WARS OF LITHUANIA

Edited by Gediminas Vitkus

Vilnius 2014
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A Systemic Quantitative Analysis of Lithuania’s Wars in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

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The idea to undertake the ‘Lithuania’s National War Experience in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Systemic Quantitative Analysis’ research project on the basis of the methodology of a project which is one of the most universal and long-term studies of warfare in the world developed rather unexpectedly. Although I had heard and read about the Correlates of War project – an ongoing systematic quantitative analysis of wars that began in the United States in 1963 – much earlier, I was prompted to become more thoroughly acquainted with it by *Resort to War*,¹ a book by Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman published in the beginning of 2010 by CQ Press. This book was extremely interesting to read. And not just because it presented the latest results of the progress of this project, i.e. covering all of the wars from 1816 to 2007, but also because the project that was begun in the 1960s is still being successfully developed and continues to provide new insights and generalizations about the phenomenon of war for those who are interested.

It goes without saying that in studying this new book with special attention – ‘under a microscope,’ so to speak – I was also curious to find out what was written in it about Lithuania’s wars. Excluding the wars that our countrymen fought, either voluntarily or by force, for foreign interests, Lithuania took part in four large-scale wars during the period from 1816 to 2007 – these are wars which were fought under the Lithuanian flag and which resulted in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. These wars are well known, and at first glance appear to have been thoroughly researched: the two uprisings in the nineteenth century, the struggle to defend the independence of the State of Lithuania after it was re-established in 1918, and the partisan war against the Soviet Union that began before World War II had ended.

Upon becoming acquainted with the data that Sarkees and Wayman present about these wars in their book, one is left with a twofold impression. On one hand, we can be satisfied with the fact that all of the Lithuanian wars that took place during the period in question are indeed presented, in one way or another. On the other hand, we also have to admit that, across the board, the factual data presented about Lithuania’s wars are not sufficiently accurate, and that the understanding and interpretation of them is also quite different from ours. However, this is not surprising. Naturally, the compilers of *Resort to War* based their book on information that was available to them and studies that had been published in English; they did not have the opportunity to become more thoroughly acquainted with the full range of historiography written in Lithuanian, Russian and Polish. Let’s also bear in mind the scale of the researchers’ task – to include and describe all (!) of the wars that have taken place in the world. So if there are some inaccuracies in describing a less influential state, this usually happens either because of a lack of research, or simply due to language barriers.

It is only natural that the inaccuracies and errors left by the compliers of the book and the data set encourage us to look into corresponding data and information in our own historiography: how much and to what extent it has been accumulated and made available to those interested. On one hand, of course, there was no reason to doubt that

quite a lot had been accomplished in researching the history of the wars that Lithuania was, in one way or another, involved in. Yet at the same time, it draws attention to the fact that the quality of the existing studies and descriptions of Lithuanian wars does vary considerably. Alongside very detailed studies that delve into individual episodes and personalities, one can also find works that are rather superficial, inaccurate or overly literary. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for some studies of wars (especially the last partisan war) to be politically disputed. It was also quickly evident the many of the research results are not available in other more widely spoken languages.

Of particular note is the fact that looking at the historiography of Lithuanian wars from the perspective of the Correlates of War project, we managed to discover a significant gap in the historiography of our wars which we otherwise wouldn't have given thought to. One must admit that the research done thus far was lacking a well-considered and explicitly formulated theoretical framework which would allow for the presentation of an aggregate systematic quantitative picture of the wars that have taken place. It was precisely this circumstance that became the key pretext for writing this book. This is when we came up with the idea of taking it upon ourselves to carry out a systematic quantitative analysis of Lithuanian wars using the methodology developed in the United States to systematise information available in historiography and safeguarded in archival funds. We hope that this will give researchers from the Correlates of War project an opportunity to utilise more comprehensive and reliable sources concerning Lithuania's wars, and make corrections in the descriptions thereof. In a sense, we are grateful to them for the opportunity to better understand, reflect upon and summarize the experience of national wars that we have accumulated, and to share our knowledge with all those who are interested.

In concluding this brief preface, I would like to thank everyone without whose help this book would not have been what it is. The publishing of a book is never just the result of the efforts of its initiator. It is difficult to decide in which order everyone should be thanked, so I will simply present an alphabetical list of all the people who have helped in one way or another. I would like to express my most sincere thanks to: Rima Bertašavičiūtė, Rima Cicėnienė, Žygintas Bučys, Teresė Birutė Burauskaitė, Terry Clark, Aurika Duobienė, Bernardas Gailius, Reda Griškaitė, Jūratė Guščinskenė, Rimantas Jokimaitis, Romas Kaunietis, Violeta Kelertienė, Regina Koženiauskienė, Ramunė Lukšienė, Vaida Mastauskienė, Jonas Minkevičius, Jūratė Novagrockienė, Eugenija Petrolienė, Valdas Rakutis, Gema Sabonytė, Meredith Reid Sarkees, Eulialija Stankevičienė, Vygantas Vareikis, Ona Vitčienė, Eugenijus Vosylius, and Agnietė Žotkevičiūtė. I would also like to thank the National Museum of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Art Museum, the Lithuanian State Historical Archives, the Lithuanian Central State Archives, the Lithuanian Special Archives, the Museum of Genocide Victims of the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, and the Šiauliai Aušros Museum for allowing iconographic material to be used in the book. And above all, I am grateful to the four authors of the studies published in this book – Virgilijus Pugačiauskas, Ieva Šenavičienė, Gintautas Surgailis and Edita Jankauskienė, who accepted my invitation and decided to contribute to the understanding and recognition of Lithuania's national war experience.

Vilnius, October 2013

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Introduction
Over the period from 1816 to 2007, Lithuania took part in as many as four large-scale wars; Lithuanians fought these wars under the Lithuanian flag and suffered more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. These are the two (1830–1831 and 1863–1864) uprisings against the Russian Empire that Lithuania fought together with Poland in the nineteenth century, the 1919–1920 War of Liberation that arose after the re-establishment of independence in 1918, and the Partisan War with the Soviet Union that began before the end of World War II. In both Lithuania and its neighbouring countries, these wars are fairly well-known, and have been researched exhaustively on more than one occasion. However, upon becoming acquainted with the publications that have been prepared on the basis of the Correlates of War project, it becomes clear that the compilers of this data set have by no means accessed all of the information that has been accumulated. Additional questions arise upon discovering what place the wars have been allocated in the typology of war used by this project.

I. Lithuania’s National War Experience and Correlates of War

It should be noted straightaway that it is only in the last book prepared on the basis of the Correlates of War project that all four of Lithuania’s wars are mentioned in one way or another. In the earlier books written by Singer and Small in 1972 and 1982, only three wars are mentioned, since data on the last war – the Partisan War – were probably not available.

Let’s take a closer look at the descriptions of the Lithuanian wars that are presented.

I.I. The 1830–1831 and 1863–1864 Uprisings

The descriptions of these wars are very similar, so we will discuss them together. In all three editions of the book, the 1831 uprising was listed as the ‘First Polish War of 1831’. Analogously, the 1863–1864 uprising is called the ‘Second Polish War of 1863–1864’. These names, of course, are not surprising, since the distinction of Lithuania as a geopolitical unit separate from Poland –

2 Ibid., p. 370.
or, all the more, as an independent political entity – was unimaginable at that time. However, the slightly more detailed narratives of these wars presented in the 2010 edition of the book are more disappointing: only military action related to the events in the Polish Kingdom\(^3\) are recounted, and Lithuania is not even mentioned. Thus, the information presented must be rectified for this alone. It would actually be interesting to assess precisely what contribution the Lithuanian fighters made to the overall fight, and compare this with the Polish contribution. Yet all we find in the book is information: it is specified that during the 1831 war, which went on for almost a year, 20,000 Poles and 15,000 Russians died, while during the 1863–1864 war, which continued for just over a year, 6,500 Poles and 10,000 Russians perished. And as the narratives of the key parameters of these wars show, the data presented only reflect the consequences of military action in the Polish Kingdom.

The authors presented these figures based on quite a wide spectrum of abundant sources. In describing the 1831 war, studies published in as many as three languages (English, German and French) on the events of 1830–1831 and the Russian Empire of that time were used in addition to the main statistical data sets.\(^4\) Data on the 1863–1864 war are presented on the basis of a more modest list of sources.\(^5\) However, it is difficult not to notice that in both cases, the authors did not make use of studies published in the Russian, Polish or Lithuanian languages. Thus, much could still be done in this respect to more precisely establish the losses experienced by the warring sides.

\(^3\) In historiography, the term ‘Kingdom of Poland’ is used in reference to two different entities: 1) the integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1795; and 2) the artificial administrative unit that was incorporated by Russia in 1815 (sometimes referred to as ‘Congress Poland’). In order to distinguish between these two geopolitical entities in this book, the term ‘Kingdom of Poland’ will be used in reference to the integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the term ‘Polish Kingdom’ will be used in reference to the administrative unit of the Russian Empire.


It would also be quite interesting to return to a question that has seemingly already been answered: who the warring sides were in these uprisings. In the 2010 edition of the book, the compilers of the Correlates of War data set indicate that in both cases, the participants of the war were Russia and ‘Poles’. It is obviously not difficult to understand what is meant by the mention of Russia. However, it is crystal clear that the compilers of the data set do not have a coherent grasp of who the ‘Poles’ were. On one hand, Poland – or more precisely, Poland-Lithuania – no longer belonged to an interstate system after 1816. On the other hand, it (they) did in any case belong to the international system, since it continued to manifest itself as a geopolitical entity that had clear political objectives and was able, among other things, to challenge a state – a member of the interstate system – and participate in military action with considerable efficacy and duration.

In the Correlates of War database, these ‘non-state’ political entities are divided into two groups: geopolitical units and non-territorial entities. The first are associated with a specific territory, while the second are not (for example, international organizations or terrorist groups). There is probably no doubt that in the case of this uprising, the ‘Poles’ are a geopolitical unit. Yet within the context of today’s historiography, it would at the very least be a misunderstanding to make the territorial borders of this unit synonymous with those of the Polish Kingdom that was formed after the Congress of Vienna. This is contradicted by the fact that the war had spread not only throughout the Polish Kingdom, but also throughout the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were already being administered as governorates of Russia. It is also contradicted by the fact that the war left a deep imprint in the historical destiny not only of the Polish nation, but of the Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian nations as well. It is not surprising that researchers working in distant lands do not understand this.

One final observation. We will draw attention to the fact that in classifying these wars, they were both assigned to the intra-state war category. At first glance, it would seem that this is fine. The wars did in fact take place within the Russian Empire. However, in light of the fact that the wars took place on the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian state, and bearing in mind that the goal of the uprising was to abrogate Russian rule and restore independence, it is a bit odd that the authors deemed these wars to be ‘civil wars over local issues’. This seems strange because according to all their parameters, these wars were less like intra-state wars and more like extra-state wars, when a state fights with a geopolitical entity that was once a state and which is trying to restore this status – one which seeks not to change the policies of the empire and gain more rights therein, but rather to separate itself from it, completely and unconditionally.
I.II. The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation

In the 1972 book, which was the first to be compiled on the basis of the Correlates of War project, the Lithuanian War of Liberation was not distinguished separately as either one war or as a group of wars. The entire period from the 1917 Russian Revolution to the very end of the civil war in 1921 was included in the database under the strange name of ‘Russian Nationalities War (1917–1921)’. One might assume that the Lithuanian War of Liberation was also included in this generalization. The wars fought by Poland, Latvia and Estonia were also left undifferentiated. Researchers at that time were clearly lacking more precise data about this whole jumble of conflicts, which also coincided with the end of World War I, the collapse of the Russian Empire, and the Russian Civil War. At that time, it was only recorded that approximately 50,000 fighters died during this ‘war’.

In the 1982 edition, we see a more differentiated picture, but one which is also rather contradictory. On one hand, this edition even includes an explanation of why the fights fought against Soviet Russia by the Baltic countries, which declared independence in 1918, cannot yet, in the opinion of the authors, be regarded as inter-state wars. According to the authors, 'the rebellious faction or self-proclaimed independent entity must have satisfied our criteria of system membership six months prior to the onset of hostilities to merit participation in an inter-state war. Thus the battles of the Baltic peoples against Soviet Russia from 1918 to 1920 were not classified as inter-state wars despite their 1918 declarations of independence; these remained in the colonial war category.' However, in this case, it remains unclear what the date of Lithuania’s declaration of independence is considered to be in this data set. If it is considered to be 16 February 1918, then six months had already passed by the time Russian Red Army forces appeared in Lithuania in December 1918; in this case, the Lithuanian War of Liberation should have already been classified as an inter-state war. On the other hand, it is difficult to comprehend why the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1920, which began on 14 February 1919, was nevertheless differentiated from the Russian Nationalities War and classified as an inter-state war, even though it did not meet the established criteria, i.e. less than six months had passed since the declaration of Polish independence on 11 November 1918. It should also be pointed out that despite the transfer of the Russo-Polish War to another category, the number of soldiers who died during the Russian Nationalities War remained unchanged: 50,000.

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7 Ibid., p. 75.
9 Ibid., p. 98.
Quite evidently, the authors of the abovementioned books and their assistants were lacking more precise data on Lithuanian war history. Since the earlier books do not include concrete descriptions of wars or corresponding bibliographic references, it is difficult to determine from the enormous reference list at the end of the book what exactly the authors used as a basis.

In any case, it is encouraging to see that the situation has clearly improved, as evidenced by the substantially revised data presented in the 2010 edition. The general list of inter-state, extra-state, intra-state and non-state wars no longer contains the fictional Russian Nationalities War (1917–1921); furthermore, the group of inter-state wars that takes its place includes the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1920,\(^{10}\) which had already been recognized earlier, as well as the Estonian War of Liberation of 1918–1920\(^{11}\) and the Latvian War of Liberation of 1918–1920,\(^{12}\) during which these countries, with the support of Germany and Finland, held off attacks of the Red Army. This indicates that the developers of the data set delved quite a bit deeper into the nuances of the history of that period and were able to describe the struggles that took place at that time more accurately.

Nevertheless, the Lithuanian War of Liberation was not distinguished. Despite the fact that at one time, Lithuania was fighting three enemies (Soviet Russia, the Bermontians, i.e. members of the Russian White Guard supported by Germany, and Poland) in defence of its independence, it is only the Lithuanian–Polish War of 1920 that merits discussion in the book as a separate war that resulted in a considerable number of battle-related deaths (both of the warring sides lost 500 men each).\(^{13}\) In the Correlates of War database, this is the only inter-state war in which Lithuania, as a member of the inter-state system, is listed as a participant. It is therefore particularly interesting to see what data is presented on this war.

The narrative briefly recounts the peripeteia of Lithuania’s dispute with Poland over Vilnius, describes the role of Russia, Germany and the League of Nations, and names Poland as the initiator and revisionist of the conflict.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 126.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 124.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 125.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 131–132.
Yet despite the fact that this description is based on authoritative sources, the authors failed to avoid certain errors and inaccuracies. The statement that is made in the text that Lithuania was part of Poland until the end of the eighteenth century is not completely accurate. Secondly, the 16 February 1918 Act of Independence of Lithuania is confused with the Act of 11 December 1917: the former is described as the document by which Lithuania declared its independence, but as a German protectorate.

The distinction in Resort to War of the Lithuanian-Polish War as a separate war prompted us to re-think whether the Lithuanian War of Liberation should be considered one war or three. If, in Lithuanian discourse, this is one war that was waged for the same goal, we can affirm that the compilers of the Correlates of War data set did not see it as such. Alternatively, it is possible that this division of the War of Liberation in principle means that Lithuania’s fights with Soviet Russia and the Bermontians are not considered wars, as they did not result in more than 1,000 battle-related fatalities. In this respect it was therefore important to find more information and check already existing data on the number of battle-related deaths. Without a doubt, this would help both the developers of the database and us personally to better understand the scale and scope of these struggles.

I.III. The 1944–1953 Lithuanian Partisan War with the Soviet Union

In the 1972 and 1982 books, the Lithuanian Partisan War is not even mentioned, even though it took place during a period that data were already collected for. The reason for this is probably obvious – the authors and

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16 Ibid.
researchers simply did not have enough information about it. However, this war is already presented in the 2010 book. The fact that this was included in an authoritative database is therefore of particular significance for those who are interested in the Lithuanian partisan war and who want the experience of this war to be widely known and duly recognized. Granted, the amount of information presented in the book on this war is still inadequate. The war itself is given the romantic title of the ‘Forest Brethren War of 1945–1951’. The warring sides are named as the Soviet Union and Baltic guerrillas. The book states that the war was initiated by the partisans, but won by the Soviet Union.17 Although the information about the war is rather laconic, it is still somehow very telling, and reflects the pros and cons of the Correlates of War database like a mirror. On one hand, as previously mentioned, it is commendable that this war, which took so many lives, has finally been recognized. On the other hand, unfortunately, inaccuracies and contestable evaluations are again quite evident.

The fact alone that the USSR’s opponent is inaccurately listed as ‘Baltic guerrillas’ speaks volumes. We are well aware that the Lithuanian resistance was purely national, focused on the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state, rather than on regional issues of relevance to all of the Baltic States.18 The same can be said of the Latvian and Estonian resistance movements. Both the Latvians and the Estonians sought to restore their national states. Although the Latvian and Lithuanian partisans did work together to some extent,19 this does not mean that the movements were in principle coordinated from a single centre. By failing to recognize that the Baltic partisans were fighting their own national wars, it is as if the authors of the data set inadvertently adopted the views of Moscow, which treated all of the partisan wars in the western part of the empire as a single problem.

Finally, attention must once again be drawn to the fact that just like the nineteenth century uprisings, the Lithuanian Partisan War is treated here as

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18 Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė N., Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio strategija, Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1999, nr. 1(5), http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/5/Nijole.htm#The%20Strategies%20of%20the%20Movement%20for%20the%20Liberation%20of%20Lithuania, 2013 10 05.
Lithuania’s Wars

intra-state war – a ‘civil war for local issues’. Since we have already touched upon this issue, we will add that the definition of intra-state war used in the Correlates of War project clearly becomes even more problematic in the case of the Lithuanian Partisan War. This is even more apparent in light of the fact that the annexation of Lithuania and the other Baltic countries was not recognized by many countries as legitimate in general. In terms of international law, the statehood of the Baltic countries was therefore discontinued *de facto*, but not *de jure*, since some 50 countries (the United States and other democratic Western in particular) did not recognize the annexation of the Baltic States in general and formally did not consider these countries to be an integral part of the Soviet Union.20

In the introduction of this book, we will not endeavour to criticize the decision taken by the Correlates of War project executors to select such a system of war typology. We will come back to this issue at the end of the book.

Now that we have established the inaccuracies that exist in the description of Lithuanian wars and set the goal of correcting them, we should discuss in more detail the theoretical basis of this work, which was formulated according to the experience and work of the compilers of the Correlates of War database.

II. Application of the Correlates of War Methodology to Carry Out Research on Lithuanian Wars

We shall note that all of the key parameters of the Correlates of War project for accumulation of data about wars that have taken place were followed in this book. In analysing the Lithuanian wars, we are first and foremost interested in the question of how many battle-related fatalities the warring sides experienced per year. Efforts were also made to check and ascertain whether and to what degree all four of Lithuania’s wars do correspond to the main criteria used in the Correlates of War project for wars to be included in the database. As we know, the project initiators decided that only an armed conflict during which the warring parties experienced at least 1,000 battle-related deaths combined in one calendar year shall be eligible for inclusion in the data set.21

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In the book, we also paid special attention to another issue that is of interest to the compilers of the Correlates of War project: the status of the participants – the warring sides. Who the participants of the war are ultimately depends on the type of war – whether it is inter-state, extra-state or intra-state. In this respect, the Lithuanian War of Liberation seemed the least problematic. At that time, Lithuania was an independent state and was involved in an inter-state war. However, the classification of the two nineteenth century uprisings and Lithuania’s partisan war with the Soviet Union as intra-state wars seemed fundamentally debatable. Therefore, based on the experience of Lithuanian wars presented in this book, we resolved to formulate some proposals for improving the existing Correlates of War typology; these proposals are set forth at the end of the book.

Efforts were made in this study to answer, as comprehensively as possible, the question of who bore the bulk of fighting in the case of the Lithuanian wars. This question was very important in examining practically all of Lithuania’s wars, with the exception of the partisan war, when the Lithuanians fought alone. However, the nineteenth century uprisings, which were fought together with Poland, and the War of Liberation, at the beginning of which the Lithuanians had assistance from Germany, were really quite interesting cases in this respect.

During the study, we also looked for the most precise answers possible to other important questions related to the parameters of the wars, i.e. the start and duration of the wars, the initiators of the wars, the winners and losers of the wars, and other consequences. On the other hand, not all of the problems examined in the Correlates of War project were relevant in the case of the Lithuanian wars. For example, transformation of a conflict from one type of war to another did not take place in any of the Lithuanian wars. The status of the war participants also remained unchanged during the course of all the wars, from start to finish.

The circumstance that the study of Lithuanian wars cannot compare, neither in its size nor scope, to the accumulation of data about all of the world’s wars that has been taking place for more than half a century in the Correlates of War database made it possible to apply a simplified version of the methodology and variables used for this project. There are approximately thirty variables for the description of wars in the Correlates of War databases. The optional variables vary somewhat depending on the type of war being described, but they are basically very similar. They include the following key parameters of wars:

1. War Number.
2. War Name - the name given to the war.
3. War Type.
4. The Country Code or System Membership number for the participant on Side A.
5. The name of the participant on Side A of the war.
6. The Country Code or System Membership number for the participant on Side B.
7. The name of the participant fighting on the other side of the war (Side B).
8. Is the war internationalized (intra-state war case)?
9. StartMonth1 - the month in which sustained combat began.
10. StartDay1 - the day on which sustained combat began.
11. StartYear1 - the year in which sustained combat began.
12. EndMonth1 - the month in which sustained combat ended, or the month of the last major engagement after which fatalities declined below the war fatality threshold.
13. EndDay1 - the day on which sustained combat ended, or the day after the last major engagement after which fatalities declined below the war fatality threshold.
14. End Year 1 - the year in which sustained combat ended, or the year of the last major engagement after which fatalities declined below the war fatality threshold.
15. Start Month 2 - after a break in the fighting, the month in which sustained combat resumes.
16. Start Day 2 - after a break in the fighting, the day on which sustained combat resumes.
17. Start Year 2 - after a break in the fighting, the year in which sustained combat resumes.
18. End Month 2 - after fighting resumes, the month in which sustained combat ended, or the month of the last major engagement after which fatalities declined below the war fatality threshold.
19. EndDay2 - after fighting resumes, the day on which sustained combat ended, or the day after the last major engagement after which fatalities declined below the war fatality threshold.
20. End Year 2 - after fighting resumes, the year in which sustained combat ended, or the year of the last major engagement after which fatalities declined below the war fatality threshold.
21. Trans From - the War Number of a preceding war that was transformed into this war.
22. Where Fought - Region where combat occurred (1 = W. Hemisphere, 2 = Europe, 4 = Africa, 6 = Middle East, 7 = Asia, 9 = Oceania).
23. Initiator - the name of the participant that began the war.
24. Trans To - the War Number of the war that this war transformed into.
25. Outcome: coded as: (1 - Side A wins, 2 - Side B wins, 3 – Compromise, 4 - The war was transformed into another type of war, 5 - The war is ongoing, 6 – Stalemate, 7 - Conflict continues at below war level).
26. Side A Deaths - the battle-related combatant fatalities suffered by the Side A participant.
27. Side B Deaths - the battle-related combatant fatalities suffered by the Side B participant.
28. Version of the data.\textsuperscript{22}

By limiting the study to the scale of Lithuania, it was possible to simplify these long lists of variables by excluding obvious or irrelevant information (e.g. the continent where the war was fought, the war’s code in the database, renewal of the war).

On the other hand, we would like to draw attention to the fact that in examining Lithuania’s wars, it was beneficial to use other variables related to the development of the Correlates of War project as well. As another reminder: in developing the project, sets of related data have begun to be created alongside the main data sets. Information was first collected about the material capabilities of the countries to wage war, i.e. the parameters of each state, changes in annual military spending, the size of the armies, energy consumption, iron and steel production, total population and the population in urban areas. Another set that began to be formed was dedicated to forms of state unions and diplomatic representation, membership in international organizations, territorial neighbours, cultural groups and trade. All of these data were put to use in various scientific studies dealing with the causes of wars.\textsuperscript{23} We decided to employ some of these variables (especially those related to Lithuania’s material capabilities to wage war) in carrying out the study of Lithuanian wars as well.

Thus, after reviewing and considering all the variables used by the Correlates of War project, the following reference plan for the description of Lithuania’s wars was selected:

1. The warring sides: status and potential.
   1.1. Lithuania: status and potential (government, population, economy, military forces).
   1.2. The opponent (-s): status and potential (government, population, economy, military forces).
2. Beginning of the war.
   2.1. Goals, reasons and pretexts of the war.
   2.2. Initiator of the war.
   2.3. Dating the beginning of the war.
3. Course and main stages of the war. The structure of this section may vary depending on the specific war. The section discusses issues such as the intensity of military

\textsuperscript{22} More information on the data collection methodology and data coding is available on the Correlates of War project website: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
\textsuperscript{23} Only some of the data sets related to the main Correlates of War data base are mentioned here. These and the other data sets are now available on the above-mentioned project website.
action, key battles, breaks in the war (from/to: year, month, date), renewal and/or stages of military action (year, month, date), involvement/withdrawal of third parties (year, month, date), the total number of months that actual military action took place (excluding breaks), and the geography of the war (where and to what extent it developed).

4. The burden of war.
   4.1. Size and provisioning of the forces.
   4.2. Leaders.
   4.3. Allies.

5. War damages.
   5.1. Fighters killed in action. This section focuses on the number of soldiers killed in battle (counting the number of soldiers from all warring sides killed in battle or who later died due to illnesses or injuries experienced in battle).
   5.2. Collateral damage (civilian casualties, repression, economic losses, etc.).

6. The end of the war and its consequences.
   6.1. Victors of the war.
   6.2. Other consequences of the war (Lithuanian geopolitical changes, economic and demographic outcome, fate of the armed forces).

7. Semantics of the war (how the warring sides referred to one another and how this was reflected in their documents, publications and discourse; what names were given to the war by each of the sides and by neutral countries during the development of the war; how those names have evolved in historiography to this day; what name is used now, how it should be assessed, and whether or not it should be changed; perpetuation).

III. Structure of the Book

The book consists of four main chapters, each of which is devoted to a different Lithuanian war. All four chapters of the book were written by historians specializing in the history of the corresponding period.

The first chapter, which is devoted to the 1830–1831 uprising, was prepared by Dr Virgilijus Pugačiauskas, who is exploring the problems of nineteenth century Lithuanian history, and has studied the impact of Napoleon’s 1812 march into Russia on Lithuania.

The author of the second chapter, which examines the uprising of 1863–1864, is Dr Ieva Šenavičienė. Dr Šenavičienė has been researching the Lithuanian side of the 1863–1864 uprising in both Lithuanian and foreign archives since 2004. She has published a number of works on the subject of the uprising, including
a monograph and numerous scientific articles and source publications.

The third chapter is dedicated to the 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation. The author of this chapter, Dr Gintautas Surgailis, is the editor-in-chief of *Karo archyvas* (‘War Archive’), a leading journal on Lithuanian military history. Dr Surgailis has also written numerous monographs on the history of the Lithuanian armed forces during the interwar period.

*Edita Jankauskienë* wrote the fourth chapter, which deals with Lithuania's partisan war against the Soviet Union. The author has been working at the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania since 1996, where she is researching anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania and has accumulated considerable experience on the topic of the Lithuanian Partisan War.

Efforts were made to illustrate the publication with moderation and meaning, in order to convey the spirit prevalent at the time of the wars that were examined. The book concludes with suggestions regarding further rectification of data on Lithuania's wars as well as observations in which, based on the case of Lithuania, the typology of war selected by the compilers of the Correlates of War database is critically assessed.
Chapter 1
Lithuania and the 1830–1831 Uprising
1.1. Vincentas Smakauskas, Angel presenting a rebel of 1831 with a pilgrim’s staff
In three books (1972, 1982 and 2010) that were compiled using the Correlates of War (COW) project as their basis, the uprising of 1830–1831 is referred to as the ‘First Polish War of 1831’. As mentioned in the preface, this name should come as no surprise, as it was not then the practice to distinguish Lithuania as a separate geopolitical unit. At that time, it was not uncommon for all of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was partitioned by Russia, Austria and Prussia at the end of the eighteenth century, to simply be called ‘Poland’. However, on reading the more detailed narrative of this war presented in the 2010 book, one is forced to acknowledge that the compilers of the data collection held to the more narrow understanding of Poland as a geopolitical unit and identified it with the Polish Kingdom, which was subordinate to the Russian Empire at that time. The significant circumstance that the war had spread not only throughout the Polish Kingdom, but also to the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania (hereinafter – Lithuania), was thus overlooked. No reference is made at all to the uprising that began independently in Lithuania in March 1831 and which joined the uprising that began in the Polish kingdom in November 1830; the battles that were fought in Lithuania by local rebels and corps of the Polish regular army are also neglected. So, in essence, it is not the entire war that is described, but only parts thereof, which, of course, does not contribute to the accurate and comprehensive itemizing of the nature of this war and the losses experienced by the warring sides.

Information about military action in Lithuania is completely left out in the description of this war. In the abundant historiography of the war, we will not

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2 In historiography, the term ‘Kingdom of Poland’ is used in reference to two different entities: 1) the integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1795; and 2) the artificial administrative unit that was incorporated by Russia in 1815 (sometimes referred to as ‘Congress Poland’). In order to distinguish between these two geopolitical entities in this book, the term ‘Kingdom of Poland’ will be used in reference to the integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the term ‘Polish Kingdom’ will be used in reference to the administrative unit of the Russian Empire.
find any significant doubt that the uprising in Lithuania was an integral part of the insurrection that began in the Polish Kingdom, or that the rebels were fighting for the common goal of liberation from Russia and the restoration of the former state – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This chapter of the book is therefore dedicated to liquidating this obvious omission and, based on historiographical material and additional research, to clarifying and identifying the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the uprising that took place in Lithuania in 1831 in accordance therewith.

It should be noted that historiography of the 1830–1831 uprising in Lithuania is quite extensive, written over nearly two centuries by various authors and in various languages. Practically as soon as the weapons had fallen silent, memoirs of witnesses and participants of the uprising emerged, and researchers from various countries set to work; this process continues to this day. The course, strategies and tactics of military operations have been elucidated in detail, and the armed forces of the contending parties have been described, yet thus far, little attention has been given to the topic of losses suffered by the warring sides. Nevertheless, more detailed information about the Lithuanian fighters who were killed in the battles of this war, as well as officers and soldiers of the Polish corps and Russian military units, can be found in works by Alexander Puzyrewski, Waclaw Tokarz, Olga Gorbacheva, Jan Ziółek, and Jacek Feduszka. One of the most comprehensive pieces dedicated to examining the uprising that took place in Lithuania is Feliksas Sliesoriūnas’s monograph, which presents a considerable amount of concrete data about the course of military action in Lithuania. This has become a pivotal point in continuing further studies, because it includes detailed descriptions of the movement of enemy military units and the course of battles, as well as lists of battle casualties: those who were killed, wounded and taken prisoner. However, the author neither provided data that summarizes the battle circumstances resulting in fatalities, nor evaluated the credibility of information provided in primary sources in more depth.

In order to present the most accurate and objective information possible on the people killed from both warring sides in battles that took place within

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the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, material safeguarded in the Russian State Military Historical Archive was reviewed. This includes documentation of Russian military authorities, reports of commanders of military units that fought in Lithuania, communiqués, and military operation journals that include data regarding casualties. New material previously unused in Lithuanian historical literature on the rebels of the Augustów Voivodeship has been found at the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw; this material reflects the course of the uprising in Lithuanian districts. New material related to the assessment of military action in Lithuania has been found in the Manuscripts Department at the University of Warsaw Library. Therefore, based on the works of the above-mentioned historians, and upon reviewing known and new primary sources, opportunities emerged to carry out a new investigation of the uprising in Lithuania.

1.1. The Warring Sides: Status and Potential

1.1.1. Lithuania: Status and Potential

After the three partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century, the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was incorporated into the Russian Empire: the bulk of the territory was restructured into the Vilnius (in Russian Вильна, in Polish Wilno), Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk and Mogilev governorates; the Užnemunė region, which was given to the Kingdom of Prussia after the partition of 1795, and then later to the Duchy of Warsaw, became part of the Polish kingdom in 1815. In the 1810s and 1820s, the population in the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania that had been annexed by Russia was considered to be average within the Empire. There were 1,100,000 people living in the Vilnius Governorate, which was immersed in the uprising, 753,000 in the Grodno Governorate, and 1,160,000 in the Minsk Governorate. There were 480,000 people living in the Augustów Voivodeship, although only the counties of Marijampolė, Kalvarija and Sejny were part of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This data is based on the Seventh Census Revision, which began to be conducted in 1815. According to 1811 data, there were an average of 14.9 people per square kilometre living in the Vilnius Governorate, and 14.6 in the Grodno Governorate.

Although the population density in this area was average for Russia, it was two or three times lower than that of Europe. The majority of the residents lived in rural areas; urban dwellers made up less than 10% of the population. A subsistence economy is characteristic of Lithuania – an agricultural land, based on grain farming, flax cultivation and animal husbandry. Domestic
industry existed in the villages as a part of the subsistence economy. Flax and grain were the most exported products, although grain export was limited due to problems with the supply of food to the Russian army. Small-scale industry was predominate in Lithuania’s cities, and oriented toward the narrow local market. Large-scale industry developed at a slow pace due to, among other reasons, the taxation policies imposed on imported products, townspeople and merchants. In Vilnius, the largest and most important city in the region, the population (which was more than 25,000 in 1830) grew slowly; several draperies and printing companies operated alongside artisan workshops as the main means of production. Incorporated into the Russian Empire, the region went through a period of economic stagnation in the early nineteenth century; this was deepened by the war of 1812, when Lithuanian agricultural capacity decreased by half.9

1.1.2. Russia: Status and Potential

At that time, Russia was a country of tsarist absolutism, a huge, scantly controlled bureaucracy, serfdom oppression, a comparatively low population density, vast space, an underdeveloped road system, a harsh climate, and frequent natural disasters (epidemic diseases). Granted, at that time Russia was one of the five countries settling Europe’s political issues at the Congress of Vienna (as a member of the Holy Alliance). One might say that Russia’s physical might seemed threatening, and it was a leader in the international arena. Russia had probably reached the apogee of its might during this period. The potential of the Russian Empire as that of a major power was reflected in statistical parameters – 52 million inhabitants (the more than 3 million residents of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania should be subtracted from this number); this in itself testifies to the country’s ability to dispose of an extensive army. Russia is an agrarian country, but the state of affairs in this area was not good: the level of agriculture was low, and the structure of social relations hindered its development. Manufacturing production, which was concentrated in the fields of metallurgy and weaving, was primarily stimulated by huge military orders.

Russia’s gross domestic product per capita was 70% of Europe’s statistical mean.  

A continental nature of domestic trade was dominant in the vast country, yet in spite of the obstacles, it developed rapidly at that time. However, in financial terms, Russia had a deficit budget during the 1823–1831 period that was increased even more by military expenditure resulting from the wars with Persia and Turkey. Even after the uprising began in Poland and then in Lithuania in March 1831, Emperor Nicholas I took out a loan in the amount of 20 million silver roubles. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the army – which was staffed by conscription – comprised 400,000 soldiers and 1,056 cannons. According to the emperor, this military force was for defending against external enemies and maintaining social order within the country. During the 18 drafts that were held from 1802 to 1825, nearly two million soldiers were enlisted to land and sea. However, in reality Russia was able to concentrate some one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers for the struggle with Poland and Lithuania. After a long period of preparation, it had 120,000 troops at its disposal to fight against Turkey. Granted, in this case Russia was better prepared for unexpected military action in Poland and Lithuania, since it had mobilized troops for a possible campaign against France, which was in the throes of revolution.

1.2. The Beginning of the War

1.2.1. Goals, Reasons and Pretexts of the War

In looking for an answer to the question of what the reasons for the uprising were, it should be noted that various internal and external circumstances existed that were inter-related. First of all, let’s take a look at what Russian government officials regarded as the reasons for the uprising. Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich (1779–1831), the Russian imperial viceroy of the Polish Kingdom, maintained that the reason for the insurrection in Lithuania was the economic
system of forced requisitioning that had exhausted the land.\textsuperscript{13} Mikhail Muravyov, then a Russian official who contributed to government actions directed against the spread of the insurrection and who would later be appointed to suppress another uprising in 1863–1864, asserted that the main reasons were weak administrative management of the region, ‘influence from Warsaw’ and a lack of police supervision.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the transformations in political consciousness among certain nobles, the tradition of confrontation with the tsarist government remained vital in the former territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, even after the 35 years that had passed since the partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. First and foremost, the incompatibility of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s republican traditions with the despotism of the Russian government (dictate of state institutions) became more and more apparent. This can be considered the main reason that determined the readiness of Lithuanian society – and, of course, the nobility in particular – to resort to a radical mode of fighting against Russian absolutism.

Without doubt, specific facts can be named that bear testimony to the existence of this fundamental reason. After Alexander I, who carried out a moderate policy in the incorporated territories, Emperor Nicholas I, the future ‘gendarme of Europe’, employed more extreme measures. The following are a few examples of measures to which the local gentry reacted negatively. Firstly, it became completely clear that the new tsar had eliminated any plans of restoring the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from his political agenda. Secondly, Russian officials were more and more frequently being appointed to government positions in the governorates of Vilnius, Minsk and Grodno. This principle began to be applied within lower-tier – county – administrations, as well as at educational institutions, including Vilnius University. Finally, the case of the Vilnius University students (the Philomaths and the Filarets) and the repressions that followed were met with a very negative response within Lithuanian society.\textsuperscript{15}

Anupras Jacevičius (Onufry Jacewicz), one of the leaders of the insurrection, provided a clear explanation of the need to take arms in his memoirs: ‘it was the fight of a nation that had fallen into a hopeless situation; one which wants, with empty hands and without any tactics or direction, to shatter the chains, and which, seeking to defend its rights and its homes, bares its chest for the chance to fight and die on the ruins of its home rather than to continue living

\textsuperscript{13} Sliesoriūnas F., \textit{1830–1831 metų sukilimas...}, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{14} Записка о ходе мятежа в губерниях от Польши возвращенных, Крокотов Д. А., \textit{Жизнь графа М. Н. Муравьева}, Санкт–Петербург, 1874, с. 505, 507.
a life of violence and oppression.\textsuperscript{16} In a will that he drew up before joining the uprising, an anonymous contemporary explained his motivation as follows: ‘I go where Honour and Duty to the Homeland call.’\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, only a propitious moment was needed for the transformation into concrete action of the antagonism that had been building up against, as it was put in one of the rebel appeals, ‘our Tyrant in St Petersburg’, who ‘clearly wants to destroy our language and our faith’.\textsuperscript{18} In 1830, the revolutionary events in France and Belgium, and especially the uprising that began in neighbouring Poland in late November, stirred up various strata of society in Lithuania even more. The actions of the Russian government, when the 79,000 troops under Field Marshal Ivan Diebitsch-Zabalkansky (1785–1831) sent to suppress the uprising in Poland as well as other units were primarily funded from the resources of local residents using the system of forced requisitioning, only increased the discontent.\textsuperscript{19}

The uprising in Lithuania was evidently prepared for in advance, and attempts were made to coordinate these actions with the organizers of the Polish insurrection. Jakub Grotkowski, the first emissary from Warsaw, arrived in Vilnius at the beginning of 1831, with specific instructions. The Chief Committee was formed to organize an uprising in the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, right to Vitebsk.\textsuperscript{20} In line with the instructions sent by the provisional government in Warsaw, the committee prepared a plan for the uprising, and later sent representatives to Warsaw to report on the situation in the region, on their readiness to revolt, and that they were waiting for the signal and support in the form of weapons. However, General Józef Chłopicki (1771–1834), who is referred to as the dictator of the uprising, received the Lithuanian delegation coldly and did not agree to support this initiative. The general took the view that a shift of military operations directly into the territory of Russia (which the land of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania was considered) would not have

\textsuperscript{16} Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicza naczelnika siły zbrojnej powstania powiatu Telszewskiego w Księstwie Żmudzkiem, Zbiór pamiętników o powstaniu Litwy w r. 1831, Paryż, 1835, s. 3.
\textsuperscript{17} Einu ten kur šaukia Garbė, Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių bibliotekos Rankraščių skyrius (toliau – LMAVB RS), f. 151–1171, l. 1.
\textsuperscript{20} The Chief Committee was formed by Antanas Goreckis, Stanislovas Šumskis, Liudvikas Zambžickis, Edvardas Rioneris, Justinas Hrebničius, Mykolas Balinskis and Leonas Rogalskis. It remains unclear who was in charge – Goreckis or Šumskis. Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 63–64; Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 36–37.
been expedient from a military point of view (the Polish military forces had deteriorated and weakened, and there was no real military force in Lithuania at that time) and would have negative consequences in the case of any future peace talks with Russia. The Polish leader did not believe that war with Russia could end in a successful victory; rather, he held high hopes for peace talks with Emperor Nicholas I, and saw military action only as a serious argument in the diplomatic game.21 Hence, the Lithuanians’ position was in clear disagreement with the military and political interests of General Chłopicki, who was the leader of the Polish Kingdom at the time.

However, public opinion in Poland on shifting the fight beyond the Nemunas and Bug rivers was much more favourable, and it gradually spread among the soldiers as well.22 Open invitations to an ‘advance into Lithuania’ appeared in December 1830 in the pages of Warsaw’s press and in the lines of poets. Here Polish poet Stefan Garczyński employed verse to urge his compatriots to partake in the ‘advance into Lithuania’:

Kraśne są Niemna doliny,  
Kraśniejsze litwinów serca,  
Złączą się z nami litwiny  
A żyć skończy przeniewierca,  
Dziś niech spólne grzmią modlitwy  
Do Litwy, wodzu, do Litwy.*

So wonderful, those valleys of the Nemunas,  
More wonderful are the Lithuanians’ hearts,  
Let us march together with them as one,  
He who is a betrayer is ruined!  
Today, let our common prayers ring out  
To Lithuania, chief, to Lithuania!

Nevertheless, neither the leader of the uprising nor the other generals changed their position, although in plans presented to the governing body, Colonel Ignacy Prądzyński (1792–1850) Lieutenant Colonel Wojciech Chrzanowski (1793–1861), and Colonel Dezydery Chłapowski (1788–1879) – officers of the general staff of the Polish army – spoke out in favour of broadening military action to enemy lines of communication in the eastern parts of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The generals faced increased pressure due to the initiatives coming from the Sejm (parliament) of the Polish Kingdom. One such was that of Joachim Lelewel – a historian and political figure who had worked as a professor at Vilnius University from 1822 to 1824. On 24 January 1831, Lelewel spoke at the Sejm of the Polish Kingdom and declared

21 Barzykowski S., Historia powstania listopadowego, Poznań, t. 2, 1883, s. 36; Feduszka J., Powstanie Listopadowe na Litwie i Żmudzi..., p. 120; Zgórniak M., Polska w czasach walk o niepodległość (1815–1864), Wielka Historia Polski, T. 7, Kraków:Fogra oficyna wydawnicza, 2001, s. 93.
* Garczyński S., ‘Modlitwa obozowa (dnia 7 maja w obozie pod Rudzienką)’ in Poezye Stefana Garczyńskiego, t.1, Paryż, nakładem autora, w drukarni i gisserni A. Pinard, 1833, s. 82.
a Lithuanian ‘act of citizen solidarity’ with the Polish nation and its Sejm. This declaration was signed by more than 200 residents of Lithuanian lands, and Lelewel presented it to the House of Representatives of the Sejm (Izba Posielska) on the Lithuanians’ behalf. Count Władysław Ostrowski, Marshal of the Sejm, spoke in favour of this initiative, declaring a new and eternal union of Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia and Ukraine. However, this did not have any concrete military consequences, as the Polish generals still opposed plans to shift military action to the territory of Lithuania.23

Thus, preparation for the revolt in Lithuania usually took place separately from Warsaw, with which interaction was irregular. In Vilnius, the Chief Committee tried to maintain its status as the centre coordinating action by sending its emissaries to the districts not only of the Vilnius Governorate, but to those of Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk as well.24

However, further preparatory action developed fairly independently and usually spontaneously, and depended on the rapidly changing situation within Lithuania and beyond its borders. According to Anupras Jacevičius, a nobleman from Žemaitija (Samogitia) who witnessed the events of that period, ‘ardour and restlessness had reached the highest degree.’25 Actions of the Russian government (arrests and deportations from Lithuania) directed against the most untrustworthy representatives of the nobility as the organizers and leaders of potential resistance increased tensions significantly. Of note is the fact that the list included a number of individuals (Mykolas Römeris, Kalikst Danilowicz, Duke Juozapas Giedraitis, Ignatas Zaviša, etc.) who actively supported Napoleon I during the 1812 war between France

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24 Szumski S., W walkach i więzieniach. Pamiętniki z lat 1813–1848, Wilno, 1931, s. 63; Gorbaczowa O, Z., historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 67–68; Feduszka J., Powstanie Listopadowe na Litwie i Żmudzi..., p. 120.
25 Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicza..., p. 9.
and Russia, and were officials of the provisional government of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{26} The already complex situation was further complicated by new circumstances: cases of peasant disobedience incited by rumours regarding the abolition of serfdom, information about the uprising in Poland, announcement of the draft, and so on.\textsuperscript{27} These circumstances thus readied Lithuanian society, once and for all, to begin armed resistance, and the military action that began in the Polish Kingdom in 1831 became the decisive stimulus that led to Lithuania’s final decision to take up arms.

1.2.2. Dating the Beginning of the War

When adverse circumstances prevented the Chief Committee in Vilnius from resolutely coordinating preparations for the uprising, the region of Żemaitija took on the role as the initiator of the war. One could say that the decision to start the fight was born spontaneously, amid fears that the Russian government would take repressive measures upon finding out about the preparations that were being made. Preparation for war began on 17 March 1831, when regional noblemen gathered at the Tytuvėnai estate of Antoni Przeczyszewski in the district of Raseiniai and decided to start an uprising. However, the Lithuanian rebels did not officially proclaim war against Russia, so the beginning of the war can be considered to be 25 March 1831, when a platoon of fighters led by Šurkont, a landowner from the town of Kulautuva in the district of Raseiniai, joined a battle in Vilkija with the Cossacks who were guarding the border, and killed three Russian soldiers, taking the rest prisoner. That same day, the uprising spread throughout most of the district, and in the early morning of the next day the rebels made their move, led by three noblemen: Benedykt Kalinowski (1801–?), who moved in from the Dubysa River, Sucharzewski, who advanced from Ariogala, and Juliusz Gruszewski (1808–1865), who approached from Kelmė and Nemakščiai. Together, they stormed Raseiniai and, after a brief clash, disarmed the local garrison. Members of the secret Raseiniai District Committee assembled people from their estates, who came on horseback, in carriages and on foot, and who were armed with hunting rifles, swords, spears and scythes. That day, the chief of the Šiauliai police, Stackelberg, sent a message to Vilnius Governor General Matvey Khrapovitsky\textsuperscript{28} about the uprising that had begun.

\textsuperscript{27} Sliesoriūnas F., \textit{1830–1831 metų sukilimas...}, p. 68–69.
1.3. The Course and Main Stages of the War

The uprising continued for almost eight months – from 25 March to 13 October. The partisan tactics employed by the rebel units and the Polish corps resulted in battles that often lasted just a few hours, and never longer than twenty-four. Several enemy clashes took place at the same time in various areas of Lithuania. The larger battles took place in cities and towns or their surroundings; as a rule, the rebels avoided fighting in open areas with the troops of the Russian regular army, which were usually more numerous. Thus, in the war that took place between the rebels and the Russian army in 1831, there were no clear, long-term front lines.

There were also frequent breaks in the military action, which lasted anywhere from one to twenty-nine days. The most intense fighting took place in May (23 battles), April (21) and July (18); June, August, September and October also saw several battles. However, the largest battle took place in June. Vast enemy forces were concentrated near Vilnius: the Russian units had 24,000–26,000 troops with 87 cannons, while the regular army corps of the Polish kingdom, led by General Antoni Gielgud (Antanas Gelgaudas, 1792–1831), together with the Lithuanian rebels had 11,000–13,000 troops and 28 cannons. More than 1,000 troops from both sides were killed in the battle. Although he had preserved his main forces, General Gielgud lost the battle over the country’s main city, which was of great strategic and political significance; he retreated to Kaunas and was forced to rethink his combat strategy and tactics.

The other battles did not compare in terms of these parameters. Battles were usually fought by enemy units made up of separate regiments, squadrons or battalions. The rebels lost the potential majority of battles with losses of various extents. Not even their quantitative advantage – which for the most part consisted of infantry made up of peasants armed with scythes – could save them. This is precisely what determined the huge losses experienced by the rebels in terms of people killed: during the Battle of Šiauliai, 700 rebels died, while the Russians only lost 115; in Marijampolė the ratio was 300:11; in Kardžiūnai – 300:4; in Leipalingis – 200:9; and in Kaunas – 200:4. The Russians only experienced greater losses than the rebels in four battles (in Utena, 20 local fighters and 103 Russian soldiers were killed; in Darbėnai – 10 and 21 respectively; in Pikeliškės – 2 and 21; and in Meškučiai – 3 and 19).

29 This officer was a descendant of the Gelgaudas family, an old line of nobles from Žemaitija. His father Mykolas was a Lithuanian great clerk and marshal of the court. The general served in the army of the Polish Kingdom. Polski Słownik Biograficzny (PSB), t. VII, Kraków, 1948–1958, s. 438–440.
In historical literature, the uprising in Lithuania is divided into two stages: the first being from the beginning of the war to the arrival of units of the Polish regular army, and the second being from the joint action of the Polish and Lithuanian fighters to the withdrawal of the Polish corps to Prussia. However, in this war it would be expedient to single out a third stage with its own specific...
features. Clearly, the uprising lost its dynamics when the allied Polish corps and part of the local Lithuanian fighters retreated, yet nevertheless, rebel units fought Russian troops in various areas for almost three months, exclusively using ‘small war’ tactics.

- The first stage lasted for almost two months – from 25 March to the end of May. A distinct feature of this period is that the Lithuanian rebel units, using partisan war tactics, fought independently against Russian garrisons and regular army units. This stage saw 36 enemy battles, i.e. nearly half of all the battles that took place. With the exception of Vilnius, the rebels managed to control a large part of Lithuania’s territory, as the Russian government was focusing all of its attention on Poland. In addition, large regular army forces had not been concentrated in the region.

- The second stage started at the end of May, when the allied forces marched into Lithuania: first, a unit of the Polish regular army led by General Chłapowski, and later – General Giełgud’s corps; this stage ended in late July with the retreat of the allies and some of the local fighters from the territory of Lithuania. The largest enemy fights took place during this period of the war, and the uprising spread to the governorates of Minsk and Grodno as well as to the Lepiel district of Vitebsk Governorate. However, it was namely in the Vilnius Governorate that the main battles were concentrated.

- The third stage stood out for the fact that it lasted the longest – from the end of July to October – although the number and scale of battles had by then diminished considerably, to just a few episodic armed clashes. However, independent rebel fighting took place in separate areas of Lithuania, and the retreat from Žemaitija to the Kingdom of Prussia of the uprising’s most prominent leaders, including Ezechiel Staniewicz (1798–1831), Józef Rymkiewicz and Juliusz Gruszewski, brought the end nearer. The last battle that we know of that claimed victims took place on 13 October in the town of Balbieriškis.32

Over the entire course of the war, i.e. almost eight months, the enemy fought 78 battles in Lithuania, and actual military action went on for 48 days.

32 Ibid., pp. 372–373.
1.4. ‘Geography’ of the War

In examining the course of military action, the ‘geography’ of the war must be discussed. We will actually be talking about the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania that stood until the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, since in both the consciousness of the Lithuanian nobility and the political aspirations that they fostered when they took up arms, it was the conception of the territorial boundaries of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania that existed from 1569 that prevailed. This was aptly noted by historian Zita Medišauskienė: ‘Throughout the entire nineteenth century, the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was linked by union ties with the Kingdom of Poland, was a constant element in the consciousness of the members of Lithuanian society – the nobility in particular – which held out and impacted their worldview and attitude, and was expressed through both symbolic and concrete actions.’33 In 1831, the nobility understood the word ‘freedom’ as the dislodgement of Russian military units from the lands of the Grand Duchy that the latter received after three partitions.34 This territory is identified as five governorates of the Russian Empire: Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk – otherwise known as the North-western Krai, as well as the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Užnemunė region, which were included in the Polish counties of Marijampolė, Kalvarija and Sejny.

Having begun in the Vilna Governorate, Žemaitija and the district of Raseiniai, the war spread rapidly, moving to the districts of Telšiai, Šiauliai, Kaunas and Upytė (Panevėžys) within a matter of days. The fighting engulfed the Vilna Governorate in early May. The civil governor of Vilnius stated that the entire governorate of Vilna (11 districts) refused to recognize the ‘legitimate authority’, and that the mood of rebellion was spreading to other territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania.35 At the same time that the fighting began in Žemaitija, rebels led by Major Karol Szon and Antoni Puszet joined the fight in the Užnemunė region (the districts of Marijampolė, Kalvarija and Puńsk) of the Augustów Voivodeship.36 When Raseiniai district rebel leader Staniewicz found out about the difficulties Puszet’s troops were having, he sent Surkont and dozens of men to help.37

* The term ‘geography’ is used in this context to define the spread of battles in the former lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
33 Lietuvos istorija..., T. VIII, I dalis, p. 34–35.
34 Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 57.
36 Tokarz W., Wojna..., p. 228; Slesorūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 156.
37 Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicza..., p. 21.
In May, the uprising gained momentum in the Grodno Governorate, especially in the forest of Białowieża, where rebels from the districts of Brest, Vawkavysk and Pružany were active. The Russian government possessed accurate information about public sentiment. For example, in one report from special assignment officer Kosowski it is emphasized that ‘the Grodno Governorate may be a source of bad intentions, as people who know this area claim that Navahrudak was always a place where former Polish officers in the French service [officers who served in regiments of the Great Army and the Lithuanian regular army in the 1812 war] rallied, and that the landowners are in a belligerent mood.’

There is evidence that a secret rebel organization functioned in Grodno from the beginning of 1831 which maintained ties with the Vilnius rebel committee. From May to August, the uprising spread to the districts of Lida, Navahrudak, Kobryn and Slonim, as well as to the forest of Naliboki. With the help of residents from Ashmyany, local fighters took over the district centre of Vileyka on 13 April.

First they attacked the postal stations (Voronov, Lida, Vileyka and elsewhere), obstructing communication with Vilnius. For example, the rebels abducted 45 horses at the Radvilos postal station and 54 at Lida, thus interrupting regular postal and transportation services. For some time, only two postal stations operated between Vilnius and Minsk.

In the second half of May, the nobility from the districts of Vileyka and Dzisna in the Minsk Governorate began attacks against Russian garrisons. Residents of the Dzisna district were incited by rebels from neighbouring Braslaw, who were unable to prompt an insurrection in their own district due to the Russian unit stationed there. Rebel representative Józef Siemaszko was sent to the neighbouring district of Barysaw with 25 cavalrymen, but their mission was not successful.

Although not as actively, residents of the districts of Minsk, Babruysk, Igumensky and Slutsky also joined the uprising. In the districts in the southern part of the governorate – Mozyr, Rechitsky and Pinsk – the uprising did not take on as large a scale as it did in the south-western districts. The initiative there was irresolute, and only began when rebels arrived from Volhynia.
The initiative for the uprising is ascribed to Feliks Kieniewicz, a nobleman from the district of Mozyr who urged residents throughout the district of Rechitsky to revolt, promising the peasants land and freedom. However, he only managed to assemble 32 rebels in the region of the Pripyat River. Emil Oskerko, whose platoon of 50 rebels was forced to surrender, was also unable to expand the uprising.\(^{42}\)

The residents of the Pinsk district were considerably late in joining the insurrection – although they had planned an uprising in spring, they later decided to wait for the rebels in Volhynia. When the units of the Polish regular army withdrew, a nobleman named Tytus Puślowski organized a platoon of some three hundred rebels (which later grew to 1,000), the ranks of which included men who came from Navahrudak, Slonim and even Volhynia. This platoon fought in the district of Kobryn.\(^{43}\) The proactive efforts of the tsarist government became a serious obstacle for activation of the uprising in the south-western districts of the Minsk Governorate. In the districts of Dzisna and Barysaw, Chief Police Officer Mikhail Muravyov – a general of the Russian Army Reserve – established a dense police network made up of local residents, and made mass arrests of suspicious persons.\(^{44}\)

In the remaining territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania that were incorporated by Russia during the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, i.e. the governorates of Mogilev and Vitebsk, rebellious sentiment did not spread. Residents of the Mogilev Governorate were not active, and the situation was closely monitored by local authorities. Muravyov, who had created a secret police network, was very active in the Mogilev Governorate. Colonel Danilov, who was the commandant of Polotsk, made sure that the Dzisna district rebels and other suspicious people were kept out of the city: lists were compiled of untrustworthy landowners from Vitebsk and Mogilev.\(^{45}\)

Having access to a strong network of informants, Major General Alexander Gerua (1784–1852) made an accurate assessment of the situation, asserting that the uprising had spread from the Vilnius Governorate to the Minsk Governorate and ‘it is not with indifference that the residents of the Vitebsk Governorate are watching the rampage of their western neighbours.’ He underlined the influence that the nobles of the Vilnius Governorate had on the local Polish landlords.\(^{46}\) However, resistance lacked enough local initiative to develop on a broader


\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp. 62–64; Feduszka J., Powstanie Listopadowe na Litwie i Żmudzi..., p. 140.

\(^{44}\) Dangel S., Rok 1831 w Mińszczyźnie..., p. 48–50.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 48.

\(^{46}\) Г енерал–майор Г еруа. Рапорт.30 марта 1831,РГВИА, ф.ВУА, оп. 16, д. 5094, ч. 21, л. 2–3.
scale, and the Russian government applied security measures effectively. News of the uprising in Warsaw reached Vitebsk on 14 December, and five days later a courier of the Russian field marshal Ivan Diebitsch-Zabalkansky arrived to announce that the Poles intended to start an uprising in Belarusan lands. The Dzisna rebels sent their messenger, Prior Adam Tatura, as well as several rebels led by Józef Siemaszko, to the district of Lepiel. On 11 May, the town of Usach was taken over.47 Led by the Odachowski brothers, some one thousand rebels who had been gathered in the Minsk Governorate occupied the district of Lepiel in the Vitebsk Governorate and fought with Russian troops. However, when the rebels were defeated, no new centres of resistance emerged.48 In his correspondence at the end of May, Emperor Nicholas I wrote: ‘Vitebsk deputies came to see me yesterday. If one was to believe their words, they are loyal to me ... However, we are faced with great insidiousness ... [so] I do not know which of them to believe.’49

Hence, it could be concluded that the geography of battles was narrower than the territorial boundaries of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, one should not forget that the residents of districts where military conflicts did not take place also took part in the fighting – they joined the rebel units of neighbouring districts. This practice was widespread in the governorates of Grodno and Minsk.50 To be more precise, the battles spread through all of the Vilnius Governorate and Žemaitija, which was its most active part; in the Minsk Governorate they covered the districts of Minsk, Vileyka, Dzisna and Pinsk; and in the Grodno Governorate – the districts of Grodno, Brest, and Lida, and especially the territories of the forest of Białowieża and the districts of Slonim and Navahrudak, as well as Lepiel, the only district in the Vitebsk Governorate.

