods into, on and through its territory, but also acknowledging the unique situation of KO, approved the

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71 BNS, Rusijos ir ES viršūnių susitikime gali būti priimtas taipinis sprendimas del Kaliningrado, mano Rogozinas, 12 October 2002.
solution of 22 October proposed by the General Affairs Council. The foreign ministers proposed that from 1 January 2003, Lithuania should implement national regulations for border control in a flexible manner (in compliance with the common line of 13 May 2002). The facilitated transit document should be available as of 1 July 2003 for all forms of direct transit. After an agreement with Lithuania on terms of reference of the feasibility study on non-stop trains is found, the EU and Lithuania will make a decision to launch a feasibility study in 2003. Russia was recommended to conclude readmission agreements with candidate countries as soon as possible. The EU decided that the issue of the establishment of the visa-free regime between Russia and the EU should remain “separate from the discussions on Kaliningrad, and will be considered as a long-term issue”. The EU confirmed its intention to include in the Accession Treaty with Lithuania binding guarantees that: 1) the EU will provide assistance to Lithuania for additional costs of the implementation of any Kaliningrad-related measures, 2) a decision on the non-stop trains option will be taken only after Lithuania’s accession to the EU. Besides, the EU committed itself to assist Lithuania in fulfilling the conditions for full participation in the Schengen regime in order to secure that Lithuania will be among the first group of candidate countries to participate fully in Schengen. Any development of the Schengen acquis to take account of the specific situation of KO would not, in itself, delay or prevent full participation of Lithuania in the Schengen regime, including the lifting of internal border controls.

While summarising the course of the negotiations between Brussels and Moscow with regard to transit, the following trends become apparent: first, Moscow demands may be characterised as unilateral and one-legged. Despite overstated statements, the Kremlin failed to make any essential concessions. Abandonment of the initial request for the visa-free transit regime for all Russian citizens travelling through the territory of Lithuania by car can hardly be considered as an example of last-ditch efforts to reach a compromise (presently this privilege is valid only for residents of KO; Moscow is not interested in retaining any special privileges for this region). Even more so, in reducing the pressure on Poland (transit of Russian citizens through Poland makes up only a few per cent). Meanwhile, the approach of the European Union demonstrates significant changes.

In the summer, the European Commission categorically rejected the idea of visa-free trains as non-compatible with the acquis. Whereas the new Communication provides for that the EU will be ready to explore technical and legal conditions for the implementation of the non-stop trains idea after Lithuania’s accession to the EU. Besides, the Communication makes a reference to the inclusion into the acquis of the exemption from visa requirement in case of transit at the airports as an important precedent for KO. Taking into account the claim of France, Italy and Spain to start a feasibility study with regard to visa-free non-stop trains immediately, the EU Common Affairs Council obligated the European Commission to discuss with Lithuanian authorities a possibility to prepare such a study even before the enlargement. Besides,

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the foreign ministers made a reference to the possible amendments to the Schengen acquis taking into account the unique situation of KO. In the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 22 October 2002, there is no clear commitment of the EU regarding legally binding guarantees for Lithuania. Apart from the promise to include financial guarantees into the Accession Treaty, there is only the political commitment of the EU member states to assist Lithuania in fulfilling the conditions for full participation in the Schengen regime as well as assurance that any development of the Schengen acquis taking account of the specific situation of KO would not, in itself, influence the date of the full participation of Lithuania in the Schengen regime. However it is evident that implementation of the idea of visa-free trains would imply much more efforts from the side of Lithuania to meet the requirements of the Schengen acquis. In other words, from the legal point of view, the decision with regard to non-stop trains is related to Lithuania’s accession to the EU, rather than membership in the Schengen treaty; the outcome of Lithuania’s request for the principle of horizontality of the Schengen acquis is still unclear as regards simplified transit documents.

The European Commission started mitigating its position, after it lost a unanimous support of the EU member states. Therefore, the Russian diplomacy, from the very beginning undertaken with individual EU member states at a bilateral level, rather than with the abstract Brussels, produced tangible results. The Kaliningrad issue demonstrated once again that the member states tend to ‘nationalise’ issues that require common decisions, after they face the necessity to make a complex choice. Although the flexible position of Southern European states hardly means anything else than an inadequate perception of the problem, a competition with regard to strategic partnership with Moscow, but at the same time an attempt to protect themselves from becoming a peripheral region in the EU enlarged towards the East.

Secondly, it seems that Russia will finally assent to the proposal on facilitated transit documents in return to the continuation of discussions on non-stop trains (before Lithuania’s accession – by preparing a feasibility study, and in 2004, by making the final decision). Lithuania has indicated a possibility to delay the introduction of the visa regime until 1 July 2003 (when facilitated transit documents will come into force), if Russia would sign the Readmission treaty and ratify the Border treaty. For Lithuania, it is essential to delay any discussions on visa-free trains until after 2004 as well as to get definite legal guarantees with regard to the participation in the Schengen treaty (it is evident that the initiative of Lithuania’s participation in the Schengen regime in advance is not realistic).

7.2. Other issues

In the Letter of Concern over the Impact of the EU Enlargement on Kaliningrad Oblast of October 200075, Russia singled out several major problems related to the prospective EU membership of the neighbouring states, including, first of all, the vital necessity of ensuring free movement of goods and services between KO and the rest of Russia by air, land and sea through the territories of “the neighbouring EU

states”. Russia expressed hope that, for the sake of ensuring such transit, the following measures would be introduced: simplification of the customs and border crossing procedures, opening of the Goldap-Grodno route for cargo transport; modernisation of the infrastructure of border-crossing points; as well as reconstruction of Via Hanseatika motorway. In addition, it is necessary to ensure free transit of oil, gas, fuel and electric energy through pipelines which cross the territories of “the neighbouring EU states”. It is equally essential to guarantee tele-communication with KO. The Letter also underlined the “objectively existing” need for financial aid (inter alia, by means of the instruments previously applied exclusively in respect of candidate countries, i.e. PHARE and structural funds) to the region in order to avoid a socio-economic gap between KO and its neighbouring states, as well as compensate negative consequences of the EU eastward enlargement⁷⁶. The outcomes of the EU-Russian dialogue on KO ought to be implemented by a special document, binding on both parties. In the Communication “EU and Kaliningrad” of 17 October 2001⁷⁷, the European Commission made a distinction between issues of the EU enlargement impact on all Russian regions (and all third countries), and specific issues related to the consequences of the future Lithuanian and Polish membership in the EU on KO (first of all in the spheres of movement of goods and persons, and electric energy supply). In addition, the Commission examined possible ways of cooperation between the EU and Russia in resolving issues which are not directly related to the EU enlargement: environmental protection, combat against crime, health care and economic development. According to the Commission, both Russia and the oblast itself are responsible for the future of KO, nevertheless, the EU and its future members are willing to facilitate a smooth introduction of changes conditioned by the membership requirements – first of all by fostering cooperation with KO in resolving a range of regional problems.

In the sphere of free movement of goods, the European Commission underlined the positive effect of the EU enlargement: geographical proximity of the Oblast will create particularly favourable opportunities for the access to the EU (including that of the future members – Lithuania and Poland) market. Nevertheless, it was also emphasised, that in order to derive the maximum benefit from the opening prospects, KO ought to be interested in the adoption of the EU norms and standards. In response to the proposal of the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union regarding the introduction of any special trade regime for KO, the European Commission underlined that KO is an integral part of Russia; therefore, the introduction of a special trade regime would cause an entire range of political and legal problems. Especially because Russia does not seem to be ready to grant KO a necessary degree of autonomy.

One aspect of movement of goods, which will require attention, is the need to strengthen border-crossing points, by modernizing the infrastructure (in the areas of customs, border control, phytosanitary, veterinary and health care) and improving coordination. The European Commission singled out a possibility to use PHARE and TACIS funds for these aims. General conditions for transit of goods between KO

⁷⁶ МИД РФ, Памятная записка о возможных последствиях вступления Литвы в Европейский Союз для российско-литовских торгово-экономических отношений, 2000.
and the rest of Russia will not worsen, because Russia’s transit through the EU territory will be exempt from customs or any other transit duties (except for transportation and administration charges). Transit activities will even be facilitated by improved border crossing procedures as well as upgrading of transport corridors I and IX. As regards energy supplies, the European Commission did not foresee any problems which could not be solved by technical means: KO could either maintain its link with the Russian electricity grid or switch over to the Central European grid. The Commission did not foresee any possible or enduring negative consequences for KO in the sphere of movement of goods or electric energy supply. However, Brussels indicated its readiness to implement a number of practical measures intended to improve border control efficiency, expedite border-crossing procedures, ensure transport communication and electric energy supply.

Thus in the Communication, the Commission focused exclusively on the issues of direct impact of the EU enlargement on KO by indicating a different level (depending on the scale such decisions would mean a deviation from the common practice) of preparedness in separate areas to deal with problems by technical-procedural means. The awareness of the threat emanating from KO determined the “general [of EU and Russia] interest” in the issues not directly related to the EU expansion: ecology (including the storage of nuclear waste), health care, combat against crime, economic development. However, the role of the EU in these areas was limited to its readiness to share expertise and give financial assistance through the existing TACIS, as well as bilateral programmes of member states on technical assistance.

In the document of 6 March 2001 called “Possible Solutions for the Problems of Kaliningrad Oblast, Related to the EU Enlargement”78, Russian suggestions embraced several key areas: transport and transit (the focus in this area should be on ensuring the unrestricted transit between KO and the remaining territory of Russia, thus creating conditions for KO to remain a part of the Russian internal market; principle measures being an air traffic corridor over the territory of Lithuania, cargo transportation by rail without submitting it to customs procedures on the EU border), electric energy supply (Russia expected to be allowed to build pipelines for the supply of oil, gas and electric energy to KO through the territories of Lithuania and Poland), and performance of agreements (all business agreements between Kaliningrad inhabitants and candidate countries, as well as agreements concluded between Kaliningrad administration and representatives of the local authorities of candidate countries, were expected to be valid until the time of their expiry, even in case of incompatibility with the acquis).

In the “Comprehensive Analysis of the Communication”, submitted to the European Commission on 19 March 200179, the EU was invited to concentrate not only on the resolution of potential problems arising in the context of the EU enlargement process, but likewise on the realisation of opportunities created by this process (if adequately managed). Having in mind such a positive attitude, Russia’s response to the EU suggestion to discuss, within the framework of a relevant sub-committee,

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78 “Kaliningrad citizens should get free Schengen–visas for Poland, Lithuania and Latvia”, Uniting Europe 136, 19 03 2001, p. 7-8.
79 “Russia’s official reaction to EU proposals on Kaliningrad”, Uniting Europe 138, 02 04 2001, p. 6–7.
the impact on KO of the change in the trade regime is surprising: Russia has no specific concerns related to the enlargement impact on economic relations of KO, and is inclined to start consultations concerning the enlargement impact on Russia as a whole. Once more this indicates that Moscow is not planning to provide the Oblast with any special status in the relations with the EU. A similar conclusion might also be drawn after the 4 October 2001 meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation, where the Programme for the Development of Kaliningrad Oblast until 2010 was approved, which identified the main aims of federal policy towards KO (maintenance of the Oblast as an integral part of Russia, development of integrating ties with other regions of Russia, exploitation of Kaliningrad’s enclave location in the common European economic area, turning of the region into the export-producing zone), but did not provide for adequate financial resources.  

In the Memorandum of Intentions, Moscow only expressed the necessity to strengthen the cooperation of the EU and Russia in facilitating movement of people and goods to and from KO in particular through the additional EU financial and technical assistance and to start elaborating technical procedures for regulating transit of Russian goods to and from KO, which would not lead to a higher cost of cargo transportation and contribute to retaining and developing the economic ties between KO and neighbourly countries.  

The Communication of the European Commission proposed to address the issue of goods transit by using simplified procedures provided for in the existing international conventions. Any decision to waive formal procedures for Russia’s transit of goods would be incompatible with the acquis. The European Commission is of the opinion that the customs transit regime, which will be applied after the enlargement and will ensure free movement of goods to and from KO without customs duties, except for transport and administration charges, is a proper one.  

To sum it up, it is important to emphasise that as negotiations for the EU accession are about to be finalised, the remaining problems obviously pale in the background of the discussions on transit issues related to people (and partially, goods). Both parties—Russia and the enlarged EU—focus on addressing problems arising from direct procedural effects of the EU enlargement, while the issue with regard to the necessity to take advantage of the positive effect of the EU enlargement is basically not being raised.  

Conclusion: is a response to the challenge adequate?  

As “the Kaliningrad issue” is emerging as a side effect of the EU enlargement, a successful unilateral resolution of this problem is not possible and requires constructive cooperation of regional actors. The EU enlargement changes the essential parameters of Kaliningrad’s political and economic environment, thus creating a

pressing need for rapid in-depth modernisation of the Oblast, for the implementation of which Russia is not ready and lacks capacity. It seems that the scenario of ‘double periphery’ is not acceptable for both Russia including KO and (because of the danger of spill-over) the EU (including candidate countries). Due to this reason, mitigation of direct effects of the EU enlargement as well as overcoming of the socio-economic lagging behind the neighbouring countries should be an important interest for all regional actors. Nevertheless, a review of their position reveals several tendencies.

On the assumption that Russia and the EU are actors, capable of effectively resolving the issue of KO (i.e., having adequate political power), the range of conditions for the realisation of the optimistic scenario of the development of the Oblast, may be narrowed to several most important circumstances: adequate perception of the problem and readiness to share responsibility in solving the issue ‘in essence’.

The assessment of the evolving situation by both Moscow and Brussels does not seem to be adequate. At the beginning of the negotiations, Moscow defined the consequences of the EU enlargement on KO in terms of economic costs and separation of the Oblast from ‘big Russia’, though, a certain conflict between the values of prosperity and territorial integrity seems likely to be resolved in favour of the latter: the most important interest of Moscow is unrestricted transit between KO and the rest of Russia. In Moscow, the attitude towards the scenario of the development of KO as an “economic bridge” between the East and the West is not homogeneous: there is a fear that fast economic development of KO and strong ties with foreign countries could weaken Moscow’s influence in the region. In addition, “the special resolution” of the Kaliningrad issue will also inevitably lead to a “special status” and a greater autonomy for the Oblast, and for such a development Moscow is clearly not ready.

Brussels acknowledged the uniqueness and importance of the Kaliningrad issue comparatively recently, likewise the possible negative impact of the enlargement on the Oblast. Besides, the EU is likewise faced with inevitability of a political choice between the interests of internal and external security. The Oblast, turning into a “double periphery”, and separated from the neighbouring states by socio-economic backwardness, contradicts the EU external security interests. On the other hand, the aim of the border control measures, introduced by the Schengen acquis, is to protect the EU territory against the new type of “private” threats (illegal migration and crime), emanating from unstable neighbouring territories.

Both Russia and the EU, even though they have monopolised the decision-making process (because of fundamentality of reforms needed by KO as well as asymmetry of the EU accession process, scope and effectiveness of the initiatives offered by Lithuania and Poland to a great extent become dependent on the framework conditions determined by the decisions of Moscow and Brussels), clearly decline from taking responsibility for the development of the Oblast, surrounded by the enlarged European Union. In Moscow’s opinion, the EU enlargement in respect of KO is an external development, therefore it is the responsibility of the EU to cover

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the costs of adjustment and ensuring of “normal” communication between the Oblast and the remaining part of the Russian territory. According to Brussels, KO is an integral part of Russia, therefore, responsibility for the development of KO should be taken by Russia.

Consequently, there is disagreement about the agenda, aims and tools. Addressing the issue ‘in essence’ would undoubtfully imply not only mitigation of negative direct effects of the EU enlargement by mechanisms of procedural/technical nature, but also creation of preconditions for successful development of the region in the ambience of the enlarged EU (including exploitation of benefits emerging as a result of the EU enlargement). Naturally, it would require some flexibility from both parties and determination to change the established practice. It is the lack of this kind of willingness that determines the fact that the EU-Russian negotiations focus on technical/procedural aspects of the acquis application, failing to raise the issue of in-depth modernisation of KO as well as its adaptation to the altered economic environment. Despite the recognition of the Kaliningrad uniqueness and the Kaliningrad issue in the context of the EU enlargement as regards the suggested decisions, the Oblast remains within the sphere of functioning of the principles and mechanisms regulating the general relations between the EU and Russia. In other words, by limiting themselves to the problem of mitigating negative effects, Russia and the EU intend to preserve status quo, thus ignoring the fact that in the context of the EU enlargement, KO can either resort to modernisation or turn into a double periphery (a further “conservation” of the problem in fact will lead to gradual deterioration of the economic situation in the Oblast).

There exists a clear link between the importance of the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue for the interests of the key actors and the realisation of the successful development scenario of the Oblast in the enlarging Europe. The fact that, despite the expected deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the Oblast, strong political determination to decide the Kaliningrad issue in essence (by resorting to unconventional tools for breaking the status quo) does not exist, enables to draw a conclusion that the problem of successful adaptation of the Oblast is not placed high on Moscow’s and Brussels’s agenda. And in that case, the intensity of the diplomatic pressure by Moscow to the member states and the EU allows to make a hardly deniable assumption that the issue of Kaliningrad Region is not a goal in itself, but a means of Moscow to influence the process of the EU enlargement.
Authoritarianism in Belarus:
Eventual Threats to Lithuania’s Security

The Republic of Belarus is the most authoritarian state in Central and Central-Eastern Europe. The international security community identifies the threats of Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime at global and regional levels. The article analyses the problem: what are the concrete threats posed to Lithuania by the Belarusian authoritarianism? The profiles of the problem presented here – the origins of authoritarianism in Belarus, the pattern of the dependence in the relations between Belarus and Russia, the international security community and Belarus, the development of the Lithuania-Belarus relationship – make it possible to identify eventual threats to Lithuania arising within political, social, economic and ecological sectors.

Following the recognition of the Republic of Belarus as an independent state in early 90’s, the relations between the Euro-Atlantic community and Belarus experienced steady progression. Belarus was given the associate member status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). The signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Union and Belarus in 1995 signalled its commitment to political, economic and trade co-operation as significant assistance was provided to Belarus within the framework of the TACIS Programmes and also through various aid programmes and loans.

However, the progress in the EU–Belarus relations stalled after 1996, because President Aleksandr Lukashenko sharply turned the helm of the state towards authoritarianism. The associate member status of Belarus in NATO PA was suspended in 1997, following the constitutional referendum organised by Lukashenko in 1996, which authorised him “to change the rules of the game” by abolishing the existing Parliament (the convention of the 13th Supreme Soviet), hand-picking the acquiescent National Assembly and amending the 1994 Constitution, by extending inter alia the presidential term of office from five to seven years. New regulations for parliamentary elections were eventually passed on the basis of the 1996 Constitution, making it possible to elect a new National Assembly in October 2000. However, the electoral legislation and, more importantly, the conditions in which the consultation took place were deemed by the OSCE as “short of meeting the minimum commitments for free, fair, equal, accountable, and transparent elections”. Precisely the same happened during the last presidential election that took place on September 9, 2001.

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In other words, particularly during the last five or six years, the Republic of Belarus has solidified its reputation as one of the most perplexing and enigmatic countries in Europe. Belarus remains an exception, an outsider among the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas almost all other states in the region have undertaken steps to implement democracy, free market reforms, and took the westward orientation (event Russia has proclaimed its West-oriented foreign policy, and even the Ukraine is trying to articulate its aspiration to join NATO in the future more clearly), Belarus has restored and resurrected the old values and principles of the Soviet Union, such as authoritarianism and state-regulated economy.

A few days before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States Secretary of State Collin Powell called the dictatorial state of Belarus “the only outlaw state of Europe”. At that time, the head of the American diplomacy emphasised a danger to the regional security in general as posed by the regime itself and the threats inherent in its origins.

The reference was primarily addressed to a militarised group established under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and charged with the execution of any assignments, including political assassinations. The decree of Lukashenko providing for the confiscation of the property of citizens and enterprises without a court trial was not left unnoticed either. Besides, that decree, as well as the methods of political blackmail and intimidation, were extensively employed by the regime, especially in the aftermath of the September 2001 presidential election, when the heads of nine Belarusian enterprises were taken under arrest, or when power structures regularly and without compunction quelled the events organised by the opposition.

It should be emphasised that the anxiety of the international security community has been caused not only by the unprecedented violations of human rights in Belarus. Within the context of regional security, particular attention is also given to a number of other circumstances.

First – the military power of Belarus, which far exceeds that of, for example, the neighbouring Lithuania or Latvia.

Second – open statements made by Lukashenko himself and his actions on the international scene. Reference is made here not only to the malicious and often offensive speeches of the President directed against the West, or his visit destinations – Cuba, Syria, Libya – but also to provocative military exercises. Thus, for example,

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1 Lentī M. Is Minsko eina tamūs ginkļu kelis (Dark Roads of Arms are going on from Minsk), Lietuvos Rytas, 1 June 2002. – No. 125.

2 This was publicly announced by former interrogators of the Belarus Prosecutor’s Office Oleg Sluchek and Dmitrij Petrushkevich who had asked for political asylum in the U.S. According to their information, the victims of the abovementioned group included politicians Jurij Zacharenka, Victor Gonchar, Anatoli Krasovskij, journalist Dmitrij Zavadskij. See: Vadovas giriasi abejotinai nuopelnai (The Leader is Boasting of his Doubtful Merit), Lietuvos Rytas, 19 November 2001.


4 And vice versa: for example, in early January 2002, Lukashenko invited Muamar al-Gaddafi, and in February the President of Iran Mohammad Katami to come to Minsk for an official visit. See: BNS information of 18 January and 14 February 2002.
right before the 2001 presidential election, in the military exercise “Neman-2001” held in September Belarus simulated a repulse of a Lithuanian-Polish assault, while the scenario of the military exercise “Berezina-2002” held in early summer of 2002 included the crossing of the Berezina River and an attack westwards.

Third - the catastrophically deteriorating economic situation and the actual threat of a total economic collapse.

These are just several of the points that not only permit it to label Belarus an outlaw state, but also highlight the potential consequences for the regional security – unpredictability of the regime, political volatility, economic destabilisation and eventual refugees.

Recently, however, the validity of this assumption has become even more pronounced. The last bastion of authoritarianism in Europe ruled by Lukashenko’s regime is continuing to violate international law. During the previous year, Minsk clandestinely turned into the key military supplier to Iraq\(^3\), other militant states and terrorist groups by providing them with high quality military equipment. And finally – the total disregard displayed by the official Minsk in respect of international organisations (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Belarus has, in essence, been rendered ineffectual) that has also become evident recently.

Thus, it is obvious that the international security community perceives potential threats posed by Belarus both at global and regional levels. The problem is – what consequences on Lithuania and its security may be expected from the situation evolving in Belarus and around it?

In searching for the answer and identifying the eventual threats within definite sectors (political, military, social, economic and ecological\(^4\)), the following aspects of the problem will be subjected to a more comprehensive analysis:

- ............................................................................................................................................................................. The origin of the Belarusian authoritarianism and its eventual specification.
- ............................................................................................................................................................................. Belarusian-Russian relations: the pattern of dependence in theory and practice.
- ............................................................................................................................................................................. The international security community and Belarus.
- ............................................................................................................................................................................. Dynamics of the Lithuanian-Belarusian relations.

The Origin of the Belarusian Authoritarianism and its Eventual Specification

The Belarus of today presents a tricky puzzle: why has this particular way of development been chosen and what are the likely developments in the further trans-

\(^3\) The Belarus-Iraq relationship received publicity in Lithuania as well. See: BNS, Seimo narys ragina daugiau aškintų Baltarusijos gyventojams apie demokratiją (Member of Seimas Urges to Explain Democratic Values for Belarusians), 2 October 2002.

formation process of the regime?

Theoretical research on society transformation and democratisation processes usually distinguishes the following distinct criteria, the absence of which precludes the evolution of one or another society into a democratic society:

- ........................................................................................................ adequate economic progress;
- ........................................................................................................ international environment (the more a country is oriented to Western- shared democratic values, the greater the prospects for democratisation to succeed);
- ........................................................................................................ political traditions (whether a country has democratic traditions or not);
- ........................................................................................................ institutional structures (parliamentary system, presidential system, etc.)

It is hardly necessary to prove that none of the criteria mentioned above is “operational” in Belarus. Belarus is an exception among other post-communist countries. Despite the break-up of the communist regime, political and economic power remained in the hands of the same political elite. Moreover, that elite was not forced to change.

After the failed 1991 coup d’etat in Moscow, the Belarusian nomenclature was forced to follow market reforms similar to those enforced in Russia. However, such reforms were carried out only partially. There was liberalisation of prices, but no privatisation or a tight monetary policy was pursued. The decision not to privatise state assets was determined by the aspirations of the ruling elite. Otherwise, under the conditions of free competition, most enterprises would have collapsed. Those half-reforms had a negative impact on the majority of the population as they were solely in the interests of the nomenclature.

The economic slump had a unifying effect on the two social forces that allowed the establishment of A. Lukashenko’s regime, namely, the old nomenclature, resisting the market economy reforms, and the impoverished part of the society, bearing the brunt of the lame reforms.

Besides, with reference to the latter, it is necessary to remind that the major part of the Belarusian society is composed of rural population, while the urban inhabitants themselves are newcomers from the provinces still guided by traditional patriarchal values. The Belarusian political scientist Viktor Chernov describes such world outlook of people as archaic conservatism and mythological way of thinking, i.e. low demands, fear of freedom and competition, “fortress-under-siege” psychology, strive for absolute rule, inability to comprehend the importance of representative institutions, orientation

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towards an authoritarian charismatic leader, loyalty to any centre of authority, high degree of adjustment to authority, passivity and compliance. That is why the authoritarian alternative imposed by Lukashenko and the idea of a union with Russia (often presented within the context of the restoration of the Soviet Union) perfectly complies with the expectations of the majority of Belarusian citizens. It is worth remembering that over 30 per cent of Belarusian people have close relatives in Russia. A lot of Belarusians have graduated from Russian higher schools, started their political or professional career in Russia and, finally, have served in the army together with Russians.11

Nonetheless, it is also necessary to emphasise that another generation without any nostalgic feelings towards the no longer existing USSR has grown up; they are quite well-educated, are able to use the Internet, are mobile enough to visit various European countries. Still, it should also be noted that the representatives of this generation, who predominantly reside in Minsk and almost naturally support the idea of their country’s Europeanisation, do not associate themselves with the opposition and are not even inclined to trust it. This scepticism is to a great extent reinforced by the fact, that the current opposition leaders and the nucleus of the Belarusian political elite in general continue using those political and social concepts that were typical to the Soviet period.12

Researchers, however, sometimes try to resort to the regional diversity of Belarus and the regional specifics determined by historic evolution (West Belarus, i.e. Grodno and Brest regions; East Belarus, i.e. Vitebsk and Mogilev regions). Though there is an ongoing discussion on whether such specifics really exists, and if yes – whether it constitutes a factor in the present political development of Belarus.

The emergence of the Lukashenko phenomenon was facilitated by other circumstances as well. It is generally explained that there were no political reforms in Belarus either. The independence was not related to an upsurge of the national movement in the country. Contrary to the neighbouring countries, the national movement in Belarus was not the main catalyst for radical changes. This was certainly mostly determined by the fact that in general it is quite complicated to talk about the traditions of statehood and national identity in relation to Belarus.

For many years, the territory comprising the present-day Belarus was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, later, the tsarist Russia and the USSR. The country experienced three major rebellions, two World Wars, the Bolshevik occupation, and then its status as a Republic within the USSR. In addition, Moscow pursued an active policy of Russification. These factors have had a huge impact on the Belarusian national identity or its lack thereof.

However, it is necessary to emphasise that at the very beginning of the 90’s, Minsk tried to compensate the problems of national identity by means of foreign policy, particularly – by claims on the Lithuanian territory. For example, on 24 February 1992, the Belarusian Foreign Minister Piotr Krauchanka openly told a visiting European Community delegation that Belarus had doubts whether Vilnius

11 Ibid. – S. 7-8.
12 In essence, Minsk was a pawn in the hands of Moscow which was actually creating complications for Lithuania. The issue was resolved in 1995, when Lithuania and Belarus signed the Agreement on State Borders and some time later the Agreement on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation. See more: The Belarus Issue. – Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, 2002. – Working Papers. – No. 1. – P. 8.
lawfully belonged to the Republic of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{13}

Though Lukashenko never made similar statements in respect of Lithuania, he nevertheless took advantage of the specifics of the Belarusian national identity in the market of the country’s domestic policy. In the middle of the 90s, by emphasising his non-allegiance to any party, he, at the same time, chose a corresponding political motto: “I am neither with the right nor with the left, I am with the people”. In a broader sense, Lukashenko took advantage of the shortcomings of the extremely weak party system. The so-called democratic forces were fragmented and headed by the leaders, whose policy was very remote from the Belarusian reality. On the other hand, until 1995, the parliament elected in the Soviet times still worked in Belarus. This communist-governed institution of power blocked the proposals of the opposition to hold election before term, thus the real power fell into the hands of the executive power.