1.5. The Burden of the War

1.5.1. Size and Provisioning of the Forces

Let’s start with the Russian army. In Lithuania, the number of Russian regular army troops fighting against the rebels changed constantly, depending

48 Breżgo B., Materjały odnoszące się do powstania 1830–1831 roku zgromazone w byłem archiwum Gubernjalnem w Witebsku (odbitka z Ateneum Wileńskiego), Wilno, 1935, s. 3–6; Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 53; Гарбачова В. В, Паўстание 1830–1831 гадой на Беларусі..., p. 82; Dangel S., Rok 1831 w Mińszczyźnie..., p. 43–44.
49 Император Николай Павлович. Письма к графу П. А. Толстому, Русская старина, т. XXXI, 1881, c. 555.
on the military situation. The Russian field forces led by Field Marshal Diebitsch-Zabalkansky that were concentrated in Lithuania crossed the border of the Polish Kingdom on 5–6 February 1831. Small Russian forces were deployed in the area: in Vilnius there was the Fifth Infantry Division (3,200 troops) led by Vilnius Governor General, Matvey Khrapovitsky; in Kaunas – part of the Uhlan Division; in Minsk – an infantry battalion of the Arkhangelsk Regiment; and in Grodno – a rifle regiment.51

At the beginning of the uprising, there might have been some eight thousand soldiers: in Vilnius there were approximately 3,200 soldiers who made up the First Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Second Infantry Corps, as well as a battery of the First Company of the Fifth Artillery Brigade, and 165 Cossacks from Kuteinikov’s Don Cossack regiment. A battalion of the Ninth Jaeger Regiment was stationed in Kaunas, with the second battalion of this regiment in Merkinė and Alytus. A reserve brigade of the First Hussar Division (1,392 soldiers) was stationed in Ukmergė. Military garrisons in district towns consisted of teams of 60–150 troops and soldiers serving as guards on the border of Prussia and the Polish Kingdom. When the uprising started in Žemaitija, the rebels, therefore, had a larger number of troops available at first.52

A unit of 1,856 soldiers was deployed to Minsk at the end of April. Provisional Military Governor of the Minsk Governorate, Nikolai Dolgorukov (1792–1847), deployed small additional units in Chernavchitsy, Nesvizh and Cimkowicz, and set up military posts on the main roads.53

More accurate data is available regarding the number of Russian troops once the Polish army marched in. The Russian commander-in-chief formed an army, designating the so-called left- and right-hand columns

51 Zajewski W., Powstanie Listopadowe..., p. 129; Шпiлёвескi І. Т., Бабровiч Л. А., Сынхронiстычная таблiца падзей паўстаньня на Беларусi, Лiтве i Польшчы, ў 1830–1831 гг., Наш край, №. 10 (49), с. 27.
53 Raport o числе войск в городе Мinskе, РГВИА, ф.ВУА, оп. 16, д. 5094, ч. 27, л. 5; Raport Минского временного военного Губернатора генерала–адъютанта князя Долгорукова, Ibid., л. 7.
as well as the units deployed in Vilnius. Headed by Lieutenant General Fabian Osten-Sacken (1752–1837), the left-hand column consisted of 32.5 squadrons, 5 infantry divisions and 63 cannons. In terms of the number of troops, there were 2,681 cavalrymen, 782 Cossacks and 11,877 infantrymen, for a total of 15,340 officers and soldiers. The structure and size of the right-hand column was similar: 21 cavalry squadrons, 9 Cossack squadrons, 17.5 infantry battalions and 52 cannons. There were 3,058 cavalrymen, 795 Cossacks and 11,551 infantrymen, for a total of 15,404 soldiers. The Russian military authorities put Vilnius Governor General Khrapovitsky in charge of 18 cavalry squadrons, 5 Cossack squadrons and 15.2 infantry battalions, all of which had 2,543 cavalrymen, 527 Cossacks, 8,362 infantrymen and 32 pieces of artillery.54 At this stage of the war, Russian military forces consisted of 8,282 cavalrymen, 2,104 Cossacks and 31,790 infantrymen – a total of 42,176 troops and 147 cannons.

Admittedly, Russian forces directly involved in battle were fewer in number – some of them were guarding Vilnius, the region’s most important city.55 After the Polish corps withdrew from Lithuania and the insurrection subsided, Russian troops decreased and separate units were left to fight with the rebels. Numerous Russian military units were still stationed in Lithuania, but in late September the Russian military command decided, for security reasons, to deploy elite Cossack units in different areas of the region: Merkinė, Kaunas, Kačerginė and Raseiniai.56

A lack of reliable sources makes it difficult to give a precise answer to the question of how many forces Lithuania had. In his memoirs, Ignacy Klukowski, one of the witnesses of the events, asserted that approximately thirty thousand local fighters had assembled.57 In official documents, the Russian military tended to round the number of Lithuanian rebels who joined the corps of the Polish Kingdom up to forty thousand.58 However, one of the Russian government officials – Muravyov – claimed that instead of seventy thousand rebels, Giełgud only managed to assemble twenty thousand in Lithuania.59
The first to present the number of Lithuanian residents who were involved in military action was the historian Feliksas Sliesoriūnas, raising the presumption that there could have been 25,000–30,000 rebels in the first stage and 10,000–15,000 in the second.60 Rebels from the governorates of Minsk and Grodno were not included in this case. In turn, Polish historian Jan Ziółek indicated that in March–April there were 26,284 rebels in 25 units in the Vilnius Governorate alone (including rebels from the Vileyka and Dzisna districts of the Minsk Governorate), the bulk of which was made up of 16,440 infantrymen. Five units had more than 2,000 troops, and the largest regiment, which was formed by Stanisław Radziszewski in the Vileyka district, had 3,300. However, there were 100–900 soldiers serving in almost half (12) of all the units.61 Nevertheless, these statistics do not include information about the rebels who joined in the military action in May and July. So let’s take a closer look at how the rebel units were formed, the number of people who participated in the uprising, and the factors that impacted the changes therein.

In Lithuania, rebel forces were formed separately in each district, but the military authorities tried to do so based on the principles of regular army formation, i.e. separate regiments were formed, which were divided into companies and squads; battalions operated as individual outfits; and units were allocated according to the type of combat arms. Their structure and size clearly differed, but the methods used for their formation were the same. The first and principal method was for landowners and nobles to bring their peasants, who were usually registered as ‘volunteers’; the second method was mobilization by draft (universal mobilization of nobleman was announced in individual districts); and the third was true volunteering.

Jews were not traditionally included in the military conscription system, but there were exceptions to the rule. For example, Ashmyany Jews were obligated

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to provide one cavalryman and two infantrymen for every twenty people in their community, with the right to choose their own officer. Józef Gorski also mobilized all of the Tartars in Ashmyany between the ages of 18 and 60.

Women also joined the ranks, including Emilija Pliaterytė (Emilia Plater, 1806–1831), Maria Prószyńska, Maria Raszanowiczówna, Wilhelmina Kasproviczówna, Antonina Romaszewska and Eleonora Mikhailovskaya (who went by the male name ‘Ferdinand Karpowicz’). Within the rebel units, their roles included those of couriers, informants and arms smugglers; since they tried not to stand out from the male context, they usually wore men’s clothing. Pliaterytė, who voluntarily joined forces with rebel units led by Karol Załuski and Konstanty Parczewski, made the biggest mark. The participation of women in battles was an unusual occurrence, so the men tried to take special care of their female counterparts. However, this young, 24-year-old noblewoman was known to be a true fighter and participated in the uprising until the very end. She claimed that her main reason for joining the rebels was her ‘love for the fatherland’ as well as other factors, including ‘loneliness’ and her ‘childhood dream of going to war’. Even during the uprising,
she had already become a symbol of self-sacrifice for national freedom.64

The rebels in the governorates of Minsk and Grodno must not be forgotten either. Calculations made by Belarusian historian Olga Gorbacheva conclude that there were approximately twenty small teams of 500–600 soldiers operating in the governorates of Minsk and Grodno.65 Evidently, some two thousand local rebels joined Polish General Chłapowski’s unit in the districts of Slonim and Vawkavysk in the Grodno Governorate. At the beginning of April, 250–300 rebels from the districts of Bialystok, Brest, Vawkavysk and Pruzhany assembled in the forest of Bialowieża, and their number later grew to 800–1,000.66 Between 15 and 17 May, 4,000 fighters from the districts of Vileyka and Dzisna gathered in Luzhki, though only 2,000 moved out to the district of Ukmergė on 18 May, as not all of them wanted to fight outside of their own district.67

In June a platoon of 1,000 rebels led by Tytus Pusłowski (1803–1854) formed in the districts of Pinsk, Slonim and Navahrudak. In July the leader of the Navahrudak district gentry, Józef Kaszyc, brought together 400 people, and a platoon of 350 soldiers (150 cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen) led by Mykolas Giedraitis was operating in the forest of Naliboki. In addition to these troops, a platoon of 400 soldiers headed by Captain Stanisław Paszkowski was operating in the aforementioned territories, and Feliks Kieniewicz’s platoon of 32 troops as well as a platoon of 50 troops led by Emil and Anton Oskerko were operating in the districts of Mozyr and Rechitsy. In summer Pusłowski assembled a platoon of some three hundred rebels, who rallied in the district of Kobryn.68 In the Pruzhany, Kobryn, Slonim and Lida districts of the Grodno Governorate, defeated platoons were replaced by new ones led by Jakub Szretter, Jan Stanislaw Żyliński (1806–?), Jan Dalubowski and Kalikst Niezabitowski (1808–?).69 In these governorates, there were evidently 6,232 rebels in the larger rebel platoons alone. Therefore, it can be concluded that at least ten thousand rebels had probably gathered in the Grodno and Minsk Governorates from April to August.

In addition, some four thousand rebels participated in battles in the

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64 According to Russian government data, Mikhailovskaya was killed in the Battle of Vilnius. 1831 07 06 Vilniaus gubernijos valdybos raštas, LVIA, f. 437, ap. 1, b. 630, l. 2, 5; Swiadzę tem moim pismem..., Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (toliau – AGAD), Archiwum Platierów z Antuzowa, sygn. 214, k. 1; Zakrzewski B., Emilia Platier, Życiorysy historyczne, literackie i legendarne, pod redakcją Zofii Stefanowskiej i Janusza Tazbira, Warszawa:Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1980, s. 189–206; Emilia Platier, PSB, t. XXVI, Kraków, 1981, s. 652–653; Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 211, 327.
67 Ibid., pp. 53–54, 62–64.
Augustów Voivodeship of the Polish Kingdom as part of partisan units led by majors of the Polish army Antoni Puszet and Karol Szon. The rebels were called ‘Litwiny’ (a Polish term once used to refer to the residents of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) in reference to residents of the districts of Marijampolė, Sejny and Kalvarija. In July Duke Tomasz Światopełk-Mirski announced the formation of cavalry and infantry rifle units in the Augustów Voivodeship, which were later reinforced by the remainder of Puszet’s unit. Incidentally, the nominal rolls of officers and soldiers who joined from Puszet’s unit testify to the fact that it included residents of the Lithuanian districts in the Augustów Voivodeship (Łomża), as well as the towns and districts of Vilnius, Grodno and Lida. It even included officers who came from Kamianets-Podilskyi. In early August the duke managed to assemble a platoon of 400 fighters (377 privates), and the village of Lukšiai in the Užnemunė region was chosen as the place of deployment, while another unit was stationed in Prienai. It is difficult to say exactly how many of them might have been rebels from Lithuania. A fragmentary muster roll testifies to the fact that there were numerous rebels who had withdrawn from Lithuania, as well as Polish soldiers who had fled Prussia. It could be presumed that they made up about one-quarter of the platoon, i.e. approximately one hundred troops.

Attempts were made to supplement the rebel ranks by announcing a draft for the infantry and cavalry units. In the district of Ukmergė, the leaders of the uprising managed to assemble 1,154 riflemen, 551 lancers and 713 riders. In the district of Raseiniai, there were 2,750 fighters serving in five units at the beginning of the war. Based on calculations made by the local authorities, this district had the potential to mobilize as many as 5,212 infantrymen and 1,942 cavalrymen, which means that less than half of the mobilization plan was carried out. Much poorer results were seen in the district of Užneris, where they only managed to muster 300 riflemen and 200 cavalrymen, even though the area had the potential to mobilize 1,500 riders and as many as 5,000 infantrymen.

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71 Wszystkich Obywateli i Mieszkańców Woiewództwa Augustowskiego. Rodacy!, dnia 8 Lipca 1831 roku, AGAD, WCPL, syg. 697, k. 58; Lista imienna Officerow i Żołnierzy z Komendy Barona Puczota, Ibid., syg. 695, k. 1–3.
73 Czerwca 1831, AGAD, syg. 710, k. 118.
The Šiauliai Economy had 1,273 infantrymen and 191 cavalrymen, yet they managed to recruit only 536 infantrymen and 229 cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{76} The Russian military command also tried to count the rebels, most likely on the basis of the Vilnius Governorate census. In the notes of Piotr Tolstoy, Commanding General of the Reserve Army in Lithuania, we find the number 30,700, which is none other than the mobilization potential.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, in the 11 districts of the Vilnius Governorate, the number of rebels that could have been mobilized by draft differed greatly depending on the circumstances: anywhere from 500 to almost 3,000, in the best case.

Mobilizing a larger number was difficult for two reasons: first, it required a fair amount of time, which was usually interrupted by Russian units; and second, this method was not particularly popular among the peasants. In the district of Užneris, which occupied a strategic position due to the road from Vilnius to the Daugavpils fortress, Russian troops were deployed, so only 500 rebels were assembled in place of the 6,500 that had been planned.\textsuperscript{78}

The eight largest parishes in the district of Ukmergė were controlled by a Russian unit headed by Colonel Litvinov, who not only plundered livestock and horses from the residents, but also caught young men to be drafted and arrested noblemen and sent them to the Daugavpils fortress. The

\textsuperscript{76} Janulaitis A., Valstiečiai ir 1831 m revoliucija Lietuvoje (Iš Šiaulių ekonomijos archyvo), Vilniuje, 1910, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{77} Записки военных действий главнокомандующего резервною армию Петра Александровича Толстого..., p. 547.
\textsuperscript{78} Historyczne opisanie powstań powiatów Zawilejskiego, Dziśnieńskiego i Wilejskiego..., p. 268–269.
Russian unit in Biržai did the same. At the beginning of the uprising in the district of Raseiniai, estate supervisor Żongolowicz assembled 195 armed recruits from the parishes of Veliuona and Seredžius, while Upytė district landlords Mostowicz and Wolff rallied 30 and 27 respectively, and Ashmyany landlord Iwaszkiewicz rounded up 20 peasants. The landlord Chodźko informed the military committee that his peasants had dispersed, and that he would not be able to assemble the number of recruits planned.

These calculations allow one to conclude that over the entire period of the uprising, more than 40,000 residents participated in military operations as part of rebel units, not including the Polish corps. Thus, the number of local rebels was almost four times the size of the corps of the Polish Kingdom, and nearly equalled the army led by Tolstoy in Lithuania.

However, when discussing the number of rebels, one important point must be emphasized: the question of whether there was a disparity between the total number of rebels and those who actually took part in military operations, especially with regard to the infantry units. From the very start of the war, there was actually a widespread tendency – for a variety of reasons – for the peasants that had been rallied to simply disperse, refuse to march beyond their

80 The rebel leaders in Kaunas failed to complete a draft in 18 days because the Russians came back to the city. Ružancovas V., В 1831 metų bylos (Kauno miesto valdybos archyvas), Karo archyvas, 1931, nr. 4, p.15; Дяков В. А, Зайцев В. М., Обученкова Л. А., Социальный состав участников восстания 1830–1831, Историко-социологическое исследование, Москва:Наука, 1970, с. 88.
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In just a couple of months, the platoon led by Maurycy Prozor, the leader of the Kaunas district rebels, decreased from 1,000 soldiers to 120. The potential majority of them were not killed in battle; rather, they decided not to continue the fight after the first clash with the enemy, and later, when the unit had marched out of its native district.

Albeit to a lesser extent, this trend also spread in Žemaitija, which was the hotbed of the uprising. Jacevičius, who was the rebel leader of the Telšiai district, stated that in May, ‘the military power in my district decreased considerably. Not counting the number of dead and injured, many departed for home ... The bulk of the soldiers in Tautkevičius’s regiment that was stationed in Plungė scattered when the Russian unit approached, and left hundreds of Russian prisoners without guard. In this way, some of the platoons that had 800 or more soldiers at the beginning of the uprising were now left with 200 or less.

In the districts of Kaunas and Telšiai, the number of rebels decreased by some two thousand men, which was approximately half of the entire rebel forces. Vincentas Bortkevičius, rebel leader of the Užneris district, let ‘the majority of the crowd armed with scythes and spears’ go home and set off for Žemaitija with select soldiers. The infantry unit thus lost several hundred troops instantaneously. The ranks of Załuski’s 5,000-troop unit were thinned out by a lack of ammunition, food and weapons, as well as peasant desertion and cholera. The leaders decided to reorganize the unit into smaller platoons so that they could continue the fight in their districts.

At the end of April, the prolonged encampment caused discipline to wane in Konstanty Parczewski’s 1,000-rebel platoon, and springtime forced some of the peasants to return home to work on the farms; in addition, some of the men did not want to leave their native areas. The commanders took more stringent measures to restore order and announced penalties, but were nevertheless forced to permit some of the infantrymen to leave the detachment due to a shortage of weapons and gunpowder. Thus, the platoon was diminished to 400 rebels. For the same reasons, only 1,600 of the 2,500 men who had been assembled in

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81 Memo written by Raseiniai district chief adviser Gielgud to the administrator of the Adakavas parish, LSHA, doc. f. 437, inv. 3, file77, p. 102. April 1831 documentation of the rebel authorities of the Ukmergė district, Ibid., pp. 54–56, 59, 63; Sliesorūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 109.
82 Maurycy Prozor, Pamiętnik obywatela powiatu kowieńskiego, Zbiór pamiętników..., p. 222.
85 Sliesorūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 199.
the Ashmyany district were left. Ignacy Klukowski, a rebel from the Ashmyany district, expressed his opinion as follows: ‘the peasants were active in joining the uprising; had there been more order, had they been better fed and dressed, there wouldn’t have been the slightest desire to desert.’\(^87\) In the district of Trakai, Gudaczewski’s rebel unit diminished from 400 troops to barely 40 on the way from Daugai to Butrimonys.\(^88\) A 1,500-man unit led by Ferdinand Grotkowski and Michal Lisiecki later decreased to 598 – nearly a third of what it had once been.\(^89\) So, according to our data, the rebel infantry units lost at least 5,000 people due to the above-mentioned reasons. This allows us to conclude that a significant disproportion existed between the official number of rebels and the number who actually participated in military operations. The cavalry units did not experience this kind of mass withdrawal from the rebel army.

The Lithuanian rebel units handled the acquisition of weapons, ammunition and uniforms on their own. There were two main sources: local resources (personal weapons and financial means) and war booty – armament and transport from Russian military warehouses and garrisons that had been taken captive. Local resources allowed the rebels to acquire only a very minimal amount of weapons, particularly for the infantry, which was made up of peasants; these fighters were usually armed only with straightened scythes, spears and axes, or – at the beginning of the war – with nothing at all.\(^90\) Parczewski’s unit was made up of 1,000 rebels, of whom 80 were on horseback, 250 were armed with guns of various calibres, and the rest with scythes and spears. The unit lacked gunpowder most of all, and it only had four or five bullets per gun.\(^91\) The 765 soldiers who had been assembled in the Šiauliai Economy were probably the best armed, with 11 swords, 29 pistols, 105 rifles, 322 spears, 162 scythes, 1 axe, 1 halberd and 18 bardiches – a total of 649 various weapons and instruments adapted for battle.\(^92\) In the region of Užnemunė, residents from the districts of Kalvarija and Suwałki donated several dozen weapons – pistols and swords – to Girski’s rebels.\(^93\)

The noblemen were better able to arm themselves, since it was common for them to have a firearm and sword of their own. It is estimated that only

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\(^{87}\) За вольнасць і веру: Ігнацій Клюкоўскі і яго ўспаміны..., p. 26; Bieliński K., Powstanie Listopadowie..., p. 14.

\(^{88}\) Дъяков В. А, Зайцев В. М., Обученкова Л. А., Социальный состав участников восстания 1830–1831..., p. 88; Sliesoriūnas E., Klasiniai prieštaravimai 1830–1831 m sukilime..., p. 104.

\(^{89}\) Ziółek J., Powstanie listopadowie na Litwie..., p. 402; AGAD, WCPL, syg 710, k. 70.

\(^{90}\) Of the 3,000 soldiers in the Ukmergė district, only 300 had weapons. Powstanie powiatu Zawilejskiego, Historja powstania w 1831 roku na Wołyniu, Podolu, Ukrainie, Żmudzi i Litwie, Lipsk, 1875, t. 1, s. 183.

\(^{91}\) Powstanie w okolicach Niemenczyna..., p. 167.


\(^{93}\) Księga ofiar dobrowolnych, ADAG, syg. 707, k. 2–4.
one-third of the rebels had firearms: some had military weapons, but most had hunting rifles. Granted, there were exceptions. For example, a platoon led by Jonas Žilinskis (1806–?) and Tadeusz Kraskowski (1803–?) was made up of 400 soldiers and had 300 guns.

However, fewer guns were fit for use, which, as evidenced by the figures put forth by rebel leaders, was because the weapons that the peasants brought were old and of poor quality and small calibre. This meant that they often stopped working after intensive firing: the stocks would break, the barrels would crack, they would get jammed, or the bolts would break. These weapons were not made for warfare.

At the beginning of the uprising, the only way in which rebel units were able to arm themselves with military rifles was to disarm local garrisons and take over their weapon depots. According to our data, a considerable number of Russian weapons fell into rebel hands; to put it more precisely, at least 2,580 carbines and 520 pistols. However, supply of weapons remained a troublesome problem, especially because the rebels would lose significant numbers of them in battle. The rebel leaders valued cannons, as these were particularly important and effective weapons; they probably had at least two dozen of them in all, mainly of light calibre, made from wood and copper. However, some of them were lost: the Russians took hold of one cannon in Panevėžys, two in Gargždai, one in Darbėnai, and two in Šiauliai; another two were burned in the village of Kaliekiai.

The home-made cannons were not known for their quality. For example,
Fyodor Bartolomey (1800–1862), a colonel in the Russian army, described the rebels’ cannons as follows: ‘the wooden cannons with copper cylinders that they made themselves exploded when they tried to fire.’\textsuperscript{100} This fact is confirmed by Michał Lisiecki, head of the Ukmerge rebel platoon, who wrote in his memoirs that after the eighteenth shot, one cannon exploded, wounding a soldier, and the other was dismantled.\textsuperscript{101} Kaunas district rebel commander Prozor stated that the lack of cannons and rifles prevented his platoon from fighting the Russian army in open battle.\textsuperscript{102} In rare cases, the rebels managed to use cannons to their full advantage in battle, with the exception of the battles at Anykščiai and the village of Kaliekiai. The rebels clearly lacked officers and soldiers experienced in artillery fire.\textsuperscript{103}

Upon entering Lithuania, the Polish army had 28 cannons, in addition to which General Chłapowski appropriated one Russian cannon in Hajnowszczyzna and two in Lida, together with gunpowder and round shots.\textsuperscript{104} However, the

\textsuperscript{100} 1831 metų žygio dienoraštis, Steponaitis V., Plk. Bartolomiejaus veikimas Lietuvoje..., p. 67.

\textsuperscript{101} Pamiętniki Michała Lisieckiego naczelnika powstania nad granicą Kurlandzką, Pamiętniki polskie, Paryż, t. II. S. 99, 105.

\textsuperscript{102} Pamiętnik obywatela powiatu Kowieńskiego(przez M. Prozora), Zbiór pamiętników..., p. 222.


\textsuperscript{104} Tokarz W., Wojna..., p. 359; Szlakiem Legionów..., p. 64.
Polish regular army corps did not always use all of their artillery. In one of his reports, General Dembiński noted that ‘I fired very little from the cannons, although the enemy was very generous with round shots; I did not fire from heavy cannons; usually just from one cannon.’\textsuperscript{105} Even in the most important battle over Vilnius, the Polish military leaders did not exhaust the potential of the cannons they had.\textsuperscript{106} Granted, the Polish corps did use a larger number of cannons during at least two battles, in Panevėžys and Molėtai.\textsuperscript{107} So, the Russian units not only had a quantitative artillery advantage – they also effectively used the advantages provided by these weapons in almost every major battle. Besides, the rebels lacked not only weapons, but also cartridges, round shots and gunpowder, which could primarily only be acquired in two ways: as war booty or by local production. Ammunition was particularly lacking at the beginning of the uprising, when the number of rebels was growing rapidly.\textsuperscript{108}

1.5.2. Allies

As mentioned previously, the Lithuanian rebels fought the Russian military garrisons and regular armed forces on their own for almost two months. The uprising in Lithuania created a new situation and prompted the politicians and soldiers of the Polish Kingdom to take concrete action. Initiative was taken by the Polish government, led by Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861), who proposed that the Sejm adopt a resolution defining the prospects of the Polish Kingdom’s relations with the constituent parts of the former state. On 26 April, the Chamber of Deputies immediately passed the resolution by potential majority vote, but the Senate demanded a broader discussion, after which both houses of the Sejm passed the resolution by majority vote (86 in favour, 6 against) on 5 May. In the first section of the resolution of the Sejm, it was declared that each part of the former state, which ‘rose in rebellion and joined the uprising in the Kingdom shall become a part of its composition in the same way as it was before the partitions (partition) and on the same terms, and shall return to its rights, which are not subject to prescription. The inhabitants of these lands shall be guaranteed aid and defence, as well as participation in negotiations and contracts which the

\textsuperscript{105} Rapport generała Dembińskiego do generała Gielguda w Eyragale 5 lipca 1831, Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 119. At the 8 July 1831 Battle of Šiauliai, 29 cannons were silent, although 5 enemy cannons did fire. Pietkiewicz M., Lithuania..., p. 196.During their attack, Russian artillerymen destroyed two rebel cannons. Действия отряда полковника Крюкова при нападении Польских войск и Виленских мятежников, РГВИА, ф.БУ А, оп.16, д. 5156, л. 31.

\textsuperscript{106} Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūrimas..., p. 305; Tokarz W., Wojna..., p. 368–369.

\textsuperscript{107} The town of Panevėžys was defended by four rebel cannons, and six were used in Molėtai. Журнал военных действий против польских мятежников, РГВИА, ф.БУ А, оп. 16, д. 5156, л. 14.

\textsuperscript{108} Duke Giedraitis’s 12 April 1831 memo to the Vilnius district committee, LSHA, doc. f. 1135, inv. 4, file 371, p. 91.In Kaunas, the rebels only had three rounds of ammunition per soldier. Pamiętniki Ignacego Domejki..., p. 29.
current parts of the Kingdom of Poland will participate in. The aspiration shared by Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was thus consolidated at a political level.

On 18 May 1831, Commander-in-Chief Jan Skrzynecki, pressed by politicians and public opinion, decided to help the Lithuanian rebels. In his proclamation he urged Lithuanians to support the Polish units, stressing that the two nations had one common interest.110

In late May, units of the Polish regular army entered Lithuania. The first unit to be sent to Lithuania was that of General Chłapowski, which consisted of 700 troops (the First Uhlan Regiment, 100 mounted riflemen, a squad of pontoniers, and 100 officer instructors and non-commissioned officers) and two cannons.

A few days later, General Chłapowski marched into the territory of Lithuania, where he planned to leave instructors for the rebel troops and then continue on to Polesia in accordance with partisan war tactics.111 The head of the Polish unit, who had returned to military service during the uprising after having been on leave for quite some time, was considered the uprising’s most gifted general – though compliant and often inconsistent, he was resolute, energetic and courageous, and treated his subordinates properly.112

109 Posiedzenie Izby Poselskiej z d. 26 kwietnia 1831 r., Dyaryusz sejmu z r. 1830–1831, Kraków, 1910, t. III, s. 146; Posiedzenie Izb połączonych z 5 maja 1831 r., Ibid., p. 317, 319; Barzykowski S., Historia powstania..., t. II, p. 298–301.
Ignacy Domeyko, a rebel who had joined the Polish unit, described the general's nature as follows: 'he was fairly strict with the patriots and soldiers who came, and ordered them to maintain discipline and order; he seemed to be more sad than happy, though he generally attracted everyone with his behaviour.'

The ranks of the unit grew as it was joined by rebel platoons who had concentrated in the forest of Białowieża, and the general began forming an infantry and cavalry brigade from the new volunteers. When it reached the district of Vawkavysk on 29 May, the unit had already grown to more than 4,000 troops. New rebels continued to join the unit as it marched toward Lida and Eišiškės. For example, 250 of Prince Ogiński's soldiers leagued together with the unit, and 350 Vilnius University students led by Gerard Gronostajski did the same in Kietaviškės. Four cavalry regiments and two infantry regiments were formed from the approximately five thousand local fighters who had joined the unit. During this period, the rebels therefore outnumbered the soldiers of the Polish unit more than seven-fold.

The local rebels received much more substantial Polish reinforcement in the form of General Giełgud's corps (14 infantry battalions and 7 cavalry squadrons with 26 cannons, of which 10 were positional). Including Zaliwski's unit of 1,200 partisans, the number of soldiers reached 12,000. Thus, together with Chłapowski's unit, the Polish corps consisted of 12,700 soldiers. Granted, it had originally been planned to send approximately twenty thousand soldiers to Lithuania.

Later, in mid-June, the Polish regular army corps was joined by 15 Lithuanian rebel platoons, which were formed into the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Uhlan Regiments, the Sixth Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, and the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiments. Some ten to twelve thousand local fighters joined Giełgud's corps, meaning that half of the Polish corps was made up of locals. The remaining rebels operated independently.

Giełgud, the commander of the corps, began his military service in 1807 during the Napoleonic Wars. During the French Invasion of Russia, he formed...
the Twenty-first Infantry Regiment of the Duchy of Warsaw at his own expense. However, in spite of his long service and acts of courage, this general never earned the confidence of his colleagues, who considered him the most talentless, stubborn and boastful commander in their ranks. Nor was he particularly popular among the officers and soldiers, as he disliked people who disagreed with him, and was rude and conceited. The officers accused the corps commander of a lack of energy and initiative.119

After nearly a month had passed since the Polish corps entered Lithuania, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, President of the Polish National Government, issued a resolution on 30 June by which he put the ‘chief general’ in charge of the units forming in ‘the brotherly land of Lithuania’; the general was also ordered to participate in the activities of the Provisional Polish Government in Lithuania (which began on 11 June) in establishing the internal organization of the institution. Instructions were also given to send reports to Warsaw. The activities of this temporary institution of authority, which was essentially formed as part of the Polish corps headquarters, were episodic and continued until 2 July.120

It should be emphasized that before General Giełgud’s corps entered Lithuania, each district there had its own rebel government and military leadership. The rebel government (committee), which also carried out the functions of civil authority (in the districts of Telšiai, Ukmergė, Užneris/Švenčionys and Vilnius), was subordinated to one person – the commander of the district rebel army (in the districts of Raseiniai, Kaunas and Trakai), who was also the highest official of civil authority (in the districts of Šiauliai and Upytė/Panevėžys). However, with the ever-changing situation of military action during the uprising, the functions of authority were often taken over by the commander of the district military units (and frequently just by the head of the unit, who was forced to solve not only military matters on his own, but also civil ones related to them). Given, the central government of Žemaitija existed for a mere two weeks.121

Thus, the allies took over leadership of the uprising in Lithuania right up until their withdrawal at the end of July. It is, however, necessary to clarify that the Polish generals were in charge of the rebels in the operational area of the


120 Postanowienie Rządu Narodowego w sprawie nominacji i zakresu władzy generała naczelnego dowodzącego na Litwie, Źródła do dziejów wojny..., t. III, p. 270–271; As of 30 June, General Chłapowski was supposed to have formally become the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army in Lithuania. However, the general did not have the opportunity to accept the decree. Ziółek J., Powstanie Listopadowe na Litwie..., p. 395; Tarczyński M., Generalicja powstania Listopadowego..., p. 299. For more information about the institutions of civil government established by the rebels, see: Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 84–102.

121 Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 64–69; Гарбачова В. В., Паўстание 1830–1831 гадоў на Беларусі..., p. 88–90.
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corps, which included the territory of the Vilnius Governorate and part of
the Grodno Governorate; in the other areas (the districts of Pruzhany and
Kobryn in the Grodno Governorate, and the districts of Mozyr, Rechitsky and
Pinsk in the Minsk Governorate), the rebels operated independently. On the
other hand, Lithuanian units operated autonomously for two months during
the beginning of the uprising, and for another three months after the Polish
corps withdrew.

1.6. War Losses

1.6.1. Fighters Killed in Action

1.1. Military operations and fatalities incurred

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of battle</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Rebels killed</th>
<th>Russian soldiers killed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 25 March 1831</td>
<td>Surkont’s rebel unit vs Russian Cossacks</td>
<td>Vilija</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 27 March 1831</td>
<td>A rebel unit vs a Cossack unit under Yesaul Vorobyov</td>
<td>Near Ariogala</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1 April 1831</td>
<td>Petrovsky’s rebels vs Russian border guards</td>
<td>Palanga</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 April 1831</td>
<td>Rebel forces (led by Rimkevičius, Staniewicz, Baublevičius and others) vs a Russian unit under Colonel Bartolomey</td>
<td>Near Viduklė</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 11 April 1831</td>
<td>Fighters led by the Kublicki and Bortkiwicz brothers vs units under Goraisky and Surkov</td>
<td>Švenčionys</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 14 April 1831</td>
<td>Ignacy Jesman’s rebels vs Chilikov’s unit</td>
<td>Lipuvka</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1* Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 135.
2* Ibid., p. 141.
3* Kurjer Litewski, 1831, nr. 53.
4* This was the first battle the Lithuanian fighters fought against the Russian army which resulted in
considerable losses. According to Russian data, i.e. a report issued by unit chief, Colonel Bartolomey, the
rebels ‘left 400 people there’ who had been killed or severely wounded. When there is no possibility of
cross-checking data presented in a sole source which gives one figure for the total number of killed and
wounded, it is assumed that one third of the total number were killed, so in this case, it can be concluded
that there were some 133 fatalities. 1831 metų žygio dienoraštis. Steponaitis V., Plk. Bartolomiejaus veiki-
as Lietuvoje 1831 metais, Karo archyvas, t. VI, p. 57, 70; Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 148.
5* Ibid., p. 164.
6* Powstanie powiatu Wileńskiego, Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 88.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>7 April 1831</td>
<td>Local fighters vs a Russian unit under Colonel Bartolomey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April 1831</td>
<td>80 fighters under Fortunat Podbereski vs a Russian unit</td>
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<td>10 April 1831</td>
<td>Jagielowicz’s fighters vs Manteuffel’s unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 April 1831</td>
<td>Rebel units vs a company of a Russian unit led by Captain Yakovlev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April 1831</td>
<td>Feliks Stelnicki’s rebels (600) vs Verzilin’s unit (1,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 April 1831</td>
<td>Rebel units led by Lisiecki and Grotkowski vs General Schirman’s unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April 1831</td>
<td>Major Moncevičius’s rebel unit vs a Russian unit under Major General Rennenkampf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April 1831</td>
<td>Units headed by Żaluski, Bilevičius, Miłosz and Przeczyzewski (approx. 3,000) vs a Russian unit (approx. 500)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 After a lengthy battle, the rebels rallied their forces (more than 10 rebel units participated) and occupied the city. There is no precise account of rebel losses, but according to the chief of the Russian unit, they ‘should be considerable’. Report No. 323 written by Colonel Bartolomey to Fr Pavel Mikhail, *War Archive*, vol. VI, pp. 71–72; Sliesorūnas F., *1830–1831 metų sukilimas*,..., p. 150.

8 Powstanie w powiecie Brasławskim, Pamiętnik Wilczyńskiego (1831), Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 191.


10 Pamiętniki Michała Lisieckiego..., p. 59.

11 Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 43; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 178; Tokarz W., Wojna..., p. 229; Garbaczow A. B., Паўстание 1830–1831 годай на Беларусі..., p. 69; In his report, Colonel Verzilin wrote that as many as 350 were killed Ashmyany and 150 were captured, of which ‘some were shot’ by order of the Vilnius governor general. The report also indicates that the Russians did not incur any losses, aside from two Cossacks. Some of those killed were local civilians. Colonel Verzilin’s report, LSHA, doc. f. 378, BS, 1831, file 306, p. 27.

12 Pamiętniki Michała Lisieckiego..., p. 61.


14 Vilnius Governor General Khrapovitsky’s 25 April 1831 report to Grand Duke Constantine, LSHA, doc. f. 378, BS, 1831, file 306, p. 40; Sliesorūnas mentioned that one Cossack was killed, along with several dozen rebels (including rebel leaders Ślageris, Mickevičius and Zaviša). Sliesorūnas F., *1830–1831 metų sukilimas*,..., pp. 184–185. Puzyrewski wrote that 120 enemy fighters were killed, as well as six Cossacks from Verzilin’s unit. Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 300. In the instructions for the commander of the Russian army that was fighting with the rebels, the use of martial law was provided for when dealing with the ‘organizers and leaders’. Дъяков В, Зайцев В, Обученкова Л., Социальный состав участников восстания 1830–1831..., p. 81. At the beginning of the uprising, privates were shot in addition to commanders as a means of intimidation. For example, Khrapovitsky ordered Colonel Tukhachevsky to shoot three peasants from Ogiński’s unit (Žukauskas, Petrauska and Šabdulskis) who had been taken prisoner during the clash at Zašliai. After the Ashmyany massacre, Emperor Nicholas I ordered ‘small-scale commanders’ not to shoot the insurgents, but rather to send them to trial in Vilnius, Daugavpils and Minsk, with the exception of ‘exceptional cases in the event of an urgent matter’. Император Николай Павлович Письма к графу П. А. Толстому, Русская старина, т. XXXI, 1881, c. 550–551 Sliesorūnas F., Caro valdžios priemonės 1830–1831 m. sukilimu Lietuvoje slopinti, *LMAD*, serija A, 1965, t. 2 (19), p. 128.
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<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Lithuanian Casualties</th>
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<td>Rebel units vs a Russian unit under Poruchik Surkov</td>
<td>Daugėliškis</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 April 1831</td>
<td>Puszet’s and Szon’s rebels vs a Russian unit under Lieutenant Colonel Kaniblotkiy</td>
<td>Marijampolė</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>311</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 April 1831</td>
<td>Gadon’s rebels vs a Russian platoon under Baron von Manteuffel</td>
<td>Skuodas</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 April 1831</td>
<td>A rebel unit under Count Stanislaw Tyszkiewicz</td>
<td>Šiauliai district, village of Kalviai</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April 1831</td>
<td>Rebels led by Šiauliai district commander Herbutowicz vs a Russian unit under General Pahlen</td>
<td>Joniškis</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April 1831</td>
<td>A Russian unit under General Schirman</td>
<td>Šeduva</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1831</td>
<td>Horodeński’s rebels vs a Russian unit under General Chilikov</td>
<td>Kieliai</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1831</td>
<td>A rebel unit led by Duke Giedraitis</td>
<td>Near Pikelisčės</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29 April 1831</td>
<td>A rebel unit led by Prozor and Matusevičius vs a Russian unit under General Sulima</td>
<td>Kėdainiai</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1831</td>
<td>Vilnius University students (who fought a Cossack unit)</td>
<td>Near Eišiškės</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1831</td>
<td>Ashmyany district fighters vs a Russian unit under Colonel Sevastyanov</td>
<td>Ashmyany district</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 1831</td>
<td>Moncevičius’s rebels vs a Russian unit under Major General Rennenkampf</td>
<td>Village of Peščiai</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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15 Bielinski K., Rok 1831..., p. 29.
16 Totoraitis I., Sudūvos Suvalkijos istorija, Kaunas, 1938, d. 1, p. 444; Tokarz W., Wojna..., p. 231; Purėnas wrote that 53 Russians perished. Purėnas P., 1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 51; Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 187.
17 Ibid., p. 228.
18 Ibid., p. 190; Kurjer Litewski, 1831, nr. 62.
20 Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 192.
22 Duke Giedraitis’s 20 April 1831 note to the Vilnius District Committee, LSHA, doc. f. 1135, inv. 4, file 371, p. 86; Bielinski K., Rok 1831..., p. 33; Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 201–202.
23 Ibid., p. 196; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 302; Callier E., Bitwy i potyczki..., s.99. Журнал военных действий с поляцкими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф.ВУА, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62. The fact that it is risky to rely on memoirs as an accurate and objective source of data is evidenced by those of rebel unit leader Prozor. In his memoirs, he wrote that some 300 Russians died and drowned. Maurycy Prozor, Pamiętnik obywatela powiatu Kowieńskiego..., p. 221.
24 Callier E., Bitwy i potyczki..., p. 100.
25 Bielinski wrote that according to Russian data, 200 rebels were killed. Bielinski K., Rok 1831..., p. 36; Idem, Powstanie listopadowie..., p. 15; According to Klukowski’s data, 100 people were killed. Powstanie powiatu Oszmiańskiego.Z notatek J. Klukowskiego, Zbiór pamiętników..., p. 247.
26 Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 229, 203.
1.1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Russian Deaths</th>
<th>Rebel Deaths</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>27 Apr 1831</td>
<td>A Russian unit under General Chilkov</td>
<td>Giedraičia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>t After the battle, the Russians shot Benecki and Stachowski, two noblemen who had been taken prisoner. Ibid., p. 203; Bieliński K., Rok 1831..., p. 34. t Rebels were killed in episodic collisions with the Russians. Powstanie w okolicach Niemczenia..., p. 165, 174.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr 1831</td>
<td>Fighters from Konstanty Parczewski’s unit</td>
<td>The environs of Nemenčine and Mašiagala</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr 1831</td>
<td>A Russian unit under Colonel Tornau</td>
<td>Near Panevėžys</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>t Гарбачова В. В., Паўстание 1830–1831 гадой на Беларўci..., p. 77; idem., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 50; In his memoirs, one of the battle participants claimed that rebel losses were ‘very few’, while over 100 Russian soldiers were killed. He reasoned the large Russian losses with the explanation that ‘valuing their cartridges, the rebels fired more accurately.’ W powiecie Wilejskim..., p. 123–124; Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1831</td>
<td>A Russian unit under Major General Satyanov</td>
<td>Minsk Governorate, Vileyka</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Apr 1831</td>
<td>A Russian unit under General Sulima</td>
<td>Prastavoniai Folwark</td>
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<td>A Russian unit under Commander Verzilin</td>
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<tr>
<td>34 May 1831</td>
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27 t After the battle, the Russians shot Benecki and Stachowski, two noblemen who had been taken prisoner. Ibid., p. 203; Bieliński K., Rok 1831..., p. 34.
28 t Rebels were killed in episodic collisions with the Russians. Powstanie w okolicach Niemczenia..., p. 165, 174.
29 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф.ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
30 t Гарбачова В. В., Паўстание 1830–1831 гадой на Беларўci..., p. 77; idem., Z historii powstania Listopadowego на Białorusi..., p. 50; In his memoirs, one of the battle participants claimed that rebel losses were ‘very few’, while over 100 Russian soldiers were killed. He reasoned the large Russian losses with the explanation that ‘valuing their cartridges, the rebels fired more accurately.’ W powiecie Wilejskim..., p. 123–124; Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
31 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
32 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
33 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
34 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
35 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
36 t Журнал военных действий c польскими мятежниками..., РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, оп. 16, д. 5179, л. 62.
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<tr>
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37* Ibid., p. 36.
39* Ibid., p. 41.
40* According to Jacevičius, who led the battle, ‘considerably more Russian soldiers were killed than ours due to better aim.’ Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicz..., p. 42; Sliesoriūnas F., *1830–1831 metų sukūrimas...,* p. 240.
41* Dangel S., *Rok 1831 w Mińszczyżnie...,* p. 43–44; Гарбачова В. В, Паўстание 1830–1831 гадай на Беларўci..., p. 96.
43* O działaniach powstania 1831 r. w powiecie Telszewskim, Zbiór pamiętników..., p. 57; In defending, the rebels lost two units chiefs – Bilevičius and Daujotas, but the number of privates who were killed is unknown. Sliesoriūnas F., *1830–1831 metų sukūrimas...,* p. 252.
44* Ibid., p. 247. One witness to the events claimed that Russian losses in terms of killed and wounded were several times higher. O działaniach powstania 1831 r..., p. 57. However, Colonel Bartolomey, head of the Russian unit, noted in his diary that he lost 30 men who had been killed or wounded, but that ‘the insurgents’ losses were very high and numbered over 1,000 people.’ 1831 metų žygio dienoraštis, V. Steponaitis, Plk. Bartolomiejaus veikimas..., Karo archyvas, t. VI, p. 62–63.
45* Гарбачова В. В., Паўстание 1830–1831 гадай на Беларўci..., p. 82.
47* Ibid., p. 245; Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicz..., p. 50; Puzyrewski A. K., Wójna polska-ruska..., p. 33; In this case, the Russian commander was being objective by stating that the number of rebel fatalities could not be ascertained due to the dense forest and darkness of night. They found 85 dead on the road and in open areas. Журнал военных действий против литовских мятежников..., РГВИА, ф. ВУА, д. 5154, ч. 1, л. 85.
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49 Ibid., p. 271–272; Bieliński K., Rok 1831..., p. 74.
50 Pamiętnik obywatela powiatu Kowienieńskiego..., p. 226.
51 Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 217.
52 Sliesoriūnas indicated that only 100 rebels were killed. Ibid., p. 276; In other literature, 200 rebels are mentioned. Kieniewicz-St., Zahorski A., Zajewski W., Trzy powstania narodowe, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1992, s. 226; Callier E., Bitwy i potyczki..., p. 172–173; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 30; Colonel Sevastyanov’s 20 May 1831 letter to Vilnius Governor General Krhapovitsky, LSHA, doc. f. 437, inv. 1, file 40, pp.18–19.
53 August Przyłuski was killed. Callier E., Bitwy i potyczki..., p. 174.
54 Wypatki pod Szawlami, Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 198–200; It is known that two rebel commanders were killed – Jarudis and Ostrovski. Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 322. Without citing a source, Purėnas stated that Szymanowski, who led the attack, lost 25 officers and 500 soldiers. Purėnas P., 1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 75; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 307.
55 Lasting four hours, the Battle of Vilnius was lost by the rebels, of whom 600 were killed, including 400 local rebels, according to General Gielgud’s report. Kiernow, 20 czerwca 1831. List generała Gielguda do generała Dembickiego, Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 24; Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 300, 302, 307; Feduszka J., Powstanie Listopadowe na Litwie i Żmudzi..., p. 154; Kieniewicz S., Zahorski A., Zajewski W., Trzy powstania narodowe..., p. 228; Zajewski W., Powstanie listopadowe..., p. 132; Ziołek J., Powstanie listopadowe na Litwie..., p. 408; Other historians have argued that the Russians’ overall losses amounted to 364 killed and wounded. Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 307; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 348; Wojskowy skrót, zdawany przy sztabie Oddziału Gwardyjskiego korpusa, t. 39, p. 340–343; Barzykowski S., Historia powstania..., t. IV, p. 257.
56 Ružancovas A., Kaunas 1831 ir 1863–1864 m. sukilmiose, Kaunas, 1927, p. 5. The author indicated that the Russians killed or wounded 500 rebels in Kaunas. Puzyrewski A. K., Wójna polsko–ruska..., p. 353; One Russian report states that as many as 500 rebels were killed and wounded. Журнал военных действий против польских мятежников, РГВИА, ф.ВУА, д. 5156, л. 14. Among the people killed were 20 Polish officers/instructors. Barzykowski S., Historia powstania..., t. IV, p. 264.
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[59] Ibid.
[62] Ibid., p. 334; Vilnius Cathedral Vicar Petrulevičius and Lieutenant Vidzga were among the people killed. Pietkiewicz M., La Lithuanie..., p. 187. Записки военных действий главнокомандующего резервной армию Петра Александровича Толстого..., p. 531.
[63] Raport generała Rohlanda do generała Chłapowskiego szefa sztabu głównego, Hrynkiński, 6 lipca o siodemj z rana 1831, Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 212; Sliesorūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 337.
[64] Ibid., p. 336. Commanders from both sides tended to exaggerate the number of enemy fatalities. For example, Polish General Dembiński asserted that ‘twice as many [Russians] were killed.’ However, the rebels clearly had no way to accurately assess Russian losses, since they retreated from the city. In this case, the Russians occupied the city and were able to count the dead soldiers from both sides without hindrance. They probably did not count the number of rebel fatalities very accurately, so in his report, General Tolstoy noted: ‘up to 2,000 rebels were killed, and up to 4,000 wounded,’ and losses were ‘three non-commissioned officers and up to 500 killed and wounded.’ Записки военных действий главнокомандующего резервной армию Петра Александровича Толстого..., p. 533; Rapport generała Dembińskiego do generała Giełguda w Eyragole. Pamiętniki polskie..., t. III, p. 119; Журнал военных действий против польских мятежников, РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, д. 5156, л. 25.
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**66** It is difficult to accurately determine rebel losses; according to Russian data, 2,000 were killed. Действия отряда полковника Крюкова при нападении Польских войск и Виленских мятежников, РГВИА, ф. ВУ А, д. 5156, л. 31; General Major Schirman’s 8 July 1831 report, LSHA, doc. f. 378, BS, 1831, file 219, pp. 35–43; the rebels were actually the attacking side, and attacked the enemy seven times in trenches and in the city. Pietkiewicz, who witnessed the events, claimed that ‘our losses on that day were higher than those suffered in the Battle of Vilnius’. Nineteen officers were killed in the Seventh Regiment alone. During the Battle of Šiauliai, the rebels did not use 29 cannons, but the Russians actively shot from five. Pietkiewicz M., La Lithuanie..., p. 196. According to Barzykowski, rebel losses in terms of wounded and killed came to 2,000. Barzykowski S., Historia powstania..., t. IV, p. 270; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 358. It is known that 125 riders of the Żemaitija Squadron were killed in the streets of the town from Russian artillery, including the renowned rebel Narbutas along with his three sons. Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 341–342; Szynler B., Henryk Dembiński..., p. 132; Pamiętniki Michała Jackowskiego..., p. 175.

**67** Purėnas P., 1831 m. sukūlimas Lietuvoje..., p. 91; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 359; Журнал военных действий против польских мятежников, РГВИА, ф.ВУ А, д. 5156, л. 32; Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 343.

**68** Ibid., p. 356.

**69** The number of private rebel soldiers who were killed is unknown. Ibid., p. 349.


**71** Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 359.

**72** Rittmeister Gofman’s report, LSHA, doc. f. 437, inv. 1, file 40, p. 41.

**73** Ibid., p. 362.

**74** Гарбацова В. В., Паустьане 1830–1831 гадой на Беларусі..., p. 99; Feduszka J., Powstanie Listopadowe na Litwie i Zmudzi..., p. 140; Dangel S., Rok 1831 w Mińsczyźnie..., p. 64.

**75** Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukūlimas..., p. 368.

**76** Ibid., p. 371.
It should be added that due to a lack of more precise data, these statistics do not include the number of people who died from battle wounds. In larger battles, the enemy frequently counted their wounded (sometimes mentioning critically wounded separately), whose numbers often exceeded 100. However, it is practically impossible to determine how many of them died from their wounds. Obviously, this could have been a significant number, given that there were usually no opportunities to provide the rebels with even minimal medical care. However, we do have examples of where the rebels did have access to an acceptable level of medical treatment. In the district of Raseiniai, treatment was administered by the Medical Committee, which was responsible for the hospital operating in the city. Some of the rebel platoons used to set up temporary military hospitals, and had doctors and a medical service. In the Upytė district, Vilnius University medical students used to act as platoon surgeons, and the hospital in the city of Ukmergė treated rebels and Russian soldiers alike.

In Žemaitija at the end of the second stage of the war, there were not enough wagons in General Gielgud’s corps to transport the wounded; they were also short of doctors and medicine, and they tried to collect wound dressings from the local residents. After the battle in Šiauliai, General Gielgud, in an effort to execute the plan for withdrawal to Prussia as quickly as possible, decided to leave the wounded to fate – their precise number is not known. In Užventis, General Rohland also

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<td>13 Oct 1831</td>
<td>Mirski’s rebels</td>
<td>Balbieriškis</td>
<td>5,590*</td>
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77 Ibid.
* This is the total number of rebels killed, including Lithuanians and soldiers from the Polish regular army units, as it is impossible to identify them separately.
122 Following are a few battles with more accurate numbers of wounded: rebels in Molėtai – 267; the Russian army in Šiauliai, Vilnius, Žadvainai and Darbėnai – 358, 201, 54, 35 seriously injured, respectively. Sliesoriūnas F., 1830–1831 metų sukilimas..., p. 359, 343, 237, 245, 307.
124 Polish Corps Military Commissar Bogdanski’s 7 June 1831 memo to Veliuona administrator Abramavičius, LSHA, doc. f. 437, inv. 3, file 77, p. 20; 26 June 1831 memo of Lukasz Hryniewicz, adviser to the Raseiniai District Committee of Internal Affairs, LSHA, doc. f. 437, inv. 3, file 77, p. 121.
decided to leave the wounded and sick in the hospital that had been set up. However, the Russians burned the hospital down, and the fate of the patients is uncertain.126

1.6.2. Other War Casualties

As far as we know, 213 civilians were killed in this war. The Russian army generally did not take extreme repressive measures against civilians who supported the rebels, although there were such cases in Žemaitija and the district of Ashmyany. After breaking into the town of Ashmyany, Russian Cossacks killed some two hundred civilians – women, children and elderly people – who were hiding in the church.127 As Jacevičius recalls in his memoirs, the Russians killed ‘many innocent peasants, women and children’128 in Darbėnai and Kretinga.

In other cases, civilian casualties were a rare exception. Russian colonel Alexander Tukhachevsky (1793–1831) sentenced estate managers Rusickis and Babravičius from the town of Vievis as well as Paulavičius from Kietaviškės to be shot for providing the rebels with food. At the Daugirdas estate in the district of Raseiniai, two landlords were killed during a Russian attack, and Cossacks killed Vilnius University student Otto Fress at the approach to Vilnius, as well as Justyn Dmochowski in Giedraičiai.129 On 20 April, Russians shot the landowner Madejski and his estate manager in Marijampolė.130

It was only under extraordinary circumstances that the rebels carried out death sentences for Russian officials or local supporters. We have only a few examples at our disposal: Raseiniai postman Grzegorzewski was hung in Raseiniai, and estate manager Dziemski was at the Szczorsy estate; and in Jonava local Russians were sentenced to death for looting estates and peasant farms.131 General Dembiński ordered a local Russian to be convicted and shot for robbery; he also sentenced to be shot a Jew who had been with the Cossacks who plundered the Kupiškis estate.132

126 Szyndler B., Henryk Dembiński..., p. 139; Barzykowski S., Historia powstania..., t. IV, p. 277.
127 In Polish Commander-in-Chief Jan Skrzyniak’s report about the march of Giełgud’s corps to Lithuania, it is indicated that some 300 women were killed. Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko–rosyjskiej..., p. 281. In his memoirs, a witness noted that approximately 80 civilians were killed. Klukowski. J., Powstanie powiatu Oszmiańskiego..., p. 241–242; Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 43; Puzyrewski A. K., Wojna polsko–ruska..., p. 178; Ginterytė–Puzinienė G., Vilniuje ir Lietuvos dvaruose, Vilnius: Regionų kultūrinų inicijatyvų centras, 2005, p. 139.
128 Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicza..., p. 16.
129 Sliesoriūnas F., Caro valdžios priemonės..., p. 128; 1831 metų žygio dienoraštis..., p. 60, 67; Callier E., Bitwy i potyczki..., p. 100–101.
130 Totoraitis J., Sudūvos Suvalkijos istorija..., d. 1, p. 444.
131 Krasicki K., Wspomnienia z roku 1831, o osobliwie z czasów wyprawy Chłapowskiego na Litwie, Zbiór pamiętników do historyi powstania Polskiego..., p. 423; Gorbaczowa O., Z historii powstania Listopadowego na Białorusi..., p. 68.
1.7. The End of the War and Its Consequences

1.7.1. Victors of the War

‘An old rebel who has lost hope and failed to improve the fate of his Fatherland meekly surrenders himself to fate, bowing his head to the One who controls all people – nations and people, exalting them and belittling them, punishing them and giving them gifts in no way that we understand, but with a mind of its own.’ This is how Polish writer and educator Anna Nakwaska (1799–1851), in one of her narratives, described the situation in Lithuania after the uprising. These words testify to the enormous shock that Lithuanian society was in. After the uprising, some of the fighters continued to put up resistance and did not abandon the goal they had set. Indeed, the uprising in Poland and Lithuania did not achieve its main goal, which was the restoration of the 1772 borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the consciousness of Lithuanian society, this period was not just a time of unfulfilled hopes; memories of it rejuvenated thoughts of freedom, encouraged traditions to be preserved, and kept the notion of restoration of the state alive. These ideas became important for the new generation as well, as is evidenced by the subsequent resistance struggle.

For the victor of the war – Russia – this was an excellent pretext to step up the integration policy for incorporated territories. Radical measures were taken, such as the closing of Vilnius University, intensification of censorship, and restriction of the activities of the Catholic Church.

1.7.2. Other Consequences of the War

The war affected the demographic dynamics of the Lithuanian population. Adverse circumstances during the war caused the population to decrease, but not drastically. The numbers themselves are the most telling, although their accuracy is not very precise. Many of the rebels emigrated to other countries. The majority – more than 2,000 men – withdrew with Giełgud’s corps to Prussia, while others emigrated independently at the end of the uprising. Of the 5,000 emigrants who reached France in 1832, approximately seven hundred were rebels from the lands the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. These included more than 170 former students from Vilnius University and 30 from the Krzemieniec Lyceum. According to data collected by the Russian government in 1836, there were 2,083 people who emigrated from the Vilnius Governorate, 258 from Grodno and 193 from Minsk.

133 Nakwaska, A., Powstanie litewski: obraz romantyczny z czasów rewolucyi w Polsce z 1831. r., Lipsk, 1845, s. 90.
134 Ziółek J., Powstanie listopadowie na Litwie..., p. 410; Tokarz W., Wojna..., p. 375; Kasperek N., Powstańcy epilog..., p. 90.
The rebels clearly had no other choice, since returning home would have meant nothing other than being handed over to the recruiters, sent to prison, or exiled in Siberia. Amnesty was not granted by the Russian emperor to private and non-commissioned officer rebels from the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Therefore, rebels from these lands who managed to get to Prussia were not hindered from emigrating to other European countries. Most of them were granted permits to emigrate. Granted, Vilnius University students were held in poor conditions in barracks near Gdansk because the Prussian government considered them to be potential resistance organizers. On 16 October 1834, the Russian emperor barred the rebels from returning to Russia, and estates owned by emigrants were to be confiscated. The Vilnius Interrogation Commission that began operating in 1831 designated 51 people as Category I, which meant they faced the death penalty; in Minsk three people were designated as such.

Lithuania also lost a number of men who the Russian government sent to serve as recruits at military units in Siberia (454) and the Caucasus (1,485). At best, they were only able to return after fifteen to twenty years of service. The potential majority consisted of Vilnius Governorate residents (only 70 were sent from the Minsk Governorate and 77 from the Grodno Governorate). The number sent out as recruits should have been considerably higher, as some of the Lithuanian rebels were sent from the Polish Kingdom.

During the almost eight months of war, the Lithuanian population suffered considerable economic losses. There were three main sources of loss: the first was the requisition of items such as food, fodder and ammunition carried out by military units; the second was the damage incurred during battles in towns and cities; and the third was the sequestration and confiscation of real estate carried out by the Russian government after the uprising.

It is actually impossible to calculate the losses experienced by residents as a result of requisitions carried out by Russian, Polish and local units based on mathematics alone, especially as quite a few requisitions were not documented in any way. Residents experienced the greatest losses from the requisitioning of food, fodder and transport for military units, as well as plundering. Urban residents were additionally forced to meet the needs of the warring sides (e.g. temporary military hospitals set up in monasteries and private homes, warehouses, holding of prisoners, defence equipment). Granted, some people

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139 Ružancovas V., Kauno miesto biudžetas 1831 metais, Karo archyvas, 1931, nr. 3, p. 20–21, 24–25; Ružancovas V., Iš 1831 metų sukilimų bylų (Kauno miesto valdybos archyvas), Ibid., nr. 8, p. 20.
issued their own bills once the uprising was over. The Kaunas Kahal succeeded in doing this: it was calculated that they spent 1,467.07 roubles on rebel assistance, when the Kahal had an income that year of 3,714.44 roubles.\textsuperscript{140}

Clearly, the areas where battles took place or where military units marched or were deployed for various lengths of time suffered the most. For example, the Russian government ordered additional requisitions for the Russian army fighting in the Polish Kingdom as a punishment for residents of the Švenčionys district. The first time, 5,698 quarts of rye flour, 629 poods of grain, and 6,960 poods of oats were requisitioned, and the second time – 2,000 poods of flour, 200 poods of grain, and 500 poods of oats. This meant starvation for the residents of the district.\textsuperscript{141} The losses incurred by residents of the Paneriai Folwark and its villages were particularly great (5,157.50 silver roubles), since the Russian units led by generals Dmitry Kuruta (1769–1833) and Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg (1784–1844) were stationed in this area. These losses accumulated due to various forms of requisition (drink, food, fodder, grain, poultry and livestock, vehicles, etc.).\textsuperscript{142} The losses that the Riešė Folwark suffered during the war, including the price of unused peasant labour, came to 239 silver roubles.\textsuperscript{143}

The greatest economic consequences experienced by the population should be calculated in Žemaitija – the area where the uprising was most intense. For example, rebels of the Šiauliai Economy (formerly the largest state holding of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was given over to General Platon Zubov after the partitions) requisitioned food and clothing to the amount of 25,174 roubles, 366 uniforms valued at 5,490 roubles, 48 horses which cost the cavalry 1,920 roubles, vodka worth 7,536.75 roubles, hay worth 2,635 roubles, and grain worth 1,145 roubles. The managers of the Joniškis farm, which was part of the aforementioned economy, calculated that their losses amounted to 6,818.80 roubles in Russian requisitions and 16,413.95 roubles in rebel requisitions.\textsuperscript{144}

Residents also suffered significant losses due to fire. As mentioned previously, the town of Ashmyany was burned down, as was Darbėnai, together with its church. Utena and Palanga suffered less from battle-related fires – only part of these towns was burned.\textsuperscript{145} The villages where battles took place suffered the most. In some cases, the Russians deliberately set them on fire. There is evidence that the villages of Rum, Old Palanga and Vilimiškė were set fire to.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{140} Ružancovas V., Kauno žydų kahalo išlaidos pirmo sukilimo metais (iš Kauno miesto archyvo), \textit{Savivaldybė}, 1930, nr. 3, p. 16–18.
\textsuperscript{141} Bielinski k., \textit{Rok 1831...}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{142} 1831 06 27 raštas Vilniaus kapitulai, \textit{LMAB RS}, f. 43–14275, l. 1; Sąrašas, Ibid., l. 3–4;
\textsuperscript{143} Sąskaita, Ibid., f. 43 – 15819, l. 9.
\textsuperscript{144} Janulaitis A., \textit{Valstiečiai...}, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{145} Pamiętniki Michała Lisieckiego..., p. 61; \textit{Karjer Litewski}, 1831, nr. 53; Pamiętnik Onufrego Jacewicza..., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{146} Powstanie powiatu Oszmiańskiego..., p. 247; Sliesoriūnas F., \textit{1830–1831 metų sukilimas...}, p. 222.
The most active participants of the uprising experienced significant losses due to the sequestration and confiscation of their movable and immovable property, including monetary assets. Statistics show that in the Vilnius Governorate, 149 residents lost their estates with 30,799 peasants, of which 59 estates with 20,944 peasants were confiscated completely, 46 estates with 4,581 peasants – partially, and 44 estates with 5,254 peasants were transferred to third parties.\footnote{Ibid., p. 393; Kaczkowski J., \\Konfiskaty na ziemiach polskich pod zaborem rosyjskim po powstaniach roku 1831 i 1863, Warszawa, 1918, s. 252, 255; Rosiak S., Wileńska komisja..., p. 13–14.} In other governorates, a significantly smaller number of the most active fighters were affected in this way: 70 in Grodno, 22 in Minsk, 6 in Vitebsk, and 1 in Mogilev.\footnote{Г арбачова В. В., Паўстание 1830–1831 гадой на Беларўci..., p. 167. In the Minsk Governorate, 13 landowners managed to recover their property. Dangel S., Rok 1831 w Mińskiem..., p. 184–189.}

1.8. Semantics of the War

It should first of all be noted that Lithuanian fighters identified themselves with ‘rebels’ and ‘patriots’, and they considered the enemy to be the Russian or Muscovite army (using the names of the commanders of the Russian units). However, the word ‘maskoliai’, a Lithuanian colloquialism which means ‘Muscovites’, comes up quite often, particularly in memoirs; it is also used in describing Russian repression.\footnote{Pamiętnik obywatela powiatu Upitckiego..., p. 175–176, 197; Powstanie powiatu Wilejskiego..., p. 272, 274; Powstanie powiatu Dziśnieńskiego..., p. 326, 336; Pamiętnik o powstaniu Białowieskiem..., p. 13; Pamiętniki Michała Lisieckiego..., p. 104–105.} Granted, some of the rebels clearly realized who their potential enemy was. For example, the authors of the Raseiniai District Confederation Act noted that ‘we do not feel any hatred for the Russians ... we hope that they achieve the same freedom.’\footnote{Uchwała powiatu Rosieniańskiego, Zbiór pamiętników..., p. 147.}

In Russia, i.e. in the documents of the emperor, the official documents of officials and soldiers, and the press, the rebels’ opposition was regarded as an illegal and unlawful act against the authority of the emperor; it was referred to as ‘mutiny’ and its participants – ‘mutineers’. In the first official address of the Russian government to the noblemen of Vilnius, Grodno and Volhynia, which was printed in Vilnius on 1 May in Kurier Litewski, it was stated that ‘a handful of ungrateful people unworthy of their noble title ... dared to interfere with the peace of the Vilnius Governorate’, and the opposition struggle was referred to as ‘mutiny’.\footnote{Report published on 13 April 1831 about the military action in Poland in which the Polish rebels are called mutineers, Kurjer Litewski, 1831, nr. 44, Dodatek nadzwyczajny.} Other expressions were also used in this capacity to belittle the enemy, such as
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Vilnius Governor General Khrapovitsky called the insurgents ‘malicious-minded individuals ill-disposed towards the government’.152 The terms ‘Vilnius mutineers’ and ‘Lithuanian mutineers’ were sometimes used in Russian military documents to describe the rebels. Incidentally, they were not identified with the regular army units of the Polish Kingdom.154 However, in correspondence between Emperor Nicholas I and Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich in April, different words were already being used to describe the war in Lithuania – ‘uprising-stricken land’, ‘uprising’, and ‘rebels’ or ‘Lithuanian rebels’; only once was the word ‘mutiny’ used.155 In correspondence with General Piotr Tolstoy, commander of the reserve army in Lithuania, the phrase ‘all sorts of gangs’ was found.156 Mikhail Muravyov, one of the Russian government officials, also used the word ‘rebels’ alongside the usual ‘mutineer’.157 Russian military commander Field Marshal Dibicz-Zabalkanski spoke similarly.158 These examples testify to the fact that the users of these words did not perceive much of a difference in their meaning, since in both cases it meant an encroachment on the authority of the Russian emperor. It should be added that the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, who had so maddened the Russian government with his libertine poems, also viewed the uprising unfavourably. At one ball, Pushkin did not allow the Polish mazurka to be danced, calling it ‘a mutinous dance’.159

In the protocol book of the Sejm of the Polish Kingdom, the word ‘uprising’ was used with particular frequency – 35 times in all – to describe the Lithuanians’ fight with Russia.160 As for the semantics used in neutral countries to describe the uprising in Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom, it should be noted that this was of most interest only to neighbouring countries; unlike the revolt in Belgium,
the uprising did not touch upon the vital interests of France and England, and the politicians of these countries did not recognize the rebel government. 161 Prussia – one of the participants in the Congress of Vienna that shared a common border with Lithuania – remained an active proponent of Russia. Prussian governor Heinrich Theodor von Schön (1773–1856) continually transmitted messages from Königsberg to Berlin about the uprising in Lithuania, sometimes calling it ‘Russischen Polen’ (‘Russian Poland’), and using the French words for ‘revolution’ and ‘uprising’ to describe the events. 162 In the reports of Saxon Envoy to Russia Jean Frédéric Lemaistre to Saxon Minister of Foreign Affairs Johann von Minckwitz, the military action was regarded as an uprising. 163

Instead of Conclusion

In accordance with the systematic quantitative study that has been carried out on the war that took place in 1830–1831 in the territories annexed by the Russian Empire over restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that was abolished in 1795, the historical claims of individual characterization of the 1831 war put forth in the book Resort to War could be revised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Correlates of War</th>
<th>This study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War number</td>
<td>Intra-state War #517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the war</td>
<td>The First Polish War of 1831</td>
<td>The Uprising of 1830–1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Russia vs. Poles</td>
<td>Russia vs. Poland-Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>February 7, 1831</td>
<td>February 7, 1831 – in Poland*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>March 25, 1831 – in Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End date</td>
<td>October 18, 1831</td>
<td>Octob. 13, 1831 – in Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 18, 1831 – in Poland*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Because this data was not under review it was simply taken as is from the book Resort to War.
| Battle-related deaths | Poles - 20,000; Russia - 15,000 | Poland – 20,000*  
|                       |                             | Lithuania – 5,590  
|                       |                             | Russia (in battles in Lithuania) – 1,159  
|                       |                             | Russia – 15,000* |
| Initiator            | Poles                       | Poland|
| Outcome              | Russia wins                  | Russia wins |
| War type             | Civil for local issues       |          |
| Narrative            | The once-autonomous Kingdom of Poland had suffered through three partition agreements during the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. Russia had received the largest part, which was supposed to have a degree of independence within the Russian Empire. The Poles resented Russian rule, and a rebellion broke out on November 29, 1830, when junior Polish army officers occupied public buildings. As the rebels became increasingly radical, Russian tsar Nicholas I decided to send troops against the rebels in February 1831, starting the war. The first battles were won by the Poles, and the Russians were stalemate at the Battle of Grochow. When spring arrived, however, Russian forces advanced, winning the battle of Ostroleka on May 26, and capturing Warsaw on September 8, 1831, after which the rebellion soon collapsed. Many of the deaths were due to disease. As a result of the war, the Polish constitution was suspended and Poland became more integrated into the Russian Empire. |
|                      | Based on the agreements of the Congress of Vienna, the Russian Empire expanded its territory at the expense of the Polish and Lithuanian lands that belonged to the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and which were thus far ruled by Prussia. The new formation – the Polish Kingdom – was connected with the authority of the Russian emperor and was granted rights of autonomy. The Poles, inspired by external and internal circumstances, decided to sever ties with Russia. On November 29-30, 1830, units of the Polish army pushed the Russians out of Warsaw; Nicholas I of Russia decided to use military force to suppress the uprising, and war broke out in February 1831. From late March, military operations spread to the governorates of Vilnius, Grodno and Minsk (the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania) when the locals rose in rebellion and a corps of the Polish army later arrived. In Poland (the Battles of Grochow, Ostroleka and Warsaw) and in Lithuania (the Battle of Vilnius), the local military forces were |

* Because this data was not under review it was simply taken as is from the book Resort to War.  
Lithuania and the 1830–1831 uprising

Unable to conquer and take the initiative, and the Russians mobilized additional forces, resulting in the collapse of the uprising in October without achieving the joint goal of restoring the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This war resulted in the Constitution of the Polish Kingdom being abolished, and radical measures being taken in Lithuania to destroy the surviving traditions of state, legal, and public life of the former Grand Duchy. The victor of the war took advantage of an excellent pretext to step up policies for the integration of Poland and Lithuania into the Russian Empire.

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ф. ВУА – военно-ученный архив

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Rps – Władze Centralne Powstania Listopadowego

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Chapter 2
Lithuania and the 1863–1864 Uprising
2.1. 'Brother Žemaitians'. This proclamation poster was found posted on the Šaukėnai Church wall, in the county of Šiauliai on 19 March 1863. The broken cross symbolized the persecution of Catholicism imposed by tsarist Russia.
The following is how the compilers of the Correlates of War (COW) research project, a US quantitative analysis of worldwide wars, presents, in the global individual descriptions published in 2010, the 1863–1864 uprising that aimed to re-establish the binary Polish and Lithuanian state that had been dissolved in 1795, which took place in the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that had been annexed by the Russian Empire:

Intra-state War #580:

The Second Polish War of 1863–1864
Participants: Russia vs. Poles
Dates: 22 January 1863 to 19 April 1864
Battle-related deaths: Russia—10,000; Poland – 6,500
Where fought: Europe
Initiator: Poland
Outcome: Russia wins
War type: Civil for local issues

Narrative: The once-independent entity of Poland had been partitioned among Russia, Austria and Prussia, with Russia gaining the largest portion. Although Poland initially had a degree of independence within the empire, it was lost as a result of the first Polish rebellion (intra-state war #517). After coming to the Russian throne in 1856, Tsar Alexander attempted to develop a better relationship with the Poles, but his limited reforms failed to dampen the Polish desire for independence. Marquis Aleksander Wielopolski, the local administrator in Poland, tried to force the Polish youth into the army, which led to open rebellion in January 1863. The Poles conducted guerrilla warfare against the numerically superior Russian forces for more than a year; however, the rebellion was ultimately suppressed. Poland lost all elements of self-government, and Russia implemented a strict policy of Russification1.

The individual description shown above of the 1863–1864 Uprising (January Uprising) does not match the reality of events. For instance, the once-

independent entity that had been partitioned was not Poland, but the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The 1863–1864 Uprising included inhabitants from each of the partitioned lands: Poland (formerly the Kingdom of Poland) and Lithuania (formerly the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). Unfortunately, in the narration of military events the uprising is attributed to Poland alone; commentary is made only for incidents in the Kingdom of Poland. The death count in the Russian version is particularly unbelievable: poorly-armed volunteer rebels could not possibly have taken such a toll on the well-armed and trained Russian military. There are also errors of chronology and subject matter in the account of the war: Emperor Alexander II is referred to as Alexander, incorrect years are used for his reign, and Wielopolski was never the local administrator of Polish Kingdom.

In presenting the mistaken account of the Lithuanian 1863–1864 Uprising to the world, COW made clear the necessity of a quantitative analysis of the war: because the 1863–1864 Uprising is known in the typology of wars as ‘the Second Polish War’, the objective of the research was to answer the questions of whether there was also a war in Lithuania, as there was in Poland, fitting the COW war criteria; and how the parties of the war should be named in terms of war classifications.

Although the general aspects of the 1863–1864 Uprising in Poland and Lithuania are well documented in Russian, Polish and Lithuanian historiography, a systemic quantitative analysis is yet to be carried out. We do not want to say that there are no systemic quantitative data about the uprising: numerous researchers from Poland, Russia and Lithuania have submitted numbers relating to the forces, engagements and deaths on the Russian as well as rebel sides. On the other hand, the data are questionable: figures differ based on author, sources are often not cited or how the calculations were made is not clear.

Ona Maksimaitienė’s work on the topic of Lithuanian rebels’ battles is notable for its systematic quantitative information about the 1863–1864 Uprising in Lithuania. The book includes data on the battles, squads, their commanders, and people killed in battle. The author’s research does not touch upon parts of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that were included in the so-called North-western Krai of the Russian Empire after the partition (the governorates of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk); rather, it focuses on

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2 In historiography, the term ‘Kingdom of Poland’ is used in reference to two different entities: 1) the integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1795; and 2) the artificial administrative unit that was incorporated by Russia in 1815 (sometimes referred to as ‘Congress Poland’). In order to distinguish between these two geopolitical entities in this book, the term ‘Kingdom of Poland’ will be used in reference to the integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the term ‘Polish Kingdom’ will be used in reference to the administrative unit of the Russian Empire.

only the lands inhabited by ethnic Lithuanians (the governorates of Vilnius and Kaunas) and the land south of the Neman River, which then belonged to the Polish Kingdom (the governorate of Augustów, and the counties of Marijampolė, Kalvarija, Sejny and Augustów). This specific range of research originated because in the twentieth century there was an attempt to explain the 1863–1864 Uprising in Lithuania as being different from the Polish uprising. The political assumption is that the 1863–1864 Uprising in Lithuania did not intend to restore the Polish-Lithuanian state, but was rather an attempt by Antanas Mackevičius (Antoni Mackiewicz) to lead peasants fighting for an independent Lithuania, as well as the fight against the Russian imperial government and the landowners, which was reflected in the anti-Polish prejudice in the first Republic of Lithuania and then in the historical conception of the Russian Marxism of the Soviet times. Darius Staliūnas has discussed in detail the political circumstances which conditioned the transformation of 1863–1864 Uprising image within Lithuanian historiography.

Some systematic quantitative data on the uprising in Lithuania, based on historiography, can also be found in David Fainhauz's book. For specific comparisons, the work of Zaytsev on the fund of documents from the Ninety-fourth Auditoriat of the Russian Empire’s War Ministry is valuable. The work analyses the social caste composition of the repressed Poles and Lithuanians taking part in the uprising. However, of all the studies carried out, the most distinguished is that of Polish historian Stanisław Zieleński, whose reconstruction of the 1863–1864 Uprising in the former territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is based on manuscripts from the Polish Museum in Rapperswil (Switzerland) as well as published material on the uprising.

Published uprising resource collections are very important for a qualitative analysis. First of all, there is Governor General of Vilnius Mikhail Muravyov’s archive material for the 1863–1864 Uprising, from the Russian military district of Vilnius. The publication includes Russian military commanders and rebel

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4 However, this was allegedly the position held by the troops, not the politically motivated Russian emperor’s decision to transfer the Governorates of Augustów, and the counties of Marijampole, Kalvarija, Sejny, and Augustów to the Governor General of Vilnius and the Vilnius territory charge in August 1863.


8 Zieleński S., Bitwy i potyczki 1863–1864 r., Rapperswil: Nakładem Funduszu Wydawniczego Muzeum Narodowego w Rapperswilu, 1913.

9 Архивные материалы Муравьёвского музея, относящиеся к польскому восстанию 1863–1864 г.г. в пределах Северо-Западного края (after that – AMMM), сост. А. И. Миловидов, Виленский временник, кн. 6, ч. 1–2, Вильна: Губернская типография, 1913, 1915.
commanders’ reports to military leadership, fragments of Russian combat registers, National Government documents, Russian war logs, and lists of Russian units and commanders. Also handy for analysis are the voluminous 1863–1864 Uprising press dossiers of all the publications on that topic that came out in Poland and Lithuania during the Soviet period. Individual published sources of Lithuanian and Polish scientists, as well as the memories of witnesses and participants in the uprising, have their own value; among them are Muravyov’s memories of the suppression of the uprising in the military district of Vilnius.

The first point of interest in researching the systemic quantitative uprising issue was resources, to systemize and describe both published and archived resource data about separate battles from Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish sources. Fund 494, the file on the military district of Vilnius at the Lithuanian State Historical Archives (Lietuvos valstybės istorijos archyvas – LVIA) turned out to be very valuable to the analysis of the uprising. It includes the district’s


military action registers for 1863 and 1864,\textsuperscript{14} regarding the rebel and Russian army squads, battles, fatalities, as well as the deployment, composition and armament of Russian forces, the formation and operation of rebel squads, the declaration of a state of war in Lithuania, etc. Other LVIA funds used include: fund 419, the Vilnius gendarmerie board, about military action taken against rebel squads; fund 378, annual reports from the Governor General of Vilnius’s Office on the economic situation, population, and rebel supply of arms in different North-western Krai governorates; fund 1248, ad-hoc outdoor tribunal documents relating to the rebel leadership’s instructions, and instructions for the commanders; funds 1252, 1253 and so on, Russian military governor documents on the progress of the uprising in different places, and rebel interrogation material touching individual counties of the Russian North-western Krai.

The paper also used Russian State Military History Archive in Moscow (Российский государственный военно-исторический архив – RGVIA) and specifically its Military science archive’s (Военно-ученный архив – VUA) collections. A comprehensive 1863 Vilnius military district registers of combats with the district battles and fatalities, also statistical summaries of Russian military force deployment in different governorates and counties, rebel leadership instructions, correspondence concerning the transfer of the Russian army, and other documents are found in fund 846, folder 16 (VUA catalogue, 1803–1892); Russian government circulars, Kaunas Governor’s Office Special Department circulars and letters of the Russian north-west region military commanders on the suppression of the uprising, insurrection participants’ files, lists of rebel leadership instructions, proclamations, etc., as well as iconographic material about the uprising are found in RGVIA VUA fund 484, folder 2.

Contributions came from the Central Warsaw Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych – AGAD) 1863–1864 Uprising document collection: fund 245 (Collection of various materials about the January Uprising 1861–1927) and fund 244 (National Organization of the January Uprising). Also, material touching upon the uprising, kept safe at the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw (Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie – MWP): sets of photos of different people, Augustus Roman Kręcki’s biography collection (Uczestnicy powstania 1863–1864), 1863’s secret uprising publication collections.

In order to process the collected quantitative information about the 1863–1864 Uprising, it was summarized in a special table, creating an original

\textsuperscript{14} The register of combats of the Vilnius military district, 11 January 1863–23 August 1863, LVIA, f. 494, ap. 1, b. 854 (KVŽ); The register of combats of the Vilnius military district, 9 April 1864–13 May 1864, ibid, b. 779 (KVŽ1); The register of combats of the Vilnius military district, 29 February 1864–22 August 1864, ibid, b. 775 (KVŽ2); The register of combats of the Vilnius military district, 24 January 1863-10 June 1863, ibid, b. 758 (KVŽ3).
secondary source and reconstructing the uprising’s battles in Lithuania (summary source). Therein the Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk battles of the rebels and Russian army are systemized, including dates, locations, squad leaders and headcounts, together with the numbers of deaths related to battle circumstances, the wounded, and soldiers taken prisoner. The most important war parameters of the uprising in Lithuania were established based on the systemized documents: the beginning and end, the number of battles, their intensity, the effectiveness of the opposing forces, and the number of commanders (squads). Also, based on the methodology created by the author, the numbers of rebels and average size of the squads from each of the governorships, and the numbers of deaths related to battle circumstances were established. The culmination of the uprising in Lithuania has been traced, the stages distinguished, the individual contributions of the governorates of the North-western Krai identified, and a comparison with the Polish Kingdom and Rus’ (Ukraine – Volyn, Podolia and Kiev governorates). The study led to a reasonable answer to the question of whether the uprising in Lithuania may be called ‘war’.

Next are presented the most important systemic quantitative results of the analysis of the 1863–1864 Uprising. The dates in the text are according to the Gregorian calendar, as used in the nineteenth century in Europe and in the Polish Kingdom. Some event dates in parentheses are according to the Julian calendar as used in the Russian Empire (the Gregorian calendar minus 12 days). The dates in the references are the originals.

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16 The research was conducted using analysis, synthesis, generalization, induction, comparative and statistical methods.
2.1. The Warring Sides: Status and Potential

2.1.1. Status of the Parties at War

As we know, the purpose of the 1863–1864 Uprising in the Russian Empire was to restore the Polish-Lithuanian state destroyed in 1795 – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. First, then, we will discuss the status of the parties at war in 1863.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the only participant that belonged to the international system was the Russian Empire. It had independence and sovereignty, a fixed territory and inhabitants, and diplomatic recognition among other countries of the world; also, an organized military force that consisted of an army and navy. We will add that the Russian state religion was Orthodox Christianity.

The situation was very different in the opposing side – Poland and Lithuania. The Polish kingdom and Lithuania were both annexed geopolitical subjects (units) of Russia, which differed from Russia in their history, territory, ethnicity and religion. This distinction of theirs was suppressed by Russia, as the population considered itself to be taken over or occupied, and did not feel as though they belonged to Russia. However, neither the Polish kingdom nor Lithuania officially existed on the world map. Politically, they both satisfied two of the three COW set criteria for integration into a state. At the time, Russian legislation contained no constitutional provisions to enable these annexed territories to participate in the management of the empire; their populations were subject to ethnic, religious, cultural and political constraints. However, the Polish Kingdom and Lithuania never recognized themselves as an integral part of Russia.

Of the three countries that divided the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Austria, Prussia and Russia), the one controlling most of the land during the 1863–1864 Uprising was Russia. Lithuania belonged to it as the North-western Krai, Rus’ as the South-western Krai, and the Polish Kingdom composed from the part of the Polish and Lithuanian territory after their partition linked up to Prussia. The ethnic Poles living in Poland and ethnic Lithuanians living in Lithuania were of the Roman Catholic faith. Those in Rus’ were Ukrainian Greek Catholic, while Lithuanian Rus’ (White Rus’ or Belarusians) were converted to Orthodoxy by Russia in 1839.

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17 See: Sarkees M. R., Wayman F. W., op.cit., p. 43.
18 In the documents of the rebels, sometimes refer to White Russia (now Belarus), which belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as Rus’. 
Although the attitude of Russian politicians after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 toward the artificial construction within their borders of the Polish
Kingdom, one of contempt, is demonstrated by the notes of Lev Tikhomirov, in which the name is written only in quotation marks, there was still a different status in Russia for Lithuania from that of the Polish Kingdom. The Polish Kingdom, though it did not have statehood status (it didn't have a legislature (Sejm)) or an army, and was ruled by Russia (by the Russian Emperor, along with the Russian Criminal Code, Russian administration of roads, customs, post, etc.), it did have a nominal institutional autonomy and was called a kingdom. Unfortunately, Lithuania did not get even that much recognition and simply became an administrative unit of the Russian Empire.

At the beginning we mentioned that according to typical COW war categorization the 1863–1864 Uprising was a war between Russia and Poland. It is evident that the principal error of the COW in describing the 1863–1864 Uprising is in identifying the adversary of Russia. In fact, the uprising against Russia was fought not by one, but two geopolitical entities – the Polish Kingdom and Lithuania. These entities represented both members of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Why, then, doesn’t the description of the 1863–1864 uprising given by COW not mention the second entity fighting against Russia, i.e. Lithuania? Such an omission could be explained by the mid-nineteenth century ambiguous use of the term ‘Poland,’ the origin of which happens to be part of the historical context.

The term Poland in the mid-nineteenth century could mean either the Polish Kingdom or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The latter concept was symbolic – among the territories of the world, such a ‘Poland’ never existed. In fact, this name reflected the old Polish unitary tendencies openly exhibited during the ratification of the third constitution in May 1791. Lithuania never agreed to merge with Poland and demanded that immediately after the ratification of the constitution on 20 October 1791 a bilateral pledge be signed regarding the status of the independent Grand Duchy of Lithuania, emphasizing and describing the dualistic nature of the state. Circumstances made it simple for the term Poland to come to mean the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, because after the union Lithuania became less visible to the rest of Europe.

The process of Lithuania’s integration into Russia accelerated after the 1830–1831 rebellion. In the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, propositions were formulated in Russia that the annexed territories of Lithuania and Rus’ had always been Russian lands, and that any Polish claim to them was unfounded. They began destroying the old traditions of the Republic, erasing Lithuania and Žemaitija (Žemaičiai, Samogitia) from world

19 Lev Tikhomirov (1852–1923) – Russian political activist, writer, publicist, philosopher, and representative of creative traditionalism.
20 Тихомиров Л. А., Варшава и Вильна в 1863 г., «Готов собою жертвовать...», p. 298.
21 Such claims were formulated by the Russian historian and educator Nikolay Ustryalov: У стрялов Н. Г., Русская история, ч. 1–5, СПб, 1837–1841; У стрялов Н. Г., История царствования Петра Великого, т. 1–6, СПб, 1858–1863 etc.
maps. Lithuania and Rus’ were renamed Western Russia, Western Krai, Western governorates, Western Russian Krai; later, Lithuania was called the North-western Krai and Rus’ the South-western Krai.\textsuperscript{22} By order of the Emperor, the Vilnius Governorate of Lithuania and Grodno Governorate of Lithuania became simply the Vilnius Governorate and the Grodno Governorate. The Žemaičiai diocese became the Telšiai diocese, the Žemaičiai consistory became the Telšiai consistory, the Žemaičiai bishop became the Telšiai bishop, etc.\textsuperscript{23}

As the name ‘Lithuania’ began to be forgotten in Europe, the two names for Poland – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Polish Kingdom – began to melt into one.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, the overall Polish and Lithuanian historical legacy went to the Polish Kingdom.

When describing the 1863–1864 Uprising, this conclusion is confirmed even by foreign researchers, who have no knowledge of the deeper Polish and Lithuanian history and works that are the basis of a draft prepared by COW and cited by Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman in the book Resort to War. These are old or compilation-type works that were published in English. Their authors were not familiar with the historiography of the uprisings of Lithuanians, Poles or Russians, because throughout the Soviet era this was difficult to access.

In summary, the militant parties in the 1863 armed uprising in Poland and Lithuania, which was meant to restore the Polish-Lithuanian state that had ceased to exist in 1795, were the Russian Empire, a member of the international community, fighting against two historically and ethnically different geopolitical subjects (units) on the periphery of its own territory – the abolished and annexed Polish Kingdom and Lithuania.

### 2.1.2. Parties’ Territories and Populations

We will now discuss the territories and populations of the parties at war. The data describing the territories and populations of the Russian Empire, Polish Kingdom and Lithuania are only available from the Russian Empire’s 1897 census report. At other times, they are fragmented. Data on Lithuania in 1862–63 is provided by the annual Russian North-western Krai civil governor’s

\textsuperscript{22} Recent titles in the imperial terminology officially prevailed after the defeat of the 1863–1864 Uprising. Incidentally, at that time (1867) the Polish Kingdom also lost its title and structure – it became Privilinsky Krai (Vistula Land), managed by a Governor General, divided into Governorates.


\textsuperscript{24} This is well illustrated by the March, April and June 1863 notes from France, England and Austria to Russia. Alexander II called upon Russia to return to Poland its 1815–1831 autonomy.
reports on the situation in governorates.25

From the fragmented data in table 2.1 we can still see the population growth tendencies for different territories. One can surmise that during the 1863–1864 Uprising the population of Lithuania could have been about seven million; the governorates of Vilnius and Kaunas were the most densely populated by ethnic Lithuanians – about two million. Between the two of them, in 1863 the Polish Kingdom and Lithuania made up about 2% of the territory of the Russian Empire. During the 1863–1864 Uprising, the territory of Lithuania was 2.4 times greater than that of the Polish Kingdom, with similar population numbers.

### 2.1. Populations of Russia, Poland and Lithuania in the nineteenth century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russian Empire</th>
<th>Polish Kingdom</th>
<th>Lithuania (North-western Krai)</th>
<th>Vilnius Governorate</th>
<th>Kaunas Governorate</th>
<th>Grodno Governorate</th>
<th>Minsk Governorate</th>
<th>Vitebsk Governorate</th>
<th>Mogilev Governorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,631,645 (38,669 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>12.9 142,100</td>
<td>9,456,100 (128,500 km²)</td>
<td>9,087,094 (304,365 km²)</td>
<td>1,591,207 (41,908 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,539,100 (91,213 km²)</td>
<td>1,489,246 (43,984 km²)</td>
<td>1,686,764 (47,950 km²)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,638,378 (40,641 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>899,993 (41,896 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>971,496 (91,324 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>882,577 (41,896 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,041,131 (42,248 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,137,634 (128,500 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,200,000 (128,500 km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 There was an opportunity to take advantage of reports: The civilian governor general of Vilnius’ report on the Governorate from 1862 to the beginning of 1863, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 900, l. 60; Same document: LIŠ, t. 2, p. 43–44; The civilian governor general of Vilnius’ report on the Governorate from 1863 to the beginning of 1864, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 902, l. 3–4, 66; Same document: LIŠ, p. 88–91; The civilian governor general of Kaunas’ report on the Governorate from 1862 to the beginning of 1863, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 900, l. 3, 93; The civilian governor general of Minsk’ report on the Governorate from 1863 to the beginning of 1864, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 901, l. 6.
2.1.3. The Economic Potential of the Parties Before the Outbreak of Hostilities

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, the Polish Kingdom and Lithuania were all backward agrarian countries with a poorly developed agricultural structure and industry. Nevertheless the regime of Alexander II (1855–1881) of the Russian Empire abolished serfdom; peasant, administrative, urban governance, judicial, financial, military, and educational reforms took place. It greatly accelerated the development of industry, particularly the rapidly growing coal and oil industries. In military terms, the territory of Russia had been divided by the Ministry of War into 15 military districts.²⁶

The North-western Krai of Russia (Lithuania) was a sadder story of economic potential. The Vilnius, Kaunas and Minsk governorates were dominated by agriculture, animal husbandry and horse-breeding. The latter was particularly famous in the Kaunas Governorate, where the ‘Žemaitukas’ breed originated. Irenėjus Oginskis (Ireneusz Ogiński) engaged in the rearing of the Žemaitukas horses on the Rietavas estates. The Russian government would finance horse shows (the horse show in 1863 was allocated 400 roubles); the ‘Žemaitukas’ horses often won awards.

The governorates’ landowners were mostly vodka producers. Coastal residents offered drift boats and rafts for hire. Factories and plants were few. For example, there were 48 larger plants in the Vilnius Governorate in 1862 – smelting iron and producing iron and linen. There were 2,481 ships and 2,410 ferries, which transported goods worth a total of 2.6 million roubles.²⁷ Industrial development in the Kaunas Governorate in 1862 was hampered by the proximity of the border (trade competition), lack of capital and lack of technical education. Factories produced iron, agricultural tools and guns. There were 106 of them in total, but only a few larger factories and mills had an annual turnover that reached 3,000 roubles. An important activity was timber rafting. Steamboat transportation between Kaunas and Tilsit was introduced in 1857, with the building of the Kaunas pier. In 1862 there were 3,029 boats with a cargo value of 2.3 million roubles. The number of ships and the amount of cargo reduced after the launch of the Warsaw–St Petersburg railway.²⁸ In the Minsk Governorate in 1863 industry was rudimentary – there were factories producing candles and tar (a total of 82). Landowners produced vodka and tar, and processed wood. There were 1,106 ships and 1,215 wooden ferries, which transported goods worth 2.6 million roubles.²⁹

²⁷ The civilian governor general of Vilnius’ report on the Governorate from 1863 to the beginning of 1864, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 902, l. 5–11.
²⁸ The civilian governor general of Kaunas’ report on the Governorate from 1862 to the beginning of 1863, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 900, l. 4–8, 122, 125.
²⁹ The civilian governor general of Minsk’s report on the Governorate from 1863 to the beginning of 1864, LVIA, f. 378, ap. 121, b. 901, l. 8.
Lithuania and the 1863–1864 Uprising

2.2. The Beginning of the War

2.2.1. The Allies and Their Objective

The Polish Kingdom was the instigator of the idea for the armed uprising. The first patriotic movement for the recreation of an independent Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began there, and there the Reds and the Whites were established.30 Poland was the active partner that then brought Lithuania in: its emissaries inspired the creation of Lithuania's Red and White leadership, and also the first Red circles in Lithuanian territory – the Grodno Governorate, bordering the Polish Kingdom.

In fact, the objective of the Polish Kingdom in the 1863–1864 Uprising was to create a unified republic dominated by Poland that would include Lithuania and Rus'. The stamp of the National Government demonstrates this: the crown (of the Poland), the wreathed shield with an eagle, the knight and St. Michael the Archangel.

This truth was no secret to Lithuanians: for example, Lithuanian peasants headed to join in the uprising said they were ‘going to be Polish soldiers', or ‘joining the Polish army'.31 However, Lithuania’s role in trying to restore the statehood of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was very important. If the Polish Kingdom had been fighting for independence alone, in the eyes of Russia and Europe it would merely have been one faction, not an entire population in arms, and a victory would only have meant autonomy for the Polish Kingdom and concessions.32 Only Lithuanian inclusion in the fight could provide a unified front:

30 The Reds–partners in the recreation of the Polish and Lithuanian State by armed uprising. The Whites–partners in the recreation of the Polish and Lithuanian State by political and economic means while held captive, by agreement with the Russian government loyalists.

31 Rerecording of a taped 30 August 1989 interview with Petras Matusevičius, brother of Professor Giedrius Subačius’s grandfather, Pijus Matusevičius, about his memories of his father; Personal archive of Professor of Linguistics, Giedrius Subačius, l. 1-2.

32 This was recognized by the National Government already in the first of its documents. In the proclamation intended to brothers Lithuanians ‘Į brolius lietuvius', it wrote: 'The essence of the whole task is in Lithuania: the uprising in Lithuania will lead to the rebirth of Poland and the death of the enemy' (Centralny Narodowy Komitet jako tymczasowy Rząd Narodowy. Do braci Litwinów!, Rok 1863. Wybor aktów i dokumentów, p. 49–50). Also see: Morozowa O., Bronisław Szwarc, Przetłoczyli: Wiktoria i René Śliwowscy, Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk, Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo, 1982, s. 43-45.
residents of both former members of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The bottom line is that the political tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was associated with a non-native speaking culture that was Lithuanian, not Polish, in its nation's history. While the upper classes in Lithuania officially spoke Polish (the official language of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), the societies of these lands differed from Poland historically, ethnically and culturally. This difference was understood clearly, as is demonstrated by the writings of Jonas Koncevičius, Antanas Volickis, and the poet and rebel Edvardas Jokūbas Daukša. Additionally, the colour blue, symbolizing Lithuanian patriotism, adorned the noblemen’s cockades and the flags of the rebels. Furthermore, the organizers of the uprising spoke of a federation of Poland, Lithuania and Rus’ in the re-established commonwealth, and the peasants of Lithuania even were incited to take part in the uprising by the using of agitation in Lithuanian and Belorussian languages. Precisely because of that, official and campaigning statements from the National Government to Lithuania, which had typically used the preposition ‘na Litwie’ (meaning ‘to a region of Poland’) increasingly began, during the uprising, to use a different, more prestigious, preposition: ‘w Litwie’.

Lithuania was important to the success of the uprising for strategic reasons, too. Russia’s primary connection with Warsaw was via Lithuania and Rus’; Lithuania had contact with the Baltic Sea, and this provided an opportunity to acquire better weapons. The leadership of the Polish and Lithuanian Reds acted independently, but kept close ties and tried to coordinate interests, even though there was some tension due to the activity of the Polish Reds in the territory of Lithuania, on the border of the Grodno Governorate. However, under the final agreement the relationships defined recognized the precedence of the National Centre

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33 See: Biržiška M., Jokūbas Daukša, *Tauta ir Žodis*, t. 4, Kaunas, 1926, p. 112–141. E.J. Daukša fought in 1863 E. Liutkevičius’s squad, was sent into servitude in Siberia for 12 years, returned in 1884.

34 During the 1830–1831 uprising the question of Lithuanian and Polish national colors arose. Red, white and blue were suggested—red and white to symbolize Poland, blue for Lithuania. On 7 February 1831, the Seim of the Polish Kingdom decided to retain the red and white colors of the cockades for the Polish Kingdom and Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The question of national colors came up once again during the 1863–1864 Uprising – the blazonry of the rebels displays the eagle of Poland on red, the knight of Lithuania on blue (it should have been red) and the archangel Michael of Rus’ on white. These colors were taken up for use not only as cockades, but for flags, and they were called the national colors.

35 See National government, the Provincial Committee of Lithuania letters: *Rok 1863. Wybór aktów i dokumentów*, p. 49, 57.


37 According to the final agreement between the two commands, before the uprising, it was agreed that the Polish Kingdom Reds does not spread their influence in the Grodno Governorate which is at the disposal of Lithuanian Reds.
Committee in Warsaw as a national centre over the Provincial Committee of Lithuania in Vilnius. The date of the concerted uprising should have been set for the spring of 1863, because otherwise there was a chance that Lithuania would not rise up at all. The leadership of the Polish Reds was recognized as supremegovernance of the forthcoming uprising in the former Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth lands annexed by Russia. It was also responsible for leading military actions in the territory of Poland. Authorization of legislation belonged to the Warsaw committee. Lithuanian rebel leadership decrees and instructions needed to reflect Polish rebel leadership strategy and tactics. The Provincial Committee of Lithuania was responsible for leading military actions in the territory of Lithuania. Both committees had to include each other's representatives; however, the Polish representative was granted greater rights and privilege in approving the most important Lithuanian resolutions.

2.2.2. The Initiator of the Uprising; Lithuania Joins the Uprising

The Polish kingdom initiated the 1863–1864 Uprising. The pretext for it to begin earlier was that the head of the civilian government in the Polish Kingdom Wielopolski, announced a summons for young men to join the Russian army. The summons was announced in Warsaw in 1863 on the night of 14–15 January with a list of names that included the Russian government's politically suspect individuals; usually, conscription was by lottery. The most active supporters of the uprising in the town were neutralized to prevent the upcoming uprising. The organizers of the Warsaw uprising responded to the summons with the decision to revolt.

Based on the COW criteria, the beginning of a war can be considered as the date of the official declaration of war, but only if uninterrupted armed conflict begins immediately thereafter (there cannot be an interruption of more than 30 days between battles). If hostilities begin earlier than the official declaration of war and extend continuously before and after, the war is dated as of the date of the first battle.

The uprising was declared by the Polish kingdom on 22 January 1863 by an Interim National Government (National Centre Committee) manifesto. The manifesto declared ‘all sons of Poland without religion and nationality, origin and class differences, free and equal citizens’ and called on the residents of the kingdom, Lithuania and Rus’ to join in the struggle for freedom. On the same day, a National Government decree was issued announcing freedom and free land for peasants, the elimination of obligations for landlords and the award of

three morgans of land to each landless militant. On the night of 22–23 January, rebels took over Russian holdings in Kielce and Podlachia. Battles took place without official interruption. Therefore, in Poland, the official published date of the uprising coincided with the actual date of the first battles.

In Lithuania there is debate as to when the uprising began – each researcher has their own opinion, but nobody has definitive proof. We will try to determine the exact date of beginning of the revolt in Lithuania using COW outbreak of war determination methodology.

The first tell-tale sign of the impending uprising in Lithuania was martial law, which was introduced in 1861 in part of its territory even on the eve of the uprising, revoked during the patriotic movement and then renewed or introduced in individual territories. Soon after the revolt, on 23 January 1863, martial law was renewed in the Polish Kingdom; the same went for the neighbouring Grodno Governorate districts of Grodno, Bielsko, Brest and Sokółka on 26 January, as well as the Vilnius Governorate districts of Trakai on 2 February and Švenčionys on 10 February. Across the governorates of Vilnius and Grodno martial law was introduced on 16 February 1863; in Kaunas Governorate martial law was declared on 3 September 1861, except for the county of Novoaleksandrovska (Zarasai), in which it was introduced on 17 March 1863. On 5 March, 17 March and 4 May 1863 a state of war was declared in various counties of the Minsk and Vitebsk governorates, and on 20 and 21 May for the entire Vitebsk, Minsk and Mogilev governorates.

According to the Russian Emperor’s Orders, the dates on which the war campaigns began to hold back the rebels in the military districts of Warsaw, Vilnius and Kiev were as follows: military district of Warsaw, 17 January 1863; Vilnius Governorate, 15 February; Kaunas Governorate, 15 March; Minsk Governorate, 19 April; Vitebsk Governorate, April 23; Mogilev Governorate, 5 May; Volhynian Governorate, 5 April; Kiev Governorate, 9 May. The first

40 Address of the Interim National Government as the National Centre Committee, 1863 01 22, Rok 1863. Wybor aktów i dokumentów, p. 44–46, 48.
41 Тихомиров Л. А., Варшава и Вильна в 1863 г., «Готов собою жертвовать...», p. 296.
43 Order of the War Minister, 24 May 1864, AMMM, d. 2, p. 418; Order of the Russian Emperor No. 174 Concerning the beginning of a military campaign in 1863 in the Warsaw, Vilnius and Kiev military districts, 24 May 1863, Полное собрание законов Российской империи, собрание второе, т. XXXIX, отделение первое, СПб, 1867, № 40929.
rebels were actually recorded somewhat earlier; however, these data are only ancillary.

Once the uprising began, the government of the Polish Kingdom became the National Centre Committee and named itself the Interim National Government and later just the National Government. The Provincial Committee of Rus’ in Kiev and the Provincial Committee of Lithuania in Vilnius worked together. While Lithuania was not yet ready to rise up, the Polish rebels decided to speed up the Lithuanian uprising by sending over their own rebel squads. Without the Lithuanian Red leadership’s knowledge, on 23 and 27 January 1863 the Polish Kingdom sent large rebel squads into the Grodno Governorate, which then attacked Russian army divisions in the city of Suraż and the county of Bielsk and near the village of Rudka in the county of Białystok. By the time the local residents’ squad joined the fight, other squads moving through Lithuania had fought 18 battles without official interruption. Some of them continued for a while in the territory of Lithuania.

The fact that the squads, which were formed in the Polish Kingdom, fought after the official declaration of the National Government manifesto without interruption in Lithuania, until the uprising was joined by Lithuanian troops, allows the conclusion that the Polish-Lithuanian uprising began on 22 January 1863. This date of the common uprising, however, is not an official date in history of the Lithuanian population joining the rebellion. Based on the COW criteria it is marked by the first battle that the local rebels fought in.

As evidenced by the summary source, the first residents of Lithuania who formed a rebel squad to fight the Russian army stood their ground on 4 February 1863 in the Trakai district of the Vilnius Governorate. After this battle, other battles took place in Lithuania less than 30 days, so this battle is considered to be the beginning of the uprising in Lithuania. The initiators of the battle, and, hence, the uprising in Lithuania, were the rebels: near Trakai a group of rebels attacked a convoy of Russian recruits. By the end of March, the governorate had hosted eight uninterrupted clashes between rebels and the Russian army.

After one month, other North-western Krai governorates began to join the rebellion. The first rebel battle with the Russian army in the Kaunas Governorate took place on 11 March in the county of Zarasai (Novoaleksandrovsk), near

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44 The Interim National Government was renamed the National Government on 10 May 1863.
46 Fajnhauz D., op.cit., p. 117–118.
47 A. Janulaitis tried to establish the beginning and the end of the battles in the separate Lithuanian Governorates battle durations in the Uprising of 1863–1864 (see: A. Janulaitis, 1863–1864 m. sukūlimas Lietuvoje, Mūsų Žinynas, Karo mokslų ir istorijos žurnalas, ed. V. Steponaitis, Kaunas: Military Research Department of the National Security Ministry, 1921, t. 1, p. 40), but the data is not accurate, so it will not be discussed.
Palėvenė; the second, when the squad led by Edmundas Kučevskis (Edmund Kuczewski) went into battle in the county of Kaunas near the village of Budos on 15 March; by the end of March, a total of seven battles without a settled interruption had taken place.

The first battle involving local rebels in Grodno Governorate that corresponds to the criteria for involvement in a war is the Grodno Voivodeship military commander General Onufry Duchiński’s battle with the Russian army in the Białystok district outside the village of Zelenaja.48 This battle took place on 30 April 1863, and after that the battles the local governorate rebels took part in continued less than 30 days apart.

The first battle involving local rebels in the Minsk Governorate took place on 19 April 1863; in Vitebsk Governorate it was 25 April; and in the Mogilev Governorate it was 5 May.

From 4 February to the end of March there were a total of 15 battles in Lithuania, with official interruptions of less than 30 days, which allows us to fix the date of the ongoing uprising. Because the battles in April took place only in the Vilnius and Kaunas governorates, it is obvious that the first section of Lithuania to rise up was the Catholics.

The official call to arms of the rebel leadership in Lithuania marked a new stage of the uprising. Next, we will discuss the conditions of this call.

When the uprising was announced in the Polish Kingdom earlier than had been agreed, the Provincial Committee of Lithuania acknowledged that the reasons for breaking the agreement were justified. The committee made its first...
proclamation of the uprising in the Polish Kingdom between 22 January 1863 and 13 February: 'Brothers! The Kingdom has risen up – we’re beating back the Muscovites everywhere! Blood spilling over the Nemen River is calling us to arms! Fight the imperialists, for your sacred rights, for our soon-to-be freedom! So together and united – and God help us! God save Poland!'\(^4\)

On 13 February 1863 the second proclamation of the Provincial Committee of Lithuania was announced, already signed by the interim national governments of Lithuania and Belarus, the text of which was disseminated in Polish and Lithuanian. In the proclamation Lithuanian peasants were briefly told about the National Government’s manifesto and the decreed claims of freedom and granted land.\(^5\) The Provincial Committee of Lithuania also reprinted the National Government’s 25 January instruction to the Voivodeship and country troop leaders,\(^5\) but still the official call to arms was not made. Meanwhile, on 22 February 1863 the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Whites made its own proclamation in which it distanced itself from the Polish Whites and voiced assent for the uprising.\(^5\) Soon enough, on 11 March the National Government executed the reorganization that the Lithuanian rebels had suggested, putting the Whites in control of the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department.\(^5\)

On 31 March 1863 the new department announced an official proclamation to rise up in Lithuania and Belarus: ‘Earthlings of all religions and classes, brothers from Lithuania and Rus’! Heroic battles in the face of the Neman River, where the noblest of Polish blood is mightily flocking – or will we continue to shamefully bow in captivity to Moscow? [...] Then to arms, brothers! To

\(^4\) Provincial Committee of Lithuania Proclamation, Восстание, p. 1. The undated proclamation was announced between 22 January and 13 February 1863. We can guess that it could have been dated 13 February 1863 (01), because immediately thereafter the Corps of Gendarmes were informed that the night after the Provincial Committee of Lithuania Proclamation from 13 to 14 February 1863 about a thousand people fled Vilnius into the forests. Statement No. 18 of the Head of the District 4 Corps of Gendarmes to Vilnius Corps of Gendarmes soldier Speyer, 4 February 1863, LVIA, f. 419, ap. 2, b. 157, l. 27.

\(^5\) Polish Governmentet Manifesto, 13 February 1863 (01), Rok 1863. Wybór aktów i dokumentów, p. 57–58; LIŠ, t. 2, p. 49–50; AMMM, d. 1, p. 276. Lithuanian historiography records a false date for this document: 1 February 1863 (01 20) – regarding the date see.: Šenavičienė I., Lietuvos katalikų dvasininkija 1863 metų sukilimo išvakarėse, p. 279–280.

\(^6\) Provincial Committee of Lithuania instructions for voivodship leaders, b. d., LVIA, f. 1248, ap. 1, b. 394, l. 160–161; Provincial Committee of Lithuania rebel instructions, b. d., ibid, b. 55, l. 57.

\(^7\) Kieniewicz S., Powstanie styczniowe, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2009, s. 417.

\(^8\) Provincial Lithuanian Government Department Address, 11 March/27 February 1863 (02 27), Rok 1863. Wybór aktów i dokumentów, p. 74–75.
arms!” On 15 May the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department made a proclamation in Belarusian informing the peasants of Belarus of the National Government’s promises of freedom and land, similarly to the proclamation made to Lithuanian peasants on 13 February. After the official call to arms, from April 1863 the uprising spread throughout all of Lithuania.

In summary, Lithuania joined the 1863–1864 Uprising on 4 February – the first rebel battle after which there was no interruption of at least 30 days between battles. The official date of the rebel leadership’s call on Lithuania to rise up is 31 March 1863. The initiators of the uprising in Lithuania were the Lithuanian rebels.

2.3. The Burden of the War

2.3.1. Russian Armed Forces

The Russian troops were well armed and prepared to fight as a regular army, which consisted of infantry battalions, cavalry squadrons, the Cossacks, artillery and other auxiliary military units, and a fleet. Once the patriotic movement began in the Polish Kingdom and Lithuania in 1862, the emperor ordered the establishment of military districts in Vilnius and Kiev, which were finally established in August 1864; by order of the Minister of War the operations of the Russian army in these military districts were designated as part of the war campaign.

Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the deployment of Russian army forces in Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom in 1863.

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54 The ‘Earthlings!’ Provincial Lithuanian Government Department Address, 31/19 March 1863 (19), _Rok 1863. Wybór aktów i dokumentów_, p. 76–79; the Soviet series of sources for the Spring Uprising of 1863 stated the wrong date of referral: 4 April/22 March 1863 (03 22) – see _DKCN_, p. 509–511.

In no time (8 April 1863) the _Ruch_ National Government body called on ‘Brothers Lithuanians’ to band together with the Lithuanian Provincial Government Department as the only real National Government designated authority for all the provinces of Lithuania and to show the world that Moscow’s oppression did not dislodge the sacred fraternal relations between Poland and Lithuania. ‘Lithuanians—to arms! Rise under the national flag to battle against Moscow. As did your forebears, resting now in graves! Forget not that the blood of Vitautas and Gediminas flows in your veins, you are unconquerable! (National Government address, 8 April 1863, _Ruch_, 1863, no. 16, _RGVIA VUA_, f. 484, ap. 2, b. 659, l. 26).

55 Provincial Lithuanian Government Department appeal to the White Rus’ population, 3 May 1863, _Восстание_, p. 20

56 _KVŽ_, l. 116.

57 Order of the War Minister, 24 May 1864, AMMM, d. 2, p. 418; _Комзолова A. A., op.cit._, p. 44.

58 Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are compiled based on: War Minister’s 1863 Annual Report to the czar regarding the army’s redeployment in connection with the 1863–1864 Uprising, 1 January 1865 (date of submission to the czar), _LVIA_, f. 494, ap. 1, b. 793, l. 55, 58–60; Same document: _LIŠ_, t. 2, p. 114–116. Another source of data about the number of soldiers states otherwise: it records that 108 662 non-commissioned officers and ordinary line formation soldiers were deployed in the military district of Vilnius on 13 January 1864 (see: _News_ of various types of Russian troop numbers in the military district of Vilnius and the Governorates of Vitebsk, Mogilev and Augustów on 1 January 1864. The supplement to the Vilnius military district’s register of combats for 1863, _RGVIA VUA_, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1311, d. V, l. 84–87).
2.2. Russian forces in the military district of Vilnius in January 1863–January 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Battalions (foot-soldiers)</th>
<th>Squadrons (cavalry)</th>
<th>Sotnia (Cossacks)</th>
<th>Guns (artillery units)</th>
<th>Total low-ranking soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1863</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>66,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1863</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>123,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 January 1864</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>144,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase from January 1863</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>- 12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>78,304 (45.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. Russian forces in the military district of Warsaw in January 1863–January 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
<th>Sotnia</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Total low-ranking soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1863</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>92,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1863</td>
<td>105.75</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>140,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 January 1864</td>
<td>130.25</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>170,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase from January 1863</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77,370 (54.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From table 2.3 we can see that at the beginning of the 1863–1864 Uprising the Russian forces in the Polish Kingdom consisted of 92,831 low-ranking soldiers. In the military district of Vilnius it was 66,482 soldiers, or 46% of all forces deployed between the Polish Kingdom and Lithuania. During 1863, i.e. from 22 January 1863 to 13 January 1864 the volume of the Russian army in the military district of Vilnius more than doubled (45.9%) to 144,786 soldiers. In the military district of Warsaw it increased to 170,201 soldiers, i.e. by 54.5%. During this time approximately the same number of Russian soldiers were redeployed to the military district of Vilnius (0.6% more) as to the military district of Warsaw. The Russian forces in the Vilnius military district accounted for 85% of the former Warsaw military district forces. This suggests that the Russian government assessed military action in Poland and Lithuania equally seriously.

The main Russian army units were concentrated in the Kaunas Governorate: 29,305 enlisted soldiers and privates were deployed there at the beginning of January 1864; 19,660 to the Vilnius Governorate; and 24,200 to the Grodno Governorate. 59

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59 News of various types of Russian troop numbers in the military district of Vilnius and the Governorates of Vitebsk, Mogilev and Augustów on 1 January 1864. The supplement to the Vilnius military district’s register of combats for 1863, RGVIA VUA, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1311, d. V, l. 84-87.
Russian politician and historian Alexander Milovidov wrote that the total campaign to the military district of Vilnius was 69 Russian army regiments, though not all at full strength (8 guards, 44 infantry, 6 cavalry, 11 Don Cossack units) and 19 units featuring other types of weapons and support troops (artillery, small arms battalions, cavalry divisions, border guard brigades, fortress guards, and a team of wounded veterans, for a total of 90,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{60} In fact, as shown in table 2.2, the Russian army had over 50,000 more troops in the military district of Vilnius.

2.3.2. Lithuanian Rebel Forces

Until the uprising neither the Polish Kingdom nor Lithuania had any armed forces. Volunteer rebel squads were spontaneously created in Poland and Lithuania once the uprising began. These squads stood to fight the organized Russian military.

The data on Lithuanian rebel armed forces is very fragmented and allows only an approximate assessment of the issue. There are practically no records of the size of the rebel forces from their own resources; comprehensive data is only available from Russian sources. The number of rebels in Lithuania has been assessed differently by various authors, ranging from between eight thousand and fifteen thousand to seventy-seven thousand.\textsuperscript{61} Milovidov’s estimate is the highest, based on Muravyov’s archive materials According to his numbers, there could have been 220 squads in the north-west, with a total of 67,957 rebels fighting. However, he does admit that he did not include 62 squads, the sizes of which were never made public or were only generalized; the squads could have included rebels in the thousands or hundreds, but they were substantial in any case. If, as Milovidov claims, each such squad averaged about a hundred and fifty people, the maximum number of rebels in Lithuania could have been as many as seventy-seven thousand.\textsuperscript{62}

However, Milovidov’s method of calculation is debatable. In fact, he did not count squads at all, but rather the number of battles, and simply multiplied that by the median number of members of a squad that participated in battles: 150.

\textsuperscript{60} Миловидов А., Предисловие, АМММ, d. 2, p. LI. According to the data of Nikolai Pavlishchev, 100 000 soldiers and officers were used to suppress the uprising in Lithuania (Павлищев Н. И., Седмців польського мятежа 1861–1864 рр., т. V, СПб, 1887, с. 383).


\textsuperscript{62} Миловидов А., Предисловие, АМММ, d. 2, p. LI-LIV. His statistics are used by Leonas Bičkauskas-Gentvila (Bičkauskas-Gentvila L., 1863 metų sukilimas Lietuvoje, Vilnius: Valstybiné politinés ir mokslinés literatūros leidykla, 1958, p. 287).
First of all, why this number? As the sources show, the number of combatants in battles ranged from 10 to 3,500.

Secondly, because Milovidov’s researched sources were also investigated during the quantitative and systematic analysis of the uprising in Lithuania, it can be stated that Muravyov’s archive material does not provide accurate data on the numbers of rebels and squads. Some of the reports on separate battles list the number of rebel combatants, but if the squad leader is not named, it is not clear whether or not this squad is a different squad from one credited for a nearby battle, and vice versa: if the squad leader is named, often he is credited for various battles but with varying numbers of fighters. It was common for the squads of a few leaders to join forces for a while, in which case wherever they were when they joined battle, the leader from that area would take charge, so sometimes the same squad could have different commanders for different battles. However, most squads were beaten and dispersed. Some of them recovered, frequently even in greater numbers, and their members were constantly changing. For example, the squad led by Liudvikas Narbutas (Ludwik Narbutt) regrouped five times before its complete destruction, and Mackevičius’s squad regrouped ten times. Often, larger squads split into smaller squads with their own leaders. Thus, it will never be completely clear whether a squad was the remnants of a former one, or a newly created squad, or a few squads joined together.

Because there is no universal methodology for determining the number of rebels fighting in Lithuania, researchers are left to keeping their own tracking principle in check. That principle is conditional, however, in whichever way we calculate, on whether it is logical that the number of rebel combatants was proportional in various North-western Krai governorates. That will allow us to consider their intensity.

For the purpose of this research, we have calculated the number of rebels in Lithuania in the following way. Of all the battles with an identified number of participants, the greatest, with 1,000 or more participants, were dismissed, as were the battles with the lowest rebel count: ten or fewer. It is evident that most people fought in the battles when squad
combinations were involved; smaller squads joined with each other to form larger ones, as well as with squads that had experienced battles before; and the smallest battles were when the rebels fighting had lost their squads. Having eliminated those battles, the participants in the remainder of the battles were added and divided by the number of battles to produce an average. This is how an average squad size was determined. This average size was multiplied by the number of squad leaders to produce the approximate number of rebels.

Applying the selected conditional principle, according to the summary source there could have been 6,628 inhabitants of the Vilnius Governorate who were fighting,\(^{63}\) 17,035 inhabitants of the Kaunas Governorate,\(^{64}\) 10,056 inhabitants of the Grodno Governorate,\(^{65}\) 4,133 inhabitants of the Minsk Governorate,\(^{66}\) 734 inhabitants of the Mogilev Governorate and 109 inhabitants of the Vitebsk Governorate.

If we add together all the combatant numbers from all the separate governorates, we would come up with a figure of no less than 38,695 Lithuanian residents participating in the uprising. However, this estimate may be low because, as we said, there is no way to count every squad and every squad leader, and even data for known squads is insufficient. Therefore, the guess of some Polish historians that there may have been as many as 50,000 local rebels in Lithuania could be correct.\(^{67}\)

The intensity of the uprising in the Kaunas Governorate was twice that of the Vilnius Governorate based on the number of rebels; 1.7 times that of the Grodno Governorate; 4.1 times that of the Mink Governorate; 23.2 times that of the Mogilev Governorate; and 156.3 times that of the Vitebsk Governorate.

It is difficult to compare the numbers of rebels in Lithuania with those of the Polish Kingdom and Rus', because a systemic analysis of this attribute was not done there. Nevertheless, the source-based research of V. Zaytsev implies that the numbers of people active in the rebel squads of the Polish Kingdom are tripled or quadrupled in Polish historiography (claims are made as to 150,000–200,000 rebel troops fighting, 20,000 people killed, and 35,000–40,000 repressed).\(^{68}\) According to him, the number of local people repressed because of the uprising should have been less in the Polish Kingdom than in Lithuania.