The President is still reaping the fruits of this victory. An independent opinion survey conducted in Belarus before the last presidential election showed that if the presidential election had been held the next day, Lukashenko would have been re-elected. His is still relying on rural population, impoverished workers, pensioners and the internal army. These social layers comprise the major part of the population, which find the status quo satisfactory and are opposed to any radical change. Even though there are talks about an increasing dissatisfaction among the ranks of the Belarusian \textit{nomenclature}, the latter is still too weak to attempt any \textit{coup d’etat} and remove Lukashenko from power. The opposition is still quite feeble and fragmented. It even failed to nominate a candidate who could offer a more or less serious competition to the incumbent president.

Some political scientists\textsuperscript{14} believe that Lukashenko, upon taking advantage of all circumstances mentioned above, has created the so-called sultanistic regime, i.e. a sub-type of the authoritarian regime, where personalised rule dominates principally in all spheres of life, where law does not apply, but a low level of institutionalisation prevails, clientelism predominates, corruption flourishes, where no clear ideology is identifiable, except laudation of the rule, etc. There is a number of well-known historic examples of such regimes: the Duvalier regime in Haiti, the Trujillo regime in the Republic of Dominique, the Ceausescu regime in Rumania. Experience has shown that changes of regimes in those historic situations were executed shedding blood and by means of a mass or military revolt.

As concerns possible scenarios in the case of Belarus, so far there has been no evidence of such alternative. It might be problematic to find an answer to the question of how the regime might be affected by the constantly deteriorating economic situation and even the signs of economic collapse discerned by some of experts. On the other hand, some other weaker sides of Lukashenko’s regime – such as the legitimacy of his presidency – might also become more pronounced. Few doubt, however, that the development of Belarus will be determined by an aggregation of internal and


external factors.

Nobody questions the fact that Russia is the only force that the official
Minsk takes into consideration. Nobody doubts the economic dependence of
Belarus upon Russia either. Far less emphasis is given to the fact that Lukashenko
employs the Russian factor as a source of his political legitimacy both inside the
country and by ignoring the opinion of the West. Nevertheless, some evidence has
lately surfaced permitting analysts and experts to state that this source has started
gradually drying up15.

Belarusian–Russian Relations:
the Pattern of Dependence in Theory and Practice

Three years ago, Lukashenko’s prospects for taking the highest office in the
Union of Belarus and Russia were openly discussed. A year and a half ago it was
already hinted that only with the help of Moscow he was thought to able to hold power
in Belarus. Today Vladimir Putin accuses Lukashenko that he is allegedly attempting
to restore the Soviet Union by means of the Union of Belarus and Russia, and, by
doing this, he is undermining the statehood of Russia.

In general, it is obvious that since the collapse of the USSR, Belarus has never
severed its close ties with Russia. Throughout the whole period following the downfall
of the communist regime, political, economic and military dependence of Belarus on
Russia has always remained especially strong. As far back as in December 1993, Minsk
signed the Collective Security Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States; in
April 1994, Belarus and Russia signed the agreement on the monetary union; in April
1996, an agreement on the Russian-Belarusian Union was signed; in May 1997 – the
Agreement on the Statutes of the Russian-Belarusian Union; on 8 December 1999 – a
declaration on further integration and the agreement on the establishment of a Union
state; on 30 November 2000 – the agreement on the introduction of a common curren-
cy for the Union state. Apart from these agreements, a whole range of agreements and
treaties were signed (over 100, including about 20 in the security and military areas).
Even though officially it is spoken about the integration of the two countries, there is no
doubt, however, that models of dependence rather than those of integration function
here. This dependence enables Russia to control and often also shape the processes
unfolding in the internal and external policy of Belarus.

The model of dependence is based on ethno-national closeness, hyper-integra-
tion of the Belarusian economy into the Soviet system, especially into the RSFSR,
and the dependence in the areas of security and defence.16 Such model allows Russia
in essence to manipulate “the Belarus card” with regard to the domestic and interna-
tional constellation. Thus, for example, during the time of Boris Yeltsin, in exchange
for the geopolitical union, Russia used to render support to Lukashenko’s regime in
the amount of 1 billion US dollars a year by selling energy sources at a lower price,
opening its market to Belarusian goods, and, most often, by permitting customs aut-

16 Wierzbowska-Miazga A. The Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Republic?, CES Studies,
horities of the neighbouring state to withhold the import tax for the goods imported into the so-called Union state (actually, into Russia). In addition, by taking advantage of the customs union, enterprises established by the administration of the Belarusian President imported a great number of smuggled goods, which were sold in Russia. During Yeltsin’s time, the Union supplied the Russian elite with a vision of a still powerful and influential Russia that managed not to lose everything with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Union was a means of blocking the eastward expansion of NATO.

With Putin becoming the President of Russia, Lukashenko was forced to bury his hopes and dreams about ruling Russia from the top of the union of the two countries. At the same time, the majority of the Russian electorate were still nostalgic about the strong-hand policy, veneration of the symbols of the past, the stern tone in communication with the West, and harnessing of the oligarchs. It should be noted that this was exactly what the President of Belarus was emphasising most in his speeches designed to attract the attention of the Russian people. The beginning of Putin’s presidency was also based on the same principles. Soon Lukashenko found it increasingly difficult to find any arguments that could help him secure the favour of Russian citizens. Before the 9 September 2001 election in order to remain on the Olympus of power, he had to convince the Kremlin leader that he was the most acceptable candidate.

Lukashenko won the election. The democratic community of the West objected to the claim that it was a democratic election. The paradox is that the criticism directed against Lukashenko was overshadowed by other events – the terrorist attack against the United States.

Nevertheless, it did not take long for Minsk to become aware of the tendencies in the world policy that emerged in the wake of the 11 September 2001 events and their influence. This influence evolved at two levels: within the contexts of Belarusian-Russian and the international security community – Belarusian relations. It is necessary to note that Lukashenko was quite quick to identify these levels himself.

In early January 2002, the Belarusian President, in defining the priorities of the country’s foreign policy, made an effort to confirm the course of strengthening the Belarusian-Russian Union, the intent to restore comprehensive relations with the European Union, and declared about his resolve to develop a dialogue on equal grounds with the United States on a whole range of issues, including fight against terrorism.

This time Lukashenko seemed to be in possession of a weighty argument in support of his traditional appeals for creating a union state with Russia – the second instalment of the loan of 30 million US dollars recently allotted by Moscow to Belarus for financing the creation of the union state. However, Minsk made a mistake in assuming that it was capable of predicting the Kremlin’s actions.

There still is an ongoing argument concerning Putin’s motives, when he made it

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18 BNS, Lukašenka patvirtina ketinimą stiprinti Rusijos ir Baltarusijos sąjungą (Lukashenko Confirms Intention to Enforce Russian – Belarusian Union), BNS, 14 January 2002.
19 BNS, Rusija finansuoja bendros su Baltarusija valstybės kūrimo išlaidas (Russia Finances the Expenses of the Creation of Common Russian – Belarusian State), 4 January 2002.
obvious in the meeting with Lukashenko in June 2002, that he did not support the aspirations of Minsk to unify Russia and Belarus as entities with equal rights. Most probably, the underlying reasons were both Moscow’s active involvement in the US-led anti-terrorist coalition, the thawing in the Moscow-Washington relationship, the publicised pro-Western course in the foreign policy and the barriers erected in Belarus to prevent the Russian capital from participating in the intended privatisation of the country’s strategic enterprises. Whatever the reasons, it did not take long for the Russian President to announce, that Lukashenko would not succeed in restoring the Soviet Union.

Formally, such response was provoked by the draft constitution of the Belarusian-Russian Union prepared by Minsk. It envisaged a creation of a union state, where both parties were provided with equal rights and the possibility to veto joint decisions, while the governing of the union state was expected to be executed on a rotating basis between the Russian and Belarusian Presidents changing every half a year. V.Putin was obliged to remind who was who – even upon Russia, having become poor, its economic power still exceeded that of Belarus by 30 times. The implication was more than clear – Belarus was expected to join Russia in the capacity of one of the provinces of the grand state instead of dreaming about having influence in the Kremlin. There was no room provided for the parasitizing economy of Belarus in the ambitious programme of economic growth of Russia.20

The Belarusian President retaliated after quite a lengthy pause. It is necessary to acknowledge that his speech on the Belarusian television sounded emotional and quite censorious towards Russia. He reiterated the necessity to create a union of the two states on equal grounds and stated that Belarus would never become the 90th entity of the Russian Federation. In early September Lukashenko once again accused Moscow of dragging its feet over the plans to unify both states. “I have always been for the union, but Moscow wants to incorporate Belarus into Russia. I am not going to put up with that”, he explained and added that Putin’s suggestion concerning the unification (in August the Kremlin suggested to hold a referendum on the unification of the two states, and in the event of positive results – to elect one parliament and one president) was inspired by his wish to humour wealthy electors.21

It should be noted that in response to that speech, a telephone call came from the Kremlin.22 At that moment, the tension seemed to have eased. The question is – for how long?

Hardly anybody doubts that Moscow’s shift away from Minsk is not determined by the Belarusian economy, Putin’s badly concealed contempt for Lukashenko,

20 Norkus A. Maskvos antausis Minskui (Moscow Slaps Minsk in the Face), Lietuva Rytas, 22 June 2002, No. 143.
22 Sanko V. Kremliovskij nokdaun (Kremlin’s Knock-out), Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 04.09.2002. - No. 185.
23 Some Russian politicians have openly charged Putin’s policy toward Lukashenko with compliance for the West. See more: Baltarujos prezidentas gali netekti posto (President of Belarus Can Lose the Post), Respublika, 16 August 2002.
24 America’s sophistications on the possibility to predict the behaviour of Sadam Huscein would be very interesting in this context. See: Whitelaw K., Mazetti M. Why War?, Cover Story, – October 14, 2002.
or even the visions of the latter about the union state, but the unanswered question concerning the predictability of Lukashenko’s actions and the constellation of international politics.\textsuperscript{23}

It is hardly possible to disregard the opinion that Lukashenko might behave unpredictably if he feels a real personal threat from Russia\textsuperscript{24}, i.e. if in the process of creating a real Russian-Belarusian union, attempts are made to remove him from power and \textit{de facto} incorporate Belarus into Russia. Lukashenko is desperately trying to stay at the helm and he quite recently stated that he “does not reject the possibility of participating in the 2006 presidential election”\textsuperscript{25}, i.e. he does not reject the possibility of amending the provisions of the Constitution of the Belarusian Republic, which does not allow to seek a third term in office. In other words, when faced with a threat of losing power, Lukashenko may resort to unpredictable actions and provoke, for example, a local-scale military conflict.

A formal expression of the influence exerted on the regime by the international constellation was the talk between the U.S. Secretary of State Powell and the Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov and “the issue of Belarus” raised in that meeting in the context of the fate of the OSCE Mission in Minsk. This repeatedly proved that practically “the Belarus issue” on the international East-West relationship agenda acquired a particular significance within the framework of the international anti-terrorist coalition initiated by the U.S. in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 events and with the launching of a new NATO-Russia cooperation formula.

**The International Security Community and Belarus**

In early 2002, Minsk was subjected to a new wave of pressure from the international security community. In January, information about Belarus being involved in the illicit trade in arms appeared in American, Israeli, Polish press.\textsuperscript{26} In early February, the Head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc the Working Group on Belarus Uta Capf warned that “the failure of the official Minsk to take steps towards democratisation may result in the beginning of an ice age”.\textsuperscript{27} After visiting Minsk in the middle of February, a delegation of the U.S. House of Representatives expressed its concern about the possibility of Belarus being involved in arms trafficking with the countries supporting terrorism.\textsuperscript{28} In early March, the U.S. issued an ultimatum to Belarus demanding to end the selling of military armaments to the countries supporting terrorism. The U.S. State Department declared about America’s readiness to take steps – including sanctions as one of the measures – in order to prevent such activity.


\textsuperscript{24} BNS, Įrodymų, kad Baltarusija neteisėtai prekiuoja ginklais nėra ir negali būti, - teigia Baltarusijos URM (According to Belarusian Foreign Ministry, there are and there could be no Evidence that Belarus is Involved in Illegal Arms Trade), 7 February 2002.

\textsuperscript{25} BNS, Baltarusijos ir Vakarų santykiai gali pradėtis ledynetis, mano ESBP PA grupės vadovė (Head of OSCE PA Thinks that Ice-Age Can Start in Belarusia – West Relations), 5 February 2002.

\textsuperscript{26} BNS, JAV kongresmenai reiškia susirūpinimą dėl galimos Baltarusijos prekybos ginklais su terorizmà remiančiomis šalimis (U.S. Congressmen Express Concern on Belarusia’s Eventual Arms Trade with “Rough Countries”), 17 February 2002.
What might be the consequences of this declaration, and, in general, the American-Belarusian conflict that has been evolving for some time already to the East-West relations at large? There can be no doubt that this question is equally important for Lithuania as well.

It should be remembered that Belarus has been regarded a participant of the conventional arms market already since 1996. It is included into the list of the top ten countries exporting armaments and military equipment. The abundance of Belarusian military export resources is determined by several factors. First, the decrease in the production of military industry after the disintegration of the USSR was less pronounced that in Russia. Second, the majority of enterprises are still under the control of the state. Third, a huge arsenal of used Russian military equipment has remained in the country.

Already in 1994, Lukashenko decided not to comply with the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe26 and, instead of demolishing the armaments, offered them to foreign clients. Alongside the export of this type, Minsk is deriving a considerable profit from armaments supplied to the world market and from the production of munition parts. Trade in weapons is of vital importance for Belarus in the financial aspect. According to the data presented by some Western experts, in the period between 1997 and 2000, the country might have earned about one billion U.S. dollars from the trade in armaments and equipment. It is believed that during last years, Minsk has stealthily turned into the key arms supplier for more than 500 million U.S dollars to the radical world of Islam. During last year alone, Minsk secretly sold arms to Palestinian fighters and the countries that shelter terrorists (Syria, Iran).

The establishment of Belarus in the arms export market and the trade policy it pursues, has long been causing concern to the international security community. Firstly, the performance of the country’s military industry, the system of arms trade and its financing is under the cover of great secrecy. The proceeds from clandestine transactions are believed to descend into Lukashenko’s shadow budget. Secondly, it is the above-mentioned Belarusian arms trade transactions with the states which are universally subjected to the United Nations arms embargo. In October 2001, for example, the Polish magazine Wprost published information that Minsk was selling military equipment to terrorist groups in the Balkans, South America and the Middle East, arms shipments “settle down” in Sudan and even in Afghanistan.

Washington is especially concerned about Lukashenko being increasingly interested in secret cooperation with Iraq. Some menacing developments are undoubtedly related to Minsk-Baghdad deals in the area of anti-aircraft defence. In February 2002, the U.S. State Department confirmed that Iraqi anti-aircraft defence officers

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26 The Treaty, signed in 1990 at the initiative of the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and adapted in 1999, sets the limits on the numbers in each of the five categories of conventional armaments that are allowed to be deployed in the regions of Europe. Out of about 30 states to sign the adapted Treaty, it was ratified only by two – Belarus and the Ukraine.

were secretly trained how to use the newest anti-aircraft missile system S-300. Since early April, there have been three attempts to shoot down the planes of the United States and Great Britain patrolling over the UN-controlled non-flying area. There were over 400 such attempts in 2001. At present, when S. Hussein, in protest against Israeli military actions in the West Bank, has deployed anti-aircraft defence systems in the non-flying area, it looks like the G.W. Bush administration will have to acknowledge that the Belarusian military equipment and competence employed by Iraq pose a threat to Americans and British.30

Some experts believe that economic sanctions might have a deterrent effect upon Minsk, i.e. they might compel Belarus to curtail or at least limit illicit arms supplies to Arab states, which are involved in conflicts, pose threats or are terrorist states. This would allegedly have a painful effect upon the export of Belarusian metal-lurgic products and fertilisers that account for the greatest part of foreign currency income in the Belarusian budget. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind that having distanced itself from the West and with Russia still in its rear, it is adequately resistant to any economic pressure from the West. In this case, it would be more reasonable to speak not about Western investments in Belarus or the EU aid, which is limited to humanitarian assistance and democratisation programmes, but rather about the indisputable fact that the energy sector, strongly supported by Russia, is the only factor which is still able to avert the total collapse of the Belarusian economy.31

Political measures have also been almost exhausted, as neither the suspension of the Belarusian membership in various international organisations nor protests issued by EU member states have yielded desired results. In addition, by threatening to withdraw from the OSCE, Minsk has practically paralysed the activity of the OSCE Mission in Belarus.32

By challenging Minsk, Washington took the risk to confront Moscow’s interests. There are several assumptions to suggest that Russia has been taking advantage of the illegal export of the neighbouring Belarus. Firstly, Moscow, which is trying to avoid being compromised in the eyes of the international community, finds it convenient to use Minsk in the area of military trade and thus avoid international bans and restrictions. Secondly, having in mind the scope of Belarusian export, it is hardly feasible that major transactions could be carried out without Russia’s assistance. Thirdly, in most cases Minsk lacks the technical capacity required to complete the assembly of military systems. Fourthly, in general, an increasingly closer military cooperation between Russia and Belarus (joint military exercises) has lately been observed.33

Thus, having in mind that Russia’s interest in arms export might be not incommensurate with that of Belarus, it could be predicted that Washington might try to resolve its conflict with Minsk by means of finding agreement with Moscow. As we have seen, namely within this context, it is possible to interpret the currently observed cooling in the Moscow-Minsk relationship.

Thus, it is possible to predict that the U.S will not want to put to test the furthe-

30 See more: Lenzi M. (note 1).
31 BNS, Baltarusijos ministras nemato galimybės tęsti ESBO misijos veikla, jie nebus pakeistas jos mandatas (Belarusian Minister has not Foreseen the Possibilities to Continue OSCE Mission), 13 January 2002; Konstitucija Lukašenka ne klūtis (Constitution is not an Obstacle for Lukashenko), Respublika, 19 September 2002. - Nr. 217.
32 Jankauskas A. (note 30). Besides, a considerable part of the joint exercises take place in Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation.
red strategic partnership and, most probably, will abstain from carrying out the threat to impose sanctions on Belarus. Such mutual agreement would be beneficial both for Russia and the anti-terrorist coalition. In the meantime, Russia would acquire one more lever for reinforcing its influence on Lukashenko’s regime, which is craving for support. In addition, with the increase of Russian influence in Belarus, the U.S. could hope for more orderliness in the maze of arms supplies and that the channelling of weaponry into the arms of political adversaries will be put under control.

On the other hand, within the context of a military resolution of the Iraq issue, it is also possible to predict Washington taking an unbending attitude towards the official Minsk. This version could be supported by the U.S. stance in respect of Leonid Kuchma, who was suspected to have sanctioned arms sales to Hussein in 2000. In the case of Lukashenko, the spotlight should be directed not so much to the training of Iraqi anti-aircraft defense officers in Belarus, but rather to the history of a far more serious strategic threat issued by Iraq to the international community – in 1995, in direct violation of the United Nations sanctions against Baghdad, Minsk sold to Hussein’s regime special diamond-tipped equipment used in the production of some components for nuclear weapons. 34

Nevertheless, a pessimistic resolution of the tension in the U.SBelarus relationship is also possible. The implementation of the Western pressure measures may fuel anti-Western sentiment in the country and provide support for the authoritarian regime. In addition, directly faced with the sternly disposed U.S., Lukashenko may become difficult to predict. Nobody can deny that he may distance himself from the Kremlin and resort to unpredictable, spontaneous actions likely to have a destabilizing effect upon other states in the region, including the NATO aspirant Lithuania.

**Dynamics of the LithuanianBelarusian Relations**

The development of the LithuanianBelarusian relationship could be divided into several stages: the periods of 1990 – 1992, 1992 – 1995 and since 1996/97. The dynamics of the first stage was determined by the specifics of Vilnius-Moscow and Minsk-Moscow bilateral relations. The second – the Moscow-inspired political course of Minsk aimed at encouraging separatism in Lithuania. 35 The third stage was characterised both by the attempts to base the relations on the principles of good neighbourhood in accordance with the Agreement on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation signed on 6 February 1995 and the emerging differences in geopolitical gravitation.

It was the latter that forced to view the Belarus neighbourhood to Lithuania as extremely unfavourable within the context of political, social and economic threats. First of all, the existence of the authoritarian regime in Belarus *per se* was a threat

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31 Lenzi M. (note 1).
35 The military doctrine of Belarus includes the majority of universally accepted international law provisions, though the principle of implementing the provisions of international law is not clearly established. Within this context, the facts of cooperation between Lukashenko and Hussein are most illustrative.
to the whole region because of its eventual unpredictability, likewise because of the ambiguity of the consequences stemming from the creation of the Belarus-Russian union.

Belarus, undoubtedly, is the most militarised territory in the geostrategic area of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{36} The amount of strategic weapons accumulated in Belarus and its abundant military capabilities\textsuperscript{37} are a potential source of military threat. It draws attention not only because of the character of the military exercises mentioned above, but also due to the doubts of whether Minsk is always going to \textit{de facto} honour the norms of international law.\textsuperscript{38}

Within the framework of Lithuania’s accession to the European Union and the Schengen system, it is necessary to emphasise that the absolute majority of illegal immigrants enter Lithuania from the territory of Belarus, which has not yet executed the demarcation of its state border with Lithuania. It is not possible to disregard a likely prospect that a considerable deterioration of economic situation in Belarus might result not only in a large-scale social turbulence inside the country, but also in a massive migration of Belarusians out of the country.

And finally, the factor of economic ties between Lithuania and Belarus. Even though the economic interdependence between Vilnius and Minsk is quite insignificant, threats to the energy sector of Lithuania are quite tangible.\textsuperscript{39}

In addition, Lithuania clearly identifies the consequences of ecological threats arising from the neighbouring state. The economic difficulties experienced by Belarus not only render it incapable of ensuring adequate ecological supervision of the operating enterprises; it is also experiencing difficulties in disposing of the munitions still remaining from the times of the USSR.\textsuperscript{40}

Lithuania, in pursuit of its aspiration to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, to neutralise the above-mentioned threats and concurrently to earn the status of an active actor in the Eastern Baltic and Eastern European sub-regions, has put forward proposals to the international community on the practical implementation of various workable versions of the relations with Belarus (“bridge”, “intermediary”, “expert”). Vilnius has openly declared that the implementation of these versions is not only determined by the character of the clearly identified threats, but it is also dependent upon:

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  rdination of the position of Lithuania in respect of Belarus with that of the Western
  allies by actively joining the declarations of the Euro-Atlantic community on Belarus
  intended to promote the development of democracy in the country and to establish
  criteria for the normalisation of relations, and by urging the official Minsk to pay
  regard to those recommendations and take concrete steps to ensure democratic de-
  velopment of the country and normalise relations with the international community;

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  huania’s disinterestedness in the international isolation of Belarus which might have

\textsuperscript{36} Reference is given here not only to the fact that the taps and gauges of the gas pipeline from Russia to Lithuania are in the territory of Belarus, but also to the fact that so far it is unclear what consequences of Lukashenko’s attempts to use energy sector in the relations with Russia could be for Lithuania.
\textsuperscript{37} BNS, Baltarusjos kariškiams iškilo šaudmenų utilizavimo problema (Belarusian Military Faces the Problem of Ammunition Utilization), 2 October 2002.
\textsuperscript{38} Lithuania’s Relations with Belarus and Internal situation in Belarus. – Druskininkai, 2002. – P. 1-6.
a negative effect on the democratisation of the country, on the normalisation of its relations with the countries of the West and concurrently on the stability and security both of Europe and the region.

These motives as well as the practical experience of relationship with Belarus have shaped a particular attitude of Vilnius in respect of Minsk – to pursue the policy of pragmatic selective cooperation. In practice, it means that the political cooperation with Belarus ought to be minimal (e.g. there have been no exchange of visits between the official heads of states or high-standing officials since the end of 2000), at the same time maintaining ties with separate power structures of Belarus and developing bilateral cooperation in those areas which are important for the security and stability not only of Lithuania, but also of the whole region (demarcation of state borders, illegal migration, regional cooperation, energy issues, etc.), irrespective of the direction of the political development of Belarus.

During its presidency in the Council of Europe in the first half of 2002, Lithuania was trying to emphasise namely this political line in its relations with Belarus. Despite a positive evaluation, the prospects for this line are still quite obscure, as there is a certain ambiguity regarding potential priorities in the policy of the international security community in respect of Belarus.

Conclusions

Belarus is the most authoritarian state in Central and Central-Eastern Europe. The threats arising from Aleksand Lukashenko’s regime are identified by the international security community at global and regional levels. These threats arise not only because of the existence of the authoritarian regime in Belarus per se, but also out of the unpredictability of this regime in internal and external policy.

Namely the unpredictability of Lukashenko’s regime in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy, political spontaneity, potentiality of employing the military sector for the legitimisation of the regime, threat of economic collapse, uncontrollable character of social consequences – all this poses particularly tangible threats to Lithuania.

In this situation, the strategy of pragmatic selective cooperation pursued by Vilnius is likely to be successful only if the international security community possesses levers of substantive influence on the evolution of Lukashenko’s regime.

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42 BNS, Lietuvos ministras Strasbūre pristatė ET pirmininkavimo prioritetą (Lithuanian Minister Has Presented Priorities of CoE Chairmanship), 22 January 2002.

43 The materials of the round-table discussions “Cooperation with Belarus: Experience and Prospects” organised by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University. – Druskininkai, I-3 March 2002.
Internal Security Issues in Lithuania
Democratic Control over the Armed Forces in Lithuania

The concept of civil control over the military is complex and multifaceted. It is especially important to understand how the civil control is implemented in practice. In this paper, the analysis mainly focuses on the current state of the democratic civil control over the Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) and the civil-military relations. The introductory part gives a short overview of the development of relations between the Armed Forces and the society in independent Lithuania. Special attention is given to the negative effects of the military coup in 1926 on the civil-military relations. The changing status of the Armed Forces around the world and its theoretical and practical implications are also outlined.

The first part of the paper discusses constitutional and legal basis of the civil control over the military and the institutional structure of the National Defence System. The authors in turn explicitly tackle the shortcomings of the executive chain of command and control over the Armed Forces and the parliamentary oversight of activities of both the executive authorities and the armed structures. The analysis rests on the assumption that despite the creation of the legal base (the Law on the Basics of National Security, the National Security Strategy, other legal acts), the practice of the democratic civil control is not fully crystallized and incontestably embedded in the Lithuanian political system. The authors also draw attention to the insufficiently effective parliamentary oversight of national defence institutions.

The second part of the paper discusses the relationship between the civil control over the military and the Lithuanian defence and foreign policy, building on the assumption that civil authorities have full control over foreign policy while the military retain some autonomy over certain professional matters of defence policy. Attention is drawn to the agreement of the parliamentary parties on defence policy priorities. The authors note the influence of cooperation with NATO countries on the development of the LAF in accordance with Western standards. However, the authors differentiate between the requirements of the membership in NATO and the EU with regard to Lithuanian defence policy.

The final part of the paper “The Armed Forces and Society” in more detail discusses the current civil-military relations in the country. The importance of the publicity of Lithuanian defence policy guidelines and the activities of the LAF is emphasized. The authors argue that crisis relief operations should be seen as an indispensable part of the activities of the LAF in peacetime. The special role of non-governmental organizations is also noted in the development of civil-military relations. The role of the media is considered to be positive despite some shortcomings of public information about national defence.
policy matters. The authors maintain that academic institutions could play a more significant role in defence and security policy analysis. While discussing the participation of military officers in the political life of the country, the authors contend that the dichotomy between a soldier, who must succumb to the discipline of military hierarchy, and a human or a citizen, who must have certain freedoms and rights, is not an easily reconcilable issue even for consolidated democracies. The resolution of this issue basically depends on the level of political culture and consciousness of the civil society of the country.

The authors conclude that despite some unresolved issues, the civil democratic control over the military has been successfully established in Lithuania. Certain unsettled issues of civil-military relations and insufficiently effective parliamentary oversight over the military structures remain a matter of further consolidation of the democratic political system and formation of civil society. The authors argue that a great number of these issues are inherent to most states and societies in transition.