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63 Squad average – 194.94871 people
64 Squad average – 170.35897 people
65 Squad average – 271.79069 people 36 squads from the Polish Kingdom has gone over and fought in the Governorate of Grodno, which could be roughly about 6 150 people. This brings the total number of fighters the Governorate could muster to no less than 16 206 Lithuanian and Polish residents.
66 Squad average – 172.21739 people
68 For example see: Wojtasik J., Aspekty militarne powstania styczniowego (1863–1864), Powstanie Styczniowe 1863–1864, Aspekty militarne i polityczne, Materiały z sympozjum, p. 34.
The information provided by Anna Komzolova indicates the split of people repressed due to the 1863–1864 Uprising thus: 57% in the North-western Krai, 38% in the Polish Kingdom and 5% in the South-western Krai. It is more likely that the number of rebels in Lithuania and in the Polish Kingdom could have been similar, or higher in the latter.

We will now estimate the number of Lithuanian rebel squads. Obviously, this number is the same as the number of rebel squad commanders. Currently available sources and literary data on the leaders of the whole territory of Lithuania in 1863 and 1864 indicate that 225 commanders and thus squads fought, including 203 native commanders and squads (it is not impossible that there were more). The numbers of leaders and squads in each whole governorate were 34 in Vilnius, 100 in Kaunas, 37 in Grodno, 24 in Minsk, 6 in Mogilev, and 2 in Vitebsk.

2.4. The Course and Main Stages of the War

2.4.1. Number of Battles

One of the most important indicators of uprising intensity is the number of battles in the Lithuanian territory. So far, this has not been clearly defined: different researchers used different data. For example, according to Zieliński, in 1863 and 1864 in the Lithuanian governorates 237 battles took place, 227 of which took place in 1863; according to Milovidov it was 260.

Historians who followed the assumption that the uprising was different in Lithuania from in Poland, and pursued other objectives, counted battles that were not, at that time, within the territory of Lithuania (the North-western Krai of Russia), but rather the areas populated by ethnic Lithuanians. Using this method Maksimaitienė counted 311 battles in the governorates of Kaunas and Vilnius and the Trans-Neman River area formally belonging to the Polish Kingdom, of which 62 took place in the Trans-Neman River area. A. Janulaitis applied a similar concept of the uprising in Lithuania and, hence, similar research perspectives, but in a somewhat wider aspect; he found 206 battles in the governorates of Kaunas, Vilnius and Grodno, and 17 more in the neighbouring Trans-Neman River area, making a total of 223 battles.

Based on the summary source data used in the research, the systematic

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69 Зайцев В. М., op.cit., Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
70 Комзолова А. А., op.cit., p. 73–74.
71 Zielinski S., op.cit., p. 509.
72 Миловидов А., Предисловие, АМММ, d. 2, p. I. A. The battle list of Milovidovas includes numerous errors.
73 Maksimaitienė O., op.cit., p. 186, 226.
quantitative battle figure data in Lithuania are presented (Russian Empire in the North-western Krai) in table 2.4. For comparison, analogous data of Zieliński’s from the Polish Kingdom and Rus’ are included in table 2.4.

2.4. **Battle counts in Lithuania, the Polish Kingdom and Rus’ in each month of 1863 and 1864**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year, Month</th>
<th>Vilnius Governorate</th>
<th>Kaunas Governorate</th>
<th>Grodno Governorate</th>
<th>Minsk Governorate</th>
<th>Mogilev Governorate</th>
<th>Vitebsk Governorate</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Polish Kingdom</th>
<th>Rus’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1863</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5+15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11+3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>8+1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22+3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15+5</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>73+5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>13+1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22+2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69+3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7+7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49+7</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>08</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6+3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44+3</td>
<td>72</td>
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</tr>
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<td>09</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

75 The number after the sign (+) means the number of the battles fighted by the squards from the Polish Kingdom.
2.4. (continued)

The period of insurrection in Lithuania by CoW criteria, excluding squads from the Polish Kingdom

<table>
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<td>(60+2)</td>
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The dynamics of battle numbers in Lithuania, the Polish Kingdom and Rus’ in 1863-1864 are depicted in diagrams 2.6 and 2.7.

2.6. Battle counts in Lithuania, the Polish Kingdom and Rus’ in each month of 1863 and 1864
Table 2.4 and diagrams 2.6 and 2.7 display a total of 62 battles in the Vilnius Governorate for 1863 and 1864 (60 battles involving local squad). The intensity culminated in June with 14 battles, mostly in the counties of Vilnius, Trakai and Dysna.

Most battles took place in the Kaunas Governorate. In 1863 and 1864, 207 battles took place there (190 in 1863, and 17 in 1864). Most of the battles took place between June and September (114 battles); the county of Šiauliai was particularly active (31% of all battles). The north of Lithuania was the more active in the uprising – the counties of Panevėžys (~23% of all battles), Šiauliai (~22%), Ukmergė (~15%) and Kaunas (~14.6% of all battles).  

The 99 battles in Grodno only took place between January and November 1863, including 62 fought by local squads between March and November.

Most battles in Mink (17) took place in May. The total battle count is 39 between February and September 1863, including 37 fought by local squads. The most active counties were Chervyen', Pinsk and Barysaw.

Battles in the Mogilev Governorate took place only in May 1863 in the counties of Cherykaw and Sianno (a total of seven battles). Four battles took place in the Vitebsk Governorate in April and May 1863 in the counties of Daugavpils and Verkhnyadzvinsk.

We will compare the battle counts in Lithuania, the Polish Kingdom and Rus'. Zieliński has tallied 954 battles that took place in the Polish Kingdom (1863 – 764; 1864 – 191), and 35 battles in Rus' (1863 – 32, 1864 – 3). This researcher was particularly diligent with his calculations, taking into account all of the

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76 During the research O. Maksimaitiene's Trans-Neman River area battle count data was clarified: 99 battles. According to the data available for the period, 368 battles took place in the cities most densely populated by Lithuanians (The Governorates of Kaunas, Vilnius, and Augustów).
resources in the Polish Museum in Rapperswil, Switzerland; however, he was not able to gain access the most important Russian military action resources. Therefore, the battle count could have been greater in the Polish Kingdom and Rus’ than has been recorded. Nevertheless, even in that case the battle count of the Polish Kingdom was much greater than that of Lithuania. Based on the battle count data available, battle intensity in Lithuania was 1.9 times lower than in the Polish Kingdom in 1863, and in 1864 it was 10.6 times lower: practically non-existent. The same goes for Rus’, where battle intensity was greater only in May 1863, and very low overall: 11.9 times lower than in Lithuania and 23.7 times lower than in the Polish Kingdom.

The research and Zielińskis’s data allow for a summary of the hotbeds of the 1863–1864 Uprising in Poland and Lithuania. Two hotbeds are clear: the governorates of Mazovia in the Polish Kingdom and Kaunas in Lithuania. What made these hotbeds special is that they were both ethnically dominated by Polish and Lithuanians and were also the Catholic centres of their countries.

2.4.2. Stages of the War

The 1863–1864 Uprising went uninterrupted in the Polish Kingdom as well as in Lithuania, so the COW criteria define the same war stages for each. Certain changes to the leadership of the uprising in Lithuania could be charted throughout the stages of the uprising, but these had no great impact on its progress. Thus, in describing the various periods of the uprising we will use the battle intensity criterion presented in table 2.4, which is the Lithuanian battle count dynamic for the months of 1863 and 1864. This dynamic makes it possible to distinguish three stages of uprising in Lithuania.

Stage one of the uprising was February–March 1863: the beginning of the guerrilla war with Russia. This stage of the uprising in Lithuania was led by the leaders of the Reds: the Provincial Committee of Lithuania, chaired by Konstantinas Kalinauskas (Konstanty Kalinowski), and the following members: Edmundas Veryha (Edmund Weryho), Jonas Kozela-Poklevskis (Jan Kozielło-Poklewski), Zigmantas Čechovičius (Zygmunt Czechowicz), Achilas Bonoldis (Achilles Bonoldi), and Boleslovas Dluskis (Bołesław Dluski). The first rebel squads were formed, and civilian and military organizations were created by the rebels in the governorates of Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk.

The first Lithuanian rebel squads had already appeared in the Vilnius Governorate in the counties of Švenčionys, Trakai, Ašmena, Lyda, Vileika, and Vilnius by the beginning of February 1863. Their active organizer and

77 Maksimaitienė O., op.cit., p. 7–44 et al.
78 KVŽ, l. 28–31; Vilnius Governorate Gendarmes soldier’s statements No. 28, No. 39/40, No. 55 to the Gendarmes chief, 29 January 1863, 7 February 1863, 20 February 1863, LVIA, f. 419, ap. 2, b. 157, l. 10, 26, 28, 30, 31.
leader was the military chief of the county of Lyda, the nobleman Narbutas, who immediately distinguished himself valiantly in battle.\textsuperscript{79} Squads were also assembled by priest Juozapas Gorbačevskis (Józef Gorbaczewski), Felikas Vislouchas (Feliks Wislouch), Stanislovas Buchoveckis (Stanisław Buchowiecki), Kletas Koreva (Anaklet Korewo), Ipolit Pasierbskis (Hipolit Pasierbski), Gustavas Čechovičius (Gustaw Czechowicz), Henrikas Dmochovskis (Henryk Dmochowski) and others.\textsuperscript{80}

The first squads in the Kaunas Governorate were formed in the Ukmergė province and the forests between the Panevėžys, Šiauliai and Kaunas provinces. The first squads were assembled by Boleslovas Koliška (Bolesław Kolyszko), Bronislovas Žarskis (Bronisław Żarski, Żardski), Antanas Norvaiša (Antoni Narwojsz), Mackevičius, Dluskis, Kletas Ciškevičius (Anaklet Cyszkiewicz), Marcijonas Kurnatovskis (Marcjan Kurnatowski), Aleksandras Šilingas (Aleksander Sziling) and others.\textsuperscript{81}

From February 1863 in the governorate of Vilnius, and March in the governorate of Kaunas, the first battles began and continued without interruption, although they did not continue intensively (by the end of this stage there had been 11 battles in the two governorates).

\textit{Stage two of the uprising} was from 31 March 1863 until September 1863, beginning after the official call to arms of the rebel leadership in Lithuania on that day. At the beginning of this stage the Whites took over leadership of the Lithuanian rebels. The reorganized Provincial Lithuanian Government Department was led by Jokūbas Geištoras (Jakób Gieysztor) and had as members Antanas Jelenskis (Antoni Jeleński), Aleksandras Oskierka (Aleksander Oskierko), Pranciškus Dalevskis (Franciszek Dalewski), Ignatas Lopacinskas (Ignacy Łopaciński) and representative of the National Government Nestoras Diuloranas (Nestor du Laurans).\textsuperscript{82} However, plenty of the uprising organization posts were held by the Reds (for example, the government of the Grodno Governorate included people from around Kalinauskas).

\textsuperscript{79} Liudvikas Narbutas (Ludwik Narbutt, 1831–1863) – reserve soldier, son of historian Teodoras Narbutas, on of the most famous rebel leaders in Lithuania (1863). Named commander of the Lyda area, he joined the uprising on 13 February 1863. On 28 February 1863 he joined his first battle. He died in a battle in the province of Lyda near the village of Dubičiai on 22 April 1863.

\textsuperscript{80} Maksimaitienė Ō., op.cit., p. 99–103.

\textsuperscript{81} See: Maksimaitienė Ō., op.cit., p. 105–108.

\textsuperscript{82} Jokūbas Geištoras (Jakób Gieysztor, 1827–1897) – a nobleman who had studied law at St Petersburg University, became in the spring of 1862 a member of the leadership of the Lithuanian Whites (Central Committee). He became chairman of the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department of the Lithuanian rebel leadership. He played an important role in the Lithuanian uprising, but his work hasn't been rightfully evaluated. Once the members of the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department were arrested, the National Government was issued a declaration to resign; however, at the end of June and beginning of July it still belonged to the Lithuanian rebel leadership, which had by then mostly been taken over by the Reds, led by Kalinauskas.
The second stage of the uprising was the consolidation of the uprising in Lithuania, during which it reached its culmination. A civilian and military administration for the uprising was created throughout Lithuania, which was divided administratively among voivodeships and counties, and was responsible for drawing people from various professions and faiths into the folds of the rebels – city dwellers, Catholic and Orthodox believers, and so on. On the other hand, tension lingered in the leadership of the rebellion between the supporters of Geištoras and Kalinauskas, the intensity of which was related to changes in the National Government. Once the Russian authorities had arrested many members of the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department, the leadership of the uprising was practically taken over by Kalinauskas's Reds in July after the Lithuanian provincial Executive Department was established on 26 June 1863.

After the official Lithuanian rebel leadership's call to revolt, the formation of squads in Lithuania was massive. In the governorates of Vilnius and Kaunas, squads formed in almost every county; starting in April they began to show up in the as yet calm governorates of Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk. The tactical level of the insurgency increased significantly. Active squad leaders came forward.

With the uprising spreading in Poland and Lithuania, in May 1863 the National Government declared a change from defensive to offensive guerrilla tactics. For this reason, isolated rebel squads began to mobilize into larger combinations. A number of squads capable of carrying out major attacks formed in Lithuania, and these ranged from five hundred to several thousand people. Maksimilijonas Černiakas (Maksymilian Czerniak) of the Vilnius Governorate became famous leading a combined squad of 650 rebels. The Koliška's Dubysa regiment, of 700–1,170 people, operated in the Kaunas Governorate; combined squads were led by Ignotas Leskauskas (Ignacy Laskowski) with 600–1,300 rebels, Povilas Šimkevičiaus (Paweł Szymkiewicz) with up to 1,500, and Albertas Minskis (Albert Miński) with about one thousand. In the Grodno Governorate the squad led by Aleksandras Lenkevičius (Aleksander Lenkiewicz) grew to a size of 3,000, Anupras Duchinski's (Onufry Duchiński) had up to 1,000 people and Vincentas Lukoševičius's (Wincenty Łukaszewicz) up to 600.

The tactics of the squad led by the nobleman Dluskis (Jablonovskis) became

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84 KVŽ, l. 116.
85 National Government Military Division Instructions, 4 May 1863, „Ruch“, 1863, no. 16, 15 June 1863, RGVIA VUA, f. 484, ap. 2, b. 659, l. 28.
86 Raguva village administration letter no. 135 to the Ukmerge military governor, 8 July 1863 LVIA, f. 1252, ap. 1, b. 2, l. 24-25.
something for all the rebels of Lithuania to be proud of. The squad consisted of elite young noblemen who excelled in their intelligence, clothing, attitude and discipline. Well-trained and armed with new weapons, the squad was an important buttress to the uprising and won the most victories; their battle on 22 June 1863 not far from the village of Druginiai (in the county of Šiauliai) became the most famous victory of the Lithuanian rebels.

According to contemporaries, though Dluskis only repulsed the enemy, he always did so perfectly. Russian soldiers fled erratically, leaving many corpses behind, and the rebels would chase them as far as they desired, though to the ends of the forest. This is how Dluskis’s squad increased the authority of the uprising among the villagers and gained a reputation as being unbeatable. Even in the spring of 1864, when the uprising was actually over, the peasants of Žemaitija still greeted his return to Lithuania as ‘the liberation of Poland’. Unfortunately, on 30 June Dluskis’s squad was beaten in the forest of Pažvėris (in the county of Raseiniai). After his defeat, Russia had got rid of its greatest threats. Dluskis withdrew abroad, and planned (sadly, unsuccessfully) to return from there to Lithuania with volunteers and weapons.

87 Boleslovas Dluskis, alias Jablonovskis (Bolesław Dłuski, 1829–1905) – nobleman, doctor, painter, reserve soldier of the Russian army and one of the most foremost leaders of the Lithuanian uprising (1863). He studied at the St Petersburg art academy and graduated from Moscow University. He joined the leadership of the Lithuanian Reds. In February 1863, he became the military governor of the Kaunas Voivodship, until that post was taken up by Z. Sierakauskas. According to his plan, he was sent to the Baltic Sea on T. Lapinkis’s weapons expedition to cover and lead the squads in Žemaitija. After the 30 June 1863 loss near Pažvėris village (Raseiniai country) he withdrew to Paris, where he tried to put together a legion of volunteers to return to Lithuania. Though living abroad, on 31 January 1864 he was appointed by the National Government to Chief of the Military Division of the Vilnius and Kaunas voivodeships.

88 After the 30 June 1863 battle near Pažvėris village (Raseiniai country) Russian troops took 50 of the finest high caliber rifles from the beaten squad of B. Dluskis. According to the testimony of prisoners, the rest of the squad was just as well armed (RGVIA VUA, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1311, d. IV, l. 298).

89 Kunigas Mackevičius kaip istorinė asmenybė, p. 199.
The squad of priest Mackevičius, which consisted of men from his congregation armed with scythes and pikes, stood out in terms of stamina. The Kaunas Governorate phenomenon, associated with an especially active participation of the peasantry in the uprising, has caused considerable speculation in historiography; however, it can be easily explained. Although Russia abolished serfdom in 1861, uprooting the support that the uprising in Lithuania would have received from the peasantry, many of the peasants in Žemaitija were patriotically drawn to the uprising by the young Catholic priests.

Žemaitija is where the efforts of Bishop Jonas Chrizostomas Gintila (Jan Chryzostom Gintyłło) and Bishop Motiejus Valančius (Maciej Wołonczewski) began in 1845 to organize and encourage spiritual work among villagers in order to consolidate Catholicism among the peasantry using the Lithuanian language. The Varniai seminary priests began to preach in Lithuanian so as to educate; this intensified the publication of Lithuanian religious booklets for the peasants, as well as religious education taught in Lithuanian at parish schools.
Besides that, the peasants of the Žemaitija diocese had not yet forgotten the support of the priests for their temperance movement. This movement arose spontaneously in 1858 following the announcement of the forthcoming abolition of serfdom, and ended when the peasants learned, to their great dismay, of the emancipation ‘Provisions’ for purchasing land. However, the authority of the clergy and peasant religiosity in the Žemaitija diocese increased greatly. Thanks to the priestly persuasion, which argued that the Russian government was out to destroy the Catholic faith and that only a re-established state could defend it, the Žemaitija diocese received the most active support.92

For the peasants of Žemaitija, priest Mackevičiūs’s personality became a unique, symbolic guarantor of their moral values. Before Mackevičius, they had only known noblemen motivated by patriotism; men they did not trust and feared would reintroduce serfdom if they gained independence. Mackevičius was a clergyman devoted to Catholicism who understood the social needs of the villagers but also sacrificed himself for the concept of freedom.93

Although the rebels in the impenetrable forests and wetlands of Lithuania were a significant military force, including among them armed men experienced with small arms, the leadership realized that a volunteer-led guerrilla war against the organized Russian army would not be victorious. Only a trained and well-armed force could fight with a similar such force. Thus, the second stage of the uprising in Lithuania included trying to take a qualitatively new step towards the creation of the rebel regular military.

92 Also see.: Šenavičienė I., Dvasininkija ir lietuvybė, p. 240–262.
93 Kunigas Mackevičius kaip istorinė asmenybė, p. 194.
This uncommon proposition was entrusted to the former officer of the Russian General Headquarters, Zigmantas Sierakauskas (Zygmunt Sierakowsky), one of the most famous leaders of the uprising in Lithuania. Once the uprising had begun and the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department had taken over the leadership, Sierakauskas came to Vilnius and was appointed military chief of Kaunas Voivodeship. On 6 April 1863 at a Lithuanian rebel leadership meeting in Vilnius with Geištoras and other leadership members, the creation of a regular military and further military actions were discussed. First, they intended to reinforce the uprising in the Kaunas Governorate; then, having received arms from the border of Prussia, to march on the

94 Zigmantas Sierakauskas, alias Dolenga (Zygmunt Sierakowski, 1827–1863) – one of the foremost leaders of the Lithuanian uprising (1863). Born in Volhynia, Lutsk Country, to a patriotic, noble family (his father, a rebel too, died in the 1830–1831 uprising). Graduated from Zhytomyr high school. Studied at St Petersburg University in 1845–1848 where he became close to the patriotic Polish youth, and visited friends in Lithuania during his vacations. Having heard about the emerging national army in Galicia, he tried to go there to learn more about it, but the he was arrested at the border and sent to the Orenburg Corps (1848–1856). With the arrival of Alexander II, he received an officer’s degree with the patronage of General A. Perovsky as an officer and was then accepted to the General Staff Academy without completing the requisite length of service. He studied at the academy from 1857 to 1859. Due to impressive talent and personal charm he gained the confidence of the Russian government and in 1859 was appointed to the General Staff, Statistics Department. During the course of Alexander II’s the reforms, the reforms and also Alexander Herzen’s ideas took in Z. Sierakauskas. Under this influence he drew up a project to eliminate corporal punishment in the army from the Criminal Code, which the Russian government favorably accepted. In 1860 he was sent to London, Turin, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and later to France and Algeria, to learn all he could of the criminal law of those countries. He sent detailed reports from abroad to the Ministry of War. In Vilnius, he met with the Dalevski family, known for their patriotic traditions, and in 1862 married then nobleman’s daughter, Apolonia Dalevsk-ka. Once the uprising began, although he thought the uprising in general was happening too soon in Poland and Lithuania, he decided to put all his knowledge toward reestablishment of his homeland. On 6 April 1863 he arrived in Vilnius. Appointed Kaunas Voivodship Military Chief by the Provincial Lithuanian Government Department, he began organizing the rebel army. On 7–9 May 1863 during an unsuccessful battle at Biržai he was injured and captured. He was hung on 27 June 1863 in Vilnius, at Lukiškės Square. Before dying he uttered these words: ‘Christ! Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven!’
Vilnius Governorate. Later the plan was modified by Sierakauskas himself; he decided to begin with a march through Courland to the Baltic coast. In Courland they planned to provoke the uprising and stockpile weapons. The occupation of the Baltic coast was supposed to make movement between Warsaw and St Petersburg complicated for Russia, to facilitate the armed intervention of the West, and to ensure a successful disembarkation of the colonel’s Teofil Łapiński’s weapons and volunteer expedition.

Sierakauskas began to organize the army in the county of Panevėžys, in the forest of Andrioniškis and at Teresboras manor. Approximately twenty rebel squads were concentrated there. The squads were divided into battalions; the foundations of the battalions of the army being created. Each battalion was made up of six subdivisions (platoons), of which four were armed with firearms and two with scythes.

Eight battalions (nine, according to Maksimaitienė) were put together and trained in the forest of Andrioniškis. According to the data of various authors, the number of people training in Teresboras could have been 1,300 (Koliška) or up to 2,500 (Zielinski) or even as many as 3,000 (Maksimaitienė). As the sources show, the main forces alone at the battle near Medeikiai accounted for 2,000 people, because more people were joining the army every day. Sierakauskas himself said to the Russian investigators that he recruited 2,000 people in two weeks. In the Russian sources the size of the rebel army is inflated to 5,000 or even as many as 10,000–20,000 people.

The regular army was created utilising professional experience, because throughout the ranks of the Lithuanian rebels there were many former Russian soldiers and officers. Most of the battalions were commanded by former

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95 Pamiętniki Jakóba Gieysztora, t. 2, p. 22.
99 For example O. Maksimaitienė claims that each of the battalions was 300 strong. Besides that, a cavalry unit accompanied every three army columns (Maksimaitienė O., op. cit., p. 118–119).
100 „Wiadomości o powstaniu na Litwie”, 25 05 1863, PT, d. 2, p. 12–13.
102 For example see: KVŽ, l. 172; Виленские очерки 1863–1865 гг., p. 190; Восстание, p. 188; Zielinski S., op.cit., p. 292.
103 Of the rebels in the Vilnius and Kaunas Governorates, only 62 had previous military training (Maksimaitienė O., op. cit., p. 58).
Russian army soldiers. It is believed that such people could better train the regular army squads. At Sierakauskas’s headquarters (his chief was a former Russian army artillery soldier, Leskauskas) they prepared a special training programme designed for open-ground battles. They ran formation drills day and night. Scythes were straightened and bullets cast in the camp workshops.

However, there was not enough time to completely train soldiers to use guns and ammunition. The task was hampered by the constant filling of the ranks with new fighters who needed to be trained from scratch. The marching plans were further complicated by the unsuccessful hold-up of a Russian army transport by Leono Pliaterio (Leon Plater) near Daugavpils on 25 April 1863; the plans were revealed to the enemy and they were able to prepare for the assault. All of these circumstances led to the defeat of Sierakauskas’s rebel army at the battle at Biržai on 7–9 May 1863 at the hands of the Russian army, and the arrest and death of Sierakauskas and his closest associates. Lithuania’s attempt to create an organized army collapsed.

Stage three of the uprising was the dwindling and end of the uprising in Lithuania. After the losses suffered by Sierakauskas and Dluskis, and their subsequent withdrawal from the military action, and losing Kolyszko, Žarskis, Šilingas, Narbutas, Dmochovskis, Černiakas, Pliateris and other commanders, the death blow to the uprising in Lithuania was the failure of Lapinski’s weapons expedition. During this period, the rebel squads became smaller and languished, turning into small groups of twenty to twenty-five people that were much easier to search out and destroy. More and more voivodeship governors, officers and squad leaders withdrew abroad. Squads were divided into infantry and cavalry, and no longer enlisted rebels armed only with scythes. The cavalry, knowing the local land well, were elusive.

The National Government during this period still provided the guerrillas with tactical instructions, advising them to avoid large battles and to attempt

104 The 1st battalion was led by Bronislovas Žarskis; the 2nd by former Russian army officer Juozas Radavičius; the 3rd by Antanas Mackevičius; the 4th by Russian army reserve officer Boleslovas Antonevičius; the 5th by Edvinas Vžesnievskis; the 6th by former Russian army artillery officer Stanislovas Kozakauskas; the 7th by artillery officer Dominykas Maleckis; the 8th by engineer Kasparas Maleckis; and the 9th, composed exclusively of riflemen, by Russian Imperial Guard infantry reserve officer Mykolas Stanišauskas. Jonas Labanauskas, Benediktas Olšauskas and Leonadas Bielevičius led the cavalry units. Povilas Vivulskis was the scythe instructor.

105 A pocket-sized notebook is stored in the Russian archives, wherein the infantry and cavalry regulations are listed: The Infantry Regulation, b. d. [1863], RGVIA VUA, f. 484, ap. 2, b. 658, l. 24–50; The Cavalry Regulation, b. d. [1863], ibid, l. 51-65. The regulations describe the soldier training: teams, formations, individual chains of command, marching order, different types of military armament. This could be the personal notebook of the person responsible for Z.Sierakauskas’s army’s military training.

106 Fajnhauz D., op.cit., p. 155–156.

107 Тихомиров Л. А., Варшава и Вильна в 1863 г., «Готов собою жертвовать…», p. 299.

108 Записки графа Михаила Николаевича Муравьева об управлении Северо-Западным краем и об усмирении в нем мятежа. 1863–1866 гг., «Готов собою жертвовать…», p. 111.
encirclement manoeuvres around the flank and rear. They instructed the combination squads to try to take over cities where small units of Russian troops were deployed, and with the help of the local population to destroy the garrisons there. However, at the time Russia had already perfected its anti-guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, even without an army, militias made up of peasants grounded in military principles joined in the fighting. Clearly, the end of the war was quickened by shortfalls in the planning of the uprising. Based on the recollections of the rebels, the country was ready and waiting for a more serious war, though people were becoming demoralized by frequent losses. These losses were not caused by ordinary accidental misfortunes, but by regular warfare marked by a mixture of educated military manoeuvres and guerrilla warfare.

Even on 3 May 1863 the Russian emperor offered a promise of clemency to all rebels who put down their arms by 13 May. Requests for clemency were submitted to the tsar in August and September by the noblemen of the Vilnius and Kaunas governorates. The extinguishing of the uprising was particularly hastened by the public letter of 18 September 1863 from the Žemaičiai bishop Valančiaus to the peasants, as well as the appeal on 22 September 1863 from the Diocese of Vilnius churches, which stated that the Vilnius Roman Catholic Consistory called on all believers and ministers to give up the uprising. Following these letters, the villagers began to return en masse from the forest to their homes.

2.5. Information on rebels who voluntarily left the uprising in the North-western Krai of Russia and pledged an oath to the emperor by 13 January 1864

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<tr>
<td>Kaunas</td>
<td>1,105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogilev</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitebsk</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table is compiled based on: The supplement to the Vilnius military district’s register of combats for 1863, RGVIA VUA, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1311, d. V, l. 84–87.

109 The National Government Military Division circular to the military chiefs of the voivodeships of the Kingdom, 28 November 1863, AMMM, d. 2, p. 368–373.
111 The Provincial Lithuanian Government Department proclamation for the Czar’s amnesty, 3 May /21 April 1863, DKCN, p. 518.
112 The Provincial Lithuanian Executive Department protest of the Vilnius consistory’s proclamation directed against the rebellion, [22 September–10 November 1863, tarp], DKCN, p. 536–538.
As the uprising dwindled, the demoralization of the rebels increased. In its 28 November 1863 circular, published for the Polish Kingdom but pertinent for Lithuania as well, the National Government’s War Department wrote that squad leaders did not always follow orders from their military superiors, holding themselves responsible only to the National Government. Often enough, when a squad leader died his next in command did not take over. Appointed squad leaders were in no hurry to get to assigned locations, were temporarily absent for a long time or simply did not return.

Leaders behaved inappropriately to their soldiers, humiliating and insulting them, and carrying out corporal punishment. It has been observed that the officers took up gambling and that squads’ staff officers enjoyed privileges and luxury, while the soldiers suffered from hunger and cold. Rebels behaved improperly to landlords and peasants, positioning more as oppressors than liberators of the population.

Voivodeship governors were instructed to ensure that no one type of weapon was favoured over the rest in the squads and that the riflemen, wielders of scythes, and cavalrymen were all equals. The upper-class volunteers were not to be better armed, because favouring the well-educated over the populace would engender jealousy and weaken the armed forces.

The final stage of the uprising was especially hopeless: waiting for third parties to come to the rescue. As was the case in the wars of independence in Serbia, Greece, Italy and Bulgaria, the chances for an uprising are low without any external assistance. Hope for external assistance was kept alive by the ever-changing political situation in Europe – French intervention defending Italian interests, the politics of Napoleon III, Giuseppe Garibaldi’s victories, Italy’s unification and Austria’s steps towards federalism. France openly demonstrated sympathy toward the uprising. Napoleon III continually encouraged the rebels to hold fast. In March, April, and June 1863 missives were delivered from France, England and Austria to Russia, urging Alexander II to return to the Polish Kingdom the rights it had in 1815–1831 and to grant them amnesty. On 5 November 1863 Napoleon III said in a public speech in Paris that the question

113 The National Government Military Division circular to the military chiefs of the voivodeships of the Kingdom, 28 November 1863, AMMM, d. 2, p. 368–373. Same document: AGAD, f. 244, b. 25.
114 This problem was always pertinent to the National Government. See: The National Government Military Division’s order No. 6 on the national army, 2 June 1863, RGVIA VUA, f. 484, ap. 2, b. 658, l. 69–72; The National Government Military Division’s order No. 9 on the national army, 3 July 1863, ibid, 1, 73.
115 The National Government Military Division’s decree, 1 June 1863, AMMM, d. 2, p. 251–252; The National Government Military Division’s decree, 22 August 1863, AMMM, d. 2, p. 311–313.
116 In the notes the Polish Kingdom is called ‘Poland’. O. Maksimaitienė, op.cit., p. 89; Ревуненков В. Г., Польское восстание 1863 г. и европейская дипломатия, Ленинград: Издательство Ленинградского университета, 1957, c. 223, 230, 288, 290.
of Poland should be decided by the rulers of the European states in court.117

In this political climate the National Government and the Lithuanian rebel leadership hoped that the armies of Europe would march into Lithuania and Poland and change the course of the war between the rebels and Russia in favour of the rebels.118 Therefore, in the third stage the uprising was maintained only because of the continuing hope for a favourable decision by the European rulers.

The rulers of the European states acknowledged the rights of Poland, but diplomatic efforts remained fruitless. France and England, despite favourable public opinion, were even reluctant to convince Russia that it should recognize the rebels as a warring party, which the National Government desperately wanted.119 The labours of Pope Pious IX to push Austria into interceding on behalf of the rebels were also fruitless.120 A gulf existed between the desires of the European rulers and those of the National Government. To France, this entity was Poland, but England saw only the Polish Kingdom. It was too complicated for the European states to solve the question of Poland in the context of Lithuania and Rus'.121 Russia was not prepared to give up Lithuania for the sake of Poland, because Lithuania was historically and strategically more important. Tikhomirov wrote: 'Overall we were ready to shrug off the “Kingdom” [...] But the “Kingdom” kept pulling Lithuanian along with it!'122

No less unfortunate for the Lithuanian and Polish rebels was the assistance from democratic movements in Europe, especially from emigrants. The emigrants were always planning something. For example, according to General Juozapas Visockis’s (Józef Wysocki’s) plan, his army and Polish divisions, put together in Constantinople and Tulcea (Romania), would follow the Italian general Menotti Garibaldi into Rus’. Volunteer units were put together in Moldova and Turkey.123 In Paris Dluskis was getting together 4,000 volunteers to send to Žemaitija.124 However, this was of no use to the rebels of Lithuania, Poland or Rus'.
By the autumn of 1863 there were no rebel squads left in the Lithuanian governorates of Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk. Most of the few larger squads left in the Kaunas governorate belonged to Mackevičius, Povilas Červinskis (Paweł Czerwiński), Otonas Kognowickis (Otton Kognowicki), Adomas Bitis (Adam Bitis), Jonas Stanievičius (Jan Staniewicz) and Povilas Šimkevičius (Pawel Szymkiewicz); the squads in the Vilnius Governorate were those of Čechovičius and Feliksas Vislouchas (Felix Wyslouch); and in the Grodno Governorate, of Valerijaus Vrublevskio (Walery Wróblewski) and Julijono Eitmonovičiaus (Julian Ejtmonowicz). By November the only large squads left were those of Mackevičius and Červinskis. However, on 26 November 1863 and 3 January 1864 they were defeated as well.125

The organization of the Lithuanian uprising suffered catastrophic losses between December 1863 and January–February 1864. In the second half of December most of the rebel leaders in Lithuania were captured and sentenced to death, among them the most famous representative of the Reds, Kalinauskas.126

All signs of the guerrilla war in Lithuania were gone by winter 1864. There were just a few scattered squads wandering around the Kaunas Governorate.

2.5. War Losses

According to the COW criteria, a war must be regarded as an armed conflict during the first year in which the parties involved experience at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. They consist of battle deaths and deaths from wounds or illness incurred in battle.127 Therefore, the most important parameter in response to the question of whether Lithuania was at war – war corresponding to the criteria laid down in the COW project – is the number of battle-related deaths.

Data collection on battle deaths is complicated, and we have no specific research on this issue. Source material makes it possible to consider the loss of Russian troops, for which data is available in the Russian military resources, particularly in reports by army commanders to the military leadership. It can be assumed that the reports should state the date and place of battle, who participated in the battle from the Russian army and the battle-related deaths of Russian soldiers – bearing in mind that the state had to keep records of military affairs and losses, and had to pay compensation to the victims’ families.

Rebel squad leaders were also obliged to submit reports to their military

125 P. Červinskis, rebel leader in Lithuania (1863) and commander of the Ukmerge area, he was hung on 7 March 1864 in the city of Uspaliai, Ukmerge Country (Povilas Červinskis personnel file, LVIA, f. 1248, ap. 2, b. 170, l. 57–60; Виленские очерки 1863–1865 гг., p. 604–609).
126 K. Kalinauskas was hung on 22 March 1863 in Vilnius at Lukiškės Square.
command summarising battles, including records of deaths and other losses on each side.\textsuperscript{128} However, not all of the leaders complied with this guideline; record-keeping made guerrilla warfare more difficult, so few reports remain. Besides which, the reports of the rebel leaders were unverifiable, so it was simply a matter of conscience to report losses accurately.

We can immediately state that we will never have precise data about battle-related deaths of the 1863–1684 Uprising. There were more than is evidenced. For example, both sides tended to describe the battles imprecisely: those who died were qualified as ‘a few’, or ‘many’, ‘dozens’, ‘scores’, ‘hundreds’, or ‘corpses blanketing the earth’, or ‘piles of corpses’, or simply ‘unknown’, ‘a squad decimated’, or a company of soldiers ‘drowned in a swamp’ or ‘were lost in a burning building’. In fact, each fighting side is able to accurately calculate only its own deaths, not those of their opponents; that would be merely a guess. The records from each sign of a single battle have differed in death figures by double or even triple digits. There is no comprehensive data on wounded soldiers who died much later from their wounds, or prisoners murdered in captivity. Because the rebels ended battles by retreating and running off, they usually did not even know how many of their comrades had died, how many were left wounded or how many of them simply ran home rather than regrouped.

First, we will discuss the Russian battle related deaths. The historiography is dominated by the differing numbers of battle-related fatalities. According to Boris Urlanis, during the period that Muravyov was quelling the uprising a total of 826 Russian soldiers died, and 348 soldiers disappeared without trace.\textsuperscript{129} Milovidov’s calculations indicated that in 1863 and 1864 there were 261 Russian soldiers killed in Lithuania, 916 injured and 18 captured.\textsuperscript{130} Maksimaitienė writes that in the uprising in the governorates of Vilnius, Kaunas and Augustów cost the Russian soldiers 319 deaths, 1,193 injuries, 19 missing in action and not a single one captured, although her data does not correspond to the citation source data.\textsuperscript{131}

However, there is one really reliable source allowing for an estimation of the battle-related deaths on the Russian side. These are known as the Muravyov plaques. Muravyov commissioned marble plaques with the names of all those

\textsuperscript{128} The National Government Military Division order No. 6 to the National Army, 2 June 1863, AMMM, d. 2, p. 255–256. Same document: \textit{RGVIA VUA}, f. 484, ap. 2, b. 658, l. 69-72.
\textsuperscript{129} Петров К. В., Богатырь труда и разума, …, p. 50; Урланис Б. Ц., \textit{История военных потерь}, СПб, 1999.
\textsuperscript{130} Миловидов А., Предисловие, AMMM, d. 2, p. I. According to Leonas Bičkauskas-Gentvila, the numbers are typically underestimated (Bičkauskas-Gentvila L., op.cit., p. 288).
\textsuperscript{131} See: Maksimaitienė O., op.cit., p. 228. Actually, O. Maksimaitienė submitted the 1863 data for battle related deaths for the military district of Vilnius as the data for the Governorates of Vilnius, Kaunas and Augustów (The supplement to the Vilnius military district’s register of combats for 1863, \textit{RGVIA VUA}, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1131, d. V, l. 1). Besides that, the summary included arithmetic mistakes. Summing correctly, the number of Russian troops to die in the military district of Vilnius is 309.
who had died in battle or from battle wounds during the North-western Krai uprising in 1863 and 1864. The plaques were hung in George’s Chapel (later demolished) in Vilnius. There the names of 298 who were killed and 111 who died of wounds were engraved – a total of 409 people. This list of Russian battle deaths had to be very accurate because it was a sign of respect on the part of the government, as well as recompense, to the relatives of the deceased who visited this memorial and found the names of their family members on the plaques.

The number of rebel battle fatalities is rather less accurate. Those calculations were done by the Russian historian Milovidov based only on the archive material of Muravyov. Based on his research, 5,934 rebels were killed, 733 injured and 1,361 taken into captivity in the North-western Krai in 1863 and 1864. All told, Milovidov noted that this is the minimum figure because 45 battles have no recorded number of victims, 150 have no number of wounded, 95 have no number of prisoners taken, and 8 have only a record of casualties (dead and wounded soldiers together.

Reliable knowledge of the battle related rebel deaths is provided by The supplement to the Vilnius military district’s register of combats for 1863 in RGVIA. According to this data 8,081 rebels were killed in 1863 alone – at least two thousand more than Milovidov’s estimates.

The objective of the study was to calculate the battle-related deaths of both warring parties in Lithuania by analysing source data from each month of the uprising as accurately as possible. Thus, the 1863 and 1864 deaths of both warring parties have been compiled according to Russian military action registers of combats and Russian and rebel squad commander reports to the military leadership, and when those official sources were lacking, according to memories, the uprising’s press, as well as research done by Zieliński, Maksimaitienė, Fainhauz and others.

The Russian and rebel death toll data according to the summary source is provided in the introduction. The systemic quantitative analysis of the uprising was carried out based on the Russian data because the rebel data appears to be more fragmented and less reliable. The statistics for Russian and Lithuanian battle-related deaths for individual months of 1863 and 1864 are presented in table 2.6.

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132 The list of names is provided by A. Milovidov (Миловидов А., Предисловие, AMMM, d. 2, p. LIII–LIV). The sum of names has been verified.

133 Миловидов А., Предисловие, AMMM, d. 2, p. LIV; Миловидов А., Перечень боевых столкновений русских войск с польскими повстанцами в кампании 1863–1864 гг. в пределах Северо-Западного края, Вильна: Губернская типография, 1915.

134 News of Russian and rebel battle deaths in the military district of Vilnius in 1863, The supplement to the Vilnius military district’s register of combats for 1863, RGVIA VUA, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1311, d. V, l. 1. This data is from the autumn of 1863 and also includes the Polish Kingdom part of the Governorate of Augustów. The summary of the source is incorrectly totaled: 8022.
2.6. Dynamics of the Russian and Lithuanian battle-related death tolls for individual months of 1863 and 1864.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year, Month</th>
<th>Vilnius Governorate</th>
<th>Kaunas Governorate</th>
<th>Grodno Governorate</th>
<th>Minsk Governorate</th>
<th>Mogilev Governorate</th>
<th>Vitebsk Governorate</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1863</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1863</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1863</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1863</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1863</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1863</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1863</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1863</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1863</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1863</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1863</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1863</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1864</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1863–September 1864</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The uprising period by COW criteria, excluding squads from the Polish Kingdom</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6,177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.12. Number of Russian and Lithuanian battle-related deaths for individual months of 1863 and 1864

2.13. Sum of Russian and Lithuanian battle-related deaths for 1863 and 1864
Data on battle-related deaths in Lithuania can be somewhat supplemented by table 2.7, a tally of Russian and Lithuanian soldiers who died in Russian hospitals.135

2.7. Information about soldiers and rebels who were injured, shell-shocked or died in Russian hospitals and war hospitals in the military district of Vilnius

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Recovered</th>
<th>Died</th>
<th>Recovering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian army officers</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low ranking Russian army troops</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table is compiled based on The supplement to Vilnius military district's register of combats for 1863, RGVIA VUA, f. 846, ap. 16, b. 1311, d. V, l. 89.

The battle-related death statistics portrayed in tables 2.6 and 2.7 and diagrams 2.10 and 2.11 indicate that during the armed uprising in Lithuania the opposing sides together incurred no fewer than 6,816 deaths. According to the COW uprising criteria there were 6,794, but this includes some from Polish squads that came to fight in Lithuania; without those, the number is reduced to 6,338.

The analysis of deaths performed allows an estimation of what the Russian and rebel losses might have been. If the Russian losses are calculated according to the Muravyov tables (409 people killed in battle or died of wounds) and table 2.7 (including the 115 hospital deaths), subtracting the sum from the total number of deaths, the number of Lithuanian battle-related rebel deaths comes to 6,292 (COW criteria define the uprising as the time period with and without the squads of the Polish Kingdom – 5,814). Hence, deaths of Lithuanian rebels accounted for 92.3% of all deaths, while deaths of Russian soldiers accounted for only 7.7%. According to the ratio of deaths, the Russian military campaign efficiency was 12 times greater than that of Lithuania. This is not surprising: the outcome of fighting between volunteers armed with double-barrelled guns and scythes against an experienced, well-armed Russian army was clearly foreseeable.

Among all the governorates of Lithuania Kaunas stands out as the leader in battle-related deaths (with about 51% of all deaths). Next is the Grodno

135 The rebel death toll could be further supplemented by the 1863–1864 statistics of the interim battlefield court of the military district of Vilnius, which state that 128 rebels or their supporters were sentences to death (see: Report of the interim battlefield court of the military district of Vilnius on rebels sentences to death in 1863 and 1864, LVIA, f. 378, PS, 1865 m. b. 446, l. 2–6; LIŠ, t. 2, p. 121–123).
Governorate with 25% and then the Vilnius Governorate with 16%. The uprising parameters in the governorates of Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk do not satisfy the COW war criteria, but their death tolls have still been added to the general sum of deaths in Lithuania.

The monthly battle-related death count in Lithuania peaked in May and June of 1863. This was partly the result of the massacre of the rebel regular army led by Sierakauskas in the Kaunas Governorate near Biržai at the beginning of May, as well as other defeats of combined squads in that time period.

An analysis of the results describing the number of battle-related deaths in the 1863–1864 Uprising allow it to be designated as a war in Lithuania. The study estimates that due to the number of battle-related deaths during the time period that the COW criteria are satisfied for the 1863–1864 Uprising in Lithuania to be designated as a war, it must be categorized as a war equal to that in the Polish Kingdom.

2.6. The End of the War: Victors of the War

According to the COW criteria the end of the war is the first 30-day interruption between battles. An exception may be made for an interruption in which battles cease due to weather conditions (such as winter, or rain). However, in one way or another the one-year period leading up to the end of the war needs to have seen at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. These criteria became the basis for determining the end date of the 1863–1864 Uprising in Lithuania.

According to historiographical data, the 1863–1864 Uprising ended in the Polish Kingdom on 21 February 1864 with the defeat of General Józef Hauke-Bosak’s rebels near Opatów – this was a fateful blow to the power of the uprising. What remained of the army after the battle had diminished to nothing by April 1864. The uprising in Rus’, according to Zieliński’s data, clearly does not comply with the COW criteria.

In Lithuania the uprising ended earlier than in Poland. We will submit Muravyov’s opinion as well as systematic quantitative research results regarding the quenching of the uprising in the North-western Krai.

Muravyov wrote: ‘with priest Mackevičius’s death in the Kaunas Governorate, the rebellion ended almost everywhere, leaving only isolated huddled squads who were soon destroyed. The Grodno Governorate also calmed down, and at the end of 1863 the rebellion was over.’

137 Киеневич С., op.cit., p. 719; Wojtasik J., op.cit., p. 33–34,
139 Записки графа Михаила Николаевича Муравьева об управлении Северо-Западным краем и об усмирении в нем мятежа. 1863–1866 гг., «Готов собою жертвовать...», p. 117.
According to the COW criteria and the summarizing source drawn up during the investigation, the uprising ended in the governorates of Vitebsk and Mogilev in May 1863 – it was then that the last battle without official interruption ended. In the Minsk Governorate the last such battle was in September 1863 in the province of Naugardukas. It was October 1863 for the Grodno Governorate, in the county of Bielsko.

The Vilnius Governorate was still fighting until the end of 1863; the last battle that satisfies COW criteria took place on 2 November 1863. However, the Russian government noticed by July 1863 that the uprising in the governorate had been stifled; there were no longer any large squads, only wandering hungry and ragamuffin little squads, which the peasants were capturing and selling to the authorities. The situation was fairly similar in the Minsk Governorate.140 The rebels held out for the longest in the Kaunas Governorate: the rebels are recorded as having 18 incidents with the Russian army in the 1864 sources, the last of which took place in September.141 The battles continued for the longest in the counties of Ukmergė and Panevėžys (86% of all the battles of 1864). However, among the battles

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140 kVŽ, l. 286, 294, 295, 297.
141 At the time, the small squads of I. Leskauskas, P. Červinskis, A. Andrikonis, J. Ambraževičius, J. Mažeika, T. Moravskis, K. Puslovskis, K. Simonavičius, Rutkauskas, and later I. Grochovskio, O. Kognovickis were fighting. The final battles in the Kaunas Governorate are recorded on 30 September 1864 in Panevėžys Country.
of 1864 there were four with official interruptions of more than 30 days, the first of which took place on 20 January 1864 and lasted two months. Without doubt, it could be considered that such a break had been determined by natural conditions (winter), but this was actually at the time when the rebel leadership of Lithuania itself was stating that the uprising was over. On 20 January 1864 a note handed over by a former Lithuanian rebel in exile, Dluskis, to the National Government, stated that the defeat of Červinskis’s squad in the county of Ukmergė in the Kaunas Governorate actually ended the guerrilla war in Lithuania. Revamping the uprising in the spring was not possible because of the pressure from the Russian army, the multitude of arrests and the completely paralysed relations with the National Government.¹⁴²

The end of the uprising is further confirmed by the death toll, which does not exceed 50 people in 1864. Therefore, according to the war-duration criteria set by COW the end date of the uprising in Lithuania is the battle of 20 January 1864. This date satisfies another COW requirement – this day meets the 1,000 battle-related deaths per year minimum.

In summary, according to the COW criteria the uprising in Lithuania lasted for 11 months and 14 days. In the Kaunas Governorate it continued for 10 months and 10 days; in the Vilnius Governorate, for 9 months and 16 days; in the Grodno Governorate, for 5 months and 8 days; in the Minsk Governorate, for 4 months and 28 days; in the Vitebsk Governorate, for 15 days; in the Mogilev Governorate, for 6 days.

The victor of the war was the Russian Empire.

2.7. Semantics of the War

The analysis performed on the uprising leads to the conclusion that, according to quantitative Correlates of War research project war typology, calling

¹⁴² A note from the War Department of the leadership of the Lithuanian uprising delivered to the National Government by Boleslovas Dluskis, 20 January 1864, Восстание, p. 67–68.
the 1863–1864 Uprising ‘the Second Polish War’ would be historically inaccurate. Based on the quantitative analysis performed, it would be more accurate for the 1863–1864 Uprising to be called ‘the Second Russian and Polish–Lithuanian War’.

The name of the uprising in Lithuania is considered with the duration in mind. The mid-nineteenth century uprising of Poland and Lithuania is called both ‘the 1863 Uprising’ and ‘the 1863–1864 uprising’ in the historiography of the Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. In the historiography of the Polish it is called ‘the January Uprising’. This term emphasizes the moment the uprising began, as does the 1863 Uprising, while the 1863–1864 Uprising emphasizes the duration.

A systematic quantitative analysis of the uprising in Lithuania shows that the most rational title for the event would be the one that marks the beginning of the uprising. This would allow the historiography of different countries to establish an unambiguous name reference that is not linked to a different end of the uprising in different areas. In Lithuania and Rus’ the uprising actually took place only in 1863 (especially when recalling that the Russian Empire used the Julian calendar), while in the Polish Kingdom it continued into 1864.

2.8. Commemoration of the War

The 1863–1864 Uprising of Poland and Lithuania was a common fight for the recreation of a commonwealth. However, in Lithuania and throughout Europe there exists a mistaken interpretation of the uprising. For this reason historians should pay more attention to the publication of uprising sources – particularly the recollections of participants – evaluate them critically and repeat the publication of important though debatable sources so that falsification can be discovered. This would help the societies of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine to correctly understand and appreciate their common historical heritage and contribution. In order to ensure that the world can understand the 1863–1864 Uprising with historical accuracy, we recommend translating into English the important academic literature on the uprising in Lithuania.

Instead of Conclusion

Based on a systematic quantitative study (from the Lithuanian point of view) of the 1863–1864 war in territories annexed when the Russian Empire abolished

143 This was said about the soviet era publication (1988) of A. Mackevičius’s testimony to investigators while under arrest and sentenced to execution (Antanas Mackevičius. Laiškai ir parodymai). Their target text falsification are discussed: Šenavičienė I., Antano Mackevičiaus įvaizdis dviejų šaltinių kontekstuose, Lietuvos istorijos metaštis, 2010, Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2011, Nr. 2, p. 29–50.
the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, it is possible to correct some of the claims made by COW regarding the 1863–1864 war that touch upon Lithuania:

Name of the War: The Second Russian and Polish-Lithuanian War of 1863–1864
Participants: Russia vs. Poland-Lithuania
Start dates:
- 22 January 1863 (in Poland)*
- 4 February (in Lithuania)
End dates:
- 20 January 1864 (in Lithuania)
- 19 April 1864 (in Poland)*
Battle-related deaths:
- Poland – approx. 6,500*,
- Lithuania – an estimated 5,653
- Russia (in battles in Lithuania) – an estimated 524
- Russia – up to 10,000* **
Initiator: Poland
Outcome: Russia wins
Narrative: The independent State of Poland and Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was at the end of the eighteenth century divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia. The former lands of Poland (the Kingdom of Poland) joined Russia, Austria and Prussia; those of Lithuania (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) were annexed by Russia (the majority) and Prussia. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the part of Polish and Lithuanian territory that had been annexed by Prussia was annexed by Russia, which then created the artificial arrangement called the Polish Kingdom. Although at the beginning of the arrangement the Polish Kingdom did have a degree of autonomy, it was lost almost completely after the 1830–1831 Uprising. After that, Russia intensified the territorial integration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into Russia. Having ascended to the throne of the Russian Empire in 1855, Alexander II initiated government reforms, which, besides improving the functioning of the government, were supposed to improve life for the residents of the annexed Polish and Lithuanian lands. In Lithuania serfdom was abolished, land reforms were begun and political constraints were weakened. In the Polish Kingdom education, administrative and other reforms took place that were very beneficial to the Poles. The more liberal management policy of Alexander II revived and strengthened the hope for a Polish-Lithuanian joint state, and helped foster preparations for the uprising against Russia. In order to prevent the uprising as it approached, the head of the civilian government in the Polish Kingdom,

* Because this data was not under review it was simply taken as is from the book ‘Resort to War.’
** Keeping in mind that the Russian soldier death toll in Lithuania is calculated as 524 people, the number for the entire uprising (together with Russian soldiers who died in the Polish Kingdom and Rus’) could reach about 1,000. The figure of 10,000 Russian soldier battle related deaths given in the COW description of the 1863–1864 is inconceivable.
Alexander Wiełopolski, announced that Polish youth would be subject to mandatory military service in the Russian army according to a list of names, which included individuals who were suspected of patriotism. This hurried the organizers of the 1863–1864 Uprising to get the uprising underway. Lithuania joined the uprising in February. The volunteer fighters of both lands led a guerrilla war for over a year against a much larger organized Russian army, but in the end their struggle was suppressed. The Polish Kingdom lost any element of autonomy it had and became known as the Russian Empire's Privislinsky Krai; Lithuania remained the North-western Krai. The villagers and the Catholic Church in both of the annexed lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth experienced intensified Russian repression.

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Chapter 3
The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation
3.1. Soldiers from the First Platoon of the Sixth Battery of the Lithuanian Army Artillery on the front at Širvintos during the last battle. 21 November 1920
Resort to War, a book published in 2010 in the United States, discusses, among other wars, the 1919–1920 independence wars of two of the Baltic States – Estonia and Latvia. Unfortunately, the 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation is not found in the book. There is an article devoted solely to the 1920 Lithuanian–Polish War, but that was only part of Lithuania’s 1919–1920 independence war. For Lithuania, the war with Soviet Russia, the Bermontians and Poland was the one same war for independence on three fronts rather than three separate wars, especially with reference to 1919, when the army of the newly re-established Lithuania had to fight on three fronts at once. It should be noted that the war with Poland began in 1919 and continued until the end of 1920; it was not strictly a 1920 campaign. Besides, the article confuses the Lithuanian declarations of independence of 11 December 1917 and 16 February 1918. The book’s authors are apparently not familiar with historiography in languages other than English; thus, only one episode of the Lithuanian War of Liberation was included in this book.

However, historiography about Lithuania’s War of Liberation is relatively plentiful, because the extremely difficult and, from Lithuania’s perspective, relatively successful war – which resulted in the state managing to defend its freedom and independence – raised interest in fights for independence, thus there are a fair number of publications in which various aspects of this time period are examined.

The Lithuanian nation’s fight for, and aim of re-establishing, an independent Lithuanian state has been studied by Pranas Čepėnas in Naujųjų laikų Lietuvos istorija. Volume Two is especially valuable to us, as Čepėnas analyses the causes and course of World War I, the activities of Lithuanian refugees in Russia, the consequences of the Russian revolutions, the course of the German occupation

in Lithuania, Lithuanian political activities under conditions of occupation, the circumstances surrounding the re-establishment of an independent Lithuanian state, and battles for independence with the Red Army, the Bermontians and the Poles.

In Vytautas Lesčius's monograph, *Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920*, 5 battles with the Red Army, the Bermontians and the Poles are examined in detail. A large quantity of factual material has been collected in this monograph, and it contains many original battle diagrams.

Battles with the Red Army and the Bermontians were also examined in depth by Kazys Ališauskas in Volume One of the monograph *Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920*. 6 A detailed description of battles is presented here, as well, although it differs from Lesčius's monograph in that it relies somewhat less on archival sources, because Ališauskas, in writing his work as an emigrant in the US, did not have the opportunity to use material located in Lithuania. However, he was a participant in those battles and had previously written multiple respected articles based on original military documents.

The Lithuanians' battles with the Bermontians were described fairly thoroughly by Aleksandras Baniusevičius in the article ‘Lietuvos kariuomenės kautynės su bermontininkais prie Radviliškio’ (‘The Lithuanian Army’s Battles against the Bermontians near Radviliškis’). 7

During the inter-war years, several scholarly articles by participants of the independence war were published that relied on archival sources and the direct experience of battle participants. 8 The French general Henri Albert Niessel, Head of the Inter-Allied Commission for the Baltic Region, which oversaw the withdrawal of the Germans, described the commission’s activities in his book, 9 which was translated into Lithuanian in 1938 and published in Kaunas. It contains a number of interesting facts about the commission’s activities, how the commission’s members assessed the situation and so forth. The former commander of the Lithuanian armed forces, Division General Stasys Raštikis, has written about the independence battles and their fatality totals in his memoirs, especially in the third volume. 10 Also worth mentioning is a 1929 article published in the journal *Vojna*


9 Niesselis H. *Vokiečių iškraustymas iš Baltijos kraščy*, Kaunas, 1938.

The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation

The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation

The Poles wrote a great deal about the battles with the Lithuanians. These are mostly historical works or memoirs about the battles that the Polish units fought against the Lithuanians. Of these, a work devoted to the history of the Polish Legions First Regiment should be mentioned. The Polish Legions Fifth Regiment had to fight the Lithuanians often, so a book dedicated to its history describes a fair number of episodes from battles between the Lithuanians and Poles. Major Jan Dąbrowski and Poruchik Adam Kiciński also described some interesting incidents from battles between the Lithuanians and Poles. Marceli Handelsman, a volunteer with the Polish Legions Fifth Regiment, wrote quite a bit in his memoirs about the Lithuanian army and combat against it.

The famous Polish historian Piotr Łossowski has devoted his works to this war. Particularly noteworthy are his books Stosunki polsko – litewskie w latach 1918–1920 and Konflikt polsko – litewski 1918–1920. Several publications about Polish battles for Vilnius have been published. Of these, the most important are Grzegorz Łukomski and Rafał E. Stolarski's Walka o Wilno and Lech Wyszczelski's Wilno 1919–1920. The latter scrutinizes the march of General Lucjan Żeligowski's group of soldiers in breach of a recently signed treaty with Lithuania as well as the abruption of Vilnius and the Vilnius region from Lithuania and their incorporation into Poland. Unfortunately, other Polish war historians are usually inclined to pass over the actions of Żeligowski's group of soldiers or mention them only briefly.

Additionally, Grzegorz Łukomski's work, Wojna domowa. Z dziejów konfliktu polsko – litewskiego 1918–1920, is also fairly significant. In a rather detailed manner, he examines the Polish and Lithuanian hostilities in Suvalkija, the invasion by Żeligowski's army group and this group's battles against the

11 Война и Революция, 1929, № 7.
14 Dzieje 1-go pułku legionów, Warszawa, 1929.
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Lithuanian army. Also worth mentioning is his work, *Walka Rzeczypospolitej o kresy północno – wschodnie 1918–1920*.

Polish historiography contains many works about the Poles’ battles with Soviet Russia’s Red Army. In waging the battles of the summer and autumn of 1920 against the Red Army, the Poles did not distinguish the front with Lithuania as a separate front. Rather, bearing in mind the peace treaty signed between Lithuania and Soviet Russia on 12 July 1920, they considered Lithuania to be Soviet Russia’s ally in their official propaganda – even though Lithuania had declared itself a neutral state in Soviet Russia’s war with Poland. As a result, the Poles included the fight against Lithuania in the general campaign they referred to as Operation Neman. Therefore, Polish military historians, in examining the battles with the Red Army, also examine the battles with Lithuania as part of that same Operation Neman. Of these, one that distinguishes itself due to its exceptional detail is worth noting: Lech Wyszczelski’s two-volume work *Wojna polsko – rosyjska 1919–1920*. In another work by the same author, *Wojsko Polskie w latach 1918–1920*, the Polish-Lithuanian war is separated into its own section.

In researching the combat operations, archival sources were widely used, first and foremost the Lithuanian army’s historical sources housed in the Lithuanian Central State Archives. In determining the duration of combat operations in days, military documents on the 1919–1920 independence war were studied: the Lithuanian army’s war diary; the war diaries of the First, Second and Third Divisions; individual regiments’ war diaries and material collected in these military units’ collections; and documents of the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defence.

Material about the Red Army’s actions was collected from the Russian State Military Historical Archive. Particularly noteworthy are Collections 200 and 201 – the so-called Soviet Lithuania and Soviet Latvia Military Collections. Of these, the war diaries of the Soviet Lithuanian and Soviet Latvian armies stand out, as does the combat action journal of the Fifteenth Soviet Russian Army, in which each day’s combat actions have been registered.

3.1. The Warring Sides: Status and Potential

3.1.1. World War I and Preconditions for Re-establishing the Lithuanian State

World War I, which began on 1 August 1914, did not bypass Lithuania, having a major effect on its fate. Even though Lithuania, which had fallen into

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the hands of Prussia and Russia after the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, did not participate in the war directly, combat operations took place on its territory; thus, war-related troubles descended upon residents from the very first days of the war. After some fierce battles, Lithuania was occupied by the German army in the autumn of 1915.

Upon occupying Lithuania, Germany decided to turn it into one of its constituent parts permanently. However, these prospects were not acceptable to the Lithuanians. Various Lithuanian organizations were secretly operating within the country and advocating for the restoration of an independent Lithuania, or at least for a certain degree of autonomy.

After lengthy negotiations with the German occupational authorities, especially after a turn for the worse of Germany’s fortunes on the fronts, the Lithuanians received permission to organize a conference in Vilnius in September 1917. At this conference, a 20-member Council of Lithuania was elected. The German administration permitted its activities, yet it had the right to consider only questions regarding the creation of a local government and the country’s economy. However, the Council of Lithuania quickly exceeded its authorized limits, and the Act of Independence of Lithuania was signed on 16 February 1918. The German military administration did not recognize the declaration and interfered with the creation of Lithuanian governmental institutions in every way. Only upon complete losses on the fronts did the Germans announce, on 5 October 1918, that the nations it had occupied had the right to establish their own states and form their own governments.

3.2. The Council of Lithuania, elected at the Vilnius National Conference on 21 September 1917
3.3. The Act of Independence of Lithuania of 16 February 1918, published on 19 February in the Lietuvos Aidas newspaper, issue No. 22 (70)
However, this German position was a forced one, because as World War I came to a close, occupied states and nations were waiting for change. The great states of the world understood this, too. On the initiative of US President Woodrow Wilson, in September 1917, a study group known as The Inquiry was established in New York. It collected information about occupied European nations, prepared new principles of national coexistence and formulated the right of national self-determination, which was later recognized by the heads of the European states. The restoration of Lithuania’s statehood was also recognized under this peace programme.  

The Bolsheviks, who had taken control of Russia after the October Revolution of 1917, were also concerned with how to keep hold of the former empire. In order to implement their imperial goals, they invoked the idea of a global socialist revolution. Among immigrants from the Russian Empire and other states who had come to believe the Bolshevik truths, the Bolsheviks managed to organize small Bolshevik groups from various countries that were preparing to propagate revolutionary ideas in their own lands. In Petrograd on 13 October 1917, the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democrat Workers’ Party (the Bolsheviks) ratified an Interim Central Office for the Lithuanian Section, with Vincas ‘Kapsukas’ Mickevičius designated as its head. The Lithuanian Affairs Commissariat led by Kapsukas was formed under the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities of the Russian Federation on 21 December 1917. In spite of the Declaration of the Rights of the Nations of Russia, which was proclaimed in November 1917, People’s Commissar of Nationalities of the Russian Federation Joseph Stalin ordered this commissariat ‘to prepare for the hour when it will be possible to demolish the old life at its foundations and create a new one in Lithuania, as well’.  

As turmoil began in Russia in 1917, Lithuanian soldiers at the front, expecting to form the core of a Lithuanian army upon their return to Lithuania, began to organize Lithuanian military units. Among these were a separate Lithuanian battalion in Vitebsk, a Lithuanian reserve battalion in Smolensk, a Lithuanian dragoon division in Valka, a Lithuanian battalion named after Vytautas the Great in Siberia, a field hospital with 226 Lithuanians on the Romanian front, and a few others. However, hopes that the Lithuanian military units that had been formed in Russia would arrive in Lithuania faded by March 1918, when it was learned that the Bolsheviks had disbanded them. Under these circumstances, it was imperative that as many soldiers as possible return to

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27 Gliožaitis A. A., „Sunkus valstybingumo kūrimas“, Lietuvos aidas, 2000 m. kovo 4 d.
28 Ibid.
29 Valka was a city in Livonian territory. In 1920, Valka was divided between Estonia and Latvia. The larger part, in Estonia, is known as Valga, while the smaller one, in Latvia, is called Valka.
Lithuania. To that end, on 15 May, the Council of Lithuania assigned Colonel Jurgis Kubilius to the Division for the Return of Prisoners of War to attend to the return of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{30}

But the situation in the Soviet Union was complicated, so it had to end its war with Germany at all costs. On 3 March 1918 in Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia and Germany signed a peace treaty. Under this treaty, Russia renounced its claims to territory occupied by Germany, including Lithuania. Essentially, this was an official renunciation of claims to Lithuania by the successor to the Russian Empire.

The Council of Lithuania also successfully took advantage of the German setbacks on the fronts that began in the autumn of 1918. In order to further the fight for true Lithuanian independence, in October 1918 the State Council of Lithuania established a Defence Commission without the Germans’ knowledge. The commission created military organizational plans, summoned Lithuanian soldiers to Vilnius, and performed other organizational work. The territory of Lithuania was divided into 12 areas. Each area was to be assigned a leader and a staff of three individuals. They were to organize defence squads in the territory assigned to them.\textsuperscript{31}

On 1 November 1918 the Defence Commission decided to begin forming a Lithuanian army. Vincas Grigaliūnas (né Glovackis) was designated as the head of the First Infantry Regiment and ordered to begin forming the regiment. Although the Germans allowed the regiment to be formed and granted it the former artillery regiment barracks in Vilnius, they did not allow it to be armed, so weapons had to be purchased secretly.\textsuperscript{32}

On 2 November, the Presidium of the State Council of Lithuania adopted the Provisional Constitution of Lithuania, under which the Presidium of the State Council gained the right to pass provisional laws, appoint a supreme commander of the army and enter into contracts with other states, among other things. On that basis, the Presidium of the State Council of Lithuania delegated Augustinas Voldemaras to form the Provisional Government of Lithuania, which was confirmed on 11 November. The prime minister also became the minister of defence. The Defence Commission was reorganized into the staff of the Ministry of Defence. Local government institutions began to be formed. In this way, Lithuania re-established its lost statehood, only without, for the time being, established borders or territory.

On 11 November 1918 at Compiègne, the Entente Powers signed an armistice agreement with Germany. Under Article 12 of the agreement, the


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 161–162.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 162.
German army would remain in the Baltic countries for some time. Although it was obliged to defend the Baltic States from the Bolsheviks, the German army retreated under pressure from the Red Army.

The existing situation forced the Government of Lithuania to become concerned with forming its army more quickly. On 23 November 1918, Prime Minister Voldemaras signed the Ministry of Defence’s first order. By this order, a defence council was established, Colonel Jonas Galvydis-Bykauskas was appointed to lead the First Infantry Regiment that was being formed in Alytus and was ordered to begin forming the regiment immediately, and Colonel Jurgis Kubilius was appointed head of the Ministry of Defence’s staff.33

Thus, 23 November 1918 is the Lithuanian army’s official birthday. At that time, the core of the Lithuanian army already comprised about one hundred officers, military planners and military doctors, as well as approximately fifty volunteer soldiers.

After this first order was issued, the army began to be organized urgently. On 24 November, the German government officially declared its consent regarding the organizing of the Lithuanian army and promised its support.

On 23–24 December 1918, a new Lithuanian government led by Mykolas Sleževičius was formed, and from the first few days it considered the creation of an army to be one of its most important tasks. On 24 December, the headquarters of the commandant of Vilnius was established, and Prime Minister Mykolas Sleževičius and Minister of National Defence Mykolas Velykis officially invited volunteers to join the Lithuanian Army on 29 December.

‘Lithuania is in danger’ – with these words, they addressed the nation, and the nation listened. Lithuania was divided into nine areas for recruiting volunteers, and registration points were set up in each county. However, with Russia’s Red Army approaching Vilnius, the Government of Lithuania relocated to Kaunas on 1 January 1919. The Red Army took Vilnius on 5 January. Kaunas became the centre for further steps in the creation of the Lithuanian army. In January 1919, the organization of new infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering and other units began. As the army grew rapidly, there soon was a shortage of officers, so a mobilization of officers, NCOs and military planners was announced on 15 January 1919. But the results of the mobilization were unimpressive; the army gained only about four hundred officers. In light of the situation, the decision was made to promptly establish a military academy. This was accomplished on 25 January 1919.

Army units were established not only in Kaunas but also in Biržai, Joniškėlis, Kėdainiai, Grodno, Panevėžys, Šiauliai, Tauragė and Ukmergė, among other

33 „Apsaugos ministerijai. Įsakymas Nr. 1“, Karo archyvas, 1992, t. 12, p. 207.
places. In some cases, they were organized by designated officers, but in others, they formed spontaneously, in spite of the Germans’ obstacles and interference. Usually, the rudiments of these and other squads became commandants’ companies or merged into the composition of other military units.

On 5 March, the first mobilization of rookies born in 1887–1888 was announced. Prior to the mobilization, approximately three thousand volunteers had joined the Lithuanian army, and, after the announcement, the formation of the army accelerated significantly. At that time, the Red Army had already occupied a decently sized part of Lithuanian territory, and war against it had become unavoidable.

Thus, Lithuania began its war for independence having only just officially restored it, recognized by only one state – Germany – and having only rudimentary armed forces and incomplete central and local administrations.

3.1.2. Lithuania’s Foes

Lithuania’s enemies were significantly superior. After the October Revolution of 1917, the political order had begun to change in Soviet Russia, with turmoil and a civil war starting. Although internal problems had weakened this state, it was still a self-sufficient, large and formidable power.

Poland, having also restored its independence after World War I, already had well-organized volunteer forces. Supported in every way possible by the Entente Powers, especially France, Poland was also a relatively strong state.

Describing the military group led by Colonel Pavel Bermondt-Avalov, which Lithuania and its army had to face, is somewhat more complicated. In 1919, the units of the Second Corps of Bermondt’s West Russian Volunteer Army were initially a part of the Western Corps, led by Colonel Prince Anatoly Lieven. Lieven, obeying orders from the infantry’s General Nikolai Yudenich – who was formally the commander-in-chief – took his division to Estonia, while Pavel Bermondt-Avalov and Evgeny Virgolich, being overtly pro-German, and the units under their command remained in Jelgava, where they began to cooperate closely with the German divisions stationed there under the command of General Rüdiger von der Goltz.34 Thus, Bermondt-Avalov’s units should not be considered independent but rather a force representing German interests.

The size of a warring state’s armed forces depends in large part on its population. Accurately determining the populations of various states at the time Lithuania was fighting for independence is impossible, because World War I brought about major revisions to state borders and populations, so we can rely only on data that existed before World War I.

Russian statisticians stated that in 1913, more than 166 million people lived in the Russian Empire, not including Finland.\textsuperscript{35} It was not possible to find data on what population the Soviet Russian government controlled in 1919, but its potential was incomparably larger than Lithuania’s.

The number of Bermontian soldiers did not depend on the population of one state or another. The number mustered depended on the German government, which used Russian prisoners of war and its own army’s soldiers.

Poland, like Lithuania, experienced difficulties in restoring its state, yet it was much bigger in terms of its population. Based on data from 1920, Poland had almost 27 million residents.\textsuperscript{36}

At the start of its war of independence, Lithuania did not yet have defined territorial limits, so it could only theoretically lay claim to 4.73 million residents. That is how many lived in the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s ethnic Lithuanian lands in the governorates of Vilnius, Kaunas and Grodno, according to the 1897 Russian Empire census.\textsuperscript{37} In practical terms, the Lithuanian government, especially at the beginning of 1919, could rely on four or five times fewer residents, but that number kept improving as more of the occupied Lithuanian territory was freed.

A warring country’s population also corresponds proportionately to the country’s economic potential. All the states had huge economic difficulties, because they had all suffered due to the war. Germany had lost the war, the revolutionary upheaval in Russia had brought chaos to a country worn out by war, and Poland and Lithuania were undergoing the rebirth of their states.

\textsuperscript{36} Gawryszewski A., \textit{Ludność Polski w XX wieku}, Warszawa: Drukarnia Klimiuk, 2005, s. 82.
\textsuperscript{37} Первая Всеобщая перепись населения Российской империи 1897 года. Наличное население в губерниях, уездах, городах Российской Империи (без Финляндии), http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_gub_97.php [2013-08-26]
Only the Bermontians did not have to worry about the country’s economy and could manage with what they received from Germany and amassed from local residents. Yet here, too, the advantage belonged to Lithuania’s opponents.

3.2. The Beginning of the War

3.2.1. Goals, Reasons and Pretexts

Having restored its independence, fairly soon Lithuania had to defend, with the help of the sword, its right to exist as a state. The war for independence started at the beginning of 1919, and, within two years, fighting would become necessary on three fronts: against Soviet Russia, the German-formed and -supported Bermontians, and Poland. It is noteworthy that nobody – not Soviet Russia, not Germany or the Bermontians it supported, and not Poland – officially declared war against Lithuania.

The reasons for the Lithuanian-Soviet war were intertwined with the international situation that had arisen at the time. With Germany and its allies having lost the war and the 1917 Bolshevik revolution having taken place in Russia, two old empires – Russia and Austria-Hungary – began to crumble. With this advantageous situation, subjugated nations sought to either establish or re-establish their independent states. Lithuania was among those to take advantage of this right, declaring the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state. Soviet Russia, meanwhile, in seeking to achieve its aim of a global socialist revolution, sent its Red Army after the retreating German army, planning to carry out the revolution with the help of the bayonet. By solidifying its state, Lithuania became an obstacle in the way of the Red Army, and that obstacle had to be removed. Thus, the primary catalyst for the war with Soviet Russia over Lithuania’s independence was the signing of the 16 February act and Lithuania’s systematic efforts to re-establish an independent state in reality, coupled with the desire of Soviet Russia, as the successor to the rights of the Russian Empire, not to lose the territory of Lithuania.

Germany, in forming Bermond’s units and supporting them in every way possible, sought to keep Lithuania and Latvia within its sphere of influence. Officially, Germany did not enter into battle with Lithuania; only the Bermontians did so.

Having re-established its state, Poland viewed Lithuania as a composite part of the formerly united Lithuanian and Polish state – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – and carried out its combat operations, proclaiming that Lithuania was a political construct created by Germany. It later claimed, after the Soviet-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of 12 July 1920 was signed, that Lithuania
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was Soviet Russia’s ally and that it was seeking to re-establish its former state with its previous borders.

Thus, even though Germany, Soviet Russia and Poland purported to recognize the right of national self-determination, in reality they applied this only to themselves and looked after their own imperialist interests only, with absolutely no consideration for the Lithuanian nation’s objective of living in an independent state. Soviet Russia and Poland both considered the Lithuanian territory to be theirs and sought to integrate it into the composition of their own states. As a small, recently restored state, Lithuania had to fight alone for its rights and its chosen path of creating an independent country. Thus, the war’s instigators were Soviet Russia, Poland and partly Germany, which operated through the forces commanded by Bermondt.

3.2.2. The Start of Combat Operations

At the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, Soviet Russia did not recognize an independent Lithuanian state, maintaining that it was fighting against counter-revolutionary groups in the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The first armed conflict between Lithuanian and Red Army soldiers took place on 13 January 1919 not far from Kėdainiai, toward Kapliai. Lithuanian army volunteer Jurgis Kiaunis was injured at that time. However, this incident should not be considered the start of serious war operations, because there were no other larger clashes between the Red Army and the nascent Lithuanian army in January. Small units of the Red Army were attacked by isolated groups of Lithuanian partisans only, the clashes not being very significant.

The onset of hostilities, it seems, should be considered 1 February 1919, when the rudimentary Lithuanian army began an organized opposition to the Red Army units who were raiding the territory controlled by the Lithuanian government. On 1 February, the Red Army took seven Lithuanian soldiers prisoner at Aristavas Manor in the county of Kėdainiai. From that day forward, Lithuanian soldiers put up organized resistance.

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39 „Įsakymas Panevėžio apsaugos būriui Nr. 28. 1919-02-03“, LCVA, f. 517, ap. 1, b. 1, l. 20; „4-jo pėstininkų Lietuvos karaliaus Mindaugo pulko istorijos konspektas už 1919 m.“, LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 103, l. 5.
Determining what should be considered the start of hostilities with regard to the Bermontians is fairly difficult. The first Bermontian platoon arrived in Kuršėnai from Latvia on 26 July 1919. It was announced that Colonel Yevgeny Virgolich would be organizing the second Russian volunteer corps in Kuršėnai.\textsuperscript{40} That same day, on Virgolich’s orders, the Bermontians posted bills in the county of Šiauliai declaring that all residents who did not show obedience to them would be punished by death. For his part, the Lithuanian commandant of Šiauliai also posted proclamations on the same day encouraging residents not to cooperate with or obey the newcomers. The Bermontians tore down the Šiauliai commandant’s proclamations and declared a state of war in the county.\textsuperscript{41} It seems that this should be considered the start of hostilities, although the first armed clash between the Bermontians and the Lithuanian army did not take place until 9 September. The Bermontians unexpectedly disarmed the Lithuanian guards of Radviliškis Railway Station, a very important railway hub.\textsuperscript{42} Seeking to temper the Lithuanian government’s negative view of the Bermontians’ actions by diplomatic means, on 7 August, the Bermontians’ General Bogdanov presented the Lithuanian government with a writ explaining that Virgolich’s units had occupied Kuršėnai by order of von der Goltz, the commander of the Germans’ Sixth Baltic Corps.\textsuperscript{43}

In Poland, the official report of the Polish General Staff of 28 January 1919 featured the first mention of a Lithuanian front.\textsuperscript{44} The first skirmish between Lithuanian and Polish soldiers occurred on 26 April 1919, when the Poles attacked Lithuanian sentries in the town of Vievis.\textsuperscript{45} However, the conflict between these two neighbouring states did not progress at that time.

On 5 April 1919, as a result of the Polish army’s movement toward Grodno,
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The Lithuanian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference presented a note to Prime Minister of France Georges Clemenceau announcing that Lithuania would consider the Polish army’s invasion of Lithuanian territory to be hostile aggression.46 Seeking to interfere with a possible armed conflict between Lithuania and Poland, on 8 April 1919, France’s military chief of the mission to Lithuania, Colonel Constantin Reboul, sent a proposal to his superior, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, to separate the Lithuanian and Polish armies by a line of demarcation, suggesting recognition of the lands north of the Augustów Canal as Lithuania’s.47

The Lithuanian government also attempted to avoid a conflict. On 16 April 1919, it sent a delegation led by Jurgis Šaulys to Warsaw to negotiate with Polish leader Józef Piłsudski for recognition of the Lithuanian state and determination of both states’ borders. The negotiations, however, were unsuccessful.48

Meanwhile, as the Poles battled with the Red Army, they occupied Vilnius on 21 April and began pushing into territory controlled by the Lithuanian administration. On 28 April, Lithuania’s delegation in Paris presented the leaders of the Entente states with a note regarding the Polish army’s attack. It was deemed an invasion. The leaders of the Western countries were requested to instruct the Polish government to pull its army out of Lithuania.49

On 2 May 1919, the General Secretary of the Paris Peace Conference addressed the Polish representative, emphasizing that the Entente Supreme Council encouraged the leaders of Lithuania and Poland to avoid military engagement. It would not recognize borders established by force.50 Yet Poland defied the requirement. On 8 May, the Poles attacked Lithuanian guards in the town of Vievis.51 This event should seemingly be considered the start of the war between Lithuania and Poland, because this was a pre-planned and calculated action by the Poles.

3.3. The Course of the War

3.3.1. The Front Against Soviet Russia

With Germany and Soviet Russia having signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, hostilities ceased between these two states. Under this agreement, Soviet Russia disclaimed the Baltic States, Poland, part of Belarus’s

46 Vitkus A., Lietuvos istorijos įvykių chronologija, 1918–1926, p.163.
47 Ibid., p. 165.
50 Ibid.
51 Svarbiausių įvykių kronika, LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 141, l. 68.
territory and Bessarabia and committed to paying Germany an indemnity of 6 million German marks. However, after Germany’s revolution in November 1918 and the signing of the armistice agreement with the Entente Powers on 11 November, demands were made for Lithuania to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Soviet Russia received word of the treaty being held invalid, and, when the scattered German army began heading west on 17–18 November, the Red Army followed in pursuit, heading in the direction of Lithuania.

As the Germans began to retreat, the Russians mustered two powerful military groups: the Latvian and Western armies. At the outset of the attack, these groups – specifically, the Pskov Division on the Western Army’s right wing and the International Division on the Latvian Group’s left wing – captured Lithuania’s eastern and northern areas. The Pskov Division comprised six regiments. It reached the Daugavpils area with 2,473 bayonets, 65 swords, 78 machine guns, 9 artillery guns and 8 aeroplanes.52 The division had been tasked with occupying Vilnius and Kaunas and, as it attacked further west, with cutting off from Germany the parts of the German military that were still in Lithuania. Initiating the attack were the Pskov and Western rifle divisions. The Pskov Division marched under marching orders, encountering no resistance. On 22 December, the Western Division also entered Lithuanian territory. Švenčionys, Vidžiai and Zarasai were occupied, followed by Utena on 23 December and Rokiškis on 27 December.53

After the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics were declared on Soviet Russia’s initiative, it proceeded to recognize them on 23 December and establish Soviet governments for each. It must be stressed that these were puppet quasi-states, autonomous in name only and without the right to decide on any significant state affairs. All questions had to be brought before relevant Russian institutions for approval, and they did not have any rights in matters such as defence, foreign policy and finance. Even before this declaration, on 16 December in Moscow, a revolutionary Lithuanian government under the leadership of Vincas ‘kapsukas’ Mickevičius had been formed, with its representatives – supported by the Red Army – beginning to establish Soviet government institutions in occupied Lithuanian territory.

When the Poles occupied Vilnius on 1 January 1919, the Red Army’s Pskov Division was ordered to begin operating against them. On 5 January, the Fifth Vilnius Regiment, the Pskov Division’s First and Fourth Regiments, and – brought in by rail – the Western Rifle Division’s One Hundred and Forty-fifth and One Hundred and Forty-sixth Regiments approached Vilnius.54 Participating

52 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 278.
54 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 279.
in the occupation of Vilnius was the Fifth Vilnius Rifle Regiment, which was formed in Moscow and included, particularly in the second battalion, many Lithuanian Communists, which is why it was specifically sent for the capture of Vilnius. These military units attacked Vilnius from the north-east, while the Western Rifle Division’s One Hundred and Forty-fifth and One Hundred and Forty-sixth Regiments struck from the east. Vilnius was defended by Polish legionnaires under the command of General Władysław Wejtko. They could not withstand the Bolsheviks’ attack and withdrew from Vilnius.

Upon occupying Vilnius, the Red Army units regrouped for a while, with the Pskov Division’s units only slogging forward in the direction of Kaunas on 9 January. That day, the commander of the Soviet Western Army handed down orders to remain in contact with the Red Army’s Latvian Group, which was pushing toward Panevėžys and Šiauliai. The First Brigade (First and Second Rifle Regiments) of Soviet Russia’s Pskov Division captured Utena on 23 December and marched after the retreating Germans on the road toward Ukmergė. Kavarskas was occupied on 7 January, with Ukmergė falling on 10 January.

From Ukmergė, the brigade operated in regiments. The First Rifle Regiment marched by road to Jonava but failed to take it; it then stopped at Markutiškiai, because the German battalion there would not move. Sent to Kėdainiai, the Second Rifle Regiment captured Siesikai, Rukoniai and Šėta without any obstacles, but on 13 January, near the village of Kapliai, it encountered guards from the Lithuanian army’s Panevėžys security platoon and stopped.

On 13 January, Soviet Russian Comandarm Jukums Vācietis issued a directive ordering the Western Army to continue the attack in the following directions: 1) Ukmergė–Raseiniai, 2) Vilnius–Kaunas, 3) Vilnius–Alytus, 4) Vilnius–Varėna and Grodno, 5) Vilnius, Lida–Grodno and 6) Lida–Masty Station. Upon receiving this directive, the commander of the Western Army assessed the situation and concluded that carrying it out would be impossible, because his army would not be able to take the strongholds of Kaunas and Grodno or the fortifications at Varėna, Alytus and Merkinė. The comandarm agreed with these arguments, ordering any point along the Neman to be taken instead.

It must be noted that the Red Army’s leadership overestimated the significance of the fortified locations at that time; considering the Lithuanian

56 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 279.
57 Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 80; Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 279.
58 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 280.
army was still being formed and could not yet equip these fortifications with the necessary garrisons and weaponry, while the German armed forces were severely demoralized after Germany’s defeat and thus less combative, these points did not have the same significance they had had during World War I.

After occupying Vilnius, the Pskov Rifle Division was renamed the ‘Lithuanian Rifle Division’ by the Soviet Russian Military Revolutionary Council on 21 January 1919 at the request of the Soviet Lithuanian Workers and Peasants Government, while its regiments became ‘Lithuanian rifle regiments.’ The Fifth Vilnius Rifle Regiment was renamed the Seventh Lithuanian Rifle Regiment and was transferred from the Red Army Polish Western Division to the Lithuanian Division. As a result, at the end of February this division had 7 rifle regiments, 6,875 bayonets, 8 cannons, 40 cavalry and various other support units. However, the division was not completely formed. It was to be supplemented by local residents.

Meanwhile, the Vilnius Division’s Fifth and Fourteenth Rifle Regiments marched via Lentvaris, capturing Vievis on 10 January and Žasliai on the night of 11 January. They did not take Kaisiadorys Station, because the Germans did not draw back from there. Somewhat later, the Fourteenth Rifle Regiment moved from Žasliai to the vicinity of Lida. Only the Fifth Rifle Regiment remained there.

Initially, separate Red Army elite corps operated in the direction of Alytus. Later, the Third Rifle Regiment arrived there and occupied Onuškis and Dusmenys on 19 January. By 22 January, they had already reached Daugai.

According to Feliksas ‘Žemaitis’ Baltušis, a Soviet military figure of Lithuanian heritage, because the Red Army’s commander of the Western Army was not expecting anything from the operation to capture the Neman system fortifications, the commander of the Pskov Division was not enthusiastic about it, either, so preparations were not made for the attack. The division was spread out over an area of 200 square kilometres.

Meanwhile, after the Pskov Division headed from the Daugavpils region toward Vilnius, it was replaced by the International Division of the Red Army’s Latvian Army Group. The Bolshevik Latvian Army Group, consisting of three divisions, operated from the Rēzekne region. Of the three, only one – the International Division – operated in Lithuania, while the other two worked in Latvia. At the end of December, the International Division, having replaced

61 Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 81.
62 Ibid.
63 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 281.
The Pskov Division in the Daugavpils region, began marching unhindered toward Panevėžys, Radviliškis, Šiauliai and Telšiai. Its mission was to reach the Lithuanian coast and protect it, protecting themselves from the Klaipėda side. At that time, the International Division consisted of the Thirty-ninth, Forty-first and Fourth Regiments. Other regiments (the Sixth and Tenth) arrived later. The Third and Forty-seventh Regiments captured Panevėžys on 9 January, then taking Šiauliai on 15 January, from where the Thirty-ninth Regiment marched to Mažeikiai and Tirkšliai and the Forty-seventh Regiment proceeded to the region of Telšiai. Part of the Forty-first Regiment, which arrived later, marched toward Kėdainiai, while the remainder guarded the railway line between Šiauliai and Panevėžys.64

In late December 1918 and early January 1919, the local communists in Šiauliai became organized. Aided by the German Spartacus League,65 they disarmed a German garrison on 8 January and declared their own rule in Šiauliai and the vicinity.66

The local Lithuanian Bolsheviks in Šiauliai organized the Žemaičių (Samogitian) Regiment, later renamed the Eighth Red Lithuanian Rifle Regiment, which belonged to the Latvian (International) Division. The regiment had approximately one thousand volunteers. Once the International Division's units had arrived in Šiauliai, the Žemaičių (Samogitian) Regiment was reinforced with 10 heavy machine guns and artillery.67

Aided by local communists and the Žemaičių (Samogitian) Regiment, the International Division captured Kurgėnai, Luokė and Žarėnai on 22 January, followed by Telšiai, Seda and Mažeikiai on 25 January. Further progress by the division was stopped by the resistance of the Germans and Lithuanian partisans.68

In January 1919, the Bolshevik forces that had occupied a sizeable part of Lithuanian territory were much larger than the Lithuanian forces. They were

64 Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 81.
65 The Spartacus League (German: Spartakusbund) was an early 20th century German Marxist organization. During World War I, called for a global proletariat revolution, which would topple capitalism, imperialism, and militarism worldwide. Starting in August 1914, it was a part of the German Social Democrat Party known as the International Opposition Group, becoming the German Social Democrat Party’s Spartacus Group in 1916 and the left wing of the Independent German Social Democrat Party, which had broken away from the German Social Democrat Party, in 1917. The Spartacus League participated in the revolution of November 1918 as an independent organization under the battle cry, “All power to the soviets”, and sought the creation of a German Socialist Republic. On 1 January 1919, the Spartacus League joined the Communist Party of Germany.
66 Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 81.
67 Vaitkevičius B., Socialistine revoliucija Lietuvoje 1918–1919 metais, p. 582.
68 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Misyę žinynas, Nr. 56, p. 283; Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 81–82.
even greater than the combination of the budding Lithuanian army and the German army aiding it. The Lithuanian Rifle Division alone had 7,405 soldiers, 104 machine guns, 12 light artillery cannons and 6 aeroplanes. Moreover, the Bolshevik army was constantly being replenished with Russian soldiers mobilized in Russia.69 These forces were concentrated during the capture of Vilnius only. Having occupied it, the Bolsheviks scattered their forces, spreading their regiments over wide sectors. There were no other large concentrations anywhere, resulting in their actions being slow and indecisive.

As a result, the Red Army’s forces operating in Lithuania were not under the authority of a single commander. The International Rifle Division, commanded by Okulov, operated in northern Lithuania and belonged to the Latvian Group’s commander. This division was formed hastily in Moscow and was poorly prepared. The so-called Panevėžys Group, which fought against Lithuania, was formed based on this division. The Pskov Division, also called the ‘Lithuanian Division’, belonged to the Western Army’s commander. Mutual ties between these divisions were weak. The mood of the Red Army’s regiments was not combative. Almost all the regiments were made up of mobilized soldiers who were Soviet citizens of Russian or other Soviet nationality and did not want to fight. Yet every regiment included Communist commissars, whose duties were to maintain discipline in the units.70

As the Russians invaded deep into Lithuania, a small number of young Lithuanian volunteers – those who leaned toward Communism, had few interests or had been propagandized – joined the Bolshevik army. Most of them later deserted. A sizeable number of mobilized Russian and Belarusian soldiers and officers fled the Bolshevik military.71 Provisioning was extremely poor. The Soviet Russian government did not provide necessary amounts of food or animal feed, so local residents’ resources had to be used. The Bolsheviks’ requisitions caused great discontent among the population of the war-ravaged country. Only the propaganda was well organized, both within the army and among local residents. Propaganda was managed by commissars and individuals specially selected for this undertaking, known as ‘agitators’, ‘organizers’, ‘military unit club leaders’ and the like. In late 1918 and early 1919, the Bolshevik propaganda was so powerful and effective that it reached even the most remote corners of Lithuania and immediately responded to events from everyday life as well as from the front. Propaganda was disseminated orally and in print. The Bolsheviks also maintained close ties with the German Spartacus League.72

69 Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 82.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 84.
that had invaded Lithuanian territory established its administration through revolutionary committees. Those who disagreed with the new order were arrested, jailed and even deported from Lithuania.\textsuperscript{73}

When the Red Army first began occupying Lithuanian territory, the Lithuanian army had only just begun to form. On 2 January 1919, with the Red Army encroaching on Vilnius, the Lithuanian government relocated to Kaunas. Efforts to organize the state and the armed forces that were already underway were continued here. Somewhat earlier, E. Zimmerle – the German civil government’s authorized general representative to Lithuania – and the German army’s staff had moved to Kaunas.\textsuperscript{74} After the Lithuanian government transferred from Vilnius to Kaunas, the German government announced, on 3 January 1919, that it had agreed to supply weapons to the Lithuanian army and militia. On 10 January, it was also announced that the German government had decided not to leave Kaunas and would take Radviliškis and Šiauliai from the Bolsheviks if the Lithuanian army would participate in the campaign.\textsuperscript{75} For its part, the Provisional Government of Lithuania turned to the German government on 10 January 1919, requesting that it defend Lithuania’s borders until the Provisional Government of Lithuania could organize its own army.\textsuperscript{76}

At that time, the German army’s Kaunas garrison was unreliable. The eastern front’s Council of Soldiers’ Deputies (Soldatenrat), whose headquarters were in Kaunas, maintained good relations only with local Bolshevik organizations and secretly had ties with representatives of the Soviet Russian government. As a result, the Kaunas garrison’s Soldatenrat on the eastern German front was gradually liquidated, its representatives being sent to Germany along with unreliable military units. They were replaced with Saxon volunteers.\textsuperscript{77}

The parts of the German army in Lithuania were concerned about the Bolsheviks potentially approaching the East Prussian border and blocking the German army’s path of retreat from Ukraine. Under these circumstances, discussions took place between the Germans and Soviet Russia, and a dividing line was agreed in writing on 18 January 1919. In Lithuania, this line went through Daugai, Stakliškės and Kaišiadorys, then 10 kilometres to the east of the railway line connecting Kaišiadorys, Jonava and Kėdainiai.\textsuperscript{78} However, the Russians did not comply with the agreement and would breach it at the beginning of February.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 116.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
At the beginning of 1919, the Bolshevik army’s command, seeking to take over Kaunas with a swinging manoeuvre from the south, began preparing for a military operation in the direction of Alytus. From a secret order to the Bolshevik army dated 6 February 1919 that fell into the hands of Lithuanian military command, it is known that the Russians were planning to begin quick and resolute operations all along the southern front on the night of 8 February, taking advantage of a revolt by workers and peasants. Each of the regiments expected to take part in the operation had approximately one thousand soldiers. The Fourth Rifle Regiment, which had operated to the right of the Third Rifle Regiment, had to depart from the town of Butrimonys on 8 February, cross to the left bank of the Neman near Punia and – on the morning of 9 February, circumventing Alytus via the surroundings of the village of Kaniūkai – cut off the Lithuanian army’s access and communications with Kaunas and Suwałki. The Third Rifle Regiment, marching along the Varėna–Alytus road, had orders to occupy Merkinė and Alytus. In taking over these locations, they were to use all means necessary to break any possible Lithuanian and German resistance. Assigned to lead this operation was the commander of the Third Rifle Regiment, Vasiukov; his aides, Grinkov and Belizoko; and a political commissar, Vavilov.79

On 8 February, the regiments of the Red Army’s Lithuanian Division began the attack. The Second Lithuanian Regiment did not attack successfully; the Germans not only repelled them but also pushed the regiment back. The Sixth Regiment manoeuvred between Ukmergė and Skaruliai without finding the enemy, the Seventh Regiment occupied Aukštadvaris, and the Third and Fourth Regiments also failed to accomplish anything significant.80

The threat of falling into Bolshevik hands arose in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, causing the Entente leadership to become concerned. They demanded that Germany actively operate against the Bolsheviks and maintain the Grodno–Kaunas–Jelgava line. In the sector between Alytus and Kaišiadorys, the Germans had only one weak battalion near each of the two railway lines. Toward Alytus, the Germans protected some semblance of a demarcation line, having set up a cavalry barrier in Peteronys.

In Alytus itself, there were German cavalry and infantry. Furthermore, around that time, the partially formed Third Prussian Hussar Regiment arrived in Alytus.81 The attacking Red Army forces were superior, and, on 13 February, they captured Alytus. However, on the night of 15 February, with the arrival of a German armoured train with infantry and other units, the Red Army withdrew from Alytus. Hence, the Bolsheviks’ efforts to capture Kaunas from the south and liquidate the re-established Lithuanian state failed. The Red Army’s almost

79 Lesčius V., Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920, p. 52.
80 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 282.
81 I pėstininkų pulko pirmieji karо žygiai, LCVA, f. 513, ap. 1, b. 379 l. 79 a. p.
contemporaneous attempt to take Kaunas from the direction of Kėdainiai also ended unsuccessfully.

In early February 1919, the Thirty-ninth and Eighth Žemaičių (Samogitian) Regiments of the Red Army’s Latvian Division were pressing deep into Žemaitija (Samogitia). Battles in the Telšiai region had already taken place between the Germans and the Bolsheviks’ Thirty-ninth Regiment at the beginning of February 1919. Having received reinforcements, the Red Army forced the German unit to retreat. The Red Army captured Lieplaukė.82

The Germans brought new units to the front with the Reds, allowing them to take Telšiai in mid-February 1919 despite stubborn resistance from the Red Army. This blow was very painful for the Bolsheviks, so the command of the Second Latvian Division’s First Brigade decided to counter-attack and retake Telšiai and Seda. The division’s Eight Žemaičių (Samogitian) Regiment and Thirty-ninth Workers’ Regiment were thrown into the counter-attack.83 On 24 February 1919, both regiments moved in the direction of Telšiai. Near Luokė, the German forces met the Eighth Regiment with concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire. With heavy losses, the Red Army regiment was forced to retreat. It had lost about two hundred soldiers.84

Meanwhile, the Panevėžys Group, which included the Thirty-ninth, Forty-first, and Forty-seventh Regiments as well as the Žemaičių (Samogitian) Regiment, which was formed in Žemaitija (Samogitia), received orders to occupy Žemaitija (Samogitia). The Red Army’s Thirty-ninth Workers’ Regiment, in carrying out the First Brigade commander’s order to win back Telšiai, marched out in two columns on 25 February 1919 and encountered massive German forces near Nevarėnai and Tirkšliai on the very first day. Fighting took place along that entire stretch for more than a week. On 3 March 1919, the Germans, supported by artillery, attacked the Red Army from the direction of Mažeikiai. After the Bolshevik transport units and artillery had been knocked out of formation, they began to fall back. Some retreated to Mažeikiai, while others headed to Viekšniai. Still others withdrew in a disorganized manner to Kuršėnai and Akmenė, ultimately meeting up in Šiauliai.85 On 4 March, the Germans, supported by an armoured train, took over Mažeikiai. The Red Army retreated to Latvia.86

Having experienced an enormous defeat, the Red Army could no longer put up resistance, and, on 11 March, German soldiers took over Šiauliai. Radviliškis

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83 Ibid., p. 600.
84 Ibid., p.601.
85 Ibid., p. 602–603; Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 285.
and Šeduva were soon taken. The Germans continued to attack the Red Army, and Joniškėlis, Pasvalys and Vabalninkas were taken at the end of March.\textsuperscript{87} On 11 March, the Germans’ armoured train forced the Red Army to draw back from Šiauliai.\textsuperscript{88} Then, on the night of 23 March, the Bolsheviks retreated from Panevėžys.\textsuperscript{89} Lithuanian soldiers did not participate in these battles as a separate unit; only Lithuanian partisans actively took part.

In order to reinforce the Red Army units after these painful losses, the Second Latvian Division’s staff, which was based in Kupiškis at the time, hurriedly redeployed its military units, and the Red Army’s central command sent reinforcements to Lithuanian territory: the Fifteenth Latgale Regiment, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission’s Vitebsk Platoon and additional artillery.\textsuperscript{90}

Having received these reinforcements, the command of the Second Latvian Division began preparations for a counter-attack. On 3 April 1919, a strike force was formed, which consisted of the Seventeenth Regiment, the Fifteenth Latgale Regiment, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission’s Vitebsk Platoon, a platoon of Kupiškis communists, one battalion from the Fourteenth Regiment and a battery from the Twenty-second Light Artillery Division. This group departed toward Panevėžys on the evening of 2 April 1919.\textsuperscript{91} The independent Lithuanian army’s unattached Panevėžys Battalion, which was defending Panevėžys – part of the Second Infantry Regiment – and the German units that were aiding them were forced to retreat, and the Red Army again occupied Panevėžys on 4 April at 14.00.\textsuperscript{92}

At approximately 4.00 on 19 April 1919, a Polish armoured train, an echelon of infantry and Colonel Władysław Zygmunt Belina-Prażmowski’s cavalry with about one thousand horsemen stormed Vilnius and occupied the railway station. From the station, the Poles attacked in two directions: through the Gate of Dawn via Didžioji Street and via Sodų, Pylimo, Vokiečių and Vilniaus Streets. They pushed toward the Green Bridge across the Neris, seeking to capture it and, in doing so, block off the route for retreating from the city. At the time of the Polish attack, the Red Army soldiers in Vilnius were sleeping and were therefore unprepared to fend off the assault. The Vilnius commandant’s company and the city militia quickly switched to the side of the Poles, while others fled. In reality, the Polish attack was opposed only by an 80-person Communist Youth company whose leader, Ivanov, had disappeared somewhere and by a Jewish group that had assembled in Vokiečių Street. By 21 April, the Polish cavalry had left the

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{88} Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 286.  
\textsuperscript{89} Lesčius V., Lietuvos kariuomenė 1918–1920 m., p. 299.  
\textsuperscript{90} Vaitkevičius B., Socialistinė revoliucija Lietuvoje 1918–1919 metais, p. 605.  
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 605–606.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ališauskas K., Kovos dėl Lietuvos nepriklausomybės 1918–1920, p. 165.
Regiments and the Third Brigade’s Fifth and Seventh Regiments – found themselves in a strategically disadvantageous situation. They were stuck between the Poles to the east and the Lithuanians to the west, and, faced with the threat of being cut off, these parts of the division began to retreat. A significant number of Lithuanian Red Army soldiers defected to the Lithuanian side, as did the commander of the Red Army’s Seventh Regiment, Aleksandras Ružancovas. The remaining units of the Red Army’s Lithuanian Division assembled in the Ukmergė region. Because this division was cut off from other Lithuanian-Belarusian army units by the Polish army, it was transferred to the authority of the Soviet Latvian Army’s commander.95

Until almost the end of April 1919, all of the Lithuanian soldiers’ battles with the Red Army’s forces that were occupying Lithuanian territory were more partisan in nature, while the operations themselves were more local: freeing a city or village, taking prisoners, depriving the enemy of weapons or ammunition, etc. This was because the Provisional Government of Lithuania was organizing the army in important centres and preparing to counter the Red Army’s aggression. Therefore, it could not split up forces that were already sparse, meaning that military units being organized in locations far from Kaunas were not able to carry out larger-scale operations. The existing army’s unpreparedness to put up greater resistance, its insufficient weaponry and ammunition, and a lack of means of communication and many other measures needed by armies forced restraint and a focus limited to actions of local significance.

The main obstacle to the Red Army invading the West at that time was the
German army. During this period, the Germans were helping the Lithuanian military units, but there were also times when the Germans interfered with them. However, on the other hand, such activity by the German army was also useful during that period, because, by not engaging in more complex operations, the centrally-based Lithuanian army had some time and could better manage affairs, find minimal provisioning and prepare for more serious combat operations. By defending fairly firmly in the centre of Lithuania, the Lithuanian army did not allow the Bolsheviks to affect their plans of surrounding and capturing Kaunas. Even this limited operational capacity by the rudimentary Lithuanian army strongly demoralized the fairly scattered Bolshevik forces.

At the end of April, Lithuania’s military units began to operate more actively. On 27 April, the Bolsheviks were crushed in Pagiriai, while on 3 May, the Panevėžys Battalion, with help from the Germans, occupied Ukmergė and reached Širvintos and Giedraičiai a few days later. These operations helped them realize that the Red Army was not that strong and could be defeated, even though the number of Red Army units located in Lithuanian territory in mid-May seemed impressive: eighteen infantry regiments, three unattached battalions, three Communist detachments, two special detachments and a few troops of cavalry. Furthermore, the conclusion was drawn that it was possible to forego the Germans’ assistance. The various parts of the armed forces had already been grouped into organized military units. Back in late March, the platoons and battalions that had been operating separately had been amassed into the Unattached Brigade.

3.7. The Red Army’s prisoners of war in 1919

96 Žukaitis S., „Panevėžio atvadavimas iš bolševikų 1919 m.“, Karo archyvas, t. 5, p. 200.
97 Baltušis-Žemaitis, „Karas su bolševikais Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, Mūsų žinynas, 1929, Nr. 56, p. 291.
On 14 May 1919, the Lithuanian army’s Supreme Commander, General Silvestras Žukauskas, issued General Operational Order No. 2, with orders to begin a full-scale attack on the Bolsheviks. At that time, the Bolsheviks were holding a line between Molėtai, Želva, Balninkai, Žemaitkiemis, Kavarskas, Raguva, Barklainiai, Upytė, Pumpėnai, Krinčinas and Biržai. In May 1919, parts of the Red Army’s Fifteenth Army retreated along with the battles, taking heavy losses. The army brigade had approximately nine hundred infantry, sixty-five cavalry, three cannons and fifteen machine guns remaining. Moreover, the troops’ morale was extremely low. On 19 May, the Red Army’s Lithuanian Division received orders to occupy the front on a line between Biržai and Panevėžys. The First Brigade had to take the line between Pumpėnai, Panevėžys and Ramygala. The brigade featured two infantry regiments, a cavalry troop, an artillery battery and an unattached detachment of four companies.

On 19 May, the Lithuanian army’s Panevėžys Group transitioned to offence. The Red Army’s First Brigade was pushed back and, having incurred significant losses, retreated from Panevėžys that same day, while the Second Brigade, which was positioned north-east of Panevėžys, remained in place, because the full-strength Sixth Latvian Regiment was called up from the reserve to assist it. The
First Brigade’s commander was tasked with actively defending the sector being occupied. On 21 May, after regrouping, the Red Army transitioned to attack. At approximately 16.00, the Sixth Latvian Rifle Regiment pushed the Lithuanians out of Panevėžys. However, the brigade commander did not dare to develop the attack further without the division commander’s instructions; the situation was such that the entire army was withdrawing, so attacking forward would pose the risk of being cut off from the army and experiencing heavy losses. As a result, the Sixth Latvian Regiment was ordered to draw back from Panevėžys to the positions it had held on 21 May.  

On 22 May, the combined forces of the Army of the Republic of Latvia and the German military broke through the Bolshevik front and took over Riga, so the Red Army’s Panevėžys Group was ordered to fall back in the direction of Daugavpils. The Lithuanian army continued to attack successfully. Along with the Saxon volunteers of the Eighteenth Regiment, it successfully completed the Utena operation and then – this time alone – the Kupiškis operation. After these operations, the Red Army was pushed back to the line between Suviekas, Avilai, Salakas and Dūkštas. The front remained pretty much at this line until the end of August, because the Red Army repelled the Lithuanians’ attack on 6-12 July and forced the Lithuanians to move back somewhat in some sectors of the front.

On 24 August, the Lithuanian army began carrying out the Zarasai operation. Opposing the Lithuanian army was the Fourth Division of the Red Army’s Fifteenth Army, which had six infantry regiments. The fighting was dogged, with the Red Army attempting to counter-attack several times. However, not being able to withstand the Lithuanians’ pressure, the Red Army’s Fourth Division retreated beyond the Daugava on 29 August. The Daugava became a natural obstacle for the warring armies. The Lithuanians fortified their positions well and were able, without much trouble, to rebuff any attempts by the enemy to cross the river. The Bolsheviks seemed jittery, constantly firing upon the Lithuanians’ positions with their artillery and attempting reconnaissance. It was as though they feared the possibility of further attacks by the Lithuanians. But it was clear from their behaviour that the Bolsheviks did not have the energy to attack, and their goal was simply to somewhat impede the Lithuanians from doing the same.

After an operation by the combined Latvian and Polish armies on 4 January 1920, Daugavpils was taken. The Lithuanians’ direct front with the Red Army had been liquidated. In reality, the war between Lithuania and Soviet Russia was over.
3.3.2. The Front Against the Bermontians

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, a large number of well-known, high-ranking political figures fled to Germany. Here, they formed the Government of West Russia, whose leadership was entrusted to General Vasily Biskupsky. However, it did not generate trust from the Entente states. This mistrust was not by chance, because this ‘government’ was cooperating with the Germans, and an outcome of this cooperation was the creation of joint Russian and German military units in the Baltics.

On 12 June 1919, Colonel Pavel Bermondt-Avalov arrived in Jelgava to command Russian volunteer units that had been formed in Germany from Russian prisoners of war and Russian *Landeswehr* companies. Even though these were units formed by Germany, the Bermontians declared that they recognized Admiral Alexander Kolchak’s authority and obeyed only him. Bermondt stated that he had been appointed by Kolchak to command the Russian armed forces in the Baltics. But in reality, even though it was not made public, this military group was commanded by German General Rüdiger von der Goltz. The group under Bermondt’s command consisted of roughly 50,000–52,000 soldiers, of which only about ten thousand were Russian, while the others were soldiers from the Sixth German Corps whom von der Goltz did not forbid switching to Bermondt’s army. This group was provisioned well by Germany – approximately six hundred machine guns, a hundred cannons, fifty mortars and one hundred and seventy aeroplanes – and openly displayed its opposition to the Baltic States’ autonomy.

The first Bermontians appeared in Lithuania on 26 July 1919. Taking advantage of the fact that the Lithuanian army was concentrated at the front against the Bolsheviks, Colonel Yevgeny Virgolich’s units arrived at Kuršėnai. Ever more Bermontian units, mostly made up of Russian prisoners of war and political emigrants, arrived here on a daily basis from Germany. The Bermontians considered the Latvian and Lithuanian territories they occupied to be parts of the former Russian Empire, did not recognize the governments of Latvia and Lithuania and requisitioned everything they needed from residents.

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103 Niessel H., *Vokiečių iškraustymas iš Baltijos krašty*, Kaunas, 1938, p. 32.
106 Ibid., p.129–130.
107 Jakštas, „Saksų savanorių dalys Lietuvoje 1919 m.“, *Karo archyvas*, t. 6, p. 208.
When the Lithuanian government began to protest against the unjustifiable creation of a foreign army group on Lithuanian territory, Virgolich, not wanting to immediately begin a conflict with the Lithuanian authorities, attempted to prevent it by diplomatic means. However, on 9 September, the Lithuanians’ first clash with the Bermontians took place at Radviliškis Railway Station. With an unexpected attack, the Bermontians disarmed a small group of Lithuanian sentries positioned at the station.

On 26 September, Germany’s ministry of defence approved the agreement between General von der Goltz and Colonel Bermondt-Avalov regarding the transfer of German military units to Bermondt. That same day, the German government sent General von der Goltz orders to return to Germany with his units.\(^{108}\) The German government was no longer responsible for those who refused to obey this order to return to Germany, as they had come entirely under the responsibility of Bermondt.

On 9 October 1919, units under Bermondt’s command began to attack Riga, while Virgolich’s units were ordered to attack Lithuania along the stretch between Šiauliai and Radviliškis. But the Latvian army, supported by Estonian units and the British navy, struck them with a powerful blow on the Riga front.\(^{109}\)

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian political and military leadership, identifying a direct threat from the Bermontians, decided to form a front against them. On 12 October at 10.00, the army’s supreme commander, Lieutenant General Pranas Liatukas, issued orders to the commander of the First Brigade, Kazys Ladyga, to begin forming a front against the Bermontians. Military units were designated for forming the front,\(^{110}\) and they began occupying the sectors of the front assigned to them.

Pushed back from Riga, the Bermontians took Biržai on 16 October, followed by Radviliškis, Joniškis, Linkuva, Raseiniai, Jurbarkas and several other

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\(^{110}\) LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1, l. 192.; Jankauskas V., „Slibino nugalėjimas. „Bermontiados“ žlugimo istorija“, *Agriminas*, 1994 m. spalio 19 d..
Lithuanian towns. Then the Lithuanian army’s commander, Liatukas, contacted the commander of all of the evacuating German and Bermontian units, General Walter von Eberhardt, and proposed that the German regular army draw back from Radviliškis and transfer the railway station to the Lithuanian Railway Board. This proposal to pull back from Radviliškis was rejected and even met with a demand for the Lithuanian army to abandon Šeduva and Baisogala.\footnote{LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1, l. 192.}

Lithuanian intelligence noticed that relations between the Bermontians and the Germans had worsened drastically at the end of October. The Germans even began disarming some Bermontian units and sending them toward Riga. In addition, the Bermontians’ morale suffered as a result of General Nikolai Yudenich’s letter, in which he denounced Bermondt’s operations, encouraged them to steer clear of Bermondt and Virgolich’s adventures and encouraged Russians to head to the Petrograd front. After this appeal, unrest arose in some Bermontian units. There was a lack of discipline in the German units, too.\footnote{Bermontininkų ir vokiečių frontas, LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 37, l. 26.}

At that time, the Germans had mustered the Šauliai Brigade, Karl von Diebitsch’s volunteer corps and the German Legion near Radviliškis. Sizeable reserves of ammunition, weapons and uniforms were located here. An aviation unit in Radviliškis was also designated for German intelligence matters. But the planes were not only used for intelligence; they also assisted during fighting against the Lithuanian army. The German leadership was afraid of Radviliškis falling into Lithuanian hands, because they would lose an important communications hub. Seeking to strengthen the defence of Radviliškis, a volunteer detachment under the command of Cordt von Brandis was sent from the Riga front as reinforcements. By 16 October, this detachment had reached Bauska.\footnote{Ibid.}

After the Bermontians and the Germans aiding them had occupied Šiauliai and Radviliškis, the Lithuanian military command decided to pull back even more of the army from the Bolshevik and Polish fronts and drive out the Bermontians first. Liatukas, the commander of the Lithuanian army, amassed a fairly large Lithuanian military force against the Bermontians: six infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, five artillery batteries, a railway company and other technical units.\footnote{Skorupskis V., _Kovos už Lietuvos laisvę. 1914–1934_, Kaunas, 1934, p. 108.}

The Lithuanian army’s clashes with the Bermontians took place as early as in mid-October 1919. On 20−22 October, a larger battle occurred near Linkačiai Railway Station (in the vicinity of Radviliškis), with the Bermontians using armoured trains. Seeking to avoid a larger conflict arising, representatives of the
Allies’ military mission in Kaunas sent von Eberhardt a warning telegram regarding the evacuation of German units from Lithuania and proposed negotiating a truce. These negotiations took place on 30 October in Šiauliai. Liatukas and von Eberhardt agreed to cease combat operations. German military units were obligated to pull out of Lithuania by 14 November. A line of demarcation was established between both armies along the Šiauliai–Tauragė railway line in the areas surrounding Joniškėlis and Radviliškis.\textsuperscript{115}

The last German unit to obey the orders of the German government, known as the von Diebitsch corps, left Lithuania on 15 November 1919. The German government would no longer accept responsibility for the units that did not pull out of Lithuania: the Iron Division, Cordt von Brandis’s volunteer corps, Gerhard Roßbach’s detachment and the German Legion.\textsuperscript{116}

On 10 October 1919, the Allies formed the Inter-Allied Commission for the Baltic Region, which oversaw the withdrawal of German troops and the control of the Baltic provinces, with French general Henri Albert Niessel designated as its chairman.\textsuperscript{117}

The formation of the Entente’s commission somewhat restricted the Bermontians’ level of activity on the front. On 11 November, Niessel’s commission arrived in Kaunas. Its members met with Lithuanian Prime Minister Ernestas Galvanauskas; President Antanas Smetona; Lieutenant General Pranas Liatukas, the supreme commander of the army; and other official representatives of the Lithuanian state. The removal of the Bermontians from Lithuania was discussed.

The Bermontians’ departure was hastened by the 11 November 1919 victory of the Latvian army in a battle against the Iron Division. After the defeat, the Iron Division and the German Legion headed toward Jelgava. On 15 November 1919, Bermondt and all of his units came under von Eberhardt’s care.\textsuperscript{118} It must be noted that the Latvian army’s battle with the Bermontians was supported by the British navy, which was positioned in the Gulf of Riga, and by Estonian military units.

A second reason for this switch was that the Bermontians’ provisioning considerably worsened after Germany declared that it was removing from the Baltic States all units that still answered to it.

\textsuperscript{115} Čepėnas P., \textit{Naujųjų laikų Lietuvos istorija}, t. 2, p. 555.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Niessel H., \textit{Vokiečių iškraustymas iš Baltijos kraštų}, Kaunas, 1938, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
At that time, the Lithuanian military command, in spite of Niessel’s prohibition, was also preparing for a pivotal fight against the Bermontians. The Seventh Infantry Regiment had already begun attacking in the direction of Raseiniai and Tauragė on 18 November. The Fifth Infantry Regiment was to attack in the direction of Šiauliai, while the First and Second struck toward Radviliškis and Šiauliai and the Fourth attacked in the direction of Stačiūnai and Meškuičiai. Cavalry units and the Pasvalys Battalion were to attack further north. The Bermontians held the stretch between Suostas, Kriukai, Pašvitinys, Lygumai, Radviliškis, Šiauliai, Šiluva, Viduklė and Jurbarkas. The plan called for the fateful blow to be delivered near Radviliškis.

Early in the morning of 21 November, enshrouded in thick fog, Lithuanian units went on the offensive. In some places, the enemy failed to withstand the unexpected strike and retreated. The Lithuanians broke through into Radviliškis while it was still dark, but after daybreak, under pressure from the enemy’s more powerful forces, they were forced to draw back.

That same day, late in the evening, the Lithuanians renewed their assault. The Lithuanian army dug in along the stretch between Kaunas, Šauliai and Riga. On 22 November at 07.00, the Lithuanians again attacked Radviliškis. The dogged, brutal fighting lasted the entire day, with the two sides even meeting in hand-to-hand combat. In the evening, the Bermontians were struck by a fateful blow and began fleeing toward Šiauliai, leaving behind sizeable riches: 15 aeroplanes,
8 cannons, 170 machine guns, 10 mortars and lots of ammunition.\textsuperscript{119}

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian army was successfully approaching Šiauliai. The Fifth Infantry Regiment succeeded in attacking the Bermontians between Šiauliai and Degučiai, blowing up the Šiauliai–Tauragė railway line and occupying Kurtuvėnai. Other Lithuanian military units also enjoyed success in their attacks. The Lithuanian army was preparing to continue its offensive, but the head of the Entente commission, Niessel, arrived in Radviliškis and demanded that the attack be called off. The front commander, Ladyga, circumventing Liatukas, the army’s supreme commander, issued orders to cease combat operations and allow the Bermontians to fall back from Lithuania comfortably.

Angered by this behaviour by the Inter-Allied Commission, Liatukas sent a telegram to Niessel, who was in Riga at the time, protesting that the latter’s officers – rather than addressing Liatukas – had given direct orders to his military units to terminate the fighting.\textsuperscript{120} Exasperated, Niessel called Prime Minister Galvanauskas and declared that if he received another telegram similar to that, he would demand that the Lithuanian army’s supreme commander be replaced within 24 hours.\textsuperscript{121} Wishing to avoid a conflict with the Inter-Allied Commission, the Lithuanians were forced to call off the offensive. Enjoying the protection of the Allies, the Bermontians again made themselves at home in Lithuanian lands, looting, murdering residents and showing no signs of eagerness to leave. The Inter-Allied Commission was also powerless to straighten them out.

Recognizing that the problem would not be solved through negotiations, Liatukas issued orders on 27 November for combat operations against the Bermontians to resume. Lithuanian soldiers occupied Joniškis Railway Station. Meanwhile, the Latvians had crushed the Bermontians and driven them out of Latvia. The shattered Bermontian columns headed across Lithuania toward Germany, plundering everything along the way. On 15 December 1919, the Lithuanian army pushed the last looting Bermontians out of Lithuanian territory and into East Prussia.

3.3.3. The Front Against Poland

As mentioned previously, the first armed clash with the Poles took place in the town of Vievis on 26 April 1919. That day, the Poles attacked Lithuanian guards.\textsuperscript{122} In order to prevent the burgeoning armed conflict from escalating, the Entente Powers initiated military negotiations between Polish and Lithuanian representatives in Vilnius on 20–21 May 1919. Because each side considered

\textsuperscript{119} Skorupskis V., \textit{Kovos už Lietuvos laisvę. 1914–1934}, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{120} Niessel H. A., \textit{Vokiečių iškraustymas iš Baltijos kraštų}, Kaunas, 1938, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Svarbiausių įvykių kronika, LVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 141, l. 67.
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Vilnius necessary for its military needs, the negotiations ended without having achieved anything. On 23 May, after the unsuccessful negotiations, the Lithuanian government addressed the Entente leadership regarding Poland’s harassment. It was emphasized that these attacks were interfering with the Lithuanian army’s ability to fight the Bolsheviks with all its might. In order to check the Poles’ intrusion into Lithuanian territory, an unattached Lithuanian military battalion was ordered to occupy a stretch in line with Čiobiškis, Ausieniškiai, Semeliškės and Jieznaš.