**Introduction: historical context**

At the beginning of the 90’s with the dismantling of the Warsaw pact and the Soviet Union itself, a group of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, including the Baltic States, faced a difficult challenge of the transition to democracy. CEE countries (and the Baltic States even more so) had to reform their political, economic and social order by eradicating and removing the remnants of Soviet legacy which was deeply rooted in different spheres of social life and even in the very mentality of people. Given this context, one of the major problems posed by the transition period was the post-Soviet legacy of and within the Armed Forces. Paradoxically, the Baltic States - former Soviet republics - had fewer problems in establishing civil control over their military than did the former Warsaw pact states that were relatively more independent from Moscow. The Baltic States simply did not have any national Armed Forces prior to 1990. They had to build their respective national defence establishments from scratch and thus avoided problems of contentious reforms in the defence sector that other CEE states had to deal with. On the other hand, the Baltic States had barely any historical experience of democracy, and the lack of it could aggravate the democratic transformation process in the nineties.

Indeed the historic record of civil-military relations in the inter-wars period is rather ambiguous. On one hand, the Lithuanian Armed Forces were created on the basis of volunteers who fought for the reestablishment of Lithuanian statehood in 1918-1919. These volunteers withstood attacks of Russian invaders and some Polish military units and this victory granted the Lithuanian military the glory and gratitude of the whole nation. However, with the military coup in 1926, civil-military relations deteriorated. The Parliament (Seimas) was dissolved and the right wing nationalist party leader Antanas Smetona took over the post of the President, in fact becoming the authoritarian leader of the State until the Soviet occupation in 1940. At this period political parties were forbidden and the media - censored. The military establishment enjoyed great autonomy from civil authorities and at the same time was one of the pillars that the authoritarian regime rested upon. These events inevitably affected civil – military relations in the country\(^1\). However, the gap that emerged between the military and the

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\(^1\) The authors refer to the memoirs of the former Commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (1935 – 1940) Gen. Stasys Raštikis, (see Lithuanian edition: S. Raščikis ‘Kovose del Lietuva’, Vilnius: Lituanus, 1990, p. 380)
society after the coup, eventually narrowed and practically disappeared before the Second World War. A positive role was played by the media - radio, newspapers and magazines - which were providing the society with a large amount of information about the Armed Forces, their living conditions, military equipment etc. A lot of social events (especially in sports and culture) also facilitated the friendly rapprochement between the military and the society². In 1940, with the failure of the political authorities to declare armed defence against the Soviet aggression, the existence of both the independent State of Lithuania and its Armed Forces ended. Some of the military, however, did start resistance after the end of the Second World War and the partisan war in Lithuanian woods lasted more than a decade.

Under the Soviet regime, the military establishment was closely intertwined with and subordinated to the Communist Party. Such relationship between the military and the state authority could by no means be referred to as the civil control, because there was no civic society itself and its democratically elected representatives. Relations between the society and the ‘Red Army’ were cold at best. Most of the military serving in Lithuania were conscripts from other Soviet republics, while natives usually were sent to serve outside Lithuania. The height of tension between the Lithuanian society and the invaders army was reached during the bloody events of January 1991³.

After the independence was restored once again, the Baltic States and to a lesser extent other Central and Eastern European States, had to struggle to build new democratic institutions, new Armed Forces and to establish mechanisms for the civil control over the military. The creation of the national defence establishment of Lithuania started in the first days after the restoration of the independence. The Government of Lithuania founded the Department of National Defence as early as 25 April 1990 - one and a half-months after the declaration of the independence. In 1991, the Department was reorganized into the Ministry of National Defence (MND). The formation of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) progressed simultaneously. At first they consisted of volunteers and former officers of the Soviet Army. Although initially some residual influence of the Soviet military school persisted within some part of the officer corps, eventually this influence faded away and the LAF strengthened and augmented to become Western-style well-trained national Armed Forces.

Twelve years of freedom and independence provide a more or less sufficient empirical basis for a critical examination of the progress made by Lithuania on the bumpy road towards the consolidation of democracy and its ultimate end - a prosperous civil society. A proper evaluation of achievements and failures of democratic governance in establishing and maintaining the National Defence System can also be made.

² Ibid. p. 385
³ On 13 January 1991 Soviet tanks rolled over the unarmed people peacefully protesting at the approaches to the TV tower in Vilnius. 13 people died and many more were injured. Although Lithuania has declared its independence on 11th March 1990, international recognition did not follow until the failure of the military coup in Russia in August 1991.
Studies related to the civil democratic control over the Armed Forces in Europe are financed and coordinated by Geneva Center for the Democratic Control over the Armed Forces (DCAF). Publications and studies of the Center are available on-line. Analysis and studies on the subject of civil-military relations in general and the civil control over the Armed Forces, in particular in Lithuania, were rather scarce up to date. On one hand, the period of the independence has been too short to draw elaborate conclusions on the matter, on the other hand, civil-military relations allegedly have never been a big issue on the political agenda of Lithuania to receive appropriate academic attention. One of the most recent and at the same time one of the few studies on the subject is an article by V. Urbelis and T. Urbonas. This article provides an excellent historical overview of the development of the LAF and the civil control over the military in Lithuania throughout the last decade. Notwithstanding the advantages of the historical analysis and a lot of interesting insights (some of them are also cited in this work), the authors of the study fall short of elaborating on the current persisting problems of the civil control over the LAF within the national security sector. V. Urbelis and T. Urbonas contend that Lithuania has fully completed legal establishment of the principles of the civil control in the laws regulating national security. Although one could hardly disagree with the latter argument, the authors of this work assume that despite the establishment of the legal basis, practical problems of the implementation of the civil democratic control do persist within the Lithuanian political system. The authors hereby seek to contribute to the research of this subject area by presenting a thorough sketch of the current state of affairs of the civil-military relations in Lithuania with a particular focus on the democratic control over the LAF.

1. Civil-military relations: theory, practice and the international context

The very concept of civil control over the military is complex and multifaceted to say the least. If the civil democratic control over the Armed Forces is to be comprehended in terms of political control over the military by legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state, what one has to do is simply look through the Constitution and other basic laws of a given country to determine whether the civil control is in place. However, there is much more to it when it comes to the understanding how successfully (or unsuccessfully) the civil control is implemented in practice. To answer this question the analysis of historical, social, economic, cultural as well as international context becomes instrumental.

http://www.dcaf.ch


In theory, the civilian control may look simple indeed. Elected representatives and the government must make all major decisions on the defence policy and the Armed Forces of a given country. At least in democracy this should be the case. In practice, however, it is not all that simple. The actual ways and means of how civilians should control their military establishments is an inherent problem for any state, whether a mature democracy or an authoritarian regime. First of all, one must bear in mind the special social status of the Armed Forces - it is a coercive institution, enjoying the monopoly of arms within the state. Moreover, the military is the largest, presumably best financed and best organized social institution in most countries of the world. The structure of the Armed Forces, strict hierarchy of obedience, mandatory conscription and conservative traditions within the military service may seem somewhat opposite to the values that democracy itself stands for. However, given the vital task the Armed Forces are assigned to – the ultimate defence of the Homeland – the society is ready to accept certain deficit of democracy and the exceptional and in some cases privileged status of the military.

At the same time, holding the monopoly of arms, the Armed Forces may represent a major threat to the statehood, which was the case for numerous times in so many different countries of the world. Military coups were a common if not a legitimate practice during the inter-wars period in the larger part of Europe, Lithuania not excluded. Latin America set the all-time record with the peak of 19 governments in countries all over the continent - from Argentina to Mexico - headed by military officers in 1979.

During the Cold War, the military exploited certain political power and evident influence over decision making process in both superpowers - the US and the Soviet Union. However, after the Vietnam failure of the former, and the disastrous Afghanistan invasion by the latter, the military establishments of both countries lost a great deal of public credibility and their political influence was also restricted.

The end of the Cold War and its profound impact on international system greatly affected civil-military relations world-wide. Both the US and Russia, as well as most of their allies undertook extensive programs of defence downsizing and conversion. Allegedly more secure yet uncertain international environment led nations to redefine the role of their Armed Forces. The military in many countries were assigned such secondary missions as disaster relief in emergency cases or construction of bridges and highways. Peacekeeping missions in the hot spots of the world became another, more important and more demanding role of the modern military. Peacekeeping is especially challenging in terms of civil-military relations in that the soldiers of any given mission usually have to encounter a foreign and at times hostile society.

Although on one hand, the role of the post-Cold War military has somewhat faltered, on the other hand civilian governments acquired a more firm control over the armed structures in vast majority of countries. In Latin America, there are no military juntas after the civilian rule was restored in Haiti in 1994. On other continents, military regimes like those of Libya, Burma, Nigeria and Pakistan are very rare

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8 Goodman, op. cit.
exceptions. However, there are many other ways in which the military establishment may undermine the democratic rule, not to count authoritarian regimes, which do exploit the army as a tool to exert control over the population.

Even for old established democracies civil-military relations continue to be an issue of the political agenda. How tough or how loose the democratic control should be? How much autonomy and on what matters should the military be granted? These are just a few important questions that Western states are still struggling to answer in a definite way. Even the leader of the democratic world itself - the US - experiences certain fears about the implications of the increasing gap between the military and the American society\(^\text{10}\). There is an ongoing debate between two schools of thought: one is associated with S. Huntington who argued for the society adhering to the conservative values of the military, the other suggests “civilianizing” the military in the context of technological advancement and modern warfare\(^\text{11}\).

Major Western European powers are also struggling with their post-Cold War defence reviews and military downsizing. The major issue for France is transition from oversized conscript army to a professional one, expected to be completed by 2015. Germany has only recently overcome its historic and psychological problems that prevented it from full-fledged participation in international military operations. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is focused on efficient spending and the improvement of the quality of forces.

What is true of Western democracies, it is even more so for new Central and Eastern European democracies. As we have already mentioned, post-communist CEE countries faced great difficulties in reforming their national defence establishments, reconciling their post-Soviet armed forces with the civil society and at the same time preventing them from interference with the domestic policy\(^\text{12}\). The situation further east – in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia – is a separate big and very problematic issue we are not in a position to address in this paper.

Given the international context of civil-military relations, ranging from military regimes without any democratic control whatsoever to established democracies ever-striving to improve their mechanisms of the civil control, one cannot but conclude that a certain degree of tension between the military and civilians is inescapable. The key problem is the reconciliation of an essentially non-democratic institution within a democratic society\(^\text{13}\). Hence the fundamental question raised by Plato in The Republic and many times recited since: ‘Who guards the guards’? Failures in the practice of the democratic control of the ‘guards’ raise difficult theoretical if not ontological questions about the nature of civil-military relations and their implications on the values of modern but ever-militant civil society\(^\text{14}\).


\(^{12}\) See: ‘Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards’, op. cit. This book contains collection of essays on situation of civil-military relations in most CEE countries.


On one hand, the civil control over the military can be considered as a prerequisite for the democratic rule, on the other hand, the civil control itself occurs as the result of a consolidated democratic political system. *Raison d’être* of the civilian control is to make security and defence matters subordinate to major purposes of a given nation, rather than the other way round. The purpose of the Armed Forces is to serve and defend the society from which they are drawn, not to restrict it\(^{15}\). This is why it is of crucial importance for transitional democracies to develop relevant procedures and tools of the civil control over the Armed Forces. Various authors argue for different requirements of the civil democratic control to be efficient. However, most of them agree on the following three sets of criteria that must be met to make it functional:

- democracy as such must be a given within the state: the rule of law, separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, human and civil rights and liberties, free democratic elections are all crucial elements for mere functioning of the civil control;
- clear subordination of the Armed Forces to the Government and accountability to the Parliament (which in turn implies the accountability to the people);
- political neutrality of the Armed Forces and abstention from any interference with internal affairs, ensured by legal punishments for violations of the civil control, credibly backed up by other armed institutions (police and security services) as a countervailing power.

We will further argue that all these criteria are fulfilled within the Lithuanian institutional settings.

2. Institutional settings for the civil control over the Lithuanian Armed Forces

The transition towards democratic structures and procedures in Lithuania to a large extent was a story of success: with the democratic constitutional order firmly established, the military establishment subordinated to the civilian authority and accountable to the legislators, and relatively strong political neutrality of the Armed Forces, there is no question or doubt whether there is the civil democratic control of the Armed Forces in Lithuania or not. However, the record of its actual performance is another matter, which requires a more detailed examination. In order to do this, two intertwined dimensions must be tackled: legal and institutional framework of the democratic control of the military and functional relationship between the national defence system and the state’s defence and foreign policies, as well as the role of the military in domestic policy and within the society. We will first focus on the institutional settings of the Lithuanian national defence establishment: 1) constitutional and legal bases for civil control; 2) executive control of the LAF and 3) parliamentary oversight of the activities of both: executive authorities and the armed structures. Building on this analysis, we will then discuss implications for Lithuanian foreign and defence policy.

\(^{15}\) This clause is firmly embedded in Lithuanian law as well: the Law on the Basics of the National Security explicitly states that the Armed Forces shall be loyal to the Republic of Lithuania, its Constitution, serve the State and society, obey the government democratically elected by the Lithuanian citizens (see: Chapter 18 of the Law. English translation of the Law may be accessed via internet at the following web address: http://www.kam.lt/en/main.php?cat= ministerija&sub=6 ).
2.1. Legal framework

The rule of law principle is essential precondition for the implementation of
democratic control of the Armed Forces\(^{16}\). Moreover, the rule of law is an equally
important premise for democratic control of the Armed Forces both in old democracies and transitional states. The constitutional and legal provisions on the competen-
cies and responsibilities of different state institutions with regard to the defence establishment and mechanisms of supervision and accountability are of crucial im-
portance for any democratic state.

It is obvious that there was no legislative basis whatsoever regulating national
security and military matters prior to the adoption of the Constitution on 13 October
1992\(^{17}\). The Constitution was also not very explicit on the subject. However Chapter
XIII of the Constitution did establish basic provisions of the national defence. According to Article 140 of this Chapter, the State Defence Council, consisting of the
President (the Chair of the Council), the Prime Minister, the Chair of the Parlia-
ment, the Minister of National Defence and the Commander of the Armed Forces,
discuss and coordinate the main issues of the national defence. The same Article
clearly and unambiguously establishes direct responsibility of the Government, the
Minister of National Defence and the Commander of the Armed Forces to the Parlia-
ment for the management of the Armed Forces of Lithuania. This provision may be
considered the legal cornerstone of the civil control in Lithuania. Article 140 also
names the President as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Lithuania
and forbids the appointment of an active serviceman as the Minister of National
Defence. Among other important provisions, the Constitution establishes the right
duty of the Seimas to impose the martial law, declare mobilisation, decide on the
usage of the Armed Forces for the defence of the Homeland or on the implementa-
tion of international commitments (see Article 142 of the Constitution).

After these fundamentals were laid down, a more explicit and detailed legisla-
tive basis was slow to develop causing certain practical-technical difficulties to the
formation of the National Defence System. Paradoxically enough, the civil control
was the guiding principle in the development of the Lithuanian National Defence
System despite the lack of legal basis and the absence of clear understanding of the
very notion of what the civil control implies to the civil - military relations. As
mentioned before, Lithuania as well as two other Baltic States, started the formation
of their respective Armed Forces from scratch. Needless to say, civilian authorities
were in the lead of this process. The civilian leadership, for example, prevented the
ill-designed practice of establishing the Commander of the Armed Forces as the
main person guiding and controlling the Armed Forces. Although such a position did
develop in the structure of the national defence establishment in 1993 (partly due to the
historical legacy), it was directly subordinated to the MND\(^{18}\).

\(^{16}\) For comprehensive study of legal aspects of civil control of the military see: ‘Legal Framing of the

\(^{17}\) English version of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania may be accessed via internet at
the following web address: http://www3.lrs.lt/e-bin/eng/prcps2?Condition1=21892&Condition2=

\(^{18}\) In common practice of Western countries the Head of the Armed Forces is the Chief of Defence
(CHOd). In Lithuania the duties of the CHOd are split between the Chief of Defence Staff, the
Commander of the Armed Forces and the Land (Field) Forces Commander.
However, it was not until the adoption of the Law on the Basics of National Security in 1996 that the practical achievements of the civil control were embedded in what is now considered to be the quintessential law of the national security of Lithuania. Chapter 8 of this Law elaborated and developed the provisions of the Constitution concerning the civil control. The Chapter reinforces the constitutional provision that all decisions on defence policy and the Armed Forces are to be made by the democratically elected civilian government, adding that defence policy and defence expenditure must be made public. It also states that not only the Minister of National Defence may not be an active serviceman, but the same also applies to the Minister of Internal Affairs, their Vice-Ministers and the Director of the State Security Department. The Law explicitly establishes the main principles and procedures of the executive command and control over the Armed Forces. The Seimas in its own right is entitled to the parliamentary control, regulating by law and disciplinary statutes the activities of the Armed Forces and other national security institutions, including the State Security Department and the police force. However, the Law failed to establish a clear definition of the parliamentary oversight and provided only limited tools of accountability and control.

The legal basis of the national security of Lithuania was further consolidated with the adoption of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence and the Military Service in 1998. Only now it was explicitly established in a legal act that the Seimas determines the amount of funds to be allocated for the development of the Armed Forces, the acquisition of weapons and other support equipment. The Law once again emphasized that the national defence policy and allocation of funds approved by the Seimas for defence must become part of the public record. The Law did not introduce anything new in terms of executive control just paraphrasing provisions established by the Law on the Basics of National Security.

The Military Defence Strategy, which was approved by the State Defence Council in October 2000, was by no means innovative in terms of specific provisions of the civil control. However, the document established the democratic civilian control over the LAF as one of the four fundamental principles of the Lithuanian defence policy, along with deterrence, total and unconditional defence and Euro-Atlantic solidarity with regard to collective defence. It is noteworthy, that priority among these was given to the civil control highlighting it as the cornerstone of the Lithuanian defence policy.

The formation of the legal system of national security was crowned by the adoption of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania on 28 May 2002. As all legal provisions concerning the civil control over the LAF were already in place, the Strategy only reiterated that the democratic control is one of the basic concepts of the Lithuanian defence policy. In spring 2002, officials of the MND declared the Partnership Goal of the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP) regarding the application of the legal system completed. However, the process of the formation of the legal basis was not so smooth as one may assume: it took a dozen years to adopt the National Security Strategy, which should have been the basic initial document of the national security policy and planning. On the other hand, the formation of the legal system should be considered as a continuous process rather than a final definite outcome.
The mere existence of a constitutional and legal framework for the democratic control over the Armed Forces may be seen as a sufficient condition for meeting formal democratic criteria. However, in practice it may not function at all if it is not set up in a democratic environment, where efficient democratic political institutions are a given and a conscious civil society is at least emerging if not yet in place. The major problem the states in transition and Lithuania among them face is not the absence of legal norms, but first and foremost their unsatisfactory or ill-defined implementation. There is a scope of political, social, technical and even cultural limitations to the legal framework as a means to execute democratic control over the national security sector. These are examined below.

2.2. The executive chain of command and control

The central principle of the civil democratic control over the military is that the Armed Forces must under any circumstances remain clearly subordinated to the Government. The authors consider the following principles as the main minimal requirements for the functioning executive control over the Armed Forces:

1) a clear chain of command with civilian leaders at the head;
2) a civilian Minister of Defence and the Ministry itself at least partly staffed by civilians;
3) subordination of the Defence Staff to the Ministry of Defence.

All these elements are in place within the National Defence System of Lithuania. The chain of command of the National Defence System of Lithuania is provided in the chart below.

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In democratic countries the armed services usually owe ultimate allegiance to the Head of State as the embodiment of the nation\(^{15}\). Lithuania is no exclusion: the President of the Republic of Lithuania is the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian

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Armed Forces. In the event of an armed attack against the State or when a threat arises to the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of the State, the President makes an immediate decision on defence against the armed aggression, introduces the martial law, declares mobilization and submits these decisions to the Seimas for approval\textsuperscript{20}. Besides these shared responsibilities, the President chairs the State Defence Council; upon the approval of the Seimas he also appoints the Commander of the Armed Forces and upon the approval of the Minister of National Defence appoints the Field (Land) Force Commander, grants high military ranks (ranks of colonel and higher) and decorates distinguished military personnel with orders.

It is obvious that the President cannot and should not personally run every aspect of the command over the Armed Forces. The Government through the Minister of National Defence carries out direct control over the military establishment. The Government as such, however, performs rather few yet important functions of the executive control. The Government or its authorized institution issues resolutions on supplying the Armed Forces, procurement of weapons, and the development of a logistical base of support within the National Defence System\textsuperscript{21}. Besides these general functions, the Government has no other specific role in carrying out civil control. After all, this is what the Minister of National Defence stands for – there needs to be a clearly defined person being fully responsible within the Government for all defence matters on whom the nation and the Parliament on one hand, and the Armed Forces on the other, can rely\textsuperscript{22}.

Indeed, the Minister of National Defence of Lithuania may be considered as the central figure of the whole national defence establishment and the MND as the central institution thereof. The Minister is fully responsible for the implementation of defence policy, development of the National Defence System and the international defence-related cooperation\textsuperscript{23}. As it was already mentioned, the Minister and the Vice-Minister can’t be active servicemen. However, the “civilianisation” of the ministerial personnel does constitute a challenge for the civilian executive control over the military. A shortage of civilian personnel with relevant defence expertise was a chronic problem throughout the last decade, as a result military personnel held key positions in the Ministry and made key defence policy decisions\textsuperscript{24}. Although the goal of the personnel management policy is to achieve an optimum balance between the civilian and military staff, the current balance with 52 % of the personnel being civilian and 48 % - military is not satisfactory. Furthermore, the practice of appointing active military servicemen as heads of key policy departments (for example, NATO Department and Defence Policy and Planning Department) is an ill-designed

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\textsuperscript{21} See the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and the Military Service, Chapter 7, English version at the following web address: http://www.kam.lt/en/main.php?cat=minsterija&sub=6
\textsuperscript{22} M. Quinlan, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{24} V. Urbelis, T. Urbonas, 'The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: the Case of Lithuania', op. cit., pp. 117-118
endeavor hardly reconcilable with the principle of the civil control. The underlying cause of such personnel policy was lack of experienced and qualified civilian personnel with relevant background. In the future, however, it should not be an excuse anymore with an increasing number of young civilian specialists with relevant education graduating from Lithuanian and/or Western universities and eventually gaining necessary experience in the National Defence System. Policy of the “civilianisation” of Ministry personnel must be carried on, yet it is not to say that professional military expertise is not necessary within the Ministry - in certain matters it is irreplaceable. However it is an imperative principle of the civil control that decision making in defence policy is a prerogative of civilian officials.

Another tier of the executive chain of command and control of the Armed Forces consists of the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Defence Staff – the main military body guiding the preparation and development of the Armed Forces. With the review of the structure of the Armed Forces being carried out in accordance with NATO standards the Commander may be seen as questionable25. Although initially the laws envisaged a very important role for the Commander, most of the 23 functions of this position set out in the Law on the Organisation of the Armed Forces and the Military Service are in practice delegated to and carried out by either the Chief of Defence Staff or the Land Force Commander.

The Defence Staff is considered to be an integral part of the MND. Although the principle of subordination of Defence Staff to civil authorities (i.e. the Minister and Vice-Minister) is observed, in practice certain questions about the ‘integrity’ may be raised. Indeed, sometimes the Defence Staff and the Ministry appear to work as two separate institutions rather than an integral body. Some of these problems are attributable to the lack of coordination. Formally, the Defence Staff is subordinated to the Commander of the Armed Forces while he in turn reports to the Minister. In practice, this means an intermediate tier of command that aggravates the command, control and communication link between the Ministry and the Defence Staff rather than facilitates it. In the worst case, this position may become a source of friction. The Commander of the Armed Forces is a political appointee, nominated by the President upon the approval of the Seimas for a 5-year term of service, while the Minister is appointed for a 4-year term but in fact his term in office depends on the political situation in the Parliament, which is fluid at best (12 Governments have changed in the 12 years of independence).

To conclude, it should be made clear, that the said shortcomings of the executive control do not in any way threaten the stable and positive overall situation of civil-military relations within the National Defence System in general and the democratic control over the Armed Forces in particular.

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25 In most NATO member countries the position of the Commander of Armed Forces does not exist. Chief of Defence Staff in most cases is the supreme military authority.
2.3. Parliamentary oversight

If in the case of the executive chain of command and control there are clearly identifiable requirements, usually common to most democratic states with minor nuances, there are wide differences in the ways the elected legislature performs the parliamentary oversight. The role of the Parliament may differ from active involvement in every aspect of defence policy and military affairs even making executive decisions (such as weapons procurement or participation in an international operation) to mere monitoring and awareness of the endeavors undertaken by the Government. Whatever the actual arrangements, the parliamentary control over the military is usually twofold: the Parliament provides for the general oversight of the Armed Forces; at the same time, the Parliament must ensure control over the executive authorities (the President and the Government / MND) implementing defence policy.

Today, all legal premises for effective parliamentary control over the security sector are in place in Lithuania: there is a sufficient quantity and quality of laws and legal norms establishing procedures for the parliamentary oversight. However, this area of the civil control notwithstanding its crucial role actually faces some major difficulties and shortcomings. *A priori* it should be noted that some of these problems are inherent in many other democratic states both mature and transitional.

The Law on the Basics of National Security has established the main functions of the Parliament in ensuring the civil control over the defence sector: the Seimas determines the organisation, development, armament needs of and assignations to the Armed Forces. As J. K. Giraldo put it in a vivid manner, “the power of the purse provides civilians with a key lever of control over the military: government preferences are more likely to be taken into account when they are backed by the provision or withholding of resources”\(^{26}\). Indeed the Parliament has the ultimate power to allocate budgetary expenditures. Once again, when it comes to the actual management of defence financial resources, the picture becomes somewhat blurred. Although the final approval of the States’ budget (and thereof defence budget) is maintained by the Seimas, in practice the possibilities of the parliamentarians to significantly alter the expenditure allocations are rather limited due to the lack of knowledge and expertise. It is obvious that the civilian and military officials of the MND are better informed about particular needs of the Armed Forces and better prepared to protect financial claims of the military. However, it is also obvious that certain ministerial claims for State’s assignations might be exaggerated or not of primary importance. Given limited financial resources of Lithuania and an urgent need to balance the State’s budget, the efficient and rational allocation of funds for defence purposes is an imperative.

One can observe that the national defence establishment is becoming a consolidated and strong lobbying institution, which sometimes behaves as a lobbying group rather than an impartial governmental institution. The following instance also prompts to such a conclusion. At the end of every year the MND submits the draft Law on the

Principle Structure of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Lithuania. This is an important annual document setting limit numbers of the personnel in the Armed Forces, including conscripts, professionals, non-commissioned officers and officers. Every year, heated discussions revolve around this Law in the Parliament with different opinions being raised as to what kind of the Armed Forces Lithuania needs: a small professional force or a large conscript Arm. Any attempts made by the parliamentarians to amend the draft Law are usually met by strong opposition from the representatives of the Ministry, bearing on the assumption that any changes in the numbers proposed by the MND would ruin long-term defence planning and would be disastrous to the whole national defence establishment. In the end of the day, the Seimas usually adopts the Law without any amendments. The conclusions that follow from this example are rather mixed. On one hand, it is evident that the national defence establishment is becoming a strong lobbying group seeking to maintain autonomy on certain defence policy matters and the structure of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the officials of the National Defence System seem to comply with the rules of the political process set by the democratically elected authorities. They never infringed the rules of lobbying for the legitimate interests of their institution. This should be regarded as a positive trend in the ongoing formation of the political system, however time is needed for such behavior to become a routine inherent in the civic political culture of Lithuania. Besides, the line between the legitimate lobbying and unlawful interference is extremely thin and therefore should be observed with adequate caution.

The process of drafting and approving the National Security Strategy - the most important document on national security - may be presented as yet another symptomatic illustration of imbalanced relationship between the Government/MND and the Parliament. The Seimas had little opportunity to influence the whole process. On one hand, the actual drafting of the Strategy has been carried out within a small group of experts from governmental institutions (the MND, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Security Department) with little public knowledge or any significant interaction with the Parliament. The Government submitted the final product to the Seimas for a rather symbolic approval. The question arising here is that of the leverage between the efficiency and legitimacy: the former should not be sought at the expense of the latter. Some balanced combination of the two must be found.