On 30 May, Wojciech Falewicz, the commandant of Poland’s Grodno Fortress, ordered the commanders of the Lithuanian army’s First Belarusian regiment, which was deployed in Grodno, to head to Slonim and join Polish general Adam Mokrzecki’s reserve group. The regiment did not obey this order. Then, on the evening of 1 June in Grodno, as a result of the refusal to join the Polish army, the Poles disarmed the First Belarusian Regiment and arrested the acting commander, Colonel Ivan Antonov. Some soldiers were captured, while others were absorbed into the army. Only the regiment’s cavalry troop, under the command of officer Mikas Glinskis, escaped and rode to Kaunas.

On 13 June, the Lithuanian government again addressed the Entente Supreme Council, requesting it to put pressure on the Polish leaders and have them call off their army’s attack. On 18 June 1919, the Entente established the first line of demarcation between the Lithuanian and Polish armies: Lyck (in Germany), Augustów (with the town of Augustów going to Poland), Sapotskin, the Augustów Canal, the Neman River up to the Ratnyčia, south through Varėna and five kilometres to the west of the railway line up to the town of Kazytiškis.

Neither the Lithuanians nor the Poles were satisfied with the demarcated line. On 20 June, the Polish government proposed a draft of a new demarcation line. On 9 July, Marshal Ferdinand Foch ordered the chief of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Paul Prosper Henrys, to demand that the Polish government pull its army back behind the demarcation line. However, the Poles did not obey. Marshal Foch’s chief of staff, General Maxime Weygand, explained the reason for the Poles’ refusal on 26 July, saying the Poles had violated...
the demarcation line because General Henrys, who was also the French general adviser to the Polish military command, had been given instructions to allow the Poles to occupy the ‘Polish’ territory that the Germans were leaving.\textsuperscript{132} This was an example of the French representative’s shameless, total disregard for Lithuanian interests.

That day, by order of the Entente Supreme Council, a second demarcation line was established between Lithuania and Poland, leaving to the aggressors the locations that they had managed to occupy in June and July. It was drawn along the borders of the Suwałki, Augustów and Sejny districts up to the Czarna Hańcza, then along it until it flowed into the Neman, then along the Neman up to Merkinė (with Merkinė left to Lithuania) and 12 kilometres to the west and north parallel to the Varėna–Vilnius–Daugavpils railway up to the front (with the railway left to Poland).\textsuperscript{133}

In mid-August, a third demarcation line was established. It granted Wiżajny, Puńsk, Berżniki, Varėna and the Varėna–Vilnius–Daugavpils railway to Poland. But the Poles were still dissatisfied. In order to justify their position before the Entente leadership, they began organizing a so-called ‘local residents’ uprising’. Starting on 22 August 1919, the Poles began to attack Lithuanian sentries throughout that section of the front. On that day, Poland attacked Lithuanian guards in Tartokas, Rusų Buda, Studziūnai and Frącki. A platoon

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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{The Seventh Artillery’s battery near Sejny in 1920}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{132} Навицкас К., Литва и Антанта, с. 62.
\textsuperscript{133} Žepkaitė R. Diplomatyja imperialismo tarpynoje, p. 47–48.
of approximately three hundred Polish partisans struck Sejny but were driven back. After the unsuccessful attack, it was announced that an uprising of ‘local residents’ had begun in the counties of Suwałki and Sejny and that General Falewicz’s brigade was coming from Augustów to assist them. At roughly 17.00, the Poles captured Sejny. The Poles incessantly attacked Lithuanian sentries in the counties of Sejny, Ukmergė and Utena. Aside from clashes on 27 August and 15, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28 and 29 September, no records exist of any others taking place. The Lithuanian government protested against these Polish actions and filed complaints with the military command of the Entente Powers. Finally, the généralissime of the Allied Armies, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, ordered Poland to pull its troops back behind the demarcation line, but the Poles did not listen and continued to attack Lithuanian soldiers.

In September 1919, with the Lithuanians engaged in decisive battles with the Red Army, the Poles attempted to initiate an overthrow of the Lithuanian government through the POW (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa). The plan was to occupy Kaunas for some time and – after bringing in the Polish army, which was positioned approximately forty or fifty kilometres away, for assistance – to dissolve the Lithuanian government, form a new cabinet of ministers and annex Lithuania to Poland. The coup d’état began as planned on the night of 28 August. Telegraph lines to certain Lithuanian regions were cut off, and some sentries were attacked in Kaunas. However, because Lithuanian intelligence managed to get hold of the POW’s documents and arrest its members, the coup was ultimately repressed, and the threat from this militant Polish organization was eliminated.

In October 1919, with the Lithuanians waging fairly intensive battles against the Bermontians, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Paderewski promised that, in seeking to support the Lithuanians’ and Latvians’ fight against the Bermontians, the Polish army would not cross the Lithuanian–Polish demarcation line. However, this promise would prove to be a mere political pledge. The next day, on 14 October, Poland occupied Balninkai, Šešuoliai, Želva, Bagaslaviškis and Barkai. On 15 October, the Poles attacked the Third Infantry Regiment’s positions near Rykantai, and the Lithuanians were forced to retreat after a battle that lasted the entire day. On 17 October, a Polish line from the village of Beržniki struck Lithuanian positions, but they were driven back. The Poles attempted to attack the Turmantas Lithuanian commandant’s headquarters on 19 October, about a hundred and fifty Poles came to the town of Alovė on 20 October, and

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137 Jėkabsonas E., „Lietuvos ir Latvijos santykiai 1919-1921 metais“, Lietuvos archyvai, t. 12, p. 98.
the Poles attacked Lithuanian sentries at roughly 22.00 of the same day near the town of Vištytis.\textsuperscript{138}

Once the fighting against the Bermontians had ceased, Lithuania enjoyed a half a year of relative peace, which it used to strengthen its military. On 1 January 1920, the Third Infantry Brigade was established. The brigades were restructured on 10 February into the First, Second and Third Infantry Divisions, each consisting of three infantry regiments and support units. War loot taken from the Bermontians significantly improved the Lithuanian army’s armament. The peaceful period was also successfully used for soldier and officer training.\textsuperscript{139}

Armed clashes lasted until July 1920. However, they were minor, and the Lithuanian military command believed that it might be possible to avoid more serious conflicts with the Poles, so they did not carry out more intensive preparations for possible large-scale military operations against Poland. Even on 29 August, on the very eve of the Polish attack, the command of the Suwałki front received a telephone message from the general staff in Kaunas saying that ‘it will be possible to avoid armed conflict with the Poles’.\textsuperscript{140}

In June 1920, with the election of the Constituent Assembly of Lithuania, the Lithuanian military command changed. Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinas Żukas was appointed minister of national defence, while Lieutenant General Maksimas Katche became the chief of the general staff.\textsuperscript{141} On 23 August, a new office was introduced in the Lithuanian army, that of the commander of the

\textsuperscript{138} Karčys, 1929, Nr. 40, p. 662, 678; Vitkauskas V., „Mūsų pėstininkai“, Mūsų žinynas, 1928, t. 15, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{140} Lietuvos Armijos karo dienynas, LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 179, l. 6 a.p.
\textsuperscript{141} Lietuvos krašto apsaugos ministrų ir kariuomenės vadų, t. 2, V., 2008, p. 69–70.
army, who was the supreme military commander’s head assistant for formations. Lieutenant Colonel Kazys Ladyga, the commander of the First Division, was appointed to this position. At the end of June 1920, Žukas received an encoded telegram from Lithuania’s military representative in Moscow, General Staff Colonel Konstantinas Kleščinskis, informing him that the Red Army would be attacking the Poles in July along the stretch between Švenčionėliai and Vileika. It was proposed that Lithuania transfer three of its divisions there in advance and strike the retreating Poles. The government was faced with a decision. After giving everything serious consideration, it was decided to remain strictly neutral in this conflict between Soviet Russia and Poland. However, given the situation, whereby Lithuania could be dragged into hostilities at any moment, Žukas began to demand that a supreme military commander be appointed immediately. On 7 July, the president appointed Žukas himself to temporarily serve in this challenging, high-level capacity.

As had been reported in advance, the Red Army attacked Poland on 12 July. The Polish army retreated in a panic. Orders were issued to the Lithuanian army not to participate in combat operations but to intern Polish military units and

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142 Įsakymas kariuomenei Nr. 417, 1920 m. rugpjūčio 26 d.
143 Įsakymas kariuomenei Nr. 379, 1920 m. liepos 13 d.
individual soldiers who crossed the border. On that same day, a peace treaty was signed between Lithuania and Soviet Russia. Under this treaty, Vilnius was recognized as being Lithuania’s. Žukas appointed the energetic and clever Captain Vladas Kurkauskas as Vilnius commandant and sent him to Vilnius along with a commandant’s company under the command of Lieutenant Eduardas Berentas.

On 14 July, the Polish leader, Piłsudski, signed an order to transfer Vilnius to the Lithuanians. However, when the Lithuanians began their march, the Poles fired upon them near Rykantai, so the Vilnius commandant’s soldiers did not enter Vilnius until 12.00 on 15 July. They found the Red Army soldiers were there already, although there were no disagreements between the two sides. As the Poles retreated, the Lithuanian army began to take over areas recognized as Lithuania’s in the 12 July treaty with Soviet Russia.

However, the situation quickly changed. In mid-August, with the Red Army retreating under pressure from the Poles, a clash took place between the Polish army and the Lithuanian army’s Marijampolė group. In order to avoid larger clashes, negotiations began between representatives of the Lithuanian and Polish governments, with the Entente Powers mediating. The Polish delegation arrived in Kaunas on 26 August. Negotiating with it were Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Konstantinas Žukas, Colonel Konstantinas Kleščinskis and Lieutenant Colonel Kazys Ladyga. Representatives of the Polish military mission proposed the formation of a military convention. They sought, first, a guarantee that the Polish army’s left wing would be safe while fighting the Red Army, and second, permission for the Polish army to use Lithuanian territory.

The Polish representatives had hoped that, after their victories over the Red Army, the Lithuanians would be more accommodating and would agree to the proposed conditions. However, during the negotiations, Žukas took a hard line and argued that, before forming a military convention, it was necessary to clearly establish the borders of both states, which Poland would respect after the war, because Poland had already violated the demarcation line established by the Entente Powers on more than one occasion. Because the Polish delegation was not authorized to decide territorial matters, the question of a military convention became moot.

Meanwhile, the Polish Council of National Defence met on 27 August to

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145 Žukas K., Žvilgsnis į praeitį, p. 283.
146 Čepėnas P., Naujųjų laikų Lietuvos istorija, t. 2, p. 594.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., p. 594–595.
consider the question of Lithuanian–Polish relations. During this meeting, an idea for how to fight the Red Army occurred to Polish Chief of State Piłsudski – that by performing a manoeuvre over Lithuanian territory, they could swing around the side of the Russians.\(^ {149}\) During the negotiations in Kaunas, the Entente Powers’ representative, Constantin Reboul, announced that a clash between Lithuanians and Poles had occurred in southern Suvalkija. He advised the Polish delegation's leader, Colonel Mieczysław Mackiewicz, to head to the front and reconcile the warring parties. Mackiewicz immediately departed for Suvalkija. Only Rittmeister Adem Romer stayed behind to negotiate. He continued to propose the formation of a military convention, informing the Lithuanians of Poland's actions against the Bolsheviks.\(^ {150}\) Soon, the Lithuanian military command received specific information that, on 28 August, the Poles had begun attacking the Lithuanians, first in the Augustów region and then, having occupied Augustów, marching onward to Suvalkija.\(^ {151}\) The negotiations with Poland broke off.

On 31 August, the Poles occupied Suwałki and Sejny. Why did this happen? Apparently, at that time, the Lithuanians perceived the greatest danger as coming from the Red Army and concentrated their army on Grodno. The Poles captured Suwałki and Sejny almost without resistance. Besides, the Poles were supported by France. French general Monvill issued an ultimatum,

\(^ {150}\) Ibid., p. 596.
\(^ {151}\) LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 286, l. 45.
demanding that Suwałki and Sejny be transferred to Poland. After the division commander defied this demand, he called the Lithuanian army’s general staff, from which he received instructions to draw back from Suwałki and Sejny. The Second Infantry Division’s command regrouped the military units known to it, seeking to block the Poles from penetrating into the depths of Lithuania. On 1 September, orders came from Lithuanian military command to occupy Suwałki and Augustów. The Lithuanians rallied quickly and, on 2 September, attacked the Poles near Augustów. Sejny changed hands several times. However, the Poles circumvented Lithuanian military units via forests and attacked. On 5 September, the Lithuanian army was forced to retreat. For the next few days, only small skirmishes took place with the Poles.

In September 1920, Konstantinas Žukas and part of the Ministry of National Defence relocated to Vilnius. On 16 September, negotiations with Poland were renewed in Kalvarija. This time, the Poles made demands of Lithuania that no self-respecting state could accept. They demanded that the army be pulled back behind the Foch line before negotiations could continue. When the Lithuanians refused, the negotiations broke off. Then the Poles, having mustered six infantry
and two cavalry regiments, attacked along the stretch between Žagarė and Giby. On 22 September, a catastrophe befell the Lithuanian army along that stretch. Poland began the attack on the morning of 22 September, but not simultaneously along the entire stretch of the front – earlier in some places and later in others. A blow was struck along stretches separating regiments on the Second Division’s section. Until noon, the division commander continued to believe that this was an attack by small Polish units only and did not comprehend the attack’s objective. When the Polish manoeuvre became clear in the evening, it was too late to do anything. Before the sun set, the Second and Eighth Infantry Regiments had already been taken prisoner, while the Fifth and Sixth Infantry Regiments were retreating. There was no chance of a defence, and a hurried retreat was the only option after the realization of the essence of the Polish manoeuvre. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Without doubt, the greatest blame for this catastrophe belongs to Ladyga, the army’s commander, yet Žukas, the supreme military commander, is no less at fault.

After the failure in the Augustów forests, Žukas replaced the army commander; Ladyga was succeeded by General Silvestras Žukauskas. Žukas also gave orders for the Third Infantry Division to head toward Vilnius. On 2 October, Žukas issued a call for the men of Lithuania to volunteer for the Lithuanian army.

As Lithuania protested against the Polish campaigns, Poland’s government justified itself by claiming that this was necessitated by the war against the Bolsheviks. Finally, Poland proposed again to continue negotiations in Suwałki. These began on 29 September. On 7 October 1920, the Suwałki Agreement was signed. Yet on the morning of 8 October, specific information was received that, in violation of the newly signed agreement, the Poles, commanded by, in the words of the Polish military command, the ‘mutinous’ Major
General Lucjan Żeligowski, were marching toward Vilnius in several columns.

Unfortunately, Lithuania did not have the strength needed for a defence of Vilnius. General Żukauskas tried anyway, issuing such an order on the morning of 8 October. It must be assumed that he lacked sufficient information about the enemy’s actions and forces and his army’s positions, because, on that same day at about 14.00, he ordered a retreat. Otherwise, a catastrophe similar to the one near Sejny could have occurred, although perhaps on a smaller scale. Vilnius was defended from the attacking Polish army by only two infantry battalions and one cavalry troop. On 8 October, another battalion was hurriedly deployed from Vilnius to meet the enemy. It was impossible to muster greater forces. Meanwhile, Vilnius was being attacked by two infantry and two cavalry brigades with ample artillery, although there were other reports that three or four infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades were operating.\textsuperscript{160}

The Lithuanians quickly regrouped their existing forces and, after tremendous efforts, held the Poles along the stretch between Musninkai, Širvintos, Giedraičiai and Dubingiai. Particularly difficult fighting took place here on 17–21 November. The Poles attacked Širvintos and pushed out the Lithuanian units. Nine Polish cavalry troops broke forth beyond the front line and began to encircle the Lithuanian army’s left wing. Knowing that the

\textsuperscript{160} Ališauskas K. „Plk. K. Žuko „Žvilgsnis į praeitį“ (Pastabos ir nuomonės)“, Karys, 1959, Nr. 8, p. 247.
The Lithuanian army was weaker; the Poles had decided to occupy all of Lithuania. They planned to splinter the Lithuanian front and, after positioning themselves behind the army, attack from two directions. The Lithuanian army’s situation had become more complicated.

Meanwhile, in Hussar barracks in Kaunas, formation of the Second Uhlan Regiment began. Having arrived there, the army’s commander, Žukauskas, ordered a troop to be formed and sent immediately to Jonava. Jonava’s bridge and railway station had to be defended against an invasion by Polish horsemen. The troop was formed and sent out at once. On 18 November in Ukmergė, Juozas Lanskoronskis, First Division chief of staff, submitted a plan proposal for how to stop the Polish attack to Edvardas Adamkavičius, the division commander. The division commander agreed with the proposal and ordered the plan to be carried out. As part of the plan’s implementation, on 19–21 November, the Lithuanians crushed Żeligowski’s ‘Lithuanian-Belarusian Brigade’, captured Širvintos and created conditions for taking back Giedraičiai. The Poles were being pushed in the direction of Vilnius. However, due to the intervention of the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations, the Lithuanian army’s attack was stopped on 21 November at 09.00. Further attacks would have

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3.20. Soldiers from the Polish army’s Grodno Infantry Regiment, which was operating near Širvintos in November 1920, with their commander (centre)
been difficult, because the army had experienced sizeable losses in earlier fighting. Żeligowski’s group also suffered heavy losses, because, with Poland professing that Żeligowski had risen up against the official government and was carrying out an independent operation, there was no chance of providing the group with any support, as the Entente representatives were watching closely. On 29 November 1920, a demarcation line with Poland was established.¹⁶⁴ At the end of the fight for independence, with the Lithuanian army having defended Lithuanian independence, the army’s authority grew significantly, even though the capital and a third of the country’s territory had been lost. This was a force that residents could depend on, trusting that, when the need arose, it would again defend Lithuania and free the capital, Vilnius.

3.4. The Burden of the War

3.4.1. Size and Provisioning of the Forces

The questions arise of how sizeable the forces included in the war for Lithuania’s independence were and what the economic costs of this war were. Lithuania began the fight for independence with only a rudiment of a military: two incomplete infantry regiments in Alytus and Kaunas, a Hussar troop, the Kaunas city and county commandant’s unit and, in Grodno, the germ of a Baltic Belarusian regiment (about two hundred and fifty soldiers) and a Baltic Belarusian cavalry troop. Smaller commandants’ and defence units had also begun to form.

With these commandants’ units, the number of Lithuanian volunteers equalled approximately four thousand to four and a half thousand people at that time. However, these forces were spread out, poorly organized and inadequately armed, with insufficient numbers of Russian and German guns and a few machine guns that used various systems.¹⁶⁵

At the time of the battle for independence, Lithuania formed its military, which included all types of armed forces except a navy, because Lithuania had no need to carry out military operations on the sea at that time. Thirteen infantry regiments, a cavalry, an artillery, an air force, and all the necessary provisioning services and military medical services were established. Starting in mid-1919, an average of 25,000 soldiers were active in the Lithuanian military, and during a critical period (in 1920, when Polish forces under the command of Żeligowski broke the terms of the truce), with volunteers again being summoned and

¹⁶⁵ Lesčius V., Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920, p. 39.
a mobilization announced, the Lithuanian army grew to 40,600 soldiers.\textsuperscript{166} Lithuania had to devote a large part of its scarce resources to maintain such an army and go into battle.

However, an army’s strength is measured not only by the number of individuals employed but also by the firepower of its weapons. The Lithuanians managed to arm their army fairly well. Sources of weaponry included arms obtained and purchased from Germany, loot captured from the crushed Bermontians, weapons taken on the battlefield from the Red Army and Polish army and those procured from France and the USA. The total number of weapons obtained between 27 January 1919 and the end of 1920 was as follows:\textsuperscript{167}

### 3.1. Total number of weapons obtained between 27 January 1919 and the end of 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guns (various)</td>
<td>42,960 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Carbines (various)</td>
<td>4,624 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Machine guns (various)</td>
<td>956 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cannons</td>
<td>118 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>1,987 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Swords</td>
<td>976 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bayonets</td>
<td>26,029 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mortars (various)</td>
<td>27 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bomb-throwers</td>
<td>16 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Telescopic sights</td>
<td>941 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>198,827 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Horsemen’s pitch</td>
<td>273 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Gun and machine gun ammunition</td>
<td>30,689,603 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Cannonballs (various)</td>
<td>230,467 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pistol ammunition</td>
<td>469,495 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mortar mines (various)</td>
<td>14,224 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mines for various systems</td>
<td>41,305 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Aircraft bombs</td>
<td>14,265 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td>129,670 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Grenades (various)</td>
<td>52,979 units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing the forces that the Red Army pitted against the Lithuanian army is more difficult, because the Lithuanian army was battling both the Soviet

Lithuanian Army, which was also fighting the Poles, and the Soviet Latvian Army, which was also fighting the Latvian army. Besides, they were constantly being supplemented and reformed, and their subordination often changed. Yet at the beginning of hostilities in February 1919, the Pskov division had 6,875 bayonets, 8 ordnances, 40 horsemen and a few support units. The Panevėžys group, which belonged to Soviet Latvia, had mustered about five thousand soldiers. Thus, the Red Army had about twelve thousand men in Lithuania, not including support units. This significantly exceeded the number of soldiers the Lithuanian army had at that time. Later, when a few Red Army regiments were transferred to the front against Lithuania, this number grew drastically.

With the Bermontians, the situation was somewhat more straightforward. Bermondt had approximately fifty thousand soldiers under his command. The main Bermontian forces were concentrated in Latvia, while it was mostly Colonel Virgolich’s corps that was deployed in Lithuania – roughly twelve thousand soldiers. But at the end of October 1919, Virgolich’s forces began to be strengthened by German units, and as the Bermontians were pushed out of Latvia, their remainder came over to Lithuanian territory. Thus, the Bermontian forces grew in number, but their fighting ability had already weakened significantly, and the Lithuanian army was superior.

It is difficult to say exactly what kind of Polish forces were deployed in Lithuania over almost two years of combat against the Lithuanian army. Some units arrived, while others departed. During the period of 1919–1920, the following fought against Lithuania for various durations: 36 infantry regiments, 15 cavalry regiments, 13 artillery regiments, 4 artillery divisions and 3 engineer regiments.

Lithuania’s 1918–1919 total budgetary revenues equalled 191,361,200 auksinai, while in 1920 they amounted to 422,525,000 auksinai. The Ministry of National Defence’s expenses totalled 63,673,000 auksinai in 1918–1919 and 236,596,900 auksinai in 1920. Thus, in 1918–1919, of all state budget funds, 33.2% was used for the creation of the army, procurement of weapons, maintaining the army and carrying out combat operations, while in 1920 the corresponding figure was 55.9%. These were only the direct budgetary appropriations, but this money was insufficient for an army fighting on three fronts. Therefore, when necessary, the army resorted to requisitioning from residents, for which compensation was paid after the War of Liberation concluded. Thus, enormous funds were assigned to the army and the struggle for independence, and this encumbered a population that had already been impoverished by World War I. Additionally, the state had to take out loans that later had to be repaid with interest. Yet the resources that were put in paid off handsomely; Lithuania won its independence.
Leaders arise in every war, with some shining more brightly and others less so. In the war for independence between Lithuania and Soviet Russia, recognition as the most important leader on the Lithuanian side must undoubtedly go to the supreme commander of the Lithuanian army, General Silvestras Žukauskas.

Even though clashes between Lithuanian military units and Bermontian units took place from the summer of 1919, one of the most famous roles in the closing stages of the battles against the Bermontians was played by Lieutenant General Pranas Liatukas, who served as minister of national defence and supreme commander of the army from 10 October 1919.

Combat against the Bermontians was directly organized by Lieutenant Colonel Kazys Ladyga, commander of the Bermontian front, which was formed in summer 1919.

In the battles against Poland, important contributions were made by Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinas Žukas.

Having become minister of national defence on 19 June 1920, he later served as supreme commander of the army.

During Lithuania’s difficult days fighting Poland, even though the more powerful enemy ripped away a third of Lithuania’s land, it did not manage to annex the whole of Lithuania. Significant credit for this goes to Konstantinas Žukas.

It is difficult to say who the leaders on the Red Army’s side were. There were no bright stars among the military commanders who could be called leaders in the struggle against the Lithuanian army. It was opposed by the armies of two artificially-created Soviet republics – Soviet Lithuania and Soviet Latvia – although, in reality, they were both part of the Red Army. In addition, the armies of Soviet Lithuania and Soviet Latvia were both restructured and renamed on several occasions in less than a year; their military units were altered and so forth, so no bright leader can be singled out.

The Bermontians were commanded by Colonel Pavel Bermondt-Avalov.
The Bermontian Second Volunteer Corps, which was deployed in Lithuanian territory, was under the direct command of Colonel Yevgeny Virgolich.

Among the Polish army’s undoubted leaders was Brigadier General Edward Rydz-Śmigły.

After Piłsudski became Poland’s ruler on 11 November 1918, Rydz-Śmigły led the Polish army’s battles against the Red Army and the Lithuanian army.

In violation of the Suwałki Agreement, Lieutenant General Lucjan Żeligowski’s Polish army group invaded Lithuania in October 1920. Although officially Żeligowski was this group’s commander, he was actually just the executor of Józef Piłsudski’s instructions.

3.5. Lithuania’s Allies

As mentioned previously, over the course of the struggle for independence, Lithuania had allies during various moments of combat, but relations with them were fairly complicated.

The first ally – the first entity to recognize Lithuania as an independent state, and the first party to help re-establish Lithuania’s army – was Germany. However, these German actions were of a more forced nature, mostly due to Germany’s defeat in World War I. Thus, this ally was not entirely trustworthy, because its demoralized army, located in Lithuania and influenced by the Spartacus League, posed a constant threat to Lithuania’s governmental institutions and fledgling armed forces. This ally’s trustworthiness increased somewhat when
newly-arrived Saxon volunteer units joined the battles against the Red Army. The first conscripted German volunteer units, mostly from Saxony, arrived in December 1918 in Suvalkija. In January 1919, there were 30 officers and 3,500 soldiers who arrived in Kaunas from Saxony.

The German military command in Lithuania had formed three infantry regiments from Saxon volunteers – the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth – with two battalions in each regiment, one unattached battalion in Raseiniai, four artillery batteries, one troop of horsemen, one engineer company, one communications detachment and an auto detachment. This whole group was integrated into the forty-sixth (Saxon) reserve division, which was named the Forty-sixth Saxon Volunteer Division. It was deployed along the stretch between Alytus, Vilkaviškis, Kaišiadorys and Kaunas. In mid-February 1919, having replaced the Kaunas commandant’s volunteer units, the forty-fifth German reserve division was deployed north of Kaunas, along the Jonava–Kėdainiai stretch. However, at the end of March 1919, it was recalled from the front. The Forty-sixth Saxon Volunteer Division’s Eighteenth Regiment took its place.

On 11 January 1919, in place of units from the Eighth German Army from East Prussia, who had drawn back from Šiauliai, a battalion of soldiers was deployed that occupied the Tilžė–Šiauliai road up to Kelmė. The German military command transferred a cavalry troop from Raseiniai to Kaunas.

Four battalions of Saxon volunteers actively assisted the Lithuanians in fighting the Red Army. Most active was the Saxon Eighteenth Infantry Volunteer Regiment, under the command of Major W. Zeschau. Initially, it operated in conjunction with the detached Panevėžys Battalion, then later with the First Infantry Regiment.
The Saxon Nineteenth Infantry Regiment almost constantly defended Kaunas from Bolshevik attacks on the section between Jieznas, Žiežmariai and Kaišiadorys. The Saxon Twentieth Infantry Regiment was organized in Grodno and defended the city from Bolshevik attacks. After Grodno was transferred to the Poles under the agreement of 5 February 1919, the Saxon Twentieth Infantry Regiment arrived in Kaišiadorys on 30 April, but it did not participate in battles against the Bolsheviks.

The battles against the Red Army for Utena and Kupiškis were the last in which Saxon volunteer units participated. At the demand of the Entente Powers and on the orders of the German government, German volunteer reserve corps units began to return from Lithuania to Germany on 1 July 1919. At the beginning of July, the Saxon Nineteenth and Twentieth Volunteer Infantry Regiments drew back from the region of Kaišiadorys and headed to Germany by way of Vilkaviškis.

Having captured Utena and Kupiškis, the Saxon Eighteenth Volunteer Infantry Regiment pulled back from the front at the beginning of June and departed to Germany via Kaunas. Saxon units and their staffs left Kaunas on 11 July, with locals escorting them and amiably bidding them farewell. On 9 July 1919, General Walter von Eberhardt, the commander of the volunteer corps, also departed Kaunas.

Only one detached Saxon battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Karl von Diebitsch, remained in Lithuania, in the vicinity of Raseiniai. This battalion did not participate in battles against the Bolsheviks, instead switching to the Bermontian side once Lithuania began fighting the Bermontians.

After these Saxon volunteer units departed in July 1919 and the Lithuanian army grew stronger, becoming capable of fighting for its state’s interests on its own, the significance of Germany as an ally was reduced, because representatives of the Entente Powers, fresh from their victory in World War I, began to gain greater influence in Lithuania.

The Republic of Latvia was also Lithuania’s ally in the fight against the Red Army. On 1 March 1919, Mykolas Sleževičius’s government entered into a mutual assistance treaty with Latvia, agreeing to coordinate combat operations against this power. Latvia granted Lithuania the right to ship in an unlimited quantity of military materials and other goods via the port at Liepāja. Lithuania could keep a military unit in Liepāja to protect the imported goods. Lithuania granted Latvia a loan of 5 million marks, coordinated combat operations during battles and supported the Latvian army.

Both of these states were allies in the battles against the Bermontians, as well. The main combat burden fell on Latvia, because the Bermontians sought to completely eliminate the Latvian state. In the struggle against the Bermontians, Germany was on
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the side of the Bermontians, because this military group had actually been organized by Germany in order to maintain its influence in the Baltics.

Even though the Republic of Latvia was Lithuania's most loyal ally in the battles against the Red Army and the Bermontians, disagreements over certain territory arose between these states in 1920. Moreover, in October 1920, after the Polish army, under the command of General Żeligowski, began to attack the Lithuanian army, the Latvian army took advantage of Lithuania's difficult situation and pushed the Lithuanian army out of the Daugavpils region, even though the Lithuanians – who had freed it from the Red Army – had hoped that local residents would determine the region's dependence in a referendum.

In the battles against Poland, Lithuania did not have a clear ally. After the peace treaty of 12 July 1920 between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation, these two states became – especially after Poland went on the offensive against the Red Army and, with it, the Lithuanian army – de facto allies, even though there were no agreements between them regarding joint combat operations against Poland. Pressured by the front's conditions, they supported each other in combat situations, even though mistrust and animosity remained on both sides due to the recent battles between them. Thus, this alliance was temporary and not very steady.

Considering what has been presented, the conclusion can be drawn that during the struggle for independence, Lithuania did not have a single faithful and reliable ally and had to mostly rely on its own abilities.

3.6. The Duration of the War

As mentioned before, Lithuania fought its war for independence, which lasted two years, against three enemies – in reality, on three fronts.

Organized battles against the Red Army began on 1 February 1919 and continued until 4 January 1920. Thus, the war against Soviet Russia lasted for 337 days. During that period, combat operations were not recorded in surviving documents for 43 days, meaning that they did not take place on these days. There were seven such days in February and eleven in March. This latter month, after the first serious battles, was relatively calm. Documents do not record any combat operations from 15 to 20 March or from 29 March to 1 April. In April, there was no combat on seven days: 10, 11, 14, 21, 22, 24 and 25 April. There were two such days in June, one in July, three in September, six in October, no days without combat in November and two days in December. The last clash with the Red Army took place on 3 January 1920, when Lithuanian scouts crossed the Daugava and attacked the Red Army for the last time. Thus, combat operations against the Red Army took place on 211 days.
When Lithuanian soldiers first clashed with the Bermontians (28 August), both sides initially tried to avoid open clashes, so they took place on only seven days in September, increasing significantly in October and November. Documents show only six days in October without any skirmishes, while November had only one such day. Starting from the beginning of December, when the Bermontian evacuation to Germany began and the Lithuanian army marched in pursuit of the retreating Bermontians, Lithuanian soldiers encountered only small groups of left-over, looting Bermontians. Essentially, these were only minor operations to liquidate bandits. The war with the Bermontians lasted for 109 days. Military clashes were not recorded for 32 of them. Fighting took place on 77 days.

On the Polish front, the combat took place with varying degrees of intensity, because the Entente Powers and Lithuania tried to stop it in every way possible. In 1919, if we consider the beginning of combat operations to be 26 April, there were no armed clashes recorded for 131 of 250 days. Clashes or combat, on a greater or lesser scale, took place on 119 days. There was almost no combat in May 1919 – only four days’ worth. Later, skirmishes became more frequent. The longest period without any combat was 13 days, between 9 and 21 August 1919.

In 1920 on the Polish front, there were 13 days without combat in January, 10 each in February and March, 13 in April, 6 each in May and June and 8 in July. The fewest engagements between the Lithuanian army and Poland took place in August, when the Red army crushingly forced the Polish army to retreat and the Lithuanian army simply took over areas abandoned by the Poles.

3.28. The Lithuanian army’s Tenth Infantry, Marijampolė Regiment, First Machine Gun Company on the front near Vilnius. 1920
During this month, the longest period without any clashes lasted from 29 July until 24 August, i.e. 26 days. The reason for this was that the Red Army pushed Polish military units back almost to Warsaw, and battles took place in Polish territory. In September, combat took place on all but three days, while October and November did not feature a single day without any armed conflict. Combat ceased on 30 November 1920 with the signing of a truce agreement. The war with Poland lasted for 584 days. Of these, 224 were free of combat. Clashes of various sizes occurred on 360 days.

Because Lithuania had to carry out the fight for independence on no fewer than three fronts in 1919, that year the Lithuanian army did not engage in combat operations (i.e. it was not possible to find data in historical sources that any kind of combat took place on those days) on only seven days: 7 February, 11 March, 7 April, 2 May, 2 June and 27 and 28 December, while from July to November there was not a single day without any military engagements.

The longest gap between direct armed clashes was the aforementioned period between 29 July and 24 August.

3.29. Number of days of combat with Lithuania's enemies per month
Every war is directly related to losses of some degree. First of all, the warring sides experience manpower losses on the battlefield, and buildings and equipment are destroyed during combat. Civilian losses are also unavoidable during battle. Additionally, every warring side strives to cause the other side as much damage as possible in order to weaken and defeat it. These are direct war losses, which can be calculated with relative ease. However, in addition to these direct losses, there are also indirect losses that are caused by war: casualties among residents reduce the population, warring sides reorganizing their economies for military purposes experience gigantic economic losses, and so forth. In truth, damage is caused to all aspects of life in the state. Calculating these losses is somewhat more difficult, and various degrees of error are possible.

Calculating the losses experienced by Lithuania during its war for independence is very difficult, because the figures, particularly for indirect losses, blend with Lithuania’s losses incurred during World War I, and dividing them into two parts is difficult at best and impossible at worst. As a result, we cannot provide the exact losses incurred by Lithuania during the War of Liberation.

3.7.1. Lithuanian Soldier Casualties

The first person to provide a generalized figure of casualties in the war for Lithuanian independence was Petras Rusekas in *Lietuvos kariuomenė*. He states that ‘during all of the wars and battles for Lithuanian independence, 2,611 officers and soldiers died from wounds or epidemics and other diseases. The number of injured totalled 1,153. Of the injured, 155 became disabled.’

In Volume I of Rusekas’s 1937 memoirs, *Savanorių Žygiai – Nepriklausomybės kary atsiminimai*, the surnames, dates of death and burial locations of all of the dead are presented. According to this list, 1,444 soldiers, riflemen and partisans

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died during the war for Lithuanian independence, while the total including those who died from injuries and various diseases equalled 4,256.¹⁶⁹ In 1919, 530 soldiers were killed in battle against the Russian Bolsheviks and Bermontians. During battles against the Poles in 1919–1920, there were 232 soldiers who perished. In battles against Želigowski’s Poles, 222 soldiers died. Eighteen soldiers and guards were killed protecting the demarcation line with Poland. Ninety-six soldiers died from their wounds. A total of 163 of the wounded became disabled. During those battles, 2,611 injured or gravely ill soldiers were treated in military hospitals.¹⁷⁰ According to data collected by Ruseckas, in 1919–1927, there were 1,146 Lithuanian army soldiers held by the enemy as prisoners.

However, Stasys Raštikis has doubts about these data. He indicates that, although all of the information published in Major Petras Ruseckas’s book was taken from the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence’s military health board, in Raštikis’s opinion, some of the numbers, especially those of the injured, were incomplete. As noted by Raštikis, in 1928 the army staff had published the following information about the injured in Mūsų žinynas: 2,463 soldiers were injured in 1919–1920, and 67 soldiers were injured in 1921–1926, which totals 2,530.¹⁷¹

On 15 April 1927, the Ministry of National Defence formed a commission for administrating soldiers’ graves, which was chaired by Lieutenant Colonel

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³³. At the graves of Lithuanian soldiers on All Saints’ Day

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 54–55.
¹⁷¹ Raštikis S., Įvykiai ir žmonės, t. 3, p. 181.
Vytautas Augustauskas, the head of the chief of staff’s maintenance division. The commission took care of the graves of Lithuanian army soldiers not only in Lithuania but also in Latvia – specifically, Lithuanian soldiers’ graves at cemeteries in Červonka, Subate, Bebrene, Ilūkste, Svente and Grīva.

This commission checked all existing files, lists and registration cards and drafted a ‘list of officers and soldiers who died in combat or on duty’. As far as the commission knew (in 1928), 1,366 men were killed or died of their wounds on the battlefield or on duty, of whom 57 were officers and four were military officials. Those perishing from various injuries and diseases numbered 2,812, with 226 missing in action, making a total of 4,404 individuals.172

The commission in charge of administrating soldiers’ graves and the army’s staff added 78 riflemen and partisans to the number of those killed in action and arrived at the conclusion that a total of 1,444 soldiers, riflemen and partisans died in the war for Lithuanian independence, while the total including those who died from injuries and various illnesses at that time equalled 4,256 individuals.173 This figure should, apparently, be considered final. The sacrifices made during the struggle for Lithuania’s independence represented 0.196% of the total population of Lithuania at that time.174

It was not possible to determine the losses incurred during the war by the enemies who fought the Lithuanian army, because the Red Army units fighting Lithuania were constantly changing, as was their direct subordination. For example, the Fifteenth Western Army’s Pskov division was renamed the ‘Lithuanian division’ on 21 January 1919 and was then reformed as two ‘Lithuanian divisions’. On 13 March, the Western Army was renamed the ‘Lithuanian-Belarusian Army’. On 9 May, the Latvian Army became the XV Army, while the Lithuanian-Belarusian Army became the XVI Army. Finally, on 21 July 1919, the remainders of the two Lithuanian divisions and the former Soviet Latvian and Soviet Estonian Armies formed the Fifteenth Western Army’s Fourth Rifle Division, with Red Army regiments that had Lithuanian or Latvian names included in it. Out of fourteen Latvian regiments, only one kept its Latvian name, while six received numbers from 472 to 477 and the other seven regiments were completely disbanded.175 When heading to battle, the regiments of the Soviet Lithuanian Army and Soviet Latvian Army were often transferred and their subordination was changed. Furthermore, cumulative data about the casualties incurred by the individual units of the Red Army’s Fifteenth Western Army are only stored in the Russian State Military Historical Archive for April 1920 onwards. However, we would think that the

172 Ibid., p. 182.
173 Ibid., p. 183.
174 Ibid.
175 Журнал военных действий 15-ой армии, RSMA, f. 200, ap. 3, b. 725, l. 73–74.
number killed should not be lower than that of Lithuania's losses. In the Russian State Military Historical Archive, an 11 July 1919 report was found, written by a Soviet Latvian Army deputy inspector about an inspection of the Soviet Latvian Army's Eleventh Rifle Regiment. The deputy inspector stated that, during battle against the Lithuanian army and while retreating, the regiment lost 1,030 fighters, or 59% of the regiment. Thus, the losses were enormous, but the report does not indicate how many of the losses were deaths. Yet, considering the aforementioned information, it can undoubtedly be asserted that their losses were no fewer than 1,000 individuals.

It was not possible to find the Bermontians' casualty data either, because the Bermontians were battling the Latvian and Lithuanian armies simultaneously, and then – after being pushed out to Germany – they were eventually disbanded. Accounting was not carried out during battle, and it was not possible to find data on how many of them died or moved on to somewhere else. The surviving Lithuanian historical sources include only individual, specific assertions. For example, on 21 November, near the Hill of Crosses, the Lithuanian army's Fourth Infantry Regiment intercepted a Bermontian train. During the battle, which included the participation of the Lithuanian artillery, roughly one hundred Bermontians died. Even though these numbers cannot be trusted absolutely without any sources from the other side, adding up all of the deaths and heavy injuries that are mentioned as taking place during all engagements results in a total of about three hundred Bermontian soldiers.

According to Major Aleksandras Ružancovas, losses among Polish soldiers equalled 264. This assertion cannot be trusted entirely, because Ružancovas did not specify the source from which this number was taken. Moreover, it is clear from his work that he calculated this number from figures published in Polish literature, yet the literature at that time had not covered all of the military units that had fought against Lithuania. Nevertheless, considering that 232 Lithuanian soldiers had died in battles against the Poles before Żeligowski's invasion, the number should be correct. For instance, in battles with Lithuanian soldiers, forty-five soldiers from the Polish Legions First Regiment were killed, the Legions Fifth Regiment lost five, the Seventy-sixth Lida Infantry Regiment had about fifty killed, forty soldiers from the Eighty-fifth Vilnius Rifle Regiment were either killed or died from injuries, the Two Hundred and Fifth Jan Kiliński Volunteer Infantry Regiment lost approximately twenty, etc.

When Lithuania was attacked by the group commanded by General

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Żeligowski, the Polish losses should have been greater than before, because Żeligowski’s army attacked – and the Lithuanian army resisted – extremely tenaciously, with the Polish army experiencing its greatest losses precisely during this period. Thus, apparently, it should be possible to assert that Polish losses ought to be no fewer than 1,000 soldiers.

In general, the losses incurred during the wars that Poland undertook in 1918–1920 were huge: 17,213 were killed, including 1,074 officers; 30,338 died from their wounds, of which 985 were officers; and 113,518 were injured, of which 9,308 were officers. A total of 642 officers were among the 51,351 missing in action. Deserters numbered 38,909.180

3.7.2. Lithuania’s Economic Losses

At the conclusion of the fight for independence, calculation began of the losses incurred. A High Commission was formed for this purpose. In response to losses caused by the Russians, 28,000 declarations were received from governmental and public institutions and organizations as well as private individuals. Of these, 618 declarations were received regarding losses caused by the Red Army. On this basis, it was calculated that the Red Army had caused Lithuania losses worth 138.9 million litas.181 However, it must be noted that some of the losses were compensated under the peace treaty signed between Lithuania and Soviet Russia. Only Lithuanian residents’ certificates of deposit in tsarist banks (13 million gold roubles) were not repaid, a planned 100,000 hectares of forest was not allowed to be cut down and archives, and books and documents recognized by the treaty were not returned.182

Losses caused by the Bermontians were not calculated separately in litas. Total losses caused by the Germans were calculated to equal 4.376 billion litas.183 However, the Lithuanian commission negotiating with the Germans over the compensation of losses to Lithuania submitted a claim for a total amount of 621.5 million gold marks, including 6.5 million gold marks for losses caused by the Bermontians.184

3.7.3. Economic and Demographic Consequences of the War

The losses incurred during World War I and the battles for independence had extremely painful consequences for Lithuania’s economy. For example, the

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182 Lesčius V., Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920, p. 176.
184 Ibid., p. 318.
losses to Lithuania’s economy caused by Germany alone were calculated to exceed 1.068 billion litas. In 1918 alone, 11,626 solid cubic metres of forest were cut down.\textsuperscript{185} Agriculture experienced particularly gigantic losses. During World War I and the independence struggle, the Germans and Bermontians requisitioned or destroyed: 90,000 horses, 140,000 cattle, 767,000 small animals, 6,020,000 \textit{poods} of grain, 56,000 \textit{poods} of seed grain, 238 \textit{poods} of root vegetables and 6,635,000 \textit{poods} of fodder. Additionally, 12,000 residential houses and 30,000 outbuildings were burned.\textsuperscript{186}

The prying away of such major cities as Vilnius, Grodno, Lida, Sejny and Suwałki from Lithuania significantly harmed the development of Lithuanian industry.

Without doubt, the war also had a negative effect on demographic processes. Approximately seventy thousand men were taken into the tsarist Russian army, of whom 11,173 perished and 17,712 were injured.\textsuperscript{187} According to data on 1917, 1918 and 1919 from the Central Statistical Bureau of Lithuania, the population also declined in Lithuania itself. In 1917, there were 9,813 more people who died than who were born. In 1918, the corresponding difference was 12,494, while in 1919 it was 10,989. However, by 1920, births exceeded deaths by 2,073. Very clear changes can be seen in terms of marriages in 1919 compared to 1918. In 1918, there were 8,699 couples married, in 1919 there were 14,517 such couples, and in 1920 the number totalled 15,517. In addition, the number of births grew significantly. In 1918, there were 30,642 children born in Lithuania, while the number grew to 37,660 in 1919 and 43,257 in 1920.\textsuperscript{188} This was undoubtedly a result of the end of World War I and the re-establishment of the Lithuanian state, and – while it still had to fight for its independence – the existence alone of a state to call their own positively affected people’s senses and brought them peace of mind. Another reason was the return from Russia to Lithuania of refugees, mostly young people, who started families and prepared for peaceful lives in their re-established homeland.

3.7.4. Geopolitical Changes

The Act of Independence of Lithuania, passed by the Council of Lithuania on 16 February 1918, states that ‘the Council of Lithuania […] declares the re-establishment of an independent, democratic Lithuanian state with a capital

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p. 316
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., p. 318.
\textsuperscript{187} Piročkinas A., „Sunkus kelias į pirmosios Respublikos nepriklausomybę“, \textit{Mokslo Lietuva}, 2013 m. birželio 6 d., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{188} „Natūralus gyventojų judėjimas Lietuvoje 1915–22 m. (Centrino statistikos biuro daviniiais)“, \textit{Mūsų žinynas}, 1923, Nr. 14, p. 320-321.
in Vilnius and the dissociation of that state from all state ties that have existed with other nations. Thus, the act re-establishing statehood did not establish the state’s borders. Its territory was assumed to be a matter of course. The first official document to establish the state’s borders was the Lithuanian-Soviet Russia peace treaty of 12 July 1920, by which Lithuania’s historical-ethnographic lands – i.e. the territory where Lithuanians lived – were recognized as belonging to it.

After the battles with Poland, Lithuania lost its capital, Vilnius, and the Vilnius region – about a third of the state’s recognized territory. Under the treaty with Soviet Russia, Lithuania’s area was supposed to be 88,111 square kilometres, with 3.3 million residents. However, after the Poles ripped away the Vilnius region, the Lithuanian state’s territory decreased to 52,822 square kilometres.\(^{189}\) Thus, the state’s area was reduced by a third, causing Lithuania huge, incalculable losses.

3.8. The End of the War

Combat with each of the powers warring with Lithuania ended, as it began, at different times.

The first step toward ending the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian war occurred on 11 September 1919, when, after the Lithuanians’ successful Zarasai operation, the Red Army was pushed out of Lithuanian territory beyond the Daugava. Soviet Russian People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin sent the Lithuanian government a note proposing to commence peace negotiations. By proposing the peace negotiations, Soviet Russia recognized Lithuania de facto.\(^{190}\) However, combat operations did not cease, even if they did acquire a positional nature once the Red Army had been pushed back beyond the Daugava after the Zarasai operation. In reality, combat against the Red Army ended on 4 January 1920, when – after a joint operation by the Polish and Latvian armies – Daugavpils was occupied and the Lithuanian army was separated from the Red Army by the Polish and Latvian armies. On the same day, Latvia and Poland made strict demands that the Lithuanian army no longer cross to the right bank of the Daugava.\(^{191}\) Legally, the war ended on 12 July 1920 with the signing of a peace treaty between Lithuania and Soviet Russia.

Battles on the Bermontian front ended on 13 December 1919, when the Bermontians’ evacuation to Germany was completed.\(^{192}\)


\(^{191}\) LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 888, l. 100.

Combat with the Polish army ended on 29 November 1920 with the signing, mediated by the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations, at Kaunas Railway Station of the Lithuanian-Polish agreement regarding the termination of combat operations between Želigowski’s army and the Lithuanian army effective from midnight on 30 November 1920 (along the stretch from Valkininkai to Joniškis). Both sides obligated themselves to transfer prisoners of war to the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations and establish a neutral zone between the armies. Thus, Lithuania’s war for independence, which had begun on 1 February 1919, ended on 30 November 1920.

The war for Lithuania’s independence was essentially won by Lithuania, because it survived as a re-established independent state. The war with Soviet Russia was unequivocally won by the Lithuanian army, as were – with the help of the Latvian army – the battles against the Bermontians, although the Entente Powers’ mission to remove the Germans from the Baltic States played a particular role in these battles.

Lithuania partly lost the war with Poland. The Lithuanian army managed to resist the Polish devices to annex Lithuania to the composition of its state, yet during the battles it lost about a third of its territory and its capital, the city of Vilnius. That was a painful defeat.

3.9. Semantics of the War

In historical documents from that period and in Lithuanian historiography, the war for Lithuania’s independence is called the ‘War of Liberation’ or the ‘battles for independence’. Yet this war is also referred to in historiography, documents of the time and oral history as the ‘War with the Bolsheviks’. Occasionally, it is known as the fight against the Red Army, the Reds, the Russians or the Belarusians.

The battles against the Bermontians are called precisely that – the ‘battles against the Bermontians’ or the ‘war against the Bermontians’ – and, occasionally, the ‘battles against the Germans’. Sometimes contemporary documents refer to the Bermontians as ‘kolčiakininkai’.

The battles against Poland are called the war or the battles ‘against the Poles’ or ‘against Poland’, while the 1920 invasion by Želigowski’s group in violation of the Suwalki Agreement is known as the war or the battles ‘against the “Želigovskininkai”’ or sometimes the ‘war with Želigowski’ – or simply the ‘battles against the Poles’.

Collectively, Lithuania’s opponents are all often called ‘enemies’ or ‘Lithuania’s enemies’.

The forces fighting against the Lithuanian army referred to Lithuanian soldiers as ‘Lithuanians’, the ‘Lithuanian army’, the ‘Whites’ or ‘the enemy’. Only in the so-called Soviet Lithuanian Army’s documents were Lithuania’s army and
its soldiers referred to as ‘Whites’, the ‘white guard’ or ‘tarybcai’ (‘тарибцы’ in Russian, as in taryba, or council, referring to military units subordinate to the Council of Lithuania), as well as, in rare cases, ‘counter-revolutionary elements’. In the documents of the Red Army’s Fifteenth Western Army, Lithuanian soldiers are called ‘Whites’, ‘enemies’ or ‘Lithuanians’.

In Polish historiography, Lithuanian soldiers are called ‘Lithuanians’ and, later, ‘Kaunas’s Lithuania’ or the ‘Kaunas Lithuanian army’.

In modern historiography, use of the same names has essentially continued, except that the word ‘tarybcai’ is now obsolete, and the terms ‘Whites’ and ‘white guard’ almost never come up in discussing the Lithuanian army. However, ‘Bolsheviks’, ‘battles against the Bolsheviks’ and the like have become strongly entrenched. In our opinion, this term does not fully reflect the situation in question. Communists, or Bolsheviks, made up no more than 10% of the ranks of the Red Army soldiers who fought against the Lithuanian army. As of 28 April 1919, of the 21,252 people who served in the Soviet Latvian First and Second divisions, which primarily fought against the Lithuanian army, only 2,200 were Communists.193 Thus, it would seem to be most advisable to refer to the ‘Red Army’ or to the general term ‘Reds’, minimizing the use of the word ‘Bolsheviks’.

3.10. Commemoration of the War

The battles for independence have been commemorated far and wide in Lithuania. First of all, they are very commonly reflected in folk songs and folklore. In cities, towns and former battle locations, monuments have been built depicting the battles that took place and the Lithuanian soldiers who lost their lives in them. Granted, after World War II, the Soviet occupying authorities destroyed almost all of these monuments, although after Lithuania regained its independence in 1990, almost all of them were rebuilt, and new monuments were also erected.

A fair number of Lithuanian artists, especially during the interwar period, have painted pictures with the independence battles as their theme. Almost every city and town features street names referring to battle events or soldiers. All of Lithuania’s ethnographic museums include exhibits devoted to Lithuania’s independence battles. The Vytautas the Great War Museum devotes an enormous amount of attention to commemorating these battles.

193 Доклад Особого отдела при штабе Армии Советской Латвии Председателю Реввоенсовета Армии Советской Латвии тов. Данишевскому, RSMA, f. 200, ap. 1, b. 18, l. 52–54.
Based on systemic quantitative research into the 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation, in presenting data about the war in Lithuania, propositions of a historical nature rendered in Resort to War about the armed conflict between Poland and Lithuania can be revised:

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
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<td>The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation</td>
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<td>Lithuania, Germany vs. Russia (Soviet), Germany and Russia (the white guard), Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Start date</td>
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<td>End date</td>
<td>1 December 1920</td>
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| Battle-related deaths | Poland – 500; Lithuania – 500 | Lithuania – 4,256  
Germany – n/d.  
Russia (Soviet) – n/d.  
Russia (Bermontians) – n/d.  
Poland – 500* |
| Initiator          | Poland                                   | Russia (Soviet), the Bermontians (German soldiers and the Russian white guard), Poland |
| Outcome            | Poland wins                              | Lithuania wins – even though it lost part of its territory, it defends the state's independence |

* Because this data was not under review it was simply taken as is from the book Resort to War.
| Narrative | Though Lithuania had been part of Poland, by the eighteenth century it had come under Russian control. In the nineteenth century a growing Lithuanian national movement led to frequent anti-Russian uprisings. During World War I (inter-state war #106), Lithuania was occupied by German troops. In February 1918 Lithuania was proclaimed an independent kingdom, under German protection. Russian troops immediately invaded, but they were driven out by the Germans. Germany then forced Soviet Russia to abandon all claims to Lithuania in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, and an independent Lithuanian republic was created in November 1918. After the conclusion of the war, however, the Soviets wanted to recover some of the lost former Russian territory and invaded Estonia (inter-state war #107) and Latvia (inter-state war #108), forcing German troops to retreat. The Soviets had similar plans for Lithuania, and a Lithuanian Soviet composed of exiles was created in Moscow in December 1918. After advancing into Estonia and Latvia, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with the Germans for an evacuation of Lithuania. The Germans withdrew from Vilnius (Vilnius). The Soviets arrived on 5 January 1919, and created the Lithuanian Provisional Government, planning to continue from | During World War I, the Lithuanian territory became a battle arena. In 1915, it was occupied by Germany. The German government decided to permanently annex Lithuania, but the Lithuaniens did not find these prospects acceptable. On 16 February 1918, the Act of Independence of Lithuania was signed, but the German military administration did everything it could to disrupt the formation of state institutions, and only after a total defeat on the fronts did Germany announce, on 5 October 1918, that occupied nations had the right to establish their own states and form governments. On 2 November, the Presidium of the State Council of Lithuania adopted the Provisional Constitution of Lithuania, on the basis of which a government was formed, state institutions were established and an army began to be organized. However, in order for independence to become entrenched, Lithuania had to conduct intensive fighting for almost two years with three enemies who saw the existence of an independent Lithuanian state as unacceptable. These were: Soviet Russia, which was planning to carry out a Communist revolutionary invasion of Europe, while Lithuania was an obstacle in its way; Poland, which, guided by its imperialist interests, viewed Lithuania as a constituent part of its state; and Germany, which, not wishing to release Lithuania from its sphere of influence, attempted to maintain it with the help of the so-called Bermontians – military units of German soldiers and captured |
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There to unite with the Marxist revolution in Germany, which was anticipated according to communist theory. The revolution did not come to fruition, however, and suppression of the Spartacist uprising (intra-state war #682) convinced the Germans to halt their withdrawal from Lithuania. The Soviets then abandoned their plans for further advances. Lithuania faced two additional problems: a dispute over Memel with the Allies and a dispute over Vilnius with Poland stemming from competing land claims addressed in the Treaty of Versailles. Poland, under the leadership of Gen. Józef Klemens Piłsudski, wanted to regain from Russia territory that had belonged to the kingdom of Poland-Lithuania in the eighteenth century (including Vilnius). Polish aims led to the Russo-Polish War (inter-state war #109) in February 1919, and within the context of that war, Polish forces captured Vilnius in April 1919. At the Versailles Peace Conference, Polish nationalists had claimed all of Lithuania, and Polish patriot Ignacy Jan Paderewski proposed a union of Poland and Lithuania, an offer rejected by Lithuania. Versailles ultimately awarded Vilnius to Lithuania. By early 1920 the Soviets decided to come to terms with the Baltic States and signed peace treaties with Estonia (2 February 1920), Lithuania (12 July 1920), and Latvia (11 August 1920). In the bilateral tsarist Russian army prisoners of war. Until February 1919, the Red Army occupied a large part of Lithuania’s territory. Fighting between the Red Army and the Lithuanian army, which had only just begun to be formed, started at the beginning of February and ended at the end of 1919 with a complete rout of the Red Army, including it being pushed out of Lithuanian territory. While battles against the Red Army were still taking place, a new enemy – the Bermontians – appeared in Lithuania in the summer of 1919. This was a military group of approximately fifty thousand soldiers formed in Germany out of Russian prisoners of war, supported in every possible way by the Germans and commanded by the Russian Colonel Pavel Bermondt-Avalov. With its help, Germany hoped to maintain its influence in Latvia and Lithuania. With the Bermontians’ behaviour in Lithuania becoming ever more audacious, a front was organized against them in October 1919. And, while the Latvians had to withstand the worst Bermontian blow, the Lithuanian army also experienced a fair number of trials. Thanks to the joint efforts of the Latvian and Lithuanian armies and the mediation of the Entente Commission that was led by General Henri Albert Niessel, the Bermontians were driven out of Lithuania to Germany in December 1919. In April 1919 the Polish army, having begun to fight the Red Army, drove it out of the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius.
peace treaty between Moscow and Lithuania, the Soviet Union recognized a large Lithuania, including the city of Vilnius; however, in Spring 1920 this city was still under Polish military occupation. In July 1920 fighting began between the Lithuanians and Poland over control of Vilnius. As the Soviet troops were pushing Polish troops back during the Russo-Polish War, Lithuania reoccupied Vilnius.

A commission from the League of Nations intervened, and on 7 October 1920 the Armistice of Suwalki was signed, according to which the Poles were to keep 25 miles south of Vilnius. Poles launched a new offensive and recaptured Vilna. The League attempted to encourage negotiations between the two countries without success. On 23 November 1920, however, Poland and Lithuania did accede to League demands to stop hostilities, though the two countries remained technically at war until 1927. In January 1922 Poland held a general election in Vilnius, and the people voted to become part of Poland. Vilnius was officially incorporated into Poland on 22 March 1923, and it remained under Polish control until World War II.

**Coding:** Lithuania became a member of the COW interstate system on 16 February 1918. Poland joined slightly later, on 3 November 1918. Hence, but by May the Poles began attacking Lithuanian army sentries. Seeking to prevent war between Lithuania and Poland, the Entente Powers established demarcation lines between them on several occasions, but these lines did not satisfy Poland, and it constantly breached them in seeking to take over the whole of Lithuania. In the summer of 1920 the Red Army, which was crushing the Polish army, pushed it out of Lithuanian territory, and this area was taken over by the Lithuanian state. However, after the Poles routed Red Army regiments commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevsky near Warsaw on 16 August and began to attack, the Polish army also attacked the Lithuanian army. Fierce battles began, which ended with the signing of the 7 October 1920 treaty between Poland and Lithuania and the establishment of a demarcation line.

However, the treaty was violated the following day. Having declared that a Polish army group under the command of General Lucjan Żeligowski had risen up against the Polish government, this group occupied the Polish capital, Vilnius, and a sizeable part of Lithuanian territory. Yet, because Poland could not officially support the ‘breakaway’ group, the Lithuanian army was able to stop the attacking Poles and, on 21 November near Giedraičiai and Širvintos, to crush them, as well. On 29 November in Kaunas, with the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations mediating,
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This war occurred almost two years after they were both founded. Poland was the initiator and revisionist in the militarized interstate dispute (1272) 'leading' to the war (though this dispute started on the same day as the war). Latvia mobilized troops (a display of force) on the Lithuanian side but did not escalate to use of force. Kohn (1999) and Phillips and Axelrod (2005) refer to this as the ‘Lithuanian War of Independence’ and include all the events from 1918 to 1920.*

An armistice was signed between Lithuania and the army group commanded by Želigowski. Thus, the uninterrupted war for independence with three enemies continued from 1 February 1919 to 30 November 1920.