The authors of this research believe that the underlying cause of the above-discussed issues is the lack of expertise. There is indeed an urgent problem of experts and advisers to the parliamentarians. However, it should be noted that this problem is inherent to many new democratic states. Few civilians in most transitional democracies have the knowledge and understanding of the military affairs to serve as civilian-defence policy experts27. Moreover, civilian expertise is an urgent need given the current post-Cold War security environment. The revolution in military affairs, which is taking place worldwide is based on high-tech sophisticated technologies and favors smaller, mobile forces. This is the target goal of the ongoing review of the LAF as well. Any reform (and reform in the defence sector even more so) may trigger sensitive social issues such as wages and employment. Although downsizing of the LAF is

27 For further argumentation see: L. W. Goodman, op. cit.
not on the agenda of the Lithuanian defence policy, however it is sought to limit spending on the personnel to not more than 50 % of the defence budget, reallocating resources to procurement and defence infrastructure\textsuperscript{28}. For the reform to go on smoothly, civilian authorities must understand military needs, as well as military officers have to be aware of the necessity of political decisions taken by civilians. This is why civilian expertise is crucial for efficient functioning of the democratic control.

Another problematic issue of the democratic control is that of transparency in procurement. The Parliament does not have any role in procurement process whatsoever. It is not to say that the Parliament should interfere when the Government is purchasing radios or shoes for the LAF. Yet when a pending tender of some major weapons amounts to a considerable portion of the defence budget, the Parliament should at least be notified and at best should take the decision on procurement. This is a common practice in many Western societies and some of CEE countries. Although this way the process of procurement would be prolonged with possible postponements and even cancellations, it would ensure transparency and accountability, preventing obscure tenders and ever-feasible corruption. But once again, at this point the Seimas lacks the necessary expertise, and the LAF would be the one that would suffer at the expense of more transparent and allegedly “better” democratic oversight\textsuperscript{29}. If improvement in terms of civilian expertise within the Parliament took place, a certain role for the Seimas in procurement process would be imperative.

Last but not least the issue that needs to be addressed in the context of parliamentary oversight is the democratic control over security structures other than the LAF, first and foremost intelligence services. The role of the Parliament in this sphere is also limited partly due to objective reasons. Activities of the intelligence services have to do with sensitive issues of the national security of the State and State secrets above all. Therefore, the civil control over these services requires different arrangements than that of the Armed Forces or the police force. Chapter 20 of the Law on the Basics of National Security contends that the State Security Department, an institution conducting foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence, is accountable to the Seimas and the President of the Republic. The budget, resources, methods and equipment of the Department are considered a State secret. Therefore, the Seimas exercises parliamentary control over the Department’s activities in compliance with the requirements of the protection state secrets.

The Second Department of the Operational Services under the auspices of the MND is an institution conducting military intelligence and counter-intelligence. Up to date, the Parliament did not have any role in controlling this Department, which is directly responsible to the Minister of National Defence. Without any parliamentary oversight in place, under certain circumstances this Department may become a source of uncontrolled political power and may be used in inappropriate ways. Although


\textsuperscript{29} The authors here would like to draw on the example of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, which recently failed to complete a major tender of procurement of Swedish Gripen fighters. Due to the politicization of the issue and apparent lack of defence experts in the Parliament, the decision has been postponed to the newly elected government, which is likely to choose another supplier.
the likelihood of such a course of events is extremely small, a relevant and acceptable mechanism of parliamentary oversight of this institution (perhaps similar to the one applied to the activities of the State Security Department) must be established.

Institutional arrangements of the civil control over the military are just one side of the whole story. The State’s domestic, foreign and defence policy is another important dimension of the democratic control that sometimes tends to be overlooked.\(^{30}\)

3. Lithuanian foreign and defence policy: implications for the democratic control

While in case of domestic policy civil-military relations do not pose any significant trouble (the military are more or less efficiently prevented from interfering into internal political affairs) foreign policy and defence policy in particular are somewhat more contentious issues.

If defence policy is to be understood in broad terms as the overall development of the Armed Forces, encompassing defence budgeting, force structure, arms procurement as well as military defence strategy and planning, most of these elements were already discussed throughout the article. To summarize, the basic feature of the Lithuanian defence policy is a certain balance between a strong civilian leadership over general policy guidelines and the military retaining relative autonomy on certain exclusively professional military matters. The recent national political consensus over a long-term direction of the Lithuanian defence policy deserves a special mention. In May 2001, the parliamentary parties of Lithuania signed an agreement on defence policy priorities for the period 2001-2004\(^{31}\). This national accord finally and irreversibly ended a decade-long ever-reemerging dispute about the direction the Lithuanian defence policy should take. The document stipulated that ‘the national security and defence system of Lithuania are developed as part of the common European security and trans-Atlantic defence systems’. The parties also agreed on a stable defence financing at 2% of GDP for the period 2002-2004.

With civilians being appointed to top positions of the National Defence System, military officers have little to no opportunity to significantly alter the general direction of the defence policy. At the same time, certain issues like force structure, defence plans or intelligence require professional military expertise while civilian interference should be limited to mere oversight. In the case of foreign policy, the role of the military is even more limited, yet fairly important. First of all it has to do with the use of a military force outside the Homeland. There is a widely spread stereotype that the military are more prone to see military threats and use armed force in solving international disputes than their civilian counterparts. Some argue this is the reason why a strong democratic civilian control becomes so vital for preser-

\(^{30}\) For example, the cited article by V. Urbelis and T. Urbonas did not elaborate on this problem at all.

ving peace. Valid or not, this assumption does not pose any trouble to Lithuania. All foreign policy decisions are firmly in the hands of civil authorities. According to the Constitution (Chapter 84) the President takes main decisions on the foreign policy and together with the Government implements them. All decisions on the use of the Armed Forces are made by the Parliament and in an emergency case by the President (and later approved by the Parliament). Although the LAF did not participate in any combat encounter with an enemy after the restoration of the independence, since 1994 Lithuanian troops have been taking part in peace support missions, including UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR and most recently KFOR. The defence establishment is also directly represented abroad via the institution of the defence attaché32. Activities of the latter, however, are limited to bilateral defence-related cooperation.

A proper analysis of the implications of the civil control over foreign and defence policy of Lithuania may not be detached from the international context. Democratic control in transition countries faces double challenges: it needs to be introduced and implemented for the first time in national settings and it longs to catch up with the new developments in supra-national setting that is being created in the Western security community33. Indeed, incentive given by the cooperation with NATO has played an important role in establishing the legal framework of the civil control over the defence sector in CEE countries and Lithuania among them. It should be noted however, that Western patterns were neither blindly copied nor were they directly applied in transition states given the varying local features and peculiarities of national defence systems.

Sometimes the concept of the civil control is misinterpreted by the general public or media as a NATO requirement which otherwise the State would not need to observe. Instead it is rather a crucial de facto prerequisite without which NATO membership of one or another country and the actual requirements it should meet would not even be considered. Moreover, the civil democratic control over the military is crucial for mere existence of the democratic constitutional order. However, the international context and the implications of outside pressures may not be neglected as well. There is a basic consensus among NATO member states that the Alliance shall not impose common solutions and models of the democratic control over the Armed Forces to other countries. NATO attempts to combine and reconcile the principles of state sovereignty, democratic control and multinational military structure. NATO’s PARP under the Partnership for Peace (PiP) program along with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) may be considered as facilitating vehicles for introducing democratic standards in defence establishments of partner and aspirant states. Therefore, pursuing NATO membership as the strategic goal of the Lithuanian defence policy continues to have a considerable impact on the development of civil-military relations in the country.

Another factor of external influence on foreign and defence policy is the process of the integration of Lithuania into the EU. Lithuania expects to join this organi-

32 Up to date Lithuania has accredited 8 defence attachés in 16 NATO member countries, 9 in partner countries, and has military representatives in NATO and the EU.

sation in 2004. Due to the supranational character of the EU, implications of its membership on Lithuanian foreign and defence policy allegedly should differ from those of NATO membership. Lithuania has already closed the negotiation chapter on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) undertaking certain commitments in this regard. However, having in mind the latent character of the CFSP formation process and lack of the collective defence dimension, NATO membership is considered to be the cornerstone of the national security of Lithuania in the future and therefore military standards of the Alliance prevail in the ongoing development of the LAF.

4. The Armed Forces and the Society

The domestic political function and position of the military within the society forms one of the core components of civil-military relations35. Above all the Armed Forces have to be accountable to the society they were created to defend. However, one has also to bear in mind, that the ideal of the democratic control is a two-way process, a constant exchange between the Army and the society, not one where politicians simply dictate to soldiers36.

The Law on the Basics of National Security states that “the national defence policy and defence expenditure shall be public knowledge”. In line with this provision, the MND has undertaken what one may call the strategy “of going public”. Different booklets, brochures and posters are aimed at increasing public awareness of the defence affairs in general and NATO integration in particular. The Ministry also finances editions of specialized literature: the newsletters - “Krašto apsauga” (“National Defence”), “NATO žinios” (“NATO News”), the monthly and quarterly magazines “Karys” (“The Soldier”), “Kardas” (“The Sword”), “Trimitas” (“The Trumpet”). The relations between the national defence establishment and the public media are not ideal, but there is no evidence of tension between the two either. The media in general supports the course of Lithuanian’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and therefore avoids severe criticism of the national defence and security policy. Yet there is an evident lack of analytical articles on the LAF, NATO integration and similar matters. Minor accidents within the Armed Forces usually attract much more media attention than some important international exercises taking place on the Lithuanian soil. This problem is attributable to the lack of expert journalists in military affairs and the immature state of Lithuanian journalism as a whole.

The Armed Forces, in their turn, carry out “the open door” policy by organising and participating in many social events on different formal (National festivals) and informal (for example, presentations of movies on military themes) occasions and above all the celebration of the Day of the Armed Forces – 23 November. During such events, both the military and civilians have an opportunity of direct intercourse. Exhibitions of military transport, hardware and weapons, a huge bowl of the so-called “military porridge” and similar attractions as nothing else enhance mutual understanding and trust between the society and the Armed Forces.

35 See: A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Forster, op. cit. p. 6
36 Ch. Donnelly, op. cit.
Another not so visible yet very important area of civil-military cooperation is search and rescue operations. Every now and then, civilian institutions call for the help of the Armed Forces in cases of natural disasters and accidents: floods, storms etc. Sometimes as a sign of goodwill or as a part of training exercises some military units assist people by building pontoon bridges and providing similar help.

The last but not least important issue of civil-military relations is the role of the so-called third sector non-governmental organisations (NGO). Although the participation and influence of the NGO on the discourse of civil-military relations and on defence policy issues was rather limited up to date, their informal role is increasing. One of the most prominent NGO is the Lithuanian Atlantic Treaty Association (LATA), which organises round table discussions and conferences on different aspects of the Lithuanian integration into NATO. The Institute of International Relations and Political Science and the Institute of Strategic Studies under the auspices of the Military Academy are emerging as “think tanks” on strategic issues of the national security and defence. For example, in June 2002 the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (based in Washington D.C.) prepared an extensive study ‘Lithuania’s Security and Foreign Policy Strategy’.

All these efforts contribute to increasingly favorable attitude of the society to both the LAF and NATO. The dynamics of the polls show that the trust of the public in the military was constantly rising throughout the last decade. According to the current public polls, the Armed Forces of Lithuania constantly rank fourth among social institutions with 40-46% of public approval (trailing only behind the Church, the media and the President, but surpassing health care, social insurance, police, the courts and the Government)\(^6\). In addition, about 60% of the population support Lithuania’s NATO membership bid.

One of the indicators of the growing popularity of the Armed Forces and the military profession itself is the increasing competition among those willing to enter the Military Academy of Lithuania. The entrance competition to this academic institution is one of the biggest in the country. One could even contend that the profession of a military officer is becoming a respectable and the Armed Forces – an indispensable part of the Lithuanian society.

It is noteworthy, however, that in the early years of the independence there was a widespread public disillusionment and negative attitudes towards the Armed Forces generated by some criminal offences, involving corruption and financial machinations, committed by the military or defence officials\(^7\), mostly those connected with the Soviet past. Other incidents were related to a high degree of politicization of the Voluntary Service of the National Defence (VSND) - paramilitary force, at the time almost personally loyal to the right wing Homeland Union and its leader V. Landsbergs. Upon the appointment of L. Linkevičius the Minister of National Defence at the end of 1993, the course was taken towards complete and irreversible depoliticization of the LAF, and the VSND was eventually reorganized and integrated into the structure of the regular Armed Forces.

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\(^6\) On 18th of May 2002 the Armed Forces of Lithuania favored 42.6% of public confidence (see: ‘Lietuvos rytas’, 18 May 2002, No. 113)

\(^7\) For more details, see: V. Urbilis and T. Urbonas: ‘The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: the Case of Lithuania’, op. cit., pp. 110-111
Today Lithuanian military are barred from the participation in the political life of the country. First of all, this clause has to do with membership in political parties. However, the dichotomy citizen-soldier is not an easy issue to handle even for consolidated democracies. There is no doubt that certain things civilians can do are not proper to the military. However, there is another side to the story: basic human rights which should not be undermined under any circumstances. The freedom of speech and the right of self-expression are at the very core of democracy. Democracy as such implies the protection and implementation of the basic human rights of individuals whether they are civilians or military officers. In this sense participation of the military in social and political life is one of the most contentious issues. These issues basically depend on the level of political culture and political consciousness of the civil society. It may require some time for democratic norms and values to be enshrined in everyday life of the Lithuanian society.

Conclusions

The civil democratic control over the military has been successfully established in Lithuania during the last dozen years. However, certain unresolved issues of civil-military relations remain a matter of further consolidation of the democratic political system and formation of the civil society in the country. Some of these have to do with the specific socio-political context of Lithuania, while other issues are of a more general nature, i.e. inherent to most democratic societies and states in transition.

The record of civil-military relations of the inter-wars period (1918-1940) and the military coup of 1926 barely had any significant influence on the process of the formation of modern Armed Forces of Lithuania in the nineties. After the restoration of statehood, Lithuania managed to create modern Armed Forces based on the model and virtues of Western democracies in a rather short period of time. The influence of Soviet legacy, which initially persisted within the military establishment, eventually faded away. Lack of historical experience of democratic governance was not that big an issue, as some may have feared initially. All the necessary legal mechanisms for the democratic civil control over the Armed Forces are firmly embedded in the Constitution and other laws regulating activities of the national defence establishment and the LAF. However, a thorough analysis of the civilian control over the Armed Forces in Lithuania enabled the authors of this article to highlight certain shortcomings rather than problems of the civil control, still persisting in the national defence establishment of Lithuania. ..............................................................

The main principles of the executive chain of command over the national defence establishment comply with the requirements of the civil control: only a civilian may be appointed the Minister of National Defence as the main person guiding the implementation of the defence policy; the Ministry itself is partly staffed by civilians and the Defence Staff is subordinated to the Ministry. However, further “civilisation” of the Ministry must be carried out and better coordination of the activities of the Defence Staff by the Ministry must be achieved.

The Parliament (Seimas) with some delays has passed all the main documents establishing and regulating activities of the National Defence System and the Armed Forces, including the Law on the Basics of National Security and the National Secu-
rity Strategy. The latter, however, given its crucial importance in establishing national security guidelines, did not receive due hearings in the Parliament before its approval. Certain ill-designed legal provisions or ill-defined implementation thereof, pose some obstacles to efficient democratic control over the National Defence System.

The Parliament also faces some objective difficulties in carrying out efficient oversight over the activities of both: institutions implementing the national security and defence policy and the Lithuanian Armed Forces. First and foremost these difficulties are attributable to the lack of relevant civilian expertise on military matters in the national Parliament. Shortage of civilian expertise in its turn triggers other problems: lack of transparency in the procurement of weapons and ever-feasible corruption; a relative autonomy of the national defence establishment on the matters such as the structure of the Armed Forces etc. The democratic oversight and control over the activities of other armed structures, especially intelligence services, does not receive due consideration among the leading decision makers and parliamentarians and, therefore, may pose some difficulties to the democratic political process of the country in the future.

Mass media, despite of chasing sensational news and the lack of professional expertise in military affairs, is favorable in regard to Lithuanian military. NGOs are also playing an increasingly important role in civil-military relations. Not least, social events organised by the LAF also contribute to a comparatively high (over 40%) public support of the LAF. But it is necessary to bear in mind that this support has never been tested by real crises and on a real battlefield in defence of the Homeland. Undesirable as it is, feasibility of the scenario, reminiscent of the events in 1940, always raises doubts (reasonable or not is another subject) within the society about the credibility and readiness of the LAF to defend it.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notwithstanding all the remaining shortcomings of the democratic control over the armed structures, the overall situation of civil-military relations and the role of the Armed Forces within the society are as positive as never before in the modern history of Lithuania.
The Content of the Strategic Dimension of Lithuania’s Economic Policy in a Comparative Perspective

This article analyses the concept, content, and historical experiences of strategic planning in modern economic policy-making. It does so also through the analysis of the case of Lithuania, which has recently undergone transformation from the centrally planned to the fully functioning market economy and now faces new challenges as a member-to-be of the European Union. The central thesis of this article is that the long-term competitiveness of the Lithuanian economy will be determined by its “micro” or enterprise-level policies, which, according to the effectiveness of implementation, will much depend on the capacity of Lithuanian institutions to manage the dilemmas of EU industrial policy.

Introduction

This article seeks to explore the concept of strategic planning in modern economic policy-making, which in the broadest sense can be understood as an intentional state intervention into economy. It also analyses the content of the strategic dimension in the Lithuanian economic policy-making during the recent transformation from the centrally planned to the fully functioning market economy. The article begins with a methodological distinction between the concepts of ‘strategy’ and ‘policy’. This distinction is then continued by a historical overview of the role of the state in economic policy-making, namely, through a comparative analysis of several types of state intervention, such as import substitution (Latin America), developmental (East and South East Asia), and the EU (combining neoliberal and welfare policies). It then analyses EU industrial policy as the management of dilemmas, or, in other words, reconciliation of seemingly mutually exclusive economic policy goals on both community and national levels. The article continues with the statement that a ‘correct’ (i.e. EU-compatible, defined through the “micro” or enterprise-level) understanding of competitiveness has been already established among Lithuania’s institu-
tions and market players. However, by using the Irish example the article concludes that this understanding alone will not suffice to achieve a long-term competitiveness of the Lithuanian economy. The prospects of Lithuania’s capacity to withstand the competitive pressure in the European Union to a large extent will depend on the capacity to manage the dilemmas of industrial and economic policies.

Economic strategy or economic policy?

The strategic dimension is increasingly penetrating the drafting vocabulary of Lithuanian institutions. During the period of 2000-2002, the Parliament (Seimas) adopted more legal acts implying the ‘strategic’ dimension than during the entire first decade of independence. Evidently, the concept of strategic planning is quite new for the country’s public administration and therefore it should come as no surprise that the variety of adopted ‘strategic’ documents almost matches the variety of the interpretations of the concept. The eve of Lithuania’s ‘strategic’ membership in the EU and NATO calls for the evaluation of the strategic approach and its manifestations in the country’s economic policy as well as the analysis of its substance and its shaping factors.

The difficulty in the interpretation of the content of strategic planning often results from the fuzzy distinction line between the concepts of ‘policy’ and ‘strategy’. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary\(^1\) provides several definitions for ‘policy’. The first one defines policy as “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions”. In another version, policy is “a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body”.\(^2\)

The same dictionary also defines strategy as “the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war”. Yet another, a more succinct definition presents strategy to be “an art of drawing plans for achieving certain goals”. Notice that the latter is rather closely linked with the definitions of policy. To summarise, strategy can be best defined as a coordinated set of actions for the attainment of a certain objective. The rationale of strategic planning is to empower a social actor to make the best use of available resources and opportunities by avoiding external threats. Strategy provides the direction and a long-term perspective for the operational activities (Keller, 1990)\(^3\).

Based upon these definitions, both strategy and policy concepts can be associated with logical structures underlying the decision making process of a state or organisation. In the case of Lithuanian public administration, it is not surprising at all that the distinction between the two concepts in many cases has been rather vague, because recently a number of new policy areas (e.g. small and medium enterprises, industrial competitiveness, regional/structural policies, etc.) have emerged anew or were redesigned completely. Also, as Lithuania only recently has undergone the transition from the principles of central to strategic planning, hence the proliferation of strategies and notions of what they imply.

\(^2\) Ibidem.
However, it must be emphasised that the underlying conceptual differences between the two concepts should not be overlooked because of apparently fuzzy conceptual boundaries. The central definition of ‘strategy’ clearly emphasises the ability to make use of the available resources for a purposeful implementation of the adopted policies. Thus, if policy is more concerned with procedural aspects, strategy deals with the direction and principles of actions. Strategy implies a systemic approach, which is not necessarily present in the definition of policy. To conclude, if policy can be defined as “a course of actions”, then strategy would mean the “co-ordinated entirety of action courses”.

Logically, economic strategy could be defined as the co-ordinated entirety of economic policies. National economic policy is in popular terms defined as “the government policy oriented to ensure the economic growth and collection of taxes”\(^4\) and is carried out through a variety of macro- and micro-level policies. The macroeconomic level mainly encompasses fiscal and monetary policies, while microeconomic is represented by industrial, small and medium enterprises, competition, innovation and technology, trade and investment, infrastructure (telecommunication, energy and transport) policies.

It thus becomes clear that the analysis of the country’s economic strategy should touch upon a very wide range of policies. Therefore, even a systemic evaluation of the country’s economic strategy demands certain concentration on the focal points. In this context, there is an intentional distinction between macroeconomic and microeconomic policies. Macroeconomic policies are mainly associated with the traditional economic functions of stabilisation and distribution, while microeconomic policies have more direct impact on the economic growth. Since the ultimate goal of national economic strategy is a sustained growth of economic competitiveness and, consequently, improvement of the standard of living, it is rational to focus mainly on ‘micro’ level policies and strategies.

It is widely agreed that structural competitiveness of national economy is determined by micro-level factors, such as investment into research and development, promotion of entrepreneurship, or even by the creation of new forms of cooperation, and not so much if at all by macroeconomic indicators (e.g. exchange or interest rates). This is not to imply or justify a potential disregard for macroeconomic policies. However, as Hughes and Hare (1991)\(^5\) tend to observe, the impact of macroeconomic policies on the economic restructuring and long-term competitiveness of enterprises remains rather limited. In this context, it seems appropriate to remember the notorious Stability (and ‘Growth’) Pact and the EU member states’ delicate search for a balance between the macroeconomic stability guarantees and preconditions for the ‘microeconomic’ dynamism.

These ‘micro-level’ policies are often covered by the general term of ‘industrial policy’, or in a more recent paradigm, ‘industrial competitiveness policy’. Despite some instrumental differences, both terms stand for the “government efforts to influence the industrial structure in order to promote productivity and economic


growth” (Bora et al., 2000). In this case, the term ‘industry’ covers not only manufacturing (as often misperceived in transitional economies), but also other productive sectors of economy, such as business services.

The article will continue with a search for manifestations of the strategic approach and its influence on Lithuania’s economic transformation process. The role of the industrial competitiveness policy in the wider context of economic transformation will be explored too. Finally, the impact of European integration processes and the Single market framework on the substance of national economic strategy in terms of new challenges will be analysed. However, the analysis of dominant approaches to industrial policies would be useful also from the historical perspective before this endeavour.

From central to strategic planning

The strategic planning dimension in public administration, especially in its economic policy, takes a variety of forms even in the states with a consolidated market economy. The importance of such strategies is determined by the dominating economic ideologies, traditional national business and governance systems in a given country.

In the (neo)liberal Western economies, such as the United States or Britain, the raison d‘être of the industrial policy lies in the correction of market failures or the creation of (static) competitive advantages in the international trade. It is recognised that, in certain cases, the market effect may be suboptimal and needs to be compensated by the ‘corrective’ action from the state. For example, small and medium enterprises (SME’s), responsible for a substantial share of employment and flexibility of economic structures, find themselves disadvantaged in respect to large companies as regards, for example, market information or credit opportunities. This usually provides a sufficient justification for specific government programmes to support the informational-financial infrastructure for SME’s. The government also co-finance the innovation processes in enterprises given their overall importance for a sustained economic growth, whereas, however, markets alone may not guarantee the economic gains on the micro-level. Despite the prevailing liberal line of thinking, the US government had a substantial impact on economic competitiveness through federal financing of ‘national security’ R&D projects (Etzkowitz, Brisolla, 1999). Nevertheless, the substance of industrial policy is dominated by horizontal measures without priority sectors or enterprises and is combined with the balanced macroeconomic policy. In this line of thinking, spontaneous interactions of market forces and free competition rather than structured government policy remain the driving force behind competitiveness.

If approaches to industrial policy were located on a continuum, the (South) East Asian economies would represent the other extreme. They emphasise the proactive role of state institutions in promoting a sustained productivity growth. This role

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is reflected by the implementation of long-term development plans, in-depth industrial analyses and targeting the ‘priority’ sectors, systemic adaptation of imported models and technologies, and a close government-enterprise interaction. Japan or ‘Asian tigers’ have an established protectionist tradition in sheltering infant industries from the international competition. In this ideological line, an active state policy rather than free market mechanisms underlies the structural changes in industry (Kobayashi, 1989). For example, an unprecedented growth, annually averaging to 9 per cent, achieved by the South East Asian economies in 1965-1984, is to a large extent attributed to their successful assessment of local and international environment and the implementation of accordingly formulated export-oriented industrial strategies. On the other hand, the protectionist policies of Latin American states (e.g. Brazil or Argentina), focusing on the promotion of import substitutes and self-sufficiency of the local market did not ‘raise’ internationally competitive firms and sustained the productivity growth (Etzkowitz, Brisolla, 1999). Another systematic difference between the two cases was that in the case of the ‘Asian tigers’, the protectionist element was associated with the promotion of all-level national educational establishments, diminished social inequalities and increased funding for research and development.

Historical perspectives – import substitution and developmental states

Literature of political economy describes two main historical types of state-economy relations, namely, import substitution and developmental states. These types usefully describe economic policy-making in historic and regional terms. So while import substitution is characteristic of Latin America of the 1950’s – 1980’s, a developmental state best describes the rapid economic growth in East and South East Asian ‘tigers’ during roughly the same period.

Of course, different historical circumstances make it difficult to draw very detailed policy recipes from the experience of economic modernisation of other countries. Still, a historical excursion can be useful in order to grasp the options available, especially keeping in mind occasional references by Lithuanian policymakers to these regions. While statements about underused industrial capacities inherited from the Soviet Union were abundant at the early stages of the transition, it can be safely concluded that probably because of a high dependency on international financial organisations, in the Lithuanian case, import substitution of the Latin American scale would have been least likely.

Import substitution as a deliberate strategy of economic development was designed in Latin America in the 1950’s. It was based on the conclusion that the main obstacle for the rapid economic development of Latin America was its high dependency on exports of raw materials and imports of industrial and technological goods. It started out as a spontaneous response to the great depression before World War II and was consolidated in the 1960’s – 1970’s with a shift towards the production of

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consumer durables and development of heavy industry. From the mid-1970’s, some of Latin American countries (such as, for example, Mexico and Venezuela) began to complement import substitution with exports of oil, and in the 1990’s Latin America (with some populist exceptions) became a true student of the Washington consensus.

The initial (primary) stage of import substitution for consumer non-durables was characteristic of all developmental states, including the East Asian ‘tigers’. However, further stages of import substitution (culminating, as a rule, in the development of heavy industry) were observed only in Latin America and mainly because long-term interests of their governments (states) coincided with short-term interests of various social groups. A shift to the export-oriented economic policy in Latin America was impeded by well-entrenched distribution coalitions that led to a political stalemate. Various distribution coalitions (agrarian interest groups in control of main exports, anti-oligarchic coalitions composed of lower social classes and non-export agrarians, state elite, namely, military officers and state bureaucrats as well as local and international industrialists) were spared by the absence of World War II. They were further consolidated by the successful primary import substitution policy. None of these groups alone were strong enough to design and implement other economic programme than import substitution. This situation is typical in the absence of state autonomy.

The secondary import substitution policy is defined as capital and technology intensive industrialisation (e.g. automobiles, petrochemicals, steel, heavy machinery). This policy suffers from the following monetary and fiscal deficiencies. It overvalues local currency, thus encouraging sales of production in domestic markets. It relies on heavy foreign borrowing, and is based on ‘a cheap money policy’ - low interest rates, which aim to encourage investment into industry. In fact, it frequently results in excessive investment into the capital-intensive sector with excess capacity which is often wasted - the number of jobs created is smaller than otherwise might have been. Since, as it has been mentioned, capital and technology intensive strategies are at the very heart of this policy, heavy industry becomes a strategic sector. It draws disproportionately on national savings to create output for a relatively long period and usually at a very high cost. If high costs are subsidised, heavy industry becomes a permanent burden on the budget. If it is not, costs are off-loaded on the downstream manufacturing thus inflating their production costs. As there is no competition from imports, heavy industry becomes technically obsolete. As a rule, import substitution strategy also underinvests in agriculture. Agricultural goods are relatively underpriced in comparison to industrial goods - this causes outmigration from rural areas. Crucially, the secondary import substitution industrialisation inflicts a strong skew in consumption patterns:

Creating an industrial structure solely on the basis of the domestic market entailed producing an industrial output, which exactly matched the existing distribution of income, which usually meant a bundle of retail goods strongly skewed towards upper-income consumption. Thus, as with basic foodstuffs in agriculture, mass consumption was sacrificed to the redistribution of profits towards industry.9

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East and South East Asian economic policies after World War II can be best summarised as a guided development. A developmental state (in most literature synonymous to an autonomous state) usually possesses enough autonomy vis-a-vis society in pursuit of developmental aims and is capable of implementing developmental strategy. In other words, such state has enough powers of social control and free design.