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Chapter 4
The 1944–1953
Lithuanian Partisan War
with the Soviet Union
4.1. Lithuanian partisans from the Jovaras Company of the Liūtas Brigade (Vytautas district)
The 1944–1953 armed resistance in defence of democratic values and the sovereignty of the state began in Lithuania during the summer of 1944, when World War II was still taking place and Lithuanians had their highest hopes set on the future peace conferences. The Lithuanian partisan war was one of the longest-lasting partisan wars in twentieth-century Europe; it took thousands of lives, and resulted in tens of thousands of Lithuanians being imprisoned and deported. For half a century, the events of this war were like a dark spot in the history of Lithuania, shrouded in myth and enlaced with lies; one that came to light only after independence was restored. The topic of armed resistance has, therefore, not lost its relevance. Based on the political stipulations of international and national law, various issues of the partisan war and its significance are still being examined by historians, political scientists and politicians to this day.

Even now, little is known in Western Europe and elsewhere about the Soviet terror and the political, ideological and military processes that took place in the countries of Eastern Europe after World War II. The global propaganda that the Soviets disseminated for so many years about the Baltic countries ‘voluntarily’ joining the USSR and the civil war concept applied to the independence struggles fought by individual nations – the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians – created conditions for conflicting and often erroneous interpretations of this period of history in foreign countries. This most probably also influenced the compilers of the Correlates of War quantitative research project in their presentation of the post-war armed conflicts in the Baltic countries. The data and evaluation of the Lithuanian partisan resistance to the Soviet occupation presented in this project do not correspond with historical facts. This presentation of incorrect data was also predetermined by the historiography used for the Correlates of War project,
which does not include a source analysis substantiated by scientific research.\(^2\)

And it could not have done so, as some of the material was published prior to the restoration of the independence of the Baltic countries in 1990–1991, when there were still no opportunities to research the documentation of Soviet repressive structures, and little information was available about the opposition struggles. Without any deeper historical research, there are many misleading facts and statistics in the published works. Only the booklet published by the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania stands out for its accuracy; however, it does not contain a lot of information – this richly illustrated, concise booklet was only meant for non-specialist foreign readers.\(^3\)

Over the two decades since Lithuanian independence was restored and opportunities emerged to study the previously inaccessible documentation on Soviet repressive structures, numerous scientific studies of consequence devoted to the Lithuanian partisan war have been published. This subject stands out for an abundance of research sources consisting of archival documents and their publications, research-based academic work, and memoirs.

Archival documents are one of the main research sources for the Lithuanian partisan war. Documents safeguarded at both the Lithuanian Special Archives (LSA) and the Russian State Military Archive (RSMA) were used for writing this treatise. The sets of documents of the Lithuanian SSR State Security Committee (LSSR KGB) and the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) that are safeguarded at the Lithuanian Special Archives contain pertinent 1944–1953 documents on the activities and agent/operative work of the institutions of the LSSR NKVD/MVD, NKGB/MGB\(^4\) and LCP as well as of the central apparatus and its subdivisions; these documents disclose the activities of Soviet repressive departments in the suppression of armed resistance, recruitment of agents, provocations, and NKVD/MVD/MGB military tactics and combat operations against the partisans, and reflect the attitude of the Communist government toward the partisan struggles. These sources also contain abundant data about the organization, evolution and military activities of partisan structures. Although the documents


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were drawn up for confidential official use, these archival sources should still be evaluated critically, carrying out a comparative analysis of different documents. The material on the operations of repressive structures contains inaccurate statistical data, misrepresentation of facts with respect to partisan activities, and erroneous generalizations.

The operational documents of the Internal Troops of the USSR NKVD/MVD/MGB that are safeguarded in the Russian State Military Archive are of particular importance for the analysis of the partisan war. This includes various collections of documents of USSR NKVD/MVD/MGB military directorates, individual divisions and regiments that were deployed in Lithuania during the partisan war. Unfortunately, not all of the documents were available for use: the collection of the Fourth Rifle Division of the Internal Troops of the NKVD/MVD/MGB of the USSR is confidential.

In order to rectify the historical facts of the partisan war and create a more comprehensive picture of the freedom struggles, the archival information of repressive structures must be compared with the documents of the partisans themselves. The majority of these documents are safeguarded at the Lithuanian Special Archives and the Museum of Genocide Victims. These document collections include orders, resolutions, activity instructions, military action summaries, regulations and rules issued by partisan leaders, as well as various proclamations and publications that contain extensive data about the military, organizational and ideological activities of partisan structures, their most important military operations, and how the supreme authority for the resistance was formed.

Since the restoration of independence, numerous collections of documents of the partisan and repressive structures safeguarded in the Lithuanian Special Archives have been published, which reflect the formation of partisan military organization structures and the activities thereof, as well as the methods used for suppressing the resistance. The key moments and ideological aspects of the armed fight are highlighted and supplemented by the partisan diaries that have

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been published – authentic and valuable witnesses of the opposition struggle.⁶

Another group of sources is made up of historical studies done during the
Soviet period, by Lithuanian emigrants, and since Lithuania regained its freedom
(in 1990). In his article, Mindaugas Pocius has presented a comprehensive
historiographical picture of the 1944–1953 partisan war in Lithuania.⁷ In
describing the results of the resistance study, the author discusses the prevailing
directions of interpretation, the development of historiography, and each
individual academic work.

In publications written by Soviet historians, attention is focused on
describing the ‘anti-national [activities] of bandits and other bourgeois
nationalists’ and the fight against them. The content and essence of the partisan
struggle is distorted, and positions of communist ideology are used in evaluating
Lithuanian resistance. The theory of ‘class struggle’ professed by the Bolsheviks
is broadly described in monographs written by Algirdas Rakūnas and Stasys
Laurinaitis.⁸ Soviet researchers specializing in the history of the LSSR and
the Communist Party of Lithuania. Unlike most other researchers at that
time, Romualdas Stanislovaitis was the first to assert in his dissertation⁹ that
armed resistance was suppressed not only by Soviet ‘defenders of the people’
(colloquially known as strybki), but also by military units.

In emigrant historiography, the monographs written by Juozas Brazaitis¹⁰
and Kęstutis Girnius¹¹ are notable. Brazaitis was the first to investigate in depth
the causes and evolution of resistance and to discuss the stages of the struggles.
Girnius’s work, which presents a comprehensive picture of the partisan war,
devotes considerable space to the theoretical aspects of the armed struggle. In
his monograph, the author refutes the use of the civil war definition in respect

to post-war processes in Lithuania, claiming that ‘resistance of a partisan nature took place against an occupant’.12

After the restoration of Lithuanian independence, one of the first works that, based on archival sources, presents exhaustive information about the war that took place in Lithuania in 1944–1953, including an investigation of all the key moments of this war, is a collective monograph entitled ‘Lietuvos partizanai’ ('Lithuanian Partisans').13 Although a considerable amount of literature clarifying the facts of the partisan war was later published, this monograph remains a valuable and primary source used by many a researcher of armed resistance. In terms of comparative analysis of Baltic armed resistance, Arvydas Anušauska’s publication14 is significant, as is the English-language collection of articles by Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian researchers, which outlines the anti-Soviet resistance and the repression thereof in these countries.15

Works written by Dainius Žalimas,16 Bernardas Gailius17 and Vytautas Sinkevičius18 are also significant to the topic being examined. In addition to the legal issues related to the restoration of independence of the Republic of Lithuania, Žalimas’s monograph devotes considerable attention to the substantiation of the continuity of the occupied Republic of Lithuania. Žalimas also assesses the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as well as the occupation and annexation of Lithuania in terms of international law. Gailius, in his work, analyses the status of the partisans and the Lithuanian state in accordance with the provisions of international and national law, convincingly demonstrating that the Lithuanian partisan war was an international one.

The beginning of the partisan war and its first stage are perhaps best elucidated in Kęstutis Kasparas’s monograph on Lithuanian resistance up until the spring of 1946.19 Based on substantial archival and historiographical material,

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12 Girnius K. K., Partizanų kovos Lietuvoje, fotografuotas leidimas, Vilnius: Mokslas, 1990, p. 43.
he provides comprehensive research-based information on the readiness of the Lithuanian nation to offer resistance, the progress of the war during its first stage, the partisans’ tactics and organizational development, the mechanism that was created by repressive structures for suppressing the opposition, and the first military operations. In his work, Kasparas also devoted considerable attention to the question of Lithuania’s status and freedom under the circumstances of the second Soviet occupation in the context of the policy of non-recognition of the forcible seizure. The occupation of the territory of Lithuania in summer–autumn 1944 is seen as a military conflict between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, which ended in the victory of the latter.20

In their own respective works, Nijolė Maslauskienė21 and Nijolė Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė22 have analysed the history and significance of partisan organizational development and the creation of a united leadership. Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė’s monograph, entitled ‘Žuvusiųjų prezidentas’ (‘President of the Fallen’) stands out for the depth of its research and its significance. This is the biography of Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania (Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdis, or LLKS) and one of the heroes of the partisan war. The publication also includes documents of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania and recollections of Žemaitis’s collaborators. Eugenijus Grunskis wrote an article that examines Lithuanian military traditions in the partisan struggles.23 Jonas Vaičenonis devoted considerable attention in his works to the insignia, uniforms and weapons of the freedom fighters.24

Research on the activities of military repressive structures holds a special place in the historiography of the partisan war. Juozas Starkauskas’s monograph entitled ‘Čekistinė kariuomenė Lietuvoje 1944–1953 metais’ (‘Cheka Troops in Lithuania in 1944–1953’)25 is one of the most important for this study. On the basis of archival documents, the book provides a thorough review of the structure, development and areas of activity of the NKVD/MVD/MGB forces, as

20 Ibid., p. 565.
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well as the activities and combat tactics of the army units deployed in Lithuania. Military losses are also presented. Other monographs by the same author uncover the role of strybki in military operations against the partisans and the influence of the Communist Party in suppressing the opposition.\(^{26}\) Henrikas Šadžius has published articles that present data about the first military operations carried out by Soviet repressive structures against the freedom fighters at the beginning of the partisan war.\(^{27}\) The intensity and scale of the military operations are illustrated by encyclopaedic atlases of the battles.\(^{28}\)

The partisan war, its suppression, and the number of victims it claimed are an important theme in the synthesis of Lithuanian history from 1940 to 1990\(^{29}\) and in the monograph by Arvydas Anušauskas.\(^{30}\) The latter, based on extensive archival sources and new scientific research, tells of the crimes the Soviets committed from 1940 to 1958 and contains substantial statistical data.

Statistical data on fatalities among NKVD/MVD and NKGB/MGB staff, the army of the aforementioned structures, strybki, party and Soviet activists and civilians is discussed in Mindaugas Pocius’s monograph.\(^{31}\) The losses experienced by the Lithuanian population during World War II and the post-war years have been elucidated and calculated by Adolfas Damušis.\(^{32}\) In this respect, the lists of genocide victims published by the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania are also important for statistical analysis.\(^{33}\)


Unfortunately, the compilers of the Correlates of War data set did not refer to all of the aforementioned Lithuanian historiography when presenting data on the partisan wars of the Baltic States. On the other hand, neither a scientific synthesis for the theme being examined, nor studies which analyse the Lithuanian partisan war using the Correlates of War coding methodology exist in Lithuanian historiography. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to systematize and summarize existing information on the Lithuanian partisan war according to the methodology used by the Correlates of War project, and to supplement this with new research.

4.1. The Warring Sides: Status and Potential

4.1.1. The Soviet Union

Social movements in Russia during the second half of the nineteenth century led to the formation of a totalitarian regime there. After the 1917 October Revolution, the state of proletariat dictatorship created by the Bolsheviks relied on force and disregarded universally recognized legal norms. From its very creation in December 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) carried out an aggressive foreign policy. An autocratic dictator, Stalin turned the USSR into a powerful militarized totalitarian state. Under his control, the Soviet Union was a terror-ridden country, where political opponents were killed or imprisoned in Gulag\(^{34}\) camps, and millions of the USSR’s citizens were deported to Siberia and the republics of Central Asia. During the forced collectivization, millions of people starved to death.

When, during World War II, the USSR occupied the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Bessarabia, Tuva, the northern part of East Prussia, as well as parts of the territories of Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Japan, the realm of the Soviet Union extended nearly 8,800 kilometres from east to west, and 5,200 kilometres from north to south. The territorial boundaries of the USSR reached their peak at the end of World War II, and remained as such until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Upon victory in World War II, the USSR tried to dictate its own terms in the international arena, create communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and expand its global influence. Although the country’s post-war economic situation was very difficult – with shortages of even the most basic goods, a destroyed economy which needed to be restored, and cities and villages which needed to be rebuilt

\(^{34}\) Gulag (Russian: ГУЛаг – Главное управление лагерей): the government agency that administered the Soviet forced labour camp system.
– the Soviet leaders nevertheless focused on the production of weapons. Even before the beginning of World War II, it was the only warring country to have a centralized, militarized economy and to develop heavy industry and military might. In 1944 the Soviet Union’s military production comprised 28,963 tanks, 40,246 planes, and 122,400 cannons.\textsuperscript{35} Soviet armed forces in 1944 consisted of the Red Army (renamed the ‘Soviet Army’ in February 1946), military air and sea fleets, and the NKVD forces. In the summer of 1944 the Red Army had approximately eleven million, three hundred thousand soldiers in its ranks. By the beginning of 1948, this number had decreased to 2,874,000.\textsuperscript{36}

Even before the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had paid special attention to suppressing opposition to the Communist regime in occupied regions, and the main repressive structures for this were the USSR NKVD (reorganized into the MVD in March 1946) and the NKGB (reorganized into the MGB in March 1946). On 1 April 1945 the NKVD forces were made up of border, internal, rear-area security, railway security, industrial security, convoy troops and government communications troops. On 30 December 1945 the NKVD (excluding troops) had 993,073 staff. At that time it had 680,280 soldiers.\textsuperscript{37} During the war, NKVD and NKGB units were staffed in the occupied Baltic countries, with the most important structures being the NKVD Department for Combatting Banditism (later the Board, the 2-N Board), and the SMERSH counter-intelligence agencies. Along with other repressive institutions – the USSR NKVD Military Tribunal, the Special Council of the USSR NKVD, the destruction battalions, the militia, the prosecuting magistracy and the courts – there was huge potential to suppress any form of armed resistance.

### 4.1.2. Lithuania

After liberating itself from tsarist Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, Lithuania was not to enjoy independence for long. In 1940–1941 Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union, then by Nazi Germany in 1941–1944, and once again by the USSR in the summer of 1944.

When the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania for the second time, the territory of the annexed country, which was administered through the institutions of the Lithuanian SSR, comprised 65,000 square kilometres. In 1945 there were approximately two and a half million people living in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{38} Lithuania

\textsuperscript{36} Веремеев Ю. 'Комплектование Советской (Красной) Армии', http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/k_sov_arm.shtml, 2013-10-29.
was surrounded by republics of the USSR (Latvia and Belarus) and communist Poland. The Russians later became Lithuania’s direct neighbours, after annexing the Königsberg (Kaliningrad) region.

Lithuania experienced significant losses as a result of the German occupation. Cities were in ruin, the majority of industrial facilities were destroyed or left without equipment, the power plants were out of order, five hundred kilometres of railway had been dismantled, and bridges had been blown up. Lithuania’s total losses amounted to 17 billion roubles (in 1941 prices). Agriculture was the main branch of the Lithuanian economy, but it had already incurred considerable losses during the first Soviet occupation due to the reorganization of land-management relations and the destruction of individual farms. The Germans did not restore property rights for landowners during their own occupation, and upon withdrawing they plundered property and burned down numerous farm buildings.

Lithuania’s political status and loss of independence was conditioned by the international events of 1939 as well as the treaties signed by Germany and the USSR on 23 and 28 August 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), according to which Germany and the Soviet Union divided Europe into spheres of interest and were able to freely subordinate third states. Like its northern neighbours, the Republic of Lithuania ceased to be a neutral state and lost its independence in foreign policy.

On 15 June 1940, taking advantage of the extremely complicated international situation in Europe and its military bases in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania; after organizing illegal elections to the so-called People’s Seimas and falsifying the results thereof, the USSR ultimately annexed the Republic of Lithuania on 3 August 1940. By occupying and annexing Lithuania, the Soviet Union violated the principles of international law and its own international obligations, and infringed upon bilateral agreements with the Republic of Lithuania. From the standpoint of international law, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are void and powerless to give the USSR any rights to Lithuania. According to the charter and verdict of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, the conclusion of these protocols and the resulting occupation and annexation of Lithuania qualify as international crimes. Hence, as an occupied state, the Republic of Lithuania retained its international rights and obligations, even though it was not able to actually implement them (i.e. its international capacity was restricted). This

was the essence of the continuity of the Lithuanian state.\footnote{Žalimas D., Lietuvos Respublikos nepriklausomybės atkūrimo 1990 m. kovo 11 d. tarptautiniai teisiniai pagrindai ir pasekmės, Vilnius, 2005, p. 319–323.}

In the international arena, significant factors supported the Lithuanians’ aspirations to regain independence in the form of the non-recognition policy of the annexation of the Baltic States. The United States of America was the firmest on this issue. Other Western countries were not unified in their position, but numerous countries around the world held to the policy of non-recognition (in Europe – the United Kingdom, Vatican City and Switzerland; in the Americas – the United States, Uruguay, and some other South American countries).\footnote{Kasparas K., Lietuvos karas: antroji Sovietų Sąjungos agresija : pasipriešinimas : ofenzyvinės gynybos tarpsnis, 1944 m. vasara–1946 m. pavasaris, Kaunas, 1999, p. 86.}

On 1 June 1940, the Lithuanian army had 28,005 soldiers (of which 1,728 were officers) and 120,400 reserve troops. The army was supplemented by the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, which was subordinate to the commander of the army and had over 62,000 members.\footnote{Okupacija ir aneksija = Occupation and annexation: pirmoji sovietinė okupacija (1940–1941) / Jakubčionis A., Knežys S., Streikus A., Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2006, p. 161–162.} The Lithuanian army and the Riflemen’s Union were liquidated during the first Soviet occupation in 1940–1941. The creation of an army was always a pressing issue for the Lithuanians. In the summer of 1941, just after the beginning of the Soviet-German war, there were designs to re-create the Lithuanian army, but the Nazi government did not allow it. The only organizations that were established were Lithuanian police and self-defence units that were subordinate the Germans (and later disbanded in summer 1944). As the end of the war drew near, the Nazis allowed the establishment of the Lithuanian Territorial Defence Force, which many Lithuanians hoped would be a step toward restoring the Lithuanian army. From 21 February to 1 March 1944, 19,500 men signed up.\footnote{Nagys P. 'Vietinė rinktinė', Kardas, 2010, Nr. 4(445), p. 30–31.} However, disagreements between the heads of the force and German SS and police authorities led to it being liquidated by the Germans. Some of the soldiers from the Lithuanian Territorial Defence Force withdrew with weapons and joined the partisan resistance when the Soviets arrived. As the front moved west through Lithuania in the summer of 1944, a considerable portion of Lithuanian military officers, policemen and administrative staff retreated to Žemaitija (Samogitia). The Homeland Defence Detachment, which was also subordinate to the Germans, was organized on their initiative for the fight with the Soviet army. On 7 October, the team took part in a battle with the Red Army at Seda. Unable to withstand the attack of the USSR, the majority of the team withdrew to East Prussia.

Even during the German occupation, all of the Lithuanian anti-Nazi resistance organizations – the Lithuanian Activist Front, the Union of Lithuanian
Freedom Fighters, the Lithuanian Freedom Defenders’ Union, the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, and the Lithuanian Liberation Council, among others – had already debated the idea of establishing an army as well as the possibilities and modes of Soviet resistance. However, once the Soviet occupation began, many of the aforementioned were tracked down and destroyed. A crucial role in organizing armed anti-Soviet resistance was played by the Lithuanian Freedom Army (‘Lietuvos laisvės armija’ LLA) – a military-political organization established on 13 December 1941 that strove to achieve Lithuanian independence and ‘the restoration of a new and more united and powerful ethnic Lithuanian state with the capital of Vilnius and the Klaipėda region’. However, even though it rallied people for the fight and laid important foundations for the creation of an opposition, it did not become an all-encompassing and unifying organization. The development of a Lithuanian army and partisan governing body was organized by the leaders of newly-emerging structures.

In 1949 the Lithuanian partisan movement was centralized; the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania was founded, and the Council thereof was formed. This resistance military authority became the only legitimate authority in occupied Lithuania; it tried to resist the illegitimate authority and the occupying state, and both united and represented all of the Lithuanian military and public units that were fighting against Soviet repressive structures.

4.2. The Beginning of the War

4.2.1. The Initiator of the War

States that occupy other countries provoke resistance among the people living in the occupied territories as well as an urge to fight for the restoration of their national independence. The intensity of this struggle and the methods of resistance are determined by a number of causes, among which the degree of brutality of the policies carried out by the occupant and the level of national and state awareness of the residents of the occupied region should be singled out. If the policies carried out by the occupant are relatively lenient, opposition often does not grow to the level of armed resistance or partisan war. The Nazi occupation of Denmark in 1940 can be used as an example. Germany occupied

Denmark in a single day, without any resistance. Danish anti-Nazi resistance was essentially unarmed; acts of diversion and sabotage only began after some time, but a partisan war did not take place. The emergence of armed resistance usually depends on the civic and patriotic maturity of the people living in the occupied area. The occupant can only provoke armed resistance and create the preconditions for it, but it is the inhabitants of the occupied territory and their leaders who initiate and organize the opposition. In the case of the Lithuanian armed resistance, the initiators were, therefore, the partisans who stood up to defend the country’s independence. At the beginning of the partisan war, there were neither military nor political authorities who could declare mobilization. The decisive force ended up being each and every person’s own choice (even if the person previously belonged to an underground organization), which was usually not so simple and unambiguous when issues of vital importance were in question.46

4.2.2. Goals and Causes of the War

Five factors stand out in Lithuanian historiography for conditioning the decision to employ arms to resist the Soviet occupation: 1) the experience of the earlier Soviet and German occupations; 2) unbridled Soviet terror in the first few years after the war; 3) the resistance movement that had spread throughout the area during the Nazi occupation, which encouraged actions to be taken against the Communists also; 4) hope of Western intervention; and 5) patriotism. Numerous men fled to the forest to avoid arrest. Becoming a partisan was usually determined by several factors, of which some became weaker and others became stronger, depending on the actions and tactics of the occupant and the partisans themselves, as well as on the changing situation in the area and the international arena. At the beginning of the partisan war, becoming a partisan was prompted by Soviet army conscription, hope of favourable international decisions, and experience from the Nazi and first Bolshevik occupations.

Conscription to the Red Army began as soon as the front moved. Since the Lithuanian people had no doubt regarding the fact of occupation, mobilization caused a vehement reaction. Over the entire period of mobilization, from July 1944 to 1 June 1945, 82,000 Lithuanians were mobilized (of the 168,737 men planned).47 Many intended on holding out until the end of the war – they hid at their homesteads, and later joined the partisans.

The hope that the international community would help never faded

47 Tininis V., 'Prievartinė mobilizacija į Raudonąją armiją 1944–1945 m.', Genocidas ir rezistencija, 2013, Nr. 1(33), p. 29.
throughout the entire period of post-war resistance. The Lithuanian public was waiting for diplomatic pressure from the United Nations to draw back Soviet troops from Lithuania, and hopes to restore Lithuanian sovereignty were cherished based on the statements of the Atlantic Charter. The partisans hoped to hold out until the restoration of freedom, and political tensions between the East and the West kept hope alive for a military conflict between the former allies and the liberation of Lithuania.

After 1945, when the risk of mobilization decreased and the hope that post-war international conferences or Western political agreements would restore justice dimmed, the decision to become a partisan became more conditioned by other causes – terror, imprisonment, deportation and patriotism. Political persecution of individuals and mass arrests were incessant. The decision to go into hiding and fight was prompted by the aspiration to stay free and protect one's compatriots from violence.

A significant role in choosing the path of armed warfare was played by patriotism. This was underscored in the memoirs and diaries of numerous partisans.48 Inter-war Lithuanian schools and organizations – the Riflemen’s Union in particular – considered the country’s independence to be its greatest asset. In order to fight for spiritual and material values and preserve their traditions and beliefs, the partisans tried to show the world that the Lithuanian nation was defending its inherent right to an independent state and that it valued human rights and freedoms, and made declarations of such in their documents.

4.2.3. Dating the Beginning of the War

Although the Correlates of War data set49 indicates that the Lithuanian partisan war began on 8 May 1945, it actually began much earlier – in July 1944 – and took at least a thousand lives from July to December 1944 alone.

War was not declared during the Lithuanian partisan war. World War II was still going on in Europe and Lithuania was still occupied by Nazi Germany, which was at war with the Soviet Union. As the front moved from the east, the Red Army crossed the north-eastern border of Lithuania on 4 July 1944. The Lithuanian capital was taken over by the Soviets on 13 July 1944. At that time the armed forces of Nazi Germany and the USSR were engaged in active hostilities. The entire territory of modern-day Lithuania was ultimately occupied again in January 1945.

As the front drew near, the Lithuanian Freedom Army command held to its position in negotiations with other resistance organizations that armed opposition against the Soviet occupation was not only necessary, but inevitable. Kęstutis Kasparas maintains that the official date of the transition of the organization of the Lithuanian Freedom Army into partisan activity was 1 July. At the beginning of the month, Commander of the Lithuanian Freedom Army Kazys Veverskis-Senis met in Kaunas with the leader of the Šiauliai district, Adolfas Eidimtas-Žybartas, to whom he handed a military preparedness order instructing all members of the Lithuanian Freedom Army capable of using a weapon to move to the partisans’ Vanagai (‘Hawks’) brigades, which were stationed in the forests. In its documents, the Lithuanian Freedom Army declared that ‘on 3 July 1944, the organizational period ended and the active fight with weapons in our hands began. The Operational Sector, called “Vanagai”, has begun partisan operations.’

According to the coding rules used for the duration of wars in the Correlates of War data set, the first day on which military conflicts take place can be considered as the beginning of the war. However, it is difficult to say which day should be considered the start of the Lithuanian partisan war because it is not known exactly which clash between the partisans and Soviet armed forces was the first. It would be inaccurate to rely on the first battle information recorded in the operational documents of the NKVD/NKGB. The administrative system of repressive structures was just being set up in the districts of Lithuania in early July, so many partisan operations may not have been recorded. Operational documents of the district branches of the LSSR NKVD/NKGB chiefly began to be drawn up in August 1944.

Vytautas Mačionis, a participant in the resistance, thinks that the active beginning of the partisan war should be considered to be 14 July 1944, when the members of an armed rifle platoon engaged in battle with soldiers from Soviet units in the village of Pagojė in the district of Anykščiai. On that day, 16 partisans from Anykščiai and Švenčionys exchanged fire with five Russian tanks that were preparing to ambush a German train. Under the fire of cannons and machine guns from both the Russians and the Germans on the approaching train, the partisans retreated toward Troškūnai without losses. On 15 July 1944,
a rifle platoon put up resistance to offensive Red Army units in the village of Vosgėliai in the district of Anykščiai. Rifleman Julius Strolia was killed.\footnote{Laisvės kovos Anykščių krašte (sud. Bražėnaitė R., Gadliauskaitė D., Vaičiūnas G.,...), Anykščiai: Anykščių A. Baranausko ir A. Žukausko-Vienuolio memorialinis muziejus, 2000, p. 7, 76.}

Later combat operations were registered in NKVD/NKGB documents. Documents of the NKVD branch of the Panevėžys district contain information about a battle on 21 July 1944, when partisans from the rural district of Šimonys opened fire on Red Army soldiers. One lieutenant and six soldiers were killed.\footnote{August 1944 dispatch sent by the USSR NKVD and NKGB operational chief to LSSR People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Juozas Bartasūnas, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 1349, p. 2.}

On 24 July 1944 a group of partisans from the Troškūnai district opened fire on Red Army soldiers; two Reds were killed.\footnote{August 1944 dispatch sent by the USSR NKVD and NKGB operational chief to LSSR People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Juozas Bartasūnas, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 1349, p. 2.}

On 3 August 1944, Jonas Dovydenas’s and Henrikas Šembergas’s joint partisan platoon attacked the town of Siesikai in the Ukmergė district and opened fire on the district offices.\footnote{Vaičiūnas G., ’Vyties apygardos istorinė apžvalga’, Laisvės kovų archyvas, t. 10, Kaunas, 1994, p. 6.}

One of the first combat campaigns executed by the Zarasai partisans took place in the early hours of 17 August 1944: led by Antanas Streikus and Captain Afanasas Kazanas, Vanagai Unit Commander in the district of Zarasai, the partisans attacked the Zarasai prison in an attempt to free its detainees.\footnote{Abarius L., ’Lietuvos partizanų Šiaurės Rytų srities 3-ioji Vytauto apygarda (1945–1952 m.), Laisvės kovų archyvas, t. 16, Kaunas, 1996, p. 68.}

The operational documentation of Soviet repressive structures contains statistical data on partisan fatalities and casualties among officers and soldiers within the occupant military structures from 15 July 1944.\footnote{August 1951 report issued by Ilya Pochkay, head of the Lithuanian SSR MGB 2-N Board, on the results of the activities of the organs of the LSSR MGB in fighting with the partisans and the national underground for the period from 15 July 1944 to 20 August 1951, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 386, pp. 51–52.} These archival documents and the above-mentioned information confirm that military actions were already taking place in mid-July 1944.

### 4.3. Soviet Military Units That Suppressed Partisan Resistance in Lithuania

The central NKVD and NKGB apparatus of the Lithuanian SSR had already been set up in Vilnius in mid-July 1944. Along with the Communist Party, they were the initiators and organizers of the ideological and political terror as well as of the anti-partisan military operations. The main executors of opposition suppression were various USSR NKVD/MVD/MGB forces and the Red Army, which assisted them.
The NKVD/MVD/MGB internal troops were a complex and unwieldy system of occupant military structures, where different types of military units constantly changed their subordination. While performing their military assignments in relation to the suppression of armed resistance in the Baltic region, western Ukraine and western Belarus, they constantly changed their places of deployment, being transferred from one country to another to carry out military operations. At the beginning of the second Soviet occupation, all NKVD regiments were subordinate to three councils, which were controlled by NKVD People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lavrentiy Beria: the Head Directorate for NKVD Forces, Rear Defence Fronts (established in May 1943, disbanded in October 1945); the Directorate of USSR NKVD Convoy Troops (established on 24 October 1942, disbanded on 21 May 1951); and the Head Directorate for USSR NKVD Internal Troops.\(^60\) The Directorate of USSR NKVD Internal Troops (Chief Directorate as of 28 April 1942) was founded on 19 January 1942 by decree of the NKVD after the reorganization of the NKVD Directorate of Operational Troops, and operated under different names until March 1960.\(^61\) The chief directorates were responsible for preparing strategic plans and had subordinate directorates that were in charge of specific formations. The internal troops of the NKVD/MVD/MGB played the main role in suppressing opposition over the entire period of the partisan war. Colonel General Arkady Apolonov was head of its chief directorate from October 1944; he was replaced in March 1946 by Lieutenant General Piotr Burmak, who held the position until the very end of armed resistance in 1953.

On 21 January 1947, management of the internal troops was moved from the MVD to the MGB by decree of the MVD and MGB authorities. At that time the internal troops comprised 71,322 people.\(^62\) The border troops became subordinate to the MGB on 17 October 1949 by decree of the MVD and MGB.

All of the different NKVD troops were operative in Lithuania during the partisan war for one period of time or another. Not all of them were involved in direct battles with the partisans, but they all contributed to suppressing the resistance somehow. Military operations in Lithuania were primarily carried out by the rear defence fronts for the Leningrad, First Baltic and Third Byelorussian Fronts, the Lithuanian District Border Troops, and units of the Fourth Rifle Division of the Internal Troops, which had the greatest presence and were the most active in Lithuania.

\(^{60}\) Anušauskas A., 'NKVD kariuomenės dokumentai Rusijos karo archyve', Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1997, Nr. 1, p. 177.
\(^{61}\) USSR NKVD/MVD Chief Internal Troops Directorate fund inventory preface, Russian State Military Archive, doc. f. 38650, inv. 1, p. 4.
\(^{62}\) USSR NKVD/MVD Chief Internal Troops Directorate fund inventory preface, Russian State Military Archive, doc. f. 38650, inv. 1, p. 6.
The largest number of NKVD units was deployed in Lithuania in 1944–1945. During this period, three types of NKVD forces were operating in the country: 1) NKVD rear defence front forces, made up of border regiments; 2) border troops; and 3) regiments of the Fourth, Sixty-third and other NKVD rifle divisions.63

Units of the Soviet border troops and Red Army border regiments of the NKVD rear area security forces were some of the first to come to Lithuania. Rear defence front formations were present in Lithuania from summer/autumn 1944 to February 1945 and from June to October 1945. From February to June 1945 the formations were sent to East Prussia. Prior to leaving for East Prussia, with World War II still continuing, the activities of these troops were directed not only against the Lithuanian underground, but also against others, such as Russian army deserters and German soldiers, saboteurs and collaborators. However, when they returned to Lithuania, their forces were aimed exclusively against Lithuanian partisans and their supporters.

The first to enter Lithuania – in July 1944 – were the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the Third Byelorussian Front, headed by Lieutenant General Ivan Lyub. Compared to the other formations of the NKVD rear defence forces operating in Lithuania, this was the largest. By the end of 1944, there were already five border regiments of this formation (the Thirteenth, Eighty-sixth, One Hundred and Thirty-second, Two Hundred and Seventeenth and Three Hundred and Thirty-first) in Lithuania, as well as the One Hundred and Fifth Independent Manoeuvre Group. Three regiments returned to Lithuania from East Prussia, and together with the One Hundred and Second and One Hundred and Fifth Independent Manoeuvre Groups, which were subordinate to the formation, fought against the partisan movement and underground until the directorate was dissolved in October 1945. In total, the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the Third Byelorussian Front shot and killed some 1,000–1,200 partisans in Lithuania.64

It is not known precisely when border regiments of the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the First Baltic Front were sent to Lithuania, but three of them were already stationed in Žemaitija and central Lithuania as of December 1944. This formation’s Thirty-first, Thirty-third, One Hundred and Thirty-fourth, Two Hundred and Sixteenth and Two Hundred and Twentieth Border Regiments, and One Hundred and Fourth and One Hundred and Eighth Independent Manoeuvre Groups operated in Lithuania at different times. The Thirty-first was re-formed into the One Hundred and Fifteenth Border Guard Detachment,

which was finally disbanded in December 1946.\textsuperscript{65} In August 1945, the name of the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the First Baltic Front was changed to the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the First Ukrainian Front.

With the end of the war and increasing resistance in Lithuania and Latvia, the Twelfth, One Hundred and Thirtieth and Two Hundred and Seventeenth Border Regiments of the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the Leningrad Front were deployed in mid-June 1945 under the command of General Vladimir Abyzov to reinforce NKVD troops. They operated at different times throughout almost all of Lithuania, with the exception of southern Lithuania.

In 1944–1945, battalions and border guards of NKVD rear defence forces for various fronts were continuously redeployed from one place to another, depending on partisan activity in the districts. There was probably not a single rural district in Lithuania where a border troop subunit had not been at least briefly stationed. Each border regiment was made up of three battalions, which each had five posts with 30–40 soldiers at each, and one back-up post. When the Head Directorate for Rear Defence Fronts under the command of Lieutenant General Ivan Garbatyuk was disbanded on 13 October 1945 by decree of the NKVD, all formations of this sort were disbanded in Lithuania as well.

The Two Hundred and Eleventh Regiment of the NKVD Railroad Facilities and Important Industrial Enterprises Security Forces was deployed in Lithuania. In 1946, this regiment had six battalions and could have had as many as two thousand soldiers. The regiment was disbanded in December 1951. In addition to carrying out its functions related to the security of railroad, transport and key industrial facilities in the territory of Lithuania, the regiment – from its very formation – also cooperated with repressive agencies and actively participated in the fight against the partisans. In order to intensify and maximize the use of this regiment in the fight with the partisans, the regiment was put under the operational control of the Lithuanian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs as of February 1946, and its subunits were made subordinate to the MVD branches of the districts where they were deployed.\textsuperscript{66} Documents of the secret police contain records of numerous battles that soldiers of this regiment participated in, the largest of which took place on 15 December 1945, when the partisans attacked Merkinė.

Units of the Soviet border troops were deployed in Lithuania from 23 July 1944. The border troops belonged to the USSR NKVD/MGB Chief Directorate of Border Troops, which was under the command of Lieutenant General Nikolai Stakhanov, and were subordinate to the Directorate of the Lithuanian SSR Border

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 157.

\textsuperscript{66} Inventory preface of the fund of the 211th Regiment of the MVD Railroad Facilities and Important Industrial Enterprises Security Forces, Russian State Military Archive, doc. f. 38438, inv. 1, p. 1.
District, which was headed by Major General Mikhail Bychkovsky. Guarding the Lithuanian border, the Kaliningrad region and part of the Latvian sea coast, the border troops, which had stationed their garrisons/posts in Lithuania, were the size of a rifle regiment, each with approximately one thousand soldiers. From the beginning of the second Soviet occupation, the border troops played a dual role in Lithuania. In addition to guarding the borders, they were instructed to fight with the partisans, even in non-border districts. Starting in March 1945, joint border guard detachments were formed from border troops to fight with the partisans in the districts. A large joint detachment of 877 soldiers was formed in June 1945. Garrisons of the Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, Ninety-fourth, Ninety-fifth, Ninety-seventh, One Hundred and Thirteenth, One Hundred and Fifteenth and One Hundred and Sixteenth Border Guard Detachments were stationed in Lithuania at different times, for different durations – some eight to ten thousand soldiers in all.

Under the command of Major General Pavel Vetrov, the Fourth Rifle Division of the NKVD/MVD/MGB Internal Troops was the largest unit deployed in Lithuania for the period of the entire partisan war and played a crucial role in suppressing the Lithuanian opposition. Formed on 10 October 1943, the division had already deployed its regiments in Lithuania on 1 August 1944. Four of this

4.2. Anti-partisan operation carried out by soldiers of the Two Hundred and Ninety-eighth Regiment of the Fourth Rifle Division of the USSR MGB Internal Troops on 30 October–1 November 1949 in the forest of Šimoniai

The division’s rifle regiments were sent to Lithuania. According to 7 January 1945 data, the Fourth Rifle Division had concentrated 2,729 soldiers to carry out punitive operations. In 1946 the division was enlarged to ten regiments, and in spring more than 200 garrisons of state security troops were stationed in district and rural centres. That year, anti-partisan military operations in Lithuania were carried out by soldiers of the Twenty-fifth, Thirty-second, Thirty-fourth, One Hundred and Thirty-seventh, Two Hundred and Sixty-first, Two Hundred and Sixty-second, Two Hundred and Seventy-third, Two Hundred and Eighty-fifth, Two Hundred and Ninety-eighth and Three Hundred and Fifty-third Rifle Regiments, as well as the One Hundred and Eighth and Three Hundred and Fifty-fourth Independent Rifle Regiments, which were not subordinate to the division. Some of these regiments were later disbanded, and by the end of 1946 the rifle division consisted of eight regiments. With the changing situation in hostilities and the state security troops becoming more and more mobile, the garrisons were reduced in number and moved to the district (regional) centres. There were 69 garrisons in the beginning of 1950. So-called special subunits, which were subordinate to headquarters – communication and transport company soldiers, as well as future sergeants from the regiment school – also participated in the battles with the partisans.

At the end of 1949 the division was split into the Second and Fourth Rifle Divisions. In 1951 these divisions were reorganized into the First Security Section; the section had five detachments and existed as such until 1 March 1954.

With Lithuanian resistance becoming increasingly intense, units of the Red Army were brought in to help even after the war had ended. Under the 27 March 1945 direction of Lieutenant General Trifon Shevaldin, the commander of the Byelorussian and Lithuanian Military District, they were instructed to fight with the partisans. Though this was not a common occurrence, since the consent of the General Staff was required for a unit of the regular army to be used in fights with the partisans, various units of this army did still take part in anti-partisan military operations. After drawing back a portion of the units from the front to the east when the front was still in Lithuania, they participated, together with NKVD units, in the largest Lithuanian purges, on 1–6 September and 1–10 December 1944. They later joined rifle regiments on more than one occasion in battles against the partisans, most actively so in the summer of 1945. Joint operative groups were formed to annihilate the partisans; soldiers were also used when organizing Soviet political campaigns and during events such as elections.

and Communist holiday celebrations. For example, during the elections that took place on 10 February 1946, 21,000 troops were rallied to guard the electoral districts, including Red Army soldiers, NKVD troops, operatives and strybi.71 Of these, some four thousand were Red Army soldiers. At that time, the regular army had at least nine rifle regiments and a few individual ones stationed in Lithuania. Although the Red Army units carried out more of a supporting role and assisted repressive structures, they still provided substantial reinforcement to the already sizeable occupant military forces.

The number of units of repressive structure and Red Army forces in Lithuania peaked in the summer of 1945, when it was as high as twenty-five thousand. There were approximately fourteen thousand troops in 1946 and ten thousand in 1951.72

Another paramilitary group that was formed by Soviet occupation structures to fight the partisans was the destruction battalions. Although later

renamed ‘defenders of the people’, these squads were still known in Lithuania as ‘stribai’ (strybki). These squads were established in Lithuania by the 24 July 1944 decree of the Central Committee of the LCP, and in all district and rural centres by decrees issued by the LSSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the LCP on 3 December. There were usually some twenty to forty strybki in each squad.

The strybki squads did not have decisive impact on the partisans' fights with the occupants; they were mainly formed from local collaborators and operated as an auxiliary paramilitary structure headed by the Communist Party and the secret police. They carried out operations together, or were called in to carry them out only when the army had other assignments. In 1945 the strybki killed 3,600 people, although the bulk of them were not partisans, but men evading mobilization. In subsequent years they were responsible for about one-fifth of all partisan fatalities.

More than twenty thousand people served as strybki from 1944 to 1954. Archival documents indicate that there were some eleven thousand in Lithuania in 1945, approximately eight thousand in 1946, more than seven thousand in 1947–1950, and later some four to five thousand. Data is available that indicates there were still 1,850 strybki on 1 January 1954. The squads were disbanded once and for all at the beginning of 1955.

Another group of collaborators included Soviet party activists, strybki support teams, and self-defence groups; although these people had no impact whatsoever on the post-war struggles (more often getting caught up in partisan ambushes themselves), they created a certain pro-occupant stratum that helped implement the Sovietization process in rural areas. For example, over the course of one and a half years – from January 1948 to June 1949 – they killed six partisans. There were a considerable number of armed activists: approximately three thousand in 1945, and six thousand in 1946–1947. Their ranks were the largest in 1949–1950. According to July 1949 data, there were 1,086 armed detachments established in Lithuania staffed by 7,431 activists. In 1951 there were approximately six thousand of them. From 1945 to 1953, the occupants may have armed some eighteen to twenty thousand civilians in total.
When the USSR occupied Lithuania in the summer of 1944, the Lithuanian Freedom Army, which was the main initiator of armed opposition, completed its reorganization. Under Resolution No. 21 of 20 July, it was divided into two parts – the Operational Sector and the Organizational Sector. The status and functions of the members of the organization were defined. The Operational Sector comprised armed fighters, who were called Vanagai (‘Hawks’). The Vanagai – the pioneers of partisan war in Lithuania – were formed from partisans and newly admitted members, by taking the same Lithuanian Freedom Army oath. The (reserve) members of the Lithuanian Freedom Army who belonged to the Organizational Sector lived legally; they were signallers, who carried out reconnaissance functions, took care of logistics and supplied the fighters with things such as food and clothing.
As the front moved, partisan units of the Lithuanian Freedom Army formed throughout Lithuania, some as the Russian army attacked, and some to its rear. The Lithuanian Freedom Army’s strongest and most organized military units were formed in Žemaitija, where representatives of underground organizations had retreated to from the already occupied eastern part of Lithuania. Although the German army only withdrew from western Lithuania during the first half of October 1944, Vanagai teams had already begun to be organized there in the summer of the same year. From late July to early August 1944, one of the strongest partisan structures was the Lithuanian Freedom Army’s Šiauliai district, which was under the command of Adolfas Eidimtas-Vygantas. In the beginning of 1945, the Žemaicių legion of the Lithuanian Freedom Army was established on the initiative of Adolfas Kubilius; abolished in March 1946, this was the longest-standing structure of the Lithuanian Freedom Army.

Despite the influence of the Lithuanian Freedom Army and its first attempts to create a long-term political and military authority and unite armed partisan detachments, substantial independent platoons of partisans started to form throughout Lithuania in the summer of 1944; the patriotic leaders of these squads took initiative, united surrounding units and created the first military resistance forces. By mid-1946 a new system of partisan districts and brigades had formed in Lithuania, with new leaders, new names, and a new structure, although some similarities did remain.

The Lithuanian partisans adopted the traditions of the Lithuanian army and operated as a military structure. They saw themselves as soldiers of Lithuania and aspired to create a centralized military organization run according to the example set by the Lithuanian army. The Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union had an undeniable impact on the strategy and tactics of the partisan fights. The members of the union were active participants in the partisan fights; they were trained for partisan warfare during the inter-war period and were well-versed in the art of war.78 On 5 December, the Lithuanian Freedom Army wrote in its newspaper, Laisvės Karžygys (‘Hero of Freedom’), that ‘Lithuanian partisans – the Vanagai, who are Lithuania’s secret weapon, who will become the foundation of our army – are operating in a well-organized fashion throughout the country’.79 This clearly shows that they intended to create armed forces, as well as a governing body that would represent these armed forces and the people. Quite a few members of the Lithuanian Freedom Army later headed structural units of the partisan organization, both large and small.

78 For more information, see: Jokubauskas V., ‘Žvelgiant į ateitį: partizaninės kovos taktikos sklaida Lietuvoje ir jos įgyvendinimas 1944–1953 m.’, Genocidas ir rezistencija, 2011, Nr. 1(29), p. 51–64.
In 1949 a military organizational partisan structure was finally formed in Lithuania, which more or less survived until 1953. It consisted of nine partisan districts, which were joined into regions. The partisans of the Biržai region were the last to join the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, in 1951.

Initially, the provisional rules and regulations for partisan activities were prepared by the commanders of larger individual formations, based on corresponding documents used by the army of independent Lithuania. Larger structural units – regions, districts, and brigades – were led by military staffs, which were made up of the commander of the formation, the chief of staff and section heads (formation, organization, mobilization, intelligence, information, etc.). From the very beginning of the partisan war, the partisans in some formations were instructed at military training courses. In August 1944 two weeks of military and partisan warfare tactics training were held for members of the Lithuanian Freedom Army at the Vanagai camp in the forests of Plateliai and Šateikiai. As many as three hundred partisans from the Telšiai brigade and other districts and brigades of the Lithuanian Freedom Army attended the camp. Training camps were organized for the partisans later as well, and ranks or promotions were awarded upon passing an exam. The districts published formation statutes. The heads of the Vytautas district prepared a booklet in 1948.

4.5. Partisans from the Dainava district carrying out drills

entitled *Partizaninės kovos pagrindai. Ką turi žinoti kiekvienas partizanas* (‘The foundations of partisan warfare. What every partisan should know’), which included information on topics such as the general laws of combat, partisan battle basics, tactics, execution of special assignments, types of weapons and how to use them, and how to set up a hideout.\(^81\)

The participants of the armed resistance were not only trying to protect the people and their property from Soviet terror – they were also striving to establish a worldwide policy of non-recognition of Lithuania’s incorporation into the USSR and demonstrate that Lithuania was not renouncing its aspirations to independence. While waiting for favourable international decisions and

support from the West, the partisans not only made efforts to remind the free world that Lithuania had been occupied, sending memoranda and information to the foreign affairs councils of great powers about the terror being carried out in Lithuania, but also reached out to the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, which aspired to represent Lithuania abroad as a government in exile.82 This is where Juozas Lukša-Skirmantas, Jurgis Krikščiūnas-Rimvydas and Kazimieras Pyplys-Mažytis made a mark for themselves: in 1947 and 1948, these Lithuanian partisan envoys managed to cross the Iron Curtain and provide the West with information collected by the partisans about repressions and people who had been arrested, deported or killed. They also conveyed information about the centralization of partisan formations, and delivered a letter to Pope Pius XII explaining the situation in occupied Lithuania and asking for support for the struggling nation. On 7–9 July 1948, the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania met with Lithuanian resistance representatives in Baden-Baden, Germany to discuss Lithuania’s liberation. During the meeting it was decided that Lithuania would be represented by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania abroad, and by a body which unified the region’s partisans in Lithuania.83

The problem of creating a unified governing body for partisan military structures was a pressing one from the very beginning of the second Soviet occupation. Having such a governing body was important for the partisans in relation to further organizing the fight and aiming to respond adequately to the changing situation in both Lithuania and the international arena. The period from 1946 to 1948 was significant to the dynamics of centralization. The General Democratic Resistance Movement, which united the entire underground, was formed, as was the governing body of the Supreme Staff of the Armed Forces. Although in this sense the Kęstutis district, which was established in 1946, became stronger, initiative during this period belonged to the leadership of the Tauras district of Southern Lithuania.84

The partisans devoted equal attention to the programme provisions for the restoration of statehood. The first such document was the 23 April 1946 declaration of the Lithuanian partisan summit. Drawn up by Southern Lithuania partisan commander Juozas Vitkus-Kazimieraitis, the declaration was adopted by the staff of the Southern Lithuania partisans on behalf of the Lithuanian

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82 For more information, see: Kuodytė D. ‘Lietuvos rezistencijos ryšiai su Vakarais’, Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1997, Nr. 2, p. 38–45.

83 Minutes of the meeting that took place between the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania and Lithuanian resistance representatives on 7–9 July 1948 in Baden-Baden, Germany, Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais: dokumentų rinkinys, p. 493.

84 For more information, see: Lietuva 1940–1990 m.: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija, Vilnius, 2007, p. 328–329.
partisan commanders. The Supreme Committee for the Restoration of Lithuania issued another political declaration on 10 June 1946. This declaration was drawn up by Jonas Deksnys, head of the committee's foreign delegation. Later, on the initiative of Antanas Baltūsis, Commander of the Tauras District, Declaration No. 2 of the United Movement for Democratic Resistance was created based on the 28 May 1947 resolutions of the United Movement for Democratic Resistance. The partisans’ last political declaration was the 16 February 1949 declaration of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, which was adopted during a meeting of partisan command representatives from all of Lithuania. The declaration begins by specifying that the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania intends to reiterate and supplement the fundamental principles set forth in the 10 June 1946 declaration of the Supreme Committee for the Restoration of Lithuania, as well as in Declaration No. 2 and the 28 May 1947 resolutions of the United Movement for Democratic Resistance.

In 1948 the process of centralization and formation of a governing body gained new impetus when the Žemaitija partisan commanders got involved in this undertaking and later became its main driving force. The greatest initiative in this was taken by the partisans from the Kęstutis district, and by Jonas Žemaitis-Žaltys, commander of the Western Lithuania (Jūra) Region, in particular.

In February 1949 a large-scale meeting was organized on Žemaitis's initiative. Attended by representatives of all of the Lithuanian partisan structural units, this meeting went down in history as a Lithuanian partisan summit. Meetings were held on 10–20 February at the Prisikėlimas district staff bunker that was set up at the homestead of a resident of the village of Minaičiai, between Radviliškis and Baisogala. The resistance organization was named the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania. The mass armed resistance became a well-organized military structure. During the summit, the union's entire governing structure and its operational tactics were regulated, and the relationship between partisans and residents was established. A governing body was formed and unanimously approved for the union; this leadership existed until the armed resistance ended. Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania. The most important document drawn up at the summit was the political declaration adopted by the council on 16 February, which established the partisans' ultimate goal: restoration of the independent, parliamentary state of Lithuania and liberation of the land from occupation. The declaration ensured

the continuity of Lithuanian statehood and emphasized democratic principles and the aspiration to defend Lithuania’s affairs in international institutions.

Once the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania was founded and its council was formed, the partisan movement was centralized. Previously, the partisans had been under the command of separate regional formations, which, however, were in close cooperation and used virtually the same partisan tactics. The Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania was the only legitimate authority in Lithuania, which means that an institution carrying out governance of the Lithuanian state did exist in Lithuania during the period of Soviet occupation.86

The MGB actively tried to keep track of the partisans’ supreme command. Agent activities, agent/death squad operations and partisan betrayals developed; all of this paralysed the activities of the organization that had been so arduously created. Commanders were killed or arrested in succession, and communication among organizational structures was broken off. Yet despite the difficulties, Žemaitis-Vytautas carried out his duties as chairman of the presidium, such as drawing up documents that regulated partisan life, issuing orders of merit, granting partisans military ranks, introducing military order in the units, and preparing a criminal statute and rules of procedure for regional courts. In an effort to implement the organization’s programme documents, he tried to continue to meet with the region and district commanders. However, the partisans’ situation continually worsened, and the headquarters that had been restored were once again destroyed under the influence of MGB agents. The organizational underground structures had been annihilated by 1953.

86 For more information, see: V. Sinkevičius, ‘Įstatymo dėl Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio Tarybos 1949 m. vasario 16 d. deklaracijos vaidmuo ir vieta Lietuvos teisės sistemoje’, Parlamento studijos (mokslo darbai), 2004, Nr. 1, p. 15–27.
From 1944 to the spring of 1945, some thirty thousand fighters assembled in the forests of Lithuania, although a considerable number of them consisted of men who were evading mobilization. When Soviet authorities issued a number of amnesties and the Soviet-German war ended, many of them became legal. According to LSSR NKVD/NKGB data, 36,144 people were legalized from 1944 to 1 December 1945, including 27,361 military service evaders and 6,259 partisans.\(^87\) A total of 8,350 partisans became legal from 15 July 1944 to 31 December 1956.\(^88\) The partisans experienced large losses in 1944–1946 due to deaths, arrests and legalization; this decreased their ranks to 4,000–4,500. In 1948 there were just over two thousand partisans. According to archival documents, there were 1,228 partisans in Lithuania in January 1950, 916 in August 1951, 337 at the beginning of 1953, 139 in January 1954 and 13 in October 1956.\(^89\) Between 1944 and 1953, at least fifty thousand people were part of the partisan ranks in Lithuania at one time or another (including those who had been killed, arrested or legalized).\(^90\)

4.4.2. Insignia, Armament and Provision

From the very beginning of the resistance the partisans felt it was important to wear uniforms with insignia emphasizing that they were defenders of

\(^88\) Ibid., p. 652.
an independent Lithuania. This not only instilled a sense of discipline and obligation, but also demonstrated the continuity of Lithuanian statehood. Everyone who had even the slightest opportunity tried to get an independent-Lithuania army uniform. Members of the Vanagai sector wore tri-colour armbands embroidered with the symbol of the Columns of Gediminas and the inscription ‘LLA Vanagai’. The majority of the partisans who had formerly been officers and soldiers of the Lithuanian army still had their military uniforms, and others had them sewn. At the beginning of the partisan war the uniforms varied, and wearing them was not mandatory. However, the uniform eventually grew in significance and became compulsory. The uniform and insignia of the Lithuanian army were introduced in some districts in the summer of 1946. A resolution adopted by the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania on 19 May 1949 changed the rules for wearing emblems of rank and position, and universally introduced Lithuanian army uniforms. Only ranks and emblems acquired in the Lithuanian army or granted by the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania were permitted, a green 8-mm band was to be sewn across the edge of epaulettes, and all officers and soldiers were required to wear uniforms with insignia when on duty.91

The symbols used by the freedom fighters were manifold. The partisans also wore emblems on the left-hand sleeve of their uniform jackets, which identified their affiliation with one command or another. Among partakers in the armed resistance, patches with symbols of the independent state of Lithuania prevailed, such as the Vytis, the Columns of Gediminas, the Order of the Cross of Vytis, and the Lithuanian triband.

Over the entire period of the partisan war, the weaponry used by the partisans was extremely diverse. Its basis was formed by German small arms that were left when the Germans retreated, Russian small arms, which were usually acquired as trophies, and weapons that had been preserved from the Lithuanian army. The latter group primarily consisted of Belgian and Czechoslovakian 1924 Mauser rifles with Lithuanian insignia, Czechoslovakian Brno light machine guns, Belgian Browning HP-35 pistols, also with Lithuanian insignia, and German pistols, including models such as the Walther P38, Walther PP, and the Pistole Parabellum 1908. The arsenal that the partisans inherited when the Germans withdrew included German Mauser rifles and carbines in various modifications of the 1898 model, MP43 assault rifles (Sturmgewehr 44), MP38, MP38/40 and MP40 submachine guns and P38 pistols.92

The partisans were well-armed. During the period from 15 July 1944 to 15 July 1951, Soviet repressive structures seized 31 mortars, 2,921 machine guns, 6,304 assault rifles, 22,962 rifles, 8,155 pistols, 15,264 grenades, 2,596 mines, and 3,779,133 cartridges from the partisans.93

The partisans usually replenished their arsenal by killing strybki or members of the secret-police forces, or by purchasing them from Red Army soldiers. The partisans were only able to take enemy weapons if they had killed all of the soldiers. This was best achieved by setting up ambushes for the soldiers. The partisans usually restocked their ammunition with new assault rifles and cartridges after clashes with the strybki. The partisans ended up with a lot of Soviet small arms, such as PPS submachine guns (1942 and 1943 models), RPD light machine guns (1934 and 1940 models) and TT pistols.94 Georgy Shpagin's 1941 PPSh-41 submachine gun was also a popular model, which the freedom fighters used until the very end of the partisan war. Another favourite among the partisans was the SVT-40 semi-automatic battle rifle, which they dubbed the ‘ten’, in reference to its 10-round magazine.95

92 Vaičenonis J., Lietuvos karių uniformos ir lengvieji ginklai XX amžiuje, p. 176.
93 Report issued by Ilya Pochkay, head of the LSSR MGB 2-N Board, on the results of LSSR MGB activities in fighting with the national underground and partisan detachments for the period from 15 July 1944 to 1 July 1951, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 386, pp. 38–39.
95 Žymiausi Lietuvos mūšiai ir kariinės operacijos, Vilnius, 2013, p. 228.
Every partisan had binoculars and carried a few grenades. They would always keep one grenade for themselves so that they could blow themselves up and avoid being taken prisoner if they ended up in a hopeless situation.

The partisans were usually provided for and supported by Lithuanian farmers and relatives, who would bring them food, wash their clothes, and supply medicine. Partisan platoons made efforts to regulate provisions. Food supply and the accounting and allocation of material goods were taken care of by logistics sections that had been established in each district or brigade. Supply issues were dealt with in the same way as in an army at war. The chief sources of food supply were donations and requisition. Unlike the regular army, the partisans tried to requisition from state farms and enterprises first. On 22 November 1944, it was specified in the provisional instructions of the Vanagai units that requisitions should be carried in the following order: property is first taken from state farms and cooperatives, then from liquidated persons of danger to the nation, and finally from ordinary citizens, explaining to them why the requisition was being carried out.\(^\text{96}\) Requisitions were only carried out by order of the structural unit authority, issuing a receipt in the format prescribed. Arbitrariness was prohibited.

The partisans’ main quarters were various hideouts and bunkers, where they would spend weeks or even months when the Russian army was on the rampage. The partisan staffs issued various instructions on equipping hideouts. At the beginning of the partisan war, big camps were set up by large crews of partisans in wooded areas of Lithuania. Later, hiding places began to be set up in forests or on farmsteads: in the basements, under houses and stoves, and in barns. The partisans’ lives depended on their secrecy. However, many partisan hideouts, particularly the bunkers dug into the ground, were not made for defence. The majority had only one exit, so when MGB soldiers opened the hatch there was no hope of escape.

4.4.3. Allies

The Lithuanian partisans did not have any allies. All of the nations of the countries that were annexed in 1939–1940 fought against the communist totalitarian system to one degree or another: Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Estonians and Poles. The military conflicts that were part of the resistance in different Baltic countries are presented as one common war in the Correlates of War database. The merging of these countries into one unit and not allocating their territories into separate countries is a legacy of the Communist government, in the reports of which the Baltic countries were simply grouped together as the ‘Soviet Baltic republics’.