There are four main indicators of state autonomy. First, historical superiority of the state over the society combined with a successful social engineering, for example, successful structural reforms at some stage - especially the land reform. Intentionally or not, they create an egalitarian social structure, which is necessary for a successful development because they destroy the existing distribution coalitions. Well-entrenched coalitions always are interested in maintaining the current social and economic order. The egalitarian social structure is a necessary condition for development. Economic policy is always tailored to the existing consumption patterns in a given society: when a country starts off with a high inequality, there is a big danger that production will be ‘upwardly skewed’. Countries sometimes do not develop not because they do not have resources, but because they misallocate them.

Second, developmental states are capable of coming up with a coherent developmental plan. Furthermore, they are flexible enough to adjust policy measures to the changing world markets (anything that benefits the development is acceptable). They possess sufficiently insulated bureaucracy to design and implement economic policies (although, retrospectively it can be said that autonomous states exhibit a blend of bureaucratic steering and corporatism). Third, developmental states are capable of extracting capital. After all, no development is possible without a back-up of sufficient resources to sustain growth. It is absolutely vital that a state has resources when developmental policies are changed, for example, from the import substitution industrialisation to export-oriented policies. Fourth, the development is guided in the sense that the state not only extracts resources, but it also lays down principles for capital allocation through investment strategies.

There were many attempts to juxtapose import substitution to developmental states. However, these two types are not completely opposites. On the one hand, historically developmental states also practised import substitution. To be true, this happened only in the early stages of industrialisation through consumer non-durables. On the other hand, while East Asia avoided state capture of the Latin American depth, eventually the relationship between businesses and bureaucracy in East Asia can hardly be described as very ethical. A critical analysis of the “tigers” growth shows that it most probably was “growth without development”. In other words, an impressive economic growth was achieved at the expense of stagnating political and democratic institutions and therefore in the long run such growth is not sustainable. Some analysts even question the economic prospects for East Asia by stating that their success was temporary and based on an extensive development that did not

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12 See, for example, Bieliūnaite, Z. (2001) Augimas be plėtros Pietryčių Azijos šalyse (Growth without Development in South East Asia), MA thesis (in Lithuanian), Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius.
match the productivity growth. Therefore, in the long run these states cannot be considered as serious rivals for Western Europe and North America\(^{13}\).

So the empirical observations of the past several decades hardly indicate a superior, not to mention the single best approach to industrial development. Both liberal and interventionist economic policies have shown different rates of growth in different stages of development. It is even possible to observe some trends of convergence in policy approaches. General external phenomena, such as globalisation and information society, bring about visible changes to national economic systems. The traditional liberal-interventionist classification becomes increasingly complex and overlapping, if not obscure.

On the one hand, there is a set of factors that point towards the growth of neoliberal ideas and market-oriented policies. From the legal point of view, global and regional liberalisation agreements make it increasingly difficult for the national governments to pursue interventionist policies of the 1970’s or 1980’s. Practical effectiveness of the protectionist approach in the time of fast technological changes and importance of global knowledge networks is also subject to serious doubt.

On the other hand, even the classical ‘liberal’ Western economies take into consideration the achievements of South East Asian states, stemming from a more co-operational-collectivist, long-term focused and integral approach to the economic development. A rather recent concern of their governments for ‘industrial strategy’ owes a lot to the East Asian success stories.

The need for the industrial strategy is now rarely being questioned in principle. Instead, another question is being raised – what should be an appropriate mix of industrial policies in a given local and international situation? Thus, despite the persisting differences in national economic systems, a growing consensus on the need for the strategic approach in managing economic development processes can be observed.

**European industrial policies: national and community levels**

Industrial policy in Europe must be discussed taking into consideration both national and community levels, as they both provide policy examples or guidelines for Lithuania and other EU candidate countries. There is a wide range of notions and definitions of industrial policy across the current EU member states. France and most of South European states have an established dirigiste economic policy tradition with state support to ‘strategic’ enterprises and economic/technological projects of ‘strategic importance’. On the other end of the scale are Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries with a more traditional emphasis on consumer markets as drivers of national economic competitiveness. Such classification may seem to be somewhat obsolete taking into consideration social aspects of business systems, especially those of ‘liberal’ Scandinavian welfare economies. However, one of the most complex and problematic for a linear generalisation is the German approach to industrial policy. According to Scott (1992)\(^{14}\), Germany takes a neutral

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\(^{13}\) See, for example, Krugman, P., “The Myths of East Asian Miracle”, http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/myth.html, accessed in September 1998. This article was also published in *Foreign Affairs*.

stance in the earlier-mentioned dichotomy of the consumer-producer orientation. By the aspect of close co-operation between state institutions and industrial structures as well as by its capacity to promote the establishment of agglomerates of hi-tech firms, German industrial policy would come closer to the Japanese case. On the other hand, the German government never, at least during the last 50 years, undertook interventionist actions of the South East Asian scale; moreover, until the late 1960's, German industrial policy could hardly be distinguished as a separate variable of economic policy.

Implications of the Community industrial policy for the national competitiveness

Given such a variety of national industrial policies, it is not surprising that the EU industrial policy has always had a complex and often vague content. It is possible to state that the European integration as such owes a lot to the sectorial industrial policy measures introduced at the time of “strategic” coal and steel industries. Of course, the emergence of such policy in the post-war Europe was preconditioned primarily by the calculus of high politics rather than economic policy. To some extent, it is still possible to observe the rudiments of the post-war industrial policy, if not in the substance of today’s EU policy, then at least in the aspects of legal classification. For example, the ‘Industrial policy’ chapter of EU screening lists for candidate countries includes only 13 directives, all of them a part of the European Coal and Steel Community legislation, which already expired in 2002. Naturally, one must ask whether all this means an end to the EU industrial policy.

Hardly so. It only shows that in a complex entity such as the European Union and in the time of a decreasing scope of the government economic intervention, industrial policy may no longer be perceived in its narrow traditional sense as direct state efforts to form the industrial structure through vertical measures. The EU competence encompasses a wide range of policies with a significant impact on enterprise competitiveness, but without being a part of the formal ‘industrial’ acquis. There is also an unequal distribution of competence between community-national and sub-national levels across different policy areas (see: Table).
EU industrial competitiveness policies, their instruments and levels of competence (adopted from Lawton, 1999)\(^{19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy instrument</th>
<th>Level of competence</th>
<th>Examples of policy areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D initiatives</td>
<td>EU+national</td>
<td>Framework programmes, Eureka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition rules</td>
<td>EU+national</td>
<td>Antitrust, monitor state aid and mergers and acquisitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade policy</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Antidumping, rules of origin, local content, voluntary export constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-promotion</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>Credit guarantees for export-led firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax incentives</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>Tax relief or exemptions for start-ups or for companies undertaking restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>Public sector contracts to firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and infrastructure</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Trans-European road, air, rail, sea, transport and communications networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and education</td>
<td>EU+national</td>
<td>Promotion of human capital, employment initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward investment incentives</td>
<td>National+sub-</td>
<td>Provision of low-cost green field sites; period of tax relief or immunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise policy</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Integrated programmes for SME’s, creation of the European Investment Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Article 157 of the Maastricht Treaty sets the legal ground for the EU industrial policy by stating that “the Community and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community’s industry exist”. The article sets four main policy directions: (1) speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes, (2) encouraging an environment favourable for undertakings, especially SME’s, (3) encouraging an environment favourable for the co-operation between undertakings, (4) fostering a better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development. Decisions in the Council require a unanimous support. The article does not provide the Community with legal powers to adopt measures that infringe the competition rules, thus preserving the superiority of the EC competition policy. The same article envisages that the EU industrial policy may be carried out through “other policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the Treaty”, as indicated in Table 1.

According to Darmer and Kuypers (2000)\(^{16}\), in relative terms, the EU is composed of ten interventionist and five liberal member states. However, given the prevailing interventionist attitudes, it may appear paradoxical that the EU industrial policy has remained largely liberal. The unanimity requirement has to a large extent prevented the introduction of pan-European interventionist measures. The Commission’s role in this context remains somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, it initiates policy measures that are primarily oriented to the establishment of the Single market by strengthening the realm of the four freedoms and competition policy. On the other hand, the Commission produces a number of sectorial industrial studies with recom-


recommendations for policy-makers that, in a more ‘favourable’ institutional environment could evolve into pan-European interventionist policies (Darmer, 2000)\(^7\). Besides, some examples of the EC industrial competitiveness policy indicate toward the communitarisation of protectionist elements. The examples could be controversial merger regulations, some aspects of trade policy or the EC technology policy, ‘Europeanised’ by French lobby groups.

It would be wrong to assume that the interventionist element was in the past alien to the EU industrial policy. Until the 1990’s, regular meetings of EU Ministers of Industry and Economy focused mainly on (protectionist) collective actions in ‘priority’ industrial sectors, such as aeronautics, data processing, mechanical or electrical engineering, shipbuilding, textile and paper industries. However, vertical measures did not prevent European industries from further losing a competitive edge in global markets and were continuously replaced by horizontal policy mechanisms. The developments in the EU over the last decade reflect the general paradigm shift from the sectorial ‘industrial policy’ to the horizontal ‘industrial competitiveness policy’ or ‘enterprise policy’ taking place in most OECD economies. It is also illustrated by the latest restructuring of the European Commission and the literal replacement of the Industrial policy DG with the Enterprise DG.

Therefore, now the EU industrial policy is predominantly influenced by a liberal Single market thinking, which is reinforced by institutional factors, such as a qualified majority voting. The European competitiveness strategy, adopted in Lisbon in 1999, sets the guidelines for the current EU industrial competitiveness policy. It formulates the strategic objective for the EU “by 2010 to become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world”. The scope of horizontal areas covered by the strategy is wide: (1) creation of the information society, (2) creation of the Europe-wide area for research and innovation, (3) improvement of business environment (SME’s), (4) completion and increased effectiveness of the Single market, (5) further integration and increased effectiveness of financial markets, (6) co-ordination of macroeconomic policies.

The Lisbon strategy objectives are implemented through the Multi-annual enterprise programme for 2001-2005, based on mainly two types of measures: horizontal financial (e.g. financial support to innovative SME’s) and informational-structural (information centres, benchmarking, best practice, etc.).

**Industrial policy as the ‘management of paradoxes’**

Various authors differ in the interpretation of complex policies influencing the industrial competitiveness in the EU. Some of them (e.g. Pitelis, 1994\(^8\)) hold that “during the last decade the EU industrial policy was a set of ad hoc created and not necessarily compatible policies”. Such inconsistencies are, for example, illustra-

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ted by the EU’s controversial approach to the firm size and its relationship to competitiveness. On the other hand, other authors (Gual, 1995, Darmer, 2000) indicate certain conflicting areas and treat them as a natural fact of the Community life.

It would be difficult to disagree with the arguments calling for transparency and consistency of policy measures. However, the existing controversies about policy directions need not to be over-dramatized. In a way, the very existence of these controversies is the raison d’être of the industrial competitiveness policy in a broad sense (as opposed to the narrow sectorial sense of the traditional industrial policy), whether national or European. In our view, some degree of policy conflicts is inevitable in a complex compromise-seeking system such as the EU.

The EU (and national) industrial competitiveness policy can be quite accurately defined as “management of paradoxes”. In practical terms, it means the necessity to ensure a fair competition in the internal market as well as the competitiveness of European firms in the global market. On the one hand, it is important to promote employment through small and medium enterprises, while on the other hand, not to disadvantage the growth of firms. On the one hand, it is necessary to promote the technological change inside the Community, while ensuring its social absorption. On the other hand, the promotion of the establishment of geographically condensed industrial clusters with high levels of productivity or innovation is desirable, but only being mindful of regional disparities or concentrated environmental pollution. Finally, the right balance between the measures of the external competitiveness of European economies must be found with those concerning their internal structural cohesion.

The solution of such dilemmas and paradoxes is an inseparable part of the strategic planning process. It is not surprising that the principles of strategic planning are probably most successfully introduced in the countries dominated by the integral-holistic thinking, such as East Asian countries, and, to some extent, Germany (Isaak, 1995). The economic systems of these countries can be described by the cohesive state-enterprise and worker-employee relationships, by their emphasis on the systemic welfare of stakeholders rather than on that of individual shareholders. The financial environment in these countries favours a long-term investment. In Japan this happens through a high savings rate, in Germany through a developed banking sector. According to Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2001), the creation of wealth is largely determined by the capacity to successfully manage dilemmas (paradoxes), i.e. to effectively balance the extremes and accordingly manage complex processes.

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It is natural that the opinions of researchers and different EU member states on the substance of industrial strategy are rather split. This is so mainly due to the fact that different countries seek to resolve different dilemmas, determined by their specific situation, the stage of economic development and the nature of their economic systems. Countries and organisations also tend to rely on their own historically successful practices, which still show a considerable degree of divergence.

It is therefore very likely that the competitiveness dilemmas resolved on the EU level provide a background, a supplement, but do not coincide with the national competitiveness dilemmas. This observation becomes of a particular relevance in the context of the forthcoming enlargement, claimed by many as unprecedented both by its substance and scope. We must ask ourselves whether the current EU industrial policies oriented to resolve the deindustrialisation, social welfare and ‘triadic’ competitiveness problems of the developed EU member states meet the economic restructuring challenges of the future members from Central and Baltic Europe. The scope of the strategic choices available to Lithuania (and to other future member states) and the capacities for their implementation should be analysed too. It is difficult to answer these questions without a prior consideration of the evolution of the strategic dimension in the context of the country’s economic transformation.

The EU impact on the path of economic transformation

The unprecedented nature of the forthcoming enlargement is to some extent reflected by an unprecedented European Commission’s influence on the economic policies of the candidate countries, going far beyond the usual framework of the acquis. The Commission exerted its influence as the guardian of the economic membership criteria adopted by the EU member states in the Copenhagen Summit in 1993. The economic membership criteria assess the readiness of the candidates to ensure the functioning of the market economy and the ability to withstand the competitive pressures of the EU internal market.

The dividing line between the functioning market economy and the ability to withstand competitive pressure criteria has always been thin. To some extent, the first criterion has to do primarily with the earlier mentioned macro-level policies, while the second targets micro-level policy issues. The market economy criterion is first of all associated with the establishment of market institutions and the implementation of the basic principles of market economy through (1) the creation of a legal system ensuring private ownership rights, free entry and exit from the market, (2) liberalisation of prices and trade, and (3) macroeconomic stabilization. The competitiveness criterion takes into account such variables as (1) functioning free market economy and macroeconomic stability, (2) human, physical and financial infrastructure, and perspectives for its development, (3) impact of government policies on competitiveness, (4) orientation of trade flows to the EU and (5) private capital share in GDP.

23 ‘Triadic’ competitiveness refers to the EU competitiveness policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world (and especially Japan and the USA).
It is evident that functioning market economy is considered as one of the variables in the operationalised concept of economic competitiveness. The nature of the EU impact on the economic transformation of candidate countries is very well reflected in the statement that the functioning market economy criterion should be satisfied before the competitiveness criterion. This requirement in principle supports the strategy of the market-based economic transformation. Thus, from the Commission’s perspective, competitiveness has always been the derivative of two factors: functioning market economy and, to a lesser extent, the level of legal approximation. There is, however, no hard empirical evidence to support the assumption that any of the two could somehow lead to an automatic structural adjustment and supply-side adaptation in the transition economies.

Although the Commission in principle recognises the conceptual difference between the functioning market economy and competitiveness criteria, its actual position has always favoured the market-driven restructuring over the structural intervention by national governments. For example, the list of short-term priorities in the Accession Partnership for Lithuania of 1999 included fiscal consolidation and promotion of enterprise competitiveness, completion of a large-scale privatisation and the restructuring of the banking sector. The later empirical evidence showed that, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, major attention was paid by the Commission to the macroeconomic stabilisation, which was actually achieved through an increased fiscal discipline (which, inter alia, resulted in the diminished funds for the competitiveness programmes). The restructuring of the banking sector was in fact synonymous to the privatisation of the two remaining state-owned banks. Another example could be the Law on Enterprise Restructuring, which was passed in early 2001 as a package-law with the new Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy. It was for a while scrutinised with suspicion in the Commission. Only after the Commission was confident that the law was passed to be a genuine instrument for the dialogue between the enterprises in trouble and their creditors and not for sustaining economically non-viable firms, it was included among the priorities into the Accession Partnership of 2001.

The main factors that influenced the Commission’s changed perception of Lithuania’s competitiveness perspectives were, in fact, the country’s ability to stabilise its macroeconomic situation after the Russian crisis, its progress in privatisation (not so much in restructuring), adoption of the new version of the Law on Bankruptcy (not so much the accompanying Law on Restructuring), and partially – the adoption of a medium-term industrial development policy paper (without a strong implementation track record).

To conclude, despite its attempts for a systemic evaluation of the candidate countries, the Commission could not avoid a certain linearity in its thinking and preference for some of the assessment criteria. This assumption, however, does not imply that, from the EU’s perspective, such preference was false or not well based. In our opinion, the emphasis placed by the Commission on the market-driven restructuring processes was determined by the following four factors. The Commission was acting first and foremost in order to ensure the proper functioning of the enlarged

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24 For example, candidate countries were invited to begin negotiations with the EU on entry terms after satisfying the first, while not necessarily fully meeting the second.

25 Accession Partnerships were individualised sets of EU priorities for candidate countries.
Single market. The external push for fundamental system changes in the economies of the candidate countries in their transition from the centrally planned to the market economy was needed even after most immediate measures of stabilisation in most cases successful to address macroeconomic problems (e.g. hyperinflation) at the outset of the transition were taken. The central planning system was discredited in the candidate countries, while the Commission did not trust the candidate countries’ administrative capacity to effectively manage the structural change. And last, in the absence of universal progress assessment methodologies and hard acquis in the field of competitiveness policy, a priority was given to the related but more objectively identifiable factors (in this case, to a well-defined Single market acquis or standard provisions of the IMF stabilisation package).

One should make an important observation that some of the EU priorities, such as, for example, privatisation and restructuring of companies, fiscal consolidation, adoption of bankruptcy legislation, promotion of SME’s or pension reforms, have no clear link with the acquis.

Meanwhile, the empirical evidence shows that Lithuania and other candidate countries have achieved more progress in the areas with well-defined acquis, both due to a better clarity of the expected actions and to more determinate Commission’s evaluations (‘transposed-not transposed’). For example, industrial policy and financial control (both fields formally falling outside the acquis) were the only areas, where Lithuania’s progress was evaluated as ‘limited’ by the Commission in its 2001 Regular Report. Despite the adopted medium-term industrial policy paper, in line with the basic principles of the EU industrial policy, the further field of action remained very wide and hardly led to a more systematic use of budgetary mechanisms.

However, one should not regard the EU impact only as the reinforcement of neoliberal principles of the economic transformation or Single market thinking. The European Commission has, on the other hand, played a role in promoting the strategic planning dimension in Lithuania’s economic policy. For example, the emergence of substantially new structural policies, such as regional and industrial policies, or the adoption of strategic documents, such as the National Development Plan, the Medium-term industrial policy paper owe a lot to the push by the European Commission. However, for the sake of objectiveness, one should not forget the Commission’s motivation. The EU’s pressure to adopt the National Development Plan is largely linked with the EU’s objective to ensure a systematic and transparent use of its structural funds. Meanwhile, the strategic industrial policy paper takes its roots in the EU concerns about the effects of the Russian crisis on the national economy and the ‘wrong’ initial response by the Government of Lithuania through the measures infringing the competition (or more precisely - state aid) acquis.

Therefore, without denying the constructive role played by the European Commission, one should come back to the earlier formulated statement that responses to the issues or dilemmas on the EU-level may only supplement, but not substitute national-level solutions. The closer the enlargement date, the more the Commission’s impact will be limited to the areas of direct concern to the Community (e.g. the EU budget or Single market acquis). It will repeatedly become obvious that the EU can be treated only as a framework for strategic choices. There is an element of paradox in the fact that with the achievement of one ‘strategic’ goal (i.e. the EU membership), the scope for further ‘strategic’ choices actually increases.
We will further analyse the substance of the Lithuanian industrial policy in relation with the principles of the EU industrial policy. We will look at some of the best practices and, in the light of the earlier discussed strategic options, will try to assess the conditions for the effective implementation of industrial policy in Lithuania as a future member of the EU.

**Industrial policy in Lithuania – evolution or revolution?**

In Lithuania, just like in other centrally planned economies, until the 1990s the industrial policy of the state was oriented to the concentration of economic resources and their centralised allocation. Industrial production was based on large state-owned enterprises, functioning as part of the industrial-military complex and focusing primarily on the economies of scale. Economic resources were mainly concentrated in the manufacturing sector at the expense of services and consumer products. Such artificial industrial structure had little to do with comparative advantages that would otherwise have resulted from the free market environment. The monopolised production and the absence of supply-demand mechanisms caused ineffective and inefficient use of the capital, labour, energy and natural resources. Moreover, they eliminated any incentives the market-based innovative activities. All technological innovations were focused on increasing the economies of scale. According to Keller (1990), in a long-term perspective centrally planned economies lost their competitive edge in both high and low value-added industrial sectors and products and only partially preserved it in sectors with high concentration requirements.

However, one should also remember that in the 1960s and 1970s even the advanced Western market economies led interventionist industrial policies with an emphasis on the economies of scale as a source of competitive advantage. As it may paradoxically seem from today's perspective, industrial policies of central planning systems were then considered as a serious economic threat to the international competition. Of course, this is not a post-mortem tribute to the failed practices of central planning. This is only to illustrate that the differences in paradigm shifts, which were later occurring in the opposing economic systems (however, at different times and for different reasons) are not as fundamental and incomparable as they seem to be at first sight.

Thus, it would be misleading to assume that the current Lithuanian industrial policy was formed in a vacuum filled only with neoliberal transformation principles. In our research, we have reviewed a long list of documents implying the strategic dimension adopted by national legislators since 1990. One of the main observations is the importance of the national security dimension on the ‘strategic’ thinking, at least at the initial stage of the transformation. The definitions of economic categories, such as ‘strategic goods’, ‘strategic stock’, ‘strategic object’, partially ‘strategic investor’ in national legal acts are directly associated with national security issues. Among the early national ‘strategic’ documents one could mention the Programme for establishing the import control and export control system of the strategic goods and technologies, National energy strategy, Strategy for search and extraction of oil, or the Law on securing the national strategic interests as regards oil provision in the emergency situations.

Thus, the first ‘strategic’ documents were primarily concerned with the issues
of national security rather than sustainable economic competitiveness. At risk of too wide a generalisation, one could conclude that national security was the main factor in determining the ‘strategic’ aspect of enterprises. The strategic importance of a company was far less shaped by the traditional (at least in some Western economies) social-economic factors, such as state support to the economic “national champions” or enterprises/sectors contributing to a significant share of employment in the region. The approach also depended on the political preferences of the ruling parties. For example, from the conservative wing of the Parliament, the Baltics’ largest oil refinery AB Mažeikių nafta (Mažeikiai Oil) was regarded as a geopolitical “national champion”, while from the social-democratic side, it was rather an economic-social “champion”. A similar treatment can be observed in the cases of other large state-owned enterprises, like AB Lietuvos dujos (Lithuanian Gas) or Ignalinos AE (Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant). What matters, however, for our observations is that none of the approaches has so far led to the economic performance deserving the champion’s name.

At this stage, it is worth repeating that the current Lithuanian industrial competitiveness policy is not emerging in a vacuum but as a result of evolutionary changes. Both the Russian crisis and the controversial privatisation process of the strategic enterprises have shown the ineffectiveness of the old policies and stimulated policy changes.

Thus, on the one hand, the conceptual changes taking place in Lithuania and other EU candidate countries to some extent replicate the general trends of EU and OECD countries. They are reflected by the acceptance of common principles of global and regional integration and knowledge economy, and characterised by a gradual transition from the traditional vertical industrial policies to horizontal measures for the industrial competitiveness. On the other hand, due to the earlier discussed specifics of the transition from the centrally planned to the market economy, the change of the industrial policy substance is so big that we can speak about the emergence of a qualitatively new policy area.

The substance of the Lithuanian industrial competitiveness policy is officially defined in the country’s medium-term industrial development policy and strategy for its implementation adopted in July 2000. This document formalises a new approach to industrial policy. It provides a general SWOT analysis of the Lithuanian industry, taking into account such external factors as globalisation, knowledge society, technological changes, future membership in the EU. It formulates the strategic objective “to achieve that, by 2015, the companies carrying out their activities in Lithuania are internationally competitive, and the industrial and business structure, as well as its share in GDP be comparable with that in the developed countries”. The policy principles are in general compliant with the contemporary industrial policy principles formulated by the EU or the OECD. Though the analysis singles out industrial sectors (mainly lower than medium added value) with current comparative advantage, it emphasises the need for an equal treatment of sectors and enterprises.

The policy paper explicitly states that competitiveness is a responsibility primarily resting on an enterprise rather than with the state. The state can contribute only through the creation of a favourable legal, macroeconomic business environment and horizontal measures, such as support to SME’s and innovations, attraction of foreign investment, promotion of industrial co-operation, improved access to finance. To focus the policy measures, most attention is to be paid to a higher value-
added, knowledge-intensive production. This priority is not generalised to encompass only higher value-added industries, but also higher stages of the value chains in traditional industries (e.g. production of furniture rather than raw wood in the wood sector). The international practice shows that countries still tend to build upon their existing strengths in implementing industrial development strategies. The development of clusters rarely happens in an empty place, so the strategy paper emphasises the need to carry out in-depth sectoral studies and analyse regional cluster development possibilities. The implementation of sectoral strategies would be a direct responsibility of business associations rather than government institutions.

Here, one should ask two questions. The first of them concerns the prospects that the strategy will be implemented. Nielsen (1995) notes that the different strategies of industrial restructuring adopted at different periods in the EU candidate countries (in 1991 in Estonia, in 1993 in Poland and the Czech Republic) hardly showed any record of an effective implementation, mostly because of the budgetary constraints behind the restructuring programmes. Also, neoliberal reformers often lacked the necessary political will to undertake active restructuring measures. Finally, these factors led to the substantially increased powers of the Ministry of Finance, whereas the Ministry of Economy in most countries was the main initiator of enterprise restructuring actions (though often lacking the degree of the necessary institutional restructuring itself). Very similar constraints can be observed in the case of Lithuania. One should especially emphasise the last factor. After the substantial increase in the powers of the Ministry of Finance (not without the EU’s preference for the centralised co-ordination of structural funds), the Ministry of Economy remained one of the few non-reformed ministries with the main powers in sectoral issues, especially the energy policy. Thus, the experience of the last decade makes us somewhat cautious about the prospects of strategy implementation.

The second and more fundamental question concerns the substance and direction of policy implementation. As has already been mentioned, the Lithuanian medium-term industrial policy paper essentially reflects the principles of the EU industrial policy, which are, to some extent, a ‘common denominator’ of the industrial policies of the member states agreed in the framework of the Single market. Here we must come back and analyse whether the transposition of the EU-level policy guidelines is sufficient for the achievement of the objectives of the national competitiveness policy.

On the one hand, the EU played a positive role as it had whipped out the ineffective and potentially hazardous atavism of the old industrial policies, such as promotion of import substitutes (which were still present in the initial versions of the policy paper). The adopted policy paper has a good educational value as a collection of the right principles for government actions in the modern business environment. In principle, it fulfils its central mission – by evaluating the country’s internal and external situation, to provide a conceptual basis for further industrial competitiveness programmes.

However, as Keller (1990) rightly observes, “it is more important to create a system that makes community members, boards and councils self-conscious about the impact of their decisions on a long term healthy economy than to have a fancy printed planning document, or a precisely “right” planning process”. The analysis of other national cases of industrial restructuring (e.g. Ireland) tells that their success mainly depended on the capacity to objectively evaluate industry and its environment,
and to make appropriate decisions. Both problems and solutions are specific to the country, its industrial structure, the scope of potential comparative advantages, and the stage of economic development. There can hardly be some generalised panaceas on the EU level. Solutions to industrial competitiveness dilemmas lie in the national processes of strategic planning. They are implemented not so much through centrally approved documents, but through the existing mechanisms of inter-institutional co-ordination and collective learning. Although the emergence of the policy paper is a positive phenomenon per se, it is by far an insufficient instrument for policy implementation.

**Industrial strategy as a system of collective learning**

Lithuania belongs to the category of “latecoming semi-industrialised countries” (LSC’s) (Storper, Thomodakis, Tsipouri, 1998)\(^26\). According to these authors, such countries occupy a specific niche between the developed industrialised and developing rural economies. The ‘latecomer’ status means that these countries emerged as players in the international competition but “under unequal terms”. They differ from the traditional developing countries as they have the basic infrastructure, educational system, rudiments of national innovation and technological transfer systems. At the same time, they differ from the developed industrial countries by insufficiently developed production structures, lack of industrial culture and modern organisational skills. Most of Central and Eastern European, South East Asian and some of Latin American countries, as well as even the less advanced EU member states fall into this category of countries.

Examples of these countries confirm several already discussed theses. The first conclusion is that traditional vertical and interventionist industrial policies no longer can serve as an appropriate instrument for modernisation of industrial structures, especially inside the EU. The most consistently successful small EU member states over the last decade, such as Ireland or Finland, followed market-oriented and open industrial policies. By the way, the ultimate shape of the Lithuanian industrial competitiveness policy paper was strongly influenced by the Irish and, especially, Finnish expert advice. Secondly, the policies of macroeconomic stabilisation proved to be insufficient and, in certain cases, even counterproductive to the industrial competitiveness.

According to Storper (1998)\(^27\), the main instrument enabling the catch-up of the ‘latecoming’ economies is the creation of collective learning processes or the learning economy. It is in these ‘soft’ aspects that the latecomers most markedly differ from the developed Western economies. In this context, it is also worth mentioning that some of the dominating Western (in fact, American) competitiveness methodologies, e.g. the influential Porter’s ‘diamond model’, show little consideration to the soft aspects of competitiveness, such as organisational culture and the learning process (O’Shaughnessy, 1997)\(^28\). Their traditional focus of analysis is often subject to

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criticism for being limited to the developed world’s leading economies and, thus, for considering only ‘success factors’ rather than a wider and more complex picture. Besides, there is some inherent caution about industrial policy suggestions among the American methodologists, like Porter or Drucker, although this should be a logical evolution of many of their arguments (O’Shaughnessy, 1997). So, although often very useful tools in policy-making (including the case of the Lithuanian policy paper), the models may not provide universal explanations and guidelines, but should be adjusted to local processes.

The learning economy is defined as “the organisation of firms that facilitates the effective responses to technological change through the accumulation of know-how, continuous adaptation to new knowledge, and the pursuit of new, higher quality, more effective production” (Storper et al., 1998). The underlying rationale of the contemporary industrial strategy is not to have a centrally formulated and formally adopted strategy document with a detailed course of action, but an adequate coordination of micro and macro-level policies through the established social conventions and informal rules in order to ensure the process of collective learning.

For example, by the mid-1980’s, the efforts of the Irish government to attract the export-oriented foreign direct investment helped reduce the trade deficit and balance payment problems, but it did not automatically solve the problems of national competitiveness or lead to an increased employment. On the contrary, unemployment problems grew even worse as local producers were pushed away from their markets. The underlying problem was that foreign investors were hardly integrated into the local economy. Their activities in Ireland were oriented to producing cheap labour-intensive production, based on imported raw materials and with the ultimate expatriation of profits. The MNC’s needed to be integrated into the national economy to foster the further growth of competitiveness and employment.

First of all, the government started off by compensating the drawbacks of local producers by providing them with financial support to marketing activities (e.g. strengthening brand-names), implementation of new technologies, management and export training. To increase the effective use of budgetary funds, the support became more focused on ‘prospective’ firms and sectors so that to build upon their existing strengths. Beginning with 1984, the Industrial Development Agency experts were working with the identified companies to help co-draft the development strategies. Another programme was oriented to support potential local suppliers to foreign enterprises. The focus of the support was redirected to ‘soft’ areas such as export skill development, technology acquisition grants, subsidies to technological audit, etc.

The financial support to technological processes increased dramatically.

Secondly, foreign investors were offered fiscal incentives to establish co-operative relations with local producers. It was important for including the latter into the value chain and knowledge networks, and for retaining more value, both in terms of money and knowledge, in the country. At the same time, incentive schemes were created to attract the higher value-added functions of MNC’s (esp. marketing and R&D). According to O’Malley (1998)39, one of the important success factors was the

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IDA’s flexibility in negotiations on the incentive package based on the prospects of new working places, links with local suppliers, the nature of functions being transferred to Ireland. Although foreign investment was further promoted, these measures contributed to structural changes that resulted in the learning effect of local firms and the constantly rising level of employment.

In the case of Lithuania, the adopted industrial development policy is capable of ensuring a certain degree of collective learning in a short-term perspective by presenting economic and institutional actors with the main principles of competitiveness, probably even by inspiring a public debate. For example, due to this document and surrounding public discussions, the concept of ‘cluster’ has been entrenched in the vocabularies and, to some extent, actions of institutions and business associations.

However, for a long-term effect to take place, rules and procedures of collective learning must be created. This implies not the creation of a single administrative body more fit for realising the traditional “top-bottom” approach, but the set-up of co-ordination and communication mechanisms among the institutions implementing industrial policy. Just as Bianchi (1998)30 puts it, “a set of conditions must be created which, however, must be grasped from below, in a sort of attempt to guide collective action through the stimulus provided by an advanced group of explorers, whose behaviour will later be taken as the standard for any future action”. Storper (1998) suggests to get rid of the age-old state-market dilemma in industrial policy-making, but to identify the actors best capable of ensuring the co-operation (e.g. IDA in Ireland, MITI in Japan, etc.), to agree on the incentive systems, to structure the government-business dialogue. It is possible to conclude that none of the Lithuanian institutions is so far ready for undertaking this important role. Neither the Lithuanian Development Agency with its probably closest access to the business world, nor the Ministry of Economy as the main industrial policy-maker, have sufficient political power, financial resources and administrative capacity to effectively rely on the Irish or Japanese examples.

On the other hand, there is a range of important measures that do not require a substantial financial investment, but may contribute to an improved dialogue and collective learning. One of them is benchmarking – a systemic self-assessment in the context of other countries and sectors, comparison of performances and action plans for the catch-up. Nevertheless, to be implemented such actions must be backed up by some political will and public/private investment. The role that benchmarking plays on the organisational learning is widely recognised. Unfortunately, this practice is still in a very premature phase of development in the Lithuanian public administration. No national institution is responsible for a systemic analysis and spread of the good policy practices.

Although increasingly spreading industrial strategies lead to a somewhat increasing communication, they still hardly provide any further mechanisms enabling collective learning. However, there are, even if limited, positive examples. For exam-

ple, the National long-term development strategy, adopted in the Parliament in November 2002, seeks to provide more organisation to the strategic planning process in Lithuania’s public administration. The methodology for strategic planning, as adopted on 6 June 2002, sets four hierarchical levels to the strategic documents: (1) National long-term development strategy (the main point of reference), (2) Long-term economic development strategy, (3) National development plan, and (4) Institutional strategic activity plans. Such classification should be capable of ensuring a better co-ordination of the strategic planning process among institutions and their policies.

To conclude, the actual effects of the recent ‘boom’ of strategic planning in the national public administration are still too early to be objectively evaluated. Although the experiences of the past should make us sceptical, one should also take into consideration the dramatically changing country’s internal and external environment. The whole set of old factors influencing strategic thinking is disappearing, while new factors are emerging. With the process of the economic transformation close to completion, the impact of international financial institutions, such as the IMF or the World Bank, on the national economic policy will be decreasing. The forthcoming completion of the privatisation process should appease the discussions on ‘strategic’ enterprises. The approaching membership date in the EU, on the one hand, puts an end to the EU requirements falling outside the acquis, whereas on the other hand, it sets clear rules for national structural intervention.

It is somewhat paradoxical that, in a way, the attainment of the ‘strategic’ objective of the EU membership leads to an even wider scope of ‘strategic’ choices, though in a rather strictly defined framework. The increasing complexity of the country’s policy-making environment sets new tasks for strategic planning. How to ensure that the competitive Single market environment contributes to the growth rather than the detriment of local firms? Which of the niches in the Single market acquis can be used in order to create a favourable business environment responsive to the country’s development needs (e.g. as regards the use of the acquis-compliant incentive package)? How to ensure the systemic use of the EU structural funds for the increasing national competitiveness? How to find the right balance between the fiscally restrictive macroeconomic obligations for the EMU membership (i.e. convergence criteria) with the structural policy objectives? Finally, how to identify the critical interests of national competitiveness and represent them effectively when adopting the new EU acquis?

The quality of the answers to these questions and the effectiveness of strategic planning will be determined both by the political will to identify and empower the actors capable of ensuring co-ordination and collective learning as well as by the actual administrative capacity for their implementation.
Analysis of Threats to Economic Security of Lithuania

With reference to research as well as legal and statistical data, this article offers an interpretation of the “security” concept, perception of country’s security, and analysis of drafting a national security strategy. It also highlights constituent parts of a national security strategy and an economic security strategy within the context of national strategies. Moreover, it shows how decisions (both operational and strategic) that are made within the context of national strategies depend on the relevance and probability of manifestation of threats. A motivated conclusion is drawn that a strategy for economic security is a constituent part of an economic strategy.

The composition of threats to economic security is further revealed by showing that threats can be both external and internal.

The article also exposes the relationship between an economic policy and economic security guarantees.

In addition, it identifies threats to the economic security of Lithuania and performs their analysis. It defines factors that predetermine the change of indicators of economic security by revealing the indicators themselves.

The analysis of threats to economic security is practically impossible without the context of an economic security strategy, or this analysis would be incomplete in a methodological sense. On the other hand, the author does not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of threats to economic security.

Introduction

Recent processes of integration and globalisation return us to the strategy for economic security and both internal and external threats to economic systems of nation states which arise from the strategy\(^1\).

A country’s economic security depends on the efficiency of functioning of its economic system and, in this sense, there is a direct correlation between the rate of economic growth and degree of economic security. On the other hand, this correlation can be directly applied only to the internal threats to economic security, while indirectly it can be applied to external threats. As history witnesses, the post-war

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economic crises were mostly provoked by external threats on the one hand, and failure of national economic systems to adjust to a new environment on the other. The main external influence, as a rule, was a sudden change in the price of raw materials and expectations of economic entities.

The object of research of the article is threats to a country’s economic security and how they originate.

The article aims at performing the analysis of threats to country’s economic security. From a methodological point of view, such an analysis covers:

- Interpretation of the concepts “security,” “national security,” “economic security,” “security of an economic entity,” and “security of a human being”;
- Setting up of goals of an economic security strategy within the goals of a general national security strategy;
- Examination of the composition and manifestation of threats to economic security;

The first part of the article deals with the definition of economic security, reveals the strategy for economic security and its place within the context of a general national security strategy. It also shows compatibility of the goals included into the strategies in question, hierarchy of goals, and the degree of centralisation/decentralisation of a decision making process. The second part focuses on the identification of the composition of threats to economic security and offers the classification of threats. From a methodological point of view, threats are understood as a part of SWOT analysis which is generally used in a strategic analysis. The third part offers a synthesis of the first and the second parts, i.e. the results of the analysis are interpreted taking into account the goals of economic security and a national security strategy.

1. Economic Security Strategy

1.1. Interpretation of the “Security” Concept

The analysis of the “security” concept can be conducted on three levels, i.e. that of a state, an economic entity and a human being. The security of the state dominates the security of an economic entity and a human being. In the face of threat, the state will employ all its resources to ensure its security without considering the security of an economic entity and a human being. Such a hierarchy of security matches hierarchy of threats in a decision-making process, since the former has to respond to the threat to national security in emergency situations, and the needs of an economic entity and a human being might be ignored.

Evidently, each level of security (that of a state, an economic entity, and a human being) has its own particularities, but it is always based on the same general principles. The analysis of threats to economic security should be performed in a multi-level approach, taking into account the different levels of security.

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2 It is better to use the concept of “risk” in the analysis of economic security of the state as the concept is wider within the context of SWOT analysis. Other methodology, i.e. the so-called PEST analysis, could be used in identifying and detailing fields of the analysis, which cover legal environment, economic environment, socio-cultural environment and technological environment. Furthermore, threats are identified and SWOT methodology is applied for a more detailed examination.

3 Similar levels of security were also singled out by Buzan, B. in the book Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė: tarptautinio saugumo studijos po šaltojo karo [People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era], Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1997.).
human being) has the object and subject of the security system. The object is the target for the subject to act in order to ensure its (object’s) security. Subjects are institutions which ensure the security of the object. It is understandable that referring to economic security of the state we have in mind material, intellectual, and cultural grounds which are simultaneously the basis for satisfying economic needs. Therefore, the object of economic security of the state is the economic system of the state.

“Economic security is not only protection of national interests, but also readiness and capacity of public authorities to establish a mechanism for realisation and protection of national interests while developing national economy and maintaining socio-political stability within the society”. This definition places more emphasis on the internal potential of the state and the role it has to play. In other words, the emphasis is put on the institutional structure of the state and its capacities.

The Russian academician L.I. Abalkin states that “economic security is the totality of circumstances and factors which ensure independence, stability, and capacity of consistent renewal of the national economy.”

According to A. Ilarionov, Director of the Institute for Economic Analysis, “economic security of the country is such a combination of economic, political and legal conditions which will ensure maximum quantities of reproduction of economic resources per capita in a long run and in the most efficient way”. Such a presentation of the concept leads to the conclusion that one of the key indicators of economic security is the level of economic development and economic growth. Therefore, the key goal is to ensure economic growth. On the other hand, guarantees of economic growth play a decisive role in the economic security of the country. In other words, according to this definition, key problems and key actors arise from the economic policy or the domestic situation of the state.

The Lithuanian National Security Strategy” attributes economic security to primary interests. One of them is “ensuring alternative energy supplies and supply of resources that are of strategic importance”. “Primary interests. These are the interests that could eventually affect the vital interests of the Republic of Lithuania if not protected”. Further description in the strategy of challenges, dangers and threats explains that:

- Overwhelming dependence of the Republic of Lithuania on strategic resources and energy supplies of one country or the concentration of foreign capital representing economy, in which free market is not secured or unstable, in one or several economic sectors of strategic importance to national security is a potential danger not only for economic prosperity but also for the security of the country.

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Certain economic conditions may constitute dangers to the security of the Republic of Lithuania, the well-being of its population, the independence of the state or constitutional order. These could be the following:

- Succession of assets and control over sectors and objects of strategic importance to national security, while pursuing political goals, as well as acting in a manner that violates economic security;
- Inefficient functioning of economic and energy sectors and deranged functioning of the objects that are of strategic importance to national security, their improper usage or non-usage, interfering with the interests of the state.
- Uneven social and economic development that increases a gap in living standards between different social groups may present a dangerous condition.
- Activities of groups of organised and financial crime constitute a major threat to the state and society.¹

The provisions of the National Security Strategy and the guidelines for its implementation also emphasise “stable economic growth. A strategic priority for the national security of the Republic of Lithuania is the formation of conditions for economic growth so as to ensure a higher quality of life for its citizens”. “General resource priorities: with regard to distribution of resources in the various areas that directly affect overall security of the Republic of Lithuania, priority is given to activities that enhance economic growth, social stability, fostering of civil society and threat response capabilities with particular attention to activities associated with integration into NATO and the EU”.

The main actions and means for implementing the National Security Strategy in the field of economic security identify the following key factors:

- Further implementation of structural reforms;
- Assurance of conditions of macroeconomic stability;
- Creation of favourable environment for the investment and business, beneficial to economic development;
- Implementation of employment policy, encouraging small and medium-sized business and regional development;
- Export incentives;
² Ibidem, p. 34.
tablishment of obligatory energy reserves;
  • ............................................................................................................. assurance of stable fiscal and monetary policy;
  • ............................................................................................................. diversification of energy supply sources;
  • ............................................................................................................. preparation of the economic infrastructure and transport for operating under extreme and critical conditions.  

Although the National Security Strategy does not provide for a compact definition of economic security, it offers an understanding that the key goal of economic security is to ensure functioning and development of the economic system by the state.

The author believes that the economic security of the country should be defined as the capacity (i.e. political will, possibility, and ability) of the state and its entities to maintain the balance between economic objects and systems, which is the key (necessary and sufficient) precondition for extended development of the state and its entities. On the other hand, goals of maintaining the balance are, as a rule, linked with the external environment of the system. This means that the economic security of the state should be understood as its capacity, as well as the capacity of its entities to maintain the balance between economic objects and systems and simultaneously react to the external environment. The internal environment of the system, as a rule, shows the potential of the system which ensures efficiency of the response to the external environment.

Thus, the essence of economic security can be defined as the state of government and economic institutions, which ensures strengthening of their internal potential and the development of the country.

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10 Greblauskas A., “Regulation of the National Currency Exchange Rate in a Small and Open Economy”, Finances and Credit: Problems, Conceptions, Management; Scientific Papers. Riga: University of Latvia, 2001, Vol. 644. pp. 193 – 204. The article examines causes why small countries with open economies most often choose a fixed exchange regime. Several interrelated elements can be noted, i.e. a small economy, open economy, liberal trade regime and fixed exchange regime. It is understandable that these characteristics significantly predetermine the content of both internal and external threats and the structure of their lists.
1.2. The Drafting Process of the National Security

NATIONAL VALUES
→
NATIONAL INTERESTS
→
STRATEGIC EVALUATION
→
NATIONAL POLICY
→
NATIONAL STRATEGIES

SECURITY
→
DIPLOMACY
→
ECONOMY
→
DIPLOMACY
→
SECURITY

Strategic

Lithuania has the following characteristics that are typical of small countries and predetermine national strategies, the list of economic threats and their content:

• Lithuanian economy is a small economy and this predetermines that Lithuanian economy is an open economy with a liberal trade regime;\(^\text{11}\)
• Lithuania has a fixed exchange regime;
• Favourable geographic location that allows to enjoy the status of a logistic third party;

• Lithuania has insufficient mineral resources or their industrial exploitation is too expensive.

Figure 1 reveals the context of the drafting process of the national security strategy.

Each national strategy is formulated on the basis of the assessment of national values in view of the international context. These values allow for better understanding of national goals, which should be reflected in the basic document, i.e. the constitution.

**Figure 1. Process of Strategic Thinking**

Nations have interests that are based on their (national) internal values and realised goals which motivate their behaviour. Thus, national interests reveal a nation’s needs and wishes within the international context. National interests of the state define its partaking in global developments. They also define the course of actions of the state in identifying goals and drafting national policy and national strategies.

Strategic evaluation includes the analysis of internal and external conditions in an attempt to define powers and trends that influence national interests, as well as possibilities and threats related to national strategies.

In order to protect national interests political actors formulate political principles which define the process of drafting national strategies. Thus a national policy sets a general direction for actions on a state level to ensure protection of national interests.

The author thinks that there are three key national strategies, i.e. those of national security, foreign policy (or diplomacy) and economy. Although some authors tend to single out more of them, other strategies can be considered as derivatives. This gives rise to one of the most essential questions: which national strategy has an economic security strategy as its derivative? Although an economic security strategy should not contradict a national security strategy, it is derived from an economic strategy. The main argument behind this is the context of its goals, processes and resources, which shows the general object of these strategies – an economic system. It is understandable that it should be balanced both horizontally and vertically. Moreover, economic security includes finance, energy, defence, military industry, information, and food supply security.

An economic strategy functions as an input in decision-making. The flow of information related to decision-making reveals reaction to threats of the external environment. The external environment is divided in two levels: national security strategy and national security strategy.

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2 In his overview of the evolution of the strategy concept, V. Urbelis singles out 4 general strategies, including social, military, economic, and diplomatic. It is understandable that if the state strives for the status of a welfare state, a social strategy also becomes one of the most important. Referring to other authors, he specifies a holistic strategy, which in practice is identical to a national security strategy, and to the aforementioned 4 general strategies on the secondary level, and strategies, i.e. activity measures (laws, staff, materials, technologies, organisation, etc.) that are attributed to the operational level, on the tertiary level. Urbelis V. "Strategija – jos evoliucija ir svokos evoliucija" ["Strategy – Its Evolution and Evolution of Its Concept"] Politologija. 2001. No. 4. pp. 53 – 81.
becomes a prevailing strategy and then all possible means and resources should be employed for attaining the goals of the national security strategy. Firstly, diplomatic means which are based on economic capacity should be also used to this end. If diplomatic channels fail, it remains to rely on resources available (both inside and outside the country). See Figures 1 and 3.

If the external environment of the country shows competition appears among the political allies of democracy as a result of which a relationship (political ally vs. economic competitors) is sufficiently confusing, since it might be interpreted differently, depending on which approach (industrial, post-industrial, geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-financial) is used.

Figure 2. Levels of Competencies

Figure 3. General National Strategies and Strategies of Economic Competency
Economic sub-strategies are interrelated, since the key goals of macroeconomic stability are to ensure a constant growth of economy, reduction of the unemployment rate, low rate of inflation, stability of the exchange rate, and a foreign trade balance.

A microeconomic stability strategy has to ensure free capital flows from sector to sector, mobility of labour force, etc.

Economic infrastructure is known to cover energy, transport, communications, telecommunications, utilities, waste management, etc. The key goal of this strategy is to ensure undisrupted economic development. Sectors of the infrastructure are usually natural monopolies which cover the entire country by their activities; therefore, their efficient work is vital in the sense of economic security. Namely, that is why these sectors are important for the country and its economic development.

It is understandable that threats (their intensity, scope and dynamics), strategies and decision-making processes are interrelated. The centralisation (importance) or decentralisation of the decisions made depends on the framework of their adoption. It is important to establish their relation with external and internal environments, as the latter are known to give rise to external and internal threats.

2. Threats to the Economic Security of the Country

2.1. Composition of Threats to Economic Security

Strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the economic potential of the country are revealed with the help of the following aspects of a strategic analysis:\footnote{A similar list is offered by A. Vasiliauskas in the article “Lietuvos ekonomikos plėtros strategijos kūrimo ir įgyvendinimo metodologiniai principai” [“Methodological Principles of Building and Implementation of the Lithuanian Economic Development Strategy”]. \textit{Pinigų studijos}, Lietuvos bankas, 2000, No. 4. The point is that such a list has to be compiled in view of the possibilities offered by PEST methodology. SWOT analysis in specific areas follows only after PEST analysis. In our case, this represents economic threats, although they are linked to other parts of SWOT analysis.}

- geographical situation, natural and material resources of the country;
- level of education and vocational training of people;
- production potential and technical level of technology: industry, agriculture, construction;
• material infrastructure: energy, transport, distance communications, utilities;
• economic-financial infrastructure: banks, commodity exchange, stock exchange, insurance;
• macroeconomic situation of the country: economic growth, structure of economy, employment, inflation, balancing the national budget, public debt, stability of the currency;
• international economic relations of the country: foreign trade, competitive capacity of the country on foreign markets, foreign investments and investments abroad, balance of payments, foreign debt;
• economic policy of the state.
  It would be possible to single out the following key economic threats:
• threat of structural deformation;
• threat of decrease in the rate of investment and innovation activities;
• threat of “destruction” of scientific – technical potential;
• threat of dependence on import;
• threat of dependence on the supplier of strategic raw materials;
• threat of decrease of currency reserves;
• threat of the growth of public satisfaction;
• threat of the growth of foreign debt;
• threat of the growth of domestic debt;
• threat of corruption in economic relations.

Naturally, the list of threats changes depending on the degree of openness of the economy. Following the reasoning of the theory of systems, the more open the economy is, the less threats to national economy might appear.14 However, it is relevant with only one essential precondition. The external environment of a national economy should be “friendly”. On the contrary, where it is not the same system theory states that the system in question will try to “close” itself from the adverse external environment.

2.2. Internal and External Threats

The national policy of a country is usually twofold: internal and external15. Thus, its economic policy is also reflected internally and externally. Therefore, threats can be classified into internal and external.

The manifestation of internal threats can be defined as incapacity to ensure safety and development, weakness of an innovative factor, ineffective state regulation of economy, incapacity to establish optimal balance of interests and inability to solve

14 What is kept in mind is Lithuania’s membership of the EU and NATO and that Lithuanian economy functions experiencing threats which arise only as a result of the competition with other countries. There is no threat of a war or a military conflict, or, in other words, there is no threat of a political nature.
15 Although lately publications appeared both in Lithuania and abroad, such a division under globalisation loses its sense. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult to separate country’s domestic and foreign policies. Strange S. Valstybės ir rinkos [States and Markets], Vilnius, Eugrinas, 1998., Gilpin R. Tarptautinių santykių politinė ekonomija [Political Economy of International Relations], Vilnius, Algarvė, 1998, Hollis M., Smith St. Tarptautiniai santykiai: aiškinimas ir supratimas [Explaining and Understanding International Relations]. Vilnius, Tyto alba, 1998.
social contradictions and conflicts.

Based on the reasoning of strategic management, we can state that long-term “maintenance” of internal threats negatively affects the internal potential of a country and makes the country more vulnerable to external threats. First and foremost, this means that an internal economic threat impedes the retaining of the country’s status in the world. Secondly, the economic weakness of the state makes the government borrow from international financial institutions. Thirdly, the dependence of the country on imports increases. Fourthly, the state loses its capacity to carry out an active foreign policy.

Internal threats mostly manifest themselves in macroeconomic and microeconomic sectors and infrastructure.

External threats can be described as an objective phenomenon, and the incapacity of the state to react adequately to a change of external environment: dynamics of competition, change in price of global conjuncture, dynamics of supply of strategic raw materials can be treated as subjective. I have already referred to inadequate reaction which is predetermined by the internal potential of the country. The relation in this case is as follows: the internal economic potential of the country predetermines its response to external threats and participation in the process of earning “global income”.

External threats are relatively better manifested in foreign economic activity. I have already mentioned that external threats are threats solely for the fact that the internal potential of the country is too weak to withstand the pressure of external threats and, therefore, the earlier listed essential economic threats may manifest themselves.

In order to avoid the manifestation of economic threats, it is necessary to ensure the growth of country’s economy. “Economically independent” are those countries that have been able to ensure their economic growth. This is proved by the analysis which was carried out by the Institute for Economic Analysis in Russia.\footnote{Илларионов А. “Критерии экономической безопасности” [Criteria of Economic Security], Вопросы экономики, 1998, No. 10, стр. 49 – 58.}

Therefore, further analysis leads to the examination of economic policy of the state and its constituent parts, such as participation of the state in business – entrepreneurship of the state, fiscal policy, monetary policy, foreign economic policy and its component – foreign trade policy.

The participation of the state in business reveals a trend which can be identified as the dependence of the rate of the economic growth on the volume of the gross domestic product (GDP) created by state property, i.e. the more GDP is created by state property the slower is its economic growth.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 51.}

Fiscal policy singles out current public consumption, public investment, budget deficit, and public debt. The point is that the bigger the current public consumption, public investment, budget deficit, and public debt are in comparison to the GDP, the slower the rate of economic growth is.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 52 – 54.}

\footnote{Ibidem, pp. 54 – 55.} The evaluation of public consump-
tion and public investment calls for the attention to the existence of two-tier indicators, i.e. the minimum rate of public expenditure (current consumption and investment) which ensures performance of necessary functions of the state and the maximum rate which, if exceeded, significantly decreases the rate of economic growth. Thus, the minimum and the maximum rates are highly dependent on certain historical development of the state, general global trends, etc.

In the sense of economic security, monetary policy is very important in solving the ways of financing the budget deficit. In countries where the average velocity of the currency in circulation, excluding the growth rate of real GDP, does not exceed 3 per cent, the rate of the economic growth is the highest. Providing other circumstances remain equal the increase of the scale of currency issue predetermines a slowdown in the rate of economic growth.20

Taking into account that the dynamics of currency in circulation are related to the dynamics of inflation, the dependence of the rate of economic growth on the rate of inflation is of a similar nature. Generally, the maximum speed of economic growth is achieved when the average annual inflation is maintained under 3 per cent.21 With an increase in the rate of inflation, the rate of economic growth slows down as a rule. When the average annual inflation fluctuates between 40 – 100 per cent, the econo-

21 Ibidem, p. 56.
22 The scheme of an economic security system was compiled by the author.
mic growth stops.

Moreover, there is a relation between the economic growth and currency devaluation. The study carried out by the Institute for Economic Analysis concludes that “the maximum rate of GDP growth between 1991 and 1996 occurred in those countries where the price of their currencies was not curtailed and grew in value in comparison to the USD”.  