The partisans of the Baltic countries were not allies – in fact, they had no connections at all aside from Lithuanian-Latvian ties. However, Lithuanian and Latvian interaction was episodic and was more determined by the situation of the geographic border area. Another country’s territory was often just a temporary refuge to hide from rampaging Soviet security units. Although the Baltic partisans were united by the same goal of national independence, the nations were fighting their own battles against the occupant.\(^\text{97}\) The partisan wars in these countries differed in their nature, tactics and combat methods, intensity, scale, and number of losses. The Lithuanian freedom fighters’ war was 10 to 15 times more intense than in Latvia, and 30 to 60 times more than in Estonia.\(^\text{98}\) According to official KGB data, approximately two and a half thousand partisans had been killed in Latvia by the end of 1953 (of which 1,089 died in 1945, and 379 in 1946),\(^\text{99}\) while more than twenty thousand had died in Lithuania by then. Thus, Lithuania’s was the strongest and most intense resistance opposition in the Baltic countries. Lithuania was also the only country to have a centralized military authority for the resistance – the sole legitimate authority, which tried to resist the illegitimate authority and the occupant state.

4.5. Leaders

Many skilled officers, anti-Soviet and anti-Nazi underground figures, teachers, farmers and other Lithuanian patriots fought in the ranks of the Lithuanian partisans. Each one of them made their own important contribution to the struggle for independence. Some of them made their mark by organizing military structures and a governing body for the resistance, some acted as strategists for the partisan war, and some kept the fighting spirit alive with the written word: Commander of the Southern Lithuania Region Juozas Vitkus-Kazimieraitis, Commander of the Western Lithuania Region Antanas Bakšys-Klajūnas, Commander of the Kęstučiai District Juozas Kasperavičius-Visvydas,

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Commander of the Prisikėlimas District Juozas Paliūnas-Rytas, Commander of the Kazimieraitis Brigade of the Dainava District Vaičovas Voveris-Žaibas, Commander of the Vytis District Danielius Vaitelis-Briedis, Commander of the Dainava District Lionginas Baliukevičius-Dzūkas, and many others. One of the most famous Lithuanian freedom fighters was Juozas Lukša-Daumantas, who had authorization of the partisan leaders to represent the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania abroad. The most important roles in the partisan war were played by two extraordinary figures: Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Partisan Commander for all of Lithuania and Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, and Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas, Chief of the Defensive Forces of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania. Both partisan leaders were sentenced to death. Žemaitis was shot on 26 November 1954 at Moscow’s Butyrka prison, while Ramanauskas was executed in Vilnius on 29 November 1957.

Lieutenant General Ivan Tkachenka, who was the USSR NKVD/MVD and NKGB/MGB agent in Lithuania, and colonel generals Arkady Apolonov and Bogdan Kobulov, who were deputy people’s commissars, were in charge of all of the repressive organs in Lithuania and organized suppression of the opposition. Major General Pavel Vetrov, Commander of the Fourth Rifle Division of the Internal Troops, which operated in Lithuania over the entire period of partisan war, also played a significant role in suppressing partisan resistance.

Another one of the key organizers in the liquidation of the Lithuanian armed resistance was Juozas Bartasiušas, who became the LSSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs in July 1944 (with his title being changed to Minister in 1946). Having supported and encouraged a severe fight, he was the LSSR Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) until 1953. In July 1944 Aleksandras Gudaitis-Guzevičius
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was appointed LSSR People's Commissar of State Security; he was succeeded by Major General Dmitriy Yefimov in August 1945. The latter, having contributed significantly to the liquidation of armed resistance, headed the LSSR security organs until February 1949. His place was taken by Major General Piotr Kapralov, who was head of the LSSR Ministry of State Security (MGB) until 1952.

4.6. The Course and Main Stages of the War

Military actions between the partisans and Soviet repressive structures took place throughout the entire period of the partisan war, from 1944 to 1953; only their intensity, scale and form of combat differed. The largest battles took place in 1944–1946, when considerable detachments of partisans were operating in the forests and units of the occupant army would attack the partisan camps with extensive forces. Battles took place in all regions of Lithuania, with the only exceptions being the district of Vilnius, the Klaipėda environs, and the Neringa peninsula, where there were few partisans due to the specifics of these regions.

In Lithuanian historiography, post-war armed resistance is divided into three periods according to partisan combat strategy and tactics, the creation of organizational structures and changes therein, the establishment of a high command, and the methods of suppression implemented by repressive organs: summer 1944 to summer 1946, summer 1946 to the end of 1948; and 1949 to spring 1953. In this article, we will divide the partisan war into two stages according the aspects of the topic being analysed: summer 1944 to the end of 1946; and 1947 to spring 1953. These periods are defined according to the intensity of military action, scope, tactics, changes in methods of the warring sides, and size of the armed forces.

4.6.1. The First Stage of the War

During this period, the fact that the Soviet-German war was still taking place gave specific traits to the processes happening in Lithuania. Hope for the restoration of independence was particularly strong. Anticipating favourable decisions at peace conferences and help from the Western world, Lithuanian patriots flocked to the forests. This was precisely what led to the formation of large detachments. At the beginning of the partisan war, both sides used maximal force. The first period was characterized by particular activeness among the partisans, and was not without spontaneous actions; meanwhile, the occupant government was trying to annihilate the resistance as quickly as possible. Not only did the resistance organization become formed during this period, but tenacious battles also took place, during which more than half of the people
who were killed over the entire period of armed resistance perished.

In 1944–1945 the partisans grouped into large detachments in the forests, with as many as two or three hundred partisans in each formation. Many of the partisan units were mobile and could quickly be redeployed on horseback, sleighs or carriages. Not only were they well-armed with machine guns and ammunition, but they also had mortars and cannons. They used provocation tactics in conflicts, running away and decoying the enemy into an ambush. They usually moved during the day, blocking roads or setting up ambushes. Open partisan assaults against the occupant government were manifested in attacks on towns (rural district centres), where they would destroy the headquarters of the repressive organs and Soviet governmental institutions and set detainees free. In the second half of 1944 the partisans attacked 17 rural district centres, where they freed a total of 82 detainees.\(^{100}\) With reasonably little effort, the partisans occupied towns, rural district centres and detention facilities and destroyed mobilization, land, property and tax documents. The Battle of Merkinė, which took place on 15 December 1945, is considered to be one of the largest offensive operations of the partisan war.\(^{101}\)

In 1944 and at the beginning of 1945, the partisans tried to keep control of the region in their hands and protect the people from the occupant. Such tactics – attacks on rural district centres, and moving and camping with the entire platoon or company – and open battles were characteristic of the first period of armed resistance only. During this period the partisans used positional war tactics, and large joint partisan platoons did not avoid open battle with the extensive NKVD troops. The battles of Paliepiai, Kalniškė, Virtukai, Kiauneliškis, Ažagai-Eimuliškis and the village of Panara were some of the largest in the history of Lithuanian resistance.

The increased number of partisans and their activities in autumn 1944 put the occupant regime at risk and thereby led to occupation forces being stepped up. Large territorial purges and mass punitive campaigns were common at the beginning of the partisan war, during which various NKVD forces were rallied together and purges were implemented throughout Lithuania in the rural districts most engulfed in partisan resistance. In the second half of November 1944, NKVD troops went on a rampage in the districts of Skapiškis, Svėdasai and Panemunėlis. Over the course of seven punitive operations that were carried out on 20–25 November 1944 in the rural districts of Kamajai and Obelai in

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Rokiškis, 68 people were killed. During the 74 punitive expeditions that were carried out in Lithuania on 20–25 December 1944, NKVD troops killed 427 people. The military operation that was carried out by joint NKVD forces (the Ninety-fifth Border Guard Regiment together with the Two Hundred and Sixty-first and One Hundred and Thirty-seventh Rifle Regiments of the Internal Troops) and local strybki in the Rokiškis district on 8–12 January 1945 was unprecedented. During the battle, the partisan platoons operating in the rural districts of Juodupė, Skapiškis, Panemunis, Pandėlys and Rokiškis were completely or partially annihilated. During the skirmishes, 283 partisans were killed and 53 bunkers were destroyed, as were weapon depots.

During the first stage of the partisan war, the NKVD troops used active offensive tactics. Extensive joint NKVD military forces were employed to execute operations, and actions were carried out according to a military operation plan prepared in advance. On 29 April 1945, soldiers from the Border Guard Detachment of the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the Leningrad Front and the Rifle Regiment of the NKVD Internal Troops were sent in to liquidate the partisans at the forest of Skobiškės in Šiauliai’s rural district of Kuršėnai. A total of 530 soldiers clashed with 50–60 partisans who, with four bunkers, were prepared

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to defend themselves. The battle went on for eight hours. During the operation, 25 partisans were killed. Some battles between the partisans and NKVD troops lasted for several days. On 6–15 August 1945, troops from the One Hundred and Thirty-second Border Regiment of the NKVD Rear Defence Forces for the Third Byelorussian Front and a joint border guard detachment carried out a military operation in the region of the Bukta swamp and Lake Žuvintas (the Žuvinto Palios swamp) in Alytus’s rural district of Simnas. Archival data indicates that more than thirty partisans were killed during that period. Nine bunkers were detected on the lakeshore and destroyed.105

The forces of Soviet repressive structures used special units to carry out military operations, including assault rifle, mortar and heavy machine gun operators, transport companies and regiments, armoured fighting vehicles, and reconnaissance aircraft. During the aforementioned operation on 6–15 August 1945, Lake Žuvintas and the Žuvinto Palios swamp were surrounded by armoured cars. Airplanes carrying out reconnaissance would mark suspicious areas of the lake with missile shots.

The army’s actions were often planned as large military operations. In this respect, the military operation carried out in the forests of Ažagai-Eimuliškis within the territory of the rural districts of Rozalimas, Pušalotas and Smilgiai in Panevėžys on 27 March 1945 was exceptional. The battle, which lasted seven hours, was carefully planned and subsequently chronicled in various NKVD reports. The operation was carried out by three battalions of the Two Hundred and Sixty-first Rifle Regiment of the NKVD Internal Troops and a special unit (approximately eight hundred people). During the battle, 120 partisans from the Žalioji Brigade were killed (although other sources indicate that this number is closer to 80).106

The most intense period of battles was from 1944 to 1946. NKVD troops carried out 555 military operations and killed 988 partisans in Lithuania in January 1945 alone.107 In December 1946, 252 partisans were killed in more than 800 operations.108

Although the large partisan platoons had the capacity to fight the extensive

106 Head of the NKVD LSSR Department for Combating Banditism Aleksander Gusev’s 12 April 1945 account of the military operation carried out in the Ažagai-Eimuliškis forest in the district of Panevėžys on 27 March 1945, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 1350, pp. 145–149.
NKVD troops, they still experienced considerable losses. The substantial concentration of Soviet repressive forces in Lithuania, the extensive joint military formations that were sent in to battle the partisans and the forest-combing operations forced the partisans to change their operation tactics and avoid open and long-term battles. Battle tactics were also dictated by the time of year. During the winter, movement of the partisans slowed down, and it was harder for them to cover their tracks. The need to survive forced the partisans to split up into smaller structural units and camp in small groups. The partisans understood the importance of their political struggle and put up particular resistance to processes of Sovietization, such as Red Army mobilization, elections to organs of the occupant government, collectivization, and other Soviet restructuring. The boycott of occupant government elections was one of the most important moments in the post-war political struggle. The partisans agitated for the locals not to participate in elections, and would arrange ambushes and destroy election ballots. Campaigns like this took place until 1950.

The partisans devoted considerable attention to the so-called land reform that was being carried out by the occupants and the creation of collective farms. When, in September 1944, land began to be taken away from farmers and given to
the ‘new settlers’, the partisans did everything they could to defend the villages and resist the plundering of landowners and the transfer of colonists to emptied farms. Collection of taxes from the farmers was interfered with. The partisans would set up ambushes for the land commission chairmen, the conscription officers and the state grain delivery inspectors; destroy tax documents, inventory statements and conscription rolls; interfere with the establishment of new collective farms; and drive away the administration. The processes of forced collectivization also directly impoverished the resistance’s material basis and weakened the structure of the countryside and its moral capacity. Collectivization became one of the reasons the occupants were able to break down the armed resistance.\textsuperscript{109}

4.6.2. The Second Stage of the War

Once the Soviets’ plans to swiftly break down Lithuanian resistance had fallen through, a transition to long war tactics was made from late 1946 to early 1947. The plan was to annihilate the partisans and intimidate and undermine the people; to use, in conjunction with Chekist military methods, field-agent and party-political measures, and to involve all state organs, including the militia, students, parts of the Soviet army, strybi and armed party activists. Tactics in which MGB troops would ravage the surroundings without having a permanent place of deployment were abandoned. By using the rapidly expanding agency network, they began to hit the opposition with more accurate shots. Military operations were carried out with information about possible partisan hiding places already secured – nearly 75% of all MVD/MGB operations were carried out in this way.

The forces of the Soviet repressive structures used world-renowned methods for fighting the partisans, including military operations, reconnaissance groups, barrages, ambushes, and stealth operations. To use Soviet terminology, the so-called military Chekist (‘военно-чекистские’) operations were the ones most commonly used in Lithuania. Military operations were organized only according to specific data collected by agents regarding the location, scale, and armament of partisan platoons. An MVD or MGB operative would be in charge of the operation, with the commander of the army unit designated to the operation as his deputy. The number of troops sent in to execute the operations ranged from 20 to 1,000 or more. Reconnaissance groups would be sent to the scene when there was no data available about the partisans – often after a partisan attack. These were small groups of five to twenty soldiers which operated during the day; looking for partisans and pursuing them, they were able to cover up to 30 kilometres with armament. Ambush and stealth troops operated in small groups of five to twenty specially trained soldiers who, based on intelligence information, would lie in wait in forest areas that the partisans were likely to

\textsuperscript{109} Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais: dokumentų rinkinys, p. 20.
visit, or near roads or farmsteads. This was usually done at night. If necessary, the army would be called in during ambushes or stealth operations.

Death squads began to be formed in 1945. In 1946 there were approximately ninety death-squad agents in action, including former partisans who had been recruited. These squads were an intrinsic part of the terror system until the very end of the partisan war (and even after, until 1959). The death-squad agents operated disguised as partisans; their activities were oriented toward the annihilation of partisan unit headquarters. Once they had established relations with real partisans, the death-squad agents aimed to disarm them and either kill them or take them alive. Fictitious partisan headquarters were also set up on the basis of these groups, where they used partisans who had been taken alive and the last partisan commanders who had been recruited. This completely disorganized the partisans’ communication system and split the united partisan organizations into groups that did not keep in contact with each other.

The partisans’ tactics changed after 1946. The Lithuanian freedom fighters, having moved to guerrilla tactics, began to operate in groups of between seven and twenty; they strengthened their conspiracy and started hiding out in underground bunkers. Ambushes against officials of the occupant government, strybai or armed Soviet activists became a frequent means of combat. On 10 December 1947 in the village of Levaniškis in Panevėžys’s rural district of Raguva, some thirty partisans ambushed a group of strybai who were travelling to Raguva with a representative of the party’s district committee to check how state grain procurement was progressing. Four strybai and the activist fell to partisan gunfire.110 On 31 August 1948 partisans from the Kupiškis region ambushed strybai from the rural district of Geležiai, near the village of Daukšėnai. The operative and six strybai perished.111

During the second period of the partisan struggle a more drastic position formed with respect to strybai and collaborators. The partisans’ attitude toward

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111 Ibid., pp. 331–332.
those collaborating with the occupants was evidenced not only by the harsh tone voiced in their publications, but also by their acts of revenge and punishment. It was considered a state of war.

Partisan units did not only strengthen in terms of organization; wavering members disappeared from their ranks – doubters legalized themselves. Although hope of receiving support from Western Europe was dying out, the partisans conserved their strength and waited for a propitious moment for a universal uprising. In hindering the Communist government from consolidating in Lithuania, fighting against the processes of integration into the Soviet Union’s political, social and economic system, and aspiring to uphold the spirit of resistance to Sovietization in society for as long as possible, the freedom fighters employed all means of combat available, from physical action against Soviet officials to military opposition press. The war journalism that flourished during the partisan war was a unique phenomenon under occupation and armed fighting. In 1946–1947, information, press and information, or information and propaganda sections were established in all of the districts.\textsuperscript{112} Over the entire span of the partisan war, more than one hundred periodicals were published for longer or shorter periods of time; with press runs ranging from a few dozen to a few thousand copies, they were secretly distributed throughout Lithuania.\textsuperscript{113} In the press, current events, Bolshevik crimes and partisan fights were recounted

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Lietuva 1940–1990 m.: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija}, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{113} For more information, see: Kašėta A., Kuodytė D., ‘Partizanų periodinė spauda’, \textit{Laisvės kovų archyvas}, t. 12, Kaunas, 1994, p. 75–98.
and religious and national holidays were commemorated. Considerable space in partisan newspapers was allotted to information about the situation on the front and news from around the world. For a society that found itself behind the Iron Curtain, the partisan publications became the sole source of information. The Kęstutis district was the most prolific, publishing as many as 176 issues of Laisvės varpas (‘Liberty Bell’) from 1946 to April 1953. From 1944 to 1952, 577 typewriters and duplicating machines fell into the hands of Soviet repressive structures during military operations. The partisans’ last newsletters were Partizany šūvių aidas (‘The Echo of Partisan Shots’), which was published by the Prisikėlimas district in 1952–1957, and Knygnešio keliu (‘The Book Smuggler’s Path’), which was printed by the last partisans of the Žemaičiai district in 1959.

The increase in publications and the belligerent actions against collaborators during the second period of the struggle were also related to the elections organized by the occupant government: the February 1946 elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the February 1947 elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. Campaigns designed to interfere with the elections were conducted throughout Lithuania: in February 1946, 39 election headquarters were attacked and 27 telephone lines were destroyed, and 18 election committee members were killed during the 1947 election campaign.\footnote{Lietuva 1940–1990 m.: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija., p. 327.} By agitating for the boycott of elections and encouraging locals to resist the processes of Sovietization, the partisans carried out their primary task – keeping society motivated to strive for independence for as long as possible. The partisan support base also depended on this to a great extent.

Even though the partisan ranks were constantly reinforced with new fighters, which allowed the nucleus of resistance to be maintained, the damage that was incurred and the loss of experienced, veteran fighters had painful consequences. Partisan forces were also drained by the mass deportations of their supporters’ families in 1948–1949. Conditions for partisan activity worsened, and agent activities and information gathered during interrogation about partisan structures and hiding places intensified the terror imposed by Soviet state security. In line with a proposal put forward by the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB), Major General Pankin, interim commander of the Fourth Rifle Division, put together a plan on 15 July 1949 for how to station the army closer to operative partisan detachments and liquidate them completely in the summer of the same year.\footnote{Anušauskas A., Teroras, 1940–1958 m., p. 177.} Within the regiments of the MGB forces, 18 mobile detachments of 130–200 soldiers were formed, which were to pursue, in accordance with agent reports, partisan groups that were ten or a hundred times smaller, and look for partisan bunkers in farms or forests. Pursuant to the 17 October 1949 order of the USSR MGB and MVD, the militia (5,573 militiamen) was transferred to the
MBG, as were the border troops and the entire MVD agency (12,132 agents and informants).116

After their commanders had been killed or arrested, the partisan regions and districts were obliterated by 1953. Almost all of the active resistance participants were killed during military operations carried out by repressive Soviet structures. The end of the partisan war in Lithuania is considered to be 30 May 1953, when Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, was arrested. Having lost many people – those who had been killed, exiled or imprisoned – Lithuania was no longer able to offer resistance. The organized war ended, and the individual fighters who remained were gradually done away with by 1969.

The statistical table of partisan attacks and military operations carried out by Soviet repressive structures presented below shows the intensity of combat action in Lithuania during the partisan war. In addition to military operations, Soviet repressive structures sent a significant number of reconnaissance and ambush teams. Over the entire period of the partisan war, several hundred thousand various detachments of this sort could have been sent in. In 1947 the occupant army stationed more than seventy-two thousand such detachments, i.e. some two hundred per day; in 1948 more than thirty thousand were deployed.117 The statistical number of partisan attacks specified in MVD/MGB documents comprises not only assaults against officers of Soviet repressive structures, soldiers, Soviet party activists, and state enterprises and institutions, but also various acts of pillaging. Many robberies and acts of crime were ascribed to the partisans. The repressive structures did not even try to distinguish the partisans from the criminals, so no difference was recorded in their reports and statistical documents, especially prior to 1947, when the subordination of the Department for Combatting Banditism was transferred from the MVD to the MGB. Moreover, the partisans’ fight with the collaborators was used to cover up crimes committed by repressive structure forces.

A certificate issued by the LSSR NKVD Department for Combatting Banditism indicates that 3,224 partisan attacks were carried out in Lithuania in 1945, of which 905 were armed attacks (called ‘acts of terrorism’ in documents) against NKVD/NKGB officials, militia, NKVD troops and Soviet party activists; 333 were attacks against state-owned enterprises and institutions; and 1,986 were acts of robbery.118 The table shows only archival data that was found on military actions carried out by the partisans against officers and troops of

116 Ibid., p. 178.
117 Starkauskas J., Čekistinė kariuomenė Lietuvoje, p. 58.
118 28 February 1946 report issued by Boris Burylin, head of the LSSR NKVD Department for Combating Banditism, on the partisan attacks that had been carried out and the losses incurred thereby, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 108, p. 77.
repressive structures, Soviet soldiers, *strybki*, and party and Soviet activists, with the exception of 1950–1953 (only the total number of attacks is given for these years, as more precise archival data is not available).

### 4.1. Number of military operations carried out by Soviet repressive structures and partisan attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military operations</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>9,444</td>
<td>15,811</td>
<td>4,466</td>
<td>5,571</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>n/d*</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>n/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military operations during which partisans were killed</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan attacks</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>63**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n/d – no data.
** Data up to 25 October 1953.

119 This table was compiled based on: a report issued on 28 January 1946 by Boris Burylin, head of the LSSR NKVD Department for Combating Banditism, on the results of the activities of NKVD/NKGB organs in fighting with the national underground and partisan detachments in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR for the year 1945, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 108, p. 13; a report issued on 28 February 1946 by Boris Burylin, head of the LSSR NKVD Department for Combating Banditism, on partisan attacks that had been carried out and the losses incurred thereby, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 108, p. 77; a report issued on 3 May 1946 by LSSR MVD Deputy Minister Piotr Kapralov on the results of the fight with the national underground for the period from 15 July 1944 to 1 April 1946, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 109, pp. 41–42; a report issued on 1 February 1947 by Stepan Figurin, head of the first branch of the LSSR MVD Board for Combating Banditism, on the results of the activities of LSSR MVD organs in fighting with the national underground and partisan detachments and registered partisan attacks and losses for the year 1946, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 109, p. 165; a report issued on 25 July 1949 by Ilya Pochkay, head of the LSSR MGB 2-N Board, on the results of the activities of the LSSR MGB in fighting with the national underground and partisan detachments, and on attacks carried out by the partisans and the losses incurred thereby for the period from 15 July 1944 to 1 July 1949, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 319, p. 113; a report issued on 19 May 1950 by Ilya Pochkay, head of the LSSR MGB 2-N Board, on attacks carried out by the partisans in 1949 and the losses incurred thereby, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 358, p. 67; a June 1950 report issued by LSSR MGB Deputy Minister Andrey Leonov on the results of the fight with the national underground and attacks carried out by the partisans in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 344, p. 10; a report issued on 24 January 1952 by LSSR MGB Minister Piotr Kapralov on the attacks carried out by the partisans in the Lithuanian SSR and the casualties resulting therefrom for the period from 15 July 1944 to 1 January 1952, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 416, p. 19; a report issued on 3 January 1953 by LSSR MGB Minister Piotr Kondakov on the attacks carried out by the partisans and the losses incurred thereby, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 441, p. 124. Calculated in accordance with LSSR MGB reports about registered partisan attacks and military operations carried out by MGB district department operative military groups for the years 1947–53, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 220, pp. 1–570; file 221, pp. 1–562; file 262, pp. 1–226; file 263, pp. 1–214; file 264, pp. 1–209; file 265, pp. 1–219; file 327, pp. 1–495; file 328, pp. 1–532; file 340, pp. 1–469; file 341, pp. 1–340; file 382, pp. 1–729; file 412, pp. 1–484; file 436, pp. 1–346.
4.7. The End and Duration of the War

By applying the criteria used in the Correlates of War project whereby a war is not considered to be over if there are still more than 1,000 war-related casualties per year, the Lithuanian partisan war ended on 31 December 1949. Hence, intensive hostilities lasted from 15 July 1944 to 31 December 1949 – five years, five months and seventeen days.

The partisan war in Lithuania is considered to have ended in 1953. This is symbolically linked to the arrest of Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters, on 30 May 1953. In addition, organized partisan structures had been destroyed by 1953. As an organizational unit, the partisans of the Juozapavičius Patrimony (Kunigaikštis Žvelgaitis Brigade of the Prisikėlimas district), who published the Partizanų šūvių aidas newspaper until 1957, survived the longest.

Starting on 15 July 1944, nine years of intensive, non-stop combat took place between the partisans and the forces of Soviet repressive structures. The individual groups of fighters that remained were gradually eliminated. There is evidence that 63 partisans were killed in Lithuania between 1954 and 1969. The last partisan, Kostas Liuberskis-Žvainys (a member of the Kunigaikštis Žvelgaitis Brigade of the Prisikėlimas district), was killed on 2 October 1969 in the district of Akmenė, near the villages of Menčiai and Liepkalnis.120

However, even after armed resistance was suppressed, the Lithuanian fight for freedom continued. The partisan war passed on the belief in the necessity of Lithuanian statehood to later generations, as well as ideological forms of resistance and means; it also laid the groundwork for Lithuanian unarmed resistance, i.e. the dissident movement, which made a significant contribution to the restoration of Lithuanian independence. Compared with other Soviet republics, civil resistance to the Soviet system in the Lithuanian SSR was particularly intense. After 1953, organizations related to the partisan movement were gradually replaced by others, which carried out non-military resistance. The culmination of the dissident movement process was the 1987 rally near the monument to Adomas Mickevičius (Adam Mickiewicz) in Vilnius, which marked the beginning of a new era. This was followed by the birth of Sąjūdis and the restoration of Lithuanian independence in 1990.

4.8. War Losses

4.8.1. Killed in Action

In calculating the number of battle-related casualties sustained in the partisan war, there are always problems, such as the depth of detail in which the

120 Vakary Lietuvos partizanų sritis, p. 147.
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The history of the armed resistance has been researched. Archival data is presented in historiography that is not accurate and reliable. The methods used by Soviet repressive structures for calculating their losses and those of the partisans are complicated and full of statistical discrepancies. In terms of fatalities, the Soviets often manipulated the figures: the number of freedom fighters killed at the beginning of the partisan war tended to be exaggerated, while their own losses were understated. Archival sources indicate that more than twelve thousand partisans were killed in 1944–1945, but this figure includes men who were evading mobilization and did not belong to the partisan ranks. At the moment there is no way to determine what percentage they accounted for. The analysis of archival documents is also complicated by the fact that there were separate calculations for losses incurred under partisan attack and those incurred during military operations carried out by repressive structures; discrepancies between data given in different reports for the same period are also not uncommon. In addition, not all of the documents have survived. Partisan documents of that time contain only the fragmented data of some smaller structural units about partisans who had been killed or removed from the partisan ranks, and the numbers given for enemy fatalities are usually exaggerated or estimated. Since NKVD/MVD/ MGB forces did not leave their dead on the battlefield, the partisans were unable to count the number of Soviet fatalities during battle.

It will only be possible to ascertain how many partisans were killed in all during the entire period of armed resistance when the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania finishes the Lithuanian Partisan Index, which it would not have been worthwhile to publish earlier, before 20 years of archival research had been carried out, witnesses had been interviewed, and recollections recorded. The Genocide Victim Index published by the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre, which acts as a register of Lithuanian residents who suffered from the occupations, also includes data about partisans who were killed (volumes covering 1939–1948 and part I of 1949 have currently been published). Although the figures are not completely accurate, they are significant for the fact that not only archival data has been collected for the compilation of this index, but also


data found in recollections and historiographical sources.

While archival data on partisan fatalities can be made more accurate with the help of memoirs, only the archival material of Soviet repressive structures can be relied upon in analysing the USSR’s casualties. Mindaugas Pocius and Arvydas Anušauskas have analysed this material and presented statistical data in their studies. The losses incurred by repressive structures and party and Soviet activists during MGB military operations and partisan attacks that Pocius presents are not completely accurate due to a lack of documentation, but still create an overall picture.123 In clarifying the victims of the Fourth Rifle Division of the Internal Troops of the USSR NKVD/MVD/MGB, this work relies upon casualty rolls safeguarded at the Russian State Military Archive. This is perhaps the most accurate data, but it is not exhaustive – most of the data only covers the period of 1947–1950.

Based on archival and historiographical sources, a table has been compiled that lists the number of casualties the warring sides sustained in relation to the fights that took place in Lithuania.

### 4.2. Battle-related casualties sustained by the warring sides

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Partisans killed</th>
<th>Genocide Victim Index data</th>
<th>Statistical archive data</th>
<th>Other archive data</th>
<th>NKVD/MVD and NKGB/ MGB officials, militiamen, NKVD/MVD/MGB troops and Soviet army soldiers, strybi and Soviet activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>approx. 450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>9,777</td>
<td>n/d</td>
<td>approx. 1,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4* Calculated according to LSSR MGB reports on registered partisan attacks and military operations carried out by the operative/military groups of MGB district departments for the 1947–53 period, LSA, doc. f. K-41, inv. 1, file 220, pp. 1–570; file 221, pp. 1–562; file 262, pp. 1–226; file 263, pp. 1–214; file 264, pp. 1–209; file 265, pp. 1–219; file 327, pp. 1–495; file 328, pp. 1–532; file 340, pp. 1–469; file 341, pp. 1–340; file 382, pp. 1–729; file 412, pp. 1–484; file 436, pp. 1–346.
According to the table, more than twenty thousand partisans were killed in total during the partisan war in Lithuania. This is considerably more than the figures presented in the Correlates of War database. By applying the Correlates of War principle for defining war, whereby war-related casualties of no less than 1,000 per year are a stipulation thereof, the Lithuanian partisan war took place from 1944 to 1949, since the number of casualties in 1950 was below the aforementioned minimum. Based on archival data, 18,223 partisans were killed between 1944 and 1949, while Soviet fatalities numbered 4,920. However, the Correlates of War database indicates that partisan fatalities for all three Baltic States over the period of 1945–1951 amounted to 17,700, while the USSR lost 14,700.124

4.8.2. Other Casualties

Once the Lithuanian armed resistance began, the Soviet occupants focused on measures that would help suppress the opposition. One such measure was the deportation of the partisans’ family members and sponsors. Deporting these

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families had already been planned at the 24 May 1945 meeting of the Lithuania Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The 1945 deportations were coordinated with the fight against the Lithuanian resistance and the legalization of men in hiding. Some families were temporarily exempted from deportation if men in hiding came to NKVD departments to legalize themselves. Other families from additional lists were deported in their place. As the partisan war in Lithuania intensified, Soviet repressive structures, unable to liquidate the growing armed resistance through military force, continued to organize new deportations. Partisan families started to be deported again in 1946. From 1945 to 1947, approximately ten thousand families of partisans and their ‘kulak’ (a derogatory term used for well-off farmers) supporters were deported.

The largest deportations targeted at the families of people in hiding, partisans who had been found or killed, and people who had been convicted, as well as supporters of the resistance, were carried out on 22–23 May 1948 (MGB code name ‘Operation Spring’; Russian: Операция «Весна») and on 25–28 March 1949 (code name ‘Operation Surf’; Russian: Операция «Прибой»). A total of some eighty-four thousand people were deported in 1945–1949.

Approximately two thousand armed partisans were arrested and jailed during the partisan war period in Lithuania. In total, some hundred thousand Lithuanian residents who were involved in one way or another in the anti-Soviet resistance were arrested and sentenced in 1944–1953.

4.9. Semantics of the War

The image the Soviets created of the partisans and the fight for freedom was reinforced by falsifying history. The Communist regime always tried to deny the fact that the Baltic States were occupied, and sought factual and legal recognition from foreign countries regarding the seizure of those states and their annexation to the USSR.

The occupant authorities called the partisans ‘bandits’ and their helpers – ‘bandit assistants’; the freedom fighters’ units were referred to as ‘gangs’ or ‘bandit units’. The Lithuanian armed resistance was interpreted by the occupation as ‘banditism’. Official documents listed the armed resistance movement in Lithuania as ‘a movement of kulaks and nationalists’. This was convenient in maintaining the

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version of ‘class struggle’ as the main grounds for the existence of armed opposition to the regime. The same Soviet statistics, although classified, are in conflict with their ‘bourgeois nationalism’ version. In terms of social origin, peasants were the most numerous among the ranks of the partisans. The partisans’ social origin can be judged based on data about people sentenced by the LSSR NKVD/MVD military tribunal. For example, among the 2,574 partisans convicted in 1945, only 229 of them were ‘kulaks’, while poor people made up nearly 60% of the people sentenced from this category. Of the partisans who were convicted, 327 people (12.7%) were members of the intelligensia.127 The ratio of convicts according to social status remained similar in subsequent years.

For purposes of substantiating the ‘class struggle’, the role of ‘defenders of the people’ and Soviet activists was emphasized on the pretext that people were fighting against their own. LSSR People’s Commissar of State Security, Dmitriy Yefimov, who was in charge of routing the armed resistance in Lithuania, spoke at the Eighteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, which took place in November 1948, saying that ‘for political reasons, the main armed force in fighting with banditism should not be soldiers, but detachments of locals, i.e. detachments of defenders of the people and armed activist groups. Though it must be said that today, neither detachments of defenders of the people nor armed groups are an able force in fighting banditism.’128 Urging party organs to recommend more Lithuanians to LSSR organs of state security, he emphasized that in this way it would be refuted ‘that it is not a class struggle that is taking place in Lithuania, but a Lithuanian national struggle against the Russian occupants.’129

The compilers of the Correlates of War project listed Baltic armed resistance as ‘the Forest Brethren War’.130 Although partisans were called ‘forest brothers’ in Estonia,131 it is not uncommon for the same name to be used in modern-day historiography in reference to the freedom fighters in all of the Baltic countries.132 This is inaccurate. Lithuanian freedom fighters called themselves ‘partisans’, and this is reflected in their documents. At the beginning of the partisan war, they were called ‘Vanagai’ (‘Hawks’) and ‘Žaliukai’ (‘Greens’). The term ‘Forest

128 Audio transcripts of the 23–25 November 1948 XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCP, LSA, doc. f. 1771, inv. 11, file 21, p. 84.
129 Audio transcripts of the 23–25 November 1948 XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCP, LSA, doc. f. 1771, inv. 11, file 21, p. 83; V. Tininis, Sovietinė Lietuva ir jos veikėjai, Vilnius, 1994, p. 188.
Brothers’, as a poetic synonym for Lithuanian partisans, can only be found on occasion in their diaries. Lithuanian locals usually called members of the armed resistance ‘Miškiniai’ (‘Forest Men’).

The partisans declared their main goal – to defend the nation from the occupant – in all of their documents, in the press and in their diaries. It was specified in the statutes of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania that the movement was a ‘military public volunteer organization operating at war and fighting occupant activities, organizing and preparing the nation for the freedom struggle, and, at the decisive moment of the freedom fight, temporarily taking over the land’s military and civil government.’ The partisans interpreted the Soviet occupation as an illegal international crime against the Lithuanian state. They labelled the Soviet Union their enemy, and referred to their adversaries in documents as ‘occupants,’ ‘Bolsheviks,’ ‘Communists’ and ‘tyrants.’

The partisans’ approach to combat techniques was determined by international events. They wanted to wait for an opportune moment to rebel; they considered their fight against the processes of Sovietization legitimate, and aspired to protect the people and defend their cultural and material values. From the very beginning of the partisan war, some formations ordered units to keep war diaries, the goal of which was ‘to leave the right picture of the fight for freedom, as material for history, and to assist in later understanding those silent, little-known heroes.’ Understanding that the ratio of forces was not in their favour and hoping for help from the international community, they tried their best to be heard. The partisans’ view of the occupation was set forth in their letter to Pope Pius XII, which was delivered in 1948. This letter was the nation’s cry for help – an account of the situation in the occupied country, the Soviet persecution, the terror they were enduring, the experiences of authors writing in the bunker and the results of the struggles.

4.10. Commemoration of the War

Even during the Soviet occupation, very modest, simple wooden crosses and shrines began to be erected secretly in Lithuania in village cemeteries, secret partisan graveyards, and on graves in the forests. These crosses had no inscriptions or commemorative plaques. They were destroyed on more than one occasion.\footnote{Statutes of the Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters (draft, undated), LSA, doc. f. 3377, inv. 55, file 218, pp. 88–89.} \footnote{Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais: dokumentų rinkinys, p. 81–83; Partizanai apie pasaulį, politiką ir savę. 1944–1956 m. Partizanų spaudos publikacijos (sud. Gaškaite-Žemaitienė N.), p. 11.} \footnote{Letter sent to Pope Pius XII at the Vatican by Roman Catholics of the Republic of Lithuania. 20 September 1947, published: Daumantas J. Partizanai (5-as papild. leidimas), p. 660–671.
occasion by the Soviet occupants and their helpers, so few remain.

After the restoration of Lithuania’s independence, old monuments began to be restored and new ones were built in memory of the freedom fighters in various areas of Lithuania. This was primarily taken care of by partisans who had been imprisoned in labour camps, relatives of fighters who had been killed and members of the Sąjūdis movement. Later, state and public organizations also got involved. Remains of partisans that had been unearthed were reburied in cemeteries. Information about the circumstances and places of partisan deaths, desecration sites, partisan camps and bunkers was collected and compiled. Burial grounds (cemeteries, burial sites), significant locations (camps, bunkers, battles, sites of demise and desecration) and buildings (native homes of notable partisans) have been maintained.

The map of Lithuania is now covered with memorials to the partisans, from typical commemorative signs and plaques to reconstructed bunkers and monuments that have been designed and built in memory of the partisan districts.

Founded in 1993, the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania has been collecting material on sites and structures related to the Lithuanian genocide and resistance movement; the centre also photographs monuments erected in these places. A total of 1,018 events, 890 burial sites, 18 bunkers and 2,204 monuments and informational signs have been inventoried thus far.\(^{136}\)

After the restoration of Lithuanian independence, the partisan struggle was acknowledged at the state level. The Lithuanian government drew up a multitude of laws\(^{137}\) that declare that each citizen has the right to resist anyone who encroaches upon Lithuania’s national independence, territorial integrity or constitutional order, and that defence of the state against external armed attack is the right and duty of every citizen of the Republic of Lithuania. The laws specify that national armed resistance took place in Lithuania from 1944 to 1953 – the Lithuanian partisan war against the occupant army of the Soviet Union and the structures of the occupant regime; they also affirm that the partisan leadership was the supreme political and military authority in Lithuania. Legal provisions illustrate that the state of Lithuania considers the partisans to have been its army, and recognizes the carte blanche of the partisan leadership for the entire

\(^{136}\) List of inventoried memorial sites and buildings as well as monuments to commemorate them: http://www.genocid.lt/centras/lt/429/a, 2013-06-15.

1944–1953 period; participants in the armed resistance have been declared military volunteers, and their ranks and awards are recognized.

In acknowledgement of the significance of the 16 February 1949 declaration of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a law on the aforementioned declaration. This law established the status of the declaration in the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania, in essence recognizing it as a legal act significant to the continuity of the Lithuanian state. In 2010, the eight partisans who signed the declaration of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania – Petras Bartkus-Žadgaila, Leonas Grigonis-Užpalis, Aleksandras Grybinas-Faustas, Vytautas Gužas-Kardas, Bronius Liesis-Naktis, Adolfa Ramanauskas-Vanagas, Juozas Šibaila-Merainis and Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas – were posthumously granted signatory status.

In 2009, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a declaration according to which Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, was recognized as the leader of the state of Lithuania in its struggle against the occupation and de facto president from the adoption of the 16 February 1949 declaration to his death on 26 November 1954.

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139 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo deklaracija dėl Jono Žemaičio pripažinimo Lietuvos valstybės vadovu, 2009 m. kovo 12 d. (Žin., Nr. 30-1166).
4.17. The monument to commemorate the 16 February 1949 declaration of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania and its signatories, opened in the village of Minačiai of the Radviliškis district on 22 November 2010
Instead of Conclusion

In accordance with the systematic quantitative study on the partisan war that took place in Lithuania (1944–1953), the historical claims on the armed conflict in the Baltic States put forth in the book *Resort to War* could be revised by presenting data on the war that took place in Lithuania:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Correlates of War</th>
<th>This study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Number</td>
<td>Intra-state War #723</td>
<td>The 1944–1953 Lithuanian Partisan War against the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the war</td>
<td>The Forest Brethren War of 1945–1951</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>USSR vs. Baltic guerrillas</td>
<td>USSR vs. Lithuania*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>May 8, 1945</td>
<td>July 15, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End date</td>
<td>December 31, 1951</td>
<td>December 31, 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle-related deaths</td>
<td>Baltic guerrillas – 17,700; USSR – 14,700</td>
<td>Lithuania – more than 18,000*; USSR – approximately 4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>Baltic guerrillas</td>
<td>Lithuanian partisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>USSR wins</td>
<td>USSR wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War type</td>
<td>Civil for local issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
<td>All along the western borderland of the Soviet Union,</td>
<td>On 15 June 1940, in violation of bilateral agreements with the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>local guerrilla forces emerged during World War II</td>
<td>of Lithuania and in breach of the principles of international law and its</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(inter-state war #139) to oppose first the Germans and</td>
<td>international obligations, the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania; after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>then the return of the Soviets. In the Baltic States</td>
<td>organizing illegal elections to the so-called People’s Seimas and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), they were known as</td>
<td>falsifying the results thereof, the USSR ultimately annexed the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Forest Brethren (or Brothers). Fierce fighting</td>
<td>of Lithuania.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Latvian and Estonian partisan wars were not the object of study, so information about them is not provided.

The 1944–1953 Lithuanian Partisan War with the Soviet Union

occurred primarily in Lithuania between the Soviet army and the Brethren for the first two and a half years after the end of the World War (May 7, 1945) and then continued at lower levels. By 1951 the Soviets had crushed the partisans, though suffering heavy losses themselves.

Within Lithuania, which had been incorporated into the USSR by force, repression with respect to the Lithuanian nation began, as did the undermining of its political-social and economic structure. In 1941–1944, during World War II, Lithuanian territory was occupied by Nazi Germany. In summer 1944, the Soviets, who had re-occupied Lithuania, continued the repression that they had begun in 1940, as well as the processes of Sovietization and the communist indoctrination directed against the nation's statehood. The Lithuanians had never accepted the loss of their country’s independence, so when the Soviets occupied the land for the second time, they were faced with strong opposition from the Lithuanian people. Opting for armed resistance, partisan detachments were organized under the initiative of Lithuanian anti-Nazi resistance organizations, representatives of the Riflemen's Union and Lithuanian military officers. Anticipating international decisions favourable to Lithuania and an opportune moment to rebel, military resistance structures were formed. The armed resistance aspired to restore the independent state of Lithuania.
The partisans resisted the Soviet government policies, the land reform being carried out, the dissemination of communist ideology and the Russification of society, and encouraged the locals not to cooperate with the occupant regime. In defending the people against Soviet terror and striving to preserve the traditions and values of the land, they also sought to establish a worldwide policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR; they aspired to prove that the Soviet government was illegal and that the Lithuanian nation was defending its inherent right to an independent state. This was the most intense and well-organized partisan resistance in the Baltic countries. Partisan military structures were formed until 1948. In 1949 the resistance was centralized: the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania (‘Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdis’) – the all-encompassing political-military organization for armed resistance to the Soviet occupation – was formed, as was the council thereof. The declaration that was adopted on 16 February 1949 established the ultimate goal of the freedom fighting: liberation of the land from occupation and restoration of the independent,
parliamentary state of Lithuania. The supreme authority for the resistance – the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania – was sanctioned as the sole legitimate government in the territory of occupied Lithuania. This is how the continuity of Lithuanian statehood was emphasized and ensured. The Communist Party was in charge of establishing the Soviet regime in Lithuania and organizing the suppression of the partisan war; this was implemented by Soviet repressive structures. Lithuanian freedom fighters engaged in guerrilla warfare against the main suppressor of the armed resistance – an army made up of various NKVD/MVD/MGB forces, which was far larger and better armed. Militarized detachments of collaborators provided auxiliary armed force. The fighting was suppressed. The resistance fighting did not restore Lithuanian independence, yet it shattered the myth created by Soviet propaganda about Lithuania’s voluntary accession to the USSR and encouraged the international community to observe a policy of non-recognition of the annexation of the Lithuanian state. Lithuanian armed resistance was replaced by unarmed resistance. The Soviet occupation ended only in 1991, when Lithuania became an independent and sovereign state recognized by the international community.
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Lithuania’s Wars


The 1944–1953 Lithuanian Partisan War with the Soviet Union


Articles


Gediminas Vitkus

Lithuanian Wars
Under the Correlates of War Typology:
Final Remark
Thus, we have presented four thorough studies of Lithuanian wars, prepared according to the same parameters. In response to statements that information about Lithuanian wars in the Correlates of War project publications was incomprehensive, inaccurate and questionable, we sought to make our descriptions in each chapter of the book as detailed and accurate as possible. A multitude of data in the four studies was diligently collected from existing historiography and supplemented with the results of new studies. All of this, of course, opens the door to renewing and supplementing the data and publications published in the context of this project.

In truth, there can be no debate over dates and numbers; searching for the most reliable sources and revising the data should suffice. But, at the same time, it should be noted that the studies presented in the book not only allow quantitative data to be revised but also direct one's attention to some debatable qualitative aspects of the descriptions of Lithuanian wars presented in the Correlates of War database.

Probably the least debatable war is the only interstate Lithuanian war, yet in this database it is reflected only in part and only as the 'Lithuanian-Polish War of 1920'. The only problem related to this war is that the Correlates of War data compilers did not have enough data showing that this was a part of the wider Lithuanian War of Liberation – an unquestionably large and significant part, but not the only one. For this reason, based on the corresponding material presented in the third part of this book, we would recommend that the database compilers review this case and amend its description accordingly. It would make the most sense to classify it as the 'Lithuanian Liberation War of 1919–1920' analogously with the Estonian and Latvian Liberation Wars of the same nature. Thus, the Lithuanian-Polish War would simply become a composite part of this war.

When speaking of the Correlates of War database's entry for the Forest Brethren War of 1945–1951, which is presented as a Baltic partisan war against the Soviet Union, it should be clarified that, based on the material in Chapter 4 of this book, the resistance of all three Baltic States to the occupation was exclusively
nationalistic and geared toward the goal of re-establishing independent countries rather than toward regional matters relevant to all of the Baltic States. The same can be said for the resistance movements of Latvia and Estonia. For this reason, essentially, there was no collective Forest Brethren War. There were three separate wars, of which Lithuania’s war stood out due to its scope.

Unfortunately, the Correlates of War database’s interpretation of the two nineteenth-century uprisings and the Lithuanian Partisan War seems to be much more problematic. All three of these wars are assigned to the database’s intra-state wars category, with a further subcategory of civil war for local issues. Yet, after a more thorough examination of the aforementioned wars’ histories as presented in this book, of the participants’ motivations and of the aims of national liberation, it appears that such a categorization of these three Lithuanian wars is incorrect or, at the very least, inaccurate.

Alas, upon a closer analysis of the war typology used by the Correlates of War, it became clear that this misunderstanding did not happen by chance and resulted not so much from a lack of information about the nature of these wars as from flaws in the chosen war typology.

A more thorough explanation is in order. First, let us point out the fact that under the original typology used by J. David Singer and Melvin Small, the wars discussed in this book were not assigned to the civil internal wars category. The nineteenth-century uprisings were assigned to the extra-systemic war category along with wars of a similar nature (e.g. the Greek Independence War of 1821–1828, the First Albanian Revolt of 1830–1831, the Belgian Independence War of 1830, the First Syrian War of 1831–1832, the Hungarian War of 1848–1849, the Second Gansu Muslim War of 1928–1930, the Tibetan Khamba Rebellion of 1956–1959, etc.). In the 1972 edition of the book, there were 43 such wars, while in 1982 there were 51. Granted, the Lithuanian Partisan War was not mentioned in these publications, but due to circumstances dictated by the Cold War, it was still an ‘unknown war’ at the time.

Under the Singer and Small typology, extra-systemic wars were colonial and imperial wars, which were fought by metropoles or were fought against recalcitrant geopolitical formations that did not have state status (imperial wars) or against possessions or colonies that already belonged to them but were rising up and seeking independence (colonial wars). It is especially important to mention that the researchers cared not about where these wars were fought but about who was fighting them and why. ‘If [...] the adversary were a colony, dependency, or protectorate composed of ethnically different people and located at some geographical distance from the given system member, or at least
peripheral to its center [sic] of government, the war was classed as colonial.\(^1\) In other words, opponents of states – members of the international system – could be geographically distant colonies, dependencies, or protectorates but could also be rebelling provinces of the metropole state itself or other types of possessions, as long as people belonging to another ethnic group live there and they are situated in a peripheral position relative to the state power centre. This is why this category encompassed wars that took place both overseas, when there was no direct contact with the metropole's territory, and on the metropole's periphery. Thus, it is completely logical that the nineteenth-century uprisings ended up in this category. The Lithuanian Partisan War would also have unavoidably been included in that category if there had been enough information available about it at that time.

We will not delve into the reasons that led the followers of Singer and Small to change the original war typology, but we will note that, in our opinion, the reform was not entirely successful, because it caused the Lithuanian Partisan War, although it was finally included in the collection of data, to bizarrely end up in the civil war for local issues category. Both of the nineteenth-century uprisings discussed in this book and 28 other wars that had been extra-systemic wars in the earlier version of the database were reclassified in exactly the same way.\(^2\)

As mentioned previously, a different approach and primary reference point for classifying wars were chosen for the new war typology. Rather than looking at wars from the perspective of an international system, it was decided to approach wars from the actor’s perspective. Instead of an international (interstate) system, a choice was made in favour of the state, which in this project is understood as ‘a territorial formation controlled by the government’.\(^3\) This also means that, in the new war typology, the concept of extra-systemic wars itself was renounced, replaced with the narrower category of extra-state wars.

In the earlier typology, all wars fought by states against geopolitical formations or apertures not belonging to the international system were considered extra-systemic, regardless of where they were located, whereas now the extra-state war category has been narrowed; it includes only wars fought against geopolitical formations or apertures clearly existing in territories geographically separated from the metropole. The territory of the metropole itself, with borders recognized on an international scale, is no longer

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3 Ibid., p. 12.
differentiated (the authors refer to this as ‘metropole distinction elimination’) and is considered integral.

Thus, all wars arising in that territory are now technically and mechanically classified as intra-state wars, with no consideration of their essence or the motives of the warring sides. Correspondingly, under the new typology, the concept of internal wars has attained a wider scope than the previously used concept of civil war. Thus, as mentioned previously, some of the wars specified as extra-systemic in the 1972 and 1982 books issued on the basis of the Correlates of War project were also re-classified as intra-state wars. And this happened solely because these wars arose not somewhere far from the metropole but on the periphery of the metropole itself.

At first glance, this decision seems fairly logical. The image of a territorially unified state is a convenient starting point for developing a classification of types of wars. But on the other hand, a closer look at the list of re-classified wars reveals that the list is dominated not by metropole-periphery wars taking place within a state but precisely by national liberation/suppression wars, which were fought by metropoles against nations and provinces that did not belong to the state’s nucleus but, unfortunately for them, had direct geographical/territorial contact with it and had usually been forcefully annexed but had not come to terms with that.

Of the 30 wars mentioned, no fewer than half consist of wars by the Ottoman Empire against people who had been subjugated by it. Also finding their way here are Russian, Austrian, and Chinese ‘internal’ wars against nations seeking to secede. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the general summary of waged war statistics (see Table 7.1 Most frequent state war participants, presented in Resort to War) a strange disproportion catches the eye; it turns out that the wars waged by the United Kingdom and France were usually extra-state – 59 out of 81 for the United Kingdom and 35 out of 67 for France – while the wars waged by Turkey, Russia, and China were usually intra-state – 24 out of 47 for Turkey, 26 out of 51 for Russia, and 23 out of 42 for China.

All of this suggests a conclusion that the authors of Resort to War, in reclassifying some of the extra-systemic wars as intra-state, probably subconsciously relied upon, in essence, a narrower conception of colonial war than was applied in the initial classification. According to such a conception, it is as if all colonial and imperial wars that have ever occurred in world history can only resemble those fought by the United Kingdom, France, Spain or Portugal.

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4 Ibid., p. 47.
5 Ibid., p. 48.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 567.
For some reason, extra-systemic (i.e., colonial or imperial) wars had to have been waged exclusively overseas.

We would suggest that the authors reviewing the Correlates of War project’s original war typology lost sight of the fact that not every power’s imperialism and colonialism developed analogously. Although the states of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires had clear nuclei, their boundaries did not have clear geographical frameworks. Thus, upon becoming powerful, these empires began seeking colonial expansion not in distant overseas lands but by simply conquering weaker neighbours. And they could continue to do so right up until they encountered another power capable of resisting this, until their own power weakened, or until the conquered neighbours rose up and, seeking to regain their independence, resisted with all their might.\(^8\)

Thus, those nurturing the Correlates of War project, in refusing to look more closely at the structure of the metropole’s territory and declining to separate the metropole’s nucleus from an ethnically distinct and conquered or otherwise annexed periphery, i.e. to differentiate the metropole (metropoly distinction), lose sight of, one might say, something essential to comprehending the reasons for these wars – they lose sight of the fact that the forces fighting against the metropole were not just a group of combatants fighting for vague local matters but were the militants of geopolitical units that had been rendered colonies or possessions and were seeking independence. Both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the case of the nineteenth-century uprisings, and the Baltic States, in the case of the Lithuanian Partisan War, in essence were not parts of an integral empire but merely its possessions, exactly like Greece’s insurgents against Turkey or Hungary’s against Austria. That the empires had nominally rendered them governorates does not change the essence of the matter, i.e., it does not change the fact that ethnically, culturally and religiously different groups and corresponding geopolitical units existed.

This is precisely where the main debatable question arises: should the determination of the type of war depend more on the location of the fighting or should more attention be paid to the warring sides’ goals and motives? Upon a thorough examination of Lithuania’s war experience, it does not seem that one can agree with the idea that the colonial wars that took place somewhere far beyond the oceans somehow materially differ from the colonial wars that occurred between a metropole and a colony located on its periphery. Having

an excessively narrow concept of colonial war and artificially tying it to an ancillary feature (i.e. geographical remoteness from the metropole) rather than an essential feature (i.e., dependence on the metropole) fundamentally skews and erroneously interprets the entire colonial/liberation war category, which includes three wars fought by Lithuania.

But the worst part is that, in this case, not only is historical truth disregarded, but the objective researcher’s impartiality is unwittingly lost, as well. Of course, there is no basis to believe that the authors of *Resort to War* consciously chose to uncritically accept the position of one of the warring sides and were seeking to justify this. But if we look more closely, it is not difficult to notice that the interpretation of the essence of national liberation wars and their assignation to a category of civil wars over internal affairs is far from free of a certain normative political position, because it is objectively useful precisely to metropoles, the dubious legitimacy of the territorial integrity of which, in principle, is no longer questioned. And the belief that the territory of all colonial empires was as ethnically or at least as politically homogenous as those of France, Portugal and the United Kingdom does not allow one to notice that the wars that took place on the edges of Turkey and Russia were only portrayed as internal wars by this latter group of countries. However, as we can see from the cases of the Lithuanian wars discussed in this book, in actual fact, they were not by their nature.

It should not be forgotten that the aforementioned empires did everything they could to ensure that the insurgents would fight isolated and entirely alone while the rest of the world (and even local residents in the state’s nucleus) would believe that the battle was taking place with mutineers, bandits, criminals and delinquents over mere ‘local issues’. The rulers of the empires acted in this way, but should scientific researchers do the same? This is why it is difficult to understand why one should believe that a European imperialist state is fighting an extra-state war only when it strikes the natives of Africa or Asia. If it is oppressing its next-door neighbours after shrewdly isolating and annexing them, then it becomes, for some reason, merely an internal matter and its own internal war. This is even more difficult to understand because the authors of *Resort to War* themselves admit that ‘we are sympathetic to the argument that highlights the ways in which intra-state metropole-periphery wars are similar to extra-systemic metropole-periphery wars.’ All of this appears to be, at the very least, a misunderstanding. It is possible that this is what it is, but the worst of it is that this misunderstanding is very useful to some people.

This is particularly obvious in the case of Lithuania’s wars. For a number

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of reasons, it was much more beneficial to Russia to present and depict all three of these wars not as the resistance of occupied countries with the aim of liberation but as some kind of unclear unrest that was taking place in the region between local residents over undefined ‘local issues’. And then, only for the sake of those same residents, the government’s armed forces have to get involved in the conflict. For example, as one could come to believe, in the war semantics discussed in this book, the nineteenth-century uprisings were portrayed as adventurous gambles by nobles who were disloyal to the emperor – gambles that were neither acceptable nor understandable to the broader masses of the peasantry. In exactly the same way (see Chapter 4 for details), during the Lithuanian Partisan War, the Soviet Union’s government spared no effort in seeking to convince the societies of Lithuania and the other Baltic States that the partisan war was essentially an internal civil conflict arising within the Baltic States, one that external force was compelled to suppress in order to ensure the safety of the citizens themselves.

Therefore, all that is left is to state that here we have a clear case of when efforts to categorize various phenomena while disassociating from their nonessential details and isolating essential ones have been unsuccessful, because, along with nonessential aspects, the researchers’ also lost sight of the phenomenon’s essence itself. In this respect, we can only note that the original war typology proposed by Singer and Small was much more accurate than the modified one. Thus, in concluding these critical remarks, we can only suggest that the compilers of the Correlates of War data collection return to the question of improving the war typology one more time.

We do not undertake questioning the decision made by the creators of the Correlates of War data collection to change the earlier war typology, but we must nonetheless point out that the elimination of the difference between the metropole and periphery and the conversion of the wider concept of extra-systemic wars to the narrower one of extra-state wars has led to some national liberation colonial wars being unjustifiably lumped in with intra-state wars. We would consider that this evaluation should be revised in one way or another, rethinking the separation of the metropole and the periphery and attempting to more thoroughly redefine the concepts of ‘metropole’, ‘periphery’ and ‘colonial war’, and correspondingly reviewing the definition of the extra-state war category to include the wars that – although they took place on territory that had direct contact with the metropole – were, in terms of their content, wars of national liberation and resistance to a foreign occupier for one side and wars of imperial integrity and preservation of earlier occupations and annexations for the other, but were in no way ‘civil wars for local issues’.
So, on the one hand, we would like again to rejoice and thank the successors of the Correlates of War project and the authors of *Resort to War* for providing information about all four Lithuanian wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the other hand, in our opinion, the data that have finally been recorded ought to be corrected in such a way that they adequately reflect the historical truth to a maximum extent.
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A presentation of systematised factual information and statistical data on Lithuania's national war experience in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the centre of attention are four wars that were fought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the Lithuanian flag: the 1830–1831 and 1863–1864 uprisings, the 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation and the 1944–1953 Lithuanian Partisan War against the Soviet Union. The accumulation and generalization of factual information and statistical data was done by employing and correspondingly adapting the methodology and techniques of the Correlates of War project, a quantitative study of the history of warfare that was begun in the United States in 1963 and is still being carried out.

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The first chapter, which is devoted to the 1830–1831 Uprising, was prepared by Dr Virgilius Pugatchaukas, who is exploring the problems of nineteenth century Lithuanian history, and has studied the impact of Napoleon’s 1812 march into Russia on Lithuania.

The author of the second chapter, which examines the 1863–1864 Uprising, is Dr Ieva Šeravičienė. Dr Šeravičienė has been researching the Lithuanian side of the 1863–1864 Uprising in both Lithuanian and foreign archives since 2004. She has published a number of works on the subject of the uprising including a monograph and numerous scientific articles and source publications.

The third chapter is dedicated to the 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation. The author of this chapter, Dr Gintautas Surgailis, is the editor-in-chief of karo archyvas (War Archive), a leading journal on Lithuanian military history. Dr Surgailis has also written numerous monographs on the history of the Lithuanian armed forces during the interwar period.

Edita Jankauskiene wrote the fourth chapter, which deals with the Lithuanian Partisan War against the Soviet Union. The author has been working at the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania since 1996, where she is researching anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania and has accumulated considerable experience on the topic of the Lithuanian Partisan War.

The book was edited by Dr Gediminas Vitkus, a professor at the Military Academy of Lithuania and the Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science.