The existence of the relation between foreign trade policy and economic growth is illustrated by the fact that the economy of countries with a liberal trade regime grows at a higher rate than in countries imposing taxes on export and import turnover.

3. Analysis of Threats to the Economic Security of Lithuania

The system of the economic security of Lithuania derives from the process of the strategic administration of the state and covers the following blocks. See Figure 4.

Figure 4. System of the Economic Security of Lithuania

The National Security Concept was approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 28 May 2002.

Lithuanian national interests in the field of economy derive from or are legitimised in the Security Concept. On the other hand, a decade of Lithuanian independence is too short a period to arrive at a very clear definition of Lithuanian national interests in the field of economy. We are aware of the fact that almost all the time interests manifest themselves in foreign economic activities; it is also understandable that internal economic resources of the country are employed for pursuing the interests. Due to the said reasons, Lithuania, in my view, has not completed the formulation and legitimisation of its national economic interests. Nevertheless, such attempts are present in the field of economic policy. The Seimas determines by law which plants and facilities (including those to be established) are of strategic importance to national security. The law also sets forth which of them must be state property, and which of them (and under what circumstances) are allowed to attract private national and foreign capital which complies with European and transatlantic integration criteria, while the power of decision-making rests with the state.

The government must ensure alternative resources of fuel and raw materials that are not dependent on a monopolistic supplier. Supply with energy resources


cannot be transferred to the control of entities in supplier countries. Foreign investment that complies with European and transatlantic integration criteria is given preference. The predominant position of foreign economic entities in the sector of natural monopolies and finance sector is also prohibited.

Within their individual authority, the Bank of Lithuania, the Government and law enforcement institutions ensure protection of the economic and banking-financial system from fraud, money and investment of an unlawful origin.

After the completion of a special state programme, Lithuanian railways should be gradually reconstructed according to the European gauge standards. The system of transportation by Lithuanian railways should be restructured according to the norms of the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF).24

On the other hand, these provisions are not applied to investment into the AB “Mažeikių Nafta”, since “the shareholding, management and supply with energy resources of the AB “Mažeikių Nafta” are solved without applying the restrictions set forth in Chapter 4 “Economic Policy” of Part 1 of the Annex “Fundamentals of National Security” of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security”.25 The Company “Yukos” invested into the AB “Mažeikių Nafta” on the basis of the same terms and conditions as the Company “Williams” did before.

3.1. Lithuania’s Relations with Transnational Corporations

The inconsistency of goals of the development of transnational corporations and nation states is an understandable and undisputable phenomenon. On the other hand, there is a considerable number of opinions on the issue of the impact that transnational corporations make on the development of nation states.26

This relation manifests itself in three aspects, i.e. 1) relations between a transnational corporation and a host country, 2) relations between a transnational corporation and the country of establishment, 3) relations between a host country and the country of establishment.

With respect to threats to economic security, the following three aspects are singled out as important. In this context we should talk about the goals of the development of “Yukos” and the state economic system of Lithuania. The development strategy of “Yukos” is based on increase in exports of crude oil and penetration into the markets of alternative energy resources (gas, power). Therefore, “Yukos” plans investments into the infrastructure of oil transportation in Europe, Asia, and Ameri-

ca and also buys shares of the Russian power system. How could Lithuania benefit from these “Yukos” actions? This is not a rhetorical question. “Yukos” has practically acquired the whole complex of oil transportation, refining, and realisation in Lithuania, except the oil terminal in Klaipėda. From the point of view of “Yukos” development strategy, the company will aim at acquiring Klaipėda Oil Terminal. Based on the same reasoning, it becomes evident that by controlling the pipeline on the territory of Lithuania, “Yukos” will be able to make an impact on the operation of Ventspils Oil Terminal and probably on its privatisation.

In the sense of economic security, the situation of Lithuania is not the best one in this context. What is controlled by the state of Lithuania in this case? The question could be paraphrased. Should Lithuania maintain control in this situation? The answers will be fifty-fifty, depending on political and economic ideology. By establishing a supermarket of a Lithuanian origin, which in its own turn opened doors for Lithuanian suppliers to the Latvian market, is an evident example of investment by Lithuanian economic entities in Latvia. As a result, the Lithuanian national budget benefits and economy grows. In case of the investment into the Latvian market, Lithuanian economic security is enhanced, as the investment promotes economic growth, but the external risk, which may result in recession in certain industrial sectors, grows too.

**3.2. Factors Which Predetermine a Change of Indicators of Economic Security**

Within the last decade Lithuanian economy underwent fundamental changes: the level of economic openness and liberalisation grew significantly, the structure of the economy changed, a private sector established itself, and competition increased. Foreign investment plays an important role in modernising the economy. The EU integration is an ongoing process. With the rapid growth of foreign trade volumes, export is reoriented from the CIS to the EU market, which now makes up about 50 per cent of Lithuanian export.27

On the other hand, the growth of small countries characterised by small scale economies is predetermined by the integration and intensification of reproduction as an essential precondition for development. From the point of view of system comprehension in the field of economic security, the process or separate parts of the process of reproduction, integration and intensification of Lithuanian economy should be “included” into the global process of reproduction. An example of such a “law” in Lithuania is the transfer of the AB “Mazeikiai Nafta” to the United States Company “Williams”. Such a “law” increases the economic security of Lithuania. The sale of the AB “Lietuvos Telekomas” to a Scandinavian consortium is another example of equal value.

Lithuania has chosen a liberal trade regime and movement of capital. General liberalisation of trade has been significantly affected by signing free trade agreements (FTAs). The countries which have concluded FTAs with Lithuania account for 70 per cent of total foreign trade. In 2001, Lithuania became a member of the World

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Trade Organisation.

The economy of Lithuania is marked with a low level of protectionism. In 2001, import duties made up only about 0.3 per cent of GDP, and those on imported goods about 53.2 per cent of GDP.

The main trend which defines the development of trade flows is increasing volumes of trade with the EU and decreasing trade with the CIS. In 1996-2000, export of Lithuanian goods to the EU grew from 32.9 to 47.9 per cent and that to the CIS dropped from 45.4 to 16.3 per cent of total exports, and import grew from 42.4 to 46.5 per cent and from 32.9 to 30.7 per cent, respectively.28

The following main reasons of fiscal risks are forecasted: deposit insurance, restitution of title to real property, debts of state-owned enterprises to banks, savings restitution, the closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and privatisation of state property. All these are attributed to internal risks.

The risks are related to external factors that can impact the financial situation through pollution, higher financing costs, higher oil prices, etc.

**In the field of energy**, Lithuania inherited a huge and well developed energy infrastructure which was aimed at serving economy of a larger scale rather than that of domestic needs, and whose modernisation is investment and time consuming. Lithuania operates a well-developed system of natural gas transmission and distribution, and also a huge and significantly modern oil refinery (the only one in the Baltic States), as well as several big power generation plants, including the Ignalina NPP, which has two big reactors of 1.3 GW capacity each. On the other hand, the power grid, gas and oil pipelines are connected only to Russian energy networks and all the primary energy resources are imported from the CIS. This understandably threatens Lithuanian economic security. The fact that 0.47 billion of m³ are supplied to Kaliningrad Region alleviates this threat.

Russia supplies gas from Belarus through the main Minskas – Vilnius gas pipeline and satisfies all the demand for gas. The gas supply network in Lithuania is also connected to Kaliningrad Region and Latvian gas pipeline network, which is not operational at the moment. There is one more gas pipeline to Belarus which is not operated at the moment either.

The Lithuanian gas network is not connected to Western networks, therefore, an alternative for natural gas supply is absent. The gas system of Lithuania should be merged with that of Poland (Western Europe), which would facilitate market relations in the gas sector and a common market. The gas pipeline connection between Lithuania and Poland would expand gas supply possibilities not only for Lithuania but also for Latvia and Estonia.

In 2000, the country’s consumers used approx. 2.3 million tons of oil products. Lithuania has the only oil refinery in the Baltic States. The oil refinery satisfies almost 90 per cent of the demand for oil products of the country. The remaining part is imported. The local oil resources are scarce. The country recorded oil extraction of 4.2 million tons at the beginning of 2001.

The oil sector enjoys market relations. There are no restrictions on import, export, transit and trade of oil and oil products or quotas imposed by the country.

2001 marked the completion of the reconstruction of oil product stevedoring terminal which is owned by the AB “Klaipėdos Nafta”. That is a universal import-export terminal with stevedoring capacities of more than 7 million tons of different
oil products.

One of the key energy policy goals of the state in decreasing dependence on the imports of energy resources is energy conservation and efficient use of primary energy resources as well as encouragement of producers and consumers for efficient consumption of local, renewable and other energy resources.

External dependence on energy resources can result in wide-range consequences. The most topical sector of dependence is gas, which is all imported. According to a forecast, the demand for gas will grow with the decommissioning of Unit II of the Ignalina NPP. Therefore, in order to diversify energy resources, one of the key goals is to develop an infrastructure for Lithuanian gas and power systems to be interconnected with those of the European Union.

The Lithuanian power market will also be gradually opened to international markets. Firstly, the integration into the common Baltic market has been foreseen, which is being developed at the moment, and further efforts will be made to integrate it into Western European and Scandinavian markets.

Certainly, the number of suppliers of energy resources predetermines their negotiating power, which is diminished to an insignificant extent by Lithuanian oil terminals and world energy prices. Even though Lithuania is capable of reducing their negotiating power, it is not capable of affecting the world price either as a consumer or a producer. Therefore, it is not by accident that the Law on the State Reserves of Crude Oil and Oil Products defines emergency in the energy sector as the period when the normal supply of energy resources or energy to energy enterprises and consumers is disrupted and their supply is interrupted to the extent that those disruptions make energy enterprises incapable of timely foreseeing and managing the situation on the basis of economic activity methods, and also as the period when emergency is announced as established by the Law.\(^2\) Thus, the impact on the prices of energy resources as a result of negotiating power and world prices on the domestic market is evident.

In the transport sector, the actions by the state and its approach towards this field of infrastructure predetermine not only the development of this sector but also the development of the entire economy.

The share of GDP from the transport sector had been increasing since 1996 and in 2000 it accounted for 8.3 per cent. About 5.1 per cent of total working population is employed in this sector.

International multimodal transport corridors of trans-European networks which were approved in the 2\(^{nd}\) (Crete) and 3\(^{rd}\) (Helsinki) European Transport Conferences and through which the main flows of cargo go, cross the Lithuanian territory. Indivisible components of multimodal transport corridors which make up TINA (Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment) network in Lithuania are as follows: transport junction in Klaipėda Seaport, Vilnius, Kaunas and Palanga international airports, inland waters route Kaunas – Klaipėda.

Klaipėda Seaport is the only ice-free port operating all year round on the eastern coastline of the Baltic Sea.

\(^2\) Law on the State Reserves of Crude Oil and Oil Products. “Valstybės žinios” (Lithuanian Official Gazette). No. 72, 17 July 2002.

The capacity of the railway network is basically satisfactory, however, the state of the railway infrastructure is rather poor and large investment is needed to improve the situation. Preparatory work is being done to renew the infrastructure by reconstructing a rail track, modernising alarm and telecommunication systems. Moreover, plans are made to build a rail track of the European standard gauge of the North–South direction.

The infrastructure of Lithuanian airports and the air traffic control system are developed to a considerably satisfactory extent, however, the existing capacities are not fully used and the equipment of landing systems is outdated.

The Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration and the Lithuanian Maritime Safety Administration were established in 2001, and an independent manager for aircraft accidents and incidents examination was appointed.

The Republic of Lithuania has ownership rights over infrastructural units.

The trends for developing transport infrastructure are regulated by Decision No 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network. This decision aims at ensuring that the trans-European transport network shall be established gradually by 2010 by integrating all transport infrastructure networks throughout the Community in accordance with the outline plans and specifications.39

Transport is known to be a very important part of socio-economic infrastructure. It directly predetermines the economic growth of the country due to international and domestic trade, tourism, and simultaneously contributes to the implementation of fundamental market principles of the Community, i.e. free movement of persons, people, goods, services, and capital.

A long-term goal of Lithuanian transport policy is to establish a system of transport which complies with the principles, goals and criteria that are set out in the guidelines for the trans-European transport network development on the territory of the EU and integrate into the trans-European transport network by developing transport corridors that cross the territory of the country.

In the field of macroeconomic stability, Lithuania has made significant achievements, and in principle it can be stated that Lithuania is a stable state from a macroeconomic point of view. This is shown by the indicators, such as fiscal deficit which is stabilised at 1.5 per cent of GDP and has not changed for several years in a row. On the other hand, every new government declares efforts to decrease the fiscal deficit. The public debt has also been stabilised.

All these positive changes have increased confidence in Lithuanian economy and its currency board arrangement (CBA), offering Lithuania a possibility of accessing international capital markets on increasingly better terms and conditions.

In the field of microeconomic stability or the level of industrial sectors, Lithuania has also made some achievements. Mobility of capital, labour force, land and other resource flows between sectors have been liberalised. The latter factor ensures microeconomic stability, which positively affects the economic growth. In this field, the threat of unemployment remains, since the unemployment rate is still very high – over 10 per cent.

Therefore, there are practically no threats to economic security in the fields of macroeconomy, microeconomy or internally. The sore points of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Lithuania could be defined as threats. They mostly mani-
fest themselves not by the lack of state support to SMEs, but by the absence of efficient subcontractual relations between large companies and SMEs, the lack of efficient and favourable legal framework for the SMEs development, and significant part of added value generated by a large business sector.

The following internal and external threats to economic security of Lithuania can be identified. The internal threats are 1) unemployment rate, 2) low mobility of labour force, 3) low mobility of capital, 4) underdeveloped land market. To sum up, in order to mitigate the impact of these threats to economy, it is necessary to increase mobility of all kinds of resources in the internal resource markets.

The external threats include 1) big negotiating power of energy resource suppliers, 2) insufficient development of infrastructural sectors, 3) insufficient development of a model of foreign economic activities. The main function of a foreign economic activity model is provision of information on Lithuanian economic potential to foreign countries and institutions as well as keeping businessmen informed about the economic development abroad.

It is important to compile a list of indicators which define the economic security of the country. In other words, indicators which are important to the security of the functioning of the country’s economic system should be identified. It is essential to understand that absolute security of the economic system is possible only under the circumstances of traditional economy. The interpretation of economic security under a closed and open economy is different in principle. Therefore, the list of the indicators that define the situation of the economic security of the country should be based on the concept of open economy.

The indicators of economic security reveal efficiency of the functioning of the country’s economic system.

Conclusions

- Irrespective of the diversity of definitions of economic security, the country’s economic security can be defined as the capacity (i.e. political will, possibility, and ability) of the state and its entities to maintain balance between economic entities-systems, which is a key (necessary and sufficient) precondition for extended development of the state and its entities.

- Lithuanian strategy for threats to economic security is predetermined by the characteristics that are common to small countries, i.e. small economy, open economy, and simple fixed exchange rate. These characteristics undoubtedly have a decisive impact on economic security.

- General national strategies are interrelated in the sense of centralisation/decentralisation of the decision-making process, intensity, scale and dynamism of threats, as well as the degree of policy-making. Economic decision-making is predetermined by the intensity, scale and dynamics of the degree of openness, volume and rate of economic growth.

- Lithuania has never clearly formulated and legitimised its national economic interests. Therefore, it is difficult to define threats to the economic security of the country.
Perception of Security Issues by Lithuanian Population

This article analyses perceptions of security in Lithuania. The analysis is based on the qualitative research (in-depth interviews). In addition, data of several public opinion polls is used as a complementary source of information that allows to have a broader view and verify the qualitative data. Perceptions of security, causes of (in)security, and factors that influence the sense of security are analysed. The research focuses on the individual (micro) rather than on the state (macro) level of security.

Introduction

During the Cold War and later, security and strategy studies focused on the macro level of security. Thus, the main area of research was security of the state and the whole international system. “In the post-Cold War era the object of security is shifting away from the state to the individual or substate group”.

In discussing this issue, one cannot avoid the study of Barry Buzan “People, States and Fear.” According to Buzan, “security has many potential referent objects. These objects of security multiply not only as the membership of the society of states increases, but also as one moves down through the state to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of the international system as a whole” and “the security of any one referent object or level cannot be achieved in isolation from the others”.

Buzan admits that individual security may be analysed separately, but also notes that individual security is subordinated to “the higher-level political structures of state and international system”. In Buzan’s view, individual security belongs to the periphery of security studies, which focus on state and international security studies.

However, by stating that national and international security cannot be reduced to the

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3 *Ibidem.*
4 *Ibidem.,* p. 54.
5 *Ibidem.*
level of individual security⁶, Buzan essentially justifies the relative independence of individual security as a separate field of research⁷.

The current critical political thought reflects the tendency to include individual security analysis into the main body of security studies. One of the proponents of this view, Kenneth Booth, emphasises that the key object of security is individuals and not states:

‘Security’ means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.⁸

The debate about the subject of security has been taking place along with the discussion about the relationship between old and new threats. The dimension of military security has been supplemented by the problems of ecology, social issues, poverty, as well as the dilemma between state and individual security. According to Kenneth Booth, majority of people in the world today fear their own government (its tyranny, incompetence or both of them) rather than the army of a neighbour state⁹. Therefore, individual security may be analysed as a totality of threats affecting the individual.

The dimension of individual security now is a part of the Lithuanian political agenda. A comparison of two reports about the condition and development of Lithuania’s national security system (done in 1999 and 2000) shows that the latter report already reflects a change in understanding national security; “there is a move from assuring security by military means to a broader spectrum of measures assuring security – economic, social and cultural”¹⁰. Chapters 6 to 11 of the report name individual and societal security variables, which had not been included into the 1999 report¹¹.

Clearly, the analysis of individual security has its niche in the realm of security and public policy studies, but it has not attracted much attention in Lithuania. The lack of individual security studies calls for a comprehensive empirical research about how people understand individual (micro) security and societal and state (macro) security using data from Lithuanian surveys and qualitative studies.

The importance of public opinion for public policy is demonstrated by the position of Belgium Defence Minister André Flahaut, expressed ahead of assuming the EU presidency. He decided to call a survey to clarify how many citizens of the EU member states back European integration in the field of common foreign and security policy. “Within the long construction of a common security and defence policy, public opinion is a strategic variable of the highest importance”¹².

Relevant questions were incorporated into the 54.1 Eurobarometer questionnaire in the year 2001.

The aim of this article is to determine whether personal or nation-wide pro-

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⁶ Ibidem.
⁷ Ibidem, p. 363.
blems of security are more important for the Lithuanians. Thus, the research covers
the analysis of threats and sources of (in)security, perceptions about what aspects of
security are the most important, who is responsible for providing secure environ-
ment, and what is the role of the state in providing security for the Lithuanians.

In the first part of this article, the methodological issues of the research are
discussed. In the second part, the following aspects are analysed: what are the major
threats for the security of the state, and why Lithuanian people feel unsafe personally
and as citizens of Lithuania. The third part of the article is devoted to the analysis of
the perceived causes of insecurity. In the fourth part, the attitudes towards the role of
NATO and the EU for the development of Lithuania, in general, and security of the
individual and the whole society, in particular, are analysed. The last, fifth part,
focuses on channels of information that are crucial for the formation of public op-
inion about security.

1. Methodological Remarks

Even though public opinion about entering NATO and the EU is regularly
researched in Lithuania, deeper studies about perceptions of security are lacking. In
general, the research of security issues began in 1991\(^{13}\), when several questions on
this issue were included into survey questionnaires. Yet, the first serious study on
security was accomplished only in 1998\(^{14}\). The same study was repeated in 2000\(^{15}\).
The research focused on public opinion about macro-level threats as well as on
positive and negative effects of entering NATO. Other public opinion polls taken in
1999 and 2002 aimed to analyse why the Lithuanians do not feel secure in their
country. The data of these studies allows to speak about general tendencies only. A
separate qualitative research was needed. The goal of this research was to analyse
perceptions of security, attitudes of different social groups towards internal and ex-
ternal security, and perceptions of means of security. In addition, this study aimed at
comparing its results with the results of the previous public opinion surveys.

In general, 19 respondents were interviewed in face-to-face in-depth inter-
views. Respondents were divided into two groups. The first group included experts
(politicians, state officials, and political scientists whose main area of interest was
international relations). The second group of respondents was formed of ordinary
people (non-experts). Respondents of different age, gender, education, and area of
residence were selected to this group. As a rule, in-depth interviews with the experts
lasted for one hour, while interviews with ordinary people were approximately 40
minutes long. A short description of the respondents in both groups is presented in
Tables 1 and 2.

\(^{13}\) Ališauskienė R. “National and International Security Issues in the Eyes of the Public of the Baltic
Countries” in Public Awareness Workshop on Security Issues in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

\(^{14}\) Opinion about Level of Public Awareness on Security Issues in the Baltic Countries. Based on the
Public Opinion in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Baltic
Surveys/GALLUP. Vilnius, 1998. This survey was accomplished in March 1998. 1000 respondents
were researched. The research was commissioned by the Division of Information and Press.

\(^{15}\) Public Opinion about Security in Lithuania. Baltic Surveys/GALLUP, Vilnius, 2000. This re-
search was commissioned by the Lithuanian Atlantic Treaty Association. The survey was accomplished
in January 21-30, 2000. In total, 1000 respondents were researched.
Table 1. The Description of the First Group of Respondents (Experts).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Area of education</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age (years)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>Employee of State Defence System</td>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>Member of the Parliament</td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>Member of the Parliament</td>
<td>Natural sciences</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>Political scientist</td>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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<td>E5</td>
<td>Employee of State Defence System</td>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>Member of Local Government</td>
<td>Technical sciences</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>Political scientist</td>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Political scientist</td>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The Description of the Second Group of Respondents (Non-Experts).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>Ethnic origin</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Place of residence</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>student</td>
<td>single</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Siauliai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>married</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>single</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>single</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>divorced</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>Utena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Lithuanian Tatar</td>
<td>retired</td>
<td>single</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Pole</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>married</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>single</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>married</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>single</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Raseiniai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>married</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire was partly based on Buzan’s theory about four types of social threats. Buzan distinguishes between physical threats (pain, injuries and death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources), threats to human rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties), and threats to social status (demotion, public humiliation)\(^{16}\). In the research, the social dimension of security embraced issues of social protection and health care.

Summarising, the in-depth interviews examined (1) general perceptions of security, (2) sources of insecurity, (3) perceptions of what aspects of individual security are the most important – economic, social, physical, etc., (4) perceptions of external threats, (5) attitudes towards state policies ensuring internal and external security, (6) attitudes towards membership in the EU and NATO, and (7) the influence of mass media in forming attitudes about security.

The central hypothesis was that better-informed respondents (experts) had a deeper understanding of security if compared to the group of non-experts. The ex-

\(^{16}\) Buzan (note. 4), p. 37.
erts were expected to be able to clearly identify and differentiate among security problems. It was believed that professional experience and education plays a crucial role in the formation of attitudes towards security.

As it was already mentioned, the data of the in-depth interviews is analysed together with the data of public opinion polls. It is believed that this approach allows a deeper analysis of security.

2. Perceptions of Security and Causes of (In)security

2.1. Public Opinion Surveys

The data of two sociological surveys taken in July 1999\(^{17}\) and in November 2002\(^{18}\) show that the majority of Lithuanian population do not feel secure in their country. In 1999 and 2002, the respondents were asked if they feel secure in Lithuania. In 1999, 18.4 percent of respondents answered that they feel safe, 48.3 percent - partly safe, and 25.5 percent - insecure. The results of the survey of 2002 show that the number of people who feel secure does not change and makes approximately one fifth of the population. Yet, an important finding is that the number of people who feel completely insecure gradually diminishes (from 25.5 percent in 1999 to 18.5 percent in 2002) (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel secure in Lithuania?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely insecure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is difficult to say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The other important issue researched in 1999 and 2002 was causes of security and insecurity. In 1999, the majority of the respondents mentioned corruption of state officials (34.4 percent), fear of losing a job (25.4 percent), inability of law enforcement institutions to ensure individuals' security (19.1 percent), the state’s indifference towards its citizens (14.9 percent), and permanent lack of money (14.4 percent).

From 1999 to 2002, the key source of insecurity was the inability of law enforcement institutions to insure individuals' security (46.4 percent and 19.1 percent, correspondingly). From 1999 to 2002, fear of losing a job increased from 25.4 percent to 31.5 percent, insecurity due to inadequate health protection - from 12.5 percent to 26.9 percent. In 2002, 30.2 percent of the respondents indicated that the

\(^{17}\) The research was accomplished by the Public Opinion and Market Research Centre Vilmorus. In total, 1,005 15-74 years-old respondents were researched. The maximal statistical error is 3 percent.

\(^{18}\) The research was accomplished by the SIC Market Research. In total, 525 15-74 year-old respondents were researched. Maximal statistical error is 4.3 percent.

\(^{19}\) This issue was not included in the survey of 1999.
Government does not provide conditions to earn a living\textsuperscript{19} (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of insecurity</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear of losing a job</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability of law enforcement institutions to insure individuals' security</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government does not provide conditions to earn a living</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent shortages</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate health protection</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The majority of people do not follow moral norms and principles</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest state officials are corrupt</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug (narcotic) abuse is increasing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media spreads sense of insecurity</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania is not capable of securing itself from external enemies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having Russia as a neighbour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Perceived Causes of Insecurity in Lithuania

in 1999 and 2002, in percent.

From 1999 to 2002, there was an increase in the share of the respondents who gave negative marks to the areas of individual security, which to a great degree depend on state policy. In a certain sense, poor performance of law enforcement and health protection systems could be attributed to 'structural threats'\textsuperscript{20}.

At the state (macro) level, the data of another sociological survey taken in 1998\textsuperscript{21} shows that 95 percent of the respondents did not consider any foreign state as a threat to Lithuania's security, and 45 percent of all the respondents indicated as more important threats to the state's internal security and stability. The respondents younger than 20, those with incomplete secondary education, non-ethnic Lithuanians and city dwellers indicated external threats more frequently. People aged between 40 and 59, those with higher education, and inhabitants of major cities more often indicated internal threats.

When answering the question about major internal threats, in both 1998 and 2002 surveys, 86 percent of the respondents indicated corruption, 69 percent - ineffective border control, 64 percent each - the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and instability in Russia, and 52 percent - Russian military transit. According to the abovementioned Eurobarometer survey 54.1, inhabitants of EU countries indicated three key non-military threats - organised crime (77 percent), threat caused by nuclear power stations (75 percent), and terrorism (75 percent). As one can see, Lithuania's and EU populations have similar views.\textsuperscript{22}

Lithuanian population's views about all threats did not change much between

\textsuperscript{20} Buzan (note 4), 45.


1998 and 2000, except that in 2000 the proportion of those who believed that corrup-

tion and crime were the most important threats was 12 points higher (see Table 5).

**Table 5. What are the Most Important Threats for Lithuania, in percent.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>January 2000</th>
<th>March 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime and corruption</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instability in Russia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War in Chechnya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian military transit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-democratic political regime in Belarus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, in 1999, the respondents believed that major problems were the fight against corruption, cutting down unemployment, curbing crime, alcoholism and narcotic abuse, and improving performance of judicial institutions. The problem of external security was directly indicated by only 0.9 percent of the respondents.

All surveys mentioned here confirm a stable tendency towards seeing internal security problems as more important than external threats.

**2.2. Qualitative Research**

The in-depth interviews show that there is a difference in perceptions of security among the researched experts and non-experts. The experts tend to define security as a complex concept that covers individual and state security. State security is divided into internal and external security. The internal security is defined as indivi-
dual and state security. Even though all experts agree that security is a complex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security as a complex notion</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three components</td>
<td>“The absence of fear, shortages, and psychological discomfort. Thus, we have three dimensions” (Interview No.E1). “I see three dimensions: individual security, in a broader sense - community security, …and in the broadest sense - security of an individual in a given state” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two components</td>
<td>“I perceive security as individual security and state security” (Interview No.E3). “Security means freedom from any kind of fear, and certainty about the present situation. This is applicable to both the state and individuals” (Interview No.E5). “[I can speak about] security when I am certain about the future, physical safety, moral safety, psychological [safety], when I feel safe and when my family feels safe. Other things are important when we speak about the state - [the issue of] terrorism, no foreign invasion” (Interview No.E6). “Political science defines security as a situation of a state in respect to various threats (economic, social, political, epidemiological, etc.). In the area of international relations, security means the general situation of international relations” (Interview No.E8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military dimension</td>
<td>“War, mass destruction weapons are elements of the concept of security” (Interview No.E8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual security</td>
<td>“You are safe not only when you feel safe physically, but rather when you have some economic and financial status” (Interview No.E3). “It is necessary to feel safe at home, on the street, to be certain about your children and your property, and in a certain sense, your future. [I see] various dimensions of security: social, economic and physical” (Interview No.E3). “State security is associated with threats to the state: economic threats, ecological threats. Personally, I care more about individual security: not to be beaten or robbed” (Interview No.E4). “Freedom from psychological discomfort” (Interview No.E1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual and state security as an interactive entity</td>
<td>“I am safe when I live in a safe state, and when I have a job, income from that job, a place to live. Then I am safe and free” (Interview No.E3). “The state protects an individual and ensures individual security. That no stranger would come and take what belongs to an individual [and his relatives], or would use physical violence” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. **Perceptions of Security. Expert Opinions.**

The experts mentioned various dimensions of individual and state security. An important issue was interrelations between these two dimensions. The military dimension was mentioned by one expert only. Yet, other respondents mentioned this topic when they talked about external security and the Lithuanian Army.

As a rule, the non-experts used a more narrow definition of security. They tended to mention just one or several aspects of security. In general, this group of the respondents focused on the issue of individual security and stressed physical and economic security:

“I understand [security] as my inviolability and my freedom. Of course, the most important is physical safety” (Interview No.4).

“Security means not to be beaten in the evening” (Interview No.3).

“In general, security means that you can walk on the street in the morning, night or evening and feel safe” (Interview No.5).

“Physical security, that you are not exterminated” (Interview No.10).

“Being certain about myself, about my health and life” (Interview No.1).

“Safety on the street, safety in a global sense… if you have a job, social protection, guaranteed medical care” (Interview No.6).

“In a broader sense, it is physical safety in social, moral, and psychological sense” (Interview No.2).

Psychological security is the third dimension mentioned by the respondents:

“It is conviction that there are no threats… neither psychological nor physical” (Interview No.7).

“Peaceful situation, with no extraordinary events” (Interview No.9).

Security is associated with various things. The most important dimensions are physical, economic and psychological safety. In addition, several respondents mentioned stability, health, comfort, and certainty about the future.

Even though respondents of both groups tend to explain security according to their personal experience, perceptions of the experts rest on their professional experience and
knowledge. The experts distinguish between individual and state security, and speak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical safety</td>
<td>“I do not think that the general situation in the country is bad, I feel safe in my district” (Interview No.E5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“[I do not feel safe when I think about] kidnapping, murders, and robberies…especially of older people” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Everything depends on what kind of street we are talking about. If it is the city, town or village. An individual feels safer in a small town. In a big city, [it is safer] on central streets” (Interview No.E6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Let us imagine, I drive 20 kilometres out of Vilnius, and there appear various possibilities to become a victim, or other kinds of disasters can happen” (Interview No.E4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Safety on the street depends on a particular place and city. For example, it is difficult to feel safe in Kaunas” (Interview No.E4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic safety</td>
<td>“[I feel safe when] I have a permanent job and incomes” (Interview No.E3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The economic advancement would definitely increase the sense of safety” (Interview No. 8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social safety</td>
<td>“State officials are the most protected … They are safe because they will not be fired… People who work in joint stock companies and other [private] companies are not safe” (Interview No. E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“[Security] partly depends on personal health” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological comfort</td>
<td>“When I watch television and read newspapers, I feel threatened in Lithuania” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Mass media forms an opinion that everything is wrong, yet, the reality is not so bad” (Interview No.E6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Psychological discomfort is great. Our state does not look good, and I do not want to live here”(Interview No.E1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty about the future</td>
<td>“Only a few are certain about their future and about the future of their children” (Interview No.E6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“An individual is unsafe because he does not know what will be tomorrow, he is not certain about his future” (Interview No.E3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State security</td>
<td>“External threat exists. If we speak about Russia or Belarus, we can not say that they have a consolidated democracy and democratic governments” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

about the international dimension. The non-experts are oriented more towards their personal life and experience (see Tables 7 and 7A).

Table 7. What Does it Mean to be Safe? Expert Opinions.

In the opinions of the experts, both individual experience and knowledge
about the general situation in the country are closely related. It is obvious that in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical safety</td>
<td>&quot;I go to work and come back and I should feel safe then. My</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parents, my relatives and friends should feel safe when they walk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>out or do various things&quot; (Interview No.2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;You should walk and know that nobody would attack you and that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nobody follows you&quot; (Interview No.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;To walk in peace not thinking about somebody attacking you or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>robbing you&quot; (Interview No.8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good health</td>
<td>&quot;I feel safe when all my relatives are in good health&quot; (Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic safety</td>
<td>&quot;It means that I have a job and home&quot; (Interview No. 9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social safety</td>
<td>&quot;When you have a job, social protection, and guaranteed health care&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>(Interview No.6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comfort</td>
<td>&quot;To feel safe personally means to have a comfort, and not thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>about what could happen. I think psychological comfort is more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>important than real threats&quot; (Interview No.7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;I associate security with stability&quot; (Interview No.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty about</td>
<td>&quot;It is safe when you are certain about everything… and about the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the future</td>
<td>future&quot; (Interview No.8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of</td>
<td>&quot;[It is safe] when there are no external threats&quot; (Interview No.9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>external threats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

comparison with non-experts, the experts more often say that they personally feel safe. The experts evaluate their individual safety more positively.

**Table 7A. Do You Personally Feel Safe? Non-Expert Opinions.**

The most visible difference between the opinions of experts and non-experts is that the experts think about individual security as their personal experience and as a general problem in the society. In addition, they take into consideration the external security. Meanwhile, the vast majority of non-experts do not mention external security as a factor, which influences their sense of security. One of the possible conclusions is that non-experts do not perceive external threats as real.

Similarly to the results of public opinion polls, the in-depth interviews show that internal problems of security dominate. Physical insecurity (threat of crimes), the possibility to lose a job and lack of social protection are the most important threats for people.

### 2.3. Causes of (In)Security

The definition of security is incomplete without mentioning causes of security. When speaking about perceived causes of insecurity, the researched experts differentiate between several social groups - educated people or professionals, retired people, unemployed people. The experts think that social status defines the perception of security:

"Professionals will find jobs everywhere… They really feel secure” (Interview No.E1).
“Older people, especially those close to the retirement age, are not able to change their qualification and show initiative, [therefore they feel unsafe]” (Interview No.E2).

“Security of retired people is the most problematic” (Interview No.E2).

In addition, the experts stressed the importance of people’s mentality and the way of thinking. The non-experts did not mention this issue.

“People do not develop themselves. Mid-aged people do not learn foreign languages and computing. Education and enlightenment, when you work and study simultaneously, is perceived as something not needed. Yet, this individual development would contribute to professional growth” (Interview No.E1).

The non-experts mentioned several causes of insecurity. Yet, only a few could rationally differentiate between real threats and imagined threats. As one of the respondents, a psychologist, said:

“This is not a question about real security, but rather about perception and the sense of security. It is possible that in a certain situation there is a real threat, however, a person does not realise it and still feels safe. Alternatively, a person could be safe in reality, however, s/he could have various threats. For example, it is possible to form an image that a city is safe despite the fact that the crime rate is higher there than in other cities. Still, there could be a sense of security. Another city could be really safe, yet people could be afraid” (Interview No.7).

In general, only one cause of insecurity was perceived as hypothetical and hardly probable. External threats to the state, e.g. a possibility to be attacked by foreign states, was not treated seriously:

“Recently, I can not see [such a threat]. Only if the global war started. I do not think that someone could attack Lithuania… But nobody is protected from terro-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
<td>“If you have hands and legs, you can find [a job], yet, there is no clear guarantee” (Interview No.E6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“An individual really feels unsafe… even if he lives in a safe state… he does not know what will be in the future… if he has no job and no income” (Interview No.E4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The younger generation just after finishing their education, has problems in finding jobs” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Major threats are associated with social stability, economic stability, and narrowing possibilities. They could be found only abroad” (Interview No.E1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>“A person could hardly live on his pension if he had no relatives. These people are really unsafe. Even in respect to health care they are not safe” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Very often an individual takes a job for a minimal salary, has no guarantees, receives a salary ‘in an envelope’. He does not think about the consequences when he will be retired, how big his pension will be” (Interview No.E4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security from various epidemics</td>
<td>“We should speak about security in a broader sense. Growing drug abuse, and – AIDS… This becomes an important problem for the state and the individual” (Interview No.3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
rism” (Interview No.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Economic security | "The majority of young people leave Lithuania because they do not feel safe. They cannot earn their living" (Interview No.3).  
  "The most important, I think, is the possibility to lose a job. [You are not sure] how your boss will treat you" (Interview No.8). |
| Psychological security | "Psychological security I imagine [is important] at work. When you are forced not to do what you like or what you are able to do. You are psychologically affected and they want to prove that at any moment you will not be able to do your job properly and you can lose your job not because of the fact that you are not able to do it" (Interview No.2). |
| Physical security | "I do not walk at nights because I feel afraid. I want to live a long life. Someone could ask you for something, and if you refuse… Of course it would be better if you die at once” (Interview No.5).  
  "It is important to come home and not find the door open" (Interview No.4).  
  “Crime and drugs come together” (Interview No.1). |
| Social security  | "I want to live to retire. If I live to that age luckily, I will say that I lived safely in Lithuania" (Interview No.5).  
  "One boss directly tells me that he will fire me… He is not the only one" (Interview No.8).  
  "I think that I can get no job, no social guarantees, I can get ill" (Interview No.2). |

Major sources of insecurity are summarised in Tables 8 and 8A.

Table 8 A. Causes of Insecurity. Non-Expert Opinions.

Summarising, it could be said that the experts use a broader definition of causes of insecurity. They point out that global problems as well as every-day life problems in Lithuania influence the sense of security and the real situation in the state. The non-experts mention state problems too; however, the key problem is their personal experiences. When compared with the data of public opinion polls, the same problems are pointed out as the most important: social guarantees, employment, and physical safety. Both public opinion polls and the qualitative research show that the issues of internal security are much more important than the external ones.

3. Means to Ensure Security

The respondents were asked to elaborate on what guarantees their security, both individual and state. The respondents listed various ways to protect security. However, an important finding was that experts and non-experts gave priority to
different factors responsible for security. The non-experts stressed the importance of the state and the Government, while the experts emphasised the role of the individual himself/herself. According to the experts, the role of an individual is crucial when we speak about individual safety (see Tables 9 and 9A).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>“[An individual] should himself create a safe environment. The second factor would be state policy” (Interview No.E3).&lt;br&gt;“An individual himself could do a lot to secure himself. Firstly, in the professional area. When a lower social class is concerned, they need more education and understanding that the state does not create security. Everything depends on them, if they are able to earn their living and to resist the actions of the state which sometimes are not legal. They are safe if they protect their rights” (Interview No.E1).&lt;br&gt;“A lot of people say that the state should regulate the relations between the employee and the employer. Yet, when the state starts to interfere, both sides lose. If the state’s requirements for an employer are too high, the labour market starts ‘limping’. Then competition among companies decreases” (Interview No.E2).&lt;br&gt;“It is a common business of an individual and the state” (Interview No.E7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>“Isolation is one of the most negative factors for state security. We will be safe only when we are in a certain alliance” (Interview No.E3).&lt;br&gt;“Security is safeguarded if the state participates actively in various international organisations… organisations associated with security. Of course, cultural and scientific interaction is important” (Interview No.E2).</td>
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<th>Dimensions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual security</td>
<td>“The state should create better conditions. This is security because an individual should be certain about his income, he should not be afraid that he will lose a job and have problems because of that” (Interview No.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State security</td>
<td>“Firstly, the Government should ensure external safety, secondly the Special Investigation Service should care about it. The police [should care] about [safety on] the streets. Then, decent business [is important], not Mafia” (Interview No.9).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. What Should Be Done in Order to Ensure People’s Security in Lithuania? Expert Opinions.<br>Table 9A. What Should Be Done in Order to Ensure People’s Security in Lithuania? Non-Expert Opinions.  
As it was already mentioned, ordinary people expect all kinds of guarantees form the state. The experts outline the role of an individual, the community, and the state. In addition, they point to a negative influence of state interference into the social sphere. Liberally oriented respondents say that the state should create necessa-
ry conditions for e individuals to make choices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of ensuring security</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the social sphere, the state can change its policies, undertake reforms, and expand social guarantees</td>
<td>&quot;Via taxes, the state redistributes a part of the value-added to perform its functions and compensate the disproportion created by market and capital, e.g. to give all the inhabitants, regardless of their social status and wealth, access to education&quot; (Interview No.E8). &quot;If the state wants to guarantee security, it must put the legal basis and the laws into order. The state is responsible and can do a lot in guaranteeing internal security&quot; (Interview No.E4). &quot;In principle, and not only in Lithuania, the state cannot guarantee full security&quot; (Interview No.E7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake social reforms in the area of physical security</td>
<td>&quot;The government's powers are not small in ensuring, first of all, the institutional basis to create security&quot; (Interview No.E4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the area of state security</td>
<td>&quot;We are now trying to have contacts with these structures – NATO and the EU&quot; (Interview No.E3). &quot;We can look for defence from these dangers only in collective security and defence structures&quot; (Interview No.2). &quot;Nowadays the world is too much interconnected. The EU could be the guarantor of security of both kinds&quot; (Interview No. E4).</td>
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Groups of the respondents point to very concrete methods how to ensure security (see Tables 10 and 10A).

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<thead>
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<th>Means of ensuring security</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the social area, the state can change its policies, undertake reforms, and expand social guarantees</td>
<td>&quot;Possibly, something depends on an individual too, but today, if you work in a state organisation, everything depends on the state and on the leadership&quot; (Interview No.1). &quot;To reform, to provide more funds&quot; (Interview No.1). &quot;The state can provide social security, as in other states - but not in Lithuania - so that people need not starve. So that a pensioner could live a worthy life, so that a newborn child has future guarantees of education and would be able to create a family even without having the money to pay for it all himself&quot; (Interview No.2). &quot;The social area is the state's responsibility. No one can ensure social security by himself, without external security&quot; (Interview No.2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake social reforms in the area of physical security</td>
<td>&quot;If these social reforms are carried out appropriately, then street crime would go down and security would be guaranteed. At least minimal security&quot; (Interview No.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the area of state security</td>
<td>&quot;To integrate into Western structures. There are more stable [social] systems there… As far as integration into the West is concerned, the state's chief function should be to take care of all negotiations while reflecting Lithuania's interests&quot; (Interview No.9).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 10. What is the Role of the State in Ensuring Security?

Expert Opinions.

Table 10A. What is the Role of the State in Ensuring Security?

Non-Expert Opinions.

Expert and non-expert opinions do not differ much when it comes to the evaluation of the role of the state. First, internal and external policies are seen as separate. In the area of internal policy, the non-experts turn their attention to the most insecure areas and confidently indicate the means of improvement: appropriate policy, adequate financing, and development of reforms. Secondly, the experts and the non-experts have similar opinions about the integration into NATO and the EU. Basically, the non-experts positively value Lithuania’s Western orientation. But the experts’ evaluation is more sceptical:

“In this regard, the society’s expectations are above the mark” (Interview No.E1).

“On the one hand, what the EU would bring to us – economic security and personal security, greater security of ownership, NATO membership – this is collective defence […] Although I am half-sceptical about EU membership” (Interview No.E2).

In evaluating the individual’s capacity to ensure his own security, the non-

<table>
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<th>Means of ensuring security</th>
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<tr>
<td>Physical security can be guaranteed by avoiding dangerous situations or by undertaking defensive measures (training, weapons)</td>
<td>“We can’t just all buy rifles and pistols to ensure our physical security. Again one must deal with this issue at several levels. In terms of physical security, an individual alone can do little. It more depends on the community, on the collective” (Interview No.E2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social security may be guaranteed via political activity</td>
<td>“If you have property, you must buy insurance. If you want a wise policy, you must go to elections and vote. If you don't like what the politicians are doing, join an organisation - go and do it yourself” (Interview No.E7). “From the point of view of professional security, trade unions show little activity” (Interview No.E4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the state</td>
<td>“The role of the state is very important. According to the principle of subsidiarity - what a single human being cannot do, the state can do” (Interview No.E7).</td>
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experts gave a wide range of answers, which partly coincided with the experts' opinion (see Tables 11 and 11A).

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<th>Means of ensuring security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical security can be ensured by avoiding dangerous situations or by taking defensive measures (training, weapons)</td>
<td>&quot;One must do this minimum to secure his own security… One can train… Don't go to some places&quot; (Interview No.1). &quot;Don't deal with the bad guys, the Mafiosi&quot; (Interview No.9).</td>
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<td>One can ensure social security by being politically active</td>
<td>&quot;Somehow politically… be more active during the elections&quot; (Interview No.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can ensure the state's security by entering the military service</td>
<td>&quot;Go to the Army… Ladies may go to voluntary service… There are some professions, for example, nurses&quot; (Interview No.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can ensure psychological security by educating yourself</td>
<td>&quot;Express your normal opinion and educate those who don't know. This is the function of education. Special broadcasting should be done on public television and radio, questioning those who know and are educated but not just people from the street&quot; (Interview No.9).</td>
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Table 11. **What Is the Role of the Individual in Ensuring his/her Security? Expert Opinions.**

Table 11 A. **What Is the Role of the Individual in Ensuring his/her Security? Non-Expert Opinions.**

Non-experts do not underestimate individual’s capacities to ensure individual security. Although they give priority to the state in the areas where only the state can guarantee certain policy, they also adequately estimate individuals’ abilities. The experts believe that an individual in Lithuania can do much more to ensure his/her own security.

4. External Security

At times external security is called the true or hard security linked to military and defence issues. But the experts interviewed did not draw a clear line between external and internal security. External security conditions both internal security and
the security of individuals. This is the major difference in the evaluation between the

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<th>Types of threats</th>
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<tr>
<td>Potential threats</td>
<td>“Every state did face, is facing, and will face threats. And especially our state, which connects the East and the West, as I say, it is located on a pathway” (Interview No.E3). “I think that these threats exist. And the neighbours are menacing, Russia, Belarus and others. And terrorism is possible” (Interview No.E7). “Non-democratic tendencies in neighbouring Eastern states will always have threat [potential] to Lithuania, first of all because of the processes that are taking place there” (Interview No.E5).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic threats</td>
<td>“I can see economic threats. Meaning, that foreign capital can destroy some companies in Lithuania producing similar products. Big corporations do this especially. They [come] not only from the East, but also from the West” (Interview No.E2). “Speaking about real threats to the statehood, this is the loss of economic and partly political sovereignty because of globalisation” (Interview No.E8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from Russia</td>
<td>Many people speak about Russia as a potential external threat to Lithuania, but it is impossible to predict how things will turn out in the future. &quot;I don't see a potential threat here. [Russia is] not [a threat] as an actor, but [a threat] structurally - [it is causing] soft security threats. Narcotics contraband, Kaliningrad district, AIDS, social instability – such factors emanate threat, but not actions by Russia as an actor in the international arena and the like&quot; (Interview No.E4).</td>
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However, the opinions of the experts and non-experts often compare on potential external threats (a certain lack of confidence is noticed among ordinary people when talking about external threats) (see Tables 12 and 12A).

The experts clearly see external threats; they name them precisely not limiting themselves to military aspects only. In fact, they emphasise that currently a military
invasion is unlikely. Therefore, external economic, social, and criminal threats crea-

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| There are no threats / it is difficult to say | "It is difficult to answer about global issues to every individual. Because in everyday life we do not understand such threat, unless it becomes evident. But making prognosis just like this - [it is] difficult … I wouldn't think that threats to us are very acute at the moment … And from the side of Russia, the threat is not so acute." (Interview No.1)  
"So far I can't imagine such threats. Neither could America imagine such invasions costing so many lives less than a year ago." (Interview No.2)  
"Lithuania has no threats, lest it accidentally gets caught into [conflicts], because we are neither the East, nor the West - just a place between the roads" (Interview No.4). |
| Threat from Belarus | "The most depressing situation is from the outside, the most dangerous [thing] is stagnation in Belarus. Everything is calm there; everybody gets his/her piece and doesn't worry about anything. And people tired from all murky transformations may wish a choice like in Belarus. This could be the biggest threat. People […] idealise Soviet times, it appears to them that [life] was so good back then. But let them remember, was it really so good. I remember myself - it wasn't so ideal" (Interview No.9). |
| Threat from Russia | "In case of a major invasion. But where from might it come? Everybody understands that [it might come] from Russia, maybe from Belarus" (Interview No.9). |

ted by the process of globalisation are becoming far more important. Just like non-experts, politicians, civil servants, and political scientists distrustfully evaluate Belarus and Russia because of the nature of their regimes and economic-social instability.

Table 12 A. Perceptions of External Threats. Non-Expert Opinions.

In one of the interviews with the experts, a respondent even indicates some threat posed by Belarus in relation to the general internal situation of Lithuania. However, the experts do not discard the possibility of terrorist acts against Lithuania. Although some of them say that this threat is not important for Lithuania which is a small state, they emphasise that this phenomenon is hard to predict and describe.

Public opinion polls indicate that Lithuanians do not see real external threats to their country. But Russia and Belarus are considered as a potential source of threat. This opinion is corroborated in responses to the questions about potential benefits for Lithuania becoming a member of the EU and NATO.

The 1998 and 2000 public opinion surveys aimed to clarify how Lithuania’s residents assess Lithuania’s membership in NATO. In respondents’ opinion, Lithuania’s membership in NATO would guarantee the progress of the Lithuanian Army and Lithuania’s security. According to sociological surveys, in 1988, 66 percent of respondents shared that opinion, while in 2000, 51 percent were of this opinion. Importantly, 53 percent of the respondents in 1998 and 41 percent of the respondents in 2002 pointed out that Lithuania would become more attractive to foreign investment. While 50 percent and 37 percent correspondingly said that the possibilities of
financial support would increase after Lithuania joins NATO.

One of the important tendencies is that a lot of people think that Lithuania’s membership in NATO have a negatively affect its relationships with Russia and Belarus. In 1998, 44 percent of the respondents who had an opinion about that issue said that Lithuania’s membership would negatively affect its relations with Russia, and 36 percent - relations with Belarus. In 2000, 53 percent of the respondents thought about the negative effect on relations with Russia, and 50 percent - with Belarus.

The data of the qualitative research supports the results of public opinion polls. In gene-

<table>
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<th>Illustrations</th>
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<td><strong>The EU</strong></td>
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<td>“When Lithuania joins the EU, we’ll leave the so called Soviet isolation for ever” (Interview No.3).</td>
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<td>“Membership in the EU will give us economic security from unexpected winds and crises… This is true of the security of our borders because the EU has common requirements. The security from narcotics will be higher because of the Interpol and Europol. In the EU, individual security will be higher, and the ecological security too...I have in mind health as well” (Interview No.2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In the EU, the choice is bigger; job and possibilities are different, market is different. I do not even speak about the material support, the financial support that we could get from them. There are some disadvantages too” (Interview No.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Membership in the EU, if we speak about hard and soft security, which is hard to define, means economic security” (Interview No.7).</td>
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<tr>
<td>“To my mind, we expect too much from the EU and NATO. We think that if we join NATO, one aspect of security will be guaranteed, while if we join the EU, the other aspect is guaranteed, economic and social welfare. Yet, the sense of insecurity of individuals and society will not disappear after joining the EU” (Interview No.1).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>“In a larger sense, security is directly related to NATO. It is one of the most important guarantees of our statehood and the final establishment of independence… It influences our economy. I mean the investment” (Interview No.3).</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Advantages are obvious: the collective security system means judicial responsibilities to defend Lithuania in case of aggression against it. Each person in Lithuania feels protected at least from external threats” (Interview No.5).</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Article No.5 says that the invasion of one country means the invasion of all NATO” (Interview No.7).</td>
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eral, expert opinions about the role of the EU and NATO in securing Lithuania’s security are rather sceptical, while the opinions of non-experts are more positive (see Table 13 and 13A).

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<th>Illustrations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong> “The EU - this is economic security, I’d think…you’d be sure about jobs. When there are many jobs, there is no feeling of insecurity” (Interview No.1). “Connections, possibilities for people to interact. Just a simple case - to go or to come back. Give yourself social guarantees, to earn something somewhere” (Interview No.4). “Theoretically security should increase. [Insecurity would only be if there is] intervention from the outside. And local problems, this is not [the case], they should be solved by us” (Interview No.6). “Joining the EU and especially NATO, according to me, would bring certain psychological confidence for investors or people who might be willing to come to Lithuania from elsewhere” (Interview No.7). &quot;People would have more jobs. There are strong connections with the increase in security as well. More investment is likely [to come] after joining NATO. And the EU - this is a bigger market for Lithuanian producers” (Interview No.8).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong> &quot;Military [security]… [Local people] would think that there is something that defends them. Lithuanian people do not yet trust the Lithuanian Army to such an extent” (Interview No.1). &quot;NATO needs developed states and, no doubt, politically stable, democratic [states], and stable democracy cannot be ensured without a strong economy, and a strong economy can be achieved via the EU” (Interview No.1). “After joining NATO, security would definitely improve because there would be some security of the state, so that other states would stand on the side of Lithuania in the case of aggression and would defend it” (Interview No.3). “So that nobody attacks our homeland and a person feels more secure” (Interview No.8). “NATO is the only panacea, there are no alternatives. There is one stereotypical mode, there is no choice” (Interview No.9).</td>
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Table 13. The Role of the EU and NATO in Ensuring Lithuania’s Security. Expert Opinions.  
Table 13A. The Role of the EU and NATO in Ensuring Lithuania’s Security. Non- Expert Opinions.

Evaluating the role of the EU and NATO, the experts see very many aspects of security – from military to individual. Meanwhile, the non-experts essentially link Lithuania’s membership in NATO with military security, membership in the EU – with growth in economic well-being. But they do not indicate a possible negative impact of the membership. To a certain extent, the claim of expert No.1 that Lithuanian people expect too much from the EU and NATO has been proven.
5. Sources of Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>“When driving I listen to the radio” (Interview No.E3 and No.E7).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>“I watch ‘Panorama’, when I have time” (Interview No.E7).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local newspapers (sceptical opinion)</td>
<td>“Our newspapers are the yellow press” (Interview No.E1, No.E2 and No.E5).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“There are no normal newspapers in Lithuania. The major newspaper is the so-called ‘tabloid’” (Interview No. 7).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional activity, foreign press</td>
<td>“International meetings, conferences, foreign press, Internet [is important]” (Interview No.E2).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“[I use] official information” (Interview No.E5).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Scientific studies” (Interview No.E7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talks with close relatives and colleagues</td>
<td>“[I receive information] from my old friends, colleagues” (Interview No.E2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal experiences</td>
<td>“[I form my opinion on the basis of] my personal experience” (Interview No.E2, No.E7 and No.E5).</td>
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</table>

Toward the end of interviews, the respondents were asked to indicate information sources that shaped their opinion about security. The essential difference between the two reference groups is that the majority of the experts do not read or negatively evaluate Lithuanian newspapers and partly other mass media (see Tables 14 and 14A).

Table 14. Sources of Information. Expert Opinions.

Table 14A. Sources of Information. Non-Expert Opinions.

It is obvious that the profession and the life style of the experts form their
opinions. Then non-experts use easily accessible sources of information: Lithuanian mass media, television and radio. Importantly, mass media is treated critically quite often. Some of the respondents say that they do not always believe the information provided by mass media. On the other hand, the experts say that they use foreign mass media and trust it more than the local one. In addition, they use official data of various institutions and the Internet. An important source of information is direct participation in conferences, international forums. The experts say that they get a lot of information at work, in private talks with colleagues.

Conclusions

The data of the qualitative research on security delineate the same tendencies as the data of public opinion polls. The general tendency is that ordinary people rarely identify any real external threats. Yet, they especially stress the internal sources of insecurity – the growing rate of crimes, drug addiction, anxiety about the future and the job, and the insufficient health care system.

Ordinary people think of individual rather than state security. Individual security is much more important for them. Contrary to that position, experts point out that all three levels of security are inseparable and treat individual security as an important measure of state security.

Perceptions of ordinary people and experts about the role of the state and the individual in safeguarding the individual security are different. According to the experts, an individual could do a lot in the spheres of social, economic and physical security. The role of the state is limited to guaranteeing external security, fighting corruption and organised crime, and developing laws and institutions responsible for security. Contrary to the position of the experts, ordinary people tend to ascribe all the responsibility for safeguarding security to the state.

Experts pay more attention to external threats to security. They point to the threats coming from the instability of neighbouring regimes in Russia and Belarus, and the threat of economic subordination. Nevertheless, membership in NATO and the EU is perceived to be the most important guarantee of security.

As this research shows, the micro security analysis can provide an interesting perspective, which can contribute to general security studies.
